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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 139998 October 29, 2002

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), AS LIQUIDATOR OF CLOSED RURAL BANK OF

MUNTINLUPA, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Special Sixth Division, HON. ALBERTO L. LERMA, Presiding Judge, RTC of
MUNTINLUPA CITY, Branch 256, and JOSE EMMANUEL JALANDONI, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner seeks to annul the resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, dated June
18, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 53094, as well as its resolution2 dated August 4, 1999, denying the motion for
reconsideration.

The antecedent facts, as culled from records, are as follows:

On February 3, 1978, the Monetary Board (MB) of the then Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas), through Resolution No. 213,3 closed the Rural Bank of Muntinlupa, Inc. (RBMI) due to insolvency and
placed it under receivership. Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC) was duly appointed as receiver.
The MB found that RBMI’s total assets of ₱4.4 million were insufficient to meet its liabilities of ₱8.2 million.

On August 28, 1981, the MB, after confirming the insolvent status of RBMI, issued Resolution No. 1523, ordering the
liquidation of said bank.4

On April 6, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of RBMI, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9697,
with the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Branch 25 (hereinafter Liquidation Court). This was pursuant to
Section 29 of R.A. No. 265,5 (now Section 306 of R.A. No. 7653).7 Private respondent opposed the liquidation,
alleging that the bank was not insolvent but capable of rehabilitation.

On June 6, 1983, the Liquidation Court dismissed Sp. Proc. No. 9697 on a finding that RBMI merely had liquidity
problems, but was not in a state of insolvency.

The Central Bank filed a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 03808, with the appellate
court alleging that in dismissing Sp. Proc. No. 9697, the Liquidation Court acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On November 22, 1984, the appellate court decided AC-G.R. SP No. 03808 in favor of Central Bank and remanded
Sp. Proc. No. 9697 to the Liquidation Court for further proceedings. Dissatisfied with a mere order to remand, the
Central Bank moved for reconsideration. This caused the Court of Appeals, on January 4, 1985, to amend the
decretal portion of its order. It granted the writ of certiorari, nullified the challenged orders of the Liquidation Court,
and ordered the latter to approve the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 9697 and assist in the liquidation of RBMI.
Private respondent Jose Emmanuel Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution,
which the appellate court denied on July 23, 1985.

Private respondent then elevated the matter to this Court in Apollo Salud, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines,
et al.8 docketed as G.R. No. 71630. On August 19, 1986, we decided it as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-03808 dated January 4,
1985 and July 23, 1985 are set aside and the Decision dated November 22, 1984 is reinstated and affirmed. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Sp. Proc. No. 9697 was then remanded to the Liquidation Court to determine whether the continuation in business
by RBMI would cause probable losses to its clients and creditors and if Board Resolutions No. 213 and 1523 had
been issued with bad faith and arbitrariness.

On August 9, 1994, the Liquidation Court dismissed Sp. Proc. No. 9697 without prejudice, in view of the proposal by
some stockholders of the bank to rehabilitate it.

On October 26, 1995, petitioner filed anew a petition for assistance in the liquidation of RBMI with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 95-076. Private respondent opposed on the
ground that as controlling stockholder of RBMI, he is the party with the preferential right to rehabilitate the bank. It is
this action which gave rise to the instant case.

On July 11, 1996, the RTC granted the petition. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but this was denied
on January 8, 1997.

Private respondent then filed a motion to declare petitioner in contempt and to suspend the liquidation proceedings
pending submission of a rehabilitation plan. He likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner opposed it, relying on Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, which explicitly declares insolvency proceedings as
"final and executory," and thus may not be enjoined, restrained, or set aside by the courts.

On December 15, 1998, the trial court granted private respondent’s application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, thus:

WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby granted. Let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against Petitioner or its
representatives, enjoining them to desist from disposing of the assets of the Rural Bank of Muntinlupa, Inc., until
final Orders from the Court, upon Movant's filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00), to answer for any damages. Petitioner may sustain by reason of the injunction, should the Court find
that Movant is not entitled thereto.

SO ORDERED.10

In enjoining the disposal of the bank’s assets, the trial court noted that a rehabilitation plan submitted by private
respondent was still being deliberated upon. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovecited order, but it was
denied in an order of March 16, 1999.

On June 4, 1999, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 53094, challenging the trial court’s orders of December 15, 1998 and March 16, 1999. On June 18, 1999,
the appellate court dismissed it for having been filed outside of the reglementary period provided for in Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, thus:

In this case, petitioner alleged that it received a copy of the Order dated December 15, 1998 on JANUARY 6, 1999.
On February 5, 1999 ¾ or thirty (30) days thereafter ¾ it filed its Motion for Reconsideration thereof. It received the
Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration on April 5, 1999.

Applying the foregoing rule, petitioner has a remaining period of thirty (30) days from April 5, 1999 or until May 5,
1999 within which to file petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed its petition on June 4, 1999. Clearly, the same
was filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is ordered
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on August 4, 1999. Hence, the
1âwphi1

instant petition.

The pertinent issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

At the outset, we note that on June 4, 1999, when CA-G.R. SP No. 53094 was filed, the prevailing rule, Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as amended by Circular No. 39-98, provided that:

SEC. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed xxx.

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or
resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice
of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Petitioner allegedly received the order of the lower court granting the writ of preliminary injunction on January 6,
1999. On February 5, 1999, it moved for reconsideration, which interrupted the running of the 60-day period. At this
point, 29 days of the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari had already lapsed. Hence, when petitioner
received its copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on April 5, 1999, it only had 31 days or until
May 6, 1999 within which to institute its special civil action for certiorari.12 But petitioner only instituted CA-G.R. SP
No. 53094 only on June 4, 1999 or well after the 60-day reglementary period. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not
abuse its discretion by dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
CA Rollo, pp. 116-117.
2
Id. at 137-138.
3
Rollo, p. 71.
4
Id. at 72.
5
Entitled "An Act Establishing The Central Bank Of The Philippines, Defining Its Powers In The Administration
Of The Monetary and Banking System, Amending the Pertinent Provisions Of The Administrative Code With
Respect To The Currency And The Bureau Of Banking, And For Other Purposes."
6
SEC. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation.—Whenever, upon report of the head of the
supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:

(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business:
Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands
induced by financial panic in the banking community;

(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral to meet its
liabilities; or

(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or
creditors; or

(d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final,
involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the
 institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior
hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.

For a quasi-bank, any person of recognized competence in banking or finance may be

designated as receiver.

The receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the
institution, administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers of
a receiver under the Revised Rules of Court but shall not, with the exception of administrative
expenditures, pay or commit any act that will involve the transfer or disposition of any asset of
the institution: Provided, That the receiver may deposit or place the funds of the institution in
nonspeculative investments. The receiver shall determine as soon as possible, but not later than
ninety (90) days from take-over whether the institution may be rehabilitated or otherwise placed
in such a condition that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public: Provided, That any determination for the resumption of
business of the institution shall be subject to prior approval of the Monetary Board.

If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume
business in accordance with the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in
writing the board of directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the liquidation
of the institution. The receiver shall:

(1) file ex parte with the proper regional trial court, and without requirement of prior notice
or any other action, a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the institution pursuant to
a liquidation plan adopted by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation for general
application to all closed banks. In case of quasi-banks, the liquidation plan shall be
adopted by the Monetary Board. Upon acquiring jurisdiction, the court shall, upon motion
by the receiver after due notice, adjudicate disputed claims against the institution, assist
the enforcement of individual liabilities of the stockholders, directors and officers, and
decide on other issues as may be material to implement the liquidation plan adopted. The
receiver shall pay the cost of the proceedings from the assets of the institution.

(2) convert the assets of the institution to money, dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties, for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution in accordance with the
rules on concurrence and preference of credit under the Civil Code of the Philippines and
he may, in the name of the institution, and with the assistance of counsel as he may
retain, institute such actions as may be necessary to collect and recover accounts and
assets of, or defend any action against, the institution. The assets of an institution under
receivership or liquidation shall be deemed in custodia legis in the hands of the receiver
and shall, from the moment the institution was placed under receivership or liquidation, be
exempt from any order of garnishment, levy, attachment, or execution.

The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall
be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for
certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave
abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may
only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten
(10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing
receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.

x x x.
7
Also known as " The New Central Bank Act."
8
227 Phil. 551 (1986).
9
Id. at 563-564.
10
Rollo, p. 61.
11
Id. at 65.
12
Section 2, Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
 SEC. 2. Effect of interruption. — Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the
period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the
cessation of the cause thereof.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period.

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