Transnational Media
Transnational Media
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Transnational Media:
Creating Consumers Worldwide
Herbert I. Schiller
By the end of the 1980s, "globalization" had become the term for accelerating
interdependence.... The primary agent of globalization is the transnational
corporation. The primary driving force is the revolution in information and
communication technologies.1
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that recent advances in communications have led to the
emergence of the
"global village," I do not believe that globalization of the
media industries sector has resulted in the formation of an inter national civil society as such.2 Rather, this process
has resulted in an international order organized by transnational economic inter ests that are largely
unaccountable to the nation-states in which they operate. This transnational corporate system is the product of
a rationalized and commercialized communications infrastruc ture, which transmits massive flows of information
and has ex tended its marketing reach to every corner of every hemisphere. While the U.S. role in the
creation and reproduction of this world wide consumer society has lessened, the supporting institutions and
the content of the information still bear a heavy American imprint.
The reality of American global information mastery was ingly on display throughout the war in
the Persian Gu ing the actual hostilities, one account — that of the transn
Sylvia Ostry, "The Domestic Domain: The New International Policy Transnational Corporations 1, no.l (February 1992) p.
7.
For an opposing perspective, see Mike Featherstone, ed., Global Culture (Ne Park, CA: Sage, 1990).
Journal of International Affairs, Summer 1993, 47, no. 1. ©The Trustees of Columbia U In the City of New York.
Journal of
International Affairs
U.S.-based Cable News Network (CNN) — dominated television
screens around the world.3 Though press interpretations of the war
may have varied from country to country, the broadcast images of
high technology combat were identical worldwide. However
remarkable a demonstration of the American informa
tion monopoly — now challenged by an expanded British Broad casting
Corporation (BBC) World Service Television and France's newly created
Euronews programming — even this barely sug gests the vast capabilities
of American broadcasters and U.S. based cultural industries to define
reality.
CNN's broadcasts are but one kind of image, sound and symbol
production. Such output also comes to us in the familiar forms of films,
television programs, video cassettes, compact discs, books, magazines,
on-line data and computer software. The transmis sion of this production
is neatly explained by Walter Wriston, former chief executive officer of Citicorp:
The single most powerful development in global communities has been the
satellite, bom a mere thirty-one years ago.... Satellites now bind the world for
better or worse, in an electronic infrastruc ture that carries news, money, and data
anywhere on the planet at the speed of light. Satellites have made borders
utterly porous to information.4
Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner and Herbert I. Schiller, Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in
the Persian Gulf: A Global Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1992) p. 12.
ibid., p. 130.
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Herbert I. Schiller
the strength and momentum of the forces of the market in the last decade of the
twentieth century are formidable. It therefore seems likely that the U.S. patterns
of commercial hegemony over broad casting will be gradually extended over
the entire globe.9
"America's Most Valuable Companies," Business Week, 1993 Special Bonus Issue,
passim.
Edward S. Herman, "The Externalities Effects of Commercial and Public Broadcasting," in
K. Nordenstreng & H.I. Schiller, eds., Beyond National Sovereignty: International Communications in
the 1990s (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1993) pp. 108-9.
ibid., p. 108.
ibid.
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ers
who dominate North American television screens.10 The American pop
cultural product has obvious hegemonic proper ties, which can be
attributed to a century of marketing experience and the rapid utilization of
state-of-the-art technologies to achieve compelling special effects.11
As Wriston enthusiastically makes clear, efforts by individual states to
protect and insulate their societies from these stimuli have been futile.
Global notions of what constitutes freedom, individual choice, a good life
and a desirable future come largely from their output. Because of market
imperatives, institutional infrastructures in country after country have been
recast to facil itate the transmission of the American informational and cultural
product.
Clearly, the media industries' unexceptional quest for profit
ability has had a direct — albeit immeasurable — impact on
human consciousness. While the ultimate effect of their cultural packages on the
human senses is impossible to assess concretely, the existence of the effect
cannot be ignored. The worldwide output of America's cultural industries
probably has as great an impact as any other form of American power.
Already it has actively assisted in the transformation of broadcasting and tele
communications systems around the world. People everywhere are
consumers of American images, sounds, ideas, products and services.
50
Herbert I. Schiller
spending for House seats by 427 Democrats, 416 Republicans and 294
candidates not affiliated with either party totalled $313.7 mil lion, compared
with about $220 million two years ago.... The combined spending for
House and Senate seats increased to $504
million in 1992, $113 more than in the same period two years ago.13
Herbert I. Schiller, Culture Inc., The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression (New Y ork: Oxford
University Press, 1989).
"Spending on Races for U.S. House Soars to a Record $313.7 Million," New York Times, 2 January
1993, p. 12.
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). First National Bank of
Boston et al. v. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al., 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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This and related rulings codified the pre-eminent role of corpo rate
expression in the contemporary American cultural land scape.
Corporate expression literally has no serious competition. Public
television, which was supposed to be a non-commercial
alternative to advertiser-supported television, has been co-opted by
sponsorship. Cable television, although receiving most of its revenues
from subscriptions, is steadily drawing more support from advertisers.
Given the overwhelming reliance of American
radio and television on commercial advertising, the domestic
informational system has become, in effect, a marketing and
ideological apparatus of corporate influence. Robert McÇhesney finds
that the media are the national and ultimate interpreters of reality;16 it is a
reality fashioned according to their own corporate advantage.
Media and cultural power, already awesome, is further en
hanced by its capability to define and present its own role to the public.
This self-constructed picture never fails to emphasize the objectivity,
dedication to the public interest and fragility of the cultural industries'
activities. Its hegemonic effect is evident: Cor
porate ascendancy, untouched by social accountability or federal
oversight, has gone almost unchallenged and largely unremarked in
the fora of public opinion.
As could be expected, the realm of permissible debate has
narrowed appreciably in recent decades. For all the talk shows,
personal witness programs and endless hours of sports spectacu lars
and crime dramas, the national discourse is astonishingly bland —
except insofar as personal accounts of behavioral ex cesses are
concerned — and almost totally reticent about the structural
determinants of American existence. Programming that might shed
some light on the country's deepening social crisis does not seem to
impress the program decision makers as worthy of much attention.
Only after South Central Los Angeles burned did the cameras turn —
and only briefly — to the Ameri can urban condition.
16. Robert W. McChesney, "Off Limits: An Inquiry Into the Lack of Debate over the Ownership,
Structure and Control of the Mass Media in U.S. Political Life," Communication 13 (1992)
pp. 1-19.
52
Herbert I. Schiller
Corporate Strategems
17. Herbert I. Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire (New York: A. Kelley, 1969; 2nd ed.,
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
53
18. Leslie Sklair, Sociology of the Global System (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins U Press, 1991).
54
Herbert I. Schiller
structures and systems on those of the developed nations. Such
dependence constitutes a serious threat to the preservation of our respective
cultures and indigenous life-styles.1
Third World efforts on behalf of the NWÏCO agenda crested in 1978; the
concept, however, was overwhelmingly rejected by the United States and its
few developed allies. Further, the unity of NWICO advocates was
shattered by a U.S. offer of limited assis tance for a development
program in communication technolo gies, calculated to win some Third
World support. This was complemented by a frontal assault —
concentrated in the West ern mass media — on the U.N. Educational,
Scientific and Cul tural Organization (UNESCO), which was an important
locus for NWICO advocates.20 This campaign culminated in the U.S. with
drawal from UNESCO in 1984, and was part of the Reagan
Administration's agenda to browbeat the international commu nity into
accepting U.S. global information policy.
Global corporate actors have sought to cripple other interna tional
agencies and state structures that might have served as shields against
unlimited transnational corporate power. For ex ample, in Europe there has
been unrelenting pressure to eliminate or marginalize the Post, Telephone
and Telecommunications enti ties (PTTs). These governmental bureaucracies,
for all their faults, at least represented in part national public communication
interests. Branded by their transnational corporate adversaries as "monop
olies," however, their authority has been eroded by liberalization and
privatization initiatives — advanced by the transnational corporate
sector and its allies. Their capability to monitor and prescribe the
behavior of the communication companies oper ating in their national
space has been largely lost and their survival is threatened. As the
Financial Times describes with manifest relish:
Speech delivered at the official opening of the Second Conference of Ministers of Information of
Non-Aligned Countries, Harare, Zimbabwe, 10 June 1987. A good summary of NWICO
argumentation and positions can be found in "Many Voices, One World," International
Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (New York: Unipub, 1980).
William Preston, Jr., Edward Herman and Herbert I. Schiller, Hope and Folly: The United States and
UNESCO, 1945-1985 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
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The European Commission will soon decide whether to abolish the
telephone monopolies which exist in most member states. Its deci
sion will not only be a watershed for telecommunications but will
also define its overall attitude to public monopolies.... The Com
mission has already taken small steps down the path of liberaliza
tion. . .but Europe has already waited long enough and nothing less
than full competition will do.21
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Herbert I. Schiller
operations. Writing from a Third World perspective, which derives
from centuries of colonial oppression, Chakravarthi Raghavan explains
this seemingly benign move:
.. .among all the fora for dealing with such issues, the Third World countries are
the weakest inside GATT, in terms of collective orga nization and
bargaining.... Unlike UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development], U.N. or other parts of the U.N. system, inside GATT there is
only a tenuous informal group of less devel oped contracting parties
[countries] that meets from time to time to exchange information....27
26. Chakravarthi Raghavan, Recolonization: GATT, the Uruguay Round and the Third World (London:
Zed Books, 1990).
27. ibid., pp. 60-1.
28. William Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility: Transborder Data Flow and National Sovereignty," in
Nordenstreng and Schiller, pp. 259-313.
57
Conclusion
Publicly unaccountable media-cultural power toda tutes the
ultimate "Catch-22" situation. The public in mands information
that is, however, dependent on priv providers whose own interests
are often incompatible.3 to confront this condition is the one of the
greatest cha the next century.
29. The U.N. Centre for Transnational Corporations was reorganized and pu
58