JÁNOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444)

Author(s): PÁL ENGEL

Source: Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1994), pp. 241-257
Published by: Akadémiai Kiadó
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 Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hung. Tomus XLVIl (3), 241-257 (1994)

JANOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444)

PÀL ENGEL

(Budapest)

The fifty years or so that had passed from the first Ottoman raid on Hungary
(1390) sufficed to create the impression in contemporaries that the Ottoman
power was invincible. Doomed were all the efforts to force it back to Asia, and
later, to at least contain its expansion. King Sigismund sustained a grave defeat
at Nicopolis (1396) and under Golubac (1428), and in 1439, having crushed the
Serbian buffer State and captured Smederevo, the sultan became the immédiate
neighbour of the Hungarian kingdom from Turnu Severin to Belgrade. In the
course of their conquests, the Ottomans did not suffer serious defeats anywhere
in Europe including Hungary, and the successful defence of a castle(e.g. Bel
grade in 1440) or the annihilation of a raiding party was regarded a splendid
achievement. This assessment of the military situation was suddenly and radical
ly altered by the appearance of Hunyadi.
Jânos Hunyadi had been involved in anti-Ottoman warfare since 1435,
distinguishing himself on several occasions. From 1441, as the governor
(Voivode) of Transylvania he had at his disposai a major military force, which
enabled him to display his organizing skills apart from his formidable sense of
tactic. In 1442 he managed to rout a major Ottoman army that had been plunder
ing South Transylvania. That already created a sensation, but when in September
of the same year he defeated the beylerbeyi of Rumelia, the commander of the
European Ottoman troops, the whole country resounded with his name. His vic
tories and the encouragement by Pope Eugene IV made Hungary launch an
offensive, the first one since the campaign of Nicopolis. Under the commander
ship of King Vladislav I (of Hungary and Poland) and Hunyadi, its army
advanced well into the Ottoman empire, and Sultan Murad II only managed to
turn it back in the heartland of Bulgaria, beyond Sofia, in the almost impassable
gorges of the Balkan Range. Having crushed all the Ottoman troops sent upon
them, the Hungarians returned home to Belgrade undefeated in January 1444,
after a four-month campaign. Though meagre was the palpable resuit of the ven
ture besides taking captives and they had not conquered a yard from the enemy,
the moral success was enormous. It turned out that the sultanic troops were not
invincible, at least for a Hunyadi, and this made more optimistic statesmen be
lieve that nothing was impossible. The long campaign had massive international
réception followed by busy diplomatie activity which resulted, within a few

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242 P. ENGEL

weeks' time, in the décision to launch a campaign against the "infidels" by the
Christian coalition of the Pope, the Hungarian king, the duke of Burgundy,
Venice and Genoa. The project aimed at no lesser a target than liberating the
whole of Europe. In practice, the allies planned to send their fleet to occupy the
Dardanelles, cutting off communication between the European and Asian prov
inces of the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman land forces stuck in the Balkans
were to have been simply pushed into the sea under Hunyadi's commandership.
Préparations began, and King Vladislav and the Hungarian magnates solemnly
swore to the papal envoy, Cardinal Julian Cesarini, the mastermind of the
planned offensive, to launch the campaign at the diet in Buda in April 1444.1
The subséquent events that took place between the spring and autumn of
1444 are widely covered in the scholarly literature. Everything what happened,
including the military préparations, the unexpected peace treaty and its even
more unexpected breach, finally the autumn campaign and the disaster at Varna
which killed Cardinal Cesarini and King Vladislav, constituted such an intricate,
even mysterious, set of events that neither the contemporaries nor posterity
could find their way among them. As time passed, views on the value and
meaning of extant information, the chronology of events and the motivation of
the actors became widely diversified, even contradictory, and nearly ail disserta
tions devoted to the subject contained new convincing détails. The stock of
sources has been expanding, unexplored records being uncovered even in our
days. All this notwithstanding, research still faces several undecided questions
including, as the gravest one, the chronology and explanation of the events
centering on the peace treaty and its breach.
Of the contemporaries, Jan Dlugosz (1415-1480) of Poland provides the
amplest and most thorough account of the events in the 12th book of his History
of Poland, in which he described the reigning of Vladislas "of Varna" in Poland
and Hungary some décades after the events. Though in 1444 he was not présent,
he used the accounts of eye witnesses (e.g. the Italian Andreas de Palatio) and as
a diplomat of Casimir IV, he had the opportunity to glance into confidential
papers. This latter aspect makes his work especially intriguing. However, by the
time he edited ail this information, misunderstandings and contradictions had
slipped into his account. The core of our problem also being hidden among
these, it seems most appropriate to summarize the relevant sections of Dlugosz's
story.2

***

According to the Polish chronicler, King Vladislas convoked the diet for
the day of Saint George (April 24th) in Buda in order to take steps for an anti

1 A review of the wars and their literature can be found in F. Szakâly,

Turco-Hungarian
Phases of Turco-Hungarian warfare before the battle of Mohâcs (1365-1526). AOH, 1979, 85-91
for the period at issue.
2 The Przezdziecki
Dlugosz, XIII, 701-714. édition was not accessible for me.

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 JÄNOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444) 243

Ottoman war. Since several barons and two bishops were for launching the
campaign, after a long discussion a tax was voted to cover the costs, the date for
the troops to start was fixed and Hunyadi was assigned the task of providing the
necessary war materials.
While the entire country was feverishly preparing for the final Showdown,
the former prince of Serbia George Brankovic — who lived in Hungary and also
attended the diet — and Hunyadi started secret (clandestine) talks with the
sultan. Informed by his spies of the major préparations by Christendom, Murad
was frightened. In Anatolia a war was about to break out, and he thought he
would be between hell and high water if he could not achieve peace in time with
the Hungarian king at any cost, even for money. He solicited his father-in-Iaw
Brankovic for intercession, offering him his lost countries in return for the
peace. The despot thought he could more easily regain Serbia in this way than
with warfare, so he gladly accepted the offer. He appeased Hunyadi by promis
ing all the fortresses and estâtes he had been given by Albert and Vladislav in
Hungary to him in a secret agreement (occulta pactione) provided that the
Ottoman-Hungarian peace was signed. The war lord undertook to support the
matter, and the agreement was concluded with the sultan without Consulting
Vladislav (Wladislao inconsulto). While Murad dispatched his envoys, Hunyadi
and the despot informed the king in a letter asking him to come to Szeged on
August Ist to give audience to the délégation (rogatur, ut Segedinum proxima
die Augusti descendat).
Though not interrupting the military préparations, Vladislav complied
with the challenge. As Dlugosz notes, he was already in Szeged when Murad's
envoys arrived and put forward their peace proposai to the royal Council. The
conditions being most favourable, Vladislav and the magnates finally enunciated
in favour of accepting them. The envoys promised to surrender the fortresses in
Serbia within eight days (castrorum restitutionem intra octo dies repromittenti
bus), and Vladislav signed a peace with them for ten years, swearing a public
oath to adhere to the peace.
No sooner had the Ottoman delegates left Szeged than foreign reports
began arriving on manoeuvres of Christian fleets urging the Hungarian troops to
set out, or, as the letter of July 30th written in Mistra by John VIII,
emperor of
Byzantium, expressing concem about the peace talks between the sultan and the
Hungarian king. (Dlugosz included the emperor's letter in füll.) All this brought
the idea of the war into the fore again. The king hesitated, and yielding to elo
quent pressure by Cesarini, eventually he made up his mind to breach the just
concluded peace. One supporting factor was that several days had passed (plures
dies praeterea absumtï), and the Ottomans had not restored the promised Castles
even in twenty, let alone eight, days (elapsis no octo solum, sed viginti diebus).
Having apostolic authority, the cardinal annulled the agreement signed with the
foe of Christianity, and Vladislav, ignoring his pledge (temerato iuramento), de
cided to continue the war. Lest some subséquent event should make them change
their minds, Cesarini took a new oath (nova iuramenta) from the king and his

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244 P. ENGEL

counsellors. Its exact text is given by Dlugosz (in hac forma). The diploma
including the oath was issued in the name of Vladislav on August 4th, 1444 in
Szeged (in Segedin, quarta die Augustï), endorsed by the Hungarian lords
présent including, of course, Jânos Hunyadi, Voivode of Transylvania.
Then — Dlugosz goes on — the king resumed war préparations collecting
a larger than ever army and set out from Szeged around September 20th. In the
meantime, however, he deeply regretted what he had done, for in the meanwhile
the sultan fulfilled the terms, giving back the Castles of Smederevo, Golubac and
the rest of the fortresses and freeing Brankovic's two sons. Gnawed by remorse
for his breach of faith, on November 3rd he crossed the Danube and pushed into
Bulgaria. The defeat at Varna happened on the eve of Saint Martin's day
(November 10th).

Researchhas long exposed major inaccuracies in Dlugosz's account. As

regards the autumn events, on September 20th the king had been far from
Szeged, in Or§ova, crossing the Danube on September 22nd, not November 3rd.
Nevertheless, the chronology of events has usually been based on his report, first
of ail because the main temporal guide, the oath on August 4th, was only
registered by his chronicle. No wonder this date became the fixed point of nearly
ail relevant historical works.
This, however, entailed numerous difficulties never overcome so far. First
of ail, the date of signing the peace was almost impossible to reconstruct, for
here Dlugosz seemed to contradict himself. On the one hand, he asserted that the
king received the Ottoman envoys at the beginning of August, and on August 4th
he already swore the oath breaching the agreement. So before signing and
breaking the agreement there remained one, or two, or at most three days. On
the other hand, Dlugosz declared that under the provisions of the agreement the
sultan was to restitute the Serbian Castles within eight days, and Vladislav only
breached the peace when this condition had remained unfulfilled not only after
eight, but after twenty days.
It Compounds the problem that, oddly enough, neither statement of the
Polish chronicler can be easily discarded. As for the latter, in his letter to the
Polish estâtes dated in Orçova on September 22nd Vladislav admitted that the
Ottomans had given back the main fortresses, he only pretended that they failed
to fulfil the rest of the conditions (reliquum quod restabat faciendum no
compleverunt), and gave this as the reason for resuming the war.3 Thus, either it
must be presumed that the king's statement lacked ail justification, or it must be
recognized that, as Dlugosz states, between the signing and breaching of the
peace treaty at least a week (but probably a far longer period of time) elapsed.
As for the dating of the Szeged talks by Dlugosz, it completely tallies with the

3 from a Polish
Quoted codex by I. Schwartz, I. Ulaszld kiräly 1444. évi kiadatlan levele
[An unpublished letter of King Vladislav from 1444]. Törte'nelmi Tdr, 1895, 400.

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 JÀNOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" ( 1444) 245

other sources available. Vladislav is known to have been in Buda on July 23rd,
so there is no reason to doubt an eye-witnesses' remark claiming the king set out
from there on the day of Saint Jacob, i.e. July 25th.4 This perfectly agréés with
Dlugosz's Statement that the king was called to Szeged for August Ist, since
covering the road between Buda and Szeged in the mid-15th Century took four to
five days.5
As can be seen, it is nearly impossible to cram ail the events into the short
period prior to August 4th. One might présumé that the date of signing was a
week earlier, July 28th, but in this case the king was to have acted on the eighth
day without waiting for reports on the Ottomans' compliance with the peace
provisions in Serbia. But even this dating is unsatisfactory, because the king and
his retinue cannot have arrived in Szeged before around July 29th the earliest.
Ail this notwithstanding, modem researchers reluctantly accepted the view that
the peace was ratified in Szeged, some time at the end of July.6
Apart from these chronological difficulties, there remain some pièces of
mysterious information we are at a loss about. Such is, first, the instruction sent
by the State Council of Venice on September 9th to Alvisi Loredano, its admirai
in the Dardenelles. Both Cardinal Cesarini and the ambassador of the republic to
Hungary, Giovanni Reguardati, the Council wrote to him, had ensured the Signo
ria in their letters written in Vârad (today's Oradea) on August 12th and 14th,
respectively, that they would keep Venice informed about the negotations the
Ottoman sultan was then having with the Hungarian king and the despot. The
Council, they wrote to Loredano, was uncertain about the outcome of the talks
for, according to the cardinal and the ambassador, the Hungarian king and the
barons were decided to set out for the extermination of the Ottomans that same
year, irrespective of what was said above (predictis non ob stantibus)1. The

4 "Der
küng ain zeit waz hoven, und ruwen bis Sant Jacabs tag. Da machet er ainen anslag
an dy Türken zu zihen... Also der kung von Ungern zach in dy stat pis gen Wardein.Die Gedich
te des Michel Beheim. —
(Hrsg. Gille, Hans und Spriewald, Ingeborg) 1. Berlin 1968. 335-336.
The diploma of July 23 (II. die Marie Magdalene): Hungarian State Archives, Collectio Ante
Mohâcsiana, DL 13 791. The king dated a document in Buda on the 22nd as well: Hungarian State
Archives, Photographical Collection, DF 262 121.
5 Besides the distance and the speed of progressing, this is supported by the following
stations in Hunyadi's - 7 -
itinerary: 2 July, Pest July, Szeged (1446); 30 Dec., 1448, Szeged
3 Jan. 1449, Buda; 25 July, Szeged-26 July, Kecskemét-30 July, Buda, 1451. See P. Engel,
Hunyadi Jânos kormânyzo itinerâriuma (1446-1452) [The itinerary of the regent Jänos Hunyadi],
Szàzadok 118 (1984) 980-985.
6
Earlier, the most accurate dating possible was achieved by J. Radonic (Zapadna Evropa i
balkanski narodi prema Turcima и prvoj polovini XV veka. Novi Sad 1905, 208, 212) (28 or 29

July). Later views are even less convincing. Most recently, Bistra Cvetkova (Pametna bitka na
narodite. Varna 1979, 288) dated the meeting to 25/26 and the ratification of the peace to "the end
of July". Hungarian historiography also sticks to the late July dating.
7 "Certi reddimur
per litteras, quas habemus a ... cardinali ... quam a ... secretario nostro ...
datas Varadini in regno Hungarie die 12 et 14 augusti nuper decursi, quod ab ipsis legato et
secretario informationem plenariam habueritis de' nonnullis praticis habitis per imperatorem Tetic
rorum tarn cum ... rege Hungarie et Polonie, quam etiam cum illustri domino despoto, quas tarnen
nescimus, si locum habiture sint, cum idem ... legatus ... ac secretarius noster nobis scribant,

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246 P. ENGEL

republic, they informed Loredano, would be pleased with the campaign; should
it be cancelled, however, the admirai ought to refrain from attacking the sultan,
for it was not Venice's intention to launch a war by herself.
In addition to this officiai Venetian source, of paramount importance is an
entry of the Serbian annals stating that the despot concluded a peace with the
sultan on the day of Our Lady, August 15th and was restored in his former seat,
Smederevo on August 22nd.8 It is noteworthy that exactly a week separates the
two dates, that is, the period of time stipulated, according to Dlugosz, for the
surrendering of the Castles. What peace pact can this Serbian piece of informa
tion refer to? If one insists that the Ottoman-Hungarian peace was signed in late
July, it must be a Serbian-Ottoman separate peace treaty, which, however, is not
confirmed by a single source. Anyway, it would be hard to explain what could
make the sultan take the gratuitous step of surrendering the Castles he had taken
great pains to win to the Serbian prince who lived in enemy territory and was
completely harmless to him.
Another enigma to be solved is hidden in the diploma of July 3rd, known
to research for a long time from György Fejér's édition and preserved in the
original form among the Brandenburg papers of the state archives in Nuremberg
as an item of the former Hunyadi archives.9 It says that on the noted day
Brankovic and his son Lazar ceded one of their largest domains, that of Vilâgos
vâr, to Hunyadi and his heirs for ever by the testimony of the chapter of Vârad. It
was granted to him, they alleged, as a recompense because returning from the
long campaign Hunyadi had recaptured the greater part of Serbia for them
(ipsum regnum Rascie pro maiori parte eisdem ... restaurasset et recuperasset),
and in the same year he also equipped a huge army for 63,000 gold pièces of his
own to recapture the entire territory. The document raises several problems.
First, only much later, in March 1445, did Hunyadi register himself as the owner
of Vilâgosvâr and its accessories. Why this delay? Second: the diploma suggests
that on July 3rd some sort of agreement had to be concluded between the despot
and the Voivode that would have implied the presence of Hunyadi. Recently
— and the —
published sources, however, reveal that on that day day before
Hunyadi was in Bra§ov.10 Why was he absent from an event of such exceptional
significance for him? The most enigmatic problem is, however, that by the indi

serenissimum dominum regem predictum ac barones Hungarie predictis non obstantibus promi
sisse velle procedere exercitualiter anno isto ad exterminium Teucrorum." S. Ljubic, Listine о od
nosajih izmedju juznoga Slavenstva i mletacke republike. 9. knj.
Zagreb 1890 (Monumenta
spectantia historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, 21), 212.
8 To the
year 6952 (=1443/44): "Umiri se (despot) s'carem' meseca avgusta 15 (na uspenje
Bogorodici); ... priimi opet' Smederevo despot' avgusta 22" (in several variants). L. Stojanovic,
Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi. Sr. Karlovci 1927, 234 (Nr. 676, 677). Cf. К. Jirecek, Istorija
Srba. (Rev. Radonic, J.) 1-2. knj. Beograd 1952,1. 369.
9 incunabula et virtus Joannis Corvini de Hunyad. Budae 1844.
Georgius Fejér, Genus,
71-75. (Photo: DF 267 426).
10
ZW, V. 140-141. On the registration of Vilâgosvâr see Jözsef Teleki, A Hunyadiak kora
Magyarorszdgon [The age of the Hunyadis in Hungary], vol. 10. Pest 1853, 159.

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 JÄNOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" ( 1444) 247

cated date not a single Castle, let alone "the greater part of Serbia" could have
been restored by Hunyadi to Brankovic. That was to take place in August, as a
resuit of the peace. What does the relevant passage of the diploma refer to then?
The reader should be finally reminded of the unsolved problern of the
despot's domains in Hungary. We do not know when and under what circum
stances Hunyadi came into possession of a major part of them. We only know
that years later, in 1448, this triggered off a strife between Hunyadi and Bran
kovic, leading to armed conflict in 1450. Upon the intervention of the magnates,
the parties eventually came to an agreement. Brankovic was Willing to agree that
the Castle of Mukacevo, the towns of Asszonypataka (today's Baia Mare), Szat
mâr, Németi (Satu Mare) and Debrecen, and the estâtes of Bôszôrmény and
Dada — all having been on the governor's hand "for a longer time in return for a
certain debt" — would remain in his possession as security at a value of 155,000
golden forints.11 After another bout of fighting, the matter was finally settled in
1451 with the cryptic Statement that the controversial estâtes would have to
remain on Hunyadi's hands "for a certain appropriate reason".12 It is not known
what caused Brankovic's immense debt and when and why he had to abandon
his huge estâtes.
Research into the mysteries of the Szeged peace was shifted out of the
deadlock by Oskar Halecki some half a Century ago. It is possible that he was the
first scholar for a long time to read the oath of Vladislav sworn on August 4
carefully. At any rate, he discovered that the document made no mention of the
breaching of any peace, and it only contained the renewal of the king's former
pledge made in April. He based his Statements on a thorough analysis of the text
and an unbiased reader must admit that his relevant reasonings are completely
convincing. He himself, however, was far from being unbiased. As a représenta
tive of Polish Catholic historiography, he tried to use his discovery to exonerate
before the jurj^of history both the young king of Poland accused of multiple
perjury and Cardinal Cesarini, blamed usually for the defeat. Thus Halecki went
too far in his conclusions, trying to prove that the peace was not ratified at all,
Vladislav merely kept beguiling the sultan with promises and the peace recorded
in the sources was only concluded by Brankovic as a separate peace.13
At first Halecki's special opinion was rejected on all sides, first of all
because hosts of contemporary written sources could be adduced in support of

11
Lajos Thallöczy-Antal Âldâsy (ed.), A Magyarorszâg és Szerbia közti ôsszekôttetések
oklevéltâra 1198-1526. [Collection of documents on Hungarian-Serbian relations 1198-1526].
Budapest 1907. Magyarorszâg melléktartomânyainak oklevéltâra [Archives of Hungary's prov
inces, 2]. 159.
12 153 (the original DL 37 614). Since outdated
Fejér, Genus, diploma: Frigyes Pesty's
work (Brankovics György rdcz despota birtokviszonyai Magyarorszdgon és a râcz despota czim
[The Serbian aespot György Brankovic's properties in Hungary and the title of the Serbian

despot], Budapest 1877) there has not been any reliabie work on Brankovic's possessions in Hun

gary. Cf. Jirecek, op.cit., II. 355-357.

13 O. Halecki, New York
The Crusade of Varna. A discussion of controversial problems.
1943. (The final version of the former Polish and French publications.)

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248 P. ENGEL

the peace. His critics did not accept his argumentation concerning the contents of
the oath either, so they had to adhéré to the customary dating of the peace to
July. This, in turn, left the mentioned problems unsolved.14
Later, however, Halecki's theory was buttressed from an unexpected
angle. Research had long lacked a source that would describe the circumstances
of the peace treaty from the viewpoint of the Ottomans. However, an unpub
lished Ottoman chronicle has been found recently, which did so. It gave a fairly
detailed account of the negotiations of the Ottoman envoys in Hungary and
revealed that the peace was ratified by the Hungarian king, Hunyadi and the
despot together. The latter went directly to Serbia escorted by the envoys and
received Smederevo and the rest of the Castles under the provisions of the peace
treaty. This shattered the theory of the separate peace, and confirmed that the
date August 15th in the Serbian annals actually refers to the endorsement of the
— if that needs confirmation
Ottoman-Hungarian peace. Halecki was thus right
at ail — in interpreting the document of August 4th differently. Halil Inalcik, the
researcher of the Ottoman chronicle, managed to give a clear schedule of events
on its basis.15 Most astonishingly, however, there are still monographers who
stick to the traditional view.16
No doubt there remain some vague points. An understanding of the real
motives of the events would require the clarification of Hunyadi's mysterious
rôle.17 In what follows, this will be attempted through a short review of the
critical events of 1444, and an exploration of the motives of the protagonists.

***

Already during the long campaign Sultan Murad was worried to note the
shift in the power set-up, and when informed by his spies of a so-far unparalleled
offensive being prepared by Western Christendom, he decided to hait it at any
cost. Through the médiation of his wife Sultana Mara he sent an envoy in late

14 Halecki's thesis was first confuted thoroughly by F. Pall, Autour de la croisade de Varna.
La question de la paix de Szeged. Bulletin de la section historique, Académie Roumaine. 1941,
144—158, and idem: Un moment décisif de l'histoire du Sud-Est européen: la croisade de Varna.
Balcania, 1944, 102 sqq., then by J. Dqbrowski, L'année 1444. Cracovie 1952, 33 sqq. (Both date
the peace to the end of July.) It followed from this, that the idea of the separate peace had to be
accepted: F. Babinger, Von Amurath zu Amurath. Vor- und Nachspiel des Schlacht bei Varna
(1444). Oriens, 1950, 139 sqq.
15 H. mira i kriza turske drzave 1444. Prilozi za
Inalcik, Pitanje Segedinskog godine
orijentalnu fdologiju 1962-1963, 269-306, esp. 300 sqq. Since then, the Ottoman chronicle has

appeared in print: Gazavat-i Sultan Murad b. Mehemmed

Han. Izladi ve Varna savaslari (1443
1444). (Ed. Halil Inalcik-Mevlud Oguz). Ankara 1978. For the knowledge of its content (35) I am
indebted to Dr Pal Fodor.
16 See note 6.
17 has always been forced to play a minor role in the investiga
Hungarian historiography
tion of the problem, since it has rejected référencés made by the.sources to Hunyadi's role as
"slanderous". Cf. from earlier literature e.g. David Angyal, A szegedi béke (1444) [The Szeged
peace]. Budapesti Szemle 1910, 207-231, more recently Lajos Elekes, Hunyadi. Budapest 1952.

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 JÂNOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444) 249

February to his father-in-law Brankovic, who had lived in his Hungarian estâtes
from 1439, offering him to return his land and free his two sons, if the despot
managed to talk Hungary out of the planned war.18
Well aware that even in case of a Christian victory he stood little chance
of getting back Serbia, Brankovic was only too glad to undertake the task. But it
was not an easy one. The long campaign having ended, Hungary was ecstatic
over her triumph, preparing for an offensive promising unheard-of success. It
ought to be also considered that in the public war for the Hungarian throne going
on since 1440 Vladislav's party used the ease of the anti-Ottoman offensive as
an ideological tool. His followers had argued for his élection saying that a
country menaced by the heathen needed a strong-handed, grown-up ruler, not an
infant king. A successful conquest in the Balkans would have incredibly
increased Vladislav's prestige and power, and chances were most auspicious at
that moment for the expansion. Thus, the cause of the war was tightly interlaced
with the interests of the "Polish party", fervently being supported by its
exponents including the highly influential great chancellor Simon Rozgonyi,
Bishop of Eger, and the bishop John de Dominis of Värad. Enthusiasm flared
high at the diet in April, and on April 24th, the day of Saint George, the king
made a solemn pledge to the papal legate, Cardinal Cesarini, to launch the
campaign in the summer. Of course, Hunyadi was to be the commander-in-chief,
whom the king ehtrusted with the préparations.19
The prevailing atmosphère was thus quite unfavourable for Brankovic to
propose peace plans to the diet. With good tactical sense, he therefore ap
proached Hunyadi. He offered him a part of his huge Hungarian estâtes if he
managed to get the peace proposed by the sultan accepted. Not averse to the
offer, Hunyadi made an agreement with the despot. On April 25th he obtained
a letter of credence for a certain Stojka Gisdanic, who must have been Bran
kovic's exponent, empowering him to pursue peace talks with the sultan as
Vladislav's envoy. The letter pretended that the king took obligation to subse
quently ratify what "his" envoy would agree with Murad. Vladislav, however,
was by then bound by his pledge to Cesarini, and it is highly unlikely that he was

18 What follows below was earlier summed up in a sketchy way (Pâl Engel, Jânos Hunyadi.
The décisive years of his career, 1440-1444. In: From Hunyadi to Râkàczi. War and society in

early modem Hungary. Ed. В. K. Kirâly et al. New York 1981), but then, unfortunately, the
studies of H. Inalcik were not known to me (cf. note 15) which I came across through the good
offices of Janos Hovâri and Ferenc Szakâly. 1 found them the more convincing, for without a

knowledge of this Ottoman chronicle 1 was also forced to corne to the same conclusion as Inalcik
did concerning the dating of the peace and several other questions.
19 In its resolution of March 6th, the greater council of Raguza put a barge at a Greek
monk's as far as Spalato,
disposai who was to see the despot as an envoy of the despot's daughter,
the empress (que ipsum ire debentem ad dominum despotum conducere debeat usque Spaletum):
N. Iorga, Notes et extraits pur servir à l'histoire des Croisades au XVe siècle. Série II—III, Paris
1899-1902, 401. This datum was already interpreted by Radonic, op.cit., 201, as part of the
sultan's peace offer.

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 250 P. ENGEL

seriously deliberating a peace. The sources suggest that he had no knowledge of

the subséquent talks, which is also confirmed by his deeds.20
Not much later, some time in May, the barons levied an extraordinary tax
of one golden florin to cover the costs of the campaign, and in June tax
collection was going on.21 On July 2nd the king informed the republic of
Florence that he would launch the campaign "decided upon by the will of the
entire country" in the course of the summer, along a différent route from the
long campaign, towards Nicopolis. He also noted that he had called on his troops
to encamp at Vârad on July 15th, and asked the subjects of the republic to
promote the success of the expédition with their prayers.22 On July 5th he called
on the leader of the Albanian rebels, Skander bey, to join the Christian offensive
with his troops.23 It must have been around mid-July that a letter of the Venetian
State Council dated 4th July arrived in Buda. It let Cesarini know that the joint
Venetian and papal fleet had set out towards the Dardanelles on June 22nd.24
The Christian war-machine had corne into swing. At last Vladislav set out from
Buda on July 25th "to destroy the accursed Turks" (alla destrution delli maledeti
Turchi),25 as he indicated his program in his letter to the Bosnian ruler written
the day before.26 However, he did not head directly to Vârad, but made a détour
to Szeged.

20 Venice answered Cesarini's letters of April

26th and 27th on May 12th, which to her
greatest pleasure, had informed her "dominum
regem omnino statuisse ac manibus vestris unacum
baronibus et aliisdominis ac primatibus regni illius adversus perfidos Teucros hac presenti aestate
potenti exercitu se transferre": Vilmos Fraknôi, Magyarorszdg egyhdzi és politikai összekötettesei
a römai Szent-székkel a konstanczi zsinattôl a mohdcsi vészig [Hungary's connections with the
Holy See from the Council of Constance to the defeat at Mohâcs]. Budapest 1902, 425. — As
illustration to the propaganda of the Vladislav party, see, for example, the famous diploma of the
Orders dated July 17th, 1440, on the élection of the king: "... cupientes necessitati nostre et huius
regni, cuius pro nunc confinia per insultantium inimicorum, paganorum scilicet et aliorum, morsus
asperos continue lacerantur, oportune providere...": J. M. Bäk, Königtum und Stände in Ungarn im
14.-16. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden 1973, 142.
21 to Andreas de Palatio, Brankovic and Hunyadi Struck an agreement with the
According
sultan "inconsulto rege": quoted by Fraknôi, op.cit.. 426. Dlugosz cites him almost Verbatim, XIII.
702. — Vladislav's letter of credence to Ciriaco Pizzicolli was published as part of the correspon
dence he discovered: F. Pall, Ciriaco d'Ancona e la crociata contro i Turchi. Välenii-de-Munte
1937, 55.
22 Elemér A magyar rendi dllam Hunyadi kordban State in the
Mâlyusz, [The Hungarian
âge of Hunyadi], Sz. 1957, collected the sources on the tax (the earlier being dated July 21).
22 "De omnium nostrorum voluntate decrevimus
regnicolarum restaurato validiore exercitu
presenti estate et alia via per quendam passum Danubii ... contra Theucros ipsos versus Nichapolim
esse revertendum. Proinde discessimus abhinc ..., XV die presentis mensis in civitatem nostram
Varadini gentes nostras convocabimus, indeque versus Danubium ... procedemus": lorga, Notes,
II, 404.
24 S.
Katona, Historia critica regum Hungariae. XIII. Budae 1790, 300.
25
lorga, Notes, III, 175.
26 to Bosnia refer to the king's letter of July 24th on Aug. 15: "la quai
Ragusa's envoys
scrive al deto re de Bosina, digando chôme de présente se mette in ordene per andar alla destrution
delli maledeti Turchi...": lorga, Notes, II, 407.

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 JANOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444) 251

In the meantime, the secret peace talks had borne fruit. The envoys of
Brankovic arrived in Adrianople, the seat of the Sultan, in early June and on
June 12th they signed a preliminary peace with him on behalf of their sovereign
and Hunyadi, as well as the king of Hungary.27 In return for a ten-year truce, the
sultan obliged himself to return Serbia and Albania to the despot together with
24 Castles including Smederevo, Golubac, Novobrdo and others, that is, the
territory he had come in possession of during the campaigns between 1427 and
1441. He promised to release his captives including Brankovic's two sons, and
undertook to pay the Hungarian king 100,000 gold pièces as war indemnity and
put 25,000 warriors at his disposai whenever he needed them against his foes.28
The return of the Castles and perhaps the fulfilment of the rest of the conditions
were due within eight days of the confirmation of the agreement by the king's
and Hunyadi's oath. Murad thought his concerns about Europe would be
resolved by the treaty. Having corroborated the clauses of the agreement by his
own oath and despatched his envoys with gorgeous présents to Hungary, Murad
set out on July 12th with a light heart to put his enemy in Asia Minor in its
place.29
Having heard of the Adrianople agreement, Brankovic immediately got
down to fulfilling his obligation toward Hunyadi. While the Voivode was
engaged levying the requirements for the war in Transylvania30, he recorded his
testimony before the chapter of Arad on July 3rd about transferring his lordship
of Vilâgosvâr "for ever" to Hunyadi on his own and his heirs' behalf. Probably
he had the other, now extant, deed or deeds written at the same time in which he
— Mukacevo,
yielded other estâtes Baia Mare, Satu Mare, Debrecen and
— to
Bôszôrmény Hunyadi, not as a perpétuai grant but as security. The value of
the loan against this security was however so large that the transfer could
actually be seen as final. The extinct diploma déclarés that Vilâgosvâr went into
Hunyadi's possession in return for having recaptured and returned to Brankovic
"a greater part of Serbia" and having spent 60,000 gold pièces of his own prepar
ing the current war.31 The lost diploma presumably contained an acknowledge
ment of having returned ail Serbia. When Hunyadi got word that the estâtes
concerned were at his disposai under the former agreement, his turn came to
fulfil his promise. In mid-July he informed the king that an Ottoman délégation

27 The sultan's letter of credence was published: 63. The letter all but
Pall, Ciriaco,
anticipâtes the subséquent events by making the réservation that the Hungarian king must swear an
oath "recte et fideliter, sine aliquo dolo".
28 an account of the peace but a more detailed
Dlugosz, XIII, 703, gives conditions,
summary can be found in the Polish estâtes' address of Aug. 26: A. Sokolowski-I. Szujski, Codex
epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti. I. Krakow 1876. (Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas
Poloniae illustrantia, 2. tom.) Pars 1, 141-142.
29 Vladislav was informed by the emperor of Byzantium of the Sultan's crossing on July
12th. Dlugosz, XIII, 706. Cf. Babinger, op.cit., 236 sqq.
30 See issues in Transylvania between 2 and 15 July, Urkundenbuch Ge
Hunyadi's zur
schichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen, ed. G. Gündisch. Köln-Wien 1975, V. 140-144.
31 See note 9.

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 252 P. ENGEL

had arrived in Hungary with a highly advantageous peace proposai, and he asked
the king to go to Szeged by August 1st to give them audience.32
In the teeth of Cesarini's protests, the king and the barons complied with
the challenge. They did not interrupt the war préparations, but the news was
for — as — "the
flattering, Dlugosz aptly noted Hungarians were used to
begging for peace for a long time, not granting it".33 They must have been even
more astonished to hear the articles of the proposed treaty. The Polish nobles
flatly termed them "incredible" (conditiones pacis nunquam credibiles), and in
their pétition to Vladislav they could not find words to express their surprise
hearing that the power "which is not in the habit of abiding by a truce if it is
asked to" was now soliciting for peace (pacem quam servare nunquam etiam
rogatum consueverat rogaverit)}4
It was indeed an exceptional moment, and it is no wonder that the joint
efforts of the sultan, Brankovic and Hunyadi eventually bore fruit. What exactly
happened could not be known even by contemporaries, because the talks soon
resumed behind closed doors (legatione hac in secretum consilium reiecta);35
but the fact is that, in principle, the royal Council consented to accepting the
peace offer. At the beginning, the cardinal desperately protested, but suddenly he
feil silent, and when the king's décision was made public, he did not oppose it
(non adversante etiam Juliane), to his contemporaries' no little surprise.36 He
had his own plan ready by then.

Though seldom admitted by modern historians, Hunyadi's steps were

governed by his limitless ambition throughout his life. He was determined to
rise, to become the first man in the country in fame, rank, wealth and power.
What immediately proves the greatness of his personality is that he achieved all
that. His ambitiousness was such a household word, that not even Bonfini feit
obliged to keep silent about it. As he noted, already King Sigismund would say
in irritation that the whole world was not enough to satisfy Hunyadi's ambi
tions.37 It cannot be accidentai that Brankovic tried to achieve his goal by

72 In the
postscript to its letter of July 31, the Council of Ragusa, with référencé to a just
received letter of the despot's envoy to Buda noting that the king was about to leave Buda for Sze
ged (esse per partirse de Buda per andar a Seghedino), gave its ambassador to Buda instructions in
case they should anticipate a peace agreement (vedendo alguna esser per concludersi): Jozsef
Gelcich, Raguza es Magyarorszâg ôsszekotteléseinek oklevéltàra [Documents on the connections
between Raguza and Hungary], Budapest 1887, 459,
«
Dlugosz, XIII, 702.
74 See note 28.
"
Dlugosz, XIII, 703.
76 to the contemporary Polish chronicler,
According Philippus Callimachus: Schwandtner,
I, 503. Dlugosz also seems to have meant the same (Iuliano cardinali ne quidquam dissuadente
[XIII, 704]).
37 "Id tulisse ferunt ac sepe dixisse
egre Sigismundum Ioannem Corvinum ad spes magnas
non esse provocandum, quando, veluti ab ambitiosa eius iuventa manticinabatur, ne toto quidem

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 JÄNOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444) 253

bribing Hunyadi. He offered the Voivode such great wealth for his intervention
that he must have been unable to décliné. If it indeed became his, he would all of
a sudden surpass all his rivais. After the arrivai of the Ottoman délégation, the
success of the plan depended on him alone. He knew that if he persisted in his
intention, eventually he would have to succeed, for all the hopes at home and
abroad were tied to his commandership. If he withdrew, the campaign would
immediately be hopeless. Thus, as Dlugosz informs us, he was sure of himself
(lonnes woiewoda potiundae pacis spem haud dubiam repromittit).38
Cesarini was fuelled by a différent ambition. Rome's leading politician for
some 15 years, he had been obsessed with the idea of restoring the waning
prestige of the Holy See, which for him stood for the cause of Christianity. His
perspective was différent from Hunyadi's. In 1439 it was he who called for the
unification of the western and eastern churches at the Council of Florence, and
when the plan was met with passionate résistance by the Constantinople masses,
ail his efforts were concentrated on reviving the idea of the Crusades to get near
Byzantium and force her to consent to the union. To this end, he had been work
ing in Hungary since 1442, and his ambitious plan was nearing consummation in
the summer of 1444. Hunyadi's stubborn opposition now jeopardized not only
the cause of a holy war but also Rome's centuries-old dream. The cardinal, as a
politician responsible for the future of Christianity, had to prevent that at any
cost.39

One is reduced to spéculations concerning his bargaining with Hunyadi.

The war lord must have made it clear to his adversary that he was personally
interested in concluding the peace, therefore Cesarini was faced with a double
task: he had to talk Hunyadi into taking part in the campaign, and he had to
ensure the booty he was hankering after.
He attained his first goal by promising the kingdom of Bulgaria to him in
case of victory. He got the king — whom he apparently easily influenced — to
a written about that.40 The other — that of the
give Hunyadi security problem
— was a harder nut to crack, but he settled it somehow. It could no
peace longer
be delayed, for the allies were getting worried. News of the secret negotiations
was quick to seep out, and the arrivai of the Ottoman délégation increased their
mistrust. They demanded an explanation and a guarantee. The latter they re
ceived, the former was tarrying.

***

orbe is expleri posset": Bonfini, Antonius de, Rerum Ungaricarum décades. (Ed. I. Fôgel et al.) III.
Lipsiae 1936, 219. Cf. Dlugosz's, XIII, 661, succinct and apparently felicitous description: "homo
obscure loco natus, sed celsioris animi et magnarum rerum cupidus".
38 XIII, 701.
Dlugosz,
39 Cf. R. Jenkins, The last crusader. New York 1963.
40 "Rex Wladislaus finito bello in Bulgariae de quo et publicas
ipsum regem praeficere,
literarum promissiones habebat, pollicebatur": Dlugosz, XIII, 708.

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254 P. ENGEL

Having accepted the peace offer and dismissed the envoys of the sultan for
some time, Vladislav made a new pledge to Cesarini on August 4th. To dispell
—
"anyone's doubt or suspicion", and to put the minds of everybody concerned
the Venetian ambassador and the cardinal, who were présent, the prince of
— at rest, he
Burgundy and the commander of the galleys of the Venetian doge
reiterated his former décision: he would launch a campaign against the Ottomans
that same year. He agreed to reach the Danube ferry at Or§ova by September 1 st,
and to advance from there in Romaniam et Graeciam, that is, towards Byzan
tium. He promised to act in this way, whatever might happen, or as he somewhat
circuitously put it, "irrespective of the fact whether he concluded or would
conclude a peace or agreement with the sultan or his envoys, no matter how that
treaty was or would be worded and whether it was or would be signed under oath
or not". The diploma recording the king's solemn oath was sealed by the Hun
garian magnates as well, with Hunyadi heading the list of the secular barons. He
had it registered in the deed that he would be 4 or 5 days late for the gathering
place of the troops.41
As has been seen, the text of the oath has corne down to us in Dlugosz's
work. His obviously mistaken commentary gave rise to the misconception in
scholarship that the diploma declared the cancellation of the peace with the
sultan. As Halecki already pointed out, nothing of the sort is speit out in the text.
The text is so unambiguous in this regard, that it is really puzzling how this
misunderstanding could and can still prevail. There is no reference in it to any
former treaty which had to be cancelled. The main purpose of the oath is made
emphatically and unmistakably clear by the king: in view of the uneasiness
caused by the arrivai of the Ottoman délégation and the audience given to it
(propter adventum oratorum Amurati imperatoris Turcorum fleri postulatum),
he wished to give the allies perfect assurance that he and his magnates would
fulfil their obligations in case of a war, and this the warring parties could surely
count upon.
It was of course redundant to record this déclaration in the form of an
oath, since the king had sworn an oath by that earlier — in April, as the diploma
itself notes. The renewed oath had a seemingly secondary goal apparent only to
the insiders. The artful wording of the oath was owing to this goal. By his new
oath, — and actually this was why he swore it — the king expressly annulled
any agreement that was, or would be, concluded with the Ottomans, be it "con
cluded under oath" (etiam iuramento firmatis vel firmandis). The significance of
this subtle formulation was soon to become clear.
The peace, shrewdly suggested by the document, was soon to be Struck,
not in Szeged however but in Vârad (today's Oradea), where the king was
originally bound to go, and where he can be documented to have stayed until the
end of August.42 From here did Cesarini and the Venetian ambassador inform

41 708-710.
Dlugosz, XIII,
42
Diplomas issued by him in Värad survived from the following days: Aug. 20 (DF 244
364), Aug. 27 (DF 212 169), Aug. 28 (DL 44 379).

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 JÂNOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444) 255

the Signoria and the Commanders of the allied fleet on August 12th and 14th,
respectively, of the ongoing negotiations. The solemn ratification of the peace on
August 15th, recorded by the Serbian annals, could only take place here.43 On
the Serbian part Brankovic, on the Hungarian part Hunyadi made an oath by its
articles "on behalf of the king himself and the entire Hungarian nation", as
Thuroczy put it. Vladislav, apparently, was unwilling to risk his salvation.44
Opinions differed as to the validity of the peace. The sultan's envoys
regarded it as valid and acted accordingly. Within the stipulated eight days, on
August 22nd, they gave over Smederevo to the despot and soon emptied the rest
of the fortresses. They probably also paid the tribute money, for in his letter of
22 September explaining the reasons for breaching the peace Vladislav did not
miss it. Hence, the sultan was expecting a long peace and the attack launched
shortly afterwards took him unawares. He accused the Hungarians of perjury,
and so did Brankovic. Having received his country back, he consistently kept
aloof of the Ottoman-Hungarian fightings.
The Hungarians, of course, were of a différent opinion. As early as August
4th the king made his stance clear about possible future oaths, and consequently,
the Vârad agreement was seen annulled by him. He immediately breached it as
soon as he could do it with at least a semblance of decency. In the meantime he
continued the préparations first in Vârad, then in Temesvâr, and in mid-Septem
ber he marched down to Or§ova. On 22nd of the same month, when Hunyadi had
arrived with his troops, he crossed the Danube and started pushing forward in
Bulgaria. In his letter sent on the same day to the Polish State Council still
rejoicing over the peace, the king argued that the Ottomans did not satisfy the
conditions apart from returning some castles, "therefore we must do what we
have decided in agreement with our country and what we have pledged by
oath..."45

Hunyadi himself went, after the oath in Szeged, to Temesvâr, where he

issued a diploma on August 1 Ith "as the captain-general and leader of the army
of the most Christian king of Hungary".46 On August 15th he played his rôle in
the peace-comedy, then he went to Transylvania to collect his troops. On August
28th he was in Szâszsebes, on September 15th he was on his way to the camp in
Orçova, having left Karânsebes.47

43 See notes 7 and 8.

44 Johannes de Thurocz, Chronica Hungarorum. I., Textus. Ed. Elisabeth Galântai et Julius
Kristö. Budapest 1985, 251. Vladislav's pledge of August 4th also alluded that the peace would be
concluded in his name.
45 "Sed
quum Turci prefati, emologati in parte maiori расе ipsa per dimissionem magnorum
et notabilium castrorum, reliquum quod restabat faciendum non compleverunt, puta in relaxatione
filiorum despoti et ceterorurn aliorum castrorum suorum, ymmo terras suas ignis incendio
concremarunt et concremare no desistunt, unde necesse nobis erat facere illud, quod cum toto

regno nostro conclusimus et iuravimus, ire videlicet contra ipsos." Cf. note 3.
46 armorum et dux militie exercitus Christianissimi
"Supremusque capitaneus regis Hunga
rie": Fejér, Genus, 63.
47 For
Aug. 28: Urkundenbuch, V, 146; for Sept. 15: Codex diplomaticus patrius. Ed. Imre
Nagy et al., Gyor-Budapest 1865-1891, VII, 464. The diploma was dated "in Themesel"; on its

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256 P. ENGEL

As regards the breaking of the treaty, Cesarini settled it with meticulous

circumspection. He used to teach canonic law in Padova, and he was apparently
at home in the highly intricate web of valid and false oaths. Although the Vârad
agreement had to be ab ovo invalid, he thought it wise to annul it formally by his
— "for the sake of
apostolic authority greater security", as Dlugosz writes.48 All
this notwithstanding, he must have been aware that the strategem he had to apply
was highly dangerous. In his letters he made desperate efforts, without success,
to convince the allies it was him and not the rumours that they should believe.
By the time, however, that the Hungarian army could set out, the leaders of the
fleets had lost patience and the makeshift coalition had fallen into pieces despite
all Cesarini's efforts. Making use of the disrupted moral climate in the fleet, the
sultan managed to return to Europe in time and annihilate the Hungarian army at
Varna on November 10th.
The dead included the king and the cardinal, but Hunyadi survived the
disaster. Though his troops perished, he himself had some gain to pride himself
on: his cunning moves had earned him the enormous estâtes given away by
Brankovic. After returning, he first toured these lands. When in March he had
lawfully entered into possession of his estate in Vilägosvar, he went further
north and raised another new acquisition, the market town of Mukacevo (oppi
dum nostrum) to the rank of a free city (libéra civitas) in a letter-patent which he
issued in another of his new properties, Boszôrmény, on April 14th.49 Next year,
he was elected governor of Hungary.

***

The
circumstances of the peace were enveloped in mist from the very
beginning. The events in Szeged were still largely public, but the Värad agree
ment was hidden by the veil of secrecy. Silence was the only political thing, for
the bargain of Cesarini and Hunyadi, being of a delicate nature, would hardly
have elicited much support. The mystery how things were arranged after all
threw even the eye-witnesses into spéculations. They realized that oath-breaking
had happened, but they could not put things together. They simply could not find
out that the peace was concluded after, not before, the public oath of Vladislav.
So they associated the peace with the Szeged talks, where the sultan's envoys
first appeared, and where the oath was sworn. The subséquent disaster was
chiefly blamed on Cesarini. Thuröczy already sounded this view, and Bonfini
downright called the cardinal "the cause of all evil" whose death was the punish
ment of God.50

whereabouts D. Csânki, Magyarorszâg törte'nelmi földrajza a Hunyadiak kordban [Historical geo

graphy of Hungary in the age of the Hunyadis]. Vol. II. Budapest 1980-1913, 66.
48 "Pro cautela
ampliori": Dlugosz, XIII, 707.
49 The facsimile of the deed is published in Andor Munkdcs vdros
Sas, Szabadalmas
levéltdra [Archives of the free town of Munkacs], Munkacs 1927, 10. Today it is only available in
the transcript of Matthias made in 1458: DF 274 904.
50 "Malorum omnium auctorem": Bonfini, III, 151. See also Thuröczy, loc.cit.

Acta Orient Hunti-XLV1I, 1994

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 JANOS HUNYADI AND THE PEACE "OF SZEGED" (1444) 257

Some, however, knew or guessed more. They included Andreas Panno

nius, a noted theological writer, who submitted fatherly admonitions to Hunya
di's son King Matthias 23 years later, in 1467, exhorting him to adhere to the
Christian virtues.
Andreas Pannonius used to be Hunyadi's soldier for five years and it is
highly likely that he participated in the Varna campaign. Immediately afterwards
he broke with his secular past and entered the Carthusian order. One wonders if
he made this choice because he knew too much. At any rate, he settled in Italy,
devoted his life to the sciences and earned great famé as a theologian of human
istic érudition. In his exhortations he often mentions the king's father, always in
a tone of a devotee, yet in recalling the deeds of the hero, he could not restrain
himself from explicating his views on the oaths.
"First and foremost, wise king, I admonish you in the words of the apostle
Jacob: Never swear any oath". For, as Saint Augustine wams, although it is no
sin to pledge by something true, it is a very grave sin to pledge by something
false and, therefore, the Lord forbids true oaths as well. "Recall, Your Majesty",
he concludes, "the history of the Pannonians' country, and you will find, if I am
not mistaken, that Vladislav of blessed memory, king of the Pannonians, as well
as Your Majesty's father, the far-famed army commander, and some other illus
trious barons of the Pannonians pledged an oath in artful words to the ferocious
emperor of the Ottomans for the sake of a peace {pro foedere pacis componendo
saevissimo imperatori Thurcorum calliditate verborum iurasse), when the coun
try of the Pannonians got back two fortresses, Smederevo and Golubac. Then,
three months later, breaching the oath sworn in artful words by the peace treaty,
they attacked with an immense army the land of the Ottomans, and then the
réputation of Christians for credibility was lost among the heathen for ever."51

Sl Vilmos Fraknoi-Jenô Abel, Két magyarorszdgi ird a XV. Andreas

egyhâzi szdzadböl.
Pannonius, Nicolaus de Mirabilibus. [Two Hungarian ecclesiastic writers in the I5th Century]
Budapest 1886 (Irodalomtorténeti emlékek, I.) 19-22. Cf. Frakndi's introduction, XI sqq.

Actu Orient. Минц. XLVII, 1994

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