Admission by co-partner or agent Admission by conspirator Jurisprudence:

BUENAFLOR CAR SERVICES VS. CEZAR DAVID, JR., G.R. No. 222730, November 07, 2016

Facts:

The case involves the illegal dismissal of Cezar Durumpili David, Jr., who was accused of participating in a
scheme to defraud the company by altering checks, with the Supreme Court ultimately ruling in favor of
the company.

Respondent Cezar Durumpili David, Jr. was employed as a Service Manager by petitioner Buenaflor Car
Services, Inc., doing business under the trade name "Pronto! Auto Services." David was in charge of the
overall day-to-day operations of the company, including signing checks, check vouchers, and purchase
orders. The company implemented a policy regarding the purchase and delivery of automotive parts and
products. Several checks issued by the company were discovered to have been altered to indicate "OR
CASH" after the payee's name. An investigation revealed that David, along with other employees, had
participated in a scheme to defraud the company by altering the checks. David and the other employees
involved were placed under preventive suspension and later terminated from employment.

Issue:

Whether or not the extra judicial confession of co-workers of Durumpil is admissible as evidence.

Ruling:

The Court emphasized that the company's evidence, including the altered checks and testimonies of
witnesses, sufficiently established David's participation in the fraudulent scheme. The Court held that
David's participation in the scheme constituted serious misconduct and willful breach of trust, which are
just causes for termination. The Court emphasized that an employer has the right to dismiss an
employee for serious misconduct and willful breach of trust, as long as there is substantial evidence to
support the allegations. Therefore, the Court concluded that David's dismissal was valid and he was not
entitled to any monetary awards.

Admission by privies Admission by silence Jurisprudence:

Villanueva v. Balaguer, G.R. No. 180197, 23 June 2009

Dismissed employee Francisco N. Villanueva files a complaint for damages against Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) and its president, Virgilio P. Balaguer, after news articles accuse him of
selling forged certificates of performance, but fails to provide sufficient evidence, resulting in the
dismissal of his case.

Facts:

Francisco N. Villanueva, a former employee of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13), was

dismissed from his position as Assistant Manager for Operations on the ground of loss of confidence.
Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission. During
the pendency of the labor case, news articles were published in various newspapers accusing Villanueva
of selling forged certificates of performance. The articles quoted Virgilio P. Balaguer, the president of IBC-
13, as saying that he uncovered various anomalies in the company, including the dismissal of an
operations executive for selling forged certificates of performance. Villanueva sent a letter to Balaguer
asking for confirmation or denial if he was the person referred to in the news articles, but received no
response. Villanueva then filed a complaint for damages against Balaguer and IBC-13, alleging that the
news articles defamed him.

Issue:

Whether of not admission by silence applies to the case

Ruling:

The letter sent by Villanueva to Balaguer cannot be considered as an admission by silence because one
cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other party. The rule on admission by
silence applies to adverse statements in writing if there was mutual correspondence between the
parties, which was not present in this case. The newspaper articles purporting to state what Balaguer
said are inadmissible against him since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons.
The alleged admission by IBC-13 in its cross-claim against Balaguer is not admissible against Balaguer
because it created an adverse interest between them. Furthermore, Villanueva failed to present
satisfactory evidence to prove that the acts imputed against Balaguer and IBC-13 were committed by
them. Therefore, the Court found that Villanueva failed to prove his case and dismissed his complaint for
damages.

SPS CIPRIANO PAMPLONA VS. SPOUSES LILIA I. CUETO, G.R. No. 204735, February 19, 2018

In a case involving a disputed contract to sell a property, the court ruled in favor of the respondents,
finding sufficient evidence to establish the existence of the contract and ordering the petitioners to pay
the cost of the suit.

Facts:

Spouses Lilia I. Cueto and Vedasto Cueto filed a case against Spouses Cipriano Pamplona and Bibiana
Intac for specific performance, conveyance, consignation, and damages. The respondents claimed that
they entered into an oral contract to sell with the petitioners for the purchase of a property in Batangas
City. The respondents alleged that they made monthly installment payments, leaving a balance of
$11,000. The respondents also alleged that they were in possession of the property and had been paying
the realty taxes and utility bills. The petitioners denied the existence of the contract to sell and argued
that the payments made by the respondents were for a previous loan. The trial court dismissed the
respondents' complaint for failure to prove the existence of the contract to sell. The appellate court
reversed the decision and ruled in favor of the respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not admission by silence can apply in the case at bar

Ruling:
Failure of Roilan to raise as a defense in the unlawful detainer suit against him the
existence of the contract to sell between Bibiana and Lilia could not be properly
construed as an admission by silence on the part of Lilia. The court ruled that the
respondents had presented enough evidence to establish the existence of the contract to sell, while the
petitioners failed to present evidence to support their argument that the payments were for a previous
loan. The court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, ruling in favor of the respondents and
ordering the petitioners to pay the cost of the suit.

Confession

Hearsay

PEOPLE v. ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of Anecito Estibal for the crime of rape. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City convicted Estibal, and the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the RTC's
decision, leading to an automatic review by the Supreme Court. The case revolves around the rape of
Estibal's daughter, referred to as AAA. Testimonies from witnesses, including a doctor who conducted a
medical examination on AAA, members of the Barangay Security Force who arrested Estibal, and a police
officer who investigated the incident, were presented by the prosecution. AAA did not testify in court.
The defense relied on denial, with Estibal claiming innocence and alleging that his wife's brothers
influenced AAA to file the complaint against him. The court found the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly the police officer who interviewed AAA, to be credible and admissible as part of
the res gestae.

Issue:

whether res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule must be appreciated from the factual
circumstances of the case

Ruling:

Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is acquitted of rape charges due to lack of spontaneous and unreflected
statements from the victim, inadmissible hearsay evidence, and failure to meet the standard of moral
certainty required for conviction. The court emphasized that the res gestae exception requires
unreflected and instinctive statements, which were not present in this case. The court highlighted the
importance of the right to confront witnesses and the need for evidence to be subjected to cross-
examination. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, based on AAA's statements, were
considered hearsay and lacked probative value since AAA was not present to testify and be cross-
examined. The court emphasized the need for proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases and the
presumption of innocence. When inculpatory facts are susceptible to different interpretations, one of
which is consistent with the accused's innocence, the evidence does not meet the standard of moral
certainty required for conviction. Based on the lack of sufficient evidence to prove Estibal's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court acquitted him. The court ordered Estibal's immediate release from
detention. The decision does not condone the crime but is based on the lack of sufficient evidence.
6. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Dying declaration Jurisprudence:

People v. Peña, G.R. No. 133964, February 13, 2002

Facts:

In the case of People v. Peña, accused-appellant Ramil Peña was convicted of murder by the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The trial court based its decision solely on
the alleged dying declaration of the victim, Jimbo Pelagio. Peña, however, argued on appeal that the
evidence was hearsay and inadmissible. He contended that the lower court should have considered
Pelagio's statement reduced in handwritten form by SPO1 Bautista as part of the res gestae, rather than
the dying declarations made by Pelagio to SPO1 Bautista, Wilfredo Lampa, and Francisca Pelagio.

Issue:

The main issue raised in the case is whether the alleged dying declaration of the victim, Jimbo Pelagio, is
admissible as evidence.

Ruling:

The Court clarified the requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations, which include the imminent
death of the declarant, the consciousness of that fact, the reference to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of death, the competence of the declarant to testify to the facts, the subsequent death of
the declarant, and the offer of the declaration in a criminal case where the declarant's death is the
subject of inquiry. In this case, the first element was lacking as it was not established whether Pelagio
was conscious of his impending death when he made his statement.

PEOPLE v. RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013

Facts:

The case involves the appeal of Ramil Rarugal, also known as "Amay Bisaya," against his conviction for
the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding
Rarugal guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Arnel Florendo. The incident occurred on
October 19, 1998, when Rarugal stabbed Florendo with a bladed weapon while Florendo was cycling
along Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City. Rarugal forcibly took Florendo's
bicycle and fled the scene. Florendo managed to reach his home and inform his brother, Renato, that
Rarugal was the one who stabbed him. Florendo was then taken to the hospital but unfortunately died
on October 26, 1998.

During the trial, witness Roberto Sit-Jar positively identified Rarugal as the assailant of Florendo. The RTC
found Rarugal guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on Sit-Jar's identification and Florendo's dying
declaration. The RTC emphasized the importance of the trial court's findings of credibility and the
admissibility of the dying declaration as evidence.
Issue:

The main issues raised in the case are as follows:

Whether or not statement of Rolando is admissible as his dying declaration

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court both emphasized the importance of the trial court's
findings of credibility. The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and
their findings should be respected. In this case, witness Roberto Sit-Jar positively identified Rarugal as
the assailant, which was given more weight than Rarugal's defense of denial and alibi.

The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court also agreed that Florendo's dying declaration complied
with the requisites of a dying declaration. A dying declaration is admissible as evidence when it relates to
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. In this case, Florendo's dying
declaration, where he identified Rarugal as the one who stabbed him, was considered strong evidence of
Rarugal's guilt.

People v. Jose Belmar Crisostomo, G.R. No. 215742, March 22, 2017

A man is convicted of parricide after his wife's dying declaration and circumstantial evidence establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, leading to his appeal to the Supreme Court.

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of Jose Belmar Umapas for the crime of parricide. On November 30,
1998, Umapas assaulted his wife, Gemma Gulang Umapas, and set her on fire using alcohol intended for
a lantern. Gemma was taken to the hospital but succumbed to her injuries on December 5, 1998. The
police interviewed Gemma the day after the incident, and she identified Umapas as her attacker.
Umapas, however, denied the allegations and claimed that he was fishing at the time of the incident. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Umapas guilty of parricide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with modification, ordering Umapas to pay additional
damages. Umapas appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

whether or not Umapas can be convicted based on Gemma's dying declaration

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed Umapas' conviction. The court held that Gemma's dying declaration, where
she identified Umapas as her assailant, was admissible as evidence. The court explained that a dying
declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no
person aware of their impending death would make a false accusation. In this case, all the requisites for
a dying declaration were met. The court also upheld Umapas' conviction based on circumstantial
evidence. The court clarified that direct evidence of the actual killing is not necessary when
circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish guilt. In this case, the testimonies of witnesses,
including the police officers who interviewed Gemma and the doctor who treated her, constituted
circumstantial evidence that pointed to Umapas as the guilty party.

Based on the established circumstances and evidence, the court concluded that Umapas was guilty of
parricide. The court affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as the death penalty was prohibited by
law. The court also modified the amounts of damages awarded to the heirs of Gemma

Declaration against interest

Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010

Facts:

The case of Lazaro v. Agustin involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land in the Municipality
of Laoag, Philippines. The petitioners, Alejandra S. Lazaro and her co-petitioners, claimed to be co-
owners of the property as descendants of the late Simeon C. Santos. They filed a complaint for partition
against the respondents, who are the children and heirs of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, alleging that the
property should be titled in the name of Basilisa but does not necessarily mean that she is the sole
owner. The petitioners also claimed that they contributed to the construction and renovation of a
residential house on the property.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities dismissed the complaint, ruling that the notarized sworn statement of
Basilisa, which recognized the co-ownership of the property with her siblings, was hearsay and lacked
evidentiary value. The MTCC also found that the testimonies of witnesses, including Basilisa's nurse and
physician, cast doubt on the due execution of the sworn statement. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the
decision of the MTCC but ordered the respondents to indemnify the petitioners for the costs of
construction and renovation of the house. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC, with
modification, ordering the respondents to pay indemnity solely to Alejandra Lazaro.

Issue:

Ruling:

It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against interest.
Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified
in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a
witness. 15 Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity
with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They
are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 16 In the present case, since Basilisa
is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's
sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against
interest.
The court ruled that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish their co-ownership.
The notarized sworn statement of Basilisa was deemed inadmissible as it was considered hearsay and its
due execution was questioned. The court also found that the testimonies of witnesses, including
Basilisa's nurse and physician, cast doubt on the authenticity of the sworn statement. Therefore, the
court denied the petitioners' claim of co-ownership.

Ratio:

The court's ruling is based on the principle that notarized documents carry evidentiary weight and enjoy
a presumption of regularity. However, this presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. In this case, the court found that the evidence presented by the respondents,
including the testimonies of witnesses, sufficiently rebutted the presumption of regularity of the
notarized sworn statement. The court also emphasized the importance of the notary public in ensuring
the accuracy and fidelity of notarized documents, and held that the notary public in this case failed to
exercise due diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the sworn statement.

In conclusion, the court denied the petitioners' claim of co-ownership of the property, ruling that the
notarized sworn statement was not admissible as evidence and the petitioners failed to provide
sufficient evidence to establish their co-ownership. The court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts,
with modification, ordering the respondents to pay indemnity solely to Alejandra Lazaro for the costs of
construction and renovation of the house.

Act or declaration about pedigree

Heirs of Fabillar v. Paller, G.R. No. 231459, January 21, 2019

Facts:

The case of Heirs of Fabillar v. Paller involves a dispute over a parcel of agricultural land in Giporlos,
Eastern Samar. The respondents, Miguel M. Paller, Florentina P. Abayan, and Demetria P. Sagales, filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, and damages against the petitioners, Heirs of Paula C.
Fabillar, before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). The respondents claimed that the land in
question was originally owned by their grandfather, Marcelino Paller, and was subsequently inherited by
their father, Ambrosio Paller, who then passed it on to them. They presented Ambrosio's baptismal
certificate as proof of his filiation with Marcelino and an unnotarized deed of sale to establish their
acquisition of the land. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that Ambrosio was not a child of
Marcelino and that the respondents failed to prove their ownership of the land and its identity.

Issue:

Whether the respondents' predecessor, Ambrosio, was a child of Marcelino and entitled to inherit the
land.

Ruling:
The Court found that the respondents failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Ambrosio's filiation
with Marcelino. While Ambrosio's baptismal certificate was presented, the Court ruled that it alone is
not enough to establish filiation and must be considered alongside other evidence. The Court also noted
that the respondents did not present any other material proof related to the baptismal certificate that
would establish Ambrosio's filiation. The Court emphasized that a baptismal certificate alone is not
enough to establish filiation and must be supported by other evidence. In this case, the respondents
failed to present any other material proof related to the baptismal certificate that would establish
Ambrosio's filiation. Additionally, the Court found discrepancies between the boundaries reflected in the
unnotarized deed of sale and the tax declarations presented by the respondents, as well as
inconsistencies with the receipts of realty tax payments. These inconsistencies and lack of evidence led
the Court to conclude that the respondents failed to prove their ownership of the land and its identity.
Therefore, the Court granted the petition and dismissed the respondents' complaint.

Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree

People v. Llanita y Opiana, G.R. No. 134101, September 5, 2001

Facts:

The case involves the accused, Felino Llanita, who was found guilty of qualified rape for sexually violating
a 5-year old girl named Catherine Acol. The accused was sentenced to death, and this decision is now
under automatic review. The accused's main defense consists of alibi and denial. The categorical
testimony of Catherine, the victim, prevails over the defense of alibi. There is no evidence to suggest that
Catherine had any motive to falsely implicate the accused. Catherine's testimony provides detailed
accounts of the rape and positively identifies the accused as the perpetrator.

The prosecution presented Catherine's testimony as evidence of her age. Catherine's testimony
regarding her age is admissible under the rule on family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The
testimony of a witness who is a member of the family is sufficient to prove age. The accused did not
question Catherine's age during the trial, and her testimony remained unrebutted. The presentation of a
birth certificate or other official documents is not necessary when the age of the victim is sufficiently
established through testimony.

Issue:

Whether or not the Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree is need to prove the age of
Catherine.

Ruling:

The Court based its ruling on the principle that the positive identification made by the victim is sufficient
to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the victim's own
testimony regarding her age is admissible, although hearsay, as it constitutes an assertion of family
tradition. The Court also noted that the accused-appellant himself admitted in his testimony that the
victim was five years old at the time of the rape. The Court further stated that the presentation of the
birth certificate is no longer necessary to prove minority and that the testimony of a competent witness
is sufficient to establish the age of the victim. The birth certificate would only serve as corroborative
evidence.
In conclusion, the Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape. The Court also ruled that the prosecution
presented sufficient evidence to prove the victim's age, and the presentation of the birth certificate is
not necessary. The accused-appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to pay the victim civil
indemnity and moral damages.

Part of the res gestae

PEOPLE v. ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015

Facts:

The case involves the conviction of Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of parricide. The Information
was filed on August 1, 2006, charging Adrian Guting y Tomas with parricide for allegedly stabbing his
father multiple times, resulting in his father's death. During the trial, the prosecution presented
witnesses, including police officers who testified that Adrian Guting y Tomas voluntarily confessed to
them that he killed his father.

Issue:

The main issue raised in the case is whether Adrian Guting y Tomas's confession is admissible as res
gestae

Ruling:

The court ruled that Adrian Guting y Tomas's confession is admissible as evidence. Accused-appellant's
declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae.A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae
and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites concur: (1)
the principal act, the res gestae,is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances. All the requisites are present in this case. Accused-appellant
had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his father's death. Accused-appellant
made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only a few minutes after and while he was still under
the influence of said startling occurrence, before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story.
In fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police Station completely
unmindful of the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who
were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The police officers
who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-appellant's father, found Jose's lifeless body with
blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae,accused-appellant's spontaneous statement is
admissible in evidence against him

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018

Facts:

In the case of People v. XXX, the Supreme Court found XXX guilty of three counts of rape based on
witness testimonies and medical evidence. The case originated from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bais City, Branch 45, where XXX was convicted of three counts of rape and acquitted of two other
charges. The victim, AAA, who was the daughter of XXX, died before she could be cross-examined. The
RTC relied on the testimonies of witnesses Gelmie Calug and EEE, who heard AAA's statements about the
rape incidents. The RTC considered these statements as part of the res gestae, which are statements
made spontaneously and immediately before, during, or after a startling event. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC's decision, and XXX appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issue in the case was whether XXX's guilt for the three counts of rape was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

XXX argued that the testimonies of Calug and EEE were hearsay evidence and should not be considered.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the testimonies were admissible as part of the res gestae. The
Court found that AAA's statements to EEE, made a few hours after the rape incidents, satisfied the
requirements of spontaneity and connection to the main event. These statements were considered as
evidence of XXX's guilt. On the other hand, AAA's statements to Calug, made three days after the
incidents, were not considered part of the res gestae and were not admissible as evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT FLORESTA Y SELENCIO, G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019

Facts:

The case of People v. Floresta y Selencio involves the appeal and acquittal of Gilbert Floresta y Selencio
for the crime of murder. The case originated from an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), charging Gilbert with the murder of Jay Lourd Bones y Zurbito. According to the prosecution,
Gilbert shot and killed Jay Lourd. Jennifer Bones, Jay Lourd's wife, testified that she found her husband
bloodied on the floor after hearing a gunshot. Jay Lourd asked her if Gilbert was still present. Gilbert, on
the other hand, claimed that he was watching a cockfight and playing a game with friends at the time of
the incident.

Issue:

Whether Jay Lourd's utterance should be admitted as part of the res gestae

Ruling:

The mere mention of Gilbert's name by Jay Lourd does not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court emphasized that for an utterance to be considered as part of the res gestae, it must be
spontaneous and made under the influence of a startling event. However, in this case, Jay Lourd's
statement was made after the shooting incident and does not meet the requirements of res gestae.

Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecution failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to
establish Gilbert's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution relied heavily on Jennifer Bones'
testimony, but her account was not enough to prove Gilbert's involvement in the crime. There was no
direct evidence linking Gilbert to the murder, such as eyewitness testimony or physical evidence. The
Court emphasized that in cases where the evidence is purely circumstantial, the circumstances must be
consistent with each other and must point to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of all other
reasonable hypotheses.
In this case, the Court found that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to establish Gilbert's guilt. The defense of alibi raised by Gilbert was not effectively rebutted
by the prosecution. Gilbert provided an alibi that he was watching a cockfight and playing a game with
friends during the time of the incident. The prosecution failed to present evidence to contradict Gilbert's
alibi or prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Based on the lack
of positive identification and insufficient circumstantial evidence, the Court concluded that Gilbert's guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the lower courts
and acquitted Gilbert Floresta y Selencio of the crime of murder.

Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding Jurisprudence:

Ambray v. Tsourous, G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016

Facts:

Ceferino Sr. and estela owned several properties. One is located in San Pablo, City, Laguna. It was
subdivided in 3 lots (Lot 2-A, Lot 2-B, and the subject property, Lot 2-C). In June 1996, Maristela
discovered that Lot 2-C had been cancelled and in its stead, TCT No. T-41382 was issued in the name of
petitioners. It appears that by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale) dated January
16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr.,with the consent of Estela, allegedly sold "a portion of lot 2 of the consolidation
subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-12441" to petitioners for a consideration of P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City only on February 5, 1996.

Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these proceedings before the RTC or on August
15, 2002. Her death transpired before the presentation of the parties' evidence could ensue. However,
she was able to testify on direct and cross-examination in the falsification case and affirmed that the
alleged forged signatures appearing on the Deed of Sale were, indeed, hers and her deceased husband,
Ceferino, Sr.'s. The parties in the falsification case involved respondents and petitioners herein, and the
subject matter therein and in this case are one and the same, i.e.,the genuineness and authenticity of
the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimony of Estela is admissible as testimony or deposition at a former proceeding

Ruling:

Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsification case, being admissible in evidence in these
proceedings, deserves significant consideration. She gave positive testimony that it was Ceferino, Sr.
himself who signed the Deed of Sale that conveyed Lot 2-C to petitioners. She likewise verified her
signature thereon. By virtue of these declarations, she confirmed the genuineness and authenticity of
the questioned signatures. Thus, it follows that the Deed of Sale itself is valid and duly executed,
contrary to the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that it was of spurious nature.

Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-41382 were
valid and dismissing the complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages filed by the
respondents due to lack of evidence of forgery. Notably, the admissibility of Estela's former testimony in
the present case finds basis in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or the "rule on former
testimony" which provides:
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving
the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.

Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the
former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case
and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. The
reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the
testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony can be introduced in evidence,
the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e.,the party must establish the basis for the
admission of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence.

Further lending credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the well-settled principle that a duly
notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the
full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal presumption, evidence
must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that
gave rise to a spurious contract.

Opinion of expert witness Jurisprudence:

Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro, G.R. No. 198240, 3 July 2013

The case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land in the Philippines. The land was
originally owned by spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro. The spouses passed
away in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind two daughters, Luisa Navarro Marcos (the
petitioner) and Lydia Navarro Grageda, as well as the heirs of their son, Andres Navarro, Jr. (the
respondents).

The respondents claimed exclusive ownership of the land based on an Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property dated May 19, 1954. The affidavit allegedly shows that Andres Navarro, Sr. donated the land to
his son, Andres Navarro, Jr. However, the petitioner and her sister believed that the affidavit was a
forgery.

The petitioner and her sister requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. Handwriting expert
PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez of the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted the examination. PO2 Alvarez
found that the signature of Andres Navarro, Sr. on the affidavit did not match his known signatures. The
petitioner and her sister filed a lawsuit seeking the annulment of the deed of donation before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate. The respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness,
arguing that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination and that they were not given notice
before it was conducted. The RTC granted the motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness, ruling
that her testimony would be hearsay and unnecessary at that stage of the proceedings.

The petitioner and her sister appealed the RTC's decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed
their petition, stating that the dismissal of the case had rendered the issue of PO2 Alvarez's
disqualification moot. The CA also refused to take judicial notice of another CA Division's decision
reinstating the case, stating that it could not do so as it was not a member of that Division. The
petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether of not PO2 as an expert witness is qualified in court to present for the validity of the signatures
in the deed of donation

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider its
decision in light of the reinstatement of the case. The Court held that the reinstatement of the case was
a fact that could not be ignored. The Court also found that the RTC had committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The Court held that PO2 Alvarez was qualified as a
witness and did not possess any of the disqualifications specified under the law. The Court stated that
the opinion of an expert witness, such as PO2 Alvarez, could be received in evidence. The Court
disagreed with the RTC's ruling that her testimony would be hearsay and held that her analysis of the
questioned signature was crucial to the resolution of the case.

Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert witness may be
received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the CA and the RTC. The Court denied the motion to
disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness.

Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, 4 December 2013

It also declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It
observed that Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal
injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It
also gave no weight to the medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the
vehicular accident caused the injury.

In the present case, Dra. dela Llana's medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that
she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on
the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela
Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause
and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.

DENIED for lack of merit.

Heirs of Donton v. Stier, G.R. No. 216491, 23 August 2017

Case Summary (G.R. No. 216491)

The Supreme Court partially grants the petition for annulment of title and reconveyance of property,
declaring the sale of the property to an American citizen void and ordering the reversion of half of the
property to the original owner.

Parties Involved and Background Information

• The case involves a dispute over the ownership of a property located in Quezon City, Philippines.

• The property was originally owned by Peter Donton and was registered under his name.

• While Donton was in the United States, the respondents, Duane Stier and Emily Maggay, took
possession and control of the property and allegedly transferred the ownership to their names through
fraudulent means.

• Donton filed a complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of the property, claiming that
his signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale, which purportedly transferred the property to the
respondents, was forged.

• Donton's lawyers made demands for the respondents to vacate the property, but to no avail.

Dismissal of Complaint by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

• The RTC dismissed Donton's complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

• The court ruled that the Deed of Absolute Sale, being a public and notarial document, enjoys the
presumption of regularity and cannot be easily invalidated by Donton's bare allegation of forgery.

• The expert testimony of a document examiner, who found significant divergences in Donton's
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale compared to his standard signatures, was not given probative
weight by the RTC.

Affirmation of RTC's Decision by the Court of Appeals (CA)

• The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, stating that the petitioners failed to substantiate their
allegation of forgery.

• The CA also ruled that the expert testimony was self-serving and based on unverified
documents.

• The petitioners failed to prove Stier's American citizenship and Maggay's lack of capacity to
purchase real property.

Partial Granting of the Petition by the Supreme Court

• The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, reversing the CA's decision.

• The Court upheld the finding that the petitioners failed to prove forgery.

• However, the Court disagreed with the ruling on Stier's citizenship.

• The Court considered Stier's admissions against interest, including his own affidavit stating that
he is an American citizen.
• The sale of the property to Stier was declared void ab initio, in violation of the constitutional
prohibition on aliens owning land in the Philippines.

• The sale to Maggay was upheld, but only to the extent of her undivided one-half share in the
property.

• The other undivided one-half share, which belonged to Stier, was ordered to revert back to
Donton.

• The Deed of Absolute Sale and the title issued to the respondents were annulled only insofar as
Stier is concerned, without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the
property.

Opinion of ordinary witnesses

Jurisprudence:

Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 & 169217, 7 August 2009

After discovering the mismanagement of her estate and mistreatment, Maria Lourdes San Juan
Hernandez (Lulu) seeks the assistance of her cousin, Jovita San Juan-Santos, leading to a court ruling in
favor of Jovita's appointment as Lulu's legal guardian due to Lulu's physical and mental incapacity.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 166470 & 169217)

Facts:

The case of Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos involves Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (Lulu) seeking the
assistance of her cousin, Jovita San Juan-Santos, after discovering the mismanagement of her estate and
mistreatment. Lulu was born on February 14, 1947, and was left in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero
C. San Juan, after her mother died during childbirth. Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San
Juan family. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling and her father, Felix
Hernandez, continued to administer her properties. After Felix's death, petitioners (Lulu's half-siblings)
took over the administration. Lulu sought Jovita's assistance in 1998, as she was living in poor conditions
and her estate was being dissipated. Jovita filed a petition for guardianship, alleging Lulu's physical and
mental incapacity. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared Lulu incompetent and appointed Jovita as her
legal guardian. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the decision was affirmed.
Petitioners also abducted Lulu, leading to a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jovita. The CA granted the
petition, and petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The main issue in the case is whether Lulu was an incompetent requiring a judicial guardian.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found that Lulu was indeed an incompetent requiring a judicial guardian. The court
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and her properties. Jovita's appointment as guardian and the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus were also upheld.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court based its decision on the admissibility of Lulu's attending physicians' opinions on her
mental state and the personal observation of the trial judge. The court considered the expert opinions of
the physicians as evidence of Lulu's mental incapacity. Additionally, the trial judge had the opportunity to
personally observe Lulu and assess her condition. Based on these pieces of evidence, the court agreed
with the lower courts' findings that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties.

Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance of protecting the rights and welfare of individuals
who are mentally incapacitated. It recognized the need for a judicial guardian to ensure the proper
management and protection of Lulu's estate. The court also condemned the actions of the petitioners in
unlawfully appropriating properties and funds from Lulu's estate. As a result, the court ordered the
petitioners to render an accounting of the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated and
potentially face criminal charges.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that Lulu was an incompetent
requiring a judicial guardian. The appointment of Jovita as her legal guardian and the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus were upheld. The court also emphasized the importance of protecting the rights and
welfare of mentally incapacitated individuals and held the petitioners accountable for their unlawful
actions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN CASTILLO G.R. No. 186533, August 9, 2010 !!!!! read full case

In the Philippine Jurisprudence case, a man's conviction for the rape of a mentally retarded woman is
affirmed as the court finds sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, highlighting
the importance of consent and the vulnerability of mentally retarded individuals in sexual assault cases.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 186533)

Facts:

Efren Castillo was convicted of raping a mentally retarded woman, referred to as AAA, in Gingoog City,
Philippines in March 2000. AAA, who suffered from epilepsy and had difficulty understanding and
following instructions, was raped by Castillo on two separate occasions. The first incident occurred at the
house of a certain Atok, where Castillo forcibly had sexual intercourse with AAA. The second incident
happened near a chapel, where Castillo again raped AAA. AAA's mother, BBB, took her to the hospital for
a medical examination, which confirmed signs of sexual assault. AAA also underwent psychological tests,
which revealed her mental retardation. Castillo denied the charges, claiming alibi and lack of evidence of
AAA's mental condition. However, testimonies from witnesses, including AAA's mother and a Guidance
Psychologist, established AAA's mental retardation. The trial court found Castillo guilty of rape and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:

Whether Efren Castillo is guilty of raping a mentally retarded woman base on ordinary witness.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Efren Castillo for the rape of a mentally retarded woman.

Ratio:

The court based its decision on AAA's credible testimony, medical evidence, and the lack of motive for
AAA to falsely accuse Castillo. The court rejected Castillo's defense of denial and alibi, concluding that
the evidence against him was sufficient for conviction. The court emphasized the vulnerability of
mentally retarded individuals in sexual assault cases and affirmed the lower courts' decision, awarding
civil indemnity and moral damages to AAA. The court clarified that while the complaint alleged
aggravating circumstances that could lead to the death penalty, the prosecution failed to provide
evidence to prove such circumstances, resulting in a conviction for simple rape. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld Castillo's conviction for rape.

Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental
condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech,
manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question. Commonly, it is required that the witness details
the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the
Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity
of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his
appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own knowledge and
observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts,
as the basis for his opinion."

8. Character Evidence

People v. Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002

Noel Lee is convicted of murder for the death of Joseph Marquez, with the main issue being the
credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness; the Supreme Court finds the eyewitness testimony to be
credible and affirms the conviction but modifies the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 139070)

Facts:

The case involves accused-appellant Noel Lee who was convicted of the crime of murder for the death of
Joseph Marquez and was initially sentenced to death. The incident occurred on September 29, 1996,
when Herminia Marquez and her son Joseph were in their living room watching television. Herminia
witnessed accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding a gun aimed at Joseph.
Without warning, Lee shot Joseph twice in the head. Herminia saw Lee flee towards his house after the
shooting. Joseph was immediately taken to the hospital but unfortunately succumbed to his injuries.
Accused-appellant Noel Lee was subsequently charged with murder for the killing of Joseph Marquez.

Issue:

The main issue raised in the case was the credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness, Herminia Marquez.
Accused-appellant argued that Herminia's testimony was biased, incredible, and inconsistent.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found Herminia Marquez's testimony to be credible and affirmed the conviction of
accused-appellant Noel Lee. However, the court modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court explained that Herminia Marquez's testimony was positive, clear, and
straightforward. She remained consistent in her narration of the shooting incident and did not waver in
her testimony despite rigorous cross-examination. The court also emphasized that any inconsistencies
between her testimony in open court and her sworn statement do not necessarily discredit the witness.
Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court declarations.

The court further stated that the evidence, including Herminia's credible testimony and the medico-legal
report, established that accused-appellant Noel Lee shot and killed Joseph Marquez. The court also took
into consideration that accused-appellant had a strong motive to harm or kill Joseph.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court found accused-appellant Noel Lee guilty of murder for the death of
Joseph Marquez based on the credible testimony of Herminia Marquez. The court affirmed the
conviction but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Character evidence not generally admissible

RULE 131

BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF EVIDENCE AND PRESUMPTIONS

A. Burden of proof and burden of evidence Jurisprudence:

Susan A. Yap vs. Elizabeth Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017

In the Philippine Jurisprudence case, a man's conviction for the rape of a mentally retarded woman is
affirmed as the court finds sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, highlighting
the importance of consent and the vulnerability of mentally retarded individuals in sexual assault cases.
Facts:

Efren Castillo was convicted of raping a mentally retarded woman, referred to as AAA, in Gingoog City,
Philippines in March 2000. AAA, who suffered from epilepsy and had difficulty understanding and
following instructions, was raped by Castillo on two separate occasions. The first incident occurred at the
house of a certain Atok, where Castillo forcibly had sexual intercourse with AAA. The second incident
happened near a chapel, where Castillo again raped AAA. AAA's mother, BBB, took her to the hospital for
a medical examination, which confirmed signs of sexual assault. AAA also underwent psychological tests,
which revealed her mental retardation. Castillo denied the charges, claiming alibi and lack of evidence of
AAA's mental condition. However, testimonies from witnesses, including AAA's mother and a Guidance
Psychologist, established AAA's mental retardation. The trial court found Castillo guilty of rape and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:

Whether Efren Castillo is guilty of raping a mentally retarded woman base on the medical examinations
conducted.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Efren Castillo for the rape of a mentally retarded woman.

Ratio:

The court based its decision on AAA's credible testimony, medical evidence, and the lack of motive for
AAA to falsely accuse Castillo. The court rejected Castillo's defense of denial and alibi, concluding that
the evidence against him was sufficient for conviction. The court emphasized the vulnerability of
mentally retarded individuals in sexual assault cases and affirmed the lower courts' decision, awarding
civil indemnity and moral damages to AAA. The court clarified that while the complaint alleged
aggravating circumstances that could lead to the death penalty, the prosecution failed to provide
evidence to prove such circumstances, resulting in a conviction for simple rape. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld Castillo's conviction for rape.

Philippine Trust Company vs. Redentor R. Gabinete, et al. G.R. No. 216120, March 29, 2017

A bank files a complaint against a realty corporation and individuals for the collection of a loan, and the
Supreme Court reinstates the lower court's decision, holding the defendants liable for the outstanding
obligations based on the authenticity of the signatures.

Case Digest (G.R. No. 216120)

Facts:

The case of Philippine Trust Co. v. Gabinete involves a complaint filed by Philippine Trust Company
(Philtrust Bank) against Shangrila Realty Corporation, Elisa Tan, and Redentor Gabinete for the collection
of a loan. Philtrust Bank granted Shangrila's application for a renewal of its bills discounting line in the
amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on a letter-advice dated May 28, 1997 bearing
the conformity of Shangrila's authorized representatives, Tan and Gabinete. The loan was conditioned on
the execution of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement, with Shangrila as the borrower and Gabinete and
Tan as sureties. Shangrila failed to pay the loan upon maturity, and Philtrust Bank filed a Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The foreclosure sale proceeds were insufficient to
fully satisfy Shangrila's obligation, resulting in a deficiency. Philtrust Bank filed a complaint for the
collection of the deficiency against the defendants.

Issue:

The main issue raised in the case is whether or not Redentor Gabinete's signature in the Continuing
Suretyship Agreement was forged, and if he should be held liable for the outstanding obligations.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstating the
Regional Trial Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the CA erred in giving credence to the
findings of the NBI Document Examiner, as the examination of the questioned signature was tainted with
flaws and irregularities. The Supreme Court also emphasized that forgery cannot be presumed and must
be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery, and in this case, Gabinete failed to prove that his signature was forged. The Supreme Court also
considered the presumption of regularity accorded to the notarized Continuing Suretyship Agreement,
which was supported by the testimony of the notary public. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the
RTC's decision, holding the defendants liable for the outstanding obligations.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court based its decision on the principle that forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proven by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. In this case, Gabinete failed to provide sufficient
evidence to prove that his signature in the Continuing Suretyship Agreement was forged. The Supreme
Court also highlighted the flaws and irregularities in the examination of the questioned signature by the
NBI Document Examiner, which rendered their findings unreliable. Additionally, the Supreme Court
considered the presumption of regularity accorded to the notarized Continuing Suretyship Agreement,
which was supported by the testimony of the notary public. This presumption of regularity further
strengthened the validity of the agreement and the defendants' liability for the outstanding obligations.
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the RTC's decision, holding the defendants liable for the
outstanding obligations.