Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

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The Political Reckoning in a Post-Nuclear Use

Landscape

Rabia Akhtar

To cite this article: Rabia Akhtar (2024) The Political Reckoning in a Post-Nuclear
Use Landscape, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 7:1, 78-90, DOI:
10.1080/25751654.2024.2364421

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2024.2364421

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Group on behalf of the Nagasaki University.

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JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
2024, VOL. 7, NO. 1, 78–90
https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2024.2364421

The Political Reckoning in a Post-Nuclear Use Landscape

Rabia Akhtar
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lahore, Lahore, Pakistan

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The international landscape, particularly in Northeast Asia, is portrayed Received 22 January 2024
as volatile due to the presence of nuclear-armed states, territorial Accepted 31 May 2024
disputes, and escalating geopolitical tensions. Considering this reality, KEYWORDS
this paper delves into the political ramifications of potential nuclear use Nuclear weapons; Asia-
in the Northeast Asia. It scrutinizes conceivable power shifts, the evol­ pacific; North Korea; arms
ving role of anti-nuclear groups, and the broader impact on security control; deterrence
policies. The exploration extends to scenarios post-nuclear use, encom­
passing positive, negative, and complex outcomes. The paper con­
cludes by offering recommendations to policymakers, underscoring
the imperative of substantive dialogues on arms control and conflict
resolution to avert catastrophic nuclear events. Overall, the paper
provides a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted challenges
posed by nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia and offers valuable
insights for crafting a more secure global environment. Recent devel­
opments point towards a disconcerting unraveling of arms control
structures and a growing threat to the nonproliferation regime. The
paper underscores the dynamic evolution of nuclear deterrence, high­
lighting the strategic use of emerging technologies by states to
reshape the balance of vulnerabilities.

Introduction
The unraveling of the global arms control architecture and the ensuing risks of unrest­
ricted competition have brought us to a perilous juncture. The elimination of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 (Trenin 2020) was
a particularly alarming shift, casting a shadow over East Asia and beyond. This change
compels us to face a deeply unsettling question: What would be the consequences if
nuclear weapons were used in this region? The potential repercussions are nothing short
of catastrophic. A nuclear conflict in East Asia would not only devastate the immediate
area but also send shockwaves across the entire world, disrupting lives and altering the
course of history. It is imperative that we grasp the full scope of these risks to safeguard
our collective future. That deterrence has not failed thus far does not guarantee its
continued effectiveness. The foundational assumptions that support the theory of the

CONTACT Rabia Akhtar rabia.akhtar@csspr.uol.edu.pk Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lahore, 1 Km

Defence Road, Lahore 54000, Pakistan
© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group on behalf of the Nagasaki University.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or
with their consent.
 JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 79

nuclear revolution1 are facing greater challenges than ever before (Lieber and Press
2017).
The world is witnessing a shift in the traditional approaches to nuclear deterrence. In
an effort to tilt the balance of vulnerabilities 2 in their favor, countries are increasingly
focused on exploiting emerging technologies that offer precision and remote sensing
capabilities. This desire to leverage new technologies to alter the offense-defense balance
with a bilateral deterrence equation is indicative of a failure to fully comprehend the
significance of the nuclear revolution and the potentially cataclysmic consequences of
nuclear war. In other words, if nuclear possessors had accepted that secure second-strike
capabilities have indeed eliminated their security dilemmas, they wouldn’t have
embroiled themselves in nuclear and conventional arms racing.
The international climate is far from peaceful, as geopolitical tensions continue to
simmer and escalate, creating additional triggers for crises, with potentially catastrophic
nuclear implications.
The probability of intentional or inadvertent nuclear incidents escalates in periods of
uncertainty and crisis. This risk is exacerbated by inadequate crisis communication
systems and potential misjudgments arising from the chaos of warfare and
misinformation.
One region where such crises could have devastating consequences is Northeast Asia.
This region has emerged as an area of significant concern due to the presence of nuclear-
armed states China, Russia, North Korea, and the United States, which exerts its
considerable influence in the region.
It is imperative to approach the issue with both a comprehensive and nuanced
understanding of the evolving dynamics between countries in the region. While the
existence of nuclear weapons makes the stakes incredibly high, other factors fuel tensions
in the region, including territorial disputes, hegemonic ambitions, and nationalist
sentiments.
In 2021, the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament (APLN), the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki
University (RECNA), and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability launched
a project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapon Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA). In an
effort to assist policymakers in mitigating tensions and preventing nuclear conflicts, the
Project has primarily concentrated on illuminating the various pathways to nuclear
deployment and the resulting physical ramifications within the region (APLN).
Supported by the findings of years 1 and 2 of the project, this paper delves into the
profound political ramifications of nuclear use in Northeast Asia. Its aim is to grasp how
the employment of nuclear weapons could potentially change the equilibrium of power
between states with nuclear weapons and those without these weapons, within the region
and beyond. Additionally, this paper critically evaluates the potential transformations in
the role and significance of anti-nuclear groups that may arise as a consequence of
1
This theory argues that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, combined with the possession of secure and
survivable second – strike capabilities, has made mutual vulnerabilities an inescapable and stabilizing phenomenon. In
other words, the theory argues that nuclear weapons eliminate or significantly reduce security dilemmas, make military
victories impossible to achieve, and, consequently, add to general stability.
2
Bilateral deterrence equations are strengthened when both countries achieve a degree of balance in terms of
vulnerabilities. However, one side feels a tad less vulnerable, this delicate balance is disturbed, incentivizing the
state which feels less vulnerable to use force against the other.
80 R. AKHTAR

nuclear use. Moreover, it analyzes the far-reaching impacts of nuclear use on the security
policies of key stakeholders and allies, as well as its influence on the delicate equilibrium
between those advocating for war and those striving for peace. In a world after nuclear
weapons have been used, the international community would face substantial transfor­
mations and new challenges. This paper examines those transformations through the
good, the bad and the ugly scenarios post-nuclear use and how nuclear weapons are
perceived in the new normal. Lastly, the paper gives recommendations to policymakers
to prevent nuclear use, including the need to engage in substantive dialogues on arms
control and conflict resolution.

Nuclear Use and the Permanent Ascendancy of Anti-Nuclear Groups

The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) successfully achieved consensus on a final document, which
marked a remarkable milestone in its history. The document noted deep concerns by the
state parties’ about “the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that
these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that
would result from the use of nuclear weapons” (Arms Control Association 2023). The
inclusion of the humanitarian aspect in the discussion on NPT’s Article VI was followed
by a new wave of activities that focused on the deleterious humanitarian repercussions of
nuclear use. This paved the way for organizations like the International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) to rally support for an international treaty to stigma­
tize, prohibit, and eliminate nuclear weapons.
These efforts resulted in the negotiation, adoption, and entry into force of the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). As of September 2023, 93 countries
had signed the TPNW, showing its wider international acceptability (ICAN 2024). Also
known as the Ban Treaty, TPNW is, unlike the NPT, a non-discriminatory Treaty
requiring all signatories to give up their nuclear weapons All state parties to the
TPNW not only have to eliminate all their nuclear stockpiles but also commit to not
amassing them again.3 Its entry into force has strengthened the position of disarmament
advocates who remind Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) recognized by the NPT of their
disarmament commitments. However, the Treaty is often criticized for its ineffectiveness,
as none of the nuclear weapon states have signed it. While the likelihood of nuclear
weapon use in Northeast Asia is low (Gilholm 2022), any such occurrence would
embolden anti-nuclear campaigners as the consequences of using nuclear weapons,
irrespective of other factors, would be too catastrophic to disregard, amplifying their
arguments against them.
The second year of the NU-NEA project thoroughly dissects the short- and long-term
impacts of nuclear use. More specifically, the project’s report on Humanitarian Impacts
of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia produces quantitative estimates of direct and
delayed deaths that various nuclear use cases could induce (APLN 2023). The findings of
the report speak to the implications of nuclear use. According to the report’s estimates,
even in “the most limited of nuclear conflicts, deaths were in the tens or hundreds of
3
“United Nations Treaty Collection”, accessed November 16, 2023, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26..
 JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 81

thousands, with the more extensive conflicts resulting in millions of deaths and hundreds
of thousands of cancer deaths” (APLN 2023, iv).
To provide a more thorough evaluation and forecast, the report examines various
physical effects, encompassing thermal radiation (fluence), firestorms, and fallout. This
comprehensive analysis enhances our understanding and enables us to make more
accurate projections. Such are the grotesque effects of nuclear use that even a DPRK
initiated4 “demonstration nuclear attack on a small ROK coastal community for the main
purpose of driving the United States, the ROK, and the international community to the
bargaining table” and limited conventional and nuclear responses by the United States,
will result in approximately 60,000 deaths, both direct and radiation-induced in the
short-to-long term (APLN 2023, 57–58).
The report examines other potential scenarios involving nuclear use, particularly those
with multiple nuclear attacks. These scenarios paint a grim picture of immense destruc­
tion and loss of life. Alarmingly, a three-way nuclear exchange between the United States,
North Korea, and China could result in the death of nearly a million people. Similarly, if
a terrorist organization were to detonate a nuclear warhead in Central Tokyo, it is
projected that around 600,000 lives could be lost in the long run (APLN 2023, 69).
These various projections illustrate the chaos and devastation that would accompany
any path towards nuclear use. That nuclear weapons cause both immediate and long-
term human casualties provides ample justification for anti-nuclear campaigners, huma­
nitarian organizations, and peace activists to unite and oppose their existence.
Encouraged by the extensive backing of the TPNW and the humanitarian agenda within
the NPT, organizations such as ICAN would amplify their advocacy and campaigns
against nuclear weapons. This surge in support would drive their efforts to new heights,
as they strive to create a world free from the threat of nuclear arms. The dissemination of
graphic images across mainstream and social media platforms serves not only to intensify
public abhorrence towards nuclear weapons and their wielders but also to rally support
for organizations dedicated to eradicating such weapons.
Consequently, mounting pressure will be exerted on nuclear weapon states (NWS) to
undertake three crucial actions, both within the framework of the NPT review cycle and
within the United Nations.
First, the pressure to fulfill their disarmament commitments in Article VI of the NPT
would intensify even further. The existing divisions within the NPT framework would be
further exacerbated, with most Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) asserting their
authority against the retention and modernization of nuclear forces. Even NNWS that
benefit from the provision of extended deterrence will also be pushed to reevaluate their
positions on nuclear weapons. Political blocs within the NPT, such as the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), will embark on a diplomatic offensive against all NWS.
Second, NNWS would request the implementation of universal, verifiable, and
non-discriminatory negative security assurances (NSAs). NWS will have limited
flexibility to remain noncommittal during Preparatory Committee meetings
(PrepComs) and Review Conferences (RevCons) following a nuclear use incident.

4
For a thorough analysis of a DPRK led first-strike see Quester (2006). For a comprehensive analysis of the strategic and
ethical considerations surrounding North Korean nuclear first use, see Erin and Scouras (2020); and for a detailed
exploration of North Korea’s nuclear threat, see Fitzpatrick (2009).
82 R. AKHTAR

Consequently, intense pressure will be exerted on NWS to commit to no-first use

(NFU) policies, both at the declarative and operational levels, as a significant con­
fidence-building measure.
Third, NWS will be urged to uphold their commitments in establishing nuclear-
weapons free zones, particularly in the Middle East. Moreover, nuclear possessors outside
of the NPT will be pressured to support the establishment of nuclear-weapons free zones,
especially in Northeast Asia. Further, the pressure on NWS to sign the Additional
Protocol of the Treaty of Bangkok would only mount going forward. It would be difficult
for NWS to avoid signing it by citing ambiguities in the Treaty’s language. Although, it is
highly improbable that NWS will adhere to these demands, even if nuclear weapons have
been employed. Consequently, the review process of the NPT may once again succumb to
the complexities of politics, impeding progress. While NNWS are already concerned
about the aforementioned issues, they will intensify their efforts in response to any
nuclear use incident. In a post-nuclear-use world, they will find themselves in a much
stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis NWS, inside and outside of the NPT setting.
A nuclear use event will confirm a bevy of skepticisms against the possession of
nuclear weapons. During the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly’s
First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, delegates from various
countries argued against the continued and entrenched belief in nuclear deterrence,
arguing that so long as it remains integral to states’ national security strategies, nuclear
risks cannot be mitigated (United Nations, 2023).
In addition to these efforts, organizations dedicated to the goal of nuclear abolition are
likely to garner increased support from various entities, including the United Nations. By
championing this cause, they can foster greater unity and collaboration towards achieving our
shared objective (UNODA, 2023). The young activists, currently engaged in disarmament
advocacy by recreating images and reviving memories of the devastating nuclear bombings in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, will undoubtedly garner sympathy, recognition, and widespread
support. They will get another set of nuclear use incidents to build a narrative against nuclear
weapons. Therefore, many perceive their efforts as a noble fight for a just cause.
Overall, regardless of the circumstances in which nuclear weapons may be employed,
the resulting devastation would amplify the influence of anti-nuclear activists.
Proponents of disarmament and supporters of the TPNW will be vindicated as they
accumulate even greater moral and political authority. They will rightfully reference the
destructive consequences of nuclear utilization to not only stigmatize these weapons, but
also construct a compelling argument against nuclear deterrence. They will contend that
since the concept of nuclear deterrence relies on the threat of nuclear use and annihila­
tion, it is inherently dangerous and risky. Moreover, they will express their strong
opposition to nuclear weapons and the concept of deterrence from a moral standpoint.
Anti-nuclear advocacy groups would emphasize the immorality of safeguarding oneself
by threatening innocent civilians with catastrophic consequences. Should there be
a nuclear incident in Northeast Asia or elsewhere, the use of nuclear weapons would
be widely condemned as abhorrent to humanity.
Following the various analysis and simulation of nuclear use incidents researched in this
Project, peace activists, civil society, and a majority of NNWS would attribute nuclear risks
solely to the possession of such weapons. These groups will continue to consider nuclear
risk-reduction efforts meaningless so long as NWS do not start the process of disarmament.
 JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 83

An Elusive Global Unity?

The use of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to international peace
and security, with repercussions that are both immediate and long-lasting. In the
event of such a catastrophic event, the international community would undoubt­
edly respond with a great deal of attention and resources. Organizations such as
the United Nations (UN) would be called upon to aid the millions of victims
impacted by nuclear use. Furthermore, in the case of countries engaging in
nuclear warfare, there would be an increased level of international scrutiny and
tension.
The UN, through its subsidiary bodies such as the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), would lead the global effort to provide
relief to victims of the nuclear attack. One of the agencies that would play a central role in
this humanitarian response is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The
ICRC has significant experience in responding to such crises and should, along with
disaster relief organizations around the world, help mitigate the immediate aftermath of
a nuclear attack (Convoy of Hope 2024).
Responsible countries will undertake some kinds of disaster relief efforts. However,
despite the expectations of global actors, they may choose to engage in blame-shifting
rather than participate in meaningful dialogue to resolve disputes for a greater good of
humanity. This will mark the ability of the UN and its agencies to carry out rescue, relief,
and rehabilitation operations. Additionally, fulfilling the critical expectations of the
international community in a time of such dire need is far from certain. The complex
and multi-faceted nature of the humanitarian crisis caused by a nuclear attack makes it
an incredibly challenging situation, further complicated by political, social, and legal
strains.
In the wake of such an attack, the engagement of great powers – the five NWS –
in humanitarian relief efforts would be influenced by a range of political and
strategic considerations. A key determinant of their level of involvement would be
the question of which state was responsible for initiating the use of nuclear
weapons. This is not surprising because geopolitics often trumps humanitarian
concerns.
The scenario of nuclear use by a great power is one that must be approached with great
caution, both in terms of the immediate consequences for the victims and in terms of the
long-term implications for alliances and security policies going forward. The United
States, as a leading world power, must respond to such situations with a level of
responsibility and accountability that recognizes the gravity of nuclear use and the
need to mitigate harm for all those affected.
The year-1 report of this project adeptly outlined plausible scenarios involving nuclear
use simulating China as the first user in Taiwan (RECNA-Nagasaki University, Asia
Pacific Leadership Network, and Nautilus Institute, 2022). Should this scenario occur, it
is expected that the United States would take a leading role in rallying support both
domestically and internationally against China and in support of the innocent victims of
Chinese nuclear-led aggression. In order to facilitate such efforts, the White House would
work closely with Congress and US government agencies to prepare a comprehensive
relief package for those affected by the attack.
84 R. AKHTAR

However, it is important to note that if the United States were to be the first user of
nuclear weapons in a conflict, relief efforts could be hindered by both the inability and
refusal to take responsibility for the initial use of such weapons. This may impede rescue,
relief, and rehabilitation work, leaving these efforts vulnerable to the various exigencies
and geopolitical rivalries that are present in the post-nuclear use world. In such
a situation, the way that great powers, particularly the United States, deals with these
challenges in providing relief activities will have a considerable impact on alliances going
forward.
After the use of nuclear weapon(s), it is reasonable to assume that allies will alter their
security policies as they assess how their nuclear umbrella-providers acted in the after­
math of a nuclear crisis. In the event that the United States were to fulfill its commitments
and act in good faith during a major nuclear crisis between North Korea and South
Korea, for instance, the latter might still not be confident in retaining its non-nuclear
status in a hostile environment. Further, it is possible that both Seoul and Tokyo will start
questioning the reliability of Washington’s ability to offer extended deterrence. This
concern is already a valid one, owing to greater public support for South Korea having an
independent nuclear deterrent (Friedhoff, Dalton, and Kim 2022). While, for now, South
Koreans are confident about the United States coming good on its commitments,
scholars are worried about the weakening of Washington-Seoul relations (Council on
Foreign Relations 2023).
As the year-1 report insightfully points out, the United States might assess that the risk
of a nuclear attack on the US homeland will increase if any crisis were to escalate to
nuclear levels in Northeast Asia. Given these considerations, allies may be inclined to at
least modify their conventional force deployments, even in a post-nuclear use world.
Voices that speak to the need for having independent nuclear forces will likely get louder
(Gallo 2023).

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in a Post-Nuclear World

In the post-nuclear world, there are three potential outcomes that may come to fruition
as a result of nuclear use: the good, the bad, and the ugly. The first scenario is “the good
scenario”, which involves the successful implementation of comprehensive arms control
and disarmament measures that effectively mitigate the risks of further nuclear use and
proliferation. The second scenario, referred to as “the bad scenario”, involves the
disillusionment and loss of faith in the efficacy of nuclear deterrence as a viable means
of preventing global nuclear war. Finally, the third and most concerning scenario, is “the
ugly scenario”, which involves the embrace of destructive ideologies and beliefs that
normalizes nuclear conflict.

The Good Scenario: The Post-Nuclear Future Will Belong to Arms Control and
Disarmament
The year-1 report of this project presents plausible scenarios for nuclear use. However,
the state of political interactions between the hostile nuclear dyads do not instill
 JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 85

confidence in their ability to resolve conflicts effectively. Nonetheless, there remains

a glimmer of hope that rational minds will unite in their commitment to preventing the
use of nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought the United States and
the former Soviet Union perilously close to a catastrophic nuclear confrontation.
However, through a fortuitous blend of luck and astute leadership, the world was spared
an immense calamity (Vaughan 2022). The close call in Cuba led to advancements in
arms control and nonproliferation. The Partial Test-Ban Treaty was signed just a year
after the incident, followed by the commencement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT-1) in 1969. While a dangerous crisis in its own right, the Cuban Missile Crisis
would be dwarfed by even a limited use of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. The
potential aftermath of any nuclear use in Northeast Asia would be an undeniable
realization that the living would envy the dead. This could force world leaders to think
about their collective futures, and take concrete steps towards arms control, confidence-
building, and multi-pronged cooperation on key regional and global issues. Should
Moscow, Washington, and Beijing come to realize the potentially catastrophic conse­
quences of another nuclear confrontation, it is conceivable that they would convene in
a trilateral setting to engage in a comprehensive dialogue on various arms control
strategies. The overall effort to buttress arms control would most likely be different to the
one made during the Cold War, mainly because the pressure to get things right will be
greater in a post-nuclear use world. Therefore, they could, for example, agree on adopting
more stringent transparency and verification mechanisms, remaining fully committed to
New START, and establishing better crisis communication frameworks.
When it comes to North Korea, it would be most beneficial for the United States to
approach it as an arms control matter, rather than as a nonproliferation one (CSSPR
2020). All variants of North Korea-specific nuclear use cases identified in the year-1
report speak to the reality and severity of Pyongyang’s nuclear challenge. A valuable
lesson that can be gleaned from a potential nuclear exchange with North Korea is that
coercive measures cannot disarm the country. However, if the United States were to
engage in arms control negotiations with North Korea, there is a possibility of
a favorable outcome as far as nuclear risk-reduction is concerned. In other words,
Pyongyang would be more open to negotiating an arms control agreement than giving
up its bomb. This is primarily because entering into arms control arrangements with the
United States will increase North Korea’s prestige and security. It will stand to lose both
counts if they commit to disarmament.
Furthermore, it will be imperative for NWS to embark on a fresh start and reaffirm
their dedication to nuclear disarmament. Such a step would play a crucial role in halting
the erosion of trust among the state parties of the NPT. In addition, bolstering disarma­
ment and nonproliferation education, which has recently become a focal point of the
NPT review process, would be a valuable complement to this endeavor. This can foster
lively debates and nuanced discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear use.
Future generations can leverage these platforms to promote lasting peace by advocating
for nuclear disarmament.
Leveraging technological advancements in disarmament will also present
a promising avenue for addressing the security challenges of a post-nuclear use
world. One possible interest of NWS would be investment in the use of AI and
other emerging technologies that could help streamline and improve global arms
86 R. AKHTAR

control and disarmament. The advancement of AI-enabled tools for identifying,

tracking, and monitoring nuclear weapons and materials has the potential to greatly
enhance existing systems, preventing their proliferation. Concomitantly, NWS must
address the vulnerabilities of these AI-driven systems. One of the biggest challenges
that AI-based systems bring to the table is an increase in the number of cyber attacks
(Malwarebytes, n.d.). Therefore, NWS should work towards establishing joint
mechanisms to enhance the security of these systems. In fact, it should become an
important arms control measure going forward. In a world scarred by the shared
experience of nuclear devastation, there will be a need for interconnected disarma­
ment mechanisms that would effectively address the diverse requirements of different
states. Such mechanisms would be a valuable asset in promoting peace and security
on a global scale. By embedding emerging technologies in such a shared system,
a framework can be established that fosters trust, transparency, and cooperation
among states, ultimately contributing to a more secure global order which would
ensure nuclear weapons are never used again.

The Bad Scenario: Embracing the Unthinkable

The potential use of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia would have catastrophic con­
sequences for global security. It would signify a failure of deterrence and break the long-
held nuclear taboo (Tannenwald 2021), endangering the current framework of interna­
tional norms and regulations which govern the responsible use of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, it may embolden NWS, such as the United States, Russia, and China as they
could draw some wrong lessons from the instances of nuclear use. The illusion of
emerging relatively unscathed from a nuclear conflict may induce a dangerous sense of
confidence that a nuclear war is indeed winnable.
Such erroneous views, if propagated, could be fatal and instigate another nuclear
weapon use. NWS may perceive the use of nuclear weapons as legitimate and feasible
means to attain strategic objectives on the battlefield, thereby advancing the reckless view
that they can be employed, despite severe consequences. This notion is inherently
destabilizing, particularly in times of crisis, as it encourages risk-taking behaviors
prone to miscalculation that would trigger accidental or deliberate use. For example,
decapitation strikes by the United States, which are military operations targeting an
adversary’s leadership or strategic assets, could be viewed as a means of disarming
a nuclear-armed North Korea. However, the use of such weapons under these circum­
stances would exacerbate the fragility of deterrence and crisis stability, further heighten­
ing the risk of conflict escalation.
Conversely, if the United States were to find itself in a world where Russia or China
employed nuclear weapons first, it may perceive a heightened need for nuclear moder­
nization. Such an approach could result in the development of destabilizing technologies
(Hersman 2020), increasing the risk of nuclear weapon use. Aegis missile defense systems
and hypersonic glide vehicles offer examples of such technologies, which could be
deployed by the United States to counter any perceived imbalances in nuclear capabil­
ities. The use of such disruptive technologies could lead to escalating tensions between
states. This situation may further aggravate the risks of deliberate or unintentional
nuclear weapon use even in a world which has seen nuclear devastation.
 JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 87

The Ugly Scenario: Losing Faith in the Religion of Nuclear Deterrence

The year-1 report brings attention to a worrisome reality that the aggressors initiated the
use of nuclear weapons without being deterred by the possibility of nuclear retaliation
from their adversaries. In a post-nuclear world, this could establish an unfavorable
precedent. Observing the failure of deterrence and the actual use of nuclear weapons,
both participating states and observers may begin to question the significance and
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.
There are two unsettling consequences that will arise from this. First, states may once
again choose to allocate resources towards conventional forces, incentivizing increased
internal conflicts and clashes.
Second, states will be motivated to elude and bypass nuclear deterrence measures that
will remain at their disposal in a post-nuclear use world. The prevalence of emerging
technologies has created a more conducive environment for such actions. The repercus­
sions of this phenomenon would manifest as heightened uncertainty, an escalation in
arms competition, and a deepening sense of distrust.
The nuclear use scenarios presented in the year-1 report depict a world fraught with
instability and chaos, where the risk of armed conflict, both conventional and nuclear,
looms large. A world where the concept of deterrence will become increasingly fragile
with states leaning towards employing force as a tool of policy. As a result, the nuclear
order will find itself in a state of disarray, with non-nuclear weapon states feeling more
vulnerable while nuclear weapon states remaining steadfast in their refusal to disarm.

Conclusion
The potential use of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia is undoubtedly one of the gravest
threats to human existence today. The region, with its strategic importance and signifi­
cant players, has the potential to become the epicenter of a catastrophic nuclear battle­
field, triggering mass destruction and loss of life. The global repercussions of any such
event would be far-reaching, creating a world that is unpredictable, unstable, and
dangerous.
As argued in this paper, the aftermath of any nuclear event in Northeast Asia would be
shaped by the actions of the major players. In such a scenario, it is imperative that global
leaders take responsibility for their inaction and make concerted efforts towards building
confidence and trust, implementing arms control measures, and establishing substantive
cooperation. The stakes are high, and the future of our planet is on the line.
The first step in preventing nuclear use in Northeast Asia is to acknowledge the gravity
of the situation and the need for action. This acknowledgment should come from all
nuclear possessors and their allies, not least because political ownership will be absolutely
critical to addressing nuclear use-related concerns. This requires a widespread under­
standing of the threat and a willingness to collaborate on solutions. A crucial factor in
achieving this is the willingness of major powers like the United States, China, and Russia
to engage in meaningful dialogue and negotiations. Efforts to pave the way for peaceful
resolutions must be pursued vigorously, even if the prospect of success seems slim.
Members of the civil society, peace activists, and global multilateral fora must pressure
great powers into engaging with one another.
88 R. AKHTAR

The establishment of mechanisms for arms control and reduction is another key
component in preventing nuclear use in Northeast Asia. As outlined in the year-1 report,
one possible scenario involves China as the first user in Taiwan, which would require the
United States to mobilize support against Chinese aggression. However, in the event of US
first use, the situation could be quite different, complicating relief efforts and falling prey to
geopolitical rivalries. In either scenario, it is essential to have arms control mechanisms and
policies in place that prevent the escalation of nuclear use.
In addition to arms control measures, substantive cooperation between regional
powers is crucial in preventing nuclear use. The ability to collaborate on non-nuclear
issues such as trade, climate change concerns, and counterterrorism can help build
relationships, trust, and confidence between nations. Such efforts may seem secondary
to the issue of nuclear use, but they can play a pivotal role in overall regional stability.
Looking forward, it is imperative that global leaders work together to prevent nuclear use
in Northeast Asia. The potential consequences of inaction are too catastrophic to ignore.
There are no guarantees of success, but concerted efforts towards confidence-building
measures, arms control mechanisms, and substantive cooperation can create a more stable
and secure region and world. The lesson from any such crisis would be that we should never
forget the enormity of our responsibilities as global citizens, especially when the stakes are so
high.

Acknowledgments
The work was supported by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapon Abolition, Nagasaki
University (RECNA; Japan).

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
This work was supported by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition.

Notes on Contributor
Rabia Akhtar is Dean Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Lahore. A Professor of
International Relations, she is also the founding Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy
and Policy Research and of the School of Integrated Social Sciences at the University of Lahore,
Pakistan. Dr. Akhtar has a PhD in Security Studies from Kansas State University. She holds
Masters degrees in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, and in
Political Science from Eastern Illinois University, USA. Her scholarly pursuits have revolved
around key areas such as South Asian nuclear security, deterrence dynamics, media in the age of
deep fakes and disinformation, nuclear weapons, AI and emerging technologies, Pakistan’s foreign
policy and national security imperatives, as well as regional and international security issues. She
has authored a book titled, ‘The Blind Eye: U.S. Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan from
Ford to Clinton’, which showcases her expertise in the field. Moreover, she serves as the Editor of
Pakistan Politico, Pakistan’s pioneering magazine on strategic and foreign affairs. Not only has
Dr. Akhtar made significant contributions to academia, but she has also played a vital role in
 JOURNAL FOR PEACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 89

shaping foreign policy as a member of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Advisory Council on Foreign
Affairs from 2018 to 2022. She is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the South Asia Center, Atlantic
Council, Washington DC, and a Nonresident Fellow at BASIC, UK. Dr. Akhtar serves as a visiting
faculty at the NATO Defence College, Rome, the NPIHP Nuclear Bootcamp, Rome and
ISODARCO, Andalo, Italy. Dr. Akhtar is a visiting scholar (2024-2025) at the Project on
Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School.

ORCID
Rabia Akhtar http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1556-6096

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