S E C R E T

ACTIVE ARCHIPELAGIC DEFENSE

STRATEGY
BUILDING THE PHILIPPINE NAVY OFFSHORE
TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCE 2020
Version 2013.1

“Tomorrow we shall be citizens of the Philippines, whose destiny will be brilliant

because it will be in the care of loving hands… our navy’s warships will guard our
shores… then commerce, industry, agriculture, and science will be free to
develop under the protection of wise and equitable laws as in prosperous
England.”– Dr. Jose Rizal in El Filibusterismo

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PART I - INTRODUCTION

LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR THE NAVAL STRATEGY

1.1. WHY DO WE NEED A NAVAL STRATEGY?

1.1.1. Naval defense is a complex undertaking that entails detailed and

deliberate planning. Today the Philippine Navy is facing two (2)
major challenges concerning the defense of the Philippine
archipelago. The first is the need to address the various maritime
security concerns, which compels the Navy to focus not only on its
military role but also on its constabulary duties. This places a
significant strain on its currently available capabilities in taking on
the latter role, at the cost of veering away from its core competency
as a naval force. The second challenge is the maintenance of an
appropriate force-mix of people, organization, equipment, and
logistics that allows the naval force to accomplish national ends
within a certain time frame and cost. This challenge involves key
decisions on the size and shape of the current and future naval
force required and the difficult strategic risk management efforts that
goes with it.

1.1.2. The Philippines in the past three years has experienced giant strides
in putting its maritime agenda in order. This was initially brought
about by the passage of the amendments to the Philippine
Baselines Law or Republic Act 9522. The law effectively set the
national policy of aligning our national boundaries consistent with
the UN Convention on the Law of Sea, eliminating strategic
ambiguities with respect to our maritime territories and jurisdiction.
The Philippine Supreme Court in denying petitions to nullify the law
further affirmed this.1

1.1.3. With the ambiguities on the extent of Philippine maritime territories

and jurisdictions removed, the enactment of laws and promulgation
of executive issuances to clarify the jurisdictions of maritime
agencies in the Philippines followed. The passage of Republic Act
9993, also known as the Philippine Coast Guard Law, effectively
limits the constabulary role of the Philippine Navy into a supporting
one. This development affords the naval service with a breathing
space to pursue the gradual shift towards Territorial Defense.

1.1.4. On the other hand, Executive Order 57 that established the

National Coast Watch System, laid the institutional governance
framework for the management of Philippine maritime interests.
Under this executive issuance, the task of maritime policy
development and implementation was devolved to a strategic-level
Council that reports directly to the President. This allows for a more

1
Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al. GR Nos. 187167. 16 August 2011.

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collaborative process of coordinating security and emerging ocean

concerns.

1.1.5. Further boosting the capacity of the Philippines to manage its

maritime endowment is the passage by Congress of an amended
AFP Modernization Law or RA 10349. The acquisition of strategic
assets under this law will be undertaken in the medium and long
term periods summarized in Annex B.

1.1.6. However, the experience with the past modernization effort should
guide the implementation of the amended law. The lessons are
more pronounced for the Philippine Navy due to the very long lead
time involved in acquiring the capital assets, developing the
manpower skills, and establishing the maintenance and life support
systems.

1.1.7. We should also be able to identify strategic risks both during asset
acquisition and transition periods to optimize public funds. Learning
lessons from other countries can help reduce the technical,
operational, and financial risks associated with the new acquisitions.
Furthermore, prudence dictates that support and sustainment
systems should be put in place in tandem with introduction into the
service of proposed acquisitions.

1.1.8. Due to these foregoing reasons, the Philippine Navy as an

institution has to collectively come up with the right direction of
naval development juxtaposed with the future Philippine defense
requirements. There is also a need to assess the evolving security
policy framework in order to clearly identify the tasks that naval
forces in the future must be able to accomplish, and what, and how
much capabilities are required to address the same.

1.1.9. The promulgation of an Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy

(AADS) accomplishes the following:

1.1.9.1. Address the current and future naval defense and maritime
security concerns of the Philippines;

1.1.9.2. Identify core strategic and operational concepts in which the

Philippine Navy is expected to derive its future operations
and employment given the most likely defense scenarios of
concern;

1.1.9.3. Determine the most appropriate force requirements

(DOTMLPFS)2 to allow the PN to perform in the near-term to
long-term periods; and,

2 Pertains
to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership, Facility, and
Sustainment.

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1.1.9.4. Provide medium-term guidance in managing the transition

from the Philippine Navy‟s legacy force towards the future
naval force.

1.2. Policy References

1.2.1. The following policy references, as discussed in detail in Annex C,

have been considered to a large extent in coming out with the
AADS:

1.2.2. The 1987 Constitution;

1.2.3. Republic Act 9522 or the Amended Philippine Baselines Law
1.2.4. Executive Order 292, also known as the Administrative Code of
1987,
1.2.5. The National Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016
1.2.6. Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT) White Paper
1.2.7. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 2014-2019
1.2.8. AFP Strategic Intent, in support to the National Military Strategy
(NMS).
1.2.9. The amended AFP Modernization Program as embodied in
Republic Act 10349
1.2.10. The Defense System of Management (DSOM)

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Part II – Strategic Environment

Setting the Direction of the Strategy

2.1. The Geographical Environment

2.1.1. One of the constants in naval planning is geography. The

Philippines is strategically located at the crossroads of the Asia
Pacific, lying between insular Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia,
at the same time linking the whole of East Asia with the South
Pacific. Its 7,100 islands lie on the Western margin of the Pacific
Ocean.3 The Philippine archipelago extends about 1,850 km from
north to south and about 1,100 km from east to west. 4 Its coastline
has a total length of 36,289 kilometers – almost twice that of the
continental United States. 5 It is bounded on the east by the
Philippine Sea, on the south by the Sulu and Celebes Sea, on the
west by the West Philippine Sea, and on the north by Luzon Strait.
Malaysia and Indonesia, which each hold territories on Borneo, are
the country‟s nearest political neighbors.

2.1.2. The Philippines is a compact archipelago composed of one fifths

(1/5) land and four fifths (4/5) water. The maritime territories and
jurisdiction of the Philippines total 586,210 square nautical miles.
Demographically, 62 of the 78 provinces of the Philippines are
located along the coast where an estimated 40 million people
reside. 6 The country has an estimated one (1) million fishermen
with additional individuals employed in commercial fishing
companies.

2.1.3. There are five (5) important international navigational routes criss-
crossing the Philippine archipelago. These are: (a) Luzon Strait-
Bashi Channel-Balintang Channel, and Babuyan Channel; (b)
Verde Island Passage-San Bernardino Strait; (c) Mindoro Strait-
Basilan Strait-Sibutu Passage; (d) Surigao Strait-Balabac Strait;
and (e) Balut Channel.7

2.1.4. The climate of the Philippines is almost entirely affected by three

(3) air currents, namely: the tradewinds which are predominant in
March and April; the southwest monsoon which is prevalent during
the months of May up to October; and the northeast monsoon
which occurs from November to early March.

3
Baviera, Aileen S. The Practice of National Security. Southeast Asian Affairs. 1998, pp. 215
4
Col. Eugenio Reyes. “Implications of the Exclusive Economic Zone on the Capability of the
Philippine Navy”NDCP : Manila, 1985 p. 141
5
Ibid., p. 142
6 Department of Environment and Natural Resources, United Nations Development Programme,

and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation Inc. “ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable
Philippine Archipelagic Development. February 2004. p.14
7
Mary Ann Palma. The Philippines as an Archipelagic and Maritime Nation. RSIS Working Paper
No. 182. Singapore:2009. p. 7.

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2.1.5. Because of the diverse geographic characteristics and varying

climatological conditions, the Philippines may be divided into
distinct areas with peculiar characteristics.

2.1.6. Northeast Luzon during the northeast monsoon season is

characterized by rough seas and strong winds that can only be
patrolled by large high-endurance vessels.

2.1.7. Southern Luzon and the Visayas offer relatively subdued sea
states and can be covered by small patrol boats and craft during
most of the year. The Mindanao-Sulu area can likewise be covered
by boats and craft.

2.1.8. During the southwest monsoon, the waters off Western Luzon and
Visayas could be very rough and require high endurance vessels.
Sulu Sea, which is an open area, offers moderate to rough sea
state conditions that requires an average-sized vessel.

2.1.9. On the other hand, the coastal waters and waterways are almost
protected from harsh weather conditions and in most cases, sea
state conditions ranging from 0 to 4 are being experienced. In this
respect, patrol boats and craft are ideal for deployment along these
waters.

2.2. Under the Defense Strategic Planning System (DSPS) Cycle 2015-2020,
there are six (6) "core security challenges” that are considered as very
urgent concerns with high impact on the Philippine‟s national sovereignty
and strategic posture. 8 These concerns would either require the
Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces to take on the lead
role or to share responsibility with other government agencies and offices
in addressing these challenges. The core security concerns are: territorial
integrity, maritime security, internal security, natural disasters, cyber
security, and global peace and security. 9

2.3. National Security Concerns

2.3.1. Territorial Defense. The recent developments in the West

Philippine Sea (WPS) highlight the challenges to our territorial
integrity and sovereignty. The areas of concern are the Kalayaan
Island Group, Bajo de Masinloc, and other critical features within the
overlapping boundaries of the 200-mile EEZ. If not properly
managed, these conflicts could undermine the peace and stability of
the region.10

8
Strategic Assessment, Defense Strategic Planning System (DSPS) Planning Cycle 2015-2020
9
The peripheral or “non-core” security concerns include food, energy, and water; and proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN)
explosives.
10
Department of National Defense, Defense Planning Guidance: 2014-2019 (2012), p.6

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2.3.2. The most compelling security concern is China. Its internal political
and economic dynamics; global developments; and the need for
resources to fuel its economy and feed its population are driving its
assertive posture in the West Philippine Sea. This is best expressed
by China‟s “nine-dash-line.” 11 Chinese posturing against the
Philippines in the last three (3) years includes: the harassment of a
seismic survey ship working for Forum Energy; the encroachment
over Bajo de Masinloc; and the blockade of Ayungin Shoal. While
the Philippines has gained international support in the WPS issue as
a result of its legal, diplomatic, and political efforts, it is undeniable
that there is a need for the AFP to develop its capability to credibly
back up the non-military efforts, adequately perform its mandate,
and ably ensure the country‟s sovereignty in the KIG. 12

2.3.3. Maritime Security. Maritime security is also a major concern, given

the country‟s fragmented geography. Its porous borders make it
vulnerable to illegal maritime activities such as terrorism; piracy;
human, drugs and firearms trafficking; money laundering; and illegal
migration.13 The Philippines‟ strategic location makes it a convenient
transit point and destination for transnational terrorists and criminals.
The presence of these threats in Philippine waters also poses a
threat to freedom of navigation, our sea lines of communication
(SLOCs), and regional commerce.

2.3.4. Internal Security. Internal security is an offshoot of poor

governance, maldistribution of wealth, and inability of
disenfranchised sectors of society to achieve their aspirations.
These gave rise to the armed groups such as the Communist Party
of the Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front
(CPP-NPA-NDF) and terrorist organizations like the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which continue to
wreak havoc in the mis-and un-governed areas of the country.
Likewise, rogue actions by the elements identified with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) adversely affect the peace and order situation in Southern
Philippines.

2.3.5. Natural and Man-Made Disasters. Disasters are a continuing

concern since the country lies at the Pacific Ring of Fire, the Pacific
Seismic Belt and the Typhoon Belt. The country is also extremely
vulnerable to the effects of climate change that may result to
flooding, landslides, and disaster-related incidents in the country. 14
11
Recently, the Government of China came out with a new claim map which was obtained by the
Philippine Embassy in Beijing. The claim map replaced the 9-dash-line with a 10-dash-line which
extended to include Taiwan, claiming the lines as part of their national borders and insisting that
that it is an extension of their land m ass, calling it “blue-colored land”. The DFA has already sent
a note verbale protesting the map, saying it is expansive and in violation of UNCLOS.
12
Strategic Assessment, Defense Strategic Planning System (DSPS) Planning Cycle 2015-2020
13
Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP Strategic Intent (2011), p.11
14
Maplecroft, Climate Change Vulnerability Index (2013). Accessed 24 April 2013, 10:17
PST.<http://maplecroft.com/about/news/ccvi_2013.html>

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These make the archipelago prone to loss of lives and properties,

refugee migration, competition for resources, and spread of various
diseases, 15 aggravated by man-made environmental crises such as
mine and oil spills, 16 toxic industrial wastes, and accidents at sea
that have detrimental effects on the environment. 17 Hence, as a
supporting agency in disaster response, the AFP‟s relevant
capabilities must be strategically deployed, prepositioned, and
immediately available when needed.18

2.3.6. Cyber Security. Cyber security is an emerging concern. Given the

benefits of information and communications technology (ICT) and
the growing reliance of the government and business sector, it has
increased also our vulnerability to cyber-attacks. Recent trends
show that attacks against government portals could undermine the
exchange of information among governments and agencies and
lead to the paralysis in delivery of basic services by national and
international financial institutions and the AFP‟s command and
control systems. Oftentimes, the defense and military
establishments are targeted by cyber attackers to gain confidential
information.19

2.3.7. Global and Regional Security Challenges. The uncertainty and

volatility of the political situations in the Korean Peninsula, the
Middle East, and Northern Africa bear continuous watching.
Specifically, the unpredictability of the North Korean regime
continues to vex the international security posture of concerned
stakeholder-states. Any fallout is likely to affect the country
considering our vulnerability from a geographical, security, and
economic sense; as well as large presence of Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) in South Korea and Japan. Meantime, the „Arab
Spring‟ may have challenged the status quo in Egypt and Syria, but
their road to democracy has been hindered by unintended
consequences. On the other hand, Syria is in the midst of a civil war
that is escalating to a region-wide conflict, as the United States,
Russia, Iran, non-state actors, among others, manifest their stake
and interests. This will likely put our UN Peacekeeping Contingent
and OFWs into harms way unless the situation in both countries are
finally resolved.

2.3.8. Peripheral Security Challenges. On the other hand, the peripheral

security challenges are considered urgent security concerns that
have low impact on national sovereignty and Philippine strategic
posture. These security concerns require the DND-AFP to provide
support for other agencies. These peripheral security concerns are:
food, water, and energy security; proliferation of weapons; and

15
ibid.
16
Office of the President of the Philippines, National Security Policy (2011),p. 21
17
Overview of the Concepts on Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy, p.1
18
Strategic Assessment, Defense Strategic Planning System (DSPS) Planning Cycle 2015-2020
19
Ibid. p. 6

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chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) explosives. 20

Other concerns that have impact on human security are poverty and
hunger incidence; issues of social injustice; inefficient delivery of
basic services; 21 graft and corruption; weak institutions; and
criminality.22

2.4. Strategic Maritime Interests. From the evolving Philippine policy

frameworks, defense planning systems, scenarios of concerns, and
strategic maritime interests that the PN needs to secure in the medium
term may be deduced. These interests underpin our aspirations as a
maritime nation.

2.4.1. Freedom of Navigation. The Philippine archipelago is interlaced by

shipping routes for domestic transport and trade.23 It also hosts vital
sealanes linking the country and the rest of the global commons to
the ports of East Asia and the Americas. The domestic routes in the
Philippines are traversed by tanker vessels used for the distribution
of petroleum in the country and merchant fleet used for domestic
trade such as passenger-cargo, cargo, fast crafts, yachts, and
fishing operations. 24 Freedom of navigation to and from Philippine
waters is essential not only for the local economy but also for the
global economy. Freedom of navigation will continue to be essential
in the world trade.

2.4.2. Shipping Security. The Philippines remains to be the world‟s top

supplier of seafarers in the world. It is estimated that in 2008 alone,
Filipino seamen sent a total of US$ 2.3 Billion in remittances to help
prop the local economy25. With 90% of world cargo transported by
ship, the role of Filipino seafarers that now comprise 20% of the 1.2
million ship workers cannot be overemphasized. 26 Pirate attacks
against tankers in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa victimized
a number of Filipino crews. It is imperative that the government is
prepared to come to their rescue if the need arises.

2.4.3. Welfare of Filipinos Overseas. The Philippine‟s foreign policy and

the billions in remittance inflows make our overseas workers
important stakeholders. They provide critical services in various
economies globally. The security and welfare of Filipinos outside the
country must be a paramount concern of the government. In this
regard, the government has the obligation to pursue ways and
means to ensure and uphold the welfare of its citizens, wherever
they may be.

20
Ibid. p. 7
21
AFP Strategic Intent, op.cit. p.12
22
National Security Policy, op.cit., pp.15-17
23Palma, ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Kale Bantique Fajardo, Filipino Crosscurrents: Oceanographies of Seafaring, Masculinities, and
Globalization, University of Minnesota Press, 2011, p. 77.
26
Ibid.

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2.4.4. Protection of Marine Resources. Fish provides about 50% of

animal protein in the Philippines. 27 The fishery sector also
contributes an estimated Php 41 Billion or roughly 4% of the
country‟s Gross Domestic Product.28 Coastal minerals found in the
seabed and in coastal areas include oil and gas, manganese, and
chromite.29 Other minerals mined in the coastal areas include sand,
stone, silica, and marble.30 Because of the extensive coastal lines
of the country, the number of beach resorts and coastal
establishments is equally significant. The Philippines has the
coastal ecosystem which includes beaches, estuaries, sea grass,
coral reefs, mangroves, marshes, and inshore waters. Eighteen of
the top 25 major tourist destinations are in coastal areas with more
areas exhibiting potential for tourism development. 31 Since 1995,
seashell products have mainly been exported to Japan and United
Kingdom and the further development of tourism in coastal areas
will further boost the prospect of this nascent industries. 32 However,
dwindling fish stocks, volatility in energy trade, environmental strains
on fragile coastal ecosystems, and competition for cheaper energy
sources are challenging the ability of the Philippines to explore and
exploit these marine resources thus the need to protect these
resources for the benefit of the Filipino people in the long term.

2.4.5. Protection of Offshore Resources. The Malampaya Natural Gas

to Power Project, the Recto Bank, and the Benham Rise provide
clear examples of actual and potential marine resources in our EEZ
and ECS, which can offer a better future for the Filipino people if
properly explored and exploited. While we develop the wherewithal
and the financial capability to exploit the full potential of these assets
beneath our seas, our current efforts should be directed at enforcing
our sovereign rights and ensuring responsible stewardship of our
patrimony.

2.4.6. Contribute to Maintaining Regional Peace and Security. The

major potential for inter-state dispute in Southeast Asia is brought by
the complex and interlocking maritime boundary disputes and
territorial claims over islands and rocks. The Philippines, for one,
has unresolved boundary disputes with Malaysia and Indonesia in
the south. The Philippines is also embroiled in territorial and
maritime disputes with China, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, and
Taiwan in the West Philippine Sea. Within ASEAN, Malaysia and
Indonesia have pending issues on maritime delimitation in the
waters off Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan despite the conclusion

27
Ibid.
28
DENR, UNDP, MERF Inc. Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid. p.14. See also, Huerto, Dexter O. “Command and Control of Philippine Maritime Air
Surveillance”. Air Power Studies Center. 1998. p.21-22
31
Ibid.
32
DENR, UNDP, MERF Inc. loc.cit.p.14

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of an award of sovereignty in favor of the former by the International

Court of Justice. In East Asia, tensions have also risen between
Japan and China in the East China Sea. It is in the interest of the
Philippines that such disputes are settled in a peaceful manner so
as not to disrupt the global commerce and trade.

2.4.7. Maritime Industry and Technology Support. Shipbuilding is

included in the Philippines‟ 2012 Investment Priorities Plan. Likewise,
the Philippines is positioning to become the ship repair hub in the
Asia-Pacific region for oceangoing merchant and fishing vessels
taking advantage of its strategic location to the region's shipping.
Identified Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) from Japan and Korea
are promising because shipbuilders from these countries are finally
looking outward for expansion opportunities. A developing and
maturing shipbuilding and ship repair industry in the Philippines may
hasten the upgrading of navy capabilities. Navy modernization offers
an opportunity for the local shipbuilding and ship repair industry to
capitalize on. However, we need to go beyond these potentials and
look at the possibility of developing a military-industrial complex that
can synergize the Navy‟s needs with our private sector – towards
the advancement of naval technology for unmanned systems,
shipbuilding, smart defense, among others.

2.5. Shift from Internal Security to Territorial Defense

2.5.1. The paradigm shift of the Defense Capability Planning System

(DCAPS) is based on the assumption that the defense force
engagements against armed internal threats will diminish over time
as the peace process is pursued and the capability of the insurgent
forces are degraded by effective internal security operations through
the promulgation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) that
puts primacy of the peace process and implementation of a “Whole
of Nation” approach.

2.5.2. There is optimism for the successful conclusion of the GPH-MILF

Peace Talks. This is due in large part to the signing of the
Framework Agreement that shall establish the Bangsamoro – an
enhanced autonomous government for Muslim Mindanao.

2.5.3. The declining capability and membership of the CPP-NPA-NDF

(CNN) is leading towards its downward spiral to banditry. While the
peace process with the group remains in limbo, the outlook from the
AFP remains positive. It is believed that the improving economic and
political environment coupled with the declining numbers of this
rebel group will eventually render it irrelevant as a security threat.

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Intentionally Blank

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Part III – Strategic and Operational Concepts

The Future Navy’s Way of Defense and Security

3.1. Culling altogether the materials from the Philippine Constitution of 1987
and policy issuances within the security sector and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the principal tasks required of the Philippine Navy are as
follows:

3.1.1. To protect and defend the integrity of the national territory;

3.1.2. To secure our strategic maritime interests;

3.1.3. To enhance our cooperative security arrangements with allies and

neighbors;

3.1.4. To protect the Filipino people wherever they are; and,

3.1.5. To protect our marine resources

3.2. In terms of defending the territory and securing the strategic maritime
interests, the Philippine Defense Transformation White Paper considers
the following capabilities critical:

3.2.1. Appropriate Strategic Response Forces. This capability is for the

conduct of joint defense and interagency operations through surface,
sub-surface and air warfare capabilities; a strategic strike capability
through manned and unmanned air capabilities; and air-, land- and
sea-based missile capabilities;

3.2.2. Enhanced C4ISR. This capability is for provision of shore-based

surveillance system to support the conduct of joint defense
operations and enhanced air and maritime situational awareness.
This can be made possible with faster collection, structural fusion,
and analysis of shared information; and

3.2.3. Interoperability with Allied Forces. This capability is for

strengthening of international defense and security engagements
while promoting cooperation in the disputed areas.

3.3 Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS). The development of the

above capabilities is embodied in the Philippine Navy‟s maritime defense
strategy called the Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS)

3.3.1 The AADS addresses the need to defend our territory and secure
our maritime interests pursuant to existing government policies and
taking into consideration the scenarios of greatest concerns as
articulated in the DSPS. Under normal peacetime conditions, the
Philippine Navy‟s focus will be on establishing a comprehensive
operating picture over our maritime areas of interest and supporting

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our interagency partners enforce the law and order at sea. In times
of crisis in our maritime territory and affecting our jurisdiction thereof,
a tiered and calibrated response will be forthcoming against any
breach of the peace. The AADS is likewise premised on a Philippine
Navy working either in a joint environment ready to undertake the
unilateral defense of the Philippines or with our allies in a
multilateral cooperation regime. (Figure 1)

Figure 1. The AADS Within the Spectrum of Conflict

3.3.2 Definition and Description. The Active Archipelagic Defense

Strategy (AADS) is our framework of defending our national territory
and sovereignty and securing our strategic maritime interests. It
refers to the pro-active control of our seas and the denial of its use to
an adversary, capitalizing on the archipelagic configuration of our
country. It involves control of critical maritime areas, and the
deployment of assets that optimizes their capabilities and firepower.

3.3.3 Areas of Consideration. Under the AADS framework, the following

regimes will be protected during peacetime: the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), Extended Continental Shelf (ECS), Contiguous Zone,
Territorial Sea, the archipelagic sealanes, regime of islands such as
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Bajo de Masinloc (BDM), the
Benham Rise, the Recto Bank, critical infrastructures such as the
Malampaya Natural Gas to Power Project, and our internal waters. In
times of crisis, defensive measures will be focused on the probable
threat axis, our Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), and critical
military infrastructures (such as C4ISTAR facilities, key ports, and
government centers, among others).

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3.3.4 Components. AADS is founded on three mutually supporting

strategic concepts to address the evolving roles of navies: Maritime
Operations, Maritime Situational Awareness, and Maritime
Cooperation.

3.4. Strategic Concepts

3.4.1. Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). Maritime Situational

Awareness, under ideal conditions, refers to the 24/7 knowledge
obtained from the integrated collection, analysis and exchange of
information that relates to the maritime environment which are all
used to support decision making for governance, development and
security undertakings. This component is consistent with the OODA
loop concept - the cyclical process of Orient, Observe, Decide, and
Act. The effective integration of the Philippine Navy‟s constabulary
and military roles, which relies on the ability to know and assess the
activities occurring in the five (5) domains, sea, undersea, air, land,
and cyberspace is at the heart of Maritime Situational Awareness.
Thus, it occupies half of the apex of the trinity triangle. It builds a
strong foundation for Maritime Operations as it provides the critical
information when needed before appropriate and timely response
can be deployed. As MSA is a prerequisite for Maritime Operations,
the potency of the latter is dependent on the effectiveness of the
former. It facilitates the correct discernment of the tangible and
intangible security challenges affecting the archipelago, thus
allowing one to craft the appropriate strategy and capability to
address an adversary‟s “center of gravity” and protect one‟s own at
all levels of conflict.

3.4.1.1. Objective. The strategic goal of Maritime Situational

Awareness is to ensure effective maritime information
support in order to facilitate effective decision making for
maritime operations and support to national and regional
cooperation for maritime security, development, and
governance.

3.4.1.2. Functions. In order to accomplish this strategic objective,

we must be ready to perform the following functions:

3.4.1.2.1. Collect Data through All-Source Information

Systems. This pertains to the method in which the
knowledge is collected. There are two (2) ways this can
be undertaken. The first is through sensor operations,
which involves the use of electronics system to provide
persistent monitoring of areas of interest. Examples of
these are shore-based surveillance systems such as the
Littoral Observatory Stations (LOS), sea-based such as
offshore patrol and SURTASS vessels, air-based
platforms such as long-range patrol aircraft (LRPAs) or
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or intercepts designed

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to track communications or electronics transmissions.

The second is through the conduct of intelligence
operations – at a strategic level. Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) is the most ideal way of sensing the
adversary‟s intent, but this will only pay-off with an asset
that has the right accessibility to the corridors of power.
Otherwise, open-source intelligence (OSINT) will be
sufficient to get sense of indications in a general way,
given the availability of conventional and social media
sources. This will allow a competent analyst to craft a
working country study, which can forecast the political,
economic, technological, and military trends. Another
avenue worth considering is through computer network
exploitation (CNE), which involves “hacking” into targeted
databases and websites to extract information not readily
available.

3.4.1.2.2. Establish and Maintain Common Maritime

Operating Picture. This pertains to our ability to fuse all
knowledge obtained from other electronic sensors and
intelligence activity and present them in a single template,
normally graphically portraying the relationship of data to
the maritime environment. The fusion will be through the
Naval Maritime Situational Awareness Center (NMSAC),
which serves as the national grid for managing
information from regional, interagency, inter-service, and
private sector partners. Generating the operating picture
supports command and control (C2) operations by
providing the decision-maker with data to formulate a
course of action, thence, the appropriate systems support
to translate it to the exercise of authority over assigned
forces to accomplish the mission. This element should be
provided for in the Intelligence-Operations Fusion
Centers or Command Centers across various
headquarters of the AFP, the Navy, and other concerned
agency partners.

3.4.1.2.3. Provide Secured Network Support to Operating

Units. This pertains to the provision for communications
and information systems that can safely serve as a
conduit of data between the collecting agencies and the
decision-makers. Such support shall be made possible by
the appropriate technology that can assure the secure
storage, processing, and dissemination of knowledge. A
necessary adjunct to this element is computer network
defense (CND), which ensures that the conduit and
associated systems are protected from “hacking” from
any adversary.

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3.4.1.2.4. Engage Other Services and Partners for

Collaborative Assessment. This pertains to the
interagency approach to appreciating all available
knowledge that is incorporated to the maritime operating
picture. This allows for the interplay of all competencies
and mandates of respective agencies to shape the
assessment, allowing for the dissenting minority to form
part of the discussion with the maritime interagency
partners, the academe, and the private sectors.

3.4.2. Maritime Operations. Maritime operations seek to protect strategic

maritime interests by deterring and preventing activities in Philippine
maritime territories and jurisdictions that is prejudicial to the security
of the Philippines. It also involves preventing a hostile group or
nation from using the sea to invade or control any or all parts of the
Philippine territory. Further, our operations shall aim to influence,
shape, or persuade potential and real adversaries to avoid a naval
confrontation or seek peaceful discourse to settle disagreements,
among others.

3.4.2.1. Concept. Our concept of defense does not rely on parity of

forces but on effective maneuver. As such, it works in tandem with
MSA to determine an adversary‟s critical vulnerabilities. Taken
together, our joint ability to know and employ tiered and calibrated
responses forms the spearhead of AADS and constitutes the
Philippine unilateral action for the defense of the Philippines.
(Figure 2)

Figure 2. AADS Maritime Operations Concept

3.4.2.2. However, if tiered and calibrated response fails to deescalate a

conflict, our force mix of maneuverable (hammer) and static (anvil)
forces may be employed as an integrated whole to achieve
sovereignty over our littorals; enforcement of national laws in our
territorial seas and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and

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Extended Continental Shelf (ECS); and to exercise our sovereign

rights over natural resources consistent with international laws
governing our maritime regimes.

3.4.2.3. Maritime Cooperation supports maritime operations. Diplomatic

efforts and employing other maritime forces to prevent an
escalation of a crisis or conflict is the first line of maritime defense.
When armed confrontation becomes imminent or unavoidable, our
forces may be integrated with those of our allies and coalition
partners to help restore peace and security.

3.4.2.4. Objective. To protect strategic maritime interests and deter a

real or potential adversary from conducting land or maritime
aggression through a tiered and calibrated employment of
maritime forces.

3.4.2.5. Functions. The following elements of Maritime Operations

are adaptive and calibrated actions that will prevent, protect, and
respond to all types and intensity of contingencies along the
spectrum of conventional and unconventional conflict/crisis
scenarios in concert with other government agencies from
peacetime and conflict short of war or crisis. Naval functions in
support of Maritime Operations are the following:

3.4.2.5.1. Conduct of Tiered Maritime Operations. Tiered

maritime operations are conducted in our internal and territorial
waters, as well as contiguous and exclusive economic zones,
through a rules-based approach in accordance with the UN
Convention on the Laws of the Sea and other appropriate
internationally recognized laws. Our rights and responsibilities
within each of the maritime regimes provided by UNCLOS will
guide naval operations. Our forces shall be prepared to defend
our sovereignty and sovereign rights and/or help enforce rights
denied to our citizens by hostile forces in disputed waters
specifically by:

3.4.2.5.1.1. Diplomatic Efforts on Conflict Management. Naval

diplomacy provides opportunities for the Philippine Navy to
articulate the country‟s interests and policies before an
international audience in the manner in which it conducts its
operations at sea. In this context, the expression of naval
power becomes a valuable tool for foreign policy. Its flexible
character allows diplomats to nuance the conduct of
operations to keep it benign or calibrate its escalation to make
a point.

3.4.2.5.1.2. Rational Employment of Assets. The Philippine

Navy aspires to develop a force mix of fleet forces designed to
address security challenges in the different maritime territories
and jurisdictions of the Philippines under its capability

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development plans. This will allow it to deploy the appropriate

assets in the littorals, the critical maritime areas of interests,
and outwards to the open seas. (Figure 3)

Figure 3. Rational Employment of Assets

3.4.2.5.1.3. Unified National Rules of Engagement and Rules

on the Use of Force. The Philippine Navy along with the other
maritime agencies must be able to patrol the areas where the
use or threat of force or engagement with a foreign armed
force is imminent (such as in disputed maritime areas) under
one National Rules of Engagement. On the other hand, in
areas where the use of force is considered a last resort (such
as during maritime law enforcement, civil disturbance
management during disaster relief operations, fishery
enforcement, etc.), there should be a Rules on the Use of
Force. These types of operational issuances provide the solid
legal bases for the conduct of naval and maritime operations
and clear limitations in each of the ocean regimes.

3.4.2.5.2. Support National Calibrated Response. The defense of

the Philippines requires a whole of nation approach. It is a
shared responsibility of the armed services, the various
instruments of government, and its entire citizenry, bound by a
common goal of harnessing all available resources to address
any contingency with use of force as a final option. In the
maritime space, the ability of civil and military maritime forces
to protect our sovereignty and enforce sovereign rights
underwrites the legality of any acts of the Philippines to defend
itself. This synergy is best achieved if we have a seamless
inter-agency mechanism through the National Security Council
(NSC) and the nascent National Coast Watch Council (NCWC).

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A national calibrated response may be accomplished through

the following:

3.4.2.5.2.1. Complementary Support to Diplomacy. It is

often said that diplomacy is our first line of defense. Bilateral
and multilateral cooperation will be pursued in areas where
interests converge, even among disputants in the West
Philippine Sea. Possible areas of cooperation include
humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, disaster
response, and technology cooperation. These venues help
build trust and minimize the possibility of misunderstanding
and miscalculations. We shall support the current efforts at
adopting a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
that will promote confidence-building, establish a “no first
use of force” policy, and peaceful settlement of the conflict.

3.4.2.5.2.2. Interagency Approach to Maritime Defense and

Security. Several Asia-Pacific coastal states, have over
time, established their respective coast guards to take the
cudgels for the constabulary duties previously performed by
their navies. Noteworthy of course is China, which has
employed its maritime agencies, now reorganized into one
coast guard agency, in addressing issues in West Philippine
Sea. In this regard, the AADS complements the
modernization of the Philippine Coast Guard and other
maritime agencies. This will capacitate them to go out
farther and longer to sea and assume responsibility over the
constabulary role that has since been delegated to the
Philippine Navy. Under this concept, we will be working with
civilian maritime agencies under an interagency mobilization
protocol pursuant to the implementation of the AADS.

3.4.2.5.2.3. Empowering Exercise of Civil Authority in the

Municipality of Kalayaan. UNCLOS states that even if
other countries occupy a submerged part of Philippine
continental shelf, the exclusive rights of the Philippines over
these submerged areas will not be affected. 33 Thus our
principal challenge is how to build appropriate facilities to
support our presence in the occupied features and ensure
that the status quo under the Declaration of Parties in the
South China Sea is maintained. However, for the features
that are permanently above waters, the Philippines must
demonstrate effective occupation and exercise of
sovereignty. This is where we need to work for the
empowerment of the Municipality of Kalayaan as the public
face of our sovereignty in the KIG, by improving and
sustaining critical facilities such as the runway in Pag-asa

33Under Part VI Article 77.3 of UNCLOS, “the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf
do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.”

20 S E C R E T
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Island, as well as boat landing stations, watch stations,

throughout all occupied features. These should be dual-use
facilities that address the need for increase civilian
commerce as well as island defense.34

3.4.2.5.3. Establish Naval Presence. In consonance with our

tiered maritime operations, we will establish naval presence,
24/7 anywhere in the Philippines‟ territorial seas up to its EEZ,
to be able to assert sovereignty and enforce sovereign rights.
A combination of surface and air patrols from the Navy and
other maritime agencies, deployed properly, should provide the
persistent and overlapping presence to perform a variety of
routine constabulary roles, which needs to be done to assert
our sovereignty and govern our seas.

3.4.2.5.4. Maintain Control of the Sea. Given the breadth of space

under Philippine maritime area of interest, control is best
exercised over our SLOCs, such as the Balintang and Bashi
Channels, and the Balabac, San Bernardino, Surigao, Basilan
Straits, among others. The interplay of a littoral environment
with restricted waters provides better opportunities to secure
such chokepoints from adversarial ingress and egress into the
archipelago. Adopting a “guerre de course” 35 strategy against
an enemy in these sealanes will become the decisive point for
any naval engagement. In the AADS context, control of the
sea is accomplished by utilizing the concept of maritime
maneuver or the ability to use the unique access provided by
the sea to apply force or influence at a time or place of our own
choosing.

3.4.2.5.5. Deploy Forces for Strategic Advantage. Strategic

deployment of forces refers to the disposition of naval forces,
assets, and sustaining facilities across the Philippine
archipelago for peacetime and contingency operations. Our
key enabler is the logical establishment or development of
bases and stations throughout the country, which can provide
optimal support to both maneuver and static forces as well as
C4ISTAR nodes. Such bases and stations should enhance the
ability of our maneuver forces (surface, air, marines, and
special operations assets, among others) to mobilize, deploy,

34 Such facilities should be benign enough so as not to complicate existing efforts towards the
adoption of a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and prevent the same from
becoming valid military targets under the Geneva Convention on the Law of Armed Conflicts.
35
A term originally accepted in international maritime law to indicate the practice of “privateering”,
or the right in wartime of individual owners of ships to arm them in order to attack the merchant
ships of an enemy power when licensed to do so by a letter of marque. A form of guerre de course
was reinstated at the Hague Convention of 1907 when it was agreed among the signatories that
merchant ships of a belligerent power could be taken up for war service as armed merchant
cruisers. Source:
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095911150

S E C R E T 21
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engage, loiter, and return to proper station in the shortest

possible time. This is especially critical when executing either
the swarming by force or the swarming by fire maneuvers. The
PN Basing Strategy should effectively support the projection
and sustainment of forces.

3.4.2.5.6. Integrate and Mobilize Naval Reservists and Reserve

Forces. This entails organizing, training, equipping, and
deploying Fleet and Marine Reserves in order to be
seamlessly integrated and employed within the regular force to
address a wide spectrum of challenges from peace and a
potential war scenario. The Philippine Navy shall organize,
train, and equip its reservists through the development of a
more realizable force-mix. The PNARUs shall assist the
regular force in enhancing maritime situational awareness and
providing early warning of any potential threats from the sea.
Forward operating bases shall serve as mobilization centers
where reservists can be organized and deployed as deemed
necessary.

3.4.2.6. Operational Strategy. The “Hammer and Anvil” attempts to out-

maneuver an opposing force in a manner where the enemy is
placed between a pincer, to be continually and simultaneously
attacked from all angles. The hammer and anvil concept in the
context of the AADS is the seamless integration of naval presence,
sea control, asymmetric approach, and strategically deployed asset
into a single coordinated action. This shall be executed as the
manner in which military force will be applied to complement or
support non-military options to achieve its desired effects. (Figure 4)

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Figure 4. Hammer and Anvil Concept for the Defense of the Philippines

3.4.2.6.1.1. Hammer Forces are composed of a force mix of surface, sub-

surface, amphibious and air assets that can engage an
approaching opposing force from a distance, lure it to positions
of a no-give zone, a definite unyielding interdiction point which
when reached by any hostile or unfriendly force will render it
vulnerable to multiple attacks in several fronts. Surface
combatants, submarines, and amphibious forces will provide the
core of this capability. These are the same forces employed in
tiered and calibrated response operations and for maintaining
naval presence. (Figure 5)

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Figure 5. Notional Deployment of Hammer Forces

3.4.2.6.1.2. Anvil Forces. This consists of strategically deployed assets

consisting of Army and Marine battalions; Army, Marines, and Air
Force missile systems, coastal artillery; and reserve forces. Littoral
combat forces stationed in bases and SLOCS provide maneuvering
forces to “swarm” against the adversary and attack from behind,
further placing it within the coverage of other friendly forces. The
concept of swarming involves a deliberately structured, coordinated,
and convergent attack against an adversary. In swarming, we rely
on the deployment of multiple small, highly mobile, and networked
forces, which can attack, withdraw, and re-attack if required or
desired by the on-scene commander. It has two fundamental
requirements --- the ability to strike the enemy from multiple
directions; and that the swarming force be “part of a „networked
organization,” providing intelligence to other members of the force
and the higher echelon units. (Figure 6)

3.4.2.6.1.2.1. Fast Attack Craft (Missile). Fast Attack Craft armed

with anti-ship missiles will provide the capability to strike a
hostile force from multiple directions. These vessels will be
deployed to Forward Operating Bases capable of supporting
organizational level maintenance and providing intermediate
level repair and maintenance activities. This deployment
concept ensures the operational readiness of the vessels and
their sustainment during prolonged operations.

3.4.2.6.1.2.2. Networked Organization. Maritime Situational

Awareness System (MSAS) shall provide the C4ISR
architecture for swarming operations. It provides the naval
commander the capability to identify and prioritize targets using
a Common Operating Picture (COP) and control and coordinate
the employment of the Fast Attack Craft (Missile) in tandem with

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other anvil forces. This operation requires secured

communications capability across all levels of command.

Figure 6. Notional Deployment of Anvil Forces

3.4.2.6.1.2.3. Adopt an Asymmetric Approach. Working within

resource constraints, an asymmetric approach is based on
maneuver warfare, which maximizes strengths and directs it
towards exploiting the adversary‟s weakness. It likewise offsets
weaknesses in the quantity and quality of arms by superior
strategy and tactics. The fleet of networked Fast Attack Craft
may use conventional or unconventional means or approaches
to nullify an opponent superior size by ways in which the
opponent has little or no means to counter, such as by
swarming maneuvers or luring a hostile ship within range of
other friendly forces. Asymmetric approach can be kinetic or
non-kinetic. It may utilize cyber warfare units to attack an
enemy‟s command and control systems. It may spillover to
diplomatic or economic aspects of strategy depending on where
the adversary‟s vulnerability lies such as blockade of an
opposing force‟s shipping routes or international arms embargo.

3.4.3. Maritime Cooperation (MC). Maritime Cooperation supports the military,

diplomatic and constabulary roles of the Philippine Navy. In a domestic
milieu, this involves engaging the agencies of government and the private
sector. In a diplomatic role, Maritime Cooperation functions through a
system of alliances, multilateral regimes, or bilateral engagements which
the Philippine government is involved in. On the other hand, maritime
cooperation in a military role involves the development of both military and

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non-military means and measures by engaging other major military service

units in the conduct of joint operations. Thus, Maritime Cooperation, in the
AADS context, is a force multiplier, leveraged against essential capability
gaps.

3.4.3.1. Maritime Cooperation serves as a multiplier for the other two

concepts. By encouraging partnerships across services, agencies,
regional partners, or stakeholders, the process of arriving at
solutions to security concerns is strengthened, risks are mitigated,
success is ensured, and gains are maintained.

3.4.3.2. Objective. The strategic objective of Maritime Cooperation is to

develop inter-agency coordination, enhance service interoperability,
and establish partnerships and alliance for enhanced maritime
situational awareness, maritime operations, and collective
response against an armed aggression.

3.4.3.3. Functions. In general, maritime cooperation may be achieved on

four interlocking levels – inter-service, inter-agency, international,
and multi-sectoral. Navy functions in support of Maritime
Cooperation are the following:

3.4.3.3.1. Develop the Joint Force for Hammer and Anvil

Operations. The Philippine Navy is the maritime component of
the overall defense architecture of the country. As such, we
must be able conduct a wide range of military operations in the
different domains with our sister services, the Army and the Air
Force. This is consistent with the higher Headquarters‟ concept
of “unified action” in addressing the AFP‟s various security
challenges. In the maritime airspace, the Air Force will
definitely play a major role in terms of air defense, sustained
aerial surveillance, and strategic airlift of our Marines to the
littorals or for non-combatant evacuation overseas. Foremost
in the accomplishment of this function is our ability to deploy
combat-ready Fleet-Marine Forces to the Joint Combatant
Commands. Similarly, we must be able to support an effective
National Maneuver Force. Moreover, strategic strike forces of
the PAF provide the AADS with a Hammer Force while Coastal
Missile Defense Systems of the PA are additional Anvil Forces
for the execution of the Hammer and Anvil concept of
operations.

3.4.3.3.2. Collaborate and Coordinate with Other Agencies for

Tiered and Calibrated Response Operations. This involves
partnership with other domestic and international government
agencies (i.e. DOTC, DILG, DA, DENR, BOC, DFA) as well as
local government units (LGUs) in addressing maritime security
concerns. Collaboration can take several forms: delineation of
areas of operations (AOO), wherein the PCG, PNP-MG, BFAR
can secure the internal waters and archipelagic sealanes while

26 S E C R E T
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the Navy secures the outer ocean regimes; interagency

surface or air patrols in common areas of interests; joint patrols
involving dissimilar assets; maintaining a common C2
watchfloor or linking dissimilar watchfloors; information-
sharing; or cross-decking of PN/ PCG personnel on PN/PCG
vessels involved in maritime patrols. Such collaboration may
be integral to an overarching information operation in support
of individual service security operations. This also entails
participation in inter-agency coordinating bodies such as the
National Coast Watch Council, Peace and Order Councils, and
the National Security Council.

3.4.3.3.3. Build and Maintain Coalition Among Partner Navies

and Allies. Engagements with other regional and/or allied
navies for the purpose of establishing a multilateral security
regime of like-minded nations either against a common threat
or to foster a common aspiration is a time-honored navy
function. Activities that can be undertaken under this
framework can include information-sharing, linking to a
common maritime domain awareness system, or development
of a humanitarian assistance and search and rescue protocol,
among others. Among the most important strategic
relationships to be maintained and enhanced under the AADS
are the following:

3.4.3.3.3.1. PH-US. The existing PH-US Mutual Defense

Treaty (MDT) and its accompanying Military Assistance
Agreement and Visiting Forces Agreement is the sole
collective defense treaty the Philippines has with a foreign
ally. The agreement allows the Philippines access to
equipment, training, and technology through the Excess
Defense Articles, Foreign Military Sales, and Foreign
Military Financing Program. Our strong alliance with the
US will continue to be a foundation of our maritime
operations strategy against would be foreign aggressors
while we are in the process of developing our own
capability.

3.4.3.3.3.2. PH-Australia. The Philippines has an existing

Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) and
Defense Cooperation Agreement with Australia. The Joint
Defense Cooperation Committee and Defense
Cooperation Working Group manage these agreements.
Naval exercises are conducted annually through Maritime
Training Activity (MTA) Lumbas. We will continue to
develop our capabilities and enhance interoperability with
the RAN through continuous engagement.

3.4.3.3.3.3. PH-South Korea. PH and South Korea have

strong historical ties. South Korea has been a major

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source of defense acquisitions for the Philippines. Recently,

our two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding
on Defense Cooperation effectively elevating the status of
engagement from one focusing simply on logistics
cooperation. The PN seeks to strengthen its engagement
with the ROKN through the conduct of a regular Staff-to-
Staff Talks.

3.4.3.3.3.4. PH-India. On 04 February 2006, the Philippines

and India signed an Agreement Concerning Defense
Cooperation that covers engagements such as training,
information exchange, port visits, and defense technology
cooperation. India has also shared its expertise on
hydrographic surveys with other countries in the region
through the ASEAN Regional Forum. With its “Look East
Policy,” India‟s engagement in South East Asia is expected
to increase.

3.4.3.3.3.5. PH-Malaysia. In 1967, Malaysia and the

Philippines concluded their Agreement on Anti-Smuggling
Cooperation. Together with the protocols signed thereafter,
the agreement established procedures governing the
transit of goods and people between Sabah and the
Philippines. A bilateral Joint Committee on Border
Cooperation (JCBC) administers this agreement. The PN
participates in the regular conduct of the Coordinated
Patrol PHILMAL pursuant to the agreement. Subsequently,
the two countries also concluded Memorandum of
Understanding on Defense Cooperation in 1994 which
paved the way for the conduct of the navy-to-navy MALPHI
LAUT Exercises.

3.4.3.3.3.6. PH-Indonesia. In 1975, Indonesia and the

Philippines concluded their Agreement on Border Crossing.
An adjunct Border Patrol Agreement governs combined
coordinated patrols, while border patrol exercises with the
Indonesian Navy dubbed as CORPATPHILINDO, are
conducted on a periodic basis. Both navies are about to
conclude an MOU for Enhance Defense Cooperation and
Information Exchange.

3.4.3.3.3.7. ASEAN Countries. ASEAN centrality in dealing

with major powers is a cornerstone of Philippine foreign
policy and our view of the region. Naval engagements
within ASEAN is managed through the ASEAN Navy
Chiefs Meeting (ANCM) and guided by the ASEAN
Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM). The PN supports the
development of practical cooperation among ASEAN
navies in the areas of disaster response, maritime patrols,

28 S E C R E T
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humanitarian assistance, technology exchange, and

defense industry collaboration.

3.4.3.3.3.8. PH-Japan. Japan‟s current territorial dispute with

China offers an opportunity for developing a more robust
maritime security partnership. Although our economic
engagement has been long standing, the venue for
security exchanges has been limited due to Japan‟s
constitutional constraints. However, with the renewed
impetus for a more pro-active defense posture, we can
expect an increase in defense cooperation on matters of
mutual interest.

3.4.3.3.3.9. PH-China. China is the principal security

challenge to Philippine maritime interests. Nevertheless,
Track-2 initiatives by other instruments of government can
be pursued as part of confidence-building initiatives on
matters of mutual concern. Likewise, engagements with
China may be pursued through multilateral undertaking
such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus China,
and Western Pacific Naval Symposium.

3.4.3.3.4. Global Partnership and Regional Networking.

Complementing maritime cooperation, networking with global
and regional partners in terms of information exchanges,
liaison exchanges, and systems integration, along with the
dependable defense attachés, all provide a venue for
cooperation that seeks to minimize uncertainty and generate a
clearer strategic picture across the board.

3.4.3.3.5. Engage Maritime Sector Stakeholders. This

involves participation in strategic dialogues and activities with
non-government domestic and international maritime sector
stakeholders. This may include members of the academe,
private volunteer organizations, business sector, or advocacy
groups. This type of partnership may work best in Track-2
activities which are aimed at crafting solutions that could not
be attributed officially. We shall continue engaging experts to
develop leadership and management systems based on best
practices in the private sector.

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Part IV- Force Structure

Providing the Means for the Navy 2020

4.1. Force Design. Under the AADS framework, the defense of the Philippine
archipelago will be undertaken through three naval areas or fronts, which
are analogous to a triangle. This triangle covers the country‟s North
Western, Eastern, and Southern Fronts. The apex of the triangle covers
the Bashi and Balintang Channel in the north, Balabac Strait in the
southwest, and the waters adjacent to Davao Oriental. The fronts were
organized based on the commonality of the operating geography and
security challenges present in these areas. (Figure 7)

Figure 7. AADS Naval Fronts

4.1.1. The Northwest Front addresses the maritime security challenges in

the West Philippine Sea and the western part of the Philippines.
This comprises the combined area of responsibility currently under
Naval Forces West and Naval Forces North. Critical challenges in
this area are the offshore interests in the West Philippine Sea such
as the Malampaya Platform, the Reed Bank, and the Benham Rise
in the eastern seaboard of the Philippines.

4.1.2. The Central Front addresses the maritime security challenges in

Central Philippines and eastern seaboard up to the limits of the
extended continental shelf of the Philippines in Benham Rise. It is
the combined area currently under Naval Forces Central and Naval
Forces Southern Luzon.

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4.1.3. The Southern Front secures the tri-border with Indonesia and
Malaysia and addresses the threat of international and domestic
terrorism. This shall comprise the combined area currently under
Naval Forces Eastern Mindanao and Naval Forces Western
Mindanao.

4.1.4. Each front will be the responsibility of a single commander having

operational command over Fleet-Marine Forces and capable of
employing various other forces under his operational control.

4.1.5. A separate Naval Maneuver Command with its own Flotilla and
Marine Brigade will be established and maintained for overseas and
combined operations. It shall be designed for capabilities such as
recovery of forces abroad, international peacekeeping operations,
non-combatant evacuation, protection of national flag carriers, and
combined naval exercises and operations.

4.2. Force Characteristics. To be an efficient and effective force, the future

navy must have the following characteristics:

4.2.1. Adaptive/Reliable. Forces are composed of combat-ready, rapidly

deployable, and self-sufficient Fleet-Marine team for naval
operations;

4.2.2. Interoperable. Forces are tasked organized and readily linked for
naval, joint, interagency, and combined operations in addressing a
wide spectrum of contingencies and challenges; and,

4.2.3. Versatile Force. Forces are a mix surface, air, ground, and cyber
forces that can respond to a wide range of operations in a local,
national, or regional environment.

4.3. Force Components. The strategic, operational, and tactical concepts as

well as the capability goals allow the Philippine Navy to determine the
major components of the force required for the AADS. Generally, the
intended force shall have the following components.

4.3.1. The C4ISTAR pertains to the command and control systems among
Maneuver Force, Static Forces, and Support/Sustainment Forces to
provide operational commanders and decision-makers at all levels
with the means to collect and exchange maritime information to
support planning and execution of naval and maritime operations.

4.3.2. The Maneuver Forces pertains to the surface, sub-surface, air,

ground, special operations-capable, psychological operators, and
cyber-forces that are the principal elements employed for offensive
and defensive operations. Such forces are employed singly, in
tandem, or converging in a “swarm by force,” depending on the
nature of the military objective, its center of gravity, and the likely
vulnerabilities. In a conventional Navy set-up, the maneuver forces

32 S E C R E T
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are made up of the Fleet surface and air units, the Marine Corps,
SEAL Teams, and in recent times, cyber units.

4.3.3. The Static Forces pertains to the coastal defense forces

responsible for securing the sealanes of communication (SLOCs),
critical maritime infrastructures, and international sealanes, among
others. The principal component is coastal artillery forces equipped
with long-range anti-ship missiles (ASMs), missile boats, and
ground-based anti-air weapon system which provides the “swarm
by fire” against surface adversaries. These are protected by layers
of anti-air missile batteries and Marines to address threats by air or
from ground action. Supporting elements also include minefields set
along critical routes and chokepoints, shore-, air-, and undersea-
based surveillance systems to provide situation awareness and
targeting data, and a local C2 center that will orchestrate the actions
of all static forces. In the case of critical maritime infrastructures,
SEAL Teams can be part of the force package, either as force
protection, interdiction, or for Gas, Oil, and Platform (GOPLAT) take-
down scenarios.

4.3.4. The Sustainment and Support pertains to the shore-, sea-, and
ground mobility-based logistics systems that support the Maneuver
Forces, Static Forces, and C4ISTAR. Shore-based facilities
provide re-provisioning, morale and welfare services,
communications, and depot services, among others. These services
are made available through the various bases, stations, and
reservations dispersed throughout the archipelago. Sea-based
component includes the logistics support vessels, oilers, munitions
vessels, - which goes with the Fleet as underway replenishment
(UNREP) vessels or strategic and tactical lift vessels that provide
forwarding services in between shore facilities.

4.4. Force Package. In order for forces and its capabilities to be employed at
the operational area, it is necessary to provide structure to the force. The
Force Structure36 is dictated by doctrines and concepts that prescribe how
a force is to be employed given a scenario or contingency. Under the
AADS, the determination of the required force is dictated by the delivery of
a force package to address a certain contingency. From this strategic
intent, we can derive the force structure packages necessary to
accomplish the objectives of the AADS.

4.4.1. C4ISR Force Structure Package

4.4.1.1. The C4ISR force structure shall be organized at the strategic

and operational levels. Flag Officer in Command, PN as the

36
The composition of the Services in terms of the number of major combat and support units, and
their relationship to each other is known as the force structure. In broad terms, it may also mean
the composition and arrangement of personnel, equipment, organizational hierarchy and
command and control elements needed to meet an operational or functional objective of a force.

S E C R E T 33
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Service Chief, exercises full command over all units of the

Philippine Navy at the national-strategic level.

4.4.1.2. PN Maritime Situational Awareness System (MSAS). The PN

MSAS is a system that fuses and integrates information from
surveillance operations and other means to support operational
level decision-making. The backbone of the system is a mix of
Littoral Observation Stations linked to the Maritime Situational
Awareness Centers at the Naval Operating Bases. (Figure 8)

Figure 8. PN Maritime Situational Awareness System (MSAS) Long Term Development

Plan

4.4.1.3. Littoral Observatory Stations (LOS) are a combination of

land-based surveillance stations scattered along the coastline of
the Philippines and SLOCs. It serves as the backbone of the
maritime surveillance architecture of the Philippines. LOS shall
have varying surveillance capabilities depending on location and
threat perception. It will be complemented by the deployment of
Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC) for prompt response or
reconnaissance mission. In the long-term period, the PN intends
to operate and maintain 32 LOS all over the Philippines.

4.4.1.4. Maritime Situational Awareness Centers (MSACs) integrated

with the Littoral Observation Stations (LOSs) will support the
Naval Commands and serves as its ISR component, providing
the operational to tactical level maritime operating picture to the

34 S E C R E T
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NA Commander. A complementary effort by the Philippine Army

and Air Force on ISR can be linked either through C3 nodes
within the Naval Commands or the MSACs.

4.4.1.5. Naval Maritime Situational Awareness Center will be the

principal ISR structure at the strategic level, which provides the
maritime global and strategic operating picture. It consolidates
the feeds from the LOS and provides the organization, training,
equippage, maintenance, and force protection for the network of
LOS and the MSACs. It is supposed to be connected with the
AFP Command Center, National Coast Watch Center, the
Regional Information Fusion Centers, and other inter-agency
and inter-government information-sharing centers.

4.4.1.6. Information Warfare/Operations Center will be designed for

non-kinetic missions using cyber warfare capabilities and
psychological operations to engage against the adversary‟s
intangible vulnerabilities such as leadership processes, public
opinion, state media, and legal institutions, among others. This
group consists of cyber warfare and psychological operations
specialists drawn from the Naval Intelligence Security Force and
Civil Military Operations Group.

4.4.1.7. Naval Commands will be organized at the operational level,

one for each of the three (3) fronts, to provide leadership and
supervision over all maneuver, static, and support and
sustainment forces in its area of responsibility (AOR).

4.4.1.8. Naval Maneuver Command shall be maintained as the

maritime component to the National Maneuver Force. It shall be
responsible for the conduct of contingency, combined, and
coalition operations. From a joint and combined operations
standpoint, the Command shall be complemented by
information feeds from the Over the Horizon and Air Search
Radars of the Philippines. Similarly, it shall develop information
sharing partnerships on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis on
maritime issues and concerns.

4.4.2. Maneuver Force Structure Package

4.4.2.1. Naval Commands are provided with a Flotilla37 and a Marine

Brigade as maneuver forces. A Flotilla consists of ships/craft38,
submarines, auxiliaries, aircraft, and special operations-
capable teams. A Marine Brigade consists of four (4) Marine
Battalions, a combat service support component, and in-
theater sealift capability. These are task organized to maintain

37
Flotilla refers to the aggregation of surface and sub-surface assets assigned to a Naval
Command for deployment and employment. Flotillas differ in size and combination as this is
dictated both by geographical considerations and force package requirements.
38
From the Offshore Combat and Littoral Combat Force

S E C R E T 35
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control of the sea in key sea lines of communications and

international sealanes and defend key islands and
infrastructures, and sustained operations ashore, within the
AOR of a Naval Commands. Naval Commands are organized
based on the similarities of threat and security challenges and
the contiguity of the area of operations.

Table 1. Operational Characteristics of AOR Naval Commands

THREATS
OPERATIONAL GEOGRAPHICAL SEA STATE
CLIMATOLOGY AND
COMMANDS FEATURES CONDITION
CHALLENGES
Naval  Wide open seas  NE waves  Ave Sea state  Military:
Northern from Nov to during summer Competing
Command  Kalayaan Island April (2-3) claims over
Group islands and
 SW monsoon  Ave Sea state features in
w/ storm (May during rainy the KIG
- Oct) season (not
below 5)  Constabulary
: piracy,
smuggling of
drugs, IUU
fishing
Naval  Wide open seas  Wind: NE Southwest  Military:
Central on the eastern from November Monsoon: Phil Insurgency
seaboard to Feb / SW Sea = average (2-
Command winds from 3)  Constabulary
 Busy shipping June to : smuggling,
lanes with September Northeast illegal fishing,
hundreds of Monsoon: Phil sea shipping
islands in the Tropical = average (3-5) security,
Central Cyclone Path: disaster
Philippines Moderate to rough response
Dec-Mar: south from July to Oct in
of AOR the rest of the
AOR
Apr-Jun:
passes directly
in the AOR

Oct-Nov: cut
across the AOR

Naval  Coast is  Mild tropical SW Monsoon: 2-3  Military:
Southern generally rocky climate. Wind Insurgency
w/ numerous predominantly NW Monsoon: 3-5 and terrorism
Command coral formation. northward
 Constabulary
 Most islands  Wet Season: : smuggling,
and islets are Nov-Jan IUU fishing,
vegetated w/ illegal
mangroves Dry Season: migration
April -Nov

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4.4.2.1.1. Naval Northern Command shall be formed out of

the merger of Naval Forces West and Naval Forces
Northern Luzon. A Flotilla will be set up to manage the
existing and future Frigates that will be deployed to the
area. It shall also have a Marine Brigade under its
operational control based in Naval Operating Bases (NOB)
Subic and Ulugan.

Figure 9. Naval Northern Command (Area Blue)

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4.4.2.1.2. Naval Central Command Flotilla will be drawn from

the assets of Naval Forces Central and Naval Forces
Southern Luzon. The Marine Brigade component will be
based in Naval Base Mactan.

Figure 10. Naval Central Command (Area Gold)

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4.4.2.1.3 Naval Southern Command assets will be composed of

a Flotilla from the assets of Naval Forces Eastern Mindanao
and Naval Forces Western Mindanao and a Marine Brigade to
be based in NOB Margosatubig.

Figure 11. Naval Southern Command (Area Red)

4.4.2.2. Naval Maneuver Command is a rapid deployment force organized,

trained, and equipped to participate in combined or coalition operations
overseas, non-combatant evacuation, protection of national flag
carriers, international peacekeeping, and other maritime cooperation
activities. It shall consist of the following:

4.4.2.2.1. Surface Action Group is designed for operations in the

high seas, as a unilateral commitment or as part of a combined,
coalition, or interagency undertaking. SAG consists of
corvettes or offshore patrol vessels (with embarked multi-
purpose helicopters) with attached Underway Replenishment
Vessels provided by the Offshore Combat Force and the
Sealift Amphibious Force.

4.4.2.2.2. Amphibious Ready Group is a Fleet-Marine formation

consisting of the landing, escort, sealift, and sustainment
components. It is designed for contingency operations inside
Philippine territory or overseas, and the seizure of key islands
and critical infrastructures. It is built around a amphibious-
certified Marine Brigade (consisting of three Marine Battalion
Landing Teams) supported by frigates (with embarked ASW
helicopters), strategic sealift vessels (with embarked multi-

S E C R E T 39
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purpose helicopters), and logistics vessels. A combat engineer

detachment may be included for forced-entry missions.

4.4.2.2.3. Special Operations Group is tasked for direct action,

execution of sensitive missions requiring precision and
deniability, and a smaller footprint on the ground. Such force
offers a viable option particularly against strategic targets with
a high-risk but a high pay-off outcome. This group is made up
of SEAL Teams, Force Recon Companies, and Combat
Engineers, drawn from the Naval Special Operations Group,
the Force Recon Battalion, and the Combat Engineer Battalion,
respectively.

4.4.3. Static Force Structure Package

4.4.3.1. Naval Commands can also employ the Marine Brigade as its
principal static force. The three (3) battalions can be deployed
at the Forward Operating Bases, while supported by sealift
vessels. It is designed for island defense and the protection of
critical infrastructure. Attached to the brigade are naval and
marine reservists trained for island defense, irregular warfare,
and combat intelligence. The brigade may also be provided
with coastal missile systems and air defense systems to
establish local sea denial and control over adjacent waters.

4.4.3.2. From a joint perspective, the Marine Brigade can operate with
the coastal batteries of the Philippine Army and Ground-Based
Anti-Air Systems of the Philippine Air Force. Specifically, the
long-range defensive layer of anti-ship missile systems will be
employed for sea denial operations in key locations covered by
Naval Northern Command, while the early warning systems
and ground-based anti-air batteries provides force protection. If
the Philippine Army no longer pursues the coastal defense role,
a Coastal Defense Battalion may be established.

4.4.4. Sustainment and Support Force Structure Package. The

sustainment of maneuver and static forces shall be executed
through shore-based, afloat, and out-sourced capabilities. The
principal support requirements for organization, training, equipage,
and maintenance are provided by the two Type Commands, the
Philippine Fleet and the Philippine Marine Corps, as well as the
other Support Commands/Units.

4.4.4.1. Philippine Fleet exercises administrative control over all

ships, aircrafts, sub-surface, and special operations units. To
enable the unit to more effectively organize, train, equip, and
maintain its units, it shall be restructured along doctrinal lines to
develop expertise in the different specialties of naval warfare.

40 S E C R E T
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4.4.4.1.1. Offshore Combat Force shall focus on surface warfare

operations in the high seas. It will have primary
responsibility for sustainment of Frigates, Corvettes and
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). These large naval assets
are multi-mission platforms and primarily employed for
maritime cooperation functions and support MSA and
Maritime Operations. Doctrinally, they are employed to
strike targets on land and convoy protection for the
Amphibious Ready Group. These ships are also capable of
responding to non-military tasks such as humanitarian
assistance and disaster response, search and rescue, and
non-combatant evacuation.

4.4.4.1.2. Littoral Combat Force will be established to specialize

in littoral and assymetric warfare operations. It shall be
responsible for the maintenance and sustainment of
Coastal Patrol Interdiction Crafts (CPICs) and Fast
Attack Crafts (both missile and non-missile capable).
These naval assets are designed for domestic littoral
missions as well as establishing control over sea lines of
communications and chokepoints. They also conduct
maritime security missions in support of other government
agencies.

4.4.4.1.3. Sealift Amphibious Force will specialize on

amphibious and sustainment operations. The unit will
specialize on providing combat logistics such as supplying
ground and surface forces for prolonged operations and
transporting ground forces, and sustaining forces in the KIG.
This capability enables our naval forces to deploy and
remain at sea for extended periods of time anywhere in
Philippine waters.

4.4.4.1.4. Submarine Force provides the primary undersea

warfare capabilities of the fleet. The submarine‟s stealth,
persistence, and firepower complement other naval forces
for maritime operations. Additionally, submarines provide
unique intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
and strategic strike capabilities that are applicable across
the range of naval and other military operations. As yet an
evolving capability, its development shall be jumpstarted
with the establishment of the Submarine Development
Office under the functional supervision of the planning
division of the Philippine Fleet.

4.4.4.1.5. Mine Warfare Force will be established to acquire the

capability to lay and/or otherwise counter the threat of naval
mines. This is a capability that will be pursued initially with
the establishment of the Mine Warfare Development Office
of the Philippine Fleet.

S E C R E T 41
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4.4.4.1.6. Naval Special Operations Group will be maintained

for strike missions. They are trained and organized for
reconnaissance, infiltration, amphibious raids, and
explosives and ordnance disposal.

4.4.4.1.7. Naval Air Group is organized for operational and

tactical maritime air surveillance, anti-submarine warfare,
vertical insertion of troops, and combat search and rescue
at sea. Naval aviation provide speed, endurance, agility, and
reach, which complement other naval capabilities. Manned
and unmanned naval aircraft will be fully integrated into the
majority of naval operations, performing a wide variety of
functions and tasks. Naval aircraft can be described in three
broad categories: fixed wing aircraft; rotary-wing aircraft;
and unmanned aerial systems.

4.4.4.1.8. Fleet Meteorological and Hydrographic Group

(FMHG). Taking its initial capabilities from the
Oceanographic and Littoral Affairs Group, the Fleet
Meteorological and Hydrographic Group shall undertake
hydrographic surveys to support surface and undersea
warfare operations as well as facilities maintenance of the
Naval Installations Command. Likewise, it shall develop
appropriate capabilities for meteorological forecasting in
support of fleet missions.

4.4.4.2. Philippine Marine Corps shall exercise administrative control over all
Marine Brigades and Battalions. It consists of infantry, armor, artillery,
and special-operations capable units with appropriate Combat
Support and Combat Service Support Brigades.

4.4.4.3. Naval Combat Engineer Brigade shall provide combat engineering

capabilities for amphibious operations. It shall have the capability to
provide a company to a battalion for contingency operations in support
of the Marine Brigades and Battalions.

4.4.4.4. Naval Installations Command shall be established with functional

capabilities for capital improvements, environmental engineering, public
works, asset management, and other contingency engineering. It shall
exercise command and control over the naval base, naval operating
bases, forward operating bases, and naval support facilities. The
principal naval base will be established in Mactan Naval Reservation,
Lapu-Lapu City. It shall be complemented by three Naval Operating
Bases 39 , 11 Forward Operating Bases 40 , and 19 Naval Support

39
Naval Operating Base is a shore establishment located in a strategic area which comprises all
naval activities capable of providing direct services to the operating forces and prompt and
sustained Fleet-Marine Operation. Three (3) NOBs will be established, namely: NOB Ulugan,
NOB Margosatubig, and NOB Subic.

42 S E C R E T
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Facilities 41. Inter-island logistics forwarding services will be provided

either by auxiliaries from the Sealift Amphibious Force or contracted out
to commercial entities.

Figure 12. PN Basing Strategy

4.5. Employing the Force. After the identification of the required force
structure packages, the next step is to organize the force from a strategic,
operational, and tactical perspective.

4.5.1. At the strategic level, the force structure provides appropriate naval
units and capabilities in support of the Joint Combatant
Commands42. Command and control over all Fleet and Marine units
are integrated at the Headquarters Philippine Navy. The Type
Commands – Philippine Fleet and the Philippine Marine Corps –
exercise administrative control over their respective units and assets.

40
Forward Operating Bases are permanently protected shore establishment in strategic coastal
areas with limited shore facilities for naval activities, including embarkation/disembarkation
facilities for Fleet-Marine forces in support to operations.
41
Naval Support Facility is shore establishment which comprises other support activities, primarily
for Officer and Enlisted Personnel housing and secondary and/or tertiary services in support to NB,
NOB, FOB and Training Bases. This facility shall include all other PN base used jointly or
exclusively by the Fleet and/or Marine forces.
42
Unified Commands under the current AFP organization.

S E C R E T 43
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4.5.2. At the operational level, the force employers are the three (3) Naval
Commands and the Naval Maneuver Command. They exercise the
operational command and control functions for assigned Fleet and
Marine units. They have the capability to task organize fleet and
marine assets and units to address contingencies within their AOR.

4.5.3. The force structure following the levels of command and control is
shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Employment of the Force Structure

Levels of C4ISTAR Maneuver Support/Sustainment Static Forces
Command C2 ISTAR
Strategic CSAFP Strategic GHQ AFPWSSUS
Level (AFP Command Command
Center)
Service FOIC, PN Maritime Research Air Defense Wing, PN Types Commands Coastal
Level (Naval Info Center PAF PN Support Defense
Operations Info Warfare/Opns Strike Wing, PAF Commands/Units Brigade, PA
Center) Center
Maritime Patrol Wing,
PAF
Operational Naval Maritime Situational Flotilla Offshore Combat Force Marine
Level Commands/ Awareness Centers Marine Brigades Littoral Combat Force Brigades
Naval Maneuver Naval Intelligence Sealift and Amphibious Littoral Combat
Command Groups Force Force
Combat Intelligence Naval Air Group Naval Reserve
Coy Naval Special Forces
Operations Group
Combat Support Brigade
Combat Service Support
Brigade
Naval Operating Bases
Tactical Flotillas Littoral Observation Frigates, Combat Logistics Forward
Level Marine Brigade Stations Corvettes, OPV Battalion Operating
Surface Action Fixed Wing Aircraft Strategic Sealift, Motor Transport Bases
Group Naval Intelligence Auxiliary Battalion Anti-Ship
Amphibious Units Combat &Transport Inshore Boat Battalion Missile
Ready Group Intelligence Team Vessels Naval Combat Battalion, PA
SEAL Teams MP &ASW Helo Engineering Battalion Air Defense
Force Recon Naval Special Battalion, PA
Teams Operations Units
Marine Battalion
Landing Team

4.5.4. The AADS Force Structure requires time to fully materialize. In the
medium-term period, changes in the current force structure will be
implemented including the decommissioning of lower level
capabilities and units. This transition process is summarized in
Annex C.

44 S E C R E T
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ANNEX A

Strategy Implementation and Management

5.1. Strategy Implementation. The implementation of the strategy must

follow the current DSOM Planning Cycle. CY 2013 shall be devoted to
laying down the foundation for enhanced implementation of the strategy
such as requirements identification. Specific activities to implement the
AADS shall be proposed as part of the Future Year‟s Defense Program
beginning CY 2014.

5.2. Strategy Management. The AADS is a dynamic and evolving document

to suit the challenges of the times. Its relevance is maintained through
periodic reviews and openness to progressive ideas brought by changes
in the strategic environment and adoption of new technologies. In order
to ensure that the principles and concepts of the AADS are updated as
the need arises, the Director, Office of the Naval Strategic Studies
(DONSS) is designated as the Secretariat for the operational
development and document maintenance of the AADS. It shall monitor
specific activities that implement the strategy and review proposals for
amendments and revisions. The review and updating of the AADS shall
be done on a semi-annual basis until such time that the widest
consensus by the stakeholders has been reached. Succeeding review
shall be conducted on a biennial basis following the Defense Strategic
Planning System (DSPS) Cycle. Constant feedback and information
flows to support strategy management includes, but not limited to:

5.2.1. Creation of AADS Board of Advisers (BOA). A select group of

experts representing the key stakeholders of the AADS will be
organized to infuse constant strategic insights to the AADS. This
group will be composed of retired naval officers, academics, naval
technology experts, maritime policy advocates, and other like-
minded individuals.

5.2.2. Operational Evaluation by the Fleet-Marine Warfare Center

and Naval Command Staff Course. The effectiveness of the
concepts and force structure of the AADS shall be constantly
assessed and evaluated by the FMWC through the conduct of
operations research, war games, investigation of specific naval or
marine operations, and updating tactics, techniques, and
procedures of naval warfare concepts. On the other hand, the
AADS shall be included in the Naval Strategy Module of the Naval
Command Staff Course (NCSC). Consequently, a review, test,
and validation of the AADS concept shall be included in the Naval
Operations Module of the NCSC.

5.2.3. Test and Validation by Tactical Units. Lessons learned must

inform policy-level actions on the impact of the strategy to
operations on the ground. Operational and support commands

S E C R E T 45
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shall submit key observations to ONSS on how the

implementation of the AADS directly affected their operational
effectiveness. Likewise, the Naval Doctrines Office (NDO) shall
conduct test and validation of our AADS and provide
recommendations on the appropriate amendments.

5.3. Way Ahead.

5.3.1. Align initiatives. The common pitfall of strategy implementation

is when new strategies are crafted without adjusting the way we
conduct business. A new strategy requires new priorities with
commensurate changes in the organization, policies, and budget.
Every activity (other than the most functional) must be reviewed
against its relevance to the new strategy. In this regard, the
review and updating of the PN Sail Plan and Balance Scorecard
shall be undertaken to provide strategic value measurement tool
for existing and new initiatives. Initiatives should be analyzed
against their strategic value and the impact to the organization.
Specific implementing functional plans and programs shall be
formulated for the AADS as follows:

5.3.1.1. Organizational Strategy

5.3.1.1.1. Organization of Type Commands for Offshore

Patrol, Littoral Combat Force, Sealift Force, Marine
Corp and Combat Engineers

5.3.1.2. C4ISTAR

5.3.1.2.1. Development of C2 for new Force Structure

5.3.1.3. Maritime Situational Awareness

5.3.1.3.1. Integration to National Coast Watch System

through MRIC/NOC
5.3.1.3.2. Establishment of additional LOS and one MSAC

5.3.1.4. Reserve Force Development Strategy

5.3.1.4.1. Alignment to AADS

5.3.1.5. Strategic Communications and Maritime

Cooperation

5.3.1.5.1. International Engagement Plans

5.3.1.5.2. Staff- to-Staff Talks with Other Navies

46 S E C R E T
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5.3.1.6. Capability Development

5.3.1.6.1. Implementation of Medium-Term Capability

Program
5.3.1.6.2. Development of Long-Term Capability Program

5.3.1.7. Doctrines/Education and Training

5.3.1.7.1. Formulation/development of doctrines for new

assets to be acquired
5.3.1.7.2. Trainings must be geared towards new assets to
be acquired
5.3.1.7.3. Linkages with Maritime Training Institutions

5.3.1.8. PN Human Capital Strategy

5.3.1.8.1. Selective recruitment

5.3.1.8.2. Specialization of personnel and officers for
competence and continuity
5.3.1.8.3. Long term assignment
5.3.1.8.4. Identify the percentage of manpower to be
recruited/allocated for specific assignments
5.3.1.8.5. Human Resource Development
5.3.1.8.6. FOS Implementation

5.3.1.9. Basing Strategy

5.3.1.9.1. Finalization of Basing Strategy

5.3.1.9.2. Prioritization of development/acquisition of Naval
Stations/Bases (Cebu, Ulugan, Balabac, and Subic)
5.3.1.9.3. Development of Master Development Plans

5.3.1.10. Logistics and Sustainment

5.3.1.10.1. Inclusion of all requirements for AADS in the

APP/APB
5.3.1.10.2. Development of Forward Logistics Support
5.3.1.10.3. Establishment of Naval Installation Command

5.3.1.11. Maintenance and Repair

5.3.1.11.1. Phase -in and Phase-out Plan

5.3.1.11.2. Development of Forward Repair Facilities

5.1.1. Align budgets and performance. Organizational performance

should be closely aligned to strategy. Performance measures
should be placed against strategic goals across the organization
and each division and staff member. The staff should recognize
their direct and indirect impact on strategy performance. The most
influential way a strategy impacts an organization is through

S E C R E T 47
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programming and budgeting. Beginning with the FOIC,PN

Program Advice 2014, initiatives to implement the strategy will be
communicated to the Secretary of National Defense. The relevant
planning and budgeting offices of the PN shall establish a working
calendar that is aligned to the DSOM Timelines. We shall
endeavor to identify our priority projects based on the AADS well
in advance of the DSOM timelines to more effectively
communicate our financial requirements to SND and Congress.

5.1.2. Structure follows strategy. A transformational strategy will

require a transformation to structure. Organizations that try and
force a new strategy into an out-dated structure will find their
strategy implementation eventually reaches a deadlock. The
transition to the future force structure must be pursued in tandem
with the planned acquisition of the capability. In the medium-term
period, the transitional force shall compose of the legacy forces.
In the immediate term period, the we shall pursue the following
transitional activities:

5.1.2.1. Reconfiguration of Philippine Fleet Organization.

The existing assets of the Philippine Fleet may allow it to
reconfigure its organization based on the future force
structure. In this regard, the Patrol Force shall be
reorganized as the Offshore Combat Force, Assault
Craft Force as the Littoral Combat Force, and Service
Force as the Sealift Amphibious Force. Their current
missions shall be expanded to include the full range of
administrative control functions and not simply for
maintenance. Flotilla Commands (akin to the defunct
Naval Task Force) will be organized as C2 structures to
deployed Fleet units and attached to the Naval
Commands. Additionally, the establishment of the
Submarine Development Office and Mine Warfare
Development Office shall be pursued.

5.1.2.2. Upgrade Status of Fleet-Marine Ready Force to

Naval Maneuver Command. The status and capability
of the Fleet-Marine Ready Force may be upgraded
equivalent to that of a Naval Area. This means providing
the unit with an initial capability where it can organize an
Amphibious Ready and Surface Action Group.

5.1.2.3. Activation of the Naval Combat Engineering Brigade.

Drawing from the current personnel, equipment, and
facilities of the Naval Construction Brigade, the Naval
Combat Engineering Brigade will be activated to
undertake the implementation of required programs to
develop the combat engineering and amphibious landing
support capability of the PN.

48 S E C R E T
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5.1.2.4. Fill-up of Marine Battalions. Filling-up Marine

Battalions allows the PMC to develop experienced core
of officers and enlisted personnel which could be tapped
to form the additional combat support units envisioned
by the future force structure.

5.1.2.5. Phased Activation of the Naval Commands. With

existing assets, the establishment of the Naval
Commands may be pursued gradually. The focus on the
West Philippine Sea may necessitate the prioritization of
the activation of Naval Northern Command. This entails
the integration of existing Naval Forces West and
Northern Luzon. This may be followed by the activation
of Naval Southern Command as internal security
operations in the area are completed after the signing of
the final peace agreement with the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front. Naval Central Command security
requirements remain predominantly constabulary in
nature and may be initially addressed with cooperation
with the Philippine Coast Guard and other interagency
partners.

5.1.2.6. Activation of the Naval Installation Command. The

activation of the Naval Installation Command is expected
to hasten the implementation of and standardization of
bases and facility development in line with the PN
Basing Strategy. This is necessary as a preparation for
the eventual arrival of planned acquisitions.

5.1.3. Engage Stakeholders. Strategy implementation also fails when

the key stakeholders are not behind it. In this regard, the following
activities shall be pursued:

5.1.3.1. Information and Education Campaign. Each sailor and

marine must know and understand the AADS. The Naval
Education and Training Command (NETC) and other
training schools and units of the PN shall include an
AADS module in their Program of Instruction.

5.1.3.2. Operational Leveling. The organization should have a

common understanding of the doctrinal foundations of the
strategy. This entails reviewing existing manuals, tactics,
techniques, and procedures to ensure that they are
consistent with the goals and requirements of the strategy.
This shall be the task of the Fleet-Marine Warfare Center.

5.1.3.3. Stakeholder Mapping. The Office for Naval Strategic

Studies shall conduct a Stakeholder Mapping to
determine the persons, organizations, and offices to be
engaged to ensure that the widest understanding and

S E C R E T 49
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support is generated for the successful implementation of

the AADS.

5.1.3.4. Strategic Communications Plan. The introduction of a

new strategy coupled with organizational changes may
entail initial resistance. As part of change management, a
strategic communications plan should be developed
focusing on each of the stakeholders identified in the
Stakeholder Map. This ensures that concerns are fully
addressed and resistance is minimized.

5.1.3.5. Transition Management Planning. Transition

management seeks to steer the outcome of change to
lessen inherent uncertainty, produce desirable
organizational outcomes, and enhance resilience during
the transition from one system to another. It minimizes the
risks of failure by adopting a long-term view of a change,
such as acquisition of new technology, that encompasses
the required activities before change is effected, through
life support, service life extension, and planned
obsolescence. This task is a joint effort among logistics
and systems-related staff (N3, N4, N6, and N10).

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ANNEX B
PN Medium Term Development Plan (2013-2017)

Table 3. PN Short Term Development Plan (2013-2017)

SURFACE WARFARE/SEALIFT /ASW
1 Frigate 2 units
2 Strategic Sealift Vessel (SSV) 2 vessels
3 Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MKIII) Missile -capable 3 units
4 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Helicopter 2 units
MARFOR COMBAT SYSTEMS
Shoulder Launched Multi-Purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW)
5 24 units
Project
6 Amphibious Assault Vehicle(AAV) Project 8 units
C4ISR PROJECTS
7 CWS Requirements (1 CWC, 3 CWS) 1 center/3 stations
MARFOR Imagery Tactical Target Acquisition and 5-UAV, 18-LRDC, 6RFAS,
8
Surveillance (MITTS) Project 4-TAS
FORWARD SUPPORT/SUSTAINMENT/SEA-BASING PROJECTS
9 PN Base Support System 10 lots
Civil Engineering Equipment Acquisition Project (PN Civil
10 10 lots
Engineering)

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Table 4. PN Long Term Development Plan (2018-2027)

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS & COMMAND AND CONTROL
1 C4ISTAR SYSTEM 4 lots
2 Littoral Observatory Station (CWS) 9 lots
3 Undersea Surveillance System 1 lot
SURFACE WARFARE
4 Frigates 4
5 Off-Shore Patrol Vessel 18
6 Corvettes 12
7 Fast Patrol Gunboats (Missile) 30
8 Coastal Interdiction Craft 12
9 MPAC (Missile) 39
UNDERSEA WARFARE
10 Submarines 3
11 Mine Warfare Vessels 6
NAVAL AIR WARFARE
12 Trainer Aircraft (Fixed Wing) 3
13 Trainer Aircraft (Rotary) 3
14 Naval Helicopters 12
15 ASW Helicopters 6
Amphibious Multi-Purpose Aircraft
16 8
(Sea Plane)
AUXILIARY/LOGISTICS & SUPPORT SYSTEM
17 Strategic Sealift Vessel 2
18 Landing Craft Utility 18
19 Logistics Support/Replenishment Ships 5
20 Ocean Tug 3
21 Fire/Yard Tug 6
22 Marine Slipway 1
23 Synchro Lift 1
24 Floating Dock 1
25 Graving Dock 1
26 Kalayaan Island Group Fortification 9
MARFOR COMBAT SYSTEM
27 Other MARFOR Combat System 18
NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE
28 Special Warfare Equipment 1 lot
NAVAL BASE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
29 Air Search Radar 4
30 Surface to Air Missile 4
31 CWIS (Land Based) 4
ORDNANCE
32 Surface-To-Surface Missile for Frigates, Corvettes & OPVs 234
33 Surface-To-Air Missile (SAM) for Frigates, Corvettes & OPVs 720
34 Surface-To-Surface Missile (SSM) for FPGMs & MPACs 162
35 Super Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff (SRBOC) Ammo 432
36 Decoy/Chaff shipborne 5616
37 Torpedoes 180

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38 Sea mines 120

39 Primary Naval Guns Ammo 25920
40 Secondary Naval Guns Ammo 86400
41 A - 244 Torpedoes 80
42 Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM) 24
43 Artillery Rocket Ammo 1 lot
44 155mm Mortar Bomb 6480
45 60mm Mortar Bomb 24750
46 81mm Mortar Bomb 79920
47 40mm HV(AAV) 6048
48 40mm Grenade Launcher ammo 104814
49 120mm Mortar Bomb 21600
50 Coastal Defense Missile 24
OTHER EQUIPMENT
51 Disaster Response Equipment 1 lot
52 Training Simulators 18
53 Naval Sea Systems Equipment 1 lot
54 Suction Dredger 2
55 Medical Equipment 3 lots
Hydrographic, Oceanographic and
56 1 lot
Meteorological Equipment
57 Environmental Equipment 3 lots
58 CBRN Personnel Protective Gears 12000
UPGRADE
59 Patrol Ships 10
60 Naval Guns (3 JCPVs) 3
61 Transport Ship 4
62 Aircraft 3
63 Marine LARSU 72
64 Shipyard 8
65 Littoral Observatory Station (CWS) 4

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Intentionally Blank

54 S E C R E T
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ANNEX C

Policy References

1.1. The 1987 Constitution provides the overall framework for identifying
the defense needs of the Philippines. Under the Declaration of State
Principles and Policies, the Philippines “renounces war as an
instrument of national policy”. 43 This generally connotes that the AFP is
intended only as a defensive force. The constitutional goal of the AFP
is “to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the
national territory.”44 There are two parts to this constitutional fiat. One is
that the AFP must at all times uphold and protect the constitutional
order that allows the free exercise of the people of their rights and
responsibilities under the law. It must be capable of addressing both
internal and external challenges to the will of the Filipino people to
govern our country in the manner of their own choosing. The second
part of the constitutional instruction relates to the role of the AFP in
ensuring that every part of Philippine territory is free from foreign
aggression and shall be under the effective control of the government.
The national territory of the Philippines includes all the islands
comprising the archipelago including the waters connecting these
islands and all other territories in which the Philippines exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction. The latter includes the territories of Sabah,
Kalayaan Island Group, and Bajo de Masinloc.

1.2. Republic Act 9522 or the Amended Philippine Baselines Law

adopted the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to delimit the
maritime territories and jurisdiction of the Philippines. The law identifies
101 basepoints connecting archipelagic baselines that enclose the
main Philippine archipelago and establishes a regime of islands in
accordance with Article 121 of UNCLOS for the Kalayaan Island Group
and the Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal. The maritime zones
in which the Philippines exercise jurisdiction are measured from these
archipelagic baselines up to the EEZ totaling 586,210 sq. nm.
Presidential Proclamation No. 370 of 20 March 1968 declared as
subject to the jurisdiction and control of the Republic of the Philippines
all minerals and other natural resources in the continental shelf.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978
established an Exclusive Economic Zone for the Philippines.

1.3. Executive Order 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
prescribes the function of the Philippine Navy to “organize, train, and
equip forces for prompt and sustained naval operations. The law also
enjoins the PN to enforce all maritime laws, rules, and regulations in
the Philippine maritime territories and jurisdictions.

43
Article 2, Section 2 of 1987 Philippine Constitution.
44
Article 2, Section 3 of 1987 Philippine Constitution.

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1.4. To address the growing maritime security concerns, the National

Security Policy (NSP) 2011-2016 states two national security goals: to
promote internal socio-political stability; and to capacitate the
Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and to provide
protection to its maritime and other strategic interests.

1.4.1. Under the NSP‟s second overarching goal, four (4) objectives
were enumerated: to promote external harmonious relationships
with our neighbors and the world at large; to pursue regional
cooperation in various areas; to enhance our cooperative
security arrangements with allies and neighbors; and to develop
a defense capability to protect our sovereignty and strategic
maritime interests.

1.4.2. To develop our defense capability, the government has outlined

ways on how it is to be addressed. These are: to promote and
enhance maritime security as a key component of national
security; to provide a stable and peaceful socio-political and
administrative environment in the country that fosters sustained
profitability and growth for maritime industries; to protect and
defend the integrity of the country‟s marine resources; and to
strengthen its maritime security posture as part of its larger
external defense plan.

1.5. On the other hand, the Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT)

White Paper identified the following strategic objectives and options for
the country‟s defense forces up to 2022:

1.5.1. Securing the national territory and protecting strategic maritime

interest;
1.5.2. Securing communities and supporting local authorities;
1.5.3. Reducing the risks of natural and human-induced disasters;
1.5.4. Strengthening and expanding international defense alliances
and partnerships; and,
1.5.5. Strengthening the integrity of the defense establishment by
subscribing to generally accepted principles of security sector
reform.

1.6. To implement the goals of the PDT White Paper, the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG) 2014-2019 identified challenges to
territorial integrity and maritime security as the top defense and
security concern. Given the limited resources, defense planning and
resources shall focus on building Minimum Credible Defense
Posture (MCDP) through equipment acquisition, equipment
sustainment, and upgraded technical skills training and education of
personnel. Support to the National Coast Watch System, as a
mechanism for interagency cooperation, shall be given priority.

1.7. Accordingly, the AFP issued the AFP Strategic Intent, in support to the
National Military Strategy (NMS), the objectives of which are the

56 S E C R E T
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following: to maintain sovereignty, defend territorial integrity and secure

maritime interests; to achieve internal peace and security; to contribute
to regional/international peace and stability; and to pursue AFP
transformation.

1.8. The amended AFP Modernization Program as embodied in Republic

Act 10349, a revision of Republic Act 7898, was signed on December
2012 to “develop the AFP‟s capability to uphold the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic and to secure the national territory
from all forms of intrusion and encroachment.” This ensures the
allocation of resources to the AFP modernization in the next 15 years.

1.9. Philippine Approach To Defense Planning. Perhaps, the most

significant change in the Philippine defense sector is the shift from
threat-based planning to capability-based planning framework. The
Defense System of Management (DSOM) builds upon and extends
the capability-based planning processes and institutional reforms
implemented under the Multi-Year Capability Planning System. It links
key functions and areas and provides the Secretary of National
Defense (SND), the Chief of Staff, AFP (CSAFP), and other senior
leaders of DND and AFP with a framework for the following:

1.9.1. Determining the Republic of the Philippines‟ defense needs and

priorities;

1.9.2. Developing capability plans and fiscally constrained plans and

budget requests that meets the most important needs; and

1.9.3. Explaining to the President and Congress the logic of these

plans and budget requests, and the risks they entail.

1.10. The DSOM encompasses two planning processes – the Medium-Term

Planning Process (MTPP) and the Long-Term Planning Process
(LTPP). The MTPP has five (5) inter-related phases from strategic
planning to implementation and covers one Presidential Term. On the
other hand, the LTPP occurs twice in a Presidential Term but covers an
18-year planning horizon. Taken as a whole, the DSOM framework is
in itself a strategy formulation process. The promulgation of the Active
Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS) effectively links the scenarios of
greatest concerns and the strategic planning options of the Defense
Strategic Planning System (DSPS) and the Defense Capability
Planning System (DCAPS) for Program-3 (Maritime Forces). Likewise,
it serves as the strategic rationale for determining the priorities for the
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) and allocation of annual budgets
under the Defense Resource Management System (DRMS).

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Intentionally Blank

58 S E C R E T
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ANNEX D
Table 5. Force Structure Transition Plan
Force Structure 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
HPN 1 1 1 1 1 1
Philippine Fleet 1 1 1 1 1 1
Patrol Force 1 0 0 0 0 0
Offshore Combat
Force 0 1 1 1 1 1
Frigate 2 2 3 5 5 5
Del Pilar Class 2 2 3 3 3 3
Combat Frigates 0 0 0 2 2 2
Corvette 0 0 1 1 1 1
OPV 12 12 10 9 8 7
Jacinto Class 3 3 3 3 3 3
PCE 6 6 4 4 4 4
DE/MSF 3 3 3 2 1 0
Assault Craft Force 1 0 0 0 0 0
Littoral Combat Force 0 1 1 1 1 1
Fast Attack Craft 59 53 50 45 40 40
PKM 6 6 5 4 4 4
78ft PG 22 22 22 22 22 22
82ft 2 2 1 1 0 0
Fast Patrol
Gunboats 0 0 0 0 0 4
DF 20 16 12 8 4 0
FACP 3 1 0 0 0 0
MPAC MK1 3 3 3 3 3 3
MPAC MK2 3 3 3 3 3 3
MPAC MK3 0 0 3 3 3 3
Coastal Patrol
Interdiction Craft 5 4 2 1 1 1
Aguinaldo Class 4 3 1 0 0 0
Cyclone Class 1 1 1 1 1 1
Service Force 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sealift Amphibious
Force 0 1 1 1 1 1
LST/LSV 4 4 4 4 4 4
SSV 0 0 1 2 2 2
LCU 5 5 6 6 6 6
Auxiliary/Transport
Vessel
Auxiliary Water 1 1 1 1 1 1
Auxiliary Fuel 1 1 0 0 0 0
Auxiliary Cargo 1 1 1 1 1 1
Coastal Fuel Tender 0 2 3 3 3 3

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Force Structure 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Naval Air Group 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fixed Wing Aircraft 10 10 10 10 10 6
Rotary Wing
Multi-Purpose Helo 7 8 7 6 6 6
Anti-Submarine Helo 0 0 0 2 2 2
Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle 0 0 0 0 0 0
Naval Special
Operations Group 1 1 1 1 1 1
Naval Special
Operations Units 4 4 4 4 4 4
Submarine Force
(Development Office) 0 1 1 1 1 1
Submarine 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mine Warfare Force
(Development Office) 0 1 1 1 1 1
Mine Countermeasure
Vessel 0 0 0 0 0 1
Fleet Meteorological
and Hydrographic
Group 0 1 1 1 1 1
Hydrographic Vessel 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fleet Support Force 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fleet Support Groups 4 4 4 4 4 4
PMC Hqs 1 1 1 1 1 1
Marine Amphibious
Brigades 3 3 3 3 3 3
Marine Amphibious
Battalions 12 12 12 12 12 12
CEIS Battalion 0 0 0 0 1 1
Marine Special
Operations Regiment 0 1 1 1 1 1
Inshore Boat Battalion 1 1 1 1 1 1
Force
Reconnaissance
Battalion 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sniper Company
Marine Combat
Support Brigade 1 1 1 1 1 1
Assault Armor
Battalion 1 1 1 1 1 1
Field Artillery
Battalion 1 1 1 1 1 1
Coastal Defense
Battalion (M) 0 0 0 0 1 1

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Force Structure 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Marine Combat Service
Support Brigade 0 1 1 1 1 1
Service Support
Battalion 0 0 0 0 1 1
Motor Transport
Battalion 1 1 1 1 1 1
CEIS Battalion 0 0 0 0 1 1
Forward Medical
Battalion 0 0 0 0 1 1
Support Commands
Naval Combat
Engineering Brigade 1 1 1 1 1 1
Naval Combat
Engineering Battalion 1 1 1 1 1 1
Naval Maritime
Situational Awareness
Center 1 1 1 1 1 1
MSAC 4 4 4 4 4 4
LOS 20 20 27 27 27 27
Cyberwarfare Group 1 1 1 1 1 1
Naval Intelligence and
Security Force 1 1 1 1 1 1
Naval Intelligence
and Security Group 7 5 5 4 4 4
Naval Installations
Command 0 1 1 1 1 1
Naval Base 0 0 0 0 1 1
Naval Operating
Base 0 1 1 2 2 3
Forward Operating
Bases 7 7 7 9 9 11
Naval Support
Facilities 19 19 19 19 19 19
Operational Commands
Naval Commands 7 5 4 3 3 3
Fleet Marine Ready
Force 1 0 0 0 0 0
Naval Maneuver
Command 0 1 1 1 1 1
Flotillas 0 2 2 4 4 4

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Intentionally Blank

62 S E C R E T
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ANNEX E

Definition of Terms

Active Archipelagic Defense Strategy (AADS) is the proactive control and

command of the sea and denial of its use to the enemy, capitalizing on the
archipelagic configuration of the country that involves control of critical
maritime areas and deployment of available assets that maximizes their
capabilities and firepower.

Active defense is the employment of limited offensive action and

counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.

Amphibious operations are attacks launched from the sea by naval and
landing forces, embarked in ships and crafts involving a landing on a hostile
shore including the following stages: planning, embarkation, rehearsal,
movement and assault.

Archipelagic Waters. The sovereignty of the Philippines extends to the

waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines as established under RA 9522
and regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. This sovereignty
extends to the airspace over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed
and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. Ships of all States enjoy the
right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters. The Philippine
Congress is considering the passage of a law designating archipelagic
sealanes and air routes there above, suitable for the continuous and
expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its
archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. As provided under
UNCLOS and Philippine law, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of
archipelagic sealanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes. Archipelagic
sealanes passage means the exercise in accordance with UNCLOS of the
rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of
continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed transit between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or
an exclusive economic zone.

Base defense are activities, assets, and capabilities to secure naval

infrastructure and facilities such as naval operating bases and forward
operating bases.

Basing is the planning, construction, maintenance, and support of facilities

intended for long term military use. In the context of this document, it refers to
the planning of where, how, and who would construct naval facilities for
organization, communication, support, training, and maintenance of the Navy.

C4ISTAR stands for command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance. This
capability is a prerequisite to maritime situational awareness and joint
capability. It is also needed for network-centric warfare.

S E C R E T 63
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Combat support is needed to assist the fleet in combat situations,

specifically in intelligence fields. Such includes naval C4ISR services, naval
intelligence services, naval meteorology and oceanography services, and
naval reserves.

Combat service support requirements specify the FRs in order to sustain

the fleet-marine team. These include a naval bases command, logistics
services, ports and harbor aerodrome services, construction or public works
management, force protection service, communications service, and financial
services.

Combined Operations involve military actions conducted between armed

forces of two or more countries. In Combined Operations, military forces of
different countries would be allowed to perform military drills as one group and
share information and technological resources in combined exercises and/or
responses. Through the Combined Operations, the Philippine Navy can be
provided with capacity building activities and resources not available to the
military force.

Contiguous Zone. The breadth of the contiguous zone as may be

established by Philippine law shall not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In its
contiguous zone, the Philippines may exercise the control necessary to either
prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea or punish infringement of the
said laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.

Continental Shelf. The Philippine continental shelf comprises the seabed

and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines
established and identified under RA 9522 and does not extend up to that
distance except in the Extended Continental Shelf. In compliance with the
requirements of UNCLOS, the Philippines has an Extended Continental Shelf
(ECS) on the Benham Rise in North Eastern Luzon over the Pacific Ocean.
The Philippines is studying the submission of an ECS in the West Philippine
Sea in due time.
Convoy protection is activity by naval forces to secure a group of vehicles
ships, traveling together for mutual support and protection. Often, a convoy is
organized with armed defensive support.

Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ).The Philippine EEZ shall not extend beyond

200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured. In the Philippine EEZ, all nations enjoy the right to exercise
the traditional high seas freedom of navigation and overflight, of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and of all other traditional high seas uses by
ships and aircraft which are not resource-related. In its exclusive economic
zone, the Philippines has:

64 S E C R E T
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i. sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,

conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of
the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such
as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;

ii. jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of

UNCLOS with regard to:

1. the establishment and use of artificial islands,

installations and structures;

2. marine scientific research;

3. the protection and preservation of the marine

environment;

4. other rights and duties provided for in UNCLOS.

Fleet requirements are needed assets in order for the fleet to fulfill the
discussed CRs. These include submarine forces, sealift and amphibious
forces, NAVSOG units, maintenance, repair, and logistics units, naval air
group, surface patrol, and mine forces.

Force - a force is an aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems,

vehicles and necessary support, or combination thereof. 45

Force generation and sustainment requirements show the forces required

in order to organize, equip, train, and maintain the Navy for future generations
and compensate personnel for their services. These are naval education and
training centers, personnel management centers, naval health and emergency
care centers, and morale, welfare, and retirement systems.

Gas and oil platform protection are activities taken to secure oil and gas
production, transport, and processing facilities located at sea, specifically oil
rigs, gas platforms, and pipelines.

Ground-based air defense systems are all measures which are terrestrial in
nature, designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action.

Infrastructure requirements specify necessary naval facilities for

organization, communication, training, resupply, and maintenance of naval
assets, specifically naval stations, forward operating bases, and naval
detachments.

Insertion is the capability to introduce squad or platoon-size units in an area

of operations with hostile forces using air, surface, or land assets.

45
US Joint Publication 1-02 p. 106

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Internal Waters. Internal waters for the Philippines comprise the waters in
the mouths of rivers, bays and ports separately enclosed by baselines or
closing lines and delimited from the territorial sea and archipelagic
waters in accordance with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS. These waters
are subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of the Philippines.

Joint Operations entail military actions conducted by two or more major

military services of the country. Through Joint Operations, the Philippine Navy
(PN), Philippine Air Force (PAF), and Philippine Army (PA) would be able to
conduct training exercises and military drills to further the different military
services‟ camaraderie and capacity to collaborate and pool resources in
responding to domestic and/or international crises or emergencies.

Law enforcement broadly refers to any system by which some members of

society act in an organized manner to promote adherence to the law by
discovering and punishing persons who violate the rules and norms governing
that society.

Local missile defense is a system, weapon, or technology involved in the

detection, tracking, interception and destruction of attacking missiles deployed
at the local level of operations.

Marine requirements are assets needed for the Marine Corps to satisfy the
CRs required for AADS. These requirements are deployable C3I, maneuver
forces, combat engineers, strategic artillery force, and combat service support
force.

Maritime Cooperation involves the development of both military and non-

military means and measures by engaging other major military service units,
government agencies, local government units, non-government organizations,
members of the academe, private volunteers, international organizations, and
foreign navies.

Maritime interdiction operations are activities by naval forces to divert,

disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy‟s maritime military potential before it can
be used effectively against friendly forces.

Maritime Operations is the conduct of surface, air, and subsurface

operations to influence, shape, or persuade potential and real adversaries to
avoid a naval confrontation or seek peaceful discourse to settle
disagreements.

Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) refers to the 24/7 knowledge

obtained from the integrated collection, analysis and exchange of information
that relates to the maritime environment which are all used to support decision
making for governance, development and security undertakings.
Mine countermeasures are techniques and equipment employed in order to
reduce or neutralize the threat of mines. In naval warfare, this refers to the
employment of skills and assets to reduce or neutralize the threat presented
by naval mines.

66 S E C R E T
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Mine warfare is the employment of mines in order to deny areas to the

enemy. It can be conducted on a strategic, operational, and tactical scale. In
this paper, mine warfare refers to the use of naval mines in order to deny sea
access to the enemy.

Sealift operations refers to the use of cargo ships for the deployment of
military assets, such as weaponry, vehicles, military personnel, and supplies.

Special operations are special operations conducted by specially organized,

trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military,
political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military
means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are
conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independent or in
coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces.

Surface and subsurface patrol are activities to gain knowledge of the enemy,
terrain, and operating environment using surface and subsurface assets.

Territorial Sea. The breadth of the territorial sea of the Philippines as may be
established by law shall not exceed 12 nautical miles, measured from
baselines as drawn in accordance with RA 9522. Ships of all States, whether
coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
Philippine territorial sea. In the Philippine territorial sea, submarines and other
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their
flag.

Undersea operations are activities of an underwater nature taken in order to

secure surface or subsurface objectives. These include submarine warfare,
mine warfare and countermeasures, and underwater detection systems.

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ANNEX F

Document Management Instructions

1. The Master Copy of the Active Archipelagic Defense

Strategy (AADS) is stored and managed by the Director, Office of
Naval Strategic Studies (D,ONSS). The purpose of this
dissemination is to inform key officers and staff of the Command of
the latest strategy promulgated by the Flag Officer in Command,
PN.

2. The AADS is to be maintained by the Director, ONSS. Any

officer or enlisted personnel of the PN may submit observations
and/or recommend amendments to the AADS.

3. Observations shall be noted and recorded in the Record of

Observations page and shall be treated as an integral part of this
document. All recommendation for changes will be deliberated
during the scheduled review of the AADS (semi-annually during the
first two years then biennially thereafter).

4. Should any amendment to the AADS be approved by the

FOIC,PN, the D,ONSS will reissue the document in hard copy
format only and issue a signal and where appropriate, a formal
communication drawing attention to this, and outlining the change in
the Record of Changes page of this document.

5. This version of the AADS is written at the SECRET

classification level and its further reproduction and release to
anyone, private or government individuals alike, is governed by
existing AFP rules and regulations.

6. The review, concurrence and approval records for this

document are held with the master copy of the document in the
Office of Naval Strategic Studies.

BY COMMAND OF THE FLAG OFFICER IN COMMAND, PN:

TEDDY G QUINZON
Commander, PN(GSC)
Director, ONSS

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ANNEX G

Recommendations for Changes

_________________________________
_______________________________
_____________________
(Originating Agency)

____________
(Date)

From: _______________________________________
(Originator)
To: Director, Office of Naval Strategic Studies

Subj: Recommendation for Changes

The following recommendation is submitted for the improvement of

_______________________________________________________
(Short title)
__________________________ __________________________
(Long title) (Page)
__________________________ __________________________
(Article Para. No.) (Line Sentence)
___________________________________________
(Figure No.)

Comment/s:

Recommendation/s:

_____________________
(Signature)

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ANNEX H

Record of Observations

Person Submitting Chapter / Specific Date

the Observation Section Observations Submitted

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ANNEX I

Summary of Changes

Version Name / Chapter / Description of Effective Date

Date Section Changes

Version 2013.1 First Issue 11 Dec 2013

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