BHOPAL GAS

DISASTER 1984
By :
• Allene Albania Linus (45445)
• Avinashrao A/L Nageswara Rao (46363)
• Dayang Noor Azie binti Abang Zainal Abidin (45516)
• Muhd Luqman bin Mohd Yusoff (45738)
 INTRODUCTION
• World’s deadliest industrial disaster

• At Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant, Bhopal , Madhya Pradesh

• Around 30,000 tonnes of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas released

• Affected 36 municipal wards of Bhopal

• Estimated about 558,125 people injured

 38,478 temporary partial injuries
 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries

• Death toll
 3,500 died in first 3 days
 10,000 immediate deaths
 25,000 died in long run
 THE COMPANY
In the early 1980s, the demand for Location = UCIL factory was
pesticides had fallen, but Bhopal, Madhya built in 1969 which
production continued, leading to Pradesh owned by the U.S.
build-up of stores of unused MIC multinational Union
Carbide Corporation
UNION (UCC)

CARBIDE
INDIA
LIMITED UCC CEO =
Warren
UCC sold its stake in UCIL to
Anderson
Eveready Industries India
Limited (EIIL), which Produce the pesticide Sevin (UCC's
subsequently merged with brand name for carbaryl) using
McLeod Russel (India) Ltd methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an
intermediate
Rusting building at the abandoned former Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India
The flare tower, where highly toxic methyl isocyanate gas was released into the
air in the 1984 disaster, at the abandoned Union Carbide pesticide factory in
Bhopal
www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/12/bhopal-the-worlds-worst-industrial-disaster-30-years-later/100864/
OPERATIONAL PROBLEM
• The chloroform ratio contain in the soil is two times greater than the
maximum standard by the US Environmental Protection Energy Board

• The standard used at UCIL does not standardize with other Union Carbide
organisation around the world

• UCIL store MIC in a large amount than the limit recommended

• MIC physical properties, BP= 39.1 ᶿC, vapour pressure = 348 mmHg at 20 ᶿC

• UCIL have cut the production cost by stopping the operation of the cooling
system, however the chemical need to be store at 32 ᶿF and this cause the
chemical temperature to increase drastically and reach to the boiling point
easily and vaporise

Open
 SEVERAL IRREGULARITIES
Shutdown of Safety system unable
The problem were
refrigeration unit Worker with no formal to cope (1st system
either fixed without
designed to keep MIC training and ordered by inoperable for days,
further examination or
cool and inhibit novice supervisor 2nd out of service for
ignored (internal leaks)
chemical reactions maintenance for weeks)

Budget reduction lead

Spare tank for Instruments were No computer system.
to insufficient training
temporary storage of unreliable (ignore the relied on workers
levels, requirements,
MIC are occupied initial warning of senses (eyes started to
education and
(should be empty) pressure) water)
maintenance levels

No effective public
warning for disaster. Most workers panicked
MIC plant staff cut
No brochures or public and escape leaving
from 12 to 6 people
education on responsibility
emergency
CAUSES OF THE INCIDENT
BEFORE THE INCIDENT
Dec 1981: May 1982:
•Plant operator •UC's internal
killed by safety audit
phosgene gas records 61
leak hazards.

Jan 1982: Oct 1982:

•28 workers •MIC leaks from
injured after broken valve
phosgene leak and 4 workers
exposed
 CONDITION OF THE PLANT
Safety system Condition on 2nd Dec 1984
Vent gas scrubber (uses caustic soda to neutralize On standby since MIC not in active production
toxic gas exhaust from MIC plant and storage but could be activated by plant operators in event
tanks before release thru vent stack or flare) of need
Flare (burns toxic gases to neutralize them) Insufficient capacity to burn large volumes of
escaping gas; shut down in November for
replacement of a corroded pipe; MIC process vents
rerouted to the vent gas scrubber while repairs
proceed
Refrigeration system (keep MIC at temperature of Shut down June 1984 and coolant (Freon) drained
0-5 C (32 to 42 F) where it is less reactive) for use elsewhere in plant
Firewater spray pipes (to control escaping gasses, Functional but insufficient height to reach top of
cool over-heated equipment or douse fires) vent stack
Safety valve between MIC storage tanks and MIC Operational; designed to hold MIC in at normal
holding tank in SEVIN production area pressures and release it if pressure to high
 HOW WATER ENTERED THE
MIC TANK
2ND DECEMBER 1984

Slip band: solid disk. 10.30-10.45pm

Required to be insert •Changing shift. Washing
into the pipe above the process continues
water washing inlet as 10.30pm
plant manual requires •Water flowed into tank
E610 via a normally-open
9.30pm isolated valve

•Water washing begins and Sabotage Theory 1988

water accumulated in the
8-9pm popes due to blocked •None of the water used for
bleeder valve (overflow Relief valve pipe to washing traveled far
•The slip bind is not device) downstream
installed before the
jumper then to relief enough down to enter Tank
flushing of phosgene valve pipe. Then, flow E610
system to scrubber via A worker shut off the into open blow-down •by 10.30pm a disgruntled
MIC storage tank. valve (nitrogen worker removes a pressure
Temperature of MIC in water flow but the plant
supervisor ordered the pressurization system). gauge on a pipe leading to
tanks is between 15 and
20 degrees C . resume of washing. Lastly, into the tank Tank E610 and connects a
E610. water hose to the coupler.
Water enters Tank E610.
 2ND - 3RD DECEMBER 1984 12:40 am
• MIC plant operation
suspended. in plant
12:30 am and external toxic
• Pressure at gas siren turned on.
maximum reading Refrigeration system
12:15 am (55 psi). engage gas fail.
• Temperature of tank vent scrubber.
increases to over caustic soda does not
11:30pm 200C and pressure flow
• Notice MIC smell about 25-30 psi
11:00 pm
and leak. Set up About 2:00 am
water spray to
neutralize leaking • Army engineer units
• Pressure of Tank with trucks are
E610 risen from 2psi and inform control 2:30 am mobilized. Assist
to 10psi. within room personnel.
• External siren general populace (to
normal range (2- hospitals and clinics)
turned on again.
25psi) 1:30 am
• Bhopal police chief
informed of leak by
1:00 am on-duty officer
• Obvious noise and
before 1:00 am
smell of gas odor Before 8:00 am:
fleeing around
• Realized Tank E619 neighborhood Madhya Pradesh governor order
is not empty. Cannot
relieve pressure.
closure of plant and arrest of plant
manager and 4 other employees
IMPACTS

Health Environment Community Legal issue

IMPACT ON HEALTH
• Gas cloud affected around 500,000 people in Bhopal

• Initial exposures led to coughing, severe eye irritation and suffocation

• Thousands died the next day mainly due to choking and oedema. Stillbirth
rate and neonatal mortality rate increased drastically

• Survivors are affected with problems related to the eyes, respiratory system,
neurological system, and children’s growth

• In 2014, around 150,000 survivors still struggle with health problem

IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENT
• Gas cloud was denser than air, stayed close to the ground

• Trees became barren and animals died within a few days

• Supplies became scarce, fishing was prohibited

• Plant was used as chemical dumping ground after closing

• Soil and water near plant were heavily polluted with toxic chemicals

• In 2004, researched showed contamination occurred up to three kilometres from original

site

• In 2010, a photojournalist was hospitalised after investigating the site due to toxic
environment
IMPACT ON COMMUNITY
• Healthcare became overloaded. Qualified doctors were insufficient

• Mass funerals and cremation for the victims

• Around 50 work-sheds and 2000 flats for victims were built

• Domestic necessities and infrastructures were unavailable

• Government allocated relief funds for victims through tax money

• Many survivors died after the initial exposure

LEGAL ISSUES
• Indian government passed Bhopal Gas Leak Act, making it a legal representative for the
victims

• Proceeding was between UCC and the Indian government

• UCC proposed 350 million dollars settlement figure, rejected by the Indian government

• The agreed settlement was 470 million dollars and was paid immediately by UCC

• CEO of UCC, Warren Anderson was charged in 1991. He did not appear for trial and
sought asylum in US. US rejected any extradition and he died in 2014

• In 2010, 7 UCIL employees were charged with 2 years imprisonment and 100,000 rupees.
Released after paying bail

• Currently, Dow Chemicals own the UCIL plant. However, jurisdiction was given to local
government for environmental clean up

• Clean up was incomplete, and water supply in Bhopal is still heavily contaminated
LAWS AMMENDED
Factories act
1948 and
subsequent
Manufacture, amendments
Central motor
storage and
vehicles rules
import of
(CMVR) 1989
hazardous
and
chemical (MS & New laws amendments
HC) rules, 1989 amended
after the
Bhopal Gas
Leak
Incident Chemical
Disaster accidents
management (Emergency
act 2005 PPR) rules,
Public 1996
liability
insurance
(PLI) act,
1991
 SUGGESTIONS
Act seriously Sophisticated backup
Strict adherence to safety systems needed
regular review of on small
problems in developing nations
safety standards

Public education in
Sense of urgency on all developing countries
safety problems and regarding hazards of
Suggestions to
attention to worst case Avoid Bhopal
toxic substances
possibilities routine in Incident in Future
industrial
Company executives
should be technically-
Special training on not just
Rural areas of administratively
handling hazardous developing world should
facilities added in trained in businesses
not be used to that use toxic
developing nations experiment new chemicals
complex technology
CONCLUSION
• Bhopal incident cause by human error

• The error affect the residence health and polluting the environment

• Company should increase their safety management

THANK YOU