APPEALS

Case Title: Republic of the Philippines vs. Capital Resources Corporation and Romeo Roxas
G.R. No.: [specific G.R. number needed]
Promulgated: [specific promulgation date needed]
Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land in Barangay Pugo, Bauang, La Union, covered by TCT No. T-
23343, registered in the names of Capital Resources Corporation (CRC) and Romeo Roxas. The
land was originally granted to Vitaliano Dumuk via a Homestead Patent in 1924, which resulted
in OCT No. 137. Over time, the title was transferred to spouses Cecilio and Laura Milo, and
later, to CRC and Roxas in 1982. The land was subdivided into several blocks, with Blocks 35
and 36 identified as foreshore land and seabed, respectively.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought the reversion
of the property to the public domain, arguing that parts of the land, particularly Blocks 35 and
36, had become foreshore land. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch
33, ruled in favor of the Republic, ordering the reversion of Blocks 35 and 36. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s ruling and ordered a resurvey of the property.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court may consider issues raised by the Republic that were not included in
the original complaint.
2. Whether the remaining portions of the subject property, aside from Blocks 35 and 36,
may be reverted to the public domain.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the issues raised by the Republic, which were not included in the
original complaint, cannot be considered. The Court affirmed the CA's decision, limiting the
reversion to Blocks 35 and 36, and rejected the Republic's request for reversion of the entire
property.
Key Notes:
 The Supreme Court emphasized that issues not raised in the original complaint or pre-
trial brief cannot be considered on appeal, citing the principles of fair play and due
process. The Republic failed to raise issues about the entire property in its original
complaint.
Case Title: Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No.: [specific G.R. number needed]
Promulgated: [specific promulgation date needed]
Facts:
Pacifico Mabasa owned a land with a two-door apartment in Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro
Manila, which he acquired in September 1981. Mabasa’s property was surrounded by those
owned by Spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and Spouses Lito and Maria Cristina Santos,
leading Mabasa to file Civil Case No. 47466 in 1982 for an easement of right of way. After
Mabasa passed away, his heirs substituted him in the case. The trial court granted a permanent
right of way to Mabasa’s heirs and ordered them to pay P8,000 as indemnity. The heirs of
Mabasa appealed, and the Court of Appeals modified the decision by awarding additional
damages. The petitioners, Spouses Custodio and Santos, sought review by the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether the grant of the right of way to the private respondents is proper.
2. Whether the award of damages to the private respondents is justified.
Ruling:
1. The petitioners are barred from raising the issue of the right of way since they did not
appeal the trial court's decision, which had already become final.
2. The Supreme Court reversed the award of damages made by the Court of Appeals, ruling
that the additional damages were not justified.
Key Notes:
 Finality of Right of Way Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners could
not contest the right of way because they failed to appeal the trial court’s decision, which
had become final. As per the rules, an appellee who does not appeal cannot seek more
relief than what the lower court has already granted.
Case Title: Domingo Neypes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No.: 141524
Promulgated: September 14, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob
Obania, and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment, reconveyance,
and/or reversion of land against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land
Bank of the Philippines, and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. After several motions, the RTC dismissed the petitioners’
case on the ground of prescription on February 12, 1998. Petitioners received the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998, and filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on
July 1, 1998. They filed a notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, but the RTC rejected it as late.
Their petition for certiorari and mandamus to the Court of Appeals (CA) was also denied, as
the CA ruled that the appeal period started from the receipt of the February 12, 1998 order.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners' appeal as filed out of
time.
2. Whether the term "final order" in Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
was misinterpreted.
3. Whether the "fresh period rule" should be applied to the petitioners' case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, reversing the decisions of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals. It held that the petitioners' appeal was filed within the allowable period,
and the denial of the motion for reconsideration should have triggered a fresh 15-day appeal
period.
Key Notes:
 Fresh Period Rule: The Supreme Court introduced the "fresh period rule," allowing a
new 15-day period to file a notice of appeal from the denial of a motion for
reconsideration or new trial. This ensures that litigants have a fair opportunity to appeal
following the final resolution of motions.
 Final Order: The Court emphasized that the "final order" refers to the denial of a motion
for reconsideration, as this constitutes the last action of the court, after which nothing
more remains for adjudication.
 Right to Appeal: The decision affirms that the right to appeal must be exercised within
the time provided by law and procedural rules. The fresh period rule was created to
regiment appeal periods and avoid confusion on when the countdown begins.
Case Title: Ligaya Ang vs. Court of Appeals, Warren Gutierrez, et al.
G.R. No.: 236043
Promulgated: October 2021
Facts:
Warren Gutierrez filed an unlawful detainer case against Spouses Ricardo and Ligaya Ang
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in 2016, claiming ownership of a 94-square
meter lot under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 013-2015003219. The lot had been sold to
the Spouses Ang on an installment basis in 1998, with the contract stating that failure to pay
would nullify the agreement. Despite making an initial payment, the Spouses Ang failed to
settle the remaining balance. The MeTC ruled in favor of Warren, ordering the Spouses Ang
to vacate the property. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the decision. Ligaya Ang's
motion for extension to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA) was denied
due to non-payment of docket fees, and her subsequent petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court followed.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ligaya Ang’s
motion for extension of time and refusing to admit her petition for review due to non-
payment of docket fees.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed Ligaya Ang’s petition, affirming the CA’s decision to deny her
motion for extension of time and refusal to admit the petition for review due to the non-
payment of docket fees.
Key Notes:
 Right to Appeal: The Supreme Court reiterated that the right to appeal is a statutory
privilege and not part of due process. This right must be exercised according to the rules,
including the timely payment of docket fees.
 Payment of Docket Fees: The Court emphasized that under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, payment of docket fees is necessary to perfect an appeal. Ligaya Ang failed to
provide adequate proof of payment, relying only on an uncorroborated affidavit from her
messenger.
 No Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the CA, as Ligaya Ang did not provide sufficient evidence or justification for her
failure to pay. Allowing her appeal would unfairly prejudice Warren Gutierrez, who had
been deprived of his property rights for an extended period.
Case Title: Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) vs. Hon. Emmanuel C. Carpio, et al.
G.R. No.: 196294
Promulgated: July 2013
Facts:
The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) filed a petition for review on certiorari
against Judge Emmanuel Carpio and several respondents, including Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and individuals represented by Manuel L. Te. The case
stemmed from a complaint filed by Dabay Abad and others against DBP for the delivery of
certificates of title that had been unlawfully detained under a loan agreement and
subsequently transferred to the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprise (GFSME).
The RTC initially issued a writ of seizure in favor of the plaintiffs, supported by a bond from
CBIC. Later, the complaint was dismissed by the RTC due to improper venue, but despite
this, DBP’s request to recover damages from the surety bond was denied by both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals (CA). DBP then petitioned the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in its strict application of Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure regarding the timing of DBP's application for damages against the bond?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied DBP’s petition and affirmed the CA's ruling.
Key Notes:
 Timeliness of Application for Damages: The Supreme Court ruled that DBP’s
application for damages against the surety bond was filed too late. Under Section 20,
 Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must file a claim for damages arising
from an improper attachment before the trial, the perfection of the appeal, or the
judgment becoming final and executory. Since DBP filed its application for damages long
after the dismissal order became final, it was untimely.
 Residual Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court also clarified that residual jurisdiction, which
allows the trial court to take certain actions after the case is appealed, only applies after a
trial on the merits. In this case, no trial occurred as the complaint was dismissed for
improper venue, making residual jurisdiction inapplicable.
RULE 40
Case Title: Encarnacion v. Amigo
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
Victoriano M. Encarnacion owned two lots in Cauayan, Isabela, which he acquired after an
Affidavit of Waiver was executed in his favor by Anita Magpantay in 1995. These lots had been
previously owned by Rogelio Valiente, who sold them through successive transactions,
ultimately leading to Encarnacion’s ownership. However, Nieves Amigo took possession of a
portion of the property in 1985 without permission and continued to occupy it despite
Encarnacion’s demand to vacate in 2001. Encarnacion then filed a complaint for ejectment,
damages, and injunction in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). The MTC ruled in favor of
Encarnacion, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds,
stating that the MTC had no jurisdiction. Encarnacion appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
which remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Encarnacion then elevated the case
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the proper action in this case was accion publiciana
and not unlawful detainer, as alleged in Encarnacion's complaint?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Encarnacion's petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to
remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Ratio:
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint at the time of its
filing. While Encarnacion filed a complaint for ejectment, the fact that he was dispossessed of
the property for almost six years made the case fall under accion publiciana, a plenary action for
the recovery of possession after more than one year of dispossession. Since the dispossession
exceeded one year, the proper action was accion publiciana, which falls under the jurisdiction of
the RTC. The Supreme Court emphasized that the RTC should have taken cognizance of the case
and ruled based on the evidence, rather than dismissing it on jurisdictional grounds. The case was
properly remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
Case Title: Canlas v. Tubil
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
The case involved a property dispute over residential land in San Juan, Betis, Guagua,
Pampanga, specifically Cadastral Lot No. 2420 covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
11199. Petitioners, Rodolfo "Rudy" Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad Canlas, and spouses Pablo
and Charito Canlas, occupied the land and built houses, claiming long-term possession. The
respondent, Iluminada Tubil, along with other heirs of her late husband, Nicolas Tubil, claimed
ownership of the land. Tubil alleged that the petitioners initially occupied the land by tolerance
but refused to vacate after the heirs sent demand letters on January 12, 2004. After barangay
conciliation failed, Tubil filed an unlawful detainer case before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Guagua, Pampanga, on June 9, 2004. Petitioners argued lack of jurisdiction, but the MTC
dismissed Tubil's complaint. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the MTC’s decision, but the
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s ruling and ordered it to decide on the merits. Petitioners
then sought review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals err in setting aside the RTC’s decision and ordering it to decide the case
on the merits?
Which court, the MTC or the RTC, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstating
the MTC's ruling dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled that the MTC had proper jurisdiction over the case since Tubil's
complaint made a valid case for unlawful detainer. Tubil alleged that the petitioners’ possession
was by tolerance, which became illegal upon their refusal to vacate following the demand letters.
The complaint was filed within one year of the final demand, meeting the requirements for an
unlawful detainer case. While the MTC dismissed the complaint due to insufficient proof of
tolerance, the MTC's jurisdiction remained intact based on the nature of the allegations in the
complaint. The Supreme Court further clarified that Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court,
which mandates the RTC to decide on the merits when the lower court lacks jurisdiction, did not
apply in this case. Thus, the MTC's decision to dismiss the complaint was affirmed.
RULE 41
Case Title: Vios v. Pantangco, Jr.
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
This case involves a land dispute over residential property located on Sampaguita St., Barangay
Pasong Tamo, Quezon City. Respondent Manuel Pantangco, Jr. filed a complaint for ejectment
and damages against the petitioners, Charlie Vios and the Spouses Rogelio and Teresita Antonio,
in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), claiming ownership of the property. Pantangco asked the
petitioners to vacate the land, but they refused, arguing that it was public land and that
Pantangco's title was invalid. On July 12, 1996, the MTC ruled in favor of Pantangco, ordering
the petitioners to vacate. When the petitioners failed to appeal within the prescribed period,
Pantangco filed for a writ of execution, which the MTC granted. Vios then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which annulled the MTC decision
and the writ of execution. Pantangco subsequently brought the matter before the Court of
Appeals (CA), which ruled that the RTC had exceeded its jurisdiction. The case was brought to
the Supreme Court for review.
Issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in entertaining Pantangco's petition for the declaration of
nullity of the RTC decision?
2. Did the RTC exceed its jurisdiction by annulling the MTC decision and the writ of
execution?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in entertaining Pantangco’s petition for
the declaration of nullity of the RTC decision. The Supreme Court also found that the RTC had
exceeded its jurisdiction in annulling the MTC decision and the writ of execution.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court explained that the proper remedy for challenging the RTC's decision in a
petition for certiorari is to file an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Section 2,
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Pantangco should have pursued an ordinary appeal rather
than filing a petition for the declaration of nullity. The Supreme Court held that the RTC erred in
annulling the MTC decision on the merits through certiorari under Rule 65, as certiorari is meant
for correcting jurisdictional errors, not errors of judgment. While the RTC correctly nullified the
writ of execution because the MTC decision had not become final, it exceeded its authority by
reversing the MTC decision on substantive grounds. Thus, the RTC decision was partly void, and
the Supreme Court directed the parties to act accordingly.
Case Title: Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
The Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) filed a complaint against Traveller Kids,
Inc., Cely L. Gabaldon-Co, and Jeannie L. Lugmoc for the collection of P8,971,118.06 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, presided by Judge Honorio E. Guanlao,
Jr. The respondents argued that the obligation had already been fully paid and that PBCOM
failed to pay the correct docket fees, thereby questioning the court's jurisdiction. The RTC
ordered PBCOM to pay additional docket fees, which PBCOM complied with, albeit late.
Consequently, the RTC dismissed the complaint on November 4, 2010, for failure to comply
with the order. PBCOM’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and when it filed a notice of
appeal, the RTC also denied it, stating that an appeal was not the proper remedy. PBCOM filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA), but the petition and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied. PBCOM then elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion by denying PBCOM’s motion
for reconsideration due to a one-day delay?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that a prior motion for reconsideration was
required before filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus?
3. Should Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. be compelled by mandamus to approve PBCOM's
notice of appeal and transmit the case records to the Court of Appeals?
4. Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that certiorari and
mandamus were the wrong modes of appeal?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted PBCOM's petition, setting aside the RTC's June 2, 2011 order and
the CA's July 31, 2014 decision and May 5, 2015 resolution. The Court directed the RTC to give
due course to PBCOM's notice of appeal and to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals
for review.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court recognized that PBCOM’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was
technically an incorrect remedy. However, under exceptional circumstances where strict
adherence to procedural rules would result in injustice, the Court may set aside procedural
technicalities. The RTC acted without jurisdiction when it denied PBCOM’s notice of appeal. It
is the Court of Appeals, not the RTC, that has the authority to determine whether an appeal
should be dismissed for being the wrong remedy. Given that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction
and considering the merits of the case, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to allow the
appeal and avoid a manifest injustice. Thus, the RTC’s denial of the notice of appeal was a patent
nullity, and PBCOM’s petition for certiorari and mandamus was the correct course of action in
this case.
RULE 42
Case Title: Maslag v. Monzon
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
In 1998, Darma Maslag filed a complaint for reconveyance of real property and nullity of the
original certificate of title (OCT) against Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston, and the Registry of
Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet. The complaint was initially brought before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, which found Monzon guilty of fraudulently obtaining the
OCT for Maslag's property. The MTC ordered Monzon to reconvey the property and pay
damages. Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet,
where Acting Presiding Judge Fernando P. Cabato declared the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the
case and assumed cognizance of it. Subsequently, Judge Edgardo B. Diaz De Rivera, Jr. reversed
the MTC's decision, ordering Maslag to return possession of the land to Monzon. Maslag filed a
notice of appeal against the RTC's resolution, but the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed her
appeal, stating that the proper mode of appeal was a Petition for Review under Rule 42. Maslag's
motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting her to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in dismissing Maslag's appeal, considering the RTC
ruled that the MTC had decided the original complaint without jurisdiction?
2. What is the appropriate remedy for the petitioner: a Petition for Review under Rule 42 or
an ordinary appeal under Rule 41?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Maslag's Petition for Review, affirming the CA's resolutions dated
May 31, 2006, and September 22, 2006, which dismissed her appeal for being an improper
remedy.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC's order declaring the MTC without jurisdiction was
erroneous, as the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter due to the
assessed value of the property being within the MTC's jurisdictional threshold. The RTC's
resolution was made in its appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction, indicating that the
proper mode of appeal from the RTC's resolution should have been a Petition for Review under
Rule 42. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and
cannot be changed by court orders or parties' actions. Since Maslag's appeal to the CA was taken
incorrectly, the CA correctly dismissed it as an improper remedy. The determinative factor in
choosing the mode of appeal depends on the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in its
decision or resolution.
Case Title: Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Company
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
In 1998, Intramuros Administration (Intramuros) leased three properties to Offshore
Construction Development Company (Offshore Construction) with lease terms from September
1, 1998, to August 31, 2003. The leases referred to a memorandum allowing renewals every five
years upon mutual agreement. Offshore Construction made improvements to the properties but
halted projects due to non-compliance with architectural requirements. In 1999, Offshore
Construction filed a complaint against Intramuros and the Department of Tourism, resulting in a
Compromise Agreement affirming two lease contracts' validity while terminating the third.
Despite the agreement, Offshore Construction accrued rental arrears of P6,762,153.70 by July
31, 2004, and a subsequent Memorandum of Agreement in 2004 to settle these arrears was also
violated, with debts reaching P13,448,867.45 by December 31, 2009. Intramuros filed an
ejectment complaint in 2010, which the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed for forum shopping
and lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court upheld this dismissal, prompting Intramuros to
file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Was direct resort to the Supreme Court proper?
2. Did the Metropolitan Trial Court have jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint?
3. Did Intramuros Administration commit forum shopping?
4. Is Intramuros Administration entitled to possess the leased premises and collect unpaid
rentals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that direct resort to the Court was proper, that the Metropolitan Trial
Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint, and that Intramuros Administration did not
commit forum shopping. Additionally, Intramuros Administration is entitled to possess the leased
premises, but the issue of unpaid rentals should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court.
Ratio:
 Direct Resort to the Supreme Court: The Court recognized exceptions to the principle
of the hierarchy of courts, allowing direct access under exigent circumstances, given the
prolonged nature of the dispute and the summary nature of ejectment proceedings.
 Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court: The sole issue in ejectment proceedings
is physical possession. The Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint
due to the complexities of the parties' relationship, as the complaint sufficiently
established jurisdiction.
 Forum Shopping: The Court found no forum shopping, noting that the issues in the
different cases did not overlap significantly. The specific performance case involved
offsetting expenses against unpaid rentals, while the interpleader case concerned the
rightful lessor, distinct from the physical possession issue in the ejectment case.
 Entitlement to Possession and Unpaid Rentals: The Court determined that Intramuros
is entitled to possess the leased premises as the lease contracts had expired, and Offshore
 Construction's possession was tolerated. However, the matter of unpaid rentals should be
addressed by the Regional Trial Court to prevent unjust enrichment.
RULE 43
Case Title: Edgar R. Erice vs. Judge Dionisio C. Sison
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
Edgar R. Erice, Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Dionisio C. Sison of RTC Branch 125, Caloocan City. The complaint arose from charges Erice
lodged against Mayor Enrico R. Echiverri and other city officials for alleged violations of the
Government Service Insurance System Act. On July 18, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman
issued a Preventive Suspension Order against Echiverri and his co-respondents. The Court of
Appeals initially granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction but later affirmed the suspension on January 2, 2012. On January 9, 2012, Echiverri
and others filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Caloocan City, seeking a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. RTC Executive Judge Eleanor R. Kwong issued a 72-hour
ex-parte TRO; however, after being re-raffled, the case landed with Judge Sison. Despite
objections from Erice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), Judge
Sison extended the TRO and issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman's
suspension order. Consequently, Judge Sison faced allegations of gross misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended finding Judge Sison guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
proposed a fine equivalent to one month's salary. The Supreme Court concurred but adjusted the
penalty to a fine of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), to be deducted from Judge Sison's
terminal leave benefits.
Issues:
1. Did Judge Dionisio C. Sison act with gross ignorance of the law by issuing a TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Ombudsman's Order of
Suspension?
2. Was there a violation of due process in the proceedings conducted by Judge Sison?
Ruling:
Yes, Judge Dionisio C. Sison was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The court did not
specifically address the due process violation in its final ruling but focused on the gross
ignorance of the law.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court determined that Judge Sison's issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction against the Ombudsman's suspension order demonstrated gross ignorance of the law.
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 precludes courts from issuing writs of injunction to delay
Ombudsman investigations unless there is prima facie evidence that the matter is outside the
Ombudsman's jurisdiction. The RTC lacks jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the
Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases, which are appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The principle of judicial stability or non-interference
dictates that decisions of certain administrative bodies like the Ombudsman are beyond RTC
control. Court orders or decisions cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Given Judge Sison's second offense and his retirement, the Court
imposed the maximum fine of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), deducted from his terminal
leave benefits.
Case Title: Sherwin T. Gatchalian vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Field Investigation
Office of the Office of the Ombudsman
Date of Joint Resolution by Ombudsman: March 16, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Sherwin T. Gatchalian faced charges for violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), malversation of public funds, and violations of
Section X126.2(c)(1) and (2) of the Manual of Regulations for Banks (MORB) in relation to
Sections 36 and 37 of Republic Act No. 7653. The context involved the sale of shares in Express
Savings Bank, Inc. (ESBI) to the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) in 2009.
Investigations revealed that stockholders, including Gatchalian, profited from the sale despite
ESBI's poor financial condition, indicating a conspiracy among LWUA and ESBI officers and
stockholders. Gatchalian's motion for reconsideration was denied on April 4, 2016. He
subsequently filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA), which
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Gatchalian then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Primary Query: Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 for lack of jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirmed the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated September 13, 2016, and January 13, 2017. The CA's dismissal of
Gatchalian's petition for lack of jurisdiction was upheld.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court established that decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases are
unappealable and can only be challenged through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
Supreme Court. Citing cases such as Fabian vs. Desierto, Kuizon v. Desierto, and Estrada v.
Desierto, the Court noted that Gatchalian's reliance on Morales v. Court of Appeals was
misplaced, as it pertains only to administrative cases. The principle of stare decisis emphasizes
that established legal principles should be adhered to in similar cases. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the CA did not err in dismissing Gatchalian's petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Case Title: St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No.: 130866
Date: September 16, 1998
Facts:
Bienvenido Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against St. Martin Funeral Home
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III,
in San Fernando, Pampanga. Aricayos alleged he had been employed as the Operations Manager
since February 6, 1995, without a formal contract or inclusion in the payroll. He claimed he was
dismissed on January 22, 1996, for allegedly misappropriating P38,000 intended for the funeral
home's VAT payment to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). St. Martin Funeral Home
countered that Aricayos was not an employee but merely the uncle of the owner, Amelita
Malabed, who had helped out of gratitude for previous financial assistance. The labor arbiter
ruled in favor of St. Martin Funeral Home, stating that no employer-employee relationship
existed, thus lacking jurisdiction. Aricayos appealed, and the NLRC set aside the labor arbiter's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. St. Martin Funeral Home's motion for
reconsideration was denied, leading to the present petition alleging grave abuse of discretion by
the NLRC.
Issues:
1. Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the labor arbiter's
decision and remanding the case for further proceedings?
2. What is the proper mode of judicial review for decisions of the NLRC?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the illegal dismissal case but remanded the
petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. It ruled that
the proper mode of judicial review for NLRC decisions is through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to be initially filed in the Court of Appeals.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court highlighted the need to reexamine the judicial review mode for NLRC
decisions due to the rising number of labor disputes and legislative changes over the years.
Historically, NLRC decisions were not subject to appellate review, but judicial scrutiny via
certiorari was permitted to ensure that administrative agencies acted within their jurisdiction and
protected substantial rights. The Court noted that the legislative intent behind amendments to
B.P. No. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) and R.A. No. 7902 was to reduce the
Supreme Court's workload by transferring the review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals.
The Court clarified that references to "appeals" from the NLRC to the Supreme Court in the
amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 should be interpreted as petitions for certiorari under Rule 65,
aligning with legislative intent to ensure an intermediate appellate review by the Court of
Appeals, facilitating quicker resolutions of labor cases while adhering to the hierarchy of courts.
Case Title: Gonzalez v. Alcaraz
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
On August 11, 2000, a road rage incident occurred between Ramon C. Gonzalez, a 61-year-old
driver, and Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz, a Customs Collector. The altercation took place on the South-
Luzon Expressway near the Sucat toll gate when Alcaraz, armed with a .38 caliber pistol,
swerved into Gonzalez's lane, prompting Gonzalez to swerve to avoid a collision. Gonzalez
chased Alcaraz and confronted him, allegedly throwing coins at his vehicle. In response, Alcaraz
fired his gun twice at Gonzalez's car, striking the vehicle but not Gonzalez. PNCC guards
intercepted Alcaraz and confiscated his firearm. Subsequently, Gonzalez filed a criminal
complaint for attempted homicide against Alcaraz. After investigation, the City Prosecutor filed
an Information for attempted homicide; however, Alcaraz claimed self-defense, stating that
Gonzalez had provoked him and that he intended only to scare Gonzalez. The Secretary of
Justice ordered the withdrawal of the Information, citing insufficient evidence of intent to kill.
Gonzalez filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the
Secretary of Justice's decision. Alcaraz then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review the resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in determining the existence of probable cause and
substituting its judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice?
3. Did Gonzalez have the legal standing to file the petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in determining the existence of probable
cause and substituting its judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice. Additionally, the Supreme
Court found that Gonzalez did not have the legal standing to file the petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is an executive function, not a judicial one. The decision to dismiss or pursue a
criminal complaint lies within the discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice. The proper remedy for challenging the Secretary of Justice's resolution is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, rather than a petition for review under Rule 43.
The Court of Appeals erred in entertaining Gonzalez's petition for review and substituting its
judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice. As a private complainant, Gonzalez lacked the legal
standing to file the petition for review; only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
possesses such standing. Consequently, the Supreme Court nullified the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals, reinstating the Secretary of Justice's order to withdraw the Information
for attempted homicide against Alcaraz.
Case Title: Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc. v. Ross Systems International, Inc.
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
The dispute arose between Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc. (GMCLI) and Ross Systems
International, Inc. (RSII) concerning a construction contract for a hospital in Cabuyao, Laguna,
valued at P248,500,000.00. The contract stipulated a 15% down payment and monthly
installments based on work completion, including an arbitration clause for disputes. On April 12,
2015, RSII submitted Progress Billing No. 15, asserting 79.31% completion, while GMCLI
estimated only 78.84%. GMCLI later realized it had not withheld the 2% Creditable Withholding
Tax (CWT) on previous billings (Nos. 1 to 14) and opted to withhold the cumulative 2% CWT
from Progress Billing No. 15. RSII demanded the release of P4,884,778.92, arguing that
GMCLI's withholding of the CWT on previous billings was unjustified. The Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) ruled in favor of GMCLI. RSII appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA), which partially granted the appeal and modified the CIAC's award. Both
parties subsequently filed petitions for review with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Is RSII entitled to the release of P3,815,996.50, representing the 2% CWT on Progress
Billing Nos. 1 to 14, in addition to the award of P1,088,214.83?
2. Can GMCLI be ordered to issue BIR Form 2307 to RSII?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, reversing the CA's decision regarding RSII's
entitlement to P1,088,214.83 and reinstating the CIAC's Final Award. The Court also ordered
GMCLI to provide RSII with the pertinent BIR Form 2307.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court clarified the proper mode of appeal for CIAC awards, highlighting the
limited scope of judicial review. Appeals from CIAC awards should be filed directly with the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 for questions of law. For factual issues, appeals may be made to
the CA under Rule 65, but only on grounds that challenge the integrity of the arbitral tribunal or
allege violations of the Constitution or positive law. The Court determined that GMCLI was not
authorized to withhold the 2% CWT on cumulative billings retroactively. It upheld CIAC's
decision that RSII was not entitled to the release of the withheld amount but emphasized the
necessity of issuing BIR Form 2307 to RSII to enable the claim of tax credits.
Case Title: Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
The petitioners are the Career Executive Service Board (CESB), represented by Chairperson
Bernardo P. Abesamis, Executive Director Ma. Anthonette Velasco-Allones, and Deputy
Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica. The respondents are the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), represented by Chairman Francisco T. Duque III and Blesilda V. Lodevico. Lodevico was
appointed by then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on May 14, 2008, as Director III of the
Recruitment and Career Development Service of CESB, holding Career Service Executive
Eligibility since November 29, 2001. On June 30, 2010, the Office of the President issued
Memorandum Circular No. 1 (MC 1), declaring all non-Career Executive Service positions
vacant and extending services of contractual employees whose contracts expired on that date.
This was followed by Implementing Guidelines on July 16, 2010, and Memorandum Circular
No. 2 (MC 2) on July 29, 2010, extending the terms of non-CESO occupying CES positions until
October 31, 2010. Acting on these circulars, Abesamis notified Lodevico that her service would
end on July 31, 2010. Lodevico appealed this decision to the CSC, which ruled in her favor on
January 31, 2011, declaring her termination null and void, reinstating her with back salaries and
benefits. The CESB filed an Omnibus Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration, which
the CSC denied on April 7, 2011. The CESB then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65.
Issues:
1. Was the dismissal of Blesilda V. Lodevico as Director III, Recruitment and Career
Development Services from the CESB proper?
2. Did the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction to hear and decide Lodevico's
appeal?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) and overturned
the Civil Service Commission's (CSC) decision. The Court held that Lodevico's dismissal was
proper and that the CSC did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide her appeal.
Ratio:
The Court first addressed the procedural issue, stating that the appropriate mode of appeal should
have been a petition for review under Rule 43, not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65. However, the Court permitted a liberal application of procedural rules to serve the
broader interests of justice. Substantively, the Court examined the jurisdiction of the CSC and the
nature of Lodevico's appointment. While the CSC has the authority to decide on civil service
matters, the CESB, although administratively attached to the CSC, has autonomy in governing
the Career Executive Service (CES). The Court found Lodevico's appointment as Director III
was not permanent, as she had not been appointed to a CES rank by the President despite holding
CES eligibility. Therefore, her appointment was temporary, serving at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. Consequently, her removal under MC Nos. 1 and 2 was valid, and the Court
concluded that Lodevico's temporary appointment did not grant her security of tenure, rendering
her termination proper.
RULE 45
Case Title: Mackay v. Angeles
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
Petitioner Arturo G. Mackay filed a case against respondents Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles and
Antonio G. Mackay regarding the intestate estate of Eufrocina G. Mackay. Arturo was appointed
as the regular administrator of the estate on March 20, 1996, but failed to submit an inventory of
the estate's assets and liabilities and did not pay the due taxes within 24 months of his
appointment. On March 10, 1998, Antonio filed an urgent motion to remove Arturo as the
administrator. Despite receiving notices, Arturo did not attend the hearings. On July 15, 1998,
Judge Angeles relieved Arturo of his duties and appointed Antonio as the substitute
administrator, conditional on a P20,000 bond. Arturo's motion for reconsideration was denied on
August 28, 1998. After receiving the order on September 7, 1998, Arturo filed a notice of appeal
on September 29, 1998. Meanwhile, the trial court issued letters of administration to Antonio on
September 24, 1998. Arturo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, which was denied on April 14, 2000, along with his motion for reconsideration on July
26, 2000. Arturo subsequently filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion by ordering Antonio's immediate
assumption as administrator before the appeal was perfected?
2. Was the issuance of letters of administration to Antonio premature and in violation of the
appeal period in special proceedings?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in resolving issues meant for an ordinary appeal that were
not raised in the certiorari petition?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Arturo's petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decisions dated April 14, 2000, and July 26, 2000.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not exhibit grave abuse of discretion in
allowing Antonio to assume the role of administrator before the appeal was perfected. Citing De
Borja v. Tan, the Court acknowledged that discretionary execution may be permitted in special
circumstances. The Court of Appeals supported the trial court's discretionary execution due to the
lack of an administrator for the estate and the undue delay in its settlement. The Supreme Court
reiterated that trial courts have a duty to expedite estate settlements and that the Rules of Court
authorize execution pending appeal. Regarding the third issue, the Court clarified that only legal
errors could be raised in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45, emphasizing that the remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and cannot be used alternatively or successively.
Arturo's claim of grave abuse of discretion fell outside the scope of certiorari appeals and
received minimal consideration.
Case Title: City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
The City of Manila, represented by Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. and City Treasurer Liberty M.
Toledo, filed a case against Hon. Caridad H. Grecia-Cuerdo, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch
112, Pasay City, along with several corporations, including SM Mart, Inc. and Watson Personal
Care Stores Phils., Inc. The dispute arose from the City of Manila's assessment of local business
taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002, totaling P19,316,458.77, which the
respondents paid under protest. On January 24, 2004, the respondents filed a complaint with the
RTC of Pasay City for a refund of the allegedly illegally collected taxes, seeking a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC granted the preliminary
injunction on July 9, 2004, prompting the petitioners to contest the decision, which was
subsequently denied. The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA) had jurisdiction. The CA's decision was upheld upon reconsideration,
leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction?
2. Did the Regional Trial Court gravely abuse its discretion in issuing a writ of injunction
against the petitioners?
3. Did the Regional Trial Court err in issuing the writ of injunction despite the respondents'
failure to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of Manila?
 4. Did the Regional Trial Court err in issuing the writ of injunction considering the
petitioners are mere collecting agents of the City Government?
5. Did the Regional Trial Court err in issuing the writ of injunction as it would result in
greater damage and prejudice to the City of Manila and its constituents?
Ruling:
Answer: The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the CA's dismissal of the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Legal Basis: The Court found that the issues raised had become moot and academic due to the
final decision of the RTC granting the tax refund, which had already become final and executory.
Additionally, the Court clarified that the CTA has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in local
tax cases.
Application: The Court emphasized that when issues are moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, making the resolution of such issues of no practical use. It ruled that the
CTA has jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari challenging interlocutory orders
issued by the RTC in local tax cases, based on the expanded jurisdiction of the CTA under
Republic Act No. 9282.
Conclusion: The authority to issue writs of certiorari is essential for preventing split-jurisdiction,
which is detrimental to the orderly administration of justice, concluding that the CTA's
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is implied from its appellate jurisdiction.
Case Title: Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
The case involves Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) and Simon Enterprises, Inc. (Simon) concerning
alleged shortages in soybean meal shipments. On October 25, 1995, 6,843.700 metric tons of
soybean meal were loaded onto the M/V "Sea Dream" for delivery to Simon. Upon arrival,
Simon claimed to have received only 6,825.144 metric tons, indicating a shortage of 18.556
metric tons. A subsequent shipment on November 25, 1995, of 3,300.000 metric tons loaded onto
the M/V "Tern" also resulted in a claimed shortage of 199.863 metric tons. Simon's claim for
damages was denied, leading to a lawsuit filed on December 3, 1996, against the unknown vessel
owners, their local agent Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and ATI. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ruled in favor of Simon, holding ATI and co-defendants solidarily liable for the shortages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision, except for the attorney's fees. ATI then filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Did Simon prove the actual loss/shortage in the shipments?
2. Are the stipulations in the bill of lading, stating the cargo's weight, quantity, and quality
were "unknown," contrary to public policy?
 3. Could the shortage be due to the inherent nature of the shipment and its insufficient
packing?
4. Did Simon substantiate its claim for damages with competent evidence?
5. Was there fault or negligence on the part of ATI?
6. Is ATI entitled to its counterclaim for attorney's fees?
Ruling:
Answer: The Supreme Court granted ATI's petition for review on certiorari, reversed and set
aside the CA's decision, and dismissed the complaint against ATI.
Legal Basis: The ruling was based on the failure of Simon to prove the actual weight of the
shipment at the port of origin, which is necessary to establish an alleged shortage. The Court also
referenced the stipulation in the bill of lading that the cargo was carried on a "shipper's weight,
quantity and quality unknown," meaning that the carrier was not privy to the actual weight,
rendering the weight indicated in the bill of lading inconclusive.
Application: The Proforma Invoice and Packing List were deemed insufficient evidence for the
actual shipment weight. The Court noted that the alleged shortage might result from the inherent
nature of soybean meal, which can lose weight due to moisture content changes during transit.
Furthermore, the minimal alleged shortage of 6.05% was within the allowable 10% variance.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court found no evidence of negligence on ATI's part, determined that
Simon's claims were unsubstantiated, and held that ATI was not liable for the alleged shortage.
The Court underscored the importance of following the Rules of Court regarding the burden of
proof in establishing claims in civil cases.
Case Title: Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc. v. Ross Systems International, Inc.
G.R. No.: [Not provided]
Date: [Not provided]
Facts:
The case involves a dispute between Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc. (GMCLI) and Ross
Systems International, Inc. (RSII) over a construction contract for a hospital in Cabuyao,
Laguna, valued at P248,500,000.00. The contract stipulated a 15% down payment and monthly
installments based on work completion, including an arbitration clause for dispute resolution. On
April 12, 2015, RSII submitted Progress Billing No. 15, claiming 79.31% project completion,
while GMCLI estimated it at 78.84%. GMCLI realized it had not withheld the 2% Creditable
Withholding Tax (CWT) on previous billings (Nos. 1 to 14) and decided to withhold the
cumulative 2% CWT from Progress Billing No. 15. RSII demanded the release of
P4,884,778.92, arguing that GMCLI should not have withheld the CWT from earlier billings.
The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) ruled in favor of GMCLI. RSII
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which partially granted the appeal and modified the
CIAC's award. Both parties then filed petitions for review with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Is RSII entitled to the release of P3,815,996.50, equivalent to the 2% CWT on Progress
Billing Nos. 1 to 14, in addition to the award of P1,088,214.83?
2. May GMCLI be ordered to issue BIR Form 2307 to RSII?
Ruling:
Answer: The Supreme Court partially granted RSII's petition, reversing the CA's decision
regarding RSII's entitlement to P1,088,214.83 and reinstating the CIAC's Final Award.
Legal Basis: The Court clarified that appeals from CIAC awards should be filed directly with the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 for questions of law. It also noted that appeals regarding factual
issues could be filed with the CA under Rule 65 but only under specific circumstances that
challenge the integrity of the arbitral tribunal or allege violations of constitutional or legal
provisions.
Application: The Supreme Court found that GMCLI was not authorized to withhold the 2%
CWT from cumulative billings belatedly. The Court upheld the CIAC's decision that RSII was
entitled to the previously withheld amount and emphasized the need for GMCLI to issue BIR
Form 2307, which would enable RSII to claim tax credits.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court's ruling underscored the importance of proper adherence to
procedural rules regarding appeals and the issuance of tax documents, reinforcing that
withholding tax obligations must be appropriately managed within contractual agreements.
RULE 48-55
Case Digest: G.R. No. 204621 (Alma C. Dangdang-David v. Arnie Cantilla Alba)
Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Norma Alba filed an Action for Recovery of Ownership against Alma
Dangdang-David, claiming ownership of Lot No. 278. Alma countered with a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer against Arnie Alba, daughter of the Spouses, claiming ownership based on a
title issued to her. Arnie opposed, asserting the title was forged, and the MTCC suspended the
unlawful detainer case pending the outcome of the ownership dispute in the RTC. Alma's Petition
for Certiorari to the RTC was dismissed, leading to a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the MTCC gravely abuse its discretion in suspending the unlawful detainer case pending the
resolution of the ownership dispute?
Ruling:
Answer: The Supreme Court granted Alma's petition, reversing the lower court's dismissal of the
unlawful detainer case.
Legal Basis: The Court cited Rule 65 for petitions for certiorari, stating that the unlawful
detainer case is independent of ownership claims, as ownership does not affect possession issues
in ejectment cases.
Application: The Supreme Court noted that the MTCC should not have suspended the case
based solely on the pendency of another action. It emphasized that raising ownership claims does
not suspend unlawful detainer proceedings, which are designed to quickly resolve possession
issues.
Conclusion: The MTCC's suspension of the unlawful detainer case was improper; thus, the case
must proceed without awaiting the outcome of the ownership dispute.
Case Digest: [Case Citation Not Provided] (Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King
& Sons, Inc. v. Spouses Gerry Ong and Elizabeth Ong)
Facts:
This case involves a dispute over three parcels of land in Mandaue City, covered by TCT Nos.
36466, 36467, and 36468. Petitioners Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King & Sons, Inc.
acquired the properties from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty on March 23, 1995. Mandaue Prime
Estate Realty had obtained these properties from respondents, Spouses Gerry and Elizabeth Ong,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 14, 1994. Respondents sought to annul the deed and
subsequent transfers in a complaint filed on February 13, 1995, which remained pending. On
January 26, 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel requested respondents to vacate the lots, but they
refused, prompting petitioners to file an ejectment complaint. The MTC ruled in favor of
petitioners, and the RTC affirmed this decision. Respondents filed a notice of appeal and a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC granted immediate execution pending
appeal. Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction with the Court of
Appeals, which ruled that the MTC lacked jurisdiction, leading petitioners to seek review by the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Did the RTC decision become final and executory at the time the petition for review was
filed?
2. Did the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly
cognizable by the MTC?
3. Are petitioners, as registered owners, entitled to possession of the subject premises?
Ruling:
Answer: The Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The RTC decision had not become final and executory at the time the petition for review
was filed.
2. The allegations in the complaint constituted a case for unlawful detainer properly
cognizable by the MTC.
3. Petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to possession of the subject premises.
Legal Basis:
The Court clarified that the period for filing the petition for review was tolled by the timely filing
of the motion for reconsideration. It emphasized that an unlawful detainer case can exist without
a rigid requirement of an express or implied contract. The MTC’s jurisdiction was affirmed based
on the unlawful withholding of possession despite the respondents' claims of ownership.
Application:
The Court found that the complaint's allegations of unlawful withholding of possession sufficed
to vest jurisdiction in the MTC. The ownership issue was not essential in the unlawful detainer
case, as it primarily concerns the right to physical possession. The pending action to annul the
deed of sale did not abate the ejectment case, nor did it oust the MTC's jurisdiction.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that both the MTC and RTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over
the ejectment case, reinstating the MTC's decision and affirming that petitioners were entitled to
possession of the subject premises.
Key Notes:
 Jurisdiction over unlawful detainer cases remains intact despite ownership claims.
 The presence of a pending ownership dispute does not abate ejectment proceedings.
 The motion for reconsideration timely filed can toll the period for appeal.
Case Digest: Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Manuel
Bolaños
Facts:
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a petition against the Court of Appeals (CA) and
the heirs of Manuel Bolaños concerning the valuation of a 71.4715-hectare land under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). LBP initially valued the property at
P1,620,750.72, which the private respondents rejected. Despite this, LBP deposited the amount,
and farmer-beneficiaries received land ownership certificates in March 1996. The private
respondents later filed for just compensation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga
City, which, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), ordered LBP to re-value the property,
resulting in a new valuation of P1,803,904.76 upheld by the SAC on May 14, 2013. The private
respondents filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41, which the SAC accepted. LBP moved to
dismiss, arguing the wrong mode of appeal was used. The CA denied this motion, leading LBP to
petition the Supreme Court after a denial of reconsideration.
Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion by allowing the use of an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41 instead of a petition for review under Rule 42?
2. Should the SAC's decision be deemed final and executory due to the private respondents'
failure to use the correct mode of appeal?
Ruling:
1. Yes, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion.
2. Yes, the SAC's decision is final and executory due to the incorrect mode of appeal.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled that the proper mode of appeal from decisions of RTCs acting as
Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) is through a petition for review under Rule 42, as mandated by
Section 60 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657. This procedural requirement aims to expedite just
compensation cases. The Court referenced prior cases to reinforce this necessity. It concluded
that the private respondents' notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period, rendering the
SAC's decision final. The Court emphasized that while procedural rules may allow for leniency,
the respondents failed to provide justifiable reasons for their non-compliance. Merely citing
"substantial justice" does not suffice to overlook procedural requirements. Thus, the CA's
leniency was inappropriate, and the SAC's decision was affirmed as final and executory.
Case Digest: Mary Louise R. Anderson v. Enrique Ho
Facts: Petitioner Mary Louise R. Anderson filed a complaint against respondent Enrique Ho on
June 5, 2003, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Anderson claimed
that Ho occupied her property on Roosevelt Avenue through her tolerance and ignored her
demand to vacate. Ho defended his occupation as part of his compensation for managing
Anderson's affairs, supported by a written document dated January 14, 1999. The MeTC
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action, giving weight to the document. The RTC also
dismissed the complaint without prejudice, pending the document's authenticity determination.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Anderson's petition for review due to a defective
certification against forum shopping, which was signed by her counsel without proper authority.
Anderson's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Did the CA err in dismissing Anderson's petition for review due to a defective
certification against forum shopping?
2. Are there justifiable reasons to relax the rule on certification against forum shopping in
this case?
Ruling:
1. Answer: The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari. Legal Basis:
The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by the petitioner
unless a special power of attorney (SPA) is executed, as established in procedural rules.
Application: Anderson had 45 days to comply but failed to provide a proper certification.
Her later submission of an SPA and explanation for the delay did not fulfill substantial
compliance, and her health condition claims lacked supporting evidence. Conclusion:
 The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's dismissal of Anderson's petition for review,
emphasizing that procedural rules are crucial for orderly and speedy justice.
2. Answer: The CA's dismissal of Anderson's petition for review was affirmed. Legal
Basis: Procedural rules require strict compliance, particularly concerning certifications
against forum shopping. Application: Anderson's failure to provide a medical certificate
and the delay in submitting the SPA indicated insufficient efforts to comply with
procedural rules. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision, reiterating
the importance of procedural compliance in the justice system.
Facts: In 1998, Intramuros Administration (Intramuros) leased three properties to Offshore
Construction Development Company (Offshore Construction), with lease terms from September
1, 1998, to August 31, 2003. The leases referenced an August 20, 1998 memorandum allowing
renewals every five years upon mutual agreement. Offshore Construction made improvements to
the properties, but work was halted due to non-compliance with architectural requirements. In
1999, Offshore Construction filed a complaint against Intramuros and the Department of
Tourism, resulting in a Compromise Agreement that affirmed the validity of two lease contracts
and terminated the third. Despite this, Offshore Construction accrued arrears of P6,762,153.70 by
July 31, 2004, due to unpaid utility bills and rental fees. A Memorandum of Agreement was
executed in 2004 to settle these arrears, but by December 31, 2009, the arrears had increased to
P13,448,867.45. Intramuros filed an ejectment complaint in 2010, which was dismissed by the
Metropolitan Trial Court for forum shopping and lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court
upheld this dismissal, prompting Intramuros to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Was direct resort to the Supreme Court proper?
2. Did the Metropolitan Trial Court have jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint?
3. Did Intramuros Administration commit forum shopping?
4. Is Intramuros Administration entitled to possess the leased premises and collect unpaid
rentals?
Ruling:
1. Answer: Direct resort to the Supreme Court was proper. Legal Basis: Exceptions to the
principle of hierarchy of courts allow direct access under exigent circumstances.
Application: Given the prolonged dispute and the summary nature of ejectment
proceedings, direct resort to the Supreme Court was justified. Conclusion: The Supreme
Court allowed direct access due to the circumstances of the case.
2. Answer: The Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint.
Legal Basis: Ejectment proceedings focus on physical possession, and jurisdiction lies
with the Metropolitan Trial Court. Application: The allegations, including the existence
of lease contracts and demand to vacate, were sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
 Conclusion: The dismissal based on complexity was erroneous, affirming the Court's
jurisdiction.
3. Answer: Intramuros Administration did not commit forum shopping. Legal Basis:
Forum shopping occurs when there is identity in the asserted rights or reliefs.
Application: The specific performance and interpleader cases involved distinct issues
from the ejectment case regarding physical possession. Conclusion: The Supreme Court
found no forum shopping in this instance.
4. Answer: Intramuros Administration is entitled to possess the leased premises. Legal
Basis: The lease contracts had expired, and Offshore Construction's continued possession
was tolerated. Application: However, the issue of unpaid rentals should be resolved by
the Regional Trial Court to avoid unjust enrichment since it was part of a counterclaim in
a pending specific performance case. Conclusion: Intramuros is entitled to possession,
but the matter of unpaid rentals requires resolution by the Regional Trial Court.
RULE 50
Facts: The case involves the Heirs of Arturo Garcia I, who substituted the Heirs of Melecio
Bueno as petitioners against the Municipality of Iba, Zambales. Melecio R. Bueno, a tenant-
farmer beneficiary of agricultural land in Poblacion, Iba, Zambales, filed an ejectment suit
against the Municipality in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Iba on October 18, 1999. Bueno
claimed that the Municipality constructed a public market on his land in 1983 without consent
and refused to vacate the property despite repeated demands. The MTC ruled in favor of Bueno,
but the Municipality's notice of appeal was denied. The Municipality then filed a petition for
certiorari in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, which was granted.
After Bueno's death, the petitioners substituted him and moved for reconsideration, which the
RTC denied. The petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) via petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, but the CA dismissed the petition on October 28, 2003, for
not being the proper mode of appeal, and denied their motion for reconsideration on February 10,
2004.
Issue:
1. Did the petitioners use the correct mode of appeal in challenging the RTC's decision?
2. Should the Court exercise its equity jurisdiction to allow the petitioners' appeal despite
the procedural error?
Ruling:
1. Answer: No, the petitioners did not use the correct mode of appeal. Legal Basis: Section
2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Application: The petitioners should have known the
different modes of appeal; they incorrectly filed a petition for review under Rule 42 when
the RTC had exercised its original jurisdiction. Conclusion: The CA's dismissal was
upheld as the petitioners failed to follow the proper procedure.
 2. Answer: No, the Court should not exercise its equity jurisdiction to allow the petitioners'
appeal despite the procedural error. Legal Basis: Appeal is a statutory privilege, not a
right. Application: The Court rejected the petitioners' request for liberality, noting that
their failure to comply with procedural requirements forfeited their privilege to appeal.
There was no compelling reason provided to relax the rules. Conclusion: The Supreme
Court affirmed the CA's resolutions and ordered the petitioners to pay the costs of the
suit.
RULE 47
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Region IV-B, filed a case against Spouses Florencio and Romelia De Castro. Free
Patent No. V-16555 for Lot No. 6742 in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, was issued to Marcelino
Manipon on July 13, 1955. The Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2124 to Manipon on March 5, 1957. Manipon later sold the lot
to the respondents, who obtained Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33730 after the
cancellation of OCT No. P-2124. An investigation revealed that the lot was part of the Paitan
Mangyan Reservation, designated as non-alienable and disposable public land by Proclamation
No. 809 on June 4, 1935. Although Manipon occupied the lot starting in 1944, neither he nor the
respondents had a legitimate right to possess or own it. In 1998, the Republic filed a complaint
for the cancellation of TCT No. T-33730 and the reversion of the lot to the State (Civil Case No.
R-4694). The respondents were declared in default for failing to file an answer, and their motion
to lift the default was denied. On October 9, 2002, the RTC nullified Manipon's Free Patent and
the respondents' TCT, ordered reversion to the State, and directed the respondents to vacate the
lot. The decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration or appeal was
filed. A writ of execution was issued on April 29, 2004, served on March 29, 2005, and
implemented on July 20, 2006. On March 15, 2007, the respondents filed a petition for
annulment of judgment, claiming lack of jurisdiction and non-receipt of the decision copy. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition but nullified the execution order due to non-service of the
decision copy. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over Marcelino Manipon, who was deceased when
the complaint was filed?
2. Did the trial court's decision attain finality despite respondents' claim of non-receipt of
the decision?
3. Were respondents justified in filing a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47?
Ruling:
1. Answer: Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case despite Manipon's death.
Legal Basis: The current titleholders (respondents) were properly served with the
complaint. Application: The trial court's jurisdiction was upheld as it was the
 respondents, not Manipon, who were the active parties in the case. Conclusion:
Jurisdiction was established even after Manipon's death.
2. Answer: Yes, the trial court's decision attained finality as the respondents failed to avail
themselves of the ordinary remedies. Legal Basis: Finality of decisions based on non-
action of the parties. Application: The respondents did not file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal, which rendered the decision final and executory. Conclusion:
The trial court's decision became final due to the respondents' inaction.
3. Answer: No, the respondents were not justified in filing a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47. Legal Basis: Rule 47 is an exceptional remedy for situations
where ordinary remedies are unavailable through no fault of the petitioner. Application:
The respondents had the opportunity to file a motion to quash the writ of execution or a
petition for relief from judgment but failed to act. Conclusion: The respondents'
negligence precluded them from seeking annulment of judgment, leading the Supreme
Court to reinstate the trial court's execution order and related proceedings.
Facts: Spouses Marcelo G. Flores and Medelyn Flores borrowed P3,000,000 from Spouses
Leopoldo A. Estrellado and Enriqueta Estrellado in December 2005, with a monthly interest rate
of 3.5%. In June 2006, the Floreses took a second loan of P2,500,000, secured by a mortgage on
their residential property in Alaminos, Laguna. Despite an agreement to defer interest payments,
the Estrellados demanded payment and subsequently foreclosed the property. The Floreses hired
Atty. Bede Tabalingcos to nullify the loan documents and foreclosure proceedings. However,
Tabalingcos was disbarred in 2012 but continued to represent the Floreses using the credentials
of other lawyers, including Atty. Cres Dan D. Bangoy and Atty. Raymond Caraos. The trial court
dismissed the Floreses' complaint in December 2013. Subsequent appeals were mishandled by
Tabalingcos and Atty. Socrates Rivera, who was later found to be suspended from practice. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the Floreses' petition for annulment of judgment, citing their
negligence. The Floreses then sought relief from the Supreme Court, arguing that they were
denied due process due to the fraudulent actions of their counsels.
Issue:
1. Were the petitioners, Spouses Flores, deprived of their right to due process due to the
fraudulent actions of their counsels?
2. Should the trial court's judgment be annulled on the grounds of denial of due process and
extrinsic fraud?
Ruling:
1. Answer: Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Legal Basis: The right to counsel is absolute and
must be observed at all times. Application: The fraudulent actions of the disbarred
Tabalingcos and the suspended Rivera left the Floreses without proper legal
representation. Conclusion: The Floreses were deprived of their right to due process.
 2. Answer: Yes, the Court declared the trial court's judgment and all related issuances void.
Legal Basis: Fraudulent misrepresentations and actions by their counsels constituted a
denial of due process. Application: The fraudulent actions prevented the Floreses from
fully presenting their case, and they were not negligent as they had consistently followed
up on their case. Conclusion: The Court emphasized its duty to provide judicial aid to
parties deprived of their rights and annulled the trial court's judgment to ensure the
Floreses received a fair chance to litigate their case.
Facts: Spouses Nora and Edgar Alvarez (petitioners) filed a certiorari petition under Rule 65
against the Former 12th Division of the Court of Appeals, Spouses Alejandro and Rebecca
Domantay, and Presiding Judge Hermogenes C. Fernandez of RTC Branch 56. The conflict
originated when the Domantay spouses filed for consolidation of ownership over land under TCT
No. 128750, based on a Deed of Sale with the right to repurchase executed on April 14, 1983, by
former owners Spouses Nicanor Alvarez and Juanita de Guzman. Nora Alvarez was not served
with summons, leading to a default judgment in favor of the Domantay spouses. On December
18, 2007, the RTC consolidated ownership in favor of the Domantay spouses. The Alvarez
spouses filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on November 13, 2008, but found that an Entry of
Final Judgment had already been made. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment due to technical reasons, including missing documents and failure to use
ordinary remedies. The motion for reconsideration was denied despite the submission of the
required documents, prompting the petitioners to seek relief from the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the Petition for Annulment of
Judgment on technical grounds?
2. Is prior availment of ordinary remedies required when the ground for annulment is lack
of jurisdiction?
3. Did the CA err in denying the Motion for Reconsideration despite the submission of the
required documents?
Ruling:
1. Answer: Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition, overturning the CA's Resolutions
dated December 16, 2009, and April 21, 2010. Legal Basis: A Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is an independent remedy based on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, as per
Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Application: The CA dismissed the
petition on technical grounds without addressing the substantive jurisdiction issue, which
is critical. Conclusion: The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
2. Answer: Yes, the Supreme Court clarified that when annulment is based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioners are not required to show that ordinary remedies were unavailable
through no fault of their own. Legal Basis: This principle upholds the integrity of judicial
proceedings. Application: The excessive strictness of the CA in interpreting technical
 rules was not warranted in this context. Conclusion: A prima facie case for annulment of
judgment was established based on the allegations and supporting documents.
3. Answer: Yes, the Supreme Court found that the CA erred in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration despite the submission of the required documents. Legal Basis: The
allegations of lack of jurisdiction, if proven, would render the RTC's decision void.
Application: The CA’s dismissal of the motion without addressing the merits of the
jurisdictional issue was improper. Conclusion: The Supreme Court emphasized the need
for further proceedings by the CA to resolve the jurisdictional issue.
acts: Marylou R. Ancheta (petitioner) entered into a loan transaction with Mary Cambay
(respondent) on June 12, 2003, borrowing P25,000.00 with a 10% monthly interest rate,
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over land in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The property
was owned by Ancheta and her former common-law spouse, Ricardo Dionila. A Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) was allegedly executed by Ancheta and Dionila in favor of Vivian
Ancheta. On June 16, 2003, Ancheta took a second loan of P25,000.00, but Vivian failed to
settle the obligations. A complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage was filed on August
30, 2004, in the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao, with summons served only on Vivian and not on
Ancheta or Dionila. The RTC issued a default judgment on August 31, 2005, ordering
payment of P50,000.00 plus 24% annual interest. The property was auctioned and ownership
consolidated to Cambay. Ancheta filed a Petition for Relief on August 14, 2006, which was
dismissed on October 17, 2006. Subsequently, she filed a Petition for Annulment with the
Court of Appeals on February 29, 2008, which was dismissed on March 16, 2012, with a
Motion for Reconsideration denied on October 18, 2012. The case was then brought before
the Supreme Court for review.
Issue:
1. Whether a named defendant in a judicial foreclosure case who was not served with
summons may file an action for annulment of judgment rendered by default.
2. Whether a prior resort to a relief from judgment, albeit erroneously availed of, bars a
resort to the remedy of annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
1. Answer: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Marylou R. Ancheta. Legal Basis: A
named defendant who was not served with summons can file for annulment of judgment,
as they were not given the opportunity to defend themselves. Application: Ancheta's lack
of service on the summons means that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over her and Dionila.
Conclusion: The Court granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari, setting aside the
CA's decisions.
2. Answer: No, prior resort to relief from judgment does not bar a remedy of annulment of
judgment. Legal Basis: Lack of jurisdiction is a valid ground for annulment and can be
asserted at any time. Application: The earlier petition for relief, being erroneously
 availed of, does not negate Ancheta's right to seek annulment. Conclusion: The Court
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Key Notes:
 A judgment rendered without proper jurisdiction is void ab initio.
 The CA's dismissal based on technical grounds without addressing the substantive issue
of jurisdiction was incorrect.
 The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of proper service of summons to ensure
jurisdiction and the right to due process.
Facts:
Spouses Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas were charged with "other forms of
swindling" under Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for selling
mortgaged land to Conrado P. Avila without disclosing the encumbrance. The RTC of Makati
City convicted them on June 30, 1994, sentencing them to two months imprisonment and a
fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court denied their
petition for review, making the conviction final. A warrant of arrest was issued on April 19,
2001, leading to Carmelita's arrest. Francisco questioned the trial court's jurisdiction and
sought annulment of decisions, which was initially dismissed but reinstated. On September
29, 2009, the Supreme Court denied the annulment petition, affirming jurisdiction. Upon
motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court re-examined the case.
Issue:
Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the offense charged? Can the petitioners be
acquitted based on the prosecution's failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling (ALAC):
Answer: The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioners based on the prosecution's failure to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Legal Basis: Under the Rules of Court, the prosecution must prove every element of the
crime charged to secure a conviction.
Application: The essential element of damage to the offended party was lacking, as neither
the RTC nor the Court of Appeals established any evidence of damage to Avila. Despite the
petitioners' conviction, Avila retained possession and control of the land throughout the
proceedings, which undermined the claim of damage.
Conclusion: Consequently, the lack of proof of damage led to the conclusion that the crime
of estafa was not committed, justifying the acquittal of the petitioners.
Key Notes:
 The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish all elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
 Procedural lapses should not prevent the attainment of substantial justice, particularly in
cases affecting life and liberty.
 The petitioner, A.L. Ang Network, Inc., filed a complaint against Emma Mondejar and her
husband Efren Mondejar on March 23, 2011, in the MTCC of Bacolod City, Branch 4, for
unpaid water bills totaling P23,111.71 for the period from June 1, 2002, to September 30,
2005. The petitioner claimed authority to supply water and collect payments from
homeowners in Regent Pearl Subdivision. While the petitioner asserted that the respondents
consumed 1,150 cubic meters of water, resulting in a bill of P28,580.09, the respondents
contended they had been paying a flat rate of P75.00 per month. The MTCC ruled that the
petitioner could only charge the flat rate before receiving a Certificate of Public Convenience
(CPC) from the NWRB on August 7, 2003, ordering the respondents to pay P1,200.00 with
legal interest. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the RTC of
Bacolod City, Branch 45, which dismissed the petition due to improper remedy. The
petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the RTC err in dismissing the petitioner's recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the small claims case?
Ruling (ALAC):
Answer: The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the RTC's decision,
reinstating the case for proper resolution.
Legal Basis: Under the Rules of Court, certiorari is available to correct errors of jurisdiction,
not of judgment, especially when no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy exists.
Application: The Supreme Court clarified that while decisions in small claims cases are
generally final and unappealable, this does not preclude the filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The RTC improperly dismissed the petition on grounds of an improper
remedy, as the RTC has jurisdiction over certiorari petitions concerning first-level courts like
the MTCC.
Conclusion: Thus, the dismissal of the petition was erroneous, necessitating the case's
remand to the RTC for proper disposition.
Key Notes:
 Certiorari can be used to challenge decisions of first-level courts, even if they are
typically final in small claims cases.
 The doctrine of hierarchy of courts must be observed, allowing petitions to be filed in the
appropriate court.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
RULE 57

 Case Digest: Lourdes A. Valmonte vs. Rosita Dimalanta

 Facts:
Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are spouses residing in
Washington, U.S.A., with Alfredo being a member of the Philippine bar practicing law in
the Philippines. Rosita Dimalanta, Lourdes’ sister, filed a complaint for partition against
 them regarding a property in Manila. The complaint claimed that summons could be
served on Alfredo at his office in Manila. Lourdes, in a previous communication, directed
that all communications regarding the partition be sent to her husband. Summons was
served on Alfredo, who refused to accept it for Lourdes, stating he had no authority to do
so. The Regional Trial Court initially denied the motion to declare Lourdes in default, but
the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to this petition.
 Issue:
Whether the service of summons on Alfredo, Lourdes' husband and attorney, constitutes
valid service on Lourdes, a foreign resident.
 Ruling (ALAC):
Answer: The Supreme Court held that there was no valid service of summons on
Lourdes A. Valmonte.
Legal Basis: The action for partition is considered quasi in rem, requiring proper service
as per Rule 14, §17 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs service on nonresident
defendants.
Application: Service must be done in a manner specified by the rules, such as personal
service or publication with registered mail to the last known address. In this case, neither
method was followed, and there was no order from the court allowing for service on
Alfredo to be considered valid for Lourdes. Additionally, the Court emphasized the
importance of adhering to the procedural rules to ensure due process.
Conclusion: The Court nullified the appellate decision declaring Lourdes in default and
reaffirmed the necessity for proper service as stipulated by law.

Facts

Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. (petitioner) filed a complaint for recovery of money and damages
against Queensland Hotel or Motel (respondents) on May 2, 1989, along with an ex parte
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Judge Milagros C. Nartatez granted the
application on May 3, 1989, and set the attachment bond at P4,600,513.37. The writ of
attachment was issued on May 11, 1989, and served on the respondents on May 12, 1989,
leading to the seizure of their properties. Respondents filed a motion to discharge the attachment
on September 6, 1989, claiming that the RTC lacked jurisdiction when the attachment order was
issued, but the RTC denied this motion. The respondents subsequently appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which nullified the writ of preliminary attachment and related orders on May 4,
1990. Davao Light sought to reverse this decision in the Supreme Court.

Issue

Can a writ of preliminary attachment be issued ex parte against a defendant before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the defendant's person through service of summons or voluntary
submission?

Ruling (ALAC)

Answer: Yes, a writ of preliminary attachment can be issued ex parte before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the defendant's person.
Legal Basis: The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision and reinstated the RTC's order and
writ of attachment.
Application: The Court clarified that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment ex parte
does not necessitate prior jurisdiction over the defendant. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
obtained upon filing the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired through
service of summons. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows for the issuance of a writ at the
commencement of the action or thereafter, implying that the court can issue such a writ before
the defendant is summoned. The ex parte nature aims to prevent the defendant from evading
justice, and defendants still have the means to contest the attachment through posting a
counterbond or demonstrating improper issuance.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court held that the RTC acted within its authority in issuing the writ
and allowed the enforcement of the attachment.

Facts

The case involves a dispute over the sale of properties owned by siblings Sofia Torres,
Fructosa Torres, and Mario Torres in Barrio Lankaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. In 1997, Nicanor
Satsatin approached Agripina Aledia, the mother of the petitioners, to negotiate the sale of
their lands. Agripina authorized Nicanor through a Special Power of Attorney after
consulting her family. In 1999, Nicanor offered the properties to Solar Resources, Inc. for
P35,000,000.00. The petitioners claimed Nicanor was supposed to remit P28,000,000.00 but
only remitted P9,000,000.00, leaving a balance of P19,000,000.00. Despite repeated
demands, Nicanor failed to remit the balance. On October 25, 2002, the petitioners filed a
complaint for a sum of money and damages against Nicanor and his family in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas. They also filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Attachment, which the RTC granted, directing them to post a bond of P7,000,000.00.
The writ was implemented, but the respondents filed a Motion to Discharge it, which the
RTC denied. The respondents then petitioned the Court of Appeals (CA), which ruled in their
favor, lifting the writ due to improper enforcement and an insufficiently approved bond. The
petitioners brought the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering the lifting of the writ of attachment pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the writ of attachment despite the bond being insufficient and
improperly issued?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in not dismissing the petition due to estoppel, laches, and
prescription, and in holding that the writ of attachment was improperly enforced in
violation of Section 5, Rule 57?
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the principle of estoppel would not apply
against the respondents?

Ruling (ALAC)
Answer: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
Legal Basis: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly found grave abuse
of discretion by the trial court in approving the bond despite non-compliance with requisite
approval conditions. The bond issued by Western Guaranty Corporation was invalid for
acceptance by the RTC of Dasmariñas, as it was only valid for the RTCs of Makati, Pasay,
and Pasig. The writ of attachment was improperly enforced since the trial court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the respondents at the time of implementation, and the summons
must be served simultaneously or prior to the writ's execution. The subsequent service did
not remedy this defect.
Application: The Court ruled that the respondents were not barred by estoppel, laches, or
prescription from challenging the RTC's orders, as the grounds for lifting the writ stemmed
from irregularities in its issuance and service, rather than the petitioners' cause of action.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court concluded that the CA's decision to lift the writ of
attachment was justified due to the identified irregularities.

Key Notes

 A valid bond is a prerequisite for a writ of attachment; failure to meet this requirement
renders the writ invalid.
 Jurisdiction over the respondents must be established prior to enforcing a writ of
attachment.
 Estoppel, laches, or prescription cannot be used to bar a party from questioning
irregularities in court orders related to writs of attachment.

Case Digest: Cherry Joy S. Bigtas v. Sterling Bank of Asia

Facts:
The case involves Cherry Joy S. Bigtas (Cherry) contesting two orders from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) regarding the property previously owned by Spouses John and Jacqueline
Bigtas. After Sterling Bank of Asia (SBA) filed a complaint against the Bigtas, the RTC
issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment, leading to the levy of their property. Cherry later
claimed ownership based on a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between her and the Bigtas,
which was registered after the Notice of Levy. Despite filing motions to quash the Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale and asserting her property as her family home, the RTC denied her motions
due to procedural deficiencies and the property’s attachment status.

Issue:

1. Is Cherry's direct resort to the Court via the present Petition proper?
2. Did the RTC err in upholding the validity of the Writ of Execution (WOE) and the
subsequent Notice of Levy on the subject property?

Ruling (ALAC):
Answer: The Petition is denied.
Legal Basis: Cherry’s claim as a third-party claimant did not entitle her to appeal or seek
certiorari against the RTC's orders. Under Section 16, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules, she must
pursue either a terceria or an independent action to assert her ownership. The RTC correctly
denied her motions based on these procedural rules.
Application: The WOE was valid, as Cherry failed to demonstrate her claim as the family
home; exemptions under Article 153 of the Family Code do not extend to properties owned
by non-judgment obligors. Cherry’s title was subject to the Notice of Levy, given the timing
of her registration.
Conclusion: Cherry's direct appeal was improper, and the RTC acted within its authority to
deny her motions due to lack of merit.

Key Notes:

 Third-party claims are governed by specific remedies outlined in Rule 39, which Cherry
did not follow.
 The exemption for a family home from execution applies strictly to properties owned by
judgment obligors.
 Cherry’s failure to present evidence or comply with procedural requirements contributed
to the denial of her motions.

Case Digest: Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. v. Visayan Surety & Insurance
Corporation

Facts of the Case: On March 26, 1996, Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. (petitioner) entered
into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders, represented by Wilson G. Chua, for constructing a
garment factory in the Cavite Philippine Economic Zone Authority (CPEZA). The project
was completed on November 27, 1996. On January 26, 2004, Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc.
filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner and its
representatives before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Win Multi-Rich secured a
bond from Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety). The RTC issued a writ
of preliminary attachment, which the petitioner countered by issuing a check to the Clerk of
Court and filing an Omnibus Motion to discharge the attachment; this motion was denied.
Subsequently, Win Multi-Rich filed a motion to release the petitioner’s cash deposit, which
was granted by the RTC, and a surety bond was posted by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. (FESICO) for the withdrawal. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA), which annulled the RTC orders but did not order the
return of the garnished amount. The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 175048, ruled in favor of
the petitioner, ordering Win Multi-Rich to return the garnished amount with interest.
Following this, the petitioner moved for execution, but the RTC absolved the surety
respondents, leading to the present petition.

Issue/s:

1. Can the execution of the judgment against Visayan Surety and FESICO be allowed
without violating their right to due process?
2. Does allowing the execution against the two surety companies give full effect to the
terms of the judgment?
Ruling:

 Answer: The Supreme Court ruled that Visayan Surety cannot be held liable due to the
lack of due process, while FESICO can be held liable under its surety bond.
 Legal Basis: Under Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, an application for
damages against a surety bond must be filed before the judgment becomes final and
executory, with due notice to the surety. Section 17, Rule 57 further provides that a surety
on a counter-bond becomes liable for the payment of the judgment upon demand and
after notice and summary hearing.
 Application: Visayan Surety was not notified before the finality of the judgment, thus
violating its right to due process. In contrast, FESICO was given due notice and an
opportunity to be heard regarding its liability under the surety bond for the withdrawal of
the cash deposit.
 Conclusion: The Court ordered that Visayan Surety be absolved of liability, while
FESICO remains liable under its surety bond.

Key Notes:

 The Court emphasized that technicalities should not obstruct the pursuit of justice.

Case Digest: China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals

Facts of the Case: On July 24, 1996, China Banking Corporation (China Bank) extended an
Omnibus Credit Line of PHP 90,000,000 to Asian Construction and Development
Corporation (ACDC). On April 12, 1999, China Bank filed a complaint against ACDC for
recovery of a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
claiming that ACDC failed to meet its obligations under the credit line and misappropriated
funds intended to be held in trust under various Deeds of Assignment. The RTC granted a
writ of preliminary attachment on April 22, 1999, leading to the levy of ACDC's personal
properties. On March 27, 2000, the RTC issued a Summary Judgment in favor of China
Bank, which ACDC appealed. China Bank later moved to take custody of the attached
properties for sale, but ACDC opposed this motion. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied China
Bank's motion to sell the attached properties, deeming the sale premature before a final
judgment. China Bank's motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting the present
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue/s:

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in denying China Bank's motion to sell the attached
properties before a final judgment?
2. Are the attached properties considered "perishable" under Section 11, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court?

Ruling:
 Answer: The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the CA's resolutions,
affirming the denial of China Bank's motion to sell the attached properties.
 Legal Basis: Under Section 11, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, a property under
attachment may be sold before judgment if it is perishable or if such sale serves the
interests of all parties.
 Application: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the CA in determining that
the attached properties were not perishable and that selling them would not benefit the
parties involved. The determination of perishability and the interests of all parties is a
factual matter beyond the scope of a certiorari petition. The bond posted by China Bank
covers damages due to wrongful attachment, not damages from the sale before final
judgment.
 Conclusion: The issue regarding the necessity and convenience of selling the attached
properties is factual and cannot be resolved in a certiorari proceeding.

Key Notes:

 The Court emphasized that the proper remedy for interlocutory orders is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, but opted to treat the case under Rule 65 in the interest of
justice.

RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Case Digest: Atty. Dupil F. Garcia v. The Honorable Clerk of Court & Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court

Facts of the Case: Atty. Dupil F. Garcia filed a petition against the Honorable Clerk of
Court & Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Sheriff Jomar A. Tomas,
the Regional Trial Court — Branch 71, Atty. Ericson O. Ang, Edgard O. Ang, Myeongkyu
Emkei You, and the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. The petition sought to challenge the
issuance of a writ of execution by the RTC. After reviewing the petition and the resolutions
from the Court of Appeals (CA), the Supreme Court denied Garcia's petition for lack of
merit.

Issue/s:

1. Did the CA err in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction to entertain original
actions for injunction?
2. Was the remedy sought by the petitioner appropriate under the Rules of Court?

Ruling:

 Answer: The Supreme Court upheld the CA's decision to dismiss the petition, affirming
that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the original action for injunction.
 Legal Basis: According to B.P. 129, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction only
over annulment of judgments and certain writs such as mandamus, prohibition, and
 certiorari. It cannot grant original actions for injunction outside of proceedings pending
before it, as specified in Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
 Application: The CA correctly held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Garcia's
original action for injunction. The Supreme Court noted that if the RTC abused its
discretion in issuing a writ of execution, the proper course of action for Garcia would
have been to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, rather than the remedy he
pursued.
 Conclusion: As Garcia availed himself of an inappropriate remedy, the CA's dismissal of
the petition was warranted.

Key Notes:

 The Court emphasized the limitations of the appellate court's jurisdiction concerning
original actions for injunction and the need for petitioners to select the correct remedy
under the Rules of Court.

Facts
Jose Danilo Sola (petitioner) filed a Complaint for Injunction against First Jia Philippines
West View Estate and Development and Philstar Development (respondents), claiming
ownership over a property developed by respondents based on a Deed of Sale from Jorge V.
Capinpin, who purported to be the sole heir of the original owner, Candida Capinpin.
Petitioner possessed a photocopy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-35202,
while respondents held TCT No. 039-2013002707 for the same property. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dismissed the Complaint, finding that the Torrens title held by respondents was
indefeasible and that the petitioner’s title was spurious, thereby weakening his cause of
action.
Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal and upholding the
RTC’s decision to deny the injunctive relief.
Ruling (ALAC)
Answer: The petition has no merit.
Legal Basis: The CA ruled that the Torrens title serves as conclusive evidence of ownership
and that the titleholder is entitled to possess the property. Petitioner failed to show a superior
right to the property.
Application: The CA found that the petitioner did not exercise due diligence when
purchasing the property, as he relied on a photocopy of the TCT without verifying its
authenticity. Additionally, there were no grounds to support his claim of being an innocent
purchaser for value.
Conclusion: The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, emphasizing that injunctive relief cannot
protect rights that are merely contingent or not legally established.
Key Notes
  The principle of indefeasibility of Torrens titles was upheld.
 An injunction will not issue to protect a right that is not in existence or lacks a legal
foundation.
 Due diligence is critical when establishing ownership rights in property disputes.

Case Digest: Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals
Facts of the Case: In 1993, a fire destroyed the public market in Padre Garcia, Batangas. The
municipal government, led by Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, partnered with Australian Professional
Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the market and construct a shopping center. On January 19, 1995,
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed, granting APRI exclusive rights to operate,
manage, and lease stall spaces for 25 years in exchange for constructing the shopping complex.
In May 1995, Victor Reyes became the new mayor. On February 6, 2003, the municipality,
through Mayor Reyes, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the MOA with Damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas. After unsuccessful service of
summons to APRI, the RTC declared APRI in default and allowed the municipality to present
evidence ex parte. On October 6, 2004, the RTC declared the MOA null and void, ordered APRI
to pay P5,000,000 in damages, and forfeited the structures to the municipality. APRI’s
subsequent Petition for Relief from Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration were denied.
APRI then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals (CA), which
denied their request for a status quo order and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) based on a
lack of urgency and irreparable injury. APRI subsequently filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for the
issuance of a status quo order and a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction?
Ruling:
 Answer: The Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirmed
the CA's resolutions dated March 26, 2008, and June 16, 2008.
 Legal Basis: The Court noted that APRI improperly filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 to challenge the denial of injunctive relief, which is
interlocutory and not appealable. The correct remedy was a Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition under Rule 65.
 Application: The Court treated the Petition as if it were filed under Rule 65. It
emphasized that injunctive relief necessitates urgent necessity to prevent serious damage
and a clear, unmistakable right to be protected. APRI failed to demonstrate a clear legal
right since the RTC had declared their rights under the MOA as inferior or nonexistent,
 and the judgment was already final and executory. Moreover, the injuries claimed by
APRI could be compensated pecuniarily, thus were not considered irreparable.
 Conclusion: The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion as it acted reasonably in
denying the motion for injunction. APRI was still able to seek recourse in their pending
petition before the CA.
Key Notes:
 The Supreme Court highlighted the importance of selecting the correct procedural
remedy and the standards for granting injunctive relief.
Case Digest: Spouses Lago v. Abul, Jr.
Facts of the Case: The case involves complainants Spouses Democrito C. Lago and Olivia R.
Lago, who filed an amended complaint on December 29, 2009, against Judge Godofredo B.
Abul, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Gingoog City. They charged Judge Abul
with violations of the Standards of Conduct for Judges, the Rules of Court, and the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The case arose from a civil action filed by Christina M. Obico on July 2, 2009,
seeking a Preliminary Injunction, Easement of Road Right of Way, and Attorney's Fees, with a
prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Obico alleged that the Lago spouses
threatened to close the access road to her milkfish farm, risking significant financial losses. The
Lago spouses contended that the civil complaint was not properly raffled, and they did not
receive notice of raffle; nonetheless, the case was assigned to Judge Abul. On July 7, 2009, Judge
Abul issued a 72-hour TRO without requiring Obico to post a bond and without serving
summons or complaint to the Lago spouses. He later extended the TRO to 20 days without a
hearing and issued a writ of preliminary injunction on August 11, 2009, without prior notice to
the Lago spouses or a required hearing. The Lago spouses filed a motion for inhibition, which
was denied on October 28, 2009, and a Motion to Hold in Abeyance Further Proceedings, which
was denied on December 15, 2009. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concluded that
Judge Abul was grossly ignorant of the law and procedure, recommending a fine of P25,000.00.
Issue/s:
1. Did Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. violate the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial
Conduct in issuing and extending the TRO without proper procedures?
2. Was the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction without prior notice and hearing a
violation of the Rules of Court?
3. Did Judge Abul's actions amount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure?
Ruling:
 Answer: Yes, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. violated the Rules of Court and the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
  Legal Basis: The Supreme Court identified that Judge Abul's actions were contrary to
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which govern the procedures for
issuing preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders.
 Application: Judge Abul failed to conduct the required raffle for the civil case and did
not ensure notification and service of summons to the Lago spouses. He issued a TRO
without the mandated procedures and extended it without a hearing, in violation of due
process rights. Additionally, he issued a writ of preliminary injunction without a hearing
or prior notice, which constitutes a gross violation of judicial conduct.
 Conclusion: The Court deemed Judge Abul's actions as gross ignorance of the law,
emphasizing that such ignorance can lead to injustice and diminish public trust in the
judiciary. As a consequence, the Court imposed a fine of P25,000.00 on Judge Abul and
issued a warning against future infractions.
Key Notes:
 The case underscores the importance of following procedural rules in judicial
proceedings to uphold the principles of due process and maintain public confidence in the
judiciary.
Case Digest: Evy Construction and Development Corporation v. Valiant Roll Forming
Sales Corporation
Facts of the Case: Evy Construction and Development Corporation purchased a parcel of land
in Lipa, Batangas, from Linda N. Ang and Senen T. Uyan on September 4, 2007, with the Deed
of Absolute Sale notarized on September 11, 2007. The title was free of liens except for an
adverse claim by Ang. However, on September 18, 2007, a Notice of Levy on Attachment was
annotated due to a Writ of Preliminary Attachment from the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, in
Civil Case No. 13442, involving Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation. Additional
encumbrances were annotated on October 2, 2007, and November 8, 2007. Evy Construction
registered the Deed on November 20, 2007, receiving a new title that reflected prior annotations.
The RTC ruled in favor of Valiant in Civil Case No. 13442, leading to a Writ of Execution and a
Notice of Levy. Evy Construction filed a Notice of Third-Party Claim, and Valiant posted an
Indemnity Bond. Subsequently, a Notice of Sale was issued, with Valiant emerging as the
winning bidder. Evy Construction filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title and sought a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction, but the RTC denied the TRO, a decision
upheld by the Court of Appeals. Evy Construction then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
1. Was Evy Construction denied due process when its application for a writ of preliminary
injunction was denied in the same proceeding as its application for a temporary
restraining order?
 2. Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Evy Construction's
application for injunctive relief?
Ruling:
 Answer (Due Process): No, Evy Construction was not denied due process.
 Answer (Grave Abuse of Discretion): No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying Evy Construction's application for injunctive relief.
Legal Basis and Application: The Supreme Court held that Evy Construction was not denied
due process as the trial court conducted a hearing on November 9, 2009, allowing the counsel to
present arguments and a witness. The trial court deemed the issues legal in nature, which Evy
Construction's counsel accepted without objection. The Court emphasized that a separate hearing
for the application for a preliminary injunction was unnecessary since the company had been
given a chance to be heard.
Regarding grave abuse of discretion, the Court noted that a preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy that requires the applicant to demonstrate an actual and existing substantial
right, a material invasion of that right, and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. Evy Construction failed to meet these requirements. The encumbrances annotated
before registration in Evy Construction's name were valid, and issuing an injunction would
prejudge the main case. Furthermore, Evy Construction did not demonstrate the urgency needed
to prevent further annotations since the alleged reputational damage had already occurred.
Conclusion: The Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the
application for injunctive relief, noting that Evy Construction had adequate remedies available,
including the removal of annotations and potential damages if the trial court found the
annotations invalid.
Case Digest: Spouses Lito P. Tumon and Lydia G. Tumon v. Radiowealth Finance
Company, Inc.
Facts of the Case: Petitioners Spouses Lito P. Tumon and Lydia G. Tumon applied for a loan
from Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. (Radiowealth) before September 2014 to finance their
tokwa business. Radiowealth approved a loan of P2,811,456.00, but after deducting a processing
fee of P100,000.00 and interest of P1,311,456.00, the petitioners received only P1,500,000.00.
The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on their property covered by TCT No. 009-
2010000083. Monthly amortizations of P58,572.00 began on November 30, 2014, with 87%
allocated to interest payments. The petitioners alleged that this high interest rate was
unconscionable and violated the "Truth in Lending Act" due to not being provided with a finance
statement or copies of the Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note. After incurring business
losses, they defaulted on payments starting October 2015, prompting Radiowealth to threaten
foreclosure. On January 14, 2016, the petitioners filed a complaint for the nullification of
mortgage documents and damages. Radiowealth applied for extrajudicial foreclosure on March
11, 2016, with a public auction set for April 26, 2016. The petitioners sought a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to prevent the foreclosure,
but the RTC denied their requests. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were also denied.
They then filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed
their petition, leading them to file the present Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error in ruling that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners' application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction (WPI)?
Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the RTC's denial of the petitioners' application for the
issuance of a WPI was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Legal Basis and Application: The Supreme Court emphasized that to obtain a WPI, the
applicant must demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right to be protected and an urgent
necessity to prevent serious damage. In the context of judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure,
compliance with A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 is required, including the payment of at least 6% per
annum interest on the principal obligation. The petitioners did not show compliance, as they
failed to prove they had paid the required interest upon filing for the TRO/WPI. The Court noted
that the trial court's preliminary finding of unconscionable interest would not resolve the main
case without trial. The obligation to pay the legal interest rate applies from the time of the
TRO/WPI application and continues while the case is pending. Since the petitioners did not
establish their clear and unmistakable right to be protected, the RTC did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in denying their application for a WPI.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the CA's ruling, confirming that the RTC acted within
its discretion in denying the petitioners' request for a WPI, as they failed to establish their
entitlement to such a remedy.
Case Digest: City of Iloilo v. Honrado
G.R. No. 160399
Promulgated on: December 9, 2015
Facts of the Case:
The petitioner, the City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas, contested orders issued
by Judge Rene B. Honrado of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, Iloilo City, and JPV
Motor Vehicle Emission Testing & Car Care Center Co., represented by Jim P. Velez. The
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) issued Department Order No. 2002-
31, which established guidelines for authorizing Private Emission Testing Centers (PETCs). JPV,
authorized to operate a PETC in Iloilo City, filed a complaint to prevent the issuance of a permit
for another PETC, arguing that there were only 53,647 registered motor vehicles in Iloilo City,
and that JPV's four lanes could accommodate 60,000 vehicles. The petitioner contended that
granting injunctive relief would create a monopoly and hinder the City Mayor's discretionary
power to issue business permits. Despite these arguments, the RTC granted JPV's application for
a writ of preliminary injunction on June 24, 2003, and denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on August 15, 2003. Grahar Emission Testing Center, another PETC operator,
also sought reconsideration, emphasizing a subsequent DOTC order that reduced the vehicle
capacity per lane from 15,000 to 12,000 vehicles. The petitioner subsequently sought certiorari
from the Supreme Court, challenging the RTC's orders.
Issue/s:
1. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated June 24, 2003,
preventing the City Mayor from issuing a permit for another PETC?
2. Did the RTC err in holding that DOTC Order No. 2002-31 justified the issuance of a writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction?
3. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on August 15, 2003?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari. The RTC's orders dated June 24, 2003, and
August 15, 2003, were annulled and set aside. The writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction was
dissolved, and the RTC was ordered to resume proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-27648 if further
proceedings were warranted.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court emphasized that a preliminary injunction is meant to preserve the rights of
the parties before the final adjudication of the issues and should not determine the merits of the
case or decide controverted facts. The RTC's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
effectively prejudged the case's merits by accepting JPV's claim and preventing the City Mayor
from issuing permits to other PETC operators. This action violated the right to be heard of both
the petitioner and the intervenor Grahar. The RTC's orders were found to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, contravening the guidelines for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, and
ignoring the principle that such writs should not dispose of the main case without trial. The
Supreme Court concluded that the RTC acted in an arbitrary manner, amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction, thus justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court's decision affirmed the need for adherence to procedural guidelines in the
issuance of preliminary injunctions, underscoring the importance of due process in ensuring that
all parties are given the opportunity to be heard before any adverse action is taken against them.
Case Digest: Laus v. Optimum Security Services, Inc.
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Spouses Ceferino C. Laus and Monina P. Laus, along with Spouses Antonio O. Koh and Elisa T.
Koh (petitioners), filed a complaint against Optimum Security Services, Inc. (respondent) on
October 3, 2005, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 62, docketed as
Civil Case No. 12307. The complaint, titled "Damages with Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI)," included several security
guards employed by the respondent and TIPCO Estate Corporation (TIPCO). The petitioners
alleged that in August 2005, armed security guards employed by the respondent and TIPCO
prevented them from entering eight parcels of land in Mabalacat, Pampanga, covered by specific
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT). They sought moral, exemplary, and liquidated damages, a
TRO, and a WPI to prevent the respondents from interfering with their rights as owners of the
subject properties. The RTC granted the WPI on October 6, 2010, finding sufficient evidence to
establish petitioners' ownership and right to possess the properties. However, the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed this decision on March 25, 2013, lifting the WPI and dismissing the
petitioners' complaint, stating that they failed to establish their physical possession of the
properties and that the WPI improperly altered the status quo. The CA also noted that the
respondent was not a real party in interest as it was merely contracted to secure the properties.
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on July 22, 2013, leading to the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
RTC?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petitioners' complaint?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision to lift the WPI but reversed the CA's decision to
dismiss the petitioners' complaint, ordering its reinstatement and remand to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court emphasized that a writ of preliminary injunction is intended to preserve the
status quo and should not create new relations between the parties. The petitioners failed to
establish their actual physical possession of the subject properties at the time of the incidents in
August 2005. The CA correctly noted that the WPI improperly transferred possession of the
properties to the petitioners, which is prohibited when the claimant's title is disputed.
Additionally, the WPI no longer served any purpose as the respondent had already vacated the
properties. However, the CA erred in dismissing the complaint, as the alleged real owners of the
properties were not indispensable parties to the case. The main issue was whether the respondent
and other defendants were justified in preventing the petitioners from accessing the properties,
which could be resolved without the participation of the alleged real owners. The Court
determined that the proper course of action was to order the impleading of the alleged real
owners if they were deemed necessary parties.
Conclusion:
Thus, the Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners' complaint and remanded
the case to the RTC for further proceedings, highlighting the importance of adhering to proper
legal procedures and ensuring that all necessary parties are considered in the resolution of
property disputes.
Case Digest: Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation v. Lim et al.
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
The case involves the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR) and its
stockholders—Pablito O. Lim, Manuel A. Agcaoili, and Consuelo M. Padilla—each holding 500
shares. On February 4, 2004, PASAR filed an Amended Petition for Injunction and Damages,
praying for a Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the
stockholders from inspecting its confidential and inexistent records. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) granted PASAR's request for a writ of preliminary injunction on April 14, 2004,
restricting the stockholders' right to inspect pending the determination of which records were
confidential or nonexistent. The stockholders then moved for the dissolution of the writ, arguing
that their right to inspect should not be restricted and that no irreparable injury would be caused
to PASAR. The RTC denied their motion, leading the stockholders to file a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA lifted and canceled the writ of preliminary injunction,
prompting PASAR to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court to reverse
the CA's decision and reinstate the RTC's injunction.
Issue/s:
1. Does an injunction properly lie to prevent stockholders from invoking their right to
inspect corporate records?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in lifting and canceling the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC?
Ruling:
No, an injunction does not properly lie to prevent stockholders from invoking their right to
inspect corporate records. No, the Court of Appeals did not err in lifting and canceling the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court denied PASAR's petition and affirmed the CA's decision. The Court
emphasized that the right of stockholders to inspect corporate records is enshrined in Section 74
of the Corporation Code, which allows stockholders to inspect records of all business
transactions and minutes of meetings at reasonable hours on business days. Any limitations on
this right, such as claims of bad faith or lack of legitimate purpose, must be raised as defenses by
the corporation in an action for mandamus or specific performance filed by the stockholders. The
Court found PASAR's preemptive action for injunction unjustly intended to impede the
stockholders' rights, asserting that the proper remedy for enforcing the right of inspection is a
writ of mandamus filed by the stockholders, not an injunction filed by the corporation.
Furthermore, the Court held that the RTC's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
constituted grave abuse of discretion, as PASAR failed to present sufficient evidence showing
that the stockholders' demand for inspection was made in bad faith or for an unlawful purpose.
The confidentiality of business transactions was deemed insufficient to deny the stockholders'
right to inspect, with any objections needing to be raised defensively by the corporation.
Conclusion:
Thus, the Court concluded that the CA did not err in lifting and canceling the injunction, as the
RTC's order lacked a clear legal basis and constituted grave abuse of discretion
Case Digest: Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Quiambao et al.
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: April 11, 2011
Facts of the Case:
This case centers on a dispute regarding Ceasar Quiambao's authority to represent Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) and the validity of loan and pledge agreements
executed by the respondents, which include Cypress Tree Capital Investment, Inc. (CTCII),
Aderito Z. Yujuico, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla, Robert L. Wong, and Star Infrastructure
Development Corporation (SIDC). The initial case was filed in Branch 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batangas City. The lower court's decision was contested, leading to several
motions for reconsideration and a motion to admit and approve a preliminary injunction bond.
The Supreme Court's resolution on April 11, 2011, addressed these motions and incidents.
Respondents argued that Quiambao's authority to represent STRADEC was a prejudicial
question and that the loan and pledge agreements were valid. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction issued by the lower court amounted to a prejudgment of the case.
STRADEC sought the admission and approval of a preliminary injunction bond to safeguard its
rights over its SIDC shares.
Issue/s:
1. Was Ceasar Quiambao's authority to represent STRADEC a prejudicial question to the
resolution of the dispute?
2. Did the lower court err in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of STRADEC?
3. Should the preliminary injunction bond filed by STRADEC be admitted and approved?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Ceasar Quiambao's authority to represent STRADEC was not a
prejudicial question. The Court upheld the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor
of STRADEC. The Court granted STRADEC's motion to admit and approve the preliminary
injunction bond.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court determined that the issue of Quiambao's authority to represent STRADEC
was not a prejudicial question because it did not involve a civil and criminal action, but rather
multiple civil actions. A prejudicial question requires the concurrence of a civil and a criminal
action, which was absent in this case. The Court found the lower court's issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction justified. The requisites for a preliminary injunction were met:
STRADEC's right to its shareholdings was clear and unmistakable, the invasion of this right was
material and substantial, and there was an urgent necessity to prevent serious damage. The
preliminary injunction aimed to restore the status quo ante and protect STRADEC's rights during
the case's pendency. The projected damage to SIDC's operations was deemed speculative,
whereas the damage to STRADEC was clear and beyond monetary recompense. The Court
rejected CTCII's offer to file a counterbond, stating it would not suffice to dissolve the
preliminary injunction, as it would allow the continuation of unauthorized acts.
Conclusion:
Therefore, the Court denied the respondents' motions for reconsideration and granted
STRADEC's motion to admit and approve the preliminary injunction bond.
WHEN TRO/WPI is prohibited/Not allowed
Case Digest: Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.) Inc. v. Hon. Ricardo P.
Presbitero, Jr.
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. (Dynamic Builders) filed a petition against
Hon. Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr., Mayor and Head of the Procuring Unit of the Municipality of
Valladolid, Negros Occidental, the Bids and Awards Committee of the Municipality, and Henry
L. Jordan and/or HLJ Construction and Enterprise. The case arose from a bidding process for the
Construction Shoreline Protection Project, a 1,050-lineal-meter rubble concrete seawall. The
Bids and Awards Committee held a pre-bid conference on January 17, 2006, and opened bids on
January 31, 2006. Dynamic Builders submitted the lowest bid but was informed it was not
substantially responsive, resulting in the contract being awarded to HLJ Construction and
Enterprise. Dynamic Builders filed a formal protest, which Mayor Presbitero dismissed on June
12, 2006. Subsequently, Dynamic Builders filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bago City on September 4, 2006, while also filing a Petition for prohibition with
the Supreme Court seeking injunctive relief. The Supreme Court issued a status quo order on
September 18, 2006, but Dynamic Builders alleged that respondents continued the project
despite this order and subsequently filed a Petition to Cite Respondents for Contempt.
Issue/s:
1. Does Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 allow simultaneous filing of a
petition for prohibition seeking injunctive relief from the Supreme Court and a petition
for certiorari before the RTC?
2. Did Dynamic Builders violate the rules against splitting a cause of action, multiplicity of
suits, and forum shopping?
3. Did Dynamic Builders violate the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts?
 4. Did Dynamic Builders resort to an improper remedy by filing a petition for prohibition
with the Supreme Court?
5. Can Regional Trial Courts issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure
projects under certain conditions?
6. Did respondents violate the Supreme Court's September 18, 2006 status quo order?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 does not allow
simultaneous filing of petitions in different courts. It found that Dynamic Builders violated the
rules against splitting a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping. The Court held
that Dynamic Builders violated the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts and determined that they
resorted to an improper remedy by filing a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court. The
Court clarified that Regional Trial Courts can issue injunctive relief against government
infrastructure projects under specific conditions. However, the Court found that respondents did
not violate the status quo order as the ongoing construction reflected the existing state of affairs
at the time the order was issued.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the simultaneous filing of petitions in different courts
violates the rules against splitting a cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping.
The proper remedy under Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 is either an action
under Rule 65 before the RTC or a proper action before the Supreme Court, but not both. The
Court underscored the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, requiring cases to be filed in
appropriate lower courts before elevating them to the Supreme Court. Additionally, the Court
noted that RTCs have the authority to grant injunctive relief against government infrastructure
projects when compelling constitutional violations exist, alongside a clear right, a need to
prevent grave and irreparable injury, and when public interest outweighs the inconvenience or
costs to the party awarded the project. Ultimately, the Court found that the respondents did not
violate the status quo order since the ongoing construction was the status quo at the time the
order was issued, and stopping the project would lead to additional costs and public prejudice.
Conclusion:
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled against Dynamic Builders on all counts, affirming the dismissal
of their petitions.
Case Digest: Antig v. Antipuesto
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
The case involves petitioners Stephen A. Antig (representing AMS Banana Exporter, Inc.) and
landowners Bernadita S. Lemosnero, Jemarie J. Testado, Thomas Bernard C. Alladin, and
Gerardo Arangoso against respondents Anastacio Antipuesto and AMS Kapalong Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (AMSKARBEMCO). The dispute concerns
four agricultural lots in Barangay Sampao, Kapalong, Davao del Norte, which were leased for
banana cultivation. In 2002, the landowners offered these lots under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) via the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme. The petitioners
contested the valuation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), arguing it excluded the value
of standing crops and improvements. While the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) was conducting summary proceedings to determine just compensation, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) notified AMS Farming of a planned "physical
takeover" by Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs). To prevent this takeover, the petitioners
sought an injunction from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagum City, which is designated as
a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). The SAC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later
an injunction, but the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside these orders, ruling that the SAC acted
with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the SAC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the petitioners'
Petition for Injunction?
2. Did the SAC have jurisdiction to issue the injunction in this case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, affirming the CA's decision and
resolution. The injunction orders issued in DAR Case No. 98-2003 were set aside, and the Office
of the Court Administrator was directed to investigate possible administrative and/or criminal
liabilities of Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, the Presiding Judge of the SAC, for issuing the prohibited
injunctive orders.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court held that the SAC had no jurisdiction over the petition for injunction and no
authority to issue such injunctions. It cited Sections 50, 56, and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), which define the quasi-judicial powers of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the limited jurisdiction of the SAC. The Court
emphasized that the SAC's jurisdiction is confined to determining just compensation and
prosecuting criminal offenses under RA No. 6657. Sections 55 and 68 of the same law explicitly
prohibit any court from issuing restraining orders or injunctions against the implementation of
CARP. The Court also referenced Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002, which
prevent trial judges from issuing such orders. The petitioners' claims of constitutional rights
violations were found unsubstantiated, with the Court reiterating that DAR had primary
jurisdiction to determine just compensation. Additionally, it noted that recourse to the SAC was
premature, as the administrative determination of just compensation was still pending before
DARAB. The Court dismissed the petitioners' reliance on Malaga v. Penachos, stating that the
cases were not analogous.
Conclusion:
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners on all counts, affirming the CA's decision
and underscoring the limited jurisdiction of the SAC in agrarian disputes.
Case Digest: Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hon. Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr.
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
The case involves the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) as the petitioner and respondents,
including Hon. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 16 in
Cebu City, Silverio Borbon, Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad, and XM Facultad &
Development Corporation. On May 22, 2001, the respondents initiated Civil Case No. CEB-
26468, seeking to declare the nullity of promissory notes, real estate and chattel mortgages, and a
continuing surety agreement executed in favor of BPI. They sought damages, attorney's fees, and
a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent BPI from
foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties. The respondents had obtained a loan from
BPI, which reached P17,983,191.49, of which only P13 million was paid due to the economic
turmoil in Asia in 1997. BPI required them to issue postdated checks under the threat of
foreclosure. On June 6, 2001, BPI filed its answer, opposing the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction and moved to dismiss the complaint based on improper venue and non-
payment of legal fees. The RTC denied BPI's motion to dismiss but granted the respondents'
application for a preliminary injunction. BPI's motion for reconsideration was also denied,
leading to BPI filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld the
RTC's orders. BPI subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
1. Should Civil Case No. CEB-26468 be dismissed for non-payment of the correct amount
of docket fee?
2. Should it be dismissed for improper venue?
3. Was the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against BPI, its agents, and
representatives in order?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for review on certiorari. It annulled and set
aside the writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 issued by the RTC for
being devoid of factual and legal bases. The Court ordered the RTC to proceed with dispatch in
the case and directed the respondents to pay the costs of the suit.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court ruled that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a personal action, thus the venue
was properly laid in Cebu City, where the respondent XM Facultad and Development
Corporation's principal office was located. The complaint sought nullification of promissory
notes and mortgage agreements for being executed against the respondents' will, not for recovery
of possession or title to the properties burdened by the mortgages. Hence, it was personal, and
the filing and docket fees should not be based on the assessed values of the mortgaged
properties. Regarding the writ of preliminary injunction, the Court found it improper. The
respondents were aware of the consequences of their non-payment and had constituted the
mortgages to secure their loan obligation. The foreclosure of the mortgages was BPI's legal
remedy, and the respondents did not dispute their unpaid obligation. The Court emphasized that a
preliminary injunction is a preventive remedy and should not determine the merits of a case or
decide controverted facts. The respondents failed to demonstrate that they would suffer
irreparable injury without the writ, and their fears did not constitute grounds for an injunction.
The RTC's issuance of the writ was deemed capricious and arbitrary, constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
Conclusion:
Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of BPI, setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction and directing the RTC to expedite the resolution of Civil Case No. CEB-26468.
RULE 59 RECEIVERSHIP
Here’s the case digest for Caboverde Tantano v. Espina-Caboverde in your requested format:

Case Digest: Caboverde Tantano v. Espina-Caboverde

G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
This case revolves around a family dispute over land ownership and management in Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte. Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano and Roseller Caboverde are children
of respondent Dominalda Espina-Caboverde and siblings of other respondents. The conflict
began on March 7, 2005, when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint to annul a Deed of Sale
transferring Lots 2, 3, and 4 to the petitioners and their siblings, leading to Civil Case No. S-760
assigned to Branch 11 of the RTC. Maximo, the father, passed away during the case, resulting in
an Amended Complaint substituting him with his eight children and wife, Dominalda. A Partial
Settlement Agreement (PSA) was executed, appointing Josephine as Administrator and granting
Dominalda half of the net income from the properties. Dominalda later filed a Motion to
Intervene and a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, asserting inaccuracies in the initial
Answer and claiming no sale of the contested properties. On July 15, 2008, she filed a Verified
Urgent Petition/Application for receivership of Lots 2, 3, and 4, alleging income appropriation
by Mila and some siblings, which left her without funds for medical expenses. The RTC granted
the receivership application on February 8, 2010, appointing Annabelle Saldia and Jesus Tan as
receivers. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting them to file a petition
for certiorari with the CA, which was also denied. The CA's decision and resolution were
subsequently challenged in the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
 1. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver
despite the reasons advanced by the applicant not being enumerated by the rules?
2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the RTC's resolution and
ruling that a receivership bond was not required prior to appointment despite the clear
dictates of the rules?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the CA's June 25, 2012
Decision and September 21, 2012 Resolution. The RTC's February 8, 2010 and July 19, 2010
Resolutions approving Dominalda Espina-Caboverde's application for receivership and
appointing the receivers were also reversed and set aside.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court emphasized that receivership is a harsh remedy, to be granted with utmost
circumspection and only in extreme situations. Dominalda's need for income for medical
expenses was not a valid justification for receivership under Sec. 1 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. The Court found no clear showing that the disputed properties were in danger of being
lost or materially impaired, nor that receivership was the most convenient and feasible means to
preserve, administer, or dispose of them. Furthermore, Dominalda was assured of receiving
income under the PSA, which entitled her to half of the net income from the uncontroverted
properties. The defendants in Civil Case No. S-760 were the registered owners of the disputed
properties, and the appointment of a receiver should only occur in extreme cases with clear
necessity to prevent grave and irremediable loss or damage to the plaintiff. The CA erred in
holding that a bond was not required prior to the appointment of receivers, as Sec. 2 of Rule 59
mandates the filing of a bond before the court can issue an order appointing a receiver, making
this requirement mandatory regardless of the other party's consent.
Conclusion:
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, reversing the prior appointments and
decisions, highlighting the stringent standards required for receivership and the necessity of
adhering to procedural mandates.
RULE 60 REPLEVIN
Case Digest: Enriquez v. Asuten
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Milagros P. Enriquez filed a Complaint for Replevin against Wilfred Asuten in 2003 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga, seeking to recover her Toyota Hi-Ace
van, valued at P300,000.00, which Asuten allegedly refused to return, claiming it was given to
him by Enriquez's son as part of a gambling deal. Enriquez secured a replevin bond from
Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. for P600,000.00, effective for one year from February 24, 2003,
and executed an indemnity agreement to indemnify Mercantile Insurance for any payments made
under the bond. However, on May 24, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice
due to Enriquez's failure to present evidence and comply with court orders, including the return
of the van to the sheriff. Consequently, the RTC declared the bond forfeited, ordering Mercantile
Insurance to pay Asuten P600,000.00. Mercantile Insurance made the payment on September 3,
2004, and subsequently filed a collection suit against Enriquez for reimbursement. Enriquez
contested the liability, claiming her daughter-in-law forged her signature on the indemnity
agreement and that the bond had expired. The RTC ruled in favor of Mercantile Insurance,
ordering Enriquez to pay P600,000.00 plus interest and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, prompting Enriquez to file a petition before the Supreme
Court.
Issue/s:
1. Should Milagros P. Enriquez be held liable for the full amount of the replevin bond paid
by Mercantile Insurance to Wilfred Asuten?
2. Was the indemnity agreement still in force when Mercantile Insurance paid Asuten?
3. Was the indemnity agreement a contract of adhesion and thus unenforceable?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision, holding Enriquez liable
for the full amount of the replevin bond. The Court ruled that the indemnity agreement was still
in force when Mercantile Insurance paid Asuten and determined that the indemnity agreement
was not a contract of adhesion and was enforceable.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court emphasized that a surety bond remains effective until the action or
proceeding is finally decided, resolved, or terminated, regardless of whether the applicant renews
the bond. This principle is incorporated into the contract between the applicant and the surety, as
per the Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds. The Court found that Enriquez's failure to return
the van and comply with court orders justified the RTC's decision to forfeit the bond and order
Mercantile Insurance to pay Asuten. The indemnity agreement, voluntarily executed by
Enriquez, bound her to indemnify Mercantile Insurance for any payments made under the bond.
The Court rejected Enriquez's argument that the indemnity agreement was a contract of adhesion,
clarifying that although insurance contracts are typically considered contracts of adhesion, they
are still enforceable. The Court underscored that Enriquez's losses stemmed from her own
actions and inactions, including her failure to prosecute the replevin case and appeal the RTC's
order.
Conclusion:
Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, holding Enriquez liable for the full amount
of the bond due to her failure to fulfill her obligations under the indemnity agreement.
Case Digest: BA Finance Corporation v. Reyes
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
The case involves BA Finance Corporation as the petitioner and Roberto M. Reyes as the private
respondent, with the Court of Appeals as the respondent. The dispute arose from a promissory
note executed on May 15, 1980, by Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan in favor of Carmasters,
Inc. for P83,080.00, payable in 36 monthly installments and secured by a chattel mortgage over a
Ford Cortina vehicle. The note and mortgage were later assigned to BA Finance Corporation
with the Manahans' consent. After the Manahans defaulted on their payments, BA Finance
Corporation filed a replevin suit on October 2, 1987, against the Manahans and an unidentified
John Doe (later identified as Reyes) to recover the vehicle or the unpaid amount. The court
issued a writ of replevin with stipulations, and summons was served to Reyes, who was in
possession of the vehicle. Reyes requested an extension to answer or intervene, but the court
dismissed the case on February 18, 1988, for failure to prosecute, ordering the vehicle's return to
Reyes. BA Finance Corporation's subsequent motions led to various court orders, including a
declaration of default against Reyes and ex parte evidence presentation. Ultimately, the trial court
dismissed the case against the Manahans for lack of prosecution and the case against Reyes for
lack of legal basis, ordering the return of the vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision, prompting BA Finance Corporation to petition for review.
Issue/s:
1. Can a mortgagee maintain an action for replevin against a possessor of the mortgaged
property who is not a party to the mortgage?
2. Is the mortgagor an indispensable party in a replevin suit aimed at foreclosing a chattel
mortgage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed that a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against a
possessor of the mortgaged property, even if the possessor is not a party to the mortgage.
Additionally, the Court ruled that the mortgagor is an indispensable party in a replevin suit aimed
at foreclosing a chattel mortgage.
Legal Basis and Application:
Replevin is a principal remedy and provisional relief primarily concerned with the right of
possession. The proper defendant in a replevin action is the person in possession of the property.
When the right of possession is disputed, other parties, such as the mortgagor, must be included
to fully resolve the controversy. A chattel mortgagee's right to possession is conditional upon the
mortgagor's default, which can be contested; thus, including the mortgagor is necessary to
establish the validity of the foreclosure and the mortgagee's right to replevy the property. The
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that BA Finance
Corporation failed to establish a clear right to possession without involving the mortgagor.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling, emphasizing the importance of including the
mortgagor in a replevin action to clarify rights and obligations under the chattel mortgage.
Case Digest: Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Laus
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Leticia Laus purchased a Colt Galant, 4-door Sedan on credit from Fortune Motors (Phils.)
Corporation on May 14, 1976, signing a promissory note for P56,028.00, payable over 48
months starting in August 1976, and secured the loan with a chattel mortgage on the vehicle. The
rights to the credit and mortgage were assigned first to Filinvest Credit Corporation and then to
Servicewide Specialists, Inc. on September 25, 1978. Laus defaulted on her payments starting
April 18, 1977. Servicewide demanded payment but Laus neither paid nor surrendered the
vehicle. Consequently, Servicewide filed a replevin complaint against Hilda Tee and John Dee,
believed to have custody of the vehicle. On August 1, 1984, Alberto Villafranca filed a third-
party claim asserting ownership of the vehicle, having purchased it from Remedios D. Yang, and
was substituted as the defendant. The lower court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence on December 27, 1985. The Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal, citing the
absence of privity of contract between Servicewide and Villafranca, as well as the failure to
implead Laus, an indispensable party.
Issue/s:
Can a case for replevin be pursued against a defendant without impleading the absconding
debtor-mortgagor?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
upholding the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Court emphasized that establishing a foreclosure under a chattel mortgage requires proof of
the existence of the chattel mortgage and the default of the mortgagor. The mortgagee's right to
possession is conditioned on the actual fact of default, which may be contested. Therefore,
including Leticia Laus, the mortgagor, was necessary for a full and conclusive determination of
the case. The Court noted that an adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot be
deprived of possession merely because the mortgagee initiates a replevin action. Since Laus was
an indispensable party, her absence was deemed fatal to Servicewide's case. The Court also
highlighted that Servicewide had procedural remedies available, such as substituted service of
summons, which it failed to utilize.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case due to the failure to implead
the indispensable party, Leticia Laus, rendering Servicewide's replevin action insufficient.
Case Digest: Vargas v. Rivera
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
On February 24, 2003, Florencio Vargas filed a complaint against Terlyngrace Rivera and several
John Does before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, seeking the
recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. Vargas claimed ownership
of the plant, having purchased it from Hyun Dae Trading Co. in December 1993. The equipment
was allegedly entrusted to Rivera's late husband, Jan T. Rivera, as caretaker of Vargas'
construction aggregates business. After Jan's death in late 2002, Rivera failed to return the
equipment despite repeated demands. Vargas sought a writ of replevin and a bond amounting to
P2,400,000.00. Summons was served on Rivera through her personal secretary on April 28,
2003, and the writ of replevin was served on a security guard named Joseph Rejumo on April 29,
2003, contrary to the sheriff's return stating it was served on Rivera. Rivera filed her answer and
a motion for acceptance of her redelivery bond on May 8, 2003, claiming the rock-crushing plant
was ceded to her husband after the dissolution of a partnership in 1998. The RTC disapproved
her redelivery bond for failing to comply with the five-day filing requirement post-seizure, and
her motion for reconsideration was denied. Rivera then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, which was also denied.
Issue/s:
1. Was the service of the writ of replevin on a security guard instead of the adverse party
valid and constitutional?
2. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Rivera's counterbond on the
ground that it was filed out of time?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the service of the writ of replevin on the security guard was
invalid and unconstitutional. The Court found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying Rivera's counterbond application.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court emphasized that replevin is a remedy that must strictly adhere to procedural
due process requirements. According to Section 4 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, the writ must
be served on the adverse party along with the application, affidavit of merit, and replevin bond,
ensuring proper notification and opportunity for the adverse party to respond. The Court ruled
that serving the writ on a security guard, who lacked authority to receive court processes on
behalf of Rivera, rendered the service invalid and unconstitutional. Since the service was invalid,
the mandatory five-day period for filing a redelivery bond did not begin, making the RTC's
denial of Rivera's application erroneous. The Court ordered the RTC to restore the parties to their
former positions by returning the seized property to Rivera and discharging Vargas' replevin
bond. The main action should continue, and Vargas may file a new application for replevin if
desired. This decision was grounded in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which guarantees
procedural due process and protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the invalidity of the writ of replevin service and the RTC's
erroneous denial of the redelivery bond application, directing the return of the property to Rivera.
Case Digest: Advent Capital and Finance Corporation v. Roland Young
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Advent Capital and Finance Corporation (Advent) initiated a replevin suit against Roland Young
(Young) to recover a 1996 Mercedes Benz E230, which was registered in Advent's name. On
July 16, 2001, Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation, resulting in a stay order issued on August
27, 2001, halting all claims against the corporation. Young, a former president and CEO of
Advent, claimed several employee benefits and refused to return the vehicle despite repeated
demands. Advent filed the replevin case on July 8, 2003, and posted a P3,000,000 replevin bond,
leading to a Writ of Seizure and the car being turned over to Advent. Young counterclaimed,
asserting his right to purchase the car and offset its value against his retirement benefits. The trial
court dismissed the replevin case for failure to prosecute and also dismissed Young's
counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction. Young's motions for reconsideration and damages against
the replevin bond were denied, prompting him to petition the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Young, directing the return of the car and scheduling a hearing for
damages against the replevin bond. Advent's motion for reconsideration was denied, resulting in
the current petition for review.
Issue/s:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in directing the return of the seized car to Young?
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the
determination of damages against the replevin bond?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to return the seized car to Young.
However, it set aside the Court of Appeals' order for the trial court to conduct a hearing to
determine damages against the replevin bond.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeals that the dismissal of the replevin case
for failure to prosecute rendered the writ of seizure functus officio, necessitating the return of the
car to Young. The dismissal without prejudice indicated that there was no adjudication on the
merits, preventing Advent from retaining possession of the vehicle. Citing Olympia International
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that dismissal restores the parties to their pre-
litigation status. It clarified that returning the car did not violate the stay order from the
rehabilitation court, as this did not amount to enforcement of a claim against Advent. Regarding
damages against the replevin bond, the Court noted that Young failed to file an application for
damages before the dismissal order became final. Citing Jao v. Royal Financing Corporation, the
Court held that Young was barred from claiming damages against the replevin bond since the
application was made post-finality of the dismissal order. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering a hearing for damages against the replevin bond.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision to return the seized car to Young while reversing the
order for a hearing regarding damages against the replevin bond.
Case Digest: Milagros P. Enriquez v. Wilfred Asuten
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Milagros P. Enriquez filed a Complaint for Replevin against Wilfred Asuten in 2003 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga. Enriquez sought to recover her Toyota
Hi-Ace van, valued at P300,000.00, which Asuten allegedly refused to return, claiming it was
given to him by Enriquez's son as part of a gambling deal. To support her case, Enriquez
obtained a replevin bond from Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. (Mercantile Insurance) for
P600,000.00, effective for one year from February 24, 2003. She executed an indemnity
agreement to indemnify Mercantile Insurance for any payments made under the bond. However,
the RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on May 24, 2004, due to Enriquez's failure to
present evidence and comply with court orders, including the return of the van to the sheriff. The
RTC subsequently declared the bond forfeited and ordered Mercantile Insurance to pay Asuten
P600,000.00. Mercantile Insurance complied on September 3, 2004, and then filed a collection
suit against Enriquez for reimbursement. Enriquez claimed her daughter-in-law forged her
signature on the indemnity agreement and argued that the bond had expired. The RTC ruled in
favor of Mercantile Insurance, ordering Enriquez to pay P600,000.00 plus interest and attorney's
fees. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, leading Enriquez to file a petition
before the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
1. Should Milagros P. Enriquez be held liable for the full amount of the replevin bond paid
by Mercantile Insurance to Wilfred Asuten?
2. Was the indemnity agreement still in force when Mercantile Insurance paid Asuten?
3. Was the indemnity agreement a contract of adhesion and thus unenforceable?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision, holding Enriquez liable
for the full amount of the replevin bond. The Court ruled that the indemnity agreement was still
in force when Mercantile Insurance paid Asuten. Additionally, the Court found that the
indemnity agreement was not a contract of adhesion and was enforceable.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Supreme Court held that a surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is
finally decided, resolved, or terminated, regardless of whether the applicant renews the bond.
This principle is incorporated into the contract between the applicant and the surety, as per the
Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds. The Court determined that Enriquez's failure to return the
van and comply with court orders justified the RTC's decision to forfeit the bond and order
Mercantile Insurance to pay Asuten. The indemnity agreement, which Enriquez voluntarily
executed, bound her to indemnify Mercantile Insurance for any payments made under the bond.
The Court rejected the argument that the indemnity agreement was a contract of adhesion,
asserting that while insurance contracts are typically considered contracts of adhesion, they are
still enforceable. The Court emphasized that Enriquez's losses stemmed from her own actions
and inactions, including her failure to prosecute the replevin case and appeal the RTC's order.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, holding Enriquez liable for the full amount of
the bond due to her failure to fulfill her obligations under the indemnity agreement.
RULE 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
Case Digest: Lucy Somosa-Ramos v. Clemente G. Ramos
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed a petition for certiorari questioning the ruling of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, which ordered the suspension of a hearing on her motion for a
preliminary mandatory injunction in her action for legal separation against her husband,
Clemente G. Ramos. Lucy alleged concubinage on Clemente's part and an attempt on her life.
She sought the injunction to recover her paraphernal and exclusive property, which was under
Clemente's management. The court, however, ruled that Article 103 of the Civil Code, which
prohibits the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the
filing of the petition, also precluded the hearing of her motion for the injunction. Lucy
challenged this ruling in her certiorari proceeding.
Issue/s:
1. Does Article 103 of the Civil Code bar the court from hearing a motion for a preliminary
mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to a suit for legal separation
before the six-month period elapses?
2. Should the court have acted on the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction prior to
the expiration of the six-month period?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the lower court's order suspending the
hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court held that
Article 103 is not an absolute bar to the hearing of such motions prior to the expiration of the six-
month period. The Court directed the respondent Judge to hear the motion for a preliminary
mandatory injunction without delay.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Court reasoned that while the six-month period is intended as a cooling-off period for
potential reconciliation between spouses, it does not prevent the court from asserting its judicial
power when necessary. Article 103 allows for the appointment of an administrator to manage the
parties' properties, indicating that the question of property management should not remain
unresolved during the six-month period. The Court emphasized the need for prompt resolution of
disputes regarding property management, especially in cases involving accusations of
concubinage and attempts on one spouse's life. Furthermore, by the time the order was issued,
more than six months had elapsed, removing any impediment for the court to act on the motion.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court granted Lucy's plea for certiorari, emphasizing the necessity for the court to
address issues of property management and the issuance of the preliminary mandatory
injunction, ultimately promoting justice and protecting the rights of the parties involved.
Case Digest: Buenaventura San Juan v. Dorotea Mejia
G.R. No. [Insert Case Number]
Promulgated on: [Insert Date]
Facts of the Case:
Buenaventura San Juan filed a petition for certiorari to annul the order of Judge Manuel E.
Valenzuela of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which granted support pendente lite to Dorotea
Mejia and her two minor children. Mejia's marriage to San Juan was declared null and void due
to his prior marriage to Isabel Bandin. On February 25, 1981, Mejia sought support from San
Juan, which led to the challenged order requiring him to pay P2,500.00 monthly starting January
1, 1982. San Juan's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file this petition on
March 16, 1982.
While the petition was pending, San Juan proposed to pay the accrued support of P15,000.00 in
installments and requested a reduction of the monthly support to P1,000.00, citing financial
constraints. The court approved the proposal but had not acted on the request for a reduction due
to the judge's absence abroad.
Issue/s:
1. Is the petition for certiorari rendered moot by San Juan’s willingness to pay the ordered
support and his proposal for a reduction in the monthly support amount?
2. Should the factual issue regarding San Juan’s current ability to pay the support be
resolved by the lower court?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic, noting that San Juan’s
willingness to comply with the support order and the court's approval of his payment plan made
the issue of support moot. The Court emphasized that the order fixing the amount of support
pendente lite was not final and could be modified based on evidence of changing financial
circumstances.
Legal Basis and Application:
The Court clarified that support pendente lite can be modified according to the obligor's financial
ability, and such changes should be presented and resolved in the proper forum. The ruling
underlined that the previous amount of P2,500.00 could be re-evaluated depending on San Juan's
financial condition.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that support obligations could change
with circumstances and should be addressed by the lower court with appropriate evidence.