“Chinese companies are leading the way in the experimentation of generative AI”

Their only arg in this card is that right now the us is actively implementing ai more, even if that is true it
doesn’t matter cause their own card agrees that Chinese is leading in the experimentation ie the
innovation of AI. We say that if china thinks they are ahead in tech innovation, that would be the
experimentation of ai so their card agrees. Furthermore, even in that card it doesn’t say that America is
ahead in tech leadership it just says that to get the benefits of ai you have to implement it and the us is
doing it more, It doesn’t matter because china is leading the innovation of the technology and even if
they aren’t, we still prove that they think they are ahead and according to our card china does and will
think they are ahead. And our card is even outdated it is from 2023 the same year as them.
Tech
 US Ahead Now
China is winning the tech race now
Hurst 23 — Daniel Hurst is Guardian Australia's foreign affairs and defence correspondent. Daniel
Hurst “China leading US in technology race in all but a few fields, thinktank finds," 3-2-2023,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/02/china-leading-us-in-technology-race-in-all-but-a-
few-fields-thinktank-finds, accessed 6-25-2023 WMK

The United States and other western countries are losing the race with China to develop advanced
technologies and retain talent, with Beijing potentially establishing a monopoly in some areas, a new report has
said.

China leads in 37 of 44 technologies tracked in a year-long project by thinktank the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute. The fields include electric batteries, hypersonics and advanced radio-frequency communications such as 5G and 6G.

The report, published on Thursday, said the US was the leader in just the remaining seven technologies such as
vaccines, quantum computing and space launch systems.

It said the findings were based on “high impact” research in critical and emerging technology fields,
focusing on papers that were published in top-tier journals and were highly cited by subsequent
research.

“Our research reveals that China

has built the foundations to position itself as the world’s leading science and
technology superpower, by establishing a sometimes stunning lead in high-impact research across the
majority of critical and emerging technology domains,” the report said.

“The critical technology tracker shows that, for some technologies, all of the world’s top 10 leading
research institutions are based in China and are collectively generating nine times more high-impact
research papers than the second-ranked country (most often the US).”

The Chinese Academy of Sciences ranked first or second in most of the 44 technologies included in the
tracker, the report added.

“We alsosee China’s efforts being bolstered through talent and knowledge import: one-fifth of its high-
impact papers are being authored by researchers with postgraduate training in a Five-Eyes country,” it
said, referring to the intelligence-sharing grouping of the US, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand.

“China’s lead is the product of deliberate design and long-term policy planning, as repeatedly outlined by Xi
Jinping and his predecessors.”

Chinese innovation out-paces America now

Magnier 23 — Mark Magnier is a US correspondent based in New York City. Before joining the Post,
he worked for the Wall Street Journal in China and for the Los Angeles Times in India, China and Japan.
Mark Magnier, "China beating US in key innovation metric, evolving from ‘imitator’: report," South China
Morning Post, 1-24-2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3207812/china-surpassing-us-
key-innovation-metric-and-evolving-imitator-washington-report-says, accessed 6-26-2023 WMK

China has often been dismissed by industrialised nations as a country that is adept at copying but weak
at creating, crippled by a memorisation-based education system, excessive respect for authority and a tendency to steal
intellectual property. But a study released on Monday finds that China has surpassed the US in one key measure of
innovation and is making major strides in another.

The report by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a

non-partisan Washington-based think tank focused on
US science and technology policy, found that China’s innovation in 2020 was 139 per cent of its US equivalent , up
from 78 per cent in 2010.

And based on another metric accounting for the comparative size of their economies and populations,
China’s innovation output was three-quarters of US levels , up from 58 per cent in 2010.

“China is evolving from an imitator to an innovator, following a path blazed by its Asian Tiger neighbours
– but at a much larger scale, with far greater geopolitical consequences ,” said Robert Atkinson, the foundation’s
president, who co-authored the report along with research assistant Ian Clay.

China has already displayed great potential for global leadership in several key areas, including
supercomputers, space exploration, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and high-speed rail .
 Ext---Tech Leadership !
Losing the tech race causes extinction
Jain et al. 19, senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he oversees
the Atlantic Council’s Democratic Order Initiative and D10 Strategy Forum; and Matthew Kroenig,
deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of
government and foreign service at Georgetown University (Ash, “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global
Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System,” Atlantic Council,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf )

The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed.
Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D
printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT),
5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great
benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in
the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous
weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s way. Yet, AI is also transforming economies and
societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of
driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been
driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and
provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select
and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction .
The other technologies on this list similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D
printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a
return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue
states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races
and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or
wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile
defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability.
Perhaps the greatest risk to global strategic stability from new technology , however, comes from the risk that
revisionist autocracies may win the new tech arms race. Throughout history, states that have dominated the
commanding heights of technological progress have also dominated international relations. The United States has been the world’s
innovation leader from Edison’s light bulb to nuclear weapons and the Internet. Accordingly, stability has been maintained in
Europe and Asia for decades because the United States and its democratic allies possessed a favorable
economic and military balance of power in those key regions. Many believe, however, that China may now have the lead in the
new technologies of the twenty-first century, including AI, quantum, 5G, hypersonic missiles, and others. If China succeeds in
mastering the technologies of the future before the democratic core, then this could lead to a drastic and
rapid shift in the balance of power, upsetting global strategic stability, and the call for a democratic-
led, rules-based system outlined in these pages.63
 Ext---Tech Leadership !---Taiwan
Falling behind in the tech race causes quick Taiwan invasion ---there’s no risk of AI
accidents, only a destabilizing power transition
Horowitz et al. 22 — Michael C. Horowitz Richard Perry Professor and Director of Perry World House
at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow for Defense Technology and Innovation at the
Council on Foreign Relations. Lauren Kahn is a Research Fellow focusing on defense innovation and
emerging technologies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Laura Resnick Samotin s Postdoctoral
Research Scholar in National Security and Intelligence Studies at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War
and Peace Studies at Columbia University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s
New American Engagement Initiative. “A Force for the Future. A High-Reward, Low-Risk Approach to AI
Military Innovation” Foreign Affairs. May/June 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2022-04-19/force-future WMK
Gunpowder. The combustion engine. The airplane. These are just some of the technologies that have forever changed the face of warfare.
Now, the
world is experiencing another transformation that could redefine military strength : the
development of artificial intelligence (AI).

Merging AI with warfare may sound like science fiction, but

AI is at the center of nearly all advances in defense
technology today. It will shape how militaries recruit and train soldiers, how they deploy forces, and how they fight.
China, Germany, Israel, and the United States have all used AI to create real-time visualizations of active battlefields. Russia has deployed AI to
make deepfake videos and spread disinformation about its invasion of Ukraine. As the Russian-Ukrainian war continues, both parties could use
algorithms to analyze large swaths of open-source data coming from social media and the battlefield, allowing them to better calibrate their
attacks.

The United States is the world’s preeminent technological powerhouse, and in theory, the rise of AI presents
the U.S. military with huge opportunities. But as of now, it is posing risks. Leading militaries often grow
overconfident in their ability to win future wars, and there are signs that the U.S. Department of Defense could be
falling victim to complacency. Although senior U.S. defense leaders have spent decades talking up the importance of emerging technologies,
including AI and autonomous systems, action on the ground has been painfully slow. For example, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy joined forces starting in 2003
to create the X-45 and X-47A prototypes: semiautonomous, stealthy uncrewed aircraft capable of conducting surveillance and military strikes. But many military
leaders viewed them as threats to the F-35 fighter jet, and the air force dropped out of the program. The navy then funded an even more impressive prototype, the
X-47B, able to fly as precisely as human-piloted craft. But the navy, too, saw the prototypes as threats to crewed planes and eventually backed away,
instead moving forward with an unarmed, uncrewed aircraft with far more limited capabilities.

The United States’ slow action stands in stark contrast to the behavior of China, Washington’s most
powerful geopolitical rival. Over the last few years, China has invested roughly the same amount as the United
States has in AI research and development, but it is more aggressively integrating the technology into
its military strategy, planning, and systems—potentially to defeat the United States in a future war. It has
developed an advanced, semiautonomous weaponized drone that it is integrating into its forces—unlike how
Washington dropped the X-45, the X-47A, and the X-47B. Russia is also developing AI-enabled military technology that
could threaten opposing forces and critical infrastructure (so far absent from its campaign against Ukraine). Unless
Washington does more to integrate AI into its military, it may find itself outgunned.
But although falling behind on AI could jeopardize U.S. power, speeding ahead is not without risks. There are analysts and developers who fear
that AI advancements could lead to serious accidents, including algorithmic malfunctions that could cause civilian casualties on the battlefield.
There are experts who have even suggested that incorporating machine intelligence into nuclear command and control could make nuclear
accidents more likely. This is unlikely—most nuclear powers seem to recognize the danger of mixing AI with
launch systems—and right now, Washington’s biggest concern should be that it is moving too slowly . But
some of the world’s leading researchers believe that the Defense Department is ignoring safety and reliability issues associated with AI, and the
Pentagon must take their concerns seriously. Successfully capitalizing on AI requires the U.S. military to innovate at a pace that is both safe and
fast, a task far easier said than done.

The Biden administration is taking positive steps toward this goal. It created the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force,
which is charged with spreading access to research tools that will help promote AI innovation for both the military and the overall economy. It
has also created the position of chief digital and artificial intelligence officer in the Department of Defense; that officer will be tasked with
ensuring that the Pentagon scales up and expedites its AI efforts.

But if the White House wants to move with responsible speed, it must take further measures. Washington will need to focus
on making sure researchers have access to better—and more—Department of Defense data, which will fuel effective algorithms. The Pentagon
must reorganize itself so that its agencies can easily collaborate and share their findings. It should also create incentives to attract more STEM
talent, and it must make sure its personnel know they won’t be penalized if their experiments fail. At the same time, the Department of
Defense should run successful projects through a gauntlet of rigorous safety testing before it implements them. That way, the United States can
rapidly develop a panoply of new AI tools without worrying that they will create needless danger.

FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE

Technological innovation has long been critical to the United States’ military success. During the American Civil
War, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln used the North’s impressive telegraph system to communicate with his generals, coordinate strategy, and
move troops, helping the Union defeat the Confederacy. In the early 1990s, Washington deployed new, precision-guided munitions in the
Persian Gulf War to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.

But history shows that military innovation is not simply the process of creating and using new technology. Instead, it entails reworking how
states recruit troops, organize their militaries, plan operations, and strategize. In the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, France and Germany both
developed tanks, trucks, and airpower. During World War II, Germany used the combined potential of these innovations (along with the radio)
to carry out its infamous blitzkriegs: aggressive offensive strikes that quickly overwhelmed its enemies. France, by contrast, invested most of its
resources in the Maginot Line, a series of forts along the French-German border. French leaders believed they had created an impenetrable
boundary that would hold off any attempted German invasion. Instead, the Nazis simply maneuvered around the line by going through Belgium
and the Ardennes forest. With its best units concentrated elsewhere, poor communication, and outdated plans for how to fight, France swiftly
fell.

It is not a coincidence that France didn’t gamble with new military systems. France was a World War I victor, and leading military powers often
forgo innovation and resist disruptive change. In 1918, the British navy invented the first aircraft carrier, but the world’s then dominant sea
power treated these ships mostly as spotters for its traditional battleships rather than as mobile bases for conducting offensives. Japan, by
contrast, used its aircraft carriers to bring attack planes directly to its fights. As a result, the British navy struggled against the Japanese in the
Pacific, and ultimately, Japan had to be pushed back by another rising power: the United States. Before and throughout World War II, the U.S.
Navy experimented with new technology, including aircraft carriers, in ways that helped it become the decisive force in the Atlantic and the
Pacific. But today, the United States risks being more like the United Kingdom—or even France. The Defense Department appears to be biased
in favor of tried-and-true capabilities over new tools, and its pace of innovation has slowed: the time it takes to move new technology from the
lab and to the battlefield went from roughly five years, on average, in the early 1960s to a decade or more today. Sometimes, the
Pentagon has seemingly dragged its feet on AI and autonomous systems because it fears that adopting those
technologies could require disruptive changes that would threaten existing, successful parts of the armed forces, as the story of
the X-45, the X-47A, and the X-47B clearly illustrates. Some projects have struggled to even make it off the drawing board. Multiple experiments
have shown that Loyal Wingman, an uncrewed aircraft that employs AI, can help aircraft groups better coordinate their attacks. But the U.S.
military has yet to seriously implement this technology, even though it has existed for years. It’s no wonder that the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence concluded in 2021, in its final report, that the United States “is not prepared to defend or compete in the
AI era.”

If the United States fails to develop effective AI, it could find itself at the mercy of increasingly
sophisticated adversaries. China, for example, is already employing AI to war-game a future conflict over
Taiwan. Beijing plans to use AI in combination with cyberweapons, electronic warfare, and robotics to make
an amphibious assault on Taiwan more likely to succeed. It is investing in AI-enabled systems to track
undersea vehicles and U.S. Navy ships and to develop the ability to launch swarm attacks with low-cost, high-
volume aircraft. If the United States lacks advanced AI capabilities, it will find itself inevitably moving at a slower pace—and
would therefore be less able to help Taiwan fend off an invasion.
That goes nuclear
Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center
for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the
Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign
Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-
nuclear/)//BB

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear
forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.”
Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China
attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip
even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in
conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027,
with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military
modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—
mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear.
Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the
island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might
be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable . That
would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has
several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to
keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping
has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area
denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from
effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a
growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive
leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and
escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times
reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver
nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable
warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the
PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which
members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the
United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries
would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory . In the game, such strikes were
intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines

for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity
of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted
Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the
Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and
surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory,
crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military
necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team
responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA
One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for
Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it
would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United
States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views,
as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience
making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also
resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional
strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island
chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the
American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the
seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did
not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a
demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did
not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II
would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most
likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic
exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of
winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the
situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The
clear lesson from the war game is that the United
States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never
views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its
conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to
conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces,
enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to
develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute
to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has
them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners

to sends a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-
winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of
developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United
States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options
to be on the table. And the
United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from
believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends
choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.
 Harm
Exemptions violate international standards
Radar 24 — Randall R. Rader was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit by President George H. W. Bush in 1990 and assumed the duties of Chief Circuit Judge on June 1,
2010 and retired from the bench on June 30, 2014. He was appointed to the United States Claims Court
(now the U. S. Court of Federal Claims) by President Ronald W. Reagan in 1988. Chief Judge Rader has
received many awards, including the Sedona Lifetime Achievement Award for Intellectual Property Law,
2009; Distinguished Teaching Awards from George Washington University Law School, 2003 and 2008
(by election of the students); the Jefferson Medal from the New Jersey Intellectual Property Law
Association, 2003; the Distinguished Service Award from the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology,
2003; the J. William Fulbright Award for Distinguished Public Service from George Washington University
Law School, 2000; and the Younger Federal Lawyer Award from the Federal Bar Association, 1983.
Randall Rader. " Rader’s Ruminations – Patent Eligibility III: Seven Times the Federal Circuit Has Struck
Out," IPWatchdog. 3-31-2024. https://ipwatchdog.com/2024/03/31/raders-ruminations-patent-
eligibility-iii-seven-times-federal-circuit-struck/id=174751/, accessed 5-7-2024 //WMK
Strike Six: Ignoring Inconsistency with International Standards Strike six involves a rather esoteric point of Supreme Court jurisprudence, but
nonetheless worthy of a mention. The Supreme Court has long abided by the principle that “an act of congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Alexander Murray v.
The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). Notably, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ( TRIPS
Agreement) has a section under the heading “Patentable Subject Matter” which requires that “patents
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology , provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” Although the TRIPS agreement has some
exceptions, it still demands the availability of “patents . . in all fields of technology.” A careful judicial
examination would likely show that some “fields of technology” have fallen under an eligibility sledgehammer to
the degree that the United States is out of harmony with international standards and obligations. Thus,
the longstanding statutory construction counsel of Charming Betsy to avoid inconsistency with international standards might also advise
reconsideration of the Court’s sweeping claim-by-claim validity analyses under the guise of testing eligibility. Even in the
face of concerns about slumping U.S. competitiveness in the world innovation marketplace (e.g., Bloomberg
Innovation Index of nations for 2021does not list the United States in the top ten; South Korea is number 1), these questions of
international harmony and implications of U.S. innovation policy still elude all attention.

Breakdown escalates civil conflicts that draw in Iran, Russia, and North Korea---
nuclear war
David Kampf 20, Senior PhD Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School, MA in
International Affairs from Columbia University, BA in Political Science from Bates College, Writing has
Appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks, POLITICO
Magazine, “How COVID-19 Could Increase the Risk of War”, World Politics Review, 6/16/2020,
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28843/how-covid-19-could-increase-the-risk-of-war

But that overlooked the ways in which the risk of interstate war was already rising before COVID-19 began to spread. Civil
wars were
becoming more numerous, lasting longer and attracting more outside involvement, with dangerous consequences for
stability in many regions of the world. And the global dynamics most commonly cited to explain the falling
incidence of interstate war—democracy, economic prosperity, international cooperation and others—were being
upended.

If the spread of democracy kept the peace, then its global decline is unnerving. If
globalization and economic
interdependence kept the peace, then a looming global depression and the rise of nationalism and
protectionism are disconcerting. If regional and global institutions kept the peace, then their degradation is unsettling. If the
balance of nuclear weapons kept the peace, then growing risks of proliferation are disquieting. And if America’s preeminent power kept the
peace, then its relative decline is troubling.
Now, the pandemic, or more specifically the world’s reaction to it, is revealing the extent to which the factors holding major wars in check are withering. The idea that war between nations is a relic of the past no longer seems so
convincing.

The Pessimists Strike Back

More than any other individual, it was cognitive scientist Steven Pinker who popularized the idea that we are living in the most peaceful moment in human history. Starting with his 2011 bestseller, “The Better Angels of Our
Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Pinker argued that the frequency, duration and lethality of wars between great powers have all decreased. In his 2019 book, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism,
and Progress,” he wrote that war “between the uniformed armies of two nation-states appears to be obsolescent. There have been no more than three in any year since 1945, none in most years since 1989, and none since the
American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.”

Optimists like Pinker held that, rather than the world falling apart, as a quick glance at headline news might suggest, the opposite was true: Humanity was flourishing. More regions are characterized by peace; fewer mass killings
are occurring; governance and the rule of law are improving; and people are richer, healthier, better educated and happier than ever before.

In their book, “Clear and Present Safety: The World Has Never Been Better and Why That Matters to Americans,” Michael A. Cohen and Micah Zenko argued that the evidence is so overwhelming that it is difficult to argue against
the idea that wars between great powers, and all other interstate wars, are becoming vanishingly rare. Even when wars do break out, they tend to be shorter and less deadly than they were in the past. John Mueller, a senior fellow
at the Cato Institute, also reasoned that the idea of war, like slavery and dueling before it, was in terminal decline, while Joshua Goldstein, an international relations researcher at American University, credited the United Nations
and the rise of peacekeeping operations for helping win the “war on war.”

But in recent years, a range of critics have begun to poke holes in these arguments. Tanisha M. Fazal, an international relations professor at the University of Minnesota, contends that the decline in war is overstated. Major
advances in medicine, speedier evacuations of wounded soldiers from the field of battle and better armor have made war less fatal—but not necessarily less frequent. Fazal and Paul Poast, who is at the University of Chicago,
further assert that the notion of war between great powers as a thing of the past is based on the assumption that all such conflicts resemble World War I and II—both are historical anomalies—and overlooks the actual wars fought
between great powers since 1945, from the Korean War and the Vietnam War to proxy wars from Afghanistan to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Bear F. Braumoeller, an Ohio State political science professor, analyzed the same historical
data on conflicts used by Pinker, Mueller and Goldstein, and found no general downward trend in either the initiation or deadliness of warfare over the past two centuries. What’s more, Braumoeller contends that the so-called
“long peace”—the 75 years that have passed without systemic war since World War II—is far from invulnerable, and that wars are just as likely to escalate now as they used to be. Just because a major interstate war hasn’t
happened for a long time, doesn’t mean it never will again. In all probability, it will.

And by focusing solely on interstate wars, the optimists miss half the story, at least. Wars between states have declined, but civil wars never
disappeared—and these internal conflicts could easily escalate into regional or global wars.
The number of conflicts in the world reached its highest point since World War II in 2016, with 53 state-based armed conflicts in 37 countries.
All but two of these conflicts were considered civil wars. To make matters worse, new studies have shown that civil wars are becoming longer,
deadlier and harder to conclusively end, and that these internal conflicts are not really internal. Civil
wars harm the economies and stability
of neighboring countries, since armed groups, refugees, illicit goods and diseases all spill over borders. Some 10 million refugees have
fled to other countries since 2012. The countries that now host them are more likely to experience war, which means states with huge refugee
populations like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey face legitimate security challenges. Even after the threat of violence has diminished in refugees’
countries of origin, return migration can reignite conflicts, repeating the brutal cycle.
A Yugoslav Federal Army tank.

Perhaps most importantly, recent research indicates that civil wars increase the risk of interstate war, in large part
because they are attracting more and more outside involvement. In a 2008 paper, researchers Kristian Skrede
Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz explained that, in addition to the spillover effects, two other factors in civil
wars increase international tensions and could possibly provoke wider interstate wars: external
interventions in support of rebel groups and regime attacks on insurgents across international borders.
Immediately after the Cold War, none of the ongoing civil wars around the world were internationalized. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program, there were 12 full-fledged civil wars in 1991—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and elsewhere—and foreign militaries were
not active on the ground in any of them. Last year, by contrast, every single full-fledged civil war involved external military participants. This is
due, in part, to the huge growth in U.S. military interventions abroad into civil conflicts, but it’s not only the Americans. All of today’s major
wars are in essence proxy wars, pitting external rivals against one another. Conflicts
in Syria, Yemen and Libya are best
understood not as civil wars, but as international warzones, attracting meddlers including the United States, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Iran, France and many others, which often intervene not to build peace, but to resolve conflicts in a way that is
favorable to their own interests. These internationalized wars are more lethal, harder to resolve and possibly more likely to recur than civil wars
that remain localized. It is not that difficult to imagine how these
conflicts could spark wider international
conflagrations. Wars, after all, can quickly spiral out of control.
As Risks Increase, Deterrents Decline

To make matters worse, most of the global trends that explained why interstate war had decreased in recent decades are now reversing. The theories that democracy, prosperity, cooperation
and other factors kept the peace have been much debated—but if there was any truth to them, their reversals are likely to increase the chance of war, irrespective of how long the coronavirus
pandemic lasts.

Democracy is often considered a prophylactic for war. Fully democratic countries are less likely to experience civil war and rarely, if ever, go to war with other democracies—though, of course,
they do still go to war against non-democracies. While this would be great news if democracy and pluralism were spreading, there have now been 14 consecutive years of global democratic
decline, and there have been signs of additional authoritarian power grabs in countries like Hungary and Serbia during the pandemic. If democracy backslides far enough, internal conflicts and
foreign aggression will become more likely.

Other theories posit that economic bonds between countries have limited wars in recent decades. Dale Copeland, a
professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, has argued that countries work to preserve ties when there
are high expectations for future trade, but war becomes increasingly possible when trade is predicted
to fall. If globalization brought peace, the recent wave of far-right nationalism and populism around the
world may increase the chances of war, as tariffs and other trade barriers go up—mostly from the United States under President
Donald Trump, who has launched trade wars with allies and adversaries alike.

The coronavirus pandemic immediately elicited further calls to reduce dependence on other countries, with Trump using the opportunity to
pressure U.S. companies to reconfigure their supply chains away from China. For its part, China made sure that it had the homemade supplies it
needed to fight the virus before exporting extras, while countries like France and Germany barred the export of face masks, even to friendly
nations. And widening economic inequalities, a consequence of the pandemic, are not likely to enhance support for
free trade.
This assault on open trade and globalization is just one aspect of a decaying liberal international order, which, its proponents argue, has largely helped to preserve peace between nations since
World War II. But that old order is almost gone, and in all likelihood isn’t coming back. The U.N. Security Council appears increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional. Even before Trump, the
world’s most powerful country ratified fewer treaties per year under the Obama administration than at any time since 1945.

Trump’s presidency only harms multilateral cooperation further. He has backed out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, reneged on the Iran nuclear deal, picked fights with allies,
questioned the value of NATO and defunded the World Health Organization in the middle of a global health crisis. Hyper-nationalism, rather than international collaboration, was the default
response to the coronavirus outbreak in the U.S. and many other countries around the world.

It’s hard to see the U.S. reluctance to lead as anything other than a sign of its inevitable, if slow, decline. The country’s institutionalized
inequalities and systemic racism have been laid bare in recent months, and it no longer looks like a beacon for others to follow. The global
balance of power is changing. China is both keen to assert a greater leadership role within traditionally Western-led institutions and to
challenge the existing regional order in Asia. Between a rising China, revanchist Russia and new global actors, including non-state groups, we
may be heading toward an increasingly multipolar or nonpolar world, which could prove destabilizing in
its own right.
Finally, the pacifying effect of nuclear weapons could be waning. While vast nuclear arsenals once compelled the United States and the Soviet
Union to reach arms control agreements, old treaties are expiring and new talks are breaking down. Mistrust is growing, and the chance of
an unwanted U.S.-Russia nuclear confrontation is arguably as high as it has been since the Cuban missile crisis.
The theory of nuclear peace may no longer hold if more countries are tempted to obtain their own nuclear deterrent. Trump’s decision to
abandon the Iran nuclear deal, for one thing, has only increased the chance that Tehran will acquire nuclear weapons. It’s almost
easy to forget that, just a few short months ago, the United States and Iran were one miscalculation or dumb mistake away from waging all-out
war. And despite Trump’s efforts to negotiate nuclear disarmament with Kim Jong Un’s regime in Pyongyang, it is wishful thinking to believe
North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons. At this point, negotiators can only realistically try to ensure that North Korea’s nuclear
menace doesn’t get even more potent.

In other words, by turning inward, the United States is choosing to leave other countries to fend for themselves. The end result may be
a less stable world with more nuclear actors.
If leaders are smart, they will take seriously the warning signs exposed by this global emergency and work to reverse the drift toward war.

If only one of these theories for peace were worsening, concerns would be easier to dismiss. But together, they are unsettling. While the
world is not yet on the brink of World War III and no two countries are destined for war, the odds of avoiding future conflicts don’t look
good.
The pandemic is already degrading democracies, harming economies and curtailing international cooperation, and it also seems to be fostering
internal instability within states. Rachel Brown, Heather Hurlburt and Alexandra Stark argue that the coronavirus could in fact sow more civil
conflict. If this proves accurate, the
increase in civil wars is likely to lead to more external meddling, and these
next proxy wars could soon precipitate all-out international conflicts if outsiders aren’t careful. With the usual
deterrents to conflict declining around the world, major wars could soon return.
 Solvency
Eliminating exemptions is the best way to solve for business and international
certainty
Mossoff 20 — Adam Mossoff is Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School George Mason
University. Mossoff, Adam. Congress Should Reform Patent Eligibility Doctrine to Preserve the US
Innovation Economy. No. 257. Legal Memorandum. 1/8/2020 //WMK

As noted in the prior section, § 103 is a guidepost for how Congress should amend § 101 of the Patent Act today. WhenCongress
enacted § 103 in 1952, this provision reflected key features of the U.S. patent system that economists and
other commentators have recognized as essential factors in the long-standing success of the patent system in
driving the U.S. innovation economy. For example, similar to all the other legal requirements for a valid patent, § 103 is technology
neutral. This is a basic tenet of the rule of law. The patent system does not discriminate between different types of
innovations: All inventions and discoveries should have the same legal rules applied to them equally. Furthermore, § 103 is concise
in both form and substance, which is essential for ease of understanding by innovators and ease of
application by the USPTO and the courts. Thus, it avoids detailed, lengthy sentences with excessive verbiage that attempt to
address every conceivable scenario. As experience has shown time and time again, complicated statutory provisions prove
only to be a fount of uncertainty and ongoing legal disputes as rent-seeking interest groups (and their
lawyers) exploit linguistic ambiguities inherent in complex grammatical structures in statutes. This is especially
important in the statutes that define the legal preconditions for the USPTO and courts to secure property rights in inventions and discoveries.
Standardized and easily recognizable legal requirements in property law, such as basic recording systems and the same core package of rights
of use and disposal in full title, are key in driving efficient economic activities in the marketplace.66 The same insight applies to property rights
in inventions, which are the foundation of the economic activities that drive the U.S. innovation economy.67 These legal features of the
historical patent statutes—technology neutrality and generalized statements of legal requirements—should be followed today by Congress
in amending § 101. It is notable that the “discussion draft” of a proposed § 101 amendment that was released in May 2019 by Senators Thom
Tillis (R–NC) and Chris Coons (D–DE) reflects all of these features of successful patent legislation.68 Their discussion draft contains other
statutory reforms that are unnecessary for the reform of § 101 itself,69 but the proposed amendments to § 101 clearly and distinctly
abrogate the Alice-Mayo framework and reassert the primacy of the statutory language enacted by
Congress as the key legal text the courts should apply in assessing the patent eligibility of inventions and
discoveries. The discussion draft for § 101 provides: Section 101: (a) Whoever invents or discovers any useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title (b) Eligibility under this section shall be determined only while considering the claimed invention as a whole, without
discounting or disregarding any claim limitation. Under the heading of “Additional Legislative Provisions,” Senators Tillis and Coons include the
following, additional provisions: The provisions of section 101 shall be construed in favor of eligibility. No implicit
or other judicially created exceptions to subject matter eligibility, including “abstract ideas,” “laws of
nature,” or “natural phenomena,” shall be used to determine patent eligibility under section 101 , and all
cases establishing or interpreting those exceptions to eligibility are hereby abrogated. The eligibility of a claimed invention
under section 101 shall be determined without regard to: the manner in which the claimed invention
was made; whether individual limitations of a claim are well known, conventional or routine; the state
of the art at the time of the invention; or any other considerations relating to sections 102, 103, or 112
of this title. These proposed amendments to § 101 would achieve the same legal and policy goals that Congress achieved with
§ 103 in nonobviousness doctrine. It abrogates the Alice-Mayo framework and the unnecessary judicial gloss on §
101 that has proven to be a nettlesome source of ambiguity and uncertainty in the patent system . It clearly
and succinctly reestablishes the fundamental rules guiding courts’ interpretation of patents for over 200 years and which have been essential to
the successes of the patent system in securing reliable and effective property rights—one of the key drivers of the U.S. innovation economy
Striking down the “inventive concept” standard is key to investor certainty and unifies
patent law
Lehrman 21 — Jessica Lehrman has a PhD in Chemistry at Northwestern University and a J.D. at The
George Washington University Law School. Jessica A. Lehrman, "Patent Subject Matter Eligibility and
Medical Diagnostics: Where Do We Go from Here?," AIPLA Quarterly Journal 49, no. 4 (Fall 2021): 697-
[ii] //WMK

One additional option is to adopt the modified test and legal standard in USPTO's 2019 eligibility guidelines. 175
This is an advantageous option because it would (1) exploit the USPTO's particular expertise in patent law, and (2) converge
and align the legal standards utilized for patent eligibility in the examination and issuance of patents (at the
USPTO), and in eligibility challenges as they arise in federal courts . This is also a promising avenue as Congress has signaled
that they are prepared to enact legislation to forcibly align the Courts and the USPTO.176 This modified test, in which the legal
standard is a "practical application" of a natural law rather than a search for an "inventive concept,"
lowers the bar for patent eligibility and is able to distinguish between a diagnostic device which relies
on and detects the natural law, and the natural law itself. In these ways, this test is more aptly in line with the
intent of the patent system 177 and the statutory text of the 1952 Patent Act.178 The statutory text of the Patent Act, both
in § 100 and § 101, explicitly refers to and defines both "inventions" and "discoveries." 179 However, the current Alice/Mayo test
contravenes the statutory text and Congressional intent because, by inserting a requirement for an
"inventive concept," necessarily excludes "discoveries" from the scope of patent eligibility .180 This distinction
has been explicitly recognized and criticized by Federal Circuit Judges Dyk181 and O'Malley. 182 In Athena, Judge O'Malley wrote: [T]he
Supreme Court has ignored Congress's direction to the courts to apply 35 U.S.C. sections 101, et seq ("Patent Act") as written. Specifically, the
Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to read into Section 101 an 'inventive concept' requirement-a baffling standard that Congress
removed when it amended the Patent Act in 1952.183 However, under the USPTO's eligibility guidelines, which requires that the
claim recite "additional elements that integratethe exception into a practical application,"184 a diagnostic device which is
directed to a use or applicationof a natural law, rather than the natural law itself, could be patent eligible. This
seemingly minor change to the eligibility analysis, eliminating the judicially created "inventive concept"
requirement, is certainly not a cure-all. However, it would make tremendous strides in resolving the patent
eligibility crisis: expanding patent eligibility to deserving inventions, while preventing the patenting of
the basic building blocks of human ingenuity and the corresponding preemption of entire scientific fields.