SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 208318, June 30, 2021 ]

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE UNDERSECRETARY

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, PETITIONERS, VS. GOLD
MARK SEA CARRIERS, INC., AS THE REGISTERED OWNER OF THE
BARGE "CHERYL ANN,"* RESPONDENT.
DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

Antecedents
OSM Shipping Phils., Inc. (OSM) entered into a Tow Hire Agreement with Fuel Zone Filipinas
Corporation (Fuel Zone) for the barge "Cheryl Ann" which contained used oil for discharge or unloading
in Manila.[1] The barge was chartered by Fuel Zone from its registered owner, respondent Gold Mark Sea
Carriers, Inc. (Gold Mark).[2]
On August 23, 2006, OSM's M/T Jacob 1 towed the barge from the Republic of Palau all the way to the
Port of Surigao where it temporarily stopped for emergency bunkering as it was allegedly running low on
fuel and food provisions and was having a mechanical problem.
OSM notified the Port authorities and concerned agencies of the anchorage of M/T Jacob 1 at the Surigao
City wharf and requested assistance pertaining to its entry and clearance formalities. The Surigao City
Immigration Officer, the Bureau of Quarantine, and other pertinent government agencies later granted
M/T Jacob 1 clearance to depart for Manila or Cebu for repairs as these cannot be done in Surigao. [3]
Even so, the Philippine Coast Guard, upon request of the District Collector of the Port of Surigao, stepped
in and detained M/T Jacob 1 and the barge because of a report that the barge contained a prohibited cargo
of used oil, sans the required importation permit from the government agency concerned. After due
proceedings, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention docketed S.I. No. 01-2006 was issued on the barge and
the cargo. A Supplemental Warrant of Seizure and Detention was also issued on M/T Jacob 1 docketed
S.I. No. 01-2006-A relative to the importation, conveyance, and/or transport of unlawful materials in
violation of Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended.
During the seizure proceedings, the parties agreed that the cases against the tugboat and the barge shall
separately proceed pertaining to the illegal importation. [4] But only OSM participated in the proceedings,
during which, it adduced evidence on its behalf. Gold Mark, the registered owner of the barge, did not. [5]
By Order[6] dated December 18, 2006, the District Collector of the Port of Surigao ruled, as follows, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the assailed Supplemental
[W]arrant of Seizure and Detention issued against the tugboat M/Tug "JACOB 1" and the barge
"CHERYL ANN" be DISMISSED for lack of legal and factual bases and that subject vessels be
RELEASED to their respective registered owners, OSM Shipping Phils., Inc. for M/T "JACOB 1" and
Gold Mark Sea Carriers, Inc., for barge "CHERYL ANN," upon proper identification, compliance with
existing rules and regulations and subject to final approval of the Commissioner of Customs pursuant to
Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. [7]
On April 13, 2007, a Disposition Form,[8] as approved by Customs Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales
(Commissioner Morales), affirmed with modification the ruling of the District Collector. He
recommended to the Secretary of Finance the continued detention and immediate forfeiture of the barge
"Cheryl Ann." Commissioner Morales found that there was prima facie evidence of violation of Section
2530 of the TCCP when the barge entered the Philippine jurisdiction carrying used oil without the
necessary importation clearances from the concerned government agencies. Since Gold Mark did not
participate in the seizure proceedings despite notice, it failed to rebut the prima facie evidence of the
imputed violation. Thus, there was sufficient basis to seize and forfeit the barge and the cargo.
By 3rd Indorsement[9] dated May 9, 2007, the Department of Finance, through Undersecretary Gaudencio
A. Mendoza, Jr. affirmed the recommendation of Commissioner Morales.
Accordingly, on May 17, 2007, Commissioner Morales issued a 4 th Indorsement[10] directing the District
Collector of Port of Surigao to implement the 3rd Indorsement dated May 9, 2007.
Aggrieved, Gold Mark sought affirmative relief via a petition for review[11] with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA)-Third Division docketed CTA Case No. 7671.
Ruling of the CTA-Third Division
By Decision[12] dated February 17, 2011, the CTA-Third Division ruled in favor of Gold Mark, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the 3rd Indorsement dated
May 9, 2007 issued by the Department of Finance, Undersecretary of the Legal and Revenue Operations
Group, Gaudencio A. Mendoza, and the 4 th Indorsement dated May 17, 2007 issued by the Bureau of
Customs, Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales, insofar as barge "Cheryl Ann" is concerned, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Commissioner of Customs is hereby ORDERED to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the barge "Cheryl Ann" to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The CTA declared that there was no evidence to prove that the barge intended to defraud the government.
The barge was not shown to have committed or attempted to commit illegal importation as to justify its
forfeiture. As a non-motorized vessel, the barge was only forced to enter the Port of Surigao because the
tugboat navigating it needed emergency repairs. In consonance with the axiom the accessory follows the
principal, the barge as an accessory should likewise be released from liability as the principal, the tugboat
was declared exempt from the penalty of forfeiture, applying Section 2530 of the TCCP.
The government's motion for reconsideration was denied under Resolution[14] dated August 23, 2011.
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On the government's petition for review,[15] the CTA En Banc affirmed under Decision[16] dated December
20, 2012. It sustained the factual finding of the CTA Third Division that the barge was merely an
accessory of the principal, the tugboat M/T Jacob 1. Thus, the release of the tugboat from forfeiture
should also be accorded to the barge.
It further ruled that despite its Charter Agreement with the cargo owner, the barge remained to be a
common carrier which simply transported the cargo (used oil) for compensation. A time charter or voyage
charter will not convert a common carrier into a private carrier. Being a common carrier, not chartered or
leased, it is exempt from forfeiture under Section 2530(a) of the TCCP.
Too, it rejected the government's belated theory that carrying hazardous unit was malum prohibitum under
Republic Act No. 6969 (RA 6969) or the Toxic Substances and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990. It
ruled that the government's invocation of this theory for the first time on motion for reconsideration came
too late in the day, hence, should be barred.
By Resolution[17] dated June 17, 2013, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. The CTA En
Banc noted that the tugboat had already been released upon order of the Pollution Adjudication Board of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The Present Petition
[18]
The government, through the Commissioner of Customs and the Department of Finance, now faults the
CTA En Banc for allegedly committing reversible error when it allowed the release of the barge, albeit it
was used to carry and transport the illegal importation of used oil from Palau for unloading or discharge
in the Philippines. The government posits that Gold Mark failed to rebut the prima facie evidence of
illegal importation. It did not present any controverting evidence during the forfeiture proceedings
showing that it had the necessary permit and licenses to import used oil into the Philippines. On the
contrary, its charter agreement with the tugboat M/T Jacob 1 and the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) special permit[19] covering the transaction both revealed that the indicated destination of the
barge was Manila, not Malaysia. Hence, the intent to unload the cargo in the Philippines was amply
proven.
Too, the principle of accessory follows the principal does not apply in the case of the tugboat and the
barge here. For each of these two (2) had a separate obligation to comply – the tugboat, under the tow hire
agreement, and the barge, under its charter agreement with the cargo owner. If at all, the barge should be
considered the principal insofar as the prohibited cargo is concerned as it carried the greater valued
property; the tugboat merely acted as an accessory.
As for the application of RA 6969, Gold Mark and the tugboat owner knew their common violation under
the law. In fact, Gold Mark admitted that on behalf of the tugboat M/T Jacob 1, OSM paid a fine of
P50,000.00 to the Pollution Adjudication Board of DENR, for which the tugboat was subsequently
cleared by the Bureau of Quarantine. Precisely, OSM paid the fine because it was fully aware of its
violation under the law. Consequently, Gold Mark cannot plead ignorance of this violation, let alone, fault
the government for purportedly bringing to fore this violation only in its motion for reconsideration
before the CTA En Banc.
Under Resolution[20] dated August 14, 2013, the Court granted the government's prayer for temporary
restraining order against the implementation of the herein assailed Decision dated December 20, 2012 and
Resolution dated June 17, 2013.
In yet another Resolution[21] dated November 14, 2016, the Court dispensed with respondent's comment
on the petition due to the latter's failure to file the same despite the Court's repeated directive.
Issue
DID THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DECLARED THAT THE BARGE "CHERYL ANN" WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL
IMPORTATION?
Discussion
The findings of fact of the CTA are generally regarded as final, binding, and conclusive upon this Court.
This is because by the very nature of its functions, the CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and
consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. As a rule,
therefore, its factual findings shall not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal. [22]
By way of exception though, a review of these factual findings by the Court is warranted when the CTA,
as in this case, was shown to have disregarded relevant facts and evidence, which if considered, would
alter the final outcome of the case. Here, the CTA En Banc disregarded the ample evidence on record,
indicating a clear intent to commit illegal importation which otherwise warrants the forfeiture of the barge
"Cheryl Ann."
Section 1202 of the TCCP, as amended provides:
Section 1202. When Importation Begins and Deemed Terminated. - Importation begins when the
carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unlade therein.
Importation is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes and other charges due upon the
articles, or secured to be paid, at a port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been
granted, or in case said articles are free of duties, taxes and other charges, until they have legally left the
jurisdiction of the customs. (Emphasis supplied)
The act of importation commences from the time the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the Philippine
territory and the carrying vessel or aircraft unloads or intends to unload the article or goods in the
Philippines. Thus, mere intent to unload into the Philippines consummates importation. [23] Intent, being a
state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and
therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct, and attendant circumstances. [24]
Contrary to the findings of the CTA En Banc, the cargo of barge "Cheryl Ann" was not bound for
Malaysia, but in truth, was bound to unload its cargo in the Philippines. Consider:
First. The Charter Agreement[25] between Fuels Zone and Gold Mark in no uncertain terms, indicated that
the cargo will be discharged in the Philippines, viz.:
CHARTER AGREEMENT
(TIME CHARTER)
CHARTERER OW
NE
R/
OP
ER
AT
OR
FUELS ZONE FILIPINAS CORP. GO
LD
MA
RK
SE
A
CA
RRI
ER
S
INC
.
Suite 2048 Unit 33 Bldg. A Unit
SM Megamall, Edsa 8,
Mandaluyong Gol
d
Par
k
Cen
ter
88
Mer
alco
Ave
.,
Pasi
g
City

CARGO .... Use

BARGE NAME .... d
TIME CHARTER RATE .... Oil
CAPACITY .... Bar
LOADING POINT .... ge
DISCHARGE POINT .... Che
x x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied) ry1
Ann
e
Php
850,
000.
 00
2,00
0,00
0
liter
s
Pala
u
Phil
ippi
nes
While there was a finding that the tugboat was en route to Malaysia, the same did not alter the fact that
the barge, together with its cargo, had only one (1) destination, the Philippines.
Too, the MARINA special permit issued to OSM for this specific towing arrangement likewise showed
that there was only one place where the cargo was to be discharged - Manila, thus:
Pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 474 and in view of the application dated 09 June
2006 by OSM SHIPPING PHILS., INC. a company duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, owner/operator of the ships M/Tug "Jacob 1" and Barge "Cheryl Ann[e]" of 208.00 and
796.99 gross tonnage burden, respectively duly documented for domestic trade: PERMISSION are hereby
granted for the said ships to engage temporarily in the overseas trade subject to the following conditions:
1. That the ships' overseas operations shall be up to 19 September 2006 only for the towing of
empty barge from Manila to Palau and to discharge used oil loaded in the barge from Palau-
Iloilo-Manila;
x x x x[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, records showed that all along, the Philippines, no other, was the only and final destination of the
illegal importation of used oil on board the barge "Cheryl Ann." It was an illegal importation because it
was not covered by a corresponding importation permit in violation of existing laws and rules and
regulations.
In forfeiture proceedings, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [28] Here, the
government had sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt to commit it,
was done by loading the items on the barge "Cheryl Ann" for transport to and unloading in the
Philippines. The use of the barge to transport the illegal importation warranted the forfeiture of both the
barge and the illegal cargo pursuant to Section 2530 of the TCCP.
Second. Section 2530 (a) and (k) of the TCCP command that any vessel or cargo used in illegal
importation or exportation into or from the Philippines shall be subjected to forfeiture, thus:
SECTION 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Laws. — Any vehicle, vessel
or aircraft, cargo, article and other objects shall, under the following conditions be subjected to
forfeiture:
a. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which shall be used unlawfully in the importation
or exportation of articles or in conveying and/or transporting contraband or smuggled articles in
commercial quantities into or from any Philippine port or place. The mere carrying or holding on
board of contraband or smuggled articles in commercial quantities shall subject such vessel, vehicle,
aircraft, or any other craft to forfeiture: Provided, That the vessel, or aircraft or any other craft is not
used as duly authorized common carrier and as such a carrier it is not chartered or leased;
xxxx
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the transport of articles subject to forfeiture under the
tariff and customs laws, with its equipage or trappings, and any vehicle similarly used, together
with its equipage and appurtenances including the beast, steam or other motive power drawing or
propelling the same. The mere conveyance of contraband or smuggled articles by such beast or vehicle
shall be sufficient cause for the outright seizure and confiscation of such beast or vehicle but the
forfeiture shall not be effected if it is established that the owner of the means of conveyance used as
aforesaid, is engaged as common carrier and not chartered or leased, or his agent in charge thereof
at the time, has no knowledge of the unlawful act;
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Gold Mark argues that it is exempt from forfeiture under Section 2530(a) of the TCCP because it is a
common carrier and not "merely carrying or holding on board of contraband or smuggled articles in
commercial quantities." The CTA even agreed that its Charter Agreement, being a time charter or voyage
charter, did not operate to convert it to a private carrier.
To be exempt from forfeiture, Section 2530(a) and (k) of the TCCP explicitly require that the vessel be a
common carrier, not a chartered or leased vessel. Here, Gold Mark's Charter Agreement with the cargo
owner belies its claim that it is exempt from forfeiture under Section 2530. The law does not distinguish
the type of charter agreement. When the law does not distinguish, neither should the court. [29] So long as
the vessel is leased or chartered, it is no longer exempt from forfeiture under Section 2530(a) and (k).
As shown here, Gold Mark's vessel was leased by the cargo owner and used to transport the
undocumented cargo from Palau and actually entered the Philippine port. Indubitably, it is subject to
forfeiture under Section 2530 of the TCCP. As it was, Gold Mark failed to adduce other evidence to
disprove its knowledge and participation in the unlawful importation of the cargo owner.
Nonetheless, we agree with the CTA En Banc that the government is already barred from raising the
malum prohibitum character of carrying and transporting into the country the subject item per RA 6969 or
the Toxic Substances and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990. For the government belatedly raised the
issue for the first time only on motion for reconsideration.
Well settled is the rule that a party cannot change its theory of the case or cause of action on appeal. Thus,
a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not
hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental
tenets of fair play.[30]
At any rate, the forfeiture of the barge "Cheryl Ann" being in accordance with law and the evidence
remains in place.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 20, 2012 and the
Resolution dated June 17, 2013 in CTA EB No. 825 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 3rd
Indorsement dated May 9, 2007 of the Department of Finance, through Undersecretary of the Legal and
Revenue Operations Group, Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr.; and the 4 th Indorsement dated May 17, 2007 of
the Bureau of Customs through Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales, both ordering the seizure and
forfeiture of the barge "Cheryl Ann" in favor of the government are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
M. Lopez, Rosario, and J. Lopez,** JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe (Chairperson), S.A.J., with concurring opinion.
*
Sometimes referred to as "Anne," in rollo.
**
Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.
[1]
Rollo, p. 12.
[2]
Id. at 167.
[3]
Id. at 12-13.
[4]
Id. at 12.
[5]
Id. at 125.
[6]
Id. at 13.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id. at 120-126.
[9]
Id. at 127.
[10]
Id. at 128.
[11]
Id. at 129-142.
[12]
Penned by Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and concurred in by Associate Justices Olga Palanca-
Enriquez and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, id. at 290-308.
[13]
Id. at 308.
[14]
Id. at 333-337.
[15]
Id. at 338-376.
[16]
Penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Ernesto D.
Acosta and Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Esperanza R.
Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, id. at 11-27.
[17]
Id. at 115-119.
[18]
Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (now
a retired member of the Court), Assistant Solicitor General Thomas M. Laragan, Senior State Solicitor
Nyriam Susan O. Sedillo-Hernandez (now an Assistant Solicitor General).
[19]
Rollo, pp. 224-225.
[20]
Id. at 463.
[21]
Id. at 499-500.
[22]
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 230016, November 23, 2020.
[23]
7107 Islands Shipping Corp. v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 215051 (Notice), September 30, 2020.
[24]
Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 1143, 1152-1153 (1991).
[25]
Rollo, pp. 167-169.
[26]
Id. at 167.
[27]
Id. at 224.
[28]
Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24, at 1152.
[29]
See Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez, G.R. No. 197126, January 19, 2021.
[30]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 535 Phil. 481, 490 (2006) citing
Mon v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 65, 73-75 (2004).

CONCURRING OPINION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur. Contrary to the Court of Tax Appeals' (CTA) holding, the Indorsements issued by the
Department of Finance (DOF) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) ordering the seizure and forfeiture of
respondent's barge "Cheryl Ann" in favor of the government should be reinstated.
However, I take this opportunity to convey my thoughts on Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines (TCCP) as applied to this case. The provision reads:
a. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which shall be used unlawfully in the importation or
exportation of articles or in conveying and/or transporting contraband or smuggled articles in commercial
quantities into or from any Philippine port or place. The mere carrying or holding on board of contraband
or smuggled articles in commercial quantities shall subject such vessel, vehicle, aircraft or any other craft
to forfeiture; Provided, That the vessel, aircraft or any other craft is not used as duly authorized
common carrier and as such a carrier it is not chartered or leased; (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring
supplied)
To recount, respondent, in this case, mainly contended that the illegal articles, albeit found in its barge
"Cheryl Ann," is not sufficient to create a prima facie case against it for violation of Section 2530 (a) of
the TCCP. Citing the proviso "Provided, That the vessel, aircraft or any other craft is not used as duly
authorized common carrier and as such a carrier it is not chartered or leased," respondent claims that it
is a common carrier, which thus exempts it from liability for "mere carrying or holding on board of
contraband or smuggled articles in commercial quantities." As proof thereof, respondent presented its
Certificate of Registry and Certificate of Ownership.[1]
For its part, the CTA En Banc concurred with respondent's argument and declared it a common carrier
exempt from the application of Section 2530 (a) of the TCCP, notwithstanding the existence of the
Charter Agreement.[2]
I disagree with the CTA's ruling.
At the onset, it should be borne in mind that the rationale behind the proviso "Provided, That the vessel,
aircraft or any other craft is not used as duly authorized common carrier and as such a carrier it is not
chartered or leased" stems from the recognition that common carriers are, by the very nature of their
business, imbued with public interest. [3] Since common carriers are expected to offer their services to the
general public indiscriminately,[4] it would have lesser control over sneaked-in goods/articles brought by
the multitude of incoming and outgoing passengers that are able to board the vessel. Thus, as embodied in
the limiting proviso, it is reasonable to not "subject such vessel, vehicle, aircraft or any other craft to
forfeiture" by the "[t]he mere carrying or holding on board of contraband or smuggled articles in
commercial quantities." To my mind, this situation (i.e., being a common carrier that is not chartered or
leased) is in stark contrast to the situation of private carriers, or common carriers which are chartered or
leased, which, because of their private nature or the limitations brought about by the chartering or lease,
are expected to have greater control over the goods/articles onboard the vessel.
Applying the foregoing, records disclose that respondent's barge was subject to a Charter Agreement. The
CTA En Banc tried to bypass this qualification by stating that the Charter Agreement did not operate to
convert respondent to a private carrier.[5] However, this interpretation does not square with the express
wording of Section 2530 (a) of the TCCP, which, for the proviso to operate, requires that the carrier
is not only a common carrier, but one which is not chartered or leased. It is well-settled that "when
the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation."[6] Further, "[w]here the law provided no qualification for the granting of the privilege, the
court is not at liberty to supply any."[7]
Hence, despite respondent's evidence that it is a common carrier, the presence of a Charter Agreement
negated its refuge sought under the proviso found in Section 2530 (a) of the TCCP. Moreover, respondent
glaringly failed to adduce any other evidence to disprove its knowledge and participation in the unlawful
importation of the cargo owners in this case. As such, the forfeiture of its vessel, as a consequence of its
unlawful importation under Section 2530 (a) of the TCCP, must be reinstated.
For another, the CTA En Banc supported its conclusion that respondent's barge "Cheryl Ann" had no
intent to unload in the Philippines by applying the legal principle of "accessory follows the principal", i.e.,
that the barge was a mere accessory to the tugboat. It emphasized that the barge could not control its own
destination, being merely tied up to the tugboat.[8]
However, I express reservations on the application of the principle of "accessory follows the principal" in
this case, considering that its jurisprudential application is ordinarily related to controversies involving
property law. As regarded in property law, the principle is meant to settle ownership disputes over
properties which have merged by virtue of the right of accession.[9]
In any event, there is nothing in the relevant provisions of the TCCP which would suggest that the
liability for the conveyance for unlawful importation can be premised on the application of the principle
of "the accessory follows the principal." In fact, the TCCP provisions on seizure or forfeiture render liable
each conveyance bearing illegal goods/articles, to wit:[10]
SECTION 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and Customs Law. - Any vehicle, vessel or
aircraft, cargo, article and other objects shall, under the following conditions be subject to forfeiture:
a. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which shall be used unlawfully in the importation or
exportation of articles or in conveying and/or transporting contraband or smuggled articles in
commercial quantities into or from any Philippine port or place. The mere carrying or holding on board
of contraband or smuggled articles in commercial quantities shall subject such vessel, vehicle, aircraft or
any other craft to forfeiture; Provided, That the vessel, aircraft or any other craft is not used as duly
authorized common carrier and as such a carrier it is not chartered or leased;
xxxx
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the transport of articles subject to forfeiture under the
tariff and customs laws, with its equipage or trappings, and any vehicle similarly used, together with its
equipage and appurtenances including the beast, steam or other motive power drawing or propelling
the same. The mere conveyance of contraband or smuggled articles by such beast or vehicle shall be
sufficient cause for the outright seizure and confiscation of such beast or vehicle, but the forfeiture shall
not be effected if it is established that the owner of the means of conveyance used as aforesaid, is engaged
as common carrier and not chartered or leased, or his agent in charge thereof at the time, has no
knowledge of the unlawful act;
xxxx
SECTION 2531. Properties Not Subject to Forfeiture in the Absence of Prima Facie Evidence. - The
forfeiture of the vehicle, vessel, or aircraft shall not be effected if it is established that the owner thereof
or his agent in charge of the means of conveyance used as aforesaid has no knowledge of or
participation in the unlawful act: Provided, however, That a prima facie presumption shall exist against
the vessel, vehicle or aircraft under any of the following circumstances: x x x (Emphases supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition.

[1]
Rollo, p. 21.
[2]
Id. at 21-22.
[3]
Luque v. Villegas, 141 Phil. 108, 122 (1969), citing Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil. 1,
18-19 (1915).
[4]
Article 1732 of the Civil Code, reads:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering
their services to the public.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[6]
Bolos v. Bolos, 648 Phil. 630, 637 (2010).
[7]
Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company, 168 Phil. 119, 123 (1977).
[8]
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[9]
Villasi v. Garcia, 724 Phil. 519, 531 (2014). See also, Articles 440, 466, and 470 of the New Civil
Code.
[10]
See Presidential Decree No. 1464 or the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (June 11, 1978).

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