Class 05

Activity: Day 2

Name: Mejias, Murphy Huse

Date Today: 29/09/2023

Course: The Operational use of Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS Refresher)

Name of Company: Status Maritime Inc

Case Study: ECDIS incompetence and

inexperienced Officer in vital positions

SYNOPSIS
At 0434 on 18 September 2013, the Malta registered chemical tanker, Ovit, ran
aground on the Varne Bank in the Dover Strait while on passage from Rotterdam,
Netherlands, to Brindisi, Italy. The vessel, which was carrying a cargo of vegetable oil,
remained aground for just under 3 hours; there were no injuries and damage to the
vessel was superficial. There was no pollution. Ovit refloated on the rising tide and
subsequently berthed in Dover. Ovit’s primary means of navigation was an electronic
chart display and information system (ECDIS). The officer of the watch was following
a route shown on the ECDIS display; the route passed directly over the Varne Bank.

Narrative 1.2.1 The grounding During the early morning of 18 September 2013, the
Malta registered tanker Ovit was transiting the Dover Strait. The vessel was on
passage from Rotterdam, Netherlands, to Brindisi, Italy carrying a cargo of vegetable
oil. The intended route through the Dover Strait was prepared using the ship’s
electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS). At 02301 , the chief officer
arrived on the bridge and took over from the second officer as the officer of the
watch (OOW). He was joined by the deck cadet who was the assigned lookout. Ovit
was following an autopilot controlled heading of 206° at a speed of between 12 and
13 knots (kts). The OOW selected the scale on the ECDIS display that closely aligned
with the 12 nautical miles (nm) range scale set on the adjacent radar display. He then
sat in the port bridge chair where he had a direct view of both displays. At about
0300, the heading on the autopilot was adjusted to 225°. As Ovit approached the
Varne Bank, the deck cadet, who was standing on the starboard side of the bridge
and using binoculars, became aware of flashing white lights ahead. He did not
identify the lights or report the sighting to the OOW. At approximately 0417, Ovit
passed close by the Varne Light Float. From 0432 the ship’s speed slowly reduced
until the vessel stopped when it grounded on the Varne Bank at 0434. 1.2.2 Shore
monitoring At 0411, Ovit’s radar vector 2 crossed into the Channel Navigation
Information Service’s (CNIS) Varne Bank alerting zone. This activated an audible
alarm in the operations room at Dover Coastguard. The ship’s symbol on the CNIS
display also changed from black to red and started to flash. The CNIS operator
‘authorised’ Ovit’s approach to the Varne Bank using a drop down menu on the CNIS
display. This action silenced the audible alarm, and the ship’s symbol stopped flashing
and its colour changed to black. The operator then returned to a very high frequency
(VHF) radio exchange with another vessel inside the CNIS area. 1.2.3 Post grounding
The OOW did not appreciate that Ovit had grounded. At 0437, an engineering alarm
sounded and the OOW placed both azipod control levers to zero. He then telephoned
the Master in his cabin to inform him of the alarm. He also telephoned the second
engineer and instructed him to check the engines. At 0443, the second engineer
telephoned the bridge and informed the OOW that 45° of ahead pitch was available
on the starboard azipod. Accordingly, the OOW moved the starboard azipod control
lever to 45° pitch ahead. The ship remained stationary, which led the OOW to assume
that there was still a problem with the ship’s engines.

Use on board Ovit ECDIS was the primary method of navigation on board Ovit; no
paper charts were carried. Therefore, it was vital that the system was set up
appropriately and that the officers operating the equipment were fully familiar with
its functions. The circumstances of the accident show that the Maris 900 was not
used effectively. In particular: Safety contour The safety contour setting is intended
to offer the OOW a distinct difference between safe and potentially unsafe water;
crossing the safety contour initiates an alarm to alert the watchkeeper. Using the
formula in Ovit’s SMS,13 (Annex E), the safety contour value should have been set at
13.35m. The ECDIS would then have defaulted to the nearest deeper contour on the
chart in use, which was the 20m contour. Instead, the safety contour was set to 30m,
which was the manufacturer’s default setting. A comparison of ECDIS displays using
30m and 20m safety contours shows that use of the 20m setting would have
provided a much clearer picture of where there was safe water available. Route
monitoring A deviation from the planned route is a mandatory ECDIS alarm.
However, the XTD alarm is only effective when the planned route is safe in the first
place and an appropriate value for XTD is set. In this case, the XTD value was 0.00nm
and therefore the XTD alarms were of no value.

ENC management During the Dover Strait passage, the ENC in use was GB202657
which was a ‘general’ chart on a scale of 1:350,000. In coastal waters, this scale of
chart would only be effective for planning purposes. ENC, GB401892 on a scale of
1:45,000, which was suitable for coastal navigation, was available on board but it was
not in use. The ECDIS ‘auto-load’ feature, which would have automatically selected
the best scale chart, was switched off. Although the presence of the jail bars should
have alerted the OOW that something was wrong with the ECDIS display, the chief
officer did not recognise their significance. Consequently, he did not manually load
the better scale ENC.
Audible alarm The ECDIS audible alarm is a mandated feature and is vital for alerting
the operator to navigational danger or system failures. Without the correct
configuration of the communications port, Ovit’s audible alarm was inoperable.
Although the installation report (Annex D) stated that all configurations had been
completed, it is possible that the audible alarm had never worked on board.
However, it is also possible that the configuration of the alarm’s communication port
had been tampered with during Ovit’s time in service. Either way, the evidence
gathered during this investigation indicates that the vessel’s deck officers had
operated the ECDIS without an audible alarm for a considerable period of time.

In addition to the incorrect operation of the ECDIS by Ovit’s deck officers, some
features of the Maris 900 ECDIS on board the vessel were either difficult to use or
appeared not to comply with international standards, notably: • At the top of the
check-route page, it clearly stated that the selected route was unsafe. However, it
was unhelpful that the words ‘no alarms’ could be seen in the bottom left of the
same page. The ‘no alarms’ information refers to system input data but, as shown by
Ovit’s deck officers’ understanding of the system, it can be inadvertently linked with
the navigational safety data above it. • Despite its critical importance, the safety
contour setting is one of several indistinguishable settings on the same page. The
importance of the safety contour setting is not emphasised to the operator. • The
safety contour alarm should have activated shortly before Ovit crossed the 30m
contour at 0417. However, the ECDIS display during the grounding shows that only
the XTD and grounding alarms were active. As the safety contour alarm is intended to
activate when a vessel is about to cross the designated contour, it is almost certain
that it did not function because the ‘display and highlight dangers’ option on the
guard zone page was set to ‘never’. Effectively, this disabled a mandatory alarm. •
The ability to record and then retrieve a vessel’s track history is a mandatory feature
listed in the ECDIS performance standards. Other than the vessel’s position at 0412,
Ovit’s track history could not be recovered from the system after the grounding.

Kindly answer the Following about the Case Study:

*What Factors that are related to Accident and Incident Investigation that are being violated,
explain each?

Ans:

Lack of knowledge on the use of ECDIS

minimum manning on bridge during Transit was not observed since Cadet officer should not and
don’t have liabilities to perform as lookout.

ISM breaches
Key ISM-related factors that contributed to the accident included:
▪ The passage plan was prepared by an inexperienced and unsupervised junior officer.

▪ The passage plan was not properly checked.

▪ The deck officers were unable to safely navigate using the vessel’s ECDIS.
▪ Master and deck officers did not implement the ship manager’s policies for safe navigation and
bridge watchkeeping.

Action by the Duty Officer?

Ans:
Duty Officer should familiarized all navigation equipment onboard specifically ECDIS
Duty officer should not rely in Cadet as lookout
Duty officer should address properly all Alarms,in Ecdis
Call Master in an ample time when in Doubt
Observed proper handover

What went wrong?

Ans:
Breach of BRM as per investigation knowing bridge is not properly manned. The deck officers were
unable to safely navigate using the vessel’s ECDIS, deck officers did not implement the ship
manager’s policies for safe navigation and bridge watchkeeping

*Actions of the Master?

Ans:
▪ Master should not let The passage plan was prepared by an inexperienced and unsupervised
junior officer. Check passage plan on ECDIS if navigating officer uses correct Chart in the
specific area
▪ Checked The passage plan properly checked. Every voyage Port to Port
▪ Familiarized all Officer involve in navigation by the used of safely navigate using the vessel’s
ECDIS.
▪ Master implement the ship manager’s policies for safe navigation and bridge watchkeeping

*Actions on the Second Officer?

Ans:
▪ The passage plan must be prepared by an experienced only
▪ The passage plan should be properly checked and acknowledge by all officer and Master
▪ Second officers should implement the ship manager’s policies for safe navigation and bridge
watchkeeping.

What standard actions should have been done to prevent that give the proper that should have
been taken?
Ans:
• Standard action should be always positive. Calling on master on an ample time.

*Passage plan Safety Meeting?

Ans:
▪ The passage plan was not properly checked. Checklist must be filled properly and passage
plan should be Checked and acknowledge by all Officer and Master

*Causes led to grounding?

Ans:
▪ The passage was planned by an inexperienced and unsupervised junior officer. The plan was not
checked by the master before departure or by the officer of the watch at the start of his watch.
▪ The ship’s position was monitored solely against the intended track shown on the ECDIS.
Navigational marks on the Varne bank were seen but not acted upon.
▪ The scale of the chart shown on the ECDIS was inappropriate. The operator-defined settings
applied to the system were unsuitable and the system’s audible alarm did not work.
▪ The officer of the watch’s situational awareness was so poor that it took him 19 minutes to
realise that Ovit had grounded and a further 14 minutes to report the accident to Dover
Coastguard.
▪ Although training in the use of the ECDIS fitted to the vessel had been provided, the master and
deck officers were unable to use the system effectively.
▪ A Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS) procedure, which should have alerted Ovit’s
officer of the watch as the tanker approached the Varne Bank, was not followed because the
procedure had not been formalized and an unqualified and unsupervised CNIS operator was
distracted.
▪ The passage through the Dover Strait was treated in exactly the same way as a passage in open
water.

What Legal Aspect or Standard Regulations being breached in the incident?

Ans:

Breach on ISM Standard

*What should the Master did in order to avoid it?

By complying all recommendation and guidelines from ISM and Apply it religiously

*Lessons Learnt?
Ans:

This incident is a clear example of ECDIS incompetence by deck officers. The official
investigation established that the ECDIS training undertaken by the ship’s master and deck
officers had not equipped the crew with the level of knowledge necessary to operate the
system effectively. To address
this, the owner company took action to ensure that ECDIS training is effectively
implemented onboard and moved to computer-based training for the familiarization of deck
officers in type-specific ECDIS.