Chapter-I

Genesis of Contemporary Environmentalism

The concern for nature is not completely new, but it has undergone conspicuous

neglect in the circle of philosophy for a long time. Even the so called philosophy of

science has concentrated on scientific concepts and methods, rather than on

integrated nature. Social and political philosophy has given more emphasis on the

social environment than on the natural environment. As a matter of fact, none of

the branches of mainstream western philosophy, like metaphysics, epistemology

and ethics, has historically been hospitable to the issue of environment and to its

values. Only with the advent of applied philosophy movement, environmental

philosophy (and environmental ethics in particular) has come out as a sub-

discipline of philosophy. Newly developed environmental ethics and philosophy is

that discipline that studies the theories and principles of the relationship of human

beings to, and also the value and moral status of, the environment and its non-

human contents. It concerns not only our behaviour but also the normative theories

and principles as applicable to the conservation and survival of this planet.

Naturally, it thus involves our views on nature, value theories, our position on this

earth, of the non-human animals and plants and the so called non-living nature.

With all these, environmental ethics and philosophy has set out its journey.

1
 As environmental ethics and philosophy has developed with the advent of

‘applied ethics movement’, let us take a quick look at the development of

contemporary applied ethics. Applied ethics involves that level of moral inquiry as

applied to practical situations, examining specific controversial moral issues that

contemporary societies face, and these are bio-medical issues, like the morality of

abortion, infanticide, surrogacy, etc., socio-political issues like terrorism, nuclear

warfare, destituteness and affluence, globalization of culture, capital punishment,

moral issues related to business, media and professions, environmental concerns and

animal rights. By using the conceptual tools of traditional normative ethics, and

sometimes of metaethics, applied ethics tries to resolve such controversial issues

based on the particularity and contextuality of the problems. And the branch of

applied ethics which studies the norms and principles of the relationship of human

beings to the environment is regarded as environmental ethics.

Being faced with an imminent eco-catastrophe, responsible thinkers from

diverse spheres of life—both academics and activists—have come forward to

tackle this problem. Contemporary philosophers, especially moral philosophers,

have responded as well. They have been concerned with the moral grounds for

protecting the non-human animals, the moral foundations for codes and laws

protecting endangered species and the ethical basis for preserving and restoring the

2
environment in general. Moral philosophers, to be precise, environmental moral

philosophers, have come forward to review our traditional views towards nature

and corresponding normative codes. They have found that our traditional (western)

nature-views and normative principles have neither been eco-friendly nor been

morally adequate. They fail to rise above the anthropocentric moral framework

which takes human interests to be only intrinsically, and so morally, valuable,

while the rest of non-human nature is regarded valuable, so far as it serves human

purpose only. Contemporary environmental philosophers regard such ethics as

hailing speciesism, the position that is based on species-discrimination, which

exhibits our moral blindness and shallowness of heart towards the non-human

nature. Needless to say, this attitude goes against any healthy environmentalism. It

seems that unless and until we overcome this speciesism and accept a holistic

position in which a living organism or a plant species or a landscape is regarded as

having some value in itself (i.e., intrinsic/inherent value), we would not really feel

direct moral obligation to save them. A genuine ecological ethics demands that, as

we are inseparably connected with other things and beings, the nature should be

regarded as intrinsically or inherently valuable, irrespective of their usefulness to

the human species.

3
 The questioning and rethinking of the relationship of human beings with the

natural environment over the last sixty years reflected an already wide-spread

perception in the 1960s that the late twentieth century faced a ‘population

explosion’ that gives a serious threat to the health of nature. In 1968 Stanford

ecologist Paul Ehrlich published The Population Bomb warning us how the growth

of human population threaten the viability of planetary life-support systems.

Among the accessible work that has first drawn attention to a sense of crisis was

Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1963), which consisted of a number of essays

earlier published in the New Yorker magazine detailing how pesticides, such as

DDT, concentrate through the food chain. It first warned of the dangers to humans

and to wildlife from toxic pesticide residues, which kindled the spark of

environmental ethics. Carson recorded her protest against human control of nature

by reiterating that ‘the control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born

of the Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that

Nature exists for the convenience of man. On the other side, the historian Lynn

White, Jr. published an essay in one of the most important journals Science in 1967

on the historical roots of the environmental crisis, where he argues that the main

strands of Judeo-Christian thinking had encouraged the overexploitation of nature

by maintaining the superiority of humans over all other forms of life on the earth,

and by depicting all of nature as created for the use of humans. White’s contention
4
is that the Bible itself and the works of the Church Fathers support the

anthropocentric perspective to the effect that humans are the only beings that

matter on this earth. This anthropocentric bias has helped to direct the modern

science and technology to exploit nature, for human purposes, of course. White is

careful to note that some minority traditions within Christianity provide an antidote

of stewardship to the ‘arrogance’ of the mainstream tradition of anthropocentric

speciesism. But most of the environmentalists hold that the whole question of the

environmental crisis is fundamentally is a crisis of the West’s anthropocentric

philosophical and religious orientations and values.

A look on the development of environmental philosophy we will find that as

early as 1949 the American forester Aldo Leopold advocated for the first time an

appreciation and conservation of things and beings ‘natural, wild and free’.

Leopold's A Sand County Almanac (1949) argued for the adoption of a Land

Ethic. By the term ‘Land’ Leopold does not merely mean soil, rather it symbolizes

the ecological concept of community, which includes all of its components, like

soil, waters, plants, animals, etc. That the Land is to be loved and respected is

obviously a genuine extension of ethics. He holds the principle that a thing is right

when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the ecological

community. It would not be right if it tends otherwise. Leopold’s attempt to extend

5
our moral horizon to cover the natural environment and its non-human contents

draws explicit attention of the later environmentalists. In 1971 the first conference

on environmental philosophy was held at the University of Georgia, USA. Just two

years later Richard Routley published his paper ‘Is there a Need for a New, an

Environmental Ethic?’ which advocates clearly for a new ethic. He hints at the

anthropocentrism imbedded in what he called the ‘dominant Western view’, or ‘the

Western superethic’, is, in effect, ‘human chauvinism’. This, he argued, is just

another form of class chauvinism, which is simply based on blind class loyalty or

prejudice, and thus unjustifiably discriminates against those outside the privileged

class. In his ‘last man’ argument, Routley asks us to imagine a hypothetical

situation in which the ‘last man’, surviving a world catastrophe, acted to ensure the

elimination of all other living things and the destruction of all the landscapes after

his demise. From the human chauvinistic perspective, the ‘last man’ would do

nothing morally wrong if he does it, since his destructive act in question would not

cause any damage to the interests and well-being of humans, who would by then

have disappeared. According to Routley, the non-human living things, whose

destruction is to be ensured by the ‘last man’, have intrinsic/inherent value, a kind

of value independent of their usefulness for humans. Based on this intuition,

Routley concludes that the main tradition of Western moral thinking is unable to

6
allow the recognition that natural things have inherent value, and that the tradition

requires overhaul of a significant kind.

John Passmore, however, does not favour a completely new ethic. In his

Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions

published in 1974, he argues that the Judeo-Christian tradition of thought about

nature, despite being predominantly ‘despotic’, contains resources for regarding

humans as ‘stewards’ or ‘perfectors’ of God's creation. Any change in attitudes to

our natural surroundings, he argued, would have to resonate and have some

continuity with the very tradition which had legitimised our practices so far.

Anyhow, Charles Darwin’s theory of Evolution has taught us to recognise the

interdependence of living species in the late 19th century. As we have noted, such a

proposal for an extension of ethics to cover all the species of the living systems of

the earth first emerged in the 50’s of the last century through Aldo Leopold’s A

Sand County Almanac. Later with the paradigm shift—from the concept of nature

as static equilibrium to the concept of nature as flux—another version of holistic,

ecological philosophy expresses itself in 1973 through the proposal of ‘Deep

Ecology’ by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, a professor at University of

Oslo. It helped us to overcome what he calls ‘shallow ecology’ movement by

pointing out its anthropocentric bias, and rejecting the biblical idea of humans as
7
authoritarian guardian of the nature. Arne Naess, who introduced the terms ‘Deep

Ecology’ and ‘Ecosophy’ into environmental literature, based his article of 1973 in

Inquiry on a talk he gave in Bucharest in 1972 at the Third World Future Research

Conference. In that talk Naess discussed the longer-range background of the

ecology movement and its connection with respect for nature and the

intrinsic/inherent worth of other beings. A series of literature then followed.

Some other events need also to be mentioned here: The Gaia hypothesis was

reformulated by the chemist James Lovelock and co-developed by the

microbiologist Lynn Margulis in the 1970s. James Lovelock called his first

proposal the Gaia hypothesis, but the term used now-a-days is Gaia theory.

Another environmentalist Holmes Rolston-III, comes forward in the 90’s to argue

that the protection of species, ecosystem, natural processes, etc. is also our moral

duty. It would be wrong, he maintains, to eliminate a rare butterfly species simply

to increase the monetary value of specimens already held by collectors. He argues

that every organism has a good of its own and so is a holder of value. A species is

a form of life that defends it and thus has value. The ecosystem, or the biosphere as

a whole, is a life-sustaining process. Meanwhile, Christopher Stone, a professor of

law at the University of Southern California, proposed that trees and other natural

objects should have at least the same standing in law as corporations. In his paper

8
‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (1972) he

argues that environmental issues be litigated before the court in the name of

inanimate objects about to be despoiled. Reacting to Stone's proposal, Jöel

Feinberg, later known as animal rights-theorist, raised a serious problem in 1974.

Only items that have interests, Feinberg argued, can be regarded as having legal

standing and, likewise, moral standing. The movement for animal liberation and

animal rights, which emerged strongly in the 1970s, can be thought of as a socio-

political movement aimed at representing the previously neglected interests of

animals. But the classical version of Biocentrism showed a deeper concern for the

whole biotic community. Paul Taylor, the most important advocate of biocentrism,

developed an individualist deontological approach to environmental ethics in his

‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’ (1981). He argued that all organisms are

teleological centers of life, pursuing their own good in their own way.

Anyhow, from the mid-1980s onwards, research, publication and teaching in

environmental ethics have rapidly expanded. Ethical positions first mooted in the

articles in Environmental Ethics in the early 1980s, then crystallized into densely

argued books and anthologies, most notable amongst these Holmes Rolston’s

‘Environmental Ethics’ and Paul Taylor’s ‘Respect for Nature’. The discipline of

environmental ethics is by then institutionalised in many parts of the developed

9
world and is increasingly chosen by researchers as the subject of their dissertation.

The scholars of the developing world, too, have played an active part in its

development. Indian thinkers, like Ram Chandra Guha, Radha Kamal Mukherjee,

activists like Sundarlal Bahuguna, Medha Patkar, Arundhati Roy, have helped in

popularizing environmental issues.

The endeavour to bring out journals in this field of environmental ethics and

philosophy simultaneously started. The first major journal, Environmental Ethics,

is founded at the University of New Mexico in 1979, with Eugene C. Hargrove as

the editor-in-chief and Holmes Rolston-III as the Associate Editor. Another

important journal Environmental Values gets based at the University of Lancaster.

Other journals contributing to environmentalism are also founded during the

1990s, and these include Worldviews: Environment, Culture, Religion first

published in 1997 and Ethics, Place, and Environment in 1998; in the USA Ethics

and the Environment in 1996 and Philosophy and Geography in 1997, The

Trumpeter in 1983. Besides, works in this field are also found in mainstream

journals of philosophy. In 1990 Rolston-III founded the International Society for

Environmental Ethics (ISEE), of which he became the President and Newsletter

Editor, with Laura Westra of the University of Windsor, Ontario, as the Secretary.

10
The society organises sessions of environmental philosophy and ethics round the

year all over the world, and it has a worldwide array of representatives.

The late Henry Odera Oruka became the founding director of an

Ecophilosophy Center at Nairobi, Kenya and organised in Nairobi a World

Conference of Philosophy on the themes of Environment, Development, and their

Philosophical Bearing in 1991. A further example is the International Conference

on Development, Ethics and the Environment, organised in Kuala Lumpur,

Malaysia in 1995 by Azian Baharuddin of the University of Malaya and the

independent Institute for Policy Research.

On the political front, the rise of environmental or ‘green’ parties in Europe in

the 1980s was accompanied by almost immediate schisms between groups known

as the ‘realists’ versus the ‘fundamentalists’. The ‘realists’ stood for ‘reform

environmentalism’, working with business and government to soften the impact of

pollution and resource depletion, especially on fragile ecosystems or endangered

species. The ‘fundies’, on the other hand, argued for radical change, the setting of

stringent new priorities, and even the overthrow of capitalism and liberal

individualism, which were taken to be the major ideological causes of

anthropogenic environmental devastation.

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 Anyhow, from the mid-1980’s, several universities began to offer courses in

environmental ethics, most notably Colorado State University and the University

of North Texas in the USA, while Lancaster University in the UK began to offer

MA courses on environmental values and philosophy. By the end of twentieth

century, environmental ethics expanded worldwide, and most universities began to

offer courses on environmental philosophy.

Anyhow, if we make a through survey of this progress of environmental

philosophy, we would find the following main debates engineering the

development of contemporary environmental philosophy and ethics. The first

controversy moves around understanding the distinction between instrumental

value and intrinsic value of the beings and things. In ethics in general, and

environmental ethics in particular, the distinction between instrumental value and

intrinsic /inherent value is of considerable importance. The instrumental value is

the value of things as means to further some other’s ends, whereas the intrinsic or

inherent value is the value of thing as end in itself, regardless of whether they are

also useful as means to other’s ends. For instance, a certain wild plant may have

instrumental value to us as it provides the ingredients for some medicine or as an

aesthetic object for human observers. But if we consider that the plant has some

value in itself, independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends, such

12
as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plant will be

said to have inherent value. We normally regard a person as having intrinsic value,

i.e., value in his or her own right, independently of his or her prospects for serving

the ends of other. It is commonly agreed that something's possession of

intrinsic/inherent value generates a prima facie direct moral duty on the part of

moral agents to protect it, or at least, to refrain from damaging it. In environmental

ethics the discussion of intrinsic/inherent value inevitably raises a question about

the origin of such value. Is it created by human beings, or is it something already in

existence in the world, which human beings recognise rather than bring it into

being? This has, again, given rise to a debate among environmental ethicists,

sometimes called the dispute between the value subjectivists and the value

objectivists. The value subjectivists argue that intrinsic value is something which

humans create and attach to their own lives, the lives of other people, and/or to

particular states of affairs, or perhaps to qualities, such as harmony. The value

objectivists, on the other hand, think that intrinsic value is not something which

humans create, but something already there in the world. J. Baird Callicott, an

environmentalist, for example, argues that all values are subjective, human created

(anthropogenic) but this does not mean that they must be human centered

(anthropocentric). Holmes Rolston III, an U.S.A-based environmental philosopher,

on the other hand, upholds that value in nature is objective, and it is located in
13
individuals, so also in species, ecosystems, and evolutionary processes. For this

reason, the natural world objectively contains intrinsic/inherent value. (It may be

noted here that some moral philosophers make a distinction between intrinsic value

and inherent value. As against instrumental value, intrinsic value is independent of

other agents’ needs or choices. But inherent value is absolutely independent of

valuers, while intrinsic value awaits a valuing conscious being, even though that

being is the valuer itself. When we feel obligated to a thing or being in nature, it is

not because of some mental state, like pleasure, of the valuer, but because of its

own value, viz., for its inherent worth. So when we speak of value of some sentient

being, it is better to use the term ‘intrinsic value’, and when we speak of value of a

being or thing that cannot feel its own worth itself, we should use the other term

‘inherent value’. When we refer to both sentient and non-sentient beings and

things, we shall here use these two terms mostly with a ‘/’, viz. ‘intrinsic/inherent

value’.) Keekok Lee, another environmental thinker, argues that we need to think

of different varieties of intrinsic/inherent value: ‘articulated’ intrinsic value, which

is created and possessed by humans alone and ‘mutely enacted’ inherent value,

which appears in the natural world. Another question concerns the locus of such

intrinsic/inherent value for both subjectivists and objectivists. Here, a wider array

of answers has been proposed. These include attributes of individual living beings,

14
such as consciousness, sentience, the ability to flourish and more abstract qualities,

such as diversity, richness, naturalness and balance.

Along with it, another debate has cropped up, and that is more directly

ethical: how should human beings act in the non-human natural world, given these

conclusions of value theory? How does one make ethical decisions where

perceived values come into conflict? An environmental ethical edifice must, like

any other ethical construction, be built on value theory. However, while it is only

just possible that two philosophers with the same value theory might make

different practical ethical responses, it is quite likely that two philosophers with

different underlying value theories might draw similar practical ethical

conclusions.

This first issue leads us to some such questions: to what extent of the nature

is to be accorded intrinsic or inherent value and moral worth? What would be the

criterion of moral worthiness? Is it sentience? Or something else? Here ‘sentience’

refers to the capacity of creatures feeling pleasure or pain. In this sense the class of

higher animals may be regarded as morally valuable, having intrinsic value. It is

acknowledged that higher animals have the feelings of pleasure and pain, and as

such most environmental thinkers demand moral considerability for them. Some

environmental philosophers go beyond sentience and regard the capacity and

15
tendency of self-growth as the criterion of something having intrinsic or inherent

value, and so, moral worth. Needless to say, in this sense the whole biotic

community, astronomic world, stars and the whole world of non-human animals

come under this purview. This means a proposal to admit moral value of every

species in the world. Some environmentalists speak of moral value of the

ecosystems. All these direct us either to a biocentric or to an eco-centric

environmental ethics, going beyond traditional anthropocentricity. Nevertheless, it

is important to note that their supporters are not unanimous on this issue of moral

extensionism.

The second debate is concerned with moral status of beings. Some moral

thinkers, who hold that discrimination is not a sound moral position, argue in

favour of equal moral worth for all beings; some, however, insert ‘in principle’

clause to this. Others, especially the utilitarians, speak of degrees of value. It may

appear difficult to maintain the position which grants the same moral value to some

insects, like a mosquito, as we value a human. Those, who hold the position of

degrees of value, are in search of some differentiating criteria, like sentience or

intelligence, to accord moral value to beings. We can accept, as some thinkers

suggest, a scale of moral value, with the bottom end being virtually negligible. We

can put the so called trivial beings, like mosquito, on the lower part of scale. On

16
the higher level we can put the sentient beings, at the apex the humans. Even

humans also have divergent interests, ranging from the insignificant to the

monumental. Thus in dealing with things and beings in our environment, we must

weigh the importance of various entities. But some environmental philosophers,

like Arne Naess, feel that ranking is not a completely moral affair.

The third issue centres round the dualism of the animal rights and the nature-

conservation. The issue can be posed thus: can we accept killing individual wild

beasts in order to maintain ecological balance of a region? The animal rightists

refuse to accept killing of individual wild animals for ecological balance. On the

other hand, the conservationists permit such killing keeping in view the integrity of

all the eco-systems. The conflict between animal rightists and conservationists has

come into light through some regional problems. For example, in a part of Africa

there has been a huge growth of wild elephants and that is why it has become

impossible to restore ecological balance there. The conservationists would suggest

killing of some of the elephants in order to maintain the ecological balance for this

particular region. It is likely that animal rightists will oppose this decision. Here it

seems that the animal rightists agree to accord moral value only to the sentient part

of environment, while the conservationists to the whole ecological earth.

17
 The fourth debate is concerned with the relation between value ascription

and conservation. Some thinkers, like Warwick Fox, do not admit any direct

connection between value ascription and conservation. They think that deep Self-

realization or some sort of Identification with the nature is needed to supplement

the process. Deep ecology, e.g., indirectly believes in the divinity of self of human

and of nature. They hold that if we can think to be inseparable from nature only

then we would be aware of conservation or welfare of the environment. What it

means is that mere admission of intrinsic or inherent value does not by itself

guarantee our obligation to the nature. For this we may have to adopt a holistic,

spiritual worldview which, in our terminology, we may call ‘spiritual ecocentrism’.

Fifthly, there is a controversy whether values in nature are regional or global

(universal). Some environmentalists, who regard environmental ethics as merely

contextual ethics, hold that environmental values are regional; and thus they

subscribe to relativist environmentalism. According to them, environmental

problems are primarily local. And as such, we should take values in nature as

regional. But those who believe in universality of values emphasizes on the fact

that the earth is an insulated whole, and so nothing can here be merely local. They

are, however, ready to interpret this universality in terms of interregional

comparisons.

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 The sixth debate is based on feminist interpretation of the ecological

concern. The feminists hold that the females have a deeper concern for the nature,

as they are similar in their productive and reproductive roles. This feminist

perspective is to be taken into consideration while formulating any environmental

policy or norm. But if women are seen closer to the nature because of their

biological and social roles, expressed distinctively through the activities of

reproduction and caring for the off-springs, are we not then leading to the age-old

feminine essentialism, which has historically been used to limit their social roles to

child-bearing and house-keeping, and to perpetuate patriarchal domination over

them? Ecofeminism, a related stance, upholds that the logic of domination over

nature is the same as the domination of women by men. A further tribute to the

development of environmental ethics has been made by Social Ecology. The

proponents of social ecology hold that present ecological problems cannot be

adequately understood, unless and until we resolutely deal with problems within

hierarchical societies and nations. Social ecology takes the major obstacle to social

and natural evolution to be the long history of human attempts to dominate others

and to conquer even nature itself. One of the most distinctive theories advanced by

19
Murray Bookchin is the view that the human urge to dominate nature is based on

human domination over other humans.

And seventhly, the environmentalists focus on the nature and basis of our

future related responsibilities, or responsibilities with regard to future generations.

Environmental responsibilities cannot be based on present human interests only,

rather we should take as well the interests of future generations into account.

When we think about the future, we need to think about transactions and relations

between successive generations. Relations between the generations impinge upon

environmental ethics not only in the sense of relations between overlapping

generations of different ages (generations such as grandparents, parents and

children) but also, more particularly, in the sense of relations between generations

living at different times, including future generation, whose numbers, quality of

life and very existence depend, in part, on current decisions and policies. Future

generations, of course include children conceived in the coming month, and born

next year, and so they foreseeably overlap with contemporary generations. In fact,

they include all the others who will or could inherit our environmental heritage and

problems in the coming centuries. But these heirs of our environmental legacy are

more liable to be forgotten than the contemporary young. So the discussion of

interrelated generations will concern relations between present agents and future

20
generations, rather than relations between older and younger contemporaries as

such.

This is an account of the genesis of contemporary environmental moral

philosophy. This demonstrates, among other things, that critiquing traditional

anthropocentrism is the labour-room of contemporary environmental ethics and

philosophy. And, thematically considered, there are, on the main, three types of

normative theories, and these are Anthropocentrism, Biocentrism and Ecocentrism.

Notes and References:

In writing this chapter we have taken help mainly of the following sources:

1. Robin Attfield. “Environmental Ethics: Overview.” Encyclopedia of Applied

Ethics. vol. 2. Ruth Chadwick et al., eds. San Diego: Academic Press, 1993.
2. Clare Palmer. “An Overview of Environmental Ethics.” Environmental Ethics: An
Anthology. Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III, eds. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2003.
3. Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III. “Introduction: Ethics and Environmental
Ethics.” Environmental Ethics: An Anthology. op. cit.
4. Andrew Brennan & Yeuk-Sze Lo. “Environmental Ethics.” 12 June 2012
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental>.

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 Chapter-II

Anthropocentrism

The term anthropocentrism comes from the Greek words ‘anthropos’ and

‘kentron’. ‘Anthropos’ means ‘human being’ and ‘kentron’ means ‘center’. So,

etymologically, anthropocentrism means humancentredness. It thus refers to the

belief or world-view that humans are at the center of the universe.

Anthropocentrism is often identified as the (theoretical) root-cause of present-day

eco-crisis, human overpopulation, and the extinctions of many non-human species.

It is believed to be the central problematique of contemporary environmental

philosophy. It is used to draw attention to a systematic bias in traditional Western

attitudes to the non-human world. This anthropocentrism may be understood from

different perspectives, and as such, we may start our discussion by taking into

account different types of anthropocentrism: ontological anthropocentrism,

cosmological anthropocentrism, epistemological anthropocentrism, teleological

anthropocentrism, and, of course, moral anthropocentrism.

Ontological Anthropocentrism

Ontological anthropocentrism represents the position that man is the sole object or

perspective of philosophical or metaphysical knowledge, flourished mainly in the

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nineteenth century and twentieth century continental philosophy, known as

existentialism, hermeneutics, etc. Søren Kierkegaard, a Danish existentialist (who

is regarded as the father of existentialism), iterates that the most authentic being is

concrete human existence. Friedrich Nietzsche argued that man does not depend

absolutely upon anyone, not even upon God. Wilhelm Dilthey thought of man as

an individual who is not only involved in history, but is the central point of history.

For Ludwig Feuerbach, too, man is the most perfect product of nature, and culture

is the projection of men. Max Scheler is regarded as the propounder of

philosophical anthropocentrism, most typical of the twentieth century. In his The

Place of Man in Nature Scheler depicts man as a spiritual personality who turns

toward himself, and also transcends the world.

The concrete character of philosophical analysis distinguishes this style of

philosophy from the philosophy of the subject (like that of Kant or Hegel).

Existentialism aims at an ontology of the concrete human person who bears the

unrepeatable mark of individuality. However, the anthropocentric character of this

philosophy is varied among the existentialists because of different types of analysis

of human existence. It reflects differences in their conception of existential

experiences and their evaluation of authentic beinghood. According to Martin

Heidegger, human being is ontologically prior to anything else. He begins his

23
analysis of being by pointing to the fact that man often loses this consciousness of

his own existence and responsibility for it. For Jean-Paul Sartre, the starting point

is a distinction between conscious human existence (being-for-itself) and the

existence of things lacking consciousness (being-in-itself), and the main thesis of

the system is the aspiration to separate man from the world of unconscious things,

the world of nature.

Ontological anthropocentrism is also evident in the thoughts of certain

natural scientists with philosophical orientation, viz. in the thoughts of Pierre

Teilhard de Chardin, M. Bonen, N. M. Bollem, T. H. Huxley, among others.1 For

example, Teilhard de Chardin advocates for cosmic evolution, his theory is all-

embracing and characterizes much more than living things. It may be seen as the

result of a reaction to the view of naive anthropocentrism that man is the center of

the world in view of the central position of the earth, which was dominant till the

sixteenth or seventeenth century. On the other hand, it may be read as a reaction to

an incomplete conception of man, since only his or her individuality was given

importance, and the ‘human phenomenon’ was overlooked. In such a vision of

man, an individual’s nature is parcelled and his integrity is thus lost. Some thinkers

considered man in the bodily aspect, others in the spiritual aspect. The integral man

as object and subject, according to this type of anthropocentrism, holds a polar

24
position in the world and marks the major axis of the world, gives meaning to

history, and is the only absolute index of evolution.

It is often reminded that man is the last link of the evolution of nature.

Man’s ability to direct the world and the course of evolution according to a

preconceived end results from his exceptional position in evolutionary

development. Teilhard de Chardin, in particular, develops this thought and

contends that man is the center of the universe, he perceives himself in everything,

and in terms of his being he stands at the summit of the universe, he is an ‘arrow in

flight’ which by the development of its psyche affirms reality and gives meaning to

the sublimation of consciousness. Man’s capacity for self-conscious thought and

the production of cultures has added a new ‘layer’ to the earth’s surface, which

Teilhard calls the ‘noosphere’ (i.e., the thinking layer) distinct from, yet

superimposed on the biosphere. The noosphere forms the unique environment of

man, marking him off from all other animals.2

Epistemological Anthropocentrism

Epistemological anthropocentrism is the position, according to which any

discussion of knowledge begins from an analysis of consciousness, a position

whose starting point is the human consciousness as the sole subject and object of

25
philosophical analysis. On this view, it is only human being in reference to which

we can speak of knowledge. Epistemological anthropocentrism is visible in the

history of modern philosophy, namely in Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, and

Hume, and it is characteristic of the philosophy of Kant. Kant, e.g., seeks in the

subject the meaning of that which is, and argues that the truth of judgments does

not consist in a correspondence of their contents with an affirmed or denied state-

of-affairs that objectively exists, but has its foundation in internal subjective

relations. According to Kant, man is a conscious being for whom there is nothing

except wonder and astonishment on account of his superiority over all concrete

ends that motivate him to act or not to act. Hence the human reason is the object of

philosophy, for the knowledge of one’s own self is a condition for understanding

the world. Fichte followed Kant and attempted to analyze human consciousness as

autonomous and independent of the influence of natural conditions. Knowledge of

this consciousness is supposed to be knowledge of man as a free being. According

to Fichte, man is responsible not only for himself but for all the domains of his

activity, for the entire environment. The starting point in this philosophy was the

understanding of man as a free being and the explanation of his relation with the

external world. In Hegel’s approach, nature exists only to produce man who

produces history; only man has the awareness of freedom and wants to make the

world his property, to know it and dominate it. The Cartesian project of philosophy
26
as thought turned toward oneself finds implications also in phenomenological

philosophy which was a reflection of cognition, an attempt to reach at the

transcendental subject hidden from natural consciousness as the principle

(‘source’) of phenomena, reducing all reality to absolute subjectivity. For Husserl

man is the only rational subject who comprehends himself adequately in cognition.

Accordingly, our consciousness in its mode of pure, intentional subjectivity

gives meaning to the world. Husserl comes to the point of saying that nothing

is, except by proper achievement of consciousness, whether actual or

potential. He reiterates that the task of philosophy is to understand being, and

as such, it must find a method that could penetrate into the depth of

subjectivity wherein being has its source. Such a method would explain the

constitution of being by the transcendental subjectivity.3

Cosmological Anthropocentrism

Cosmological anthropocentrism is the theory, according to which humans occupy a

privileged place in this cosmos, in this natural order. In astrophysics and

cosmology this theory refers to the philosophical argument that observations of the

physical universe must be compatible with conscious human life that observes it,

that means, there must be humans for the physical universe to exist meaningfully.

27
Some proponents of the argument contend that it explains why the universe has the

age and the fundamental physical elements necessary to accommodate conscious

life. As a result, they believe in the fact that the universe's fundamental constants

happen to fall within the narrow range of thought to allow life. And thus humans

are at the centre of the cosmos.

The strong version of cosmological anthropocentrism states that this is all

the case because the universe is compelled, in some sense, to have conscious life

eventually to emerge. On the other hand, in a sufficiently large universe, some

worlds might evolve conscious life regardless of adverse conditions. Douglas

Adams used the metaphor of a living puddle examining its own shape, since, to

those living creatures, the universe may appear to fit them perfectly (while, in fact,

they simply fit the universe perfectly).4 Critics argue in favor of a weak version,

similar to the one defined by Brandon Carter, which states that the universe’s

ostensible fine tuning is the result of selection bias, i.e. in the long term, only

survivors can observe and report their location in time and space.5

Cosmological anthropocentrism is formulated as a response to a series of

observations that the laws of nature and parameters of the universe take on values

that are consistent with conditions for life as we know it rather than a set of values

that would not be consistent with life as observed on the earth. This view of natural
28
order states that this phenomenon is a necessity because living observers would not

be able to exist, and hence, observe the universe, were these laws and constants not

constituted in this way. As a matter-of-fact, this view first appeared in Brandon

Carter’s contribution to a 1973 Krakow Symposium honouring Copernicus’s 500th

birthday. Carter, a theoretical astrophysicist, articulated the Anthropocentric

Principle in reaction to the Copernican Principle, which states that humans do not

occupy a privileged position in the universe. As Carter said, “Although our

situation is not necessarily central, it is inevitably privileged to some extent.”6

Specifically, Carter disagrees with the effort to use the Copernican principle to

justify the Perfect Cosmological Principle, which states that all large regions and

times in the universe must be statistically identical. Carter defined two forms of the

this principle, a ‘weak’ one which refers only to anthropocentric selection of

privileged space-time locations in the universe, and a more controversial ‘strong’

form which addresses the values of the fundamental constants of physics.7

Teleological Anthropocentrism

‘Telos’ means goal, and, as such, teleology signifies goal-directedness or

purposefulness. Thus, etymologically, teleological anthropocentrism is the view

that everything is made for the sake of humanity, and evolution of animals and

plants for the benefit of humans only. Teleological activity, as against mechanical
29
activity, is purposive in which it is controlled, goal-directed. A teleological order

is that which introduces the notion of processes and structures being fitted to serve

some purpose. From living organisms onwards the whole universe aims at some

such end. The supporters of teleological anthropocentrism uphold that the world

owes its existence to human beings who operate in accordance with a plan, the

intelligibility of human mind.

Ignoring the chauvinistic perspective embedded herein, there are valid

reasons why the human species has a place of some importance, at least in what Sri

Aurobindo terms the ‘terrestrial evolution’.8 Teleologically and esoterically, we

can indeed speak of a ‘human kingdom’.9 The reason for the uniqueness of the

human species and kingdom is something like this: In terms of mental

development and capabilities, the human species has the greatest intellectual

capacity. The dolphin might have a larger brain to body-weight ratio. But

dolphins and whales do not have civilization, as men have. The human kingdom,

which is sometimes called ‘noosphere’10, exists alongside, but it modifies the

geosphere and biosphere. The human kingdom will eventually go into space,

populate the universe, and seed other worlds with life and biospheres, thus

completing Gaia's development as a fully living super-organism.11

30
Moral Anthropocentrism

Although we speak of different versions of anthropocentrism, it is moral

anthropocentrism that actually concerns us in environmental ethics and philosophy.

As a moral view-point, anthropocentrism takes only human interests to be

intrinsically valuable, and upholds that only human interests are truly worthy of

moral considerations. According to this view-point, the non-human world acquires

value in so far as it serves human purposes. In this way, anthropocentrism makes

ethics solely a human enterprise. In environmental philosophy it stands for the

attitudes, values or practices which promote human interests, even at the expense

of the basic, crucial needs and interests of other species or the nature in general. To

illustrate, if I hit a man or woman without sufficient provocation, my conduct

would be judged as morally wrong. But our behaviour would not likewise be

condemned wrong if I kill a goat for flesh!

We may, however, start our discussion by distinguishing between two forms of

moral anthropocentrism: absolute moral anthropocentrism and relative moral

anthropocentrism: i) The anthropocentric view which suggests that only humans

have intrinsic value and assigns absolutely no value for non-human species is what

we call anthropocentrism in an absolutist sense. Obviously, this view of absolute

anthropocentrism permits us any kind of treatment for non-human animals and the

31
nature in general. ii) The anthropocentric view which suggests that humans have

greater intrinsic value than any other species is characterized as relative

anthropocentrism. We may claim, for example, that humans are superior because

they, through culture, ‘realize a greater range of values’ than members of non-

human species, or we might claim that humans are superior in virtue of their

‘unprecedented capacity to create ethical system that imparts worth to other life-

forms.’

Anyhow, one of the first extended philosophical essays addressing

environmental ethics, John Passmore’s Man's Responsibility for Nature, has been

repeatedly criticised by defenders of contemporary environmentalism because of

its anthropocentrism, often claimed to be constitutive of traditional western moral

thought. To put the matter in some different terminology, traditional

anthropocentrism has expressed itself in two main forms: Dominionism and

Stewardism.

Dominionism

The main theses of dominionism are two i) humans are masters of nature, which

exists to serve only human needs; and ii) the nature is a limitless resource to which

we can do anything. As a matter-of-fact, in the West our moral values are largely

devised by the Christian tradition. Irrespective of individual religious affiliations,

32
the Christian ethics permeates the fabric of the moral life and history of the West.

The Christian attitude towards nature is explained either in terms of Dominionism

or in terms of Stewardism. The former view, in which nature is regarded as

something to be exploited for its materials, as a source of knowledge leading to

power and control over it, is typical of the modern scientific attitude. In pagan

religions the natural world is seen as surrounded by spirits or gods, and as such, it

is to be approached with awe. By contrast, the mainstream Christian view regards

nature as created by God. This provides the ground for natural science and

technology to control and dominate nature. Nature is there solely for man’s use.

Human needs and wants are of paramount importance, and nature, in one way or

other, exists to satisfy them. This is a classic formulation of what is frequently

termed as ‘strong anthropocentrism’ or dominionism. In this context the story of

Genesis is often referred to:

God created men in his own image, and blessed them, and told them to have

‘domination over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over

the cattle, and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creepeth

upon the earth.12

This has been interpreted as men’s charter, granting them the right to subdue

the earth and all its inhabitants, not only by the Jews but also by the Christians and

33
Muslims. And here we find God issuing a mandate to us: ‘Be fruitful and multiply

and replenish the earth and subdue it’.13 So Genesis clearly tells men not only what

they can do, but what they should do–multiply and replenish and subdue the planet.

God is represented, no doubt, as issuing these instructions before the Fall.

But the Fall did not, according to the Genesis story, substantially affect men’s

duties. What it did, rather, was to make the performance of those duties more

arduous. After the Flood –men’s position in the intervening period is more than a

little vague –God still urged Noah in this direction: ‘Be fruitful, and multiply, and

replenish the earth.’ But then he made two significant stipulations. The first

stipulation made it clear that men should not expect to subdue the earth either by

love or by the exercise of natural authority, as distinct from force: ‘And the fear of

you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every

fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth and upon all the fishes of the

sea: into your hand are they delivered.’14 The second stipulation—‘every moving

thing that liveth shall be meat for you’15—permitted men to eat the flesh of

animals. In the Garden of Eden, Adam, along with the beasts, had been a

vegetarian, whose diet was limited to ‘every herb bearing seed …and every tree, in

that which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed’.16 Now, in contrast, not only the

34
‘green herb’ but all living things were handed over to Adam and his descendants as

their food. All these integrate absolute anthropocentrism.

The critics of western civilization, according to Passmore, are to this extent

justified in their historical diagnosis, as there is evidently a strong Western

tradition that man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, since it exists only for

him. But, Passmore contends, they are not totally correct in tracing this attitude

back to Genesis.17 Genesis, and after it, the Old Testament generally, certainly

portrays man to be master of the earth and all it contains. But at the same time it

insists that the world was good before man was created, and that it exists to glorify

God rather than to serve man. It is only as a result of Greek influence that Christian

theology was led to think of nature as nothing but a system of resources, man’s

relationships with which are in no respect subject to moral censure. Passmore

criticises much of the western philosophical and religious traditions for

encouraging man to think of himself as nature’s absolute master, for whom

everything that exists was designed. Let me quote him: “It is one thing to say,

following Genesis, that man has dominion over nature in the sense that he has the

right to make use of it: quite another to say… that nature exists only in order to
18
serve his interests.” Nevertheless, his interpretation could not rise above

anthropocentrism: the natural world has no value in its own right; it is valuable

because humans care for it, love it, and find it beautiful. We have responsibilities
35
regarding the natural world, but the basis of these responsibilities lies in human

interests.

Stewardism

Dominionism openly supports exploitation of natural resources in whatever way

man pleases. It says nothing about respecting or caring for the nature or for other

creatures. It has no thought about the negative consequences of human actions.

But, Stewardism, on the other hand, upholds that humans are the care-takers for the

inherently valuable nature. As a matter-of-fact, stewardism is based mainly on

these two tenets: i) humans are caretakers of nature in that we look after it in some

way; and ii) humans are important, but other creatures also have value.

Some people of Christian faith claim that nature exists for God, and it is the

role of humans to ensure that His works continue by acting as His stewards. A

secular view of stewardism is that we should look after nature for future human

generations to use. Stewardism appeals to the nature conservationists also. This

alternative view of stewardship has coexisted with the first view of dominionism

and is rooted in a different reading of the book of Genesis. But the main issue here

is not about the correct reading the Bible, but we are to see which attitude has been

dominant. Many contemporary environmental thinkers argue forcefully that

Christianity in practice has been committed to exploitative attitude, sowing the

seeds of the contemporary environmental crisis.

36
 But the alternative reading of the story of Genesis has now come to the fore,

and its insight has much to offer to contemporary thinking. Robin Attfield, for

example, argues that the Christian tradition should be viewed as one in which

domination of the natural world implies not a predatory attitude towards it, but the

contrary. It implies that we should have dominion in the sense of being a steward

appointed by God to look after and cherish both the garden he has given us to

cultivate and the creatures that live in it. We do not unconditionally own parts of

the earth, but hold them on trust.19 Such a view may lead us to an ethic of

environmental concern. It may be environmentally superior to a view in which

property rights are held to be absolute, in which all parts of the natural world are

held to be merely means to human ends, and where we have a right to do exactly

what we want with our property even at the expense of those who come after us.

The theory of stewardship may be regarded an example of weak or relative

anthropocentrism.

To gather more insight, let us again refer to the key biblical passage of

Genesis in which man was commanded to multiply and replenish the earth and

subdue it and have dominion over every living thing that moveth upon the earth,

and fly in the sky, 20 and that man was put ‘into the garden of Eden to dress it and

to keep it’.21 There is no gain denying that human beings are permitted here to use

nature. But it is not sufficiently clear that they have been granted an unlimited right
37
of exploitation, such that they have no duties towards the natural world. A word,

like ‘dominion’, needs to be considered carefully: ‘man’s ‘dominion’ should

perhaps be interpreted as the granting of trust to humans, giving them stewardship

to look after nature on behalf of God. It should not be thought of as justifying

despotism or tyranny, but as the responsible exercise of a trust. The tradition of

stewardship derives from this interpretation. Human beings, although they have a

privileged place in nature, are strongly persuaded to act responsibly and with

consideration towards the natural world.22

In this connection it may be noted that the World Council of Churches

commented recently that creation of man in God’s image meant that humans

should be seen as ‘reflecting God’s creating and sustaining love’ and that ‘any

claim to the possession and mastery of the world is idolatrous’. In the light of this,

domination refers specifically to the task of upholding God’s purposes in creation

rather than imposing humanity’s self-serving ends’. Thus the symbolism of the

garden is important: humanity’s role is to tend and keep the garden which god has

granted it dominion over; the injunction to replenish implies that it should be kept

fertile and not overworked. The concept of stewardship has thus moved to the

centre of modern Christian thinking. According to Watson and Sharpe,

“Stewardship is today the generally accepted understanding within

38
Christianity…of the role given to humanity in creation, in its relations with the rest

of nature. This can be interpreted as co-worker with God in creation, but in no

sense as co-equal. For it signifies that humanity’s position is that it is tenant and

not owner, that it holds the earth in trust, for God and for the rest of creation,

present and to come. The principles of stewardship include responsibility for the

whole Earth; solidarity of all people; the need to take a long-term view. As such,

they offer a critique of existing capitalist relations, and are congruent with broad

principles of sustainable development.” 23

Whatever interpretation of the story of Genesis is made, none of it can rise

above humancentredness in environmental matters. Some critics have opined that

the wrapper of stewardship does not help us to transcend speciesist

anthropocentrism; it works like a sugar-coat for bitter quinine! Another part of the

problem of the stewardship position is by no means adequately characterized

anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g., who is the man

the steward for and responsible to?

Anyhow, there are a number of important implications of an anthropocentric

view, which strongly influence the ways in which humans interpret their

relationships with other species and with nature and ecosystems. Some of these are

stated below:

39
i) The anthropocentric view, whatever form it assumes, minimally suggests that

humans have greater intrinsic value than other species. A result of this attitude is

that any species that are of potential use to humans can be a ‘resource’ to be

exploited. This use may occur in an unsustainable fashion that results in

degradation, sometimes to the point of extinction of the biological resource, as has

occurred with the species, like dodo, great auk, and other animals.

ii) The view that humans have greater intrinsic value than other species also

influences ethical judgments about interactions with other organisms. These ethics

are often used to legitimize treating other species in ways that would be considered

morally unacceptable if humans were similarly treated. For example, animals are

often treated very cruelly during the normal course of events in medical research

and agriculture. But if someone treats a human being in such a way, he or she is

punished.

iii) Another implication of the anthropocentric view is the belief that humans rank

at the acme of the natural evolutionary progression of species and of life. This

belief is in contrast to the modern biological interpretation of evolution, which

suggests that no species are ‘higher’ than any others, although some clearly have a

more ancient evolutionary lineage, or may occur as relatively simple life forms.

40
 It is, however, true that the individual, cultural, and technological skills of

humans are among the attributes that make their species, Homo sapiens, special

and different. The qualities of humans have empowered their species to a degree

that no other species has achieved during the history of life on earth, through the

development of social systems and technologies that make possible an intense

exploitation and management of the environment. This power has allowed humans

to become the most successful species on earth. This success is indicated by the

population of humans that is now being maintained, the explosive growth of those

numbers, and the increasing amounts of earth's biological and environmental

resources that are being appropriated to sustain the human species. Anyhow,

traditional justifications for anthropocentrism are associated with emphasizing

some distinctive characteristics of humans—such as having an immortal soul or

mind, rationality, or sophisticated language—that set them apart from the rest of

nature including animals, and thus making ethics exclusively an human affair. To

put in other words, traditional philosophers have emphasized upon some very

distinctive characteristics of humans, such as rationality, capacity of using

sophisticated language, and the like, which set them apart from non-human nature.

(Consequently, it has made ethics exclusively a human affair.) This is called

‘human exceptionalism’, to which we now turn on.

41
Human Exceptionalism

It refers to a belief that human beings have special status in the course of nature

based on unique capacities. This belief is the grounding for some naturalistic

concepts of human rights. Religious proponents of human exceptionalism base the

belief on the same religious texts, such as the verse 1:26 of the Bible in the Book of

Genesis. We have already quoted it, and seen how God is said to create men in his

own image, and to give them ‘domination’ over everything upon the earth. 24

Some secular proponents of human exceptionalism point to evidence of

unusual rapid evolution of the brain and the emergence of exceptional aptitudes.

As one commentator has put it, ‘Over the course of human history, we have been

successful in cultivating our faculties, shaping our development, and impacting

upon the wider world in a deliberate fashion, quite distinct from evolutionary

processes.’25

The defenders of human exceptionalism argue that it is the necessary basic

premise to defend universal human rights, since what matters morally is simply

being human. For example, Mortimer J. Adler, a noted philosopher, wrote, “Those

who oppose injurious discrimination on the moral ground that all human beings,

being equal in their humanity, should be treated equally in all those respects that

concern their common humanity, would have no solid basis in fact to support their
42
normative principle.”26 Adler thus holds that denying what is now called human

exceptionalism could lead to tyranny, writing that if we ever came to believe that

humans do not possess a unique moral status, the intellectual foundation of our

liberties collapses: “Why, then, should not groups of superior men be able to

justify their enslavement, exploitation, or even genocide of inferior human groups

on factual and moral grounds akin to those we now rely on to justify our treatment

of the animals we harness as beasts of burden, that we butcher for food and

clothing, or that we destroy as disease-bearing pests or as dangerous predators?”27

Wesley J. Smith, an important defender of human exceptionalism, has

written in A Rat is a Pig is a Dog is a Boy that human exceptionalism is what gives

rise to human duties to each other, the natural world and to treat animals humanely.

He writes, “Because we are unquestionably a unique species--the only species of

even contemplating ethical issues and assuming responsibilities--we uniquely are

capable of apprehending the difference between right and wrong, good and evil,

proper and improper conduct toward animals. Or to put it more succinctly, if being

human isn't what requires us to treat animals humanely, what in the world does?”28

Nevertheless, the true measure of evolutionary success, in contrast to

temporary empowerment and intensity of resource exploitation, is related to the

length of time that a species remains powerful—the sustainability of its enterprise.

43
There are clear signals that the intense exploitation of the environment by humans

is causing widespread ecological degradation and a diminished carrying capacity to

sustain people, numerous other species, and many types of natural ecosystems. If

this environmental deterioration proves to be truly alarming, and there are many

indications that it will, then the recent centuries of unparalleled success of the

human species will turn out to be a short-term phenomenon, and will not represent

evolutionary success. This will be a clear demonstration of the fact that humans

have always, and will always, require access to a continued flow of ecological

goods and services to sustain themselves and their societies.

Anyhow, according to this theory of exceptionalism, all and only humans

have moral standing or intrinsic value. This can be illustrated if someone argues

that he has no interest in preserving penguins for their own sake. Penguins may

only be important when we people like to enjoy seeing them walk on rocks. The

moral implications of this theory are as follows: i) Non-humans are mere

instruments to human benefits and survival, they are mere means to human ends.

The whole earth then turns out to be human resource. ii) We have no direct duties

to non-humans, but only duties to other humans pertaining to non-humans. iii) It

may support an environmental ethics and speak of protecting the environment for

the sake of humans (and not for its own sake).

44
 Anyhow, it should be kept in mind that anthropocentric arguments as such

need not always be selfish. For instance, worrying about lead poisoning since it

kills black children disproportionately—a problem of environmental justice—is

human-centered but not selfish. Again, anthropocentric reasons may sometimes be

good reasons for protecting nature. What is controversial is the view that they are

the only good reasons. Why do we not argue for environmental protection using

both non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric reasons?

Similarly, it should be noted that anthropocentrism are not always

‘unenlightened’, it can be ‘enlightened’ as well. Unenlightened anthropocentrism

may ignore future and non-consumptive human interests and focus on immediate

preference satisfaction, on more consumer goods now. Enlightened

anthropocentrism, on the other hand, takes seriously the interests of future humans

and understands the significant tangible benefits (e.g., cancer cures, recreational

opportunities) and intangible benefits (aesthetic and spiritual enrichment) and

services (oxygen production, etc.) the natural world provides for humans. A

section of environmental thinkers holds that anthropocentrism can ground

environmental protection policies, as because human welfare depends on the sound

functioning of natural systems. But how strong these environmental policies will

be depends on (i) how closely human and non-human welfare is tied together, and

(ii) to what extent humans can modify natural systems while insuring that they
45
continue to provide life-support for humans. Some think it politically effective, as

appeals to self-interest and fear of harm to humans are often very effective.

If we take a historical look, we would find that we are habituated to think in

anthropocentric terms. One enduring source of support for this view is the great

Chain of Being that can be traced from Plato and Aristotle through Plotinus to

Aquinas, who ordered types of being according to their degree of perfection,

descending from God, through the angels to humans, with animals and plants

below them. The ethical corollary of it is that less perfect beings may be

subordinated to more perfect ones. And from the very ancient period (western)

moral thinkers have been thinking that humans have a prerogative to use or rule

over other creatures and the rest of nature as they see fit for their own purpose.

As already hinted, religious sources underpinned this anthropocentric idea. In

particular, the Judaic-Christian doctrine of creation has fostered the belief that

humans were made in the image of God and they share in God’s transcendence of

nature and that the whole natural order was created for their sake. Such religious

views have tended to emphasize upon the uniqueness of human beings because

they believe in that image of God, in the story of Genesis. Anyhow, the use of the

word ‘dominion’ in Genesis, where God purportedly gives man dominion over all

creatures is controversial. Environmental philosopher Stephen Schwarzschild has

46
observed that the Christian theory of creation does not teach us to love and care for

the Nature, rather indirectly direct us to hate and dominate over the non-human

world. Some consider this to be a flawed translation of a word meaning

‘stewardship’, but it persists as the most common translation. In the 1985 CBC

series ‘A Planet for the Taking’, Dr. David Suzuki explored the Old Testament

roots of anthropocentrism and how it shaped how we view non-human animals.

Again, in his book Pale Book Dot author Dr. Carl Sagan also reflects on what he

perceives to be the conceitedness and pettiness of anthropocentrism, specifically

associating the doctrine with religious belief.29

There are also secular sources of anthropocentric thought, to which we now

turn. Protagoras, an ancient Greek philosopher, declared: ‘Man is the measure of

all things’. In the present context this relativism can be taken to refer to mean that

whatever truths—scientific or moral—we acquire are valid for humans only.

Sophocles in his tragedy Antigone proclaimed, ‘Wonders are many on earth, and

the greatest of these is man…He is the lord of all things living; birds of the air,

beast of the field, all creatures of sea and land.’30

The crucial argument is that only humans participate in ethical deliberations.

Whether or not this is due to man’s unique capacity for moral agency, the fact

remains that saying of other creatures as having any moral obligation, either
47
towards one another or towards humans, does not really make sense. It makes little

sense to say that a cat does moral wrong in tormenting a mouse, since we do not

suppose that a cat has a moral sense. Since only humans are moral agents, having

moral obligations, and non-humans have no moral sense, it is hardly possible to

evoke the Golden Rule—‘Do unto others as you have them do unto you.’

Mutuality is absent in the rule, and the other party is so constitutionally different as

to render the necessary comparison impossible. Because of this radical asymmetry,

it is argued, anthropocentrism is justified.

As already noted, someone may think that it is only the unenlightened or less-

enlightened ancient thinkers who held this view-point. But a comprehensive

scrutiny shows that such a thought is not correct; even the so called enlightened,

modern thinkers not only subscribed to this view, some of them have come out to

adduce arguments in favour of anthropocentrism.

Renaissance thinkers upheld such moral humancentredness. M. Ficino, one

of the greatest Italian authors, proclaimed: ‘Man not only makes use of the

elements, but also adorn them…man who provides generally for all things, both

living and lifeless, is a kind of God’.31 Manetti in his The Dignity and Excellence

of Man stated: ‘Nothing in the world can be found that is worthy of more

admiration than man.’ Most of the modern thinkers, including philosophers, upheld
48
the same anthropocentric position. The list of philosophers, who upheld this view,

ranges from Kant to Nietzsche through Marx. Immanuel Kant suggested, ‘Man is

the ultimate purpose of creation here on Earth’.32 Marx proposed that ‘The whole

of what world history is is nothing but the creation of man by human labour.’33

Marx upheld this position and argued that what distinguishes the worst architect

from the best of bees is that the architect raises its structure in imagination before

he erects it in reality. Nietzsche said that humanity was near ‘perfect’ and that the

position of humanity with regard to other animals has to be reconsidered.34

Nevertheless, anthropocentrism is human chauvinism, underpinning the

human relationship with the natural world. Such an intellectual mind-set leads to a

moral discourse that initiates and creates preferences, and cements attitudes, and if

this is misplaced, then the entire intellectual and moral pursuit becomes

problematic.

Evolutionary theory throws humans into a tizzy. Driven by the need to

amass knowledge, we find ourselves surging forward into the exploration of a story

where the more we know, the less we can feature ourselves. Eminent evolutionary

biologist Ernst Mayr contends that anthropocentrism and belief in evolution by

natural selection are mutually exclusive.35 In other words, the Darwinian theory of

biological evolution rejects the notion of progress and replaces it with directionless
49
change, thereby subverting the conception of human superiority on a biological

scale toward perfection. Evolution by natural selection undermines the idea that

humans are the culmination and ultimate beneficiaries of all nature. However, to

say that anthropocentrism necessarily dissolves in the rising tide of evolutionary

theory is to ignore the ways in which man-centered humanness plays an intriguing

role in evolution.

In his article, ‘Anthropocentrism: A Modern Version’, W.H. Murdy

integrates these two conflicting phenomena by tracking the evolution of

anthropocentrism itself and proposing that Darwinian theory marks the shift from

an old version of anthropocentrism to a new, modern version. This modern

reconceptualization is able to situate human centered thinking within the story of

evolution, but it also elucidates a complex and uniquely human crisis in which

anthropocentrism becomes self-destructive.

Anyhow, if we try to put the matter of development of anthropocentrism in

thematic terms, we would find more or less five strands of thought that have

consolidated such a view-point.36 These are:

(i) the distinction between the mental and the physical,

(ii) the individual nature of existence,

(iii) the dichotomy between humanity and nature,

50
 (iv)the use and value of nature, and

(v) the domination over nature.

Let us now see how these strands of thought have been instrumental in

integrating anthropocentricity.

(i)The distinction between the physical and the mental: The early rationalists, such

as Plato and Pythagoras, laid the foundation of the distinction between the physical

and the mental via two belief systems. First, they believed in the separation of the

immortal soul from the mortal body. Second, Pythagoras and Plato did not give

much importance on sensation or empirical observation as a source of knowledge.

They took abstract reason as the source of knowledge. This is just the opposite

position taken by philosophers, like Aristotle and Kant, who valued both the

importance of reason and the senses, along with the reality of empirical world.

Plato thought that the soul or the mental is distinct from the physical. And it is this

Platonic view of physical world stemming from the separation between the

spiritual world and the material world came to be dominant in early western

society after the birth of Christ.

Later in the seventeenth century, Rene Descartes, who is regarded as the

father of modern philosophy, divided reality into two different substances: mind

and matter,5 and argued for a complete dualism of mind and body, and with this the

dichotomy between the mental and the physical was completely cemented. With
51
his method of doubt, he established his own identity from his ability to think: ‘I

think, therefore I am’ (cogito ergo sum). Everything outside this cogito is seen as

having only a questionable existence. This has put the natural order distinct from

the human realm that enjoys spiritual or mental existence. Descartes believed that

nature consists of only tangible qualities, like size and weight, and so does not

have any intrinsic/inherent value.

(ii)The individual nature of existence: A corollary that comes out from the

Cartesian philosophy is: existence means only distinctive individual existence. Of

course, this idea has its old root in ancient Greece. Pythagoras held that all things

are composed of numbers. Democritus and other atomists further contend that not

only are all things composed by numbers, all of them are isolated, individual units.

They thought that everything was made of atoms, which are solid and insular. This

thinking was repeated in Greek and Roman periods of Stoicism.

The concept of atomic individualism assumed larger relevance with the

general percepts of Christianity. It repeated itself again with a religious emphasis

during the Reformation. Later this idea of abstract individualism spilled into other

aspects of social and scientific discourse. In the discipline of sociology Thomas

Hobbes picked up this idea and argued that society is nothing more than self-

interested atomistic individuals.37 This idea creeps into science through great
52
scientists, like Isaac Newton and Galileo Galilei, Their quantitative approach

towards nature, in other words, their mathematization of nature, has influenced

integrating individualism. Galileo postulated that studies should be restricted to the

essential properties of shapes, numbers, and movements which could be measured

and thus quantified as irreducible and stubborn facts. Newton also proposed such a

theory to explain the motion of the planets, the moon, and comets down to the

smallest detail, as well as the flow of tides and other phenomena related to gravity.

Descartes gives a philosophic validation to this metaphysics of individualism

through his philosophical method and ontological assumptions. This notion of

individualism continued through philosophers like Locke, Rousseau, and Leibniz.

Locke interpreted natural law as a claim on indefeasible rights inherent in each

individual. Rousseau depended heavily upon this systematic individualism

preached by Locke. Leibniz’s ontology of monads is also an extreme version of

individualism.

The importance of the individual continued to remain on the centre-stage in

liberalist thinking. Both in French and Scottish Enlightenment it became a central

feature; it dominated the eighteenth century England, the American Constitution,

and the French encyclopedists. Individualism was supported by philosophers such

as Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and some contemporary liberal

53
philosophers, such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Robert Nozick. All this

integrates the ontology of individual nature, just in opposition to the ecological

principle of interdependence.

(iii)The dichotomy between humanity and nature: The distinction between

humanity and Nature has been based on humanity’s unique characteristics, like

rationality. Linked to the assertion that only humans are rational is the assumption

that only humans can communicate. This dualistic principle has been put forward

by many philosophers, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Kant, Descartes, Hegel,

Nietszche.38

Another justification for the distinction between humanity and the rest of the

natural world, including animals, is the discourse of moral behaviuor. Humans see

the behaviour of beasts as predominantly instinctive, irrational, and violent, which

humans resemble when they are wicked. Socrates argued that the most virtuous

human being is one who most fully transcends their animal and vegetative nature.

The ability to use tools or modify and change the environment also constitutes

another justification for this division between humanity and nature. Marx and

Engels contribute to this idea. Both argued that only man produces when he is free

from physical need. A group of thinkers has based the distinction between

54
humanity and animals on religious grounds. Aquinas, for example, argued that man

is created in the image of God. Descartes also said that man has an immortal soul.

(iv)The use and value of nature: The theory of social progress involving the use of

the natural world by humanity is the fourth factor in integrating the anthropocentric

position. This derives from the belief that labour is the only valuable factor in

production. Marxist philosophers propose that the purely natural stuff in which no

human labour is objectivised has no value. Likewise, a modern liberalist, John

Locke, suggests that in natural state, nature is almost worthless. There is no value

on raw land until it is improved, and that labour is the chief factor in any value

assignment. Adam Smith also proposed that labour is the real measure of the

exchangeable value of all commodities. Marxist and liberal views thus see nature

devoid of any inherent value, it has only instrumental value.

(v)The domination over nature: Another constitutive factor of anthropocentrism is

the notion of mastery of nature. This notion has developed from ancient time of

Greek philosophy. Aristotle, for example, suggested that nature has made all

animals for the sake of man. Cicero declared that the produce of the earth is

designed for those who make use of it, and though some beasts may rob us of a

small part, it does follow that the earth produced it also for them.

55
 Then, in the Enlightenment era of Industrial Revolution, Bacon comes out to

advocate this idea of domination. He said that our main object is to make Nature

serve the business and convenience of men. His basic argument is that scientific

knowledge is technological power over nature. He did not hesitate to declare that

in near future humanity would subdue ‘nature with all her children, to bind to

service, and to make her slave’.39 Kant’s view is not very new: as nature is not self-

conscious then it is merely a means to an end, and that end is humanity. Fichte put

the last nail on the coffin: ‘I will be the Lord of nature, and she shall be my

servant. I will influence her according to the measure of my capacity, but she will

have no influence on me.”40 This view of mastering the nature has been the

mainstream thought, including philosophy. Everything has thus been determined

from ‘unrestricted’ human interests. And the only aim left to humanity is to

conquer and dominate the nature!

These are five main strands of thought which have been instrumental in the

development of the anthropocentric position. A result of this attitude is that any

species that are of potential use to humans can be a ‘resource’ to be exploited. This

use often occurs in an unsustainable fashion that results in degradation, sometimes

to the point of extinction of the biological resource, as has occurred with the dodo,

great auk, and other animals.

56
 However, contemporary environmental philosophy places the blame for

ecological deterioration on the domination of nature by human beings, which

meets some resistance from the ecofeminists who see the domination of both

nature and woman by man as the root cause of modern crisis. An environmental

philosophy that fails to attend to these important links will, accordingly, be

theoretically deficient. The ecofeminist attempts a synthesis between two struggles

previously thought to be separated, feminism and ecology. The goals of two

movements are mutually reinforcing. It aims to have feminism and ecology

mutually reinforcing one another, developing a feminism that is ecological and an

ecology that is feminist.

Ecofeminism is an academic theory, and also an ideology for praxis,

according to which there are important connections—historical, experiential,

symbolic, conceptual, theoretical, etc.—between the domination of women and the

domination of nature, an understanding of which is crucial to both feminism and

environmental ethics. It holds that both the exploitation of women and of nature

results from patriarchal oppressions, and further that women, due to their

distinctive biological and social roles, have an innate concern for nature which

could save the deteriorating earth.

57
 Ecofeminism has its roots in the wide variety of feminisms, in different

feminist practices and philosophies. What makes it distinct is its insistence that

non-human nature and the domination of nature are both feminist issues. Anyhow,

what one takes to be a genuine ecofeminist position depends largely upon how one

conceptualizes both feminism and ecology. While feminists fail to agree about the

nature of, and solution to, the subordination of women, they all agree that the sexist

oppression exists, is wrong and must be abolished. On the other hand,

environmental degradation and exploitation of nature is feminist issue, as an

understanding of it contributes to an understanding of the oppression of women.

To put it more succinctly, ecofeminism asserts that all forms of oppression

are connected and that structures of oppression must be addressed in their totality.

Oppression of the natural world and of women by patriarchal power structures

must be examined together or neither can be confronted fully. These socially

constructed oppressions formed out of the power dynamics of patriarchical

systems. Ultimately they involve the development of worldviews and practices that

are not based on male-biased models of domination. It is contended that women

must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological

crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be

one of domination.

58
 Anyhow, if we reflect a little, we would find that anthropocentrism in

general and androcentrism in particular are linked by the rationalist conception of

the human self as masculine and by the account of authentically human

characteristics as centred round rationality and the exclusion of its contrasts

(especially characteristics regarded as feminine, animal and natural) as less human.

It challenges us to understand the contribution of gender to the forms of culture

and economic rationality that bring contemporary societies into danger zones.

Some think that the central problem is androcentrism rather than anthropocentrism.

The effect of ecofeminism is not, of course, to absorb or sacrifice the critique of an

anthropocentrism, but to deepen and enrich it.

It may be noted that this domination over nature has been debated by the

ecofeminists in terms of engendered social structure of patriarchy. They argue that

the control of nature is the multifaceted dominance relationship that stems from

culturally embedded attitudes of masculine gender bias. The domination of the

male over the female and the dominance of human over the nature are entwined

processes, the inferiorising of the female taking reinforcement from the view that

women partake more fully of nature than man, and the degrading manipulation of

nature taking legitimacy from its characterization as women. The feminists identify

patriarchy as the most significant constraint upon the fulfillment of human

59
potential. Patriarchy is a gender-privileging system of power relations that is subtly

embedded within dominant social structures, at all social levels, across almost all

cultures, and sustained throughout history. The explanation for its tenacity is to be

found, not in overt discrimination, but within conceptual frameworks that

systematically deny access and justice to women.41

Anyhow, natural scientific findings of ecology has undermined man’s views

of himself as the centre of the universe—anthropocentrism—showing them instead

as a product of natural evolutionary process, having considerable affinities with

other creatures, and to have vulnerable dependence on ecological conditions of

existence. The human is seen as occupying no special position on this planet, and

this naturally calls into question his prerogative to use non-human resources

whatever they like. This also draws widespread moral intuitions that some higher

animals are somehow similar to humans and that other natural part of reality has

value in itself, that is, has intrinsic or inherent value.

Actually, contemporary environmental philosophy is developed through

critiquing traditional anthropocentrism. The principled objections to

anthropocentrism find increasing applications in practice. Many human practices

are criticized on this ground, including those involve cruelty to animals,

destruction of habitats, endangering species, and disturbing ecosystemic balances.

60
Most environmentalists see anthropocentrism as human chauvinism, with

narrowness of sympathy that is comparable to sexual, racial or national

chauvinism. The paradigm in this context involves the core belief that underpins

the human relationship with the natural world.42 And many human practices appear

to be concerned only for human interests, and even for trivial, non-basic human

preferences, above any consideration of non-human interests, even of basic or

crucial ones. The most significant trend of present-day environmentalism is to rise

above this misguided view-point, and this means, among other things, focusing on

locus of intrinsic/inherent value other than on humans.

Notes and References:

1. Stanisław Zięba. “Anthropocentrism.” 28 April 2012

<http://peenef2.republika.pl/angielski/hasla/a/anthropocentrism.html>.
2. “Noosphere.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 12 April 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noosphere>.
3. Edmund Husserl. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. W.R. Boyce
Gibson. London: George Allen & Unwin, trans. 1931. (First original German edition,
1913). pp. 11-30. (Author’s Preface to the English Edition).
4. “Anthropic principle.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 18 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle>.
5. Ibid.
6. B. Carter. “Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology.”
IAU Symposium 63: Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data.
Dordrecht: Reidel. 1974. pp. 291–298. 18 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle>.
61
7. “Anthropic principle.” op. cit.
8. M. Alan Kazlev. “Anthropocentrism.” 28 April 2012
<http://www.kheper.net/topics/worldviews/anthropocentrism.html>.
9. Ibid.
10. “Noosphere.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 19 March 2012
<en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noosphere>.
11. M. Alan Kazlev. “Anthropocentrism.” 7 Feb 2012
<www.kheper.net/topics/worldviews/anthropocentrism.html>.
12. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:26.
London: Oxford University Press, 1884. p. 2.
13. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:28.
op. cit., p. 2.
14. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 9:2. op.
cit., p. 9.
15. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 9:3. op.
cit., p. 9.
16. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:29.
op. cit., p. 2.
17. Richard Routley and Val Routley. “Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics.”
quoted in D. S. Mannison, M. MacRobbie and R. Routley, eds. Environmental
Philosophy. Canberra: ANU Research School of Social Sciences, 1980. pp. 96-189.
18. Peter Hay. Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought. Bloomington, USA:
Indiana University Press, 2002. p. 105.
19. Cf: James Connelly & Graham Smith, eds. Politics and the Environment: From Theory to
Practice. London: Routledge, 1999. p. 18.
20. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 1:28.
op. cit., p. 2.
21. The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis 2:15.
op. cit., p. 3.

62
22. Cf: James Connelly & Graham Smith, eds. Politics and the Environment: From Theory
To Practice. London: Routledge, 1999. p. 18.
23. Ibid., p. 19.
24. Cf: The Holy Bible: The Revised Version with Revised Marginal References. Genesis
1:26. op. cit., p. 2.
25. Sandy Starr. “What Makes Us Exceptional?.” Spiked Science. London: Signet House,
2004. pp. 49-51. 19 March 2012 < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speciesism>.
26. Cf: Frederick J. Crosson, Human And Artificial Intelligence, New York: Meredith
Corporation, 1970. p. 246.
27. Mortimer J. Adler. The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes. New York:
Fordham University Press, 1993. p. 264. 30 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_exceptionalism>.
28. Wesley J. Smith. A Rat is a Pig is a Dog is a Boy: The Human Cost of the Animal Rights
Movement. New York: Encounter Books, 2010. pp. 243-44. 30 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_exceptionalism>.
29. “Anthropocentrism.” 27 March 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropocentrism#cite_note-8>.
30. Cf: Robin Sowerby. The Greeks: An Introduction to their Culture. Oxford: Routledge,
1995. p. 88.
31. Cf: Daniel N. Robinson. An Intellectual History of Psychology. 3rd ed. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1930. p. 120.
32. Immanuel Kant. quoted in Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy
and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. p. 4.
33. Karl Marx. quoted in Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and
Ethics. op. cit., p. 4.
34. Cf: Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit.,
p. 4.
35. Mayr Ernst. “The Nature of the Darwinian Revolution.” Science. vol. 176, 1972. pp. 981-
989. 31 March 2012 <http://www.123helpme.com/preview.asp?id=24612>.
36. Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit., p. 5.

63
37. Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. quoted in Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental
Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit., p. 7.
38. Alexander Gillespie. International Environmental Law: Policy and Ethics. op. cit., p. 10.
39. J. Spedding, ed. The Works of Francis Bacon. London: Oldham Press, 1857. vol. 4, p.
517.
40. J.G. Fichte. The Vocation of Man. London: Routledge, 1946. p. 29.
41. Peter Hay. Main Currents In Western Environmental Thought. op. cit., p. 73.
42. M. Fitzmaurice, David M. Ong & Panos Merkouris, eds. Research Handbook on
International Environmental Law. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010. p. 118.

64
 Chapter-III

Biocentrism

Speciesist anthropocentrism has been identified by the majority of environmental

philosophers and other environmentalists as the root-cause of the present day eco-

crisis. And it is often said that contemporary environmental philosophy has set out

its journey by questioning this moral anthropocentrism. It is regarded as a

systematic bias in traditional Western attitude to the non-human world or the

nature in general. There have, however, recently developed some important views

rejecting this attitude, and this development has strongly influenced the ways in

which humans interpret their relationship with other species and with the nature

and ecosystems. One such world-view we find in contemporary environmental

philosophy is Biocentrism that considers all living beings to have moral value and

humans to be one among innumerable species of organisms that live on the earth.

‘Biocentrism’ (from Greek: βίος, bio, ‘life’; and κέντρον, kentron, ‘center’) is a

term that has more than one meaning. In environmental philosophy, however, it

refers to the life-centric nature-view. It means that all living beings on the earth,

including humans, have moral value. It recommends well-being of all life in the

biosphere.

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 But it may be noted here that biocentrism also refers to the scientific position

that life and consciousness forms the basis of observable reality, and thereby is the

basis of the universe itself. For example, American scientist Robert Lanza

proposed a theory in 2007, where he upholds this view that life and biology are

central to being, reality, and the cosmos— life creates the universe rather than the

other way around. This biocentrism of Robert Lanza asserts that current theories of

the physical world do not work, and can never be made to work, until they fully

account for life and consciousness. While physics is considered fundamental to the

study of the universe, and chemistry fundamental to the study of life, biocentrism

places biology before the other sciences to produce a ‘theory of everything’.1

Of course, the reception of Lanza's theory has been mixed. Critics have

questioned whether the theory is falsifiable. Lanza has argued that future

experiments, such as scaled-up quantum superposition, will either support or

contradict the theory.2 Anyhow, this is a theory of cosmology, while we are

interested in environmental philosophy and ethics. In environmental philosophy

biocentrism is well-defined as the belief that all forms of life are equally valuable

and humanity is not the center of existence.

Anyhow, biocentrism transcends anthropocentrism. While anthropocentrism

argues in favor of a world-view centering solely on humans and recognizes value

66
only in human beings, biocentrism regards every living being in the nature as

having intrinsic value and thus goes beyond speciesist anthropocentricity. This

view asserts that we have an obligation to the whole biotic community. The central

claim of biocentrism is that our moral obligation extends beyond humans to

include all living beings. This obligation is direct, not merely indirect obligation to

the living beings via humans. We are morally obliged, e.g., to preserve endangered

species, not only because present and future humans would find life of diminished

value unless we do that, but also because they are living beings with

intrinsic/inherent value, the fact that demands our moral respect.

Australian philosopher Richard Routley (Sylvan) gives a good example in

favour of biocentrism in his paper ‘Is there a Need for a New, an Environmental

Ethic? (1973) It goes by the name ‘last man argument’, where Routley asks us to

imagine a hypothetical situation in which the ‘last man’, surviving a world

catastrophe, acts to ensure the elimination of all other living beings and the

destruction of all the landscapes after his demise. From the anthropocentric point

of view, the ‘last man’ would do nothing morally wrong, since his destructive act

in question would not cause any damage to the interest and well-being of humans,

who would by then have disappeared. Nevertheless, Routley points out, there is a

moral intuition that the imagined last act would be morally wrong. An explanation

67
for this judgement, he gives, is that those non-human objects in the environment

whose destruction is ensured by the ‘last man’ have intrinsic value, a kind of value

independent of their usefulness for humans. From his critique, Routley concluded

that the main approach in traditional western moral thinking was unable to allow

the recognition that natural things have intrinsic value and that the tradition

required overhaul of a significant kind. Anyhow, our common intuition is that it

does matter to destroy the last form of life, and this is taken as evidence that non-

human life has value independent of the existence of conscious valuers—and that

this value is relevant to the assessment of the moral standing of living things.

Classical Biocentrism

Paul Taylor is the champion of this biocentric view of Nature, to whom we owe for

its classical version. But the first life-centered concern in Western ethics is found,

perhaps, in Albert Schweitzer’s Civilization and Ethics published in 1923.

Schweitzer’s biocentric point of view is illustrated in terms of ‘Reverence for

Life’. He sees this as stemming from a fundamental ‘will-to-live’, inherent in all

living beings. In self-conscious beings, like us, this will-to-live establishes a drive

towards both self-realization and empathy with other living beings. He formulates

his world-view in this way: ‘I am life which wills to live, and I exist in the midst of

life which wills to live.’3 (‘Ich bin Leben, das leben will, inmitten von Leben, das
68
leben will.’) Just in my own will-to-live there is a yearning for more life, the same

obtains in each the will-to-live around me equally, whether it expresses itself or

remains unvoiced. According to Schweitzer, all life is sacred and we should live

accordingly, keeping in mind that each and every living being is inherently

valuable ‘will-to-live’. In nature one form of life falls prey upon another. But,

human consciousness holds an awareness of, and sympathy for, the will of other

beings to live. As a moral human being, he strives to rise above from this predator-

prey relation so far as it is possible. Actually, as living beings with moral

consciousness, we are not only concerned with our own life but also for the lives of

other living beings and the environment in which we live in. According to him, ‘It

is good to maintain and cherish life; it is evil to destroy and check life.’4 We have

to choose to live up to this moral conscience; and our world-view must derive from

this life-view, not vice versa. Respect for life, overcoming coarser impulses and

hollow doctrines, leads the individual to live in the service of other people and of

every living creature. In contemplation of the will-to-life, respect for the life of

others becomes the highest principle and the defining purpose of humanity.

The fundamental principles of morality which we seek as a necessity for

thought is not, according to Schweitzer, a matter of galvanizing the traditional

moral views and norms, but also of expanding and extending the moral horizon.

69
Morality, accordingly, is, in its unqualified form, extended responsibility with

regard to anything living. He writes: “A man is really ethical only when he obeys

the constraint laid on him to help all life which he is able to succour, and when he

goes out of his way to avoid injuring anything living. He does not ask for how far

this or that life deserves sympathy as valuable in itself, nor does he ask how far it

is capable of feeling. To him life as such is sacred.”3

It may be mentioned here that Schweitzer received the 1952 Nobel Peace

Prize for his philosophy of ‘Reverence for Life’. Schweitzer’s ‘reverence for life’

philosophy upholds that all living beings have intrinsic or inherent value. The

intrinsic value of nature can and should be appealed to as the basis for human

ethics. And the attitude of reverence for life would establish the connections

between ethics and nature. According to Schweitzer, ethics begins when we

recognize these connections, we feel awe and respect in the fact of living beings

that commands our reverence and that compels us to strive to promote and preserve

life in all its forms.

Anyhow, Schweitzer’s assertion ‘I am will-to-live’ reminds us of

Schopenhauer as his forerunner in the philosophy of ‘willing’ and ‘will’ in general.

Of course, Schweitzer somehow individualizes this ‘will to live’, and this is

something like this: I am life which wants to live amidst of lives which want to
70
live! According to Schweitzer, I first of all experience the will to live and living in

my own feeling and organism and I come to rationally respect this will also in

other living beings, if I respect this will to live in myself. I am therefore forced or

driven to acknowledge some such will to living also in other living beings around

me and have to appreciate and respect this in the same way as in my own case. The

transfer from the respect for my own will to living to the reverence for life of the

other beings is grounded by certain methodological or meta-ethical principle of

equality or equalitarianism, being a certain kind of inference by analogy, which

Schweitzer however emphasizes as being ‘denknotwendig’ (necessary in

thinking).6 This kind of necessity and equalitarianism would and should lead me to

respect and revere any other life and living being independently from any

constraints or perspectives of speciesism, egotism or other partisan view-points.

Ethics should not be constrained by speciesist, racial, nationalistic or whatever

restricted points of view. Thus, the reverence for the will of life in other beings

should be a universal requirement.

Anyhow, as already stated, Paul Taylor is the best proponent of contemporary

biocentric view of nature. Taylor’s is, perhaps, the most comprehensive attempt to

articulate and defend a biocentric position in environmental discourse. His

biocentric world-view first comes to the fore with the publication of the article,

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‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’ in Environmental Ethics in 1981. It was then

followed by a full-fledged book titled Respect for Nature: A Theory of

Environmental Ethics, which he published in the year 1986. The core of Taylor’s

position is the claim that all living things and beings have inherent value and so

merit moral respect. According to him, to say that an entity has a good of its own is

simply to say that, without reference to any other entity, it can be benefited or

harmed. This good is ‘objective’, in the sense that it is independent of what any

conscious being happens to think about it. Anyhow, to say that each living being

has a good of their own or something has inherent worth is, according to Taylor, to

invoke two principles: the principle of moral consideration and the principle of

intrinsic value.7

The principle of moral consideration means that every living being that has a

good of its own merits moral consideration. And the principle of intrinsic value

states that the realization of the good of an individual is intrinsically valuable. This

means that its good is prima facie worthy of being preserved or promoted as an end

in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is. The combination of these

two principles constitutes the fundamental moral attitude which Taylor calls

‘respect for Nature’.

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 The first principle of moral consideration states that all living things deserve

the concern and attention of all moral agents simply by virtue of their being

members of the earth’s community of life. From the moral point of view, their

good must be taken into account whenever it is affected for better or worse by the

behaviour of some agents. This provision stands for all, no matter what species the

creature belongs to. The good of each entity is accorded some value and so

acknowledged as having some weight in the deliberations of all rational agents.

However, it may be necessary for such an agent to act in ways contrary to the good

of this or that particular organism in order to further other’s good, including human

good. But the principle of moral consideration prescribes that, with respect to each

being an entity having its own good, every individual deserves moral

consideration.

On the other hand, the principle of intrinsic value asserts that, irrespective of

what kind of entity it is in other respects, if it is a member of the earth’s biotic

community, the realization of its good is something intrinsically valuable. This

signifies that the good of the entity concerned is worthy of being preserved or

attended to, and this intrinsic/inherent value is an end in itself and for the sake of

the entity concerned. While we consider an entity as having intrinsic or inherent

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value, we deny that it can be treated as a mere object, or as an entity whose value

completely depends on being instrumental in promoting another’s good.8

Though these two principles seem nearer to each other, they are not identical.

While the principle of moral consideration affirms that all living beings deserve the

concern and consideration of all moral agents simply by virtue of their being

members of the earth’s community of life, the principle of intrinsic value states

that if some entity is a member of the earth’s biotic community, the realization of

its good is something intrinsically valuable, its good is worthy of being respected,

and this intrinsic value is an end in itself, and as such, it is for the sake of the entity

concerned. According to Taylor, when rational, autonomous agents regard such

entities as possessing inherent worth, they place intrinsic value on the realization of

their good and so hold themselves responsible for performing actions that will have

this effect and for refraining from actions having the contrary effect. Not only that,

then they subscribe to the principles of moral consideration and of intrinsic value

and so conceive of wild living beings as having that kind of worth. On Taylor’s

judgment, “[S]uch agents are adopting a certain ultimate moral attitude toward the

natural world. This is the attitude I call “respect for Nature”. 9

Respect for nature thus signifies a life-centered world-view of environmental

philosophy. This ethics of respect for nature has three basic elements: a belief
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system, an ultimate moral outlook, and a set of rules of duty and standards of

character. These elements are connected with each other in the following manner.

The belief system underlying this attitude of respect for nature is called ‘the

biocentric outlook on Nature’. As Taylor explains, the belief system provides a

certain outlook on nature which supports and makes intelligible an autonomous

agent’s adopting, as an ultimate moral attitude, the attitude of respect for nature.

Living things and beings are viewed as the appropriate objects of the attitude of

respect, and are, accordingly, regarded as entities possessing inherent/intrinsic

worth. One then places intrinsic value on the promotion and protection of their

good. As a consequence of this, one makes a moral commitment to abide by a set

of rules of duty and to fulfill certain standards of good character.

This ethics of respect for nature is symmetrical with a system of human ethics

grounded on ‘respect for person’. This has three aspects: The first is a conception

of oneself and others as persons, as centers of autonomous choice. Second, there is

an attitude of respect for person as person. It is adopted as an ultimate moral

attitude in which every person is regarded as having inherent worth or human

dignity. Third, there is an ethical system of duties which are acknowledged to be

owed by everyone to everyone. These duties are forms of conduct in which public

recognition is given to each individual’s inherent worth as a person.

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 Accordingly, the bio-centric outlook on nature implies all these four

things:10

(1) Humans are members of the earth’s community of life on the same terms

as all the non-human members are.

(2) The earth’s natural ecosystems are seen as a complex web of

interconnected and interdependent elements.

(3) Each individual organism is conceived of as a teleological centre of life,

pursuing its own good in its own way.

(4) Humans are not superior to any other living thing.

While thus formulating the biocentric outlook, Taylor takes cognizance of

the fact of our being an animal species to be a fundamental feature of our

existence. He and his supporters do not deny the significant differences between

ourselves and other species, but they wish to keep in the forefront of our

consciousness the fact that, in relation to our planet’s natural ecosystems, we are

but one species population among many others. Our origin lies in the same process

of evolution that gives rise to all other species and that we are confronted with

similar environmental conditions that confront the members of other species. The

so-called laws of natural selection, of adaptation and of genetics apply

simultaneously with all of us as members of the biological community.

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 If we have a deep watch on the happenings in the nature, we would see that

each animal and plant is like us in having a good, a telos of its own. Although our

human good (e.g., of value and significance of human life, including the exercise

of individual autonomy in choosing our own particular value-system) is not exactly

similar to the good of a non-human animal or plant, it cannot be maintained that

their good can go without the biological necessities for survival and physical

health.

Again, the possibility of the extinction of the human species makes us aware

of another aspect in which we should not consider ourselves in better position than

other species. Our well-being and survival is dependent upon the ecological health

and wellbeing of various animals and plants communities, while their survival and

health does not depend on human wellbeing. Rather, many wild animals and plants

would be greatly benefited if all human beings disappear from the earth. The

depletion of their habitats by human beings in the name of ‘development’ would

then cease. The anthropogenic pollution of the land, air and water would come to

an end. Ecosystems could gradually return to their balance, suffering only some

natural disruptions. All these imply that our presence is not so much needed from

the community standpoint.

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 Let us come to the second component of biocentric worldview, which sees the

natural world as an organic system. To accept the biocentric outlook and regard

ourselves and our place in the world from its perspective is to see the whole natural

order of the earth’s biosphere as a complex but unified web of interconnected

organisms, objects, and events. The ecological relationship between any

community of living things and their environment forms an organic whole of

functionally interdependent parts. Such dynamic, but at the same time, relatively

stable structures such as food-chains, predator-prey relations, plant succession in a

forest, are self-regulating energy-recycling mechanisms that preserve the

equilibrium of the whole.11

And for this, while we think of the well-being of the biotic communities—of

humans, animals and plants, we should be careful for the ecological equilibrium.

When one views the realm of nature from this biocentric perspective, one should

never forget that in the long run the integrity of the entire biosphere of our planet is

essential to the realization of the good of its constituent communities of life, both

human and non-human. This holistic view of the earth’s ecological systems,

according to Taylor, does not by itself constitute a moral norm. These are facts of

biological reality, rather a set of causal connections put forth in empirical terms. Its

ethical implications for our treatment of the natural environmental lie entirely in

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the fact that our knowledge of these casual connections is an essential means to

fulfilling the ends we set for ourselves in adopting the attitude of respect for

Nature.

In order to explain the third component of the biocentric outlook Taylor

reiterates that each individual organism is to be conceived of as a teleological

center of life. The organism comes to mean something to be one as a unique,

irreplaceable individual. The final culmination of this process is the achievement

of a genuine understanding of the biocentric point of view and with that

understanding, an ability would crop up to take that point of view. Conceiving of a

living being as a center of life, one is able to look at the world from its perspective.

Understanding living beings as teleological centers of life does not necessitate

associating them with human characteristics. We need not consider all of them as

having consciousness like us. Some of them may be aware of the world around

them and others may not. Nor need we deny that different kinds and levels of

awareness are exemplified when high level consciousness in some form or other is

present. But be they conscious or not, all are equal teleological centers of life in the

sense that each is a unified system of goal-oriented activities directed toward their

preservation and well-being.

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 The denial of human superiority as the fourth component of the biocentric

outlook on nature is perhaps the most important idea in establishing the

justifiability of the attitude of respect for nature. The concept of human superiority

is strictly human point of view, that is, from a point of view in which the good of

humans is taken as the standard of judgment. Because of that, all we need to do is

to look as the capacities of non-human animals from the standpoint of their good to

find a contrary judgment of superiority. In each case, the claim to human

superiority would be rejected from a non-human standpoint.

As Taylor explains, it is true that we are different from non-human animals in

respect of some specific capabilities. But these facts do not by themselves establish

human superiority. If we think a little, we would find that it is only from human

standpoint that looks like this. On the other hand, many non-human animals have

some capacities that we humans lack. The cheetah can run faster than men; an

eagle can see things from a far distance; so on and so forth. Why would these not

be considered as signs of their superiority over humans? From a neutral

perspective, the claim to human superiority does not carry weight, rather it could

be regarded as ‘an irrational bias in our own favor’.12

According to Taylor, this becomes clear as and when we conceive our relation

to other species in terms of the three components of the biocentric outlook. These
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components together give us an overall view of the natural world and of the place

of humans in it. As we take this point of view, we come to realise ‘other living

things, their environmental conditions and their ecological relationships in such a

way as to awake in us a deep sense of our kinship with them as fellow members of

the Earth’s community of life’.13 We then understand that humans and non-humans

together constitute an unified whole in which all living beings are functionally

interrelated. Each is then seen to share with us the same characteristic of being a

teleological centre of life. When this entire outlook becomes a part of the

conceptual framework, we come to look onto ourselves as bearing a certain moral

relation to non-human forms of life.

Another key exponent of biocentrism is Robin Attfield. He takes trees as an

example of non-sentient life and seeks to establish whether and why they might

also be morally considerable. He likewise maintains trees have a good of their

own, but, for him, it is not sufficient to show that trees merit moral consideration.

There are further differences between his position and that of Taylor. Taylor

appeals to the rational and scientific merits of biocentricism in support of the moral

status of trees, while Attfield appeals to analogy with morally significant human

interests, such as the interests that derive from their capacities for nutrition,

growth, and respiration.14

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 Again, as to how the good of a non-human can be the ground of an obligation

for moral agents, the answer turns on its good having intrinsic/inherent value. It is

worth distinguishing between approaches which are qualified and unqualified in

their commitment to the intrinsic/inherent value of the good of non-rational beings.

A representative of the qualified view is Robin Attfield. For Attfield, whatever has

a good of its own has moral standing, i.e., merits moral consideration. His position

is that if we grant consideration to humans then we cannot consistently deny it to

other living beings, and the onus is on a would-be opponent of this view to name

some morally relevant differences between humans and other living beings which

would justify considering humans as moral patients and non-humans not. He

believes that this will prove hard to do. Anyhow, Attfield’s qualified view does not

deny that there might well be a preponderant need most of the time to treat plants,

and, perhaps, some other creatures, as resources, valuable though their lives are in

themselves. For Attfield, the moral standing of a being is established separately

and prior to any judgements as to its moral significance. All beings which have

moral standing have intrinsic/inherent value, but some of them will have very little

of it—indeed, too little to be a determinant of any obligation of a moral agent. It,

therefore, appears that a qualified approach may not necessarily lay the ground for

claiming anything more than a frankly anthropocentric one.

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 Robin Attfield does not think that we owe moral respect to all living beings,

as not all lives are worthwhile. He also is not egalitarian even with regard to those

lives that are owed moral respect. The most compelling reason for preserving trees

refers first to the interests of humans, and then to those of other sentient animals.

He concludes that while some degree of respect is due to almost all life, the interest

of other non-sentient life will always have a relatively low priority. Even then,

Attfield and Taylor agree on the point that things and beings without good of their

own cannot merit moral consideration in their own right, and that only living

beings have goods of their own.15

Christopher Stone, a professor of law at the University of Southern California,

supports Attfield’s contention, but in different way. Stone proposes in his article

‘Should Trees have Standing?’ that trees and other natural objects should have at

least the same standing in law as corporations. Stone argues that if trees, forests

and mountains could be given standing in law then they could be represented in

their own right in the courts. Moreover, like any other legal person, these natural

things could become beneficiaries of compensation if it could be shown that they

had suffered compensatable injury through human activity.

Biocentric view-point is also present in John Rodman’s environmental

thought. He places the position of biocentricity in ‘ecological sensibility’ category.

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In his famous paper ‘The Liberation of Nature?’ he comes out to organize

environmental thought into four categories: resource conservation (contending the

reckless exploitation of forest, wildlife, soil, etc), wilderness preservation (arguing

for certain natural areas as sacred places), moral extensionism (supporting the view

that we have duties directly to some non-human natural entities), and ecological

sensibility (a complex pattern of perceptions, attitudes, and judgment to the

nature).16

Rodman speaks of three components of this ecological sensibility, and these

are: (i) a theory of value that recognizes intrinsic/inherent value in nature without

engaging in mere extensionism; (ii) a metaphysics that takes account of the reality

and importance of relationships and systems as well as of individuals; (iii) an

ethics that ‘includes such duties as non-interference with natural processes,

resistance to human acts and policies that violate the non-interference

principle….and a style of co-inhabitation that involves the knowledgeable,

respectful, and restrained use of nature’,17 for one ought not to treat with disrespect

or use as a mere means anything that has a telos or end of its own.

Most biocentric positions are presented within the framework of conventional

ethical theories. Attfield, for example, takes a consequentialist position. Taylor’s

position draws extensively on both Kant and Aristotle. Anyhow, biocentrism is

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individualistic in that their various moral concerns are directed towards individuals

only, not ecological wholes, such as species, populations, biotic communities, and

ecosystems. None of these is sentient, a subject-of-a-life, or a teleological-center-

of-life, but the preservation of these collective entities is a major concern for many

environmentalists. Moreover, the goals of animal liberationists, such as the

reduction of animal suffering and death, may conflict with the goals of the

environmentalists. For example, the preservation of the integrity of an ecosystem

may require the culling of feral animals or of some indigenous populations that

threaten to destroy fragile habitats. So there are disputes about whether the ethics

of animal liberation is a proper branch of environmental ethics.18

As we have seen above, Rodman and other critics have suggested that it is not

possible to generate an adequate environmental ethics by extending the range of

contemporary theories to this biocentric way, because these theories have evolved

to articulate moral claims that arise on an analogy to human cases, and are

inherently anthropocentric and individualistic. They are thus less than well-suited

to articulate the moral claims of non-humans, particularly those who are extremely

unlike human individuals.

According to Rodman, all the first three categories of environmental thought

will be rendered obsolete with the realization of ecological sensibility. But even
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then, the position of ecological sensibility derives primarily from the category of

moral extensionism, in which he places Singer’s Animal Liberation: Towards an

End to Men’s Inhumanity to Animals to be an example. The basis of the extension

thought from the third to fourth category is the idea of equality that involved with

non-human beings.

Anyhow, it is now time to turn onto the issue of animal liberation, which is

related with biocentrism. This discussion may be made in the name of Sentientism.

Sentientism

The term ‘sentience’ comes from Latin word ‘sentire’, that means ‘to feel’ or to

‘perceive’. ‘Sentience’ thus means ‘the capacity of feeling pleasure and suffering

pain’. Sentientism is the moral theory that all sentient beings, be they human or

non-human, have intrinsic moral value. Therefore, we are obligated to treat all

sentient beings with kindness and compassion, regardless of their external form or

level of intelligence. It is also said that no ethical system can be valid if it fails to

acknowledge all sentient beings. As early as in 18th century, Jeremy Bentham

raised the issue of non-human suffering and sadism in his An Introduction to the

Principles of Morals and Legislation:

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 If we study a little we can see that the French have already discovered that

the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be

abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor... What else is it that

should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the

faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a

more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day,

or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what

would it avail? The question is not, "Can they reason?" nor "Can they talk?"

but, "Can they suffer?”19

Following Bentham, the advocates of ethical sentientism propose in the

second half of 20th century that the most appropriate criterion of moral

considerability is that of sentience, that is, the capacity for experiening pleasure

and pain. If an entity is sentient, they argue, it seeks pleasurable states of being and

seeks to avoid painful states of being, and this is its interests. And since interests

are interests, irrespective of the species to which they belong, it is arbitrary to

respect only human interests. Rather beings, that have interests, ought to have their

interests taken into account in the context of actions regarding them. If an entity,

on the other hand, is not sentient or is incapable of having any interests of its own,

it does not owe any consideration to us. After all, what does it matter how we treat

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an entity if that entity cannot matter to itself? Peter Singer, the most prominent

exponent of this approach in contemporary times, summarizes this line of

argument as follows: “A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer.

Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A

mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being kicked along the road,

because it will suffer if it is.”20 He goes on saying: “If a being suffers, there can be

no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No

matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its

suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough

comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of

suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken

into account. That is why the limit of sentience… is the only defensible boundary

of concern for the interests of others.”21

The idea of equality towards non-human beings, to the sentient beings was

also widely discussed at the end of the 1970’s. Bentham was well aware of the fact

that the logic of the demand for racial equality should not stop at the equality of

humans. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take

that suffering into consideration, and, indeed, to count it equally with like suffering

of any other being. Rather than regarding them as inferior to human beings because

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of their inability to reason, Bentham applied the moral principle of utilitarianism to

sentient animals. He said that because animals suffer, their happiness is indeed

relevant. The ethical theory of utilitarianism states that an action is right if its

results are superior to those of any other action. The basic idea is to generate the

greatest possible amount of happiness among the greatest number.

Indeed, utilitarianism is a powerful force in support of many environmental

philosophies. Rather than believing in the absolute ‘rights’ of animals and nature,

many environmentalists contend instead that their programme maximizes utility.

They say that because animals can suffer, they should be taken into account when

judging the morality of an action.8 The classical utilitarians shaped much of

philosophical debates in the nineteenth century, but they did not take animals’

moral standing seriously. It is in the second half of 20th century moral

philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Jöel Feinberg, and Tom Regan who took up the

issue.

John Rodman appears to have first used the term ‘sentientism’ to refer to that

mode of ethics which restricts moral standing only to the living beings who can

feel pain and pleasure. But it is Peter Singer who can be regarded as the champion

of sentientism. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation based on utilitarianism has

become ‘the holy book’ of animal liberation movement, and for this reason, the
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term ‘animal liberation’ has become closely associated with Singer’s views. He

claims that all animals are equal as they all have interests. He wonders, how could

this go unnoticed that this applies also to non-human animals, who also have lives

that can go well or badly, can suffer and hence have interest that we can affect!22

Some moral philosophers applied the idea of rights to animals. They argue

that animals, like humans, have certain basic rights, like the right to live and

flourish freely. This means that there are human actions which are simply

unacceptable, and that humans must respect animal rights. The equality claim does

not, however, imply equality in all respects, e.g., in intelligence and abilities,

capacity for leadership, rationality, etc. that are applicable to humans.

As already hinted, Singer has two key ideas of justification for equality of

consideration: First, he adopted Bentham’s pleasure and pain principle, argued for

sentience and in particular, the capacity to suffer. Animals feel pain, and this fact

makes them moral subjects. Animals who can suffer have an interest in avoiding

pain. And pain in a non-human animal is no different in moral significance to pain

in a human. Secondly, he evokes the principle of equality: the principle of equal

consideration of like interests. All entities which have a capacity to suffer have an

interest in avoiding suffering—of equal moral standing in each case—each such

entity has a claim to equally. But this does not, of course, mean equal treatment in
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all respects. Interests are not identical across living beings. Still then we could

admit that animals are entitled to equal considerations. But equal consideration for

different beings may, however, lead to different treatment.23

The grounds for inferring that animals can feel pain are nearly as good as the

ground for inferring other humans’ pain. Only nearly, for there is at least

behavioural sign that humans have, and no non-human have, and that is

sophisticated language. This has long been regarded as an important distinction

between man and other animals. But this distinction is not relevant to the question

of how animals ought to be treated, unless it is linked to the issue of whether

animals suffer. The link, according to Singer, has been attempted in two ways.

First, stemming from philosophical thought associated with Wittgenstein, who

maintains that we cannot meaningfully attribute states of consciousness to beings

without language. This position seems to us implausible one. States, like pain, are

more primitive, and seem nothing to do with language. Singer refers to Michael

Peters’ Animal, Men and Morals, where it is argued that the basic signals we use to

convey pain, fear, sexual arousal, and so on, are not specific to our species.24 So

there is no reason to believe that a creature without language cannot suffer. The

second link is the best evidence that we can have that another creature is in pain is

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when he tells us that he is. But, according to Singer, ‘I am in pain’ is not really the

best possible evidence that the speaker is in pain because he or she might be lying.

Anyhow, let us now see how do we know that animals can feel pain? We can

never directly experience the pain of another being, whether that being is human or

non-human. Animals in pain behave in much the same way as humans do, and

their overt behavior is sufficient justification for the belief that they feel pain. We

also can point to the fact that the nervous systems of all vertebrates, and especially

of birds and mammals, are fundamentally similar. This anatomical parallel makes

it likely that the capacity of animals to feel pain and pleasure is similar to our

own.25 Thus Singer claims that the capacity for consciousness of pleasure and pain

would, all by itself, suffice to give an animal moral standing. In Animal Liberation

Singer writes: “The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for

having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of

interests in a meaningful way.”26 Anyhow, in his essay ‘All Animals are Equals’

Singer makes his form of sentientism even more explicit: If a being is not capable

of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing in it to be

taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience is the only defensible

boundary of concern for the interests of other. Given Singer’s understanding of

what it is to be sentient, we have the following criterion of morality:

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 A thing has interests or well-being only if it is capable of suffering or

experiencing enjoyment.

A potentially more stringent sentientist position is proposed by moral and

political philosopher Jöel Feinberg. In his famous essay ‘The Rights of Animals

and Unborn Generations’ argues that while it make sense to attribute rights to some

non-human animals and to future generations of humans, neither plants, species,

nor ecosystems are plausible candidates for right. According to Feinberg, in order

to have right, an entity must be capable of consciously aiming at – thinking about –

things in its future. In his own words, “…an interest…presupposes at least

rudimentary cognitive equipment cognitive equipment. Interests are compounded

somehow out of desires and aims—both of which presuppose something like

beliefs, or cognitive awareness…Mere brute longings unmediated by beliefs—

longings for one knows not what—might be a primitive form of

consciousness…but they are altogether different from the sort of thing we mean by

‘desire’, especially when we speak of human beings.” 27

Beside Singer and Feinberg, a third proponent of animal liberation is Tom

Regan. He characterized a truly environmental ethics in an article entitled ‘The

Nature and Possibility of Environmental Ethics’ in the celebrated journal

Environmental Ethics (1981), as one in which ‘all conscious beings and some non-
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conscious beings held to have moral standing’. Although he, like Singer and

Feinberg, takes sentience to be of moral significance, he does not refer his case to

utilitarianism as source. He embraces a sentientist but deontological rights view,

labeling Aldo Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’ as ‘environmental fascism’.28 Regan argued

for the need for a more rights-based focus than could be found within Singer’s

Animal Liberation. According to Regan, it is not be possible to argue convincingly

the case for animal rights unless they are held to possess a right to life. Regan

accords moral standing to those animals who are ‘subjects of life’. Beings that

meet the criterion, however, are ends in themselves and possess inherent worth,

and on this ground, they can be said to possess rights.

In the book The Case for Animal Rights (1983) Regan says that ‘having moral

right’ is an all or nothing thing; to ‘have rights’ at all is to have a blanket right not

to be significantly harmed in any way. His argument for extending to animals a

blanket right not to be harmed has two parts. First, he argues that recognizing this

blanket right in human is the essence of respecting them as individuals. Second, he

argues that any non-speciesist explanation of why very nearly all human beings

deserve to be treated with this kind of individual respect will imply that many

animals deserve the same. In particular, Regan argues that what he calls the

‘subject of a life criterion’ best explains the scope of moral rights among humans,

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and implies that at least all normal adult mammals, and probably all normal adult

birds, deserve similar respect. To be a subject of a life, in Regan’s sense, is to have

a conscious well-being which is tied to having one’s conscious desire for one’s

future.

Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (1983) is a rigorous exploration of the

implications of extending a common conception of moral rights from humans to

animals which have the kind of cognitive capacities that Feinberg took to be

necessary for having interests. Regan’s account of the tie between interests and

rights can be paraphrased in this way. If an entity A ‘has moral rights’, then it

would be wrong to set back significant way on purely utilitarian grounds—it would

be wrong to set back significant interests of A unless a certain kind of non-

utilitarian justification for doing so was available. Although appeals to rights in

day-to-day speech are significantly more nuanced than this simple account, it does

capture a core meaning of rights claims as used in daily arguments about ethics.

For instance, when opponents of abortion invoke a fetus’s right to life, they are in

effect saying that the costs of carrying it to term cannot suffice to justify aborting it

—that only be invoking a similar right to life on the mother’s side could abortion

be justified.

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 It is important to note that, for Regan, ‘having moral rights’ is an all-or-

nothing: to ‘have rights’ at all is to have a blanket right not to be significantly

harmed in any way (at least not for the sake of purely utilitarian goals). In daily life

when we talk about rights we typically invoke various specific rights not to be

harmed in fairly specific ways. For instance, to have a right to free speech is to

have the right not to be harmed in the specific way we would be harmed by having

our speech limited, to have a right to a public education is to have to have the right

not to be harmed in the way we would be harmed by not being provided with an

education, etc.

Regan’s argument for extending to animals a blanket right not to be harmed

has two parts. First, he argues that recognizing this blanket right in humans is the

essence of respecting them as individuals. To think that aggregate benefits to

others can suffice to justify us in harming an individual is to think of that

individual as a mere ‘utility receptacle’. Regan claims that the classic objections to

utilitarianism—that it could justify punishing the innocent, slavery, etc., if only the

aggregate benefits are large enough to outweigh the costs to the harmed individuals

—arise because utilitarianism fails to respect individuals in this way. Second,

Regan argues that any non-speciesist explanation why very nearly all human

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beings deserve to be treated with this kind of individual respect will imply that

many animals deserve the same.

In particular, Regan argues that what he calls the ‘subject of a life’ criterion

best explains the scope of moral rights among humans and implies that at least all

normal adult mammals, probably all normal adult birds, deserve similar respect. To

be a ‘subject of a life’ in Regan’s sense is (roughly) to have a conscious well-being

which is tied to having one’s conscious desires for one’s future satisfaction. On

this criterion, a permanently comatose human no longer has moral rights, because

he no longer has any conscious desires for his future in terms of which we can

conceive of him as being harmed in the relevant sense; but even very profoundly

retarded humans would be harmed in this sense, and so, too, animals with at least

rudimentary conscious desires for their future would have that right.

So Regan’s view, like Feinberg’s, may be even more restrictive than

Singer’s. For Singer, the bare capacity to feel pleasure or pain gives an entity

moral standing. According to Regan and Feinberg, however, something more is

required: the capacity to consciously desire things in one’s future—it is in terms of

one’s desires for the future, rather than bare consciousness of pain. But evolution

may have produced consciousness of pain in some organisms without coupling it

with the ability to consciously plan for the future. Pain combines vital information
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about tissue damage in the present with strong negative effect, and these might aid

organisms in simple conditioned learning where thinking about how to achieve

things in the future is unnecessary.

Even then, when Regan distinguished between ‘an ethic for the use of the

environment’ and ‘an ethic of the environment’, it is argued, he seems to embrace

some form of holism. Gary Varner said that if ‘environmental philosophy’ were

defined as that discipline that attributes moral standing to non-conscious entities,

then it would be an analytic truth that no form of sentientism could be an

‘environmental ethic’. Varner concludes that any version of holism claims that no

version of sentientism would be ‘adequate’ as an environmental ethics. Three kinds

of reason for this conclusion may be given:29 First, the range of policy goals for

preserving the health or integrity of ecosystems, sentientist ethics cannot support

these goals as fully as holistic ethics could. Second, in certain hypothetical

situations (like the ‘last man’ case) a sentientist ethic conflicts with the intuitions

of a holistic environmental philosopher. Third, it is that because environmental

philosophers are directly concerned with preserving holistic entities, such as

species and ecosystems, the conceptual machinery of traditional ethical theory is

ill-suited in capturing the general value framework of environmental philosopher.

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 The most widely discussed in this connection is J. Baird Callicott’s 1980-

paper ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affairs’ contributing to the widespread

impression that sentient ethics must be an inadequate basis for an environmental

ethics. Callicott draws between the implications of sentientist ethics and the Land

Ethic of Aldo Leopold on practical issues in very stark terms. He says that the

Land Ethic would permit or even require hunting of animals to protect the local

environment, implying that animal liberationists should oppose hunting even in

such situations. The Land Ethic sees that predators as critically important members

of the biotic community, but sentientist condemn them as merciless, wanton, and

incorrigible murderers. Animal liberationists advocate vegetarianism, but Callicott

argues that universal vegetarianism probably would produce an environmentally

catastrophic population increase.30

Anyhow, in none of the sentientist views surveyed here can include entities

such as species or ecosystems (as opposed to some to their individual members)

plausible candidates for moral standing, and this basic feature of sentientist views

has played a major role in their rejection by many prominent environmental

ethicists. This leads us to search for a more comprehensive environmental theory,

like ecocentrism.

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 Notes and References:

1. “Biocentrism (Cosmology).” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 01 June 2012

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biocentrism_ (cosmology)>.
2. Ibid.
3. Albert Schweitzer. “Reverence for Life.” Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and
Application. Louis P. Pojman & Paul Pojman, eds. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008.
p. 132.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 133.
6. Hans Lenk. Global Technoscience and Responsibility: Schemes Applied to Human
Values, Technology, Creativity and Globalization. Auslieferung/Verlagskontakt,
Fresnostr: Lit Verlag, 2007. p. 296.
7. Paul Taylor. “Biocentric Egalitarianism.” (Originally published in Environmental Ethics.
vol. 3, 1981. in the name of ‘The Ethics of Respect for Nature’). Environmental Ethics:
Readings in Theory and Application. op. cit., p. 141.
8. Ibid., p. 142.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 145.
11. Ibid., p. 147.
12. Ibid., p. 152.
13. Ibid.
14. Kate Rawles. “Biocentrism.” Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. Ruth Chadwick et al. vol.
1, San Diago: Academic Press, 1993. p. 278.
15. Ibid.
16. John Rodman. “The Liberation of Nature.” Inquiry 20. 1977. pp. 94-101.
17. Peter Hay. “Ecophilosophy.” A Companion to Environmental Thought. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2002. p. 31.
18. “Environmental Ethics.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 02 June 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_Ethics >.

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19. Jeremy Bentham. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ch. XVII.
London: Russell, 1962. Sec. 1. Footnote to paragraph 4.
20. Peter Singer. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. p.
57.
21. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
22. Peter Hay. “Animal Liberations/Animal Rights.” A Companion to Environmental
Thought. op. cit., p. 37.
23. Ibid.
24. Peter Singer. “Animal Liberation.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to
Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 25.
25. Peter Singer. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. op. cit., p. 70.
26. Peter Singer. Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Men’s Inhumanity to Animals.
Wellingborough: Thorsons Publishers, 1975. p. 9.
27. Gary Varner. “Sentientism.” A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. Dale Jamieson,
ed. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001. p. 194.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 196.
30. J. Baird Callicott. “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affairs.” Environmental Ethics.
Robert Elliot, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 55.
Special acknowledgement: In preparing this chapter I have also taken some help of I Gede
Suwantana’s unpublished thesis From Ecology to Ecosophy: A Study of Arne Naess’s
Environmental Philosophy. Burdwan: The University of Burdwan, 2010.

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 Chapter-IV

Ecocentrism

Biocentrism gives us an account of environmental ethics, according to which our

moral obligation should extend also to individual living beings. But the so-called

non-living part of nature and the abiotic features of the non-human world are

equally vital for the sustenance and well-being of living beings. But they are not

recognized as intrinsically or inherently valuable, since to have moral significance

in their own right in such an environmental philosophy requires to be an individual

living organism. The claim that only living individuals are morally significant is

said to be underpinned by a view of the world as populated by diverse, discrete

individuals, whose relations are contingent and external. This world-view is

unfavourably contrasted with another view that focuses upon the various

relationships of interdependence as the science of ecology demonstrates.

Contemporary ecological investigations have clearly illustrated that the dichotomy

of the biotic and the abiotic is merely an abstraction. Moral standing of the whole

nature, both the animate and the inanimate parts, is to be recognized. This

recognition has finally led us to the position of Ecocentrism, which is another

alternative to speciesist anthropocentrism.

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 Ecocentrism is that holistic environmental theory, according to which not

only living beings, but the whole ecosystem, including the abiotic part of nature, is

worthy of moral consideration. This way of understanding nature develops from

the conviction that ecology plays a primary role in our understanding and valuing

of nature. Contemporary science of ecology emphasizes the importance, not of

individual organisms, but of the relationships between organisms, and between

organisms and the environment. In compliance with it, ecocentrism maintains that

an adequate eco-ethics must include our relations with ecological systems,

processes, along with non-living natural objects. The environmentalists who

subscribe to this ecocentrism contend that these things have inherent value—and

not mere instrumental value. And so they owe a direct moral obligation to us.

The justification for ecocentrism thus consists in an ontological belief and

subsequent ethical claim. The ontological belief denies that there are any

existential divisions between human and non-human nature sufficient to claim that

humans are either the sole bearers of intrinsic value or possess greater intrinsic

value than non-human nature. Thus the subsequent ethical claim is for an equality

of intrinsic/inherent value across human and non-human nature.

Anyhow, the first version of modern ecocentric world-view is found in

Aldo Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’. Leopold’s holistic nature view, however, reminds us
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of Lovelock’s Gaia theory, and so we like to take here a brief note of it also. Arne

Naess’s Deep Ecology is perhaps the most popular form of ecocentrism now-a-

days. It is a radical and holistic environmental theory that brings thinking, feeling,

spirituality and action together in order to diffuse imminent eco-catastrophe. It is

also necessary to make a cursory journey through the view of Holmes Rolston–III.

Rolston explicitly argues for greater weight to collective entities, like species,

ecosystem, etc. In this chapter we like to discuss the views of these four

environmental thinkers with special emphasis on Naess.

The Land Ethic

The early version of modern ecocentrism is found in Aldo Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’.

Aldo Leopold is an American forester who has been regarded as the single most

influential figure in the development of an ecocentric environmental philosophy.

He felt as early as in 1949 the need for a new ethic, an ‘ethic dealing with man’s

relation to the land and to the animals and plants.’1 He calls it as the ‘Land Ethic’,

which aims at the boundaries of the community to include in its fold soil, water,

plants, and animals, or collectively, the Land.2 This view effects a rethinking of

ethics in the light of the new science of ecology.

In his A Sand County Almanac Leopold argues for an extension of ethics: not

only that ethics would deal with the relation between individuals and between the

individual and society, but also would deal with man’s relation to the ‘Land’ and to
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the animals and plants. Accordingly, the Land should be respected as a biological

community to which we all belong. This extension of ethics, according to Leopold,

is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in

ecological as well as in philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation

of freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a

differentiation of the social from anti-social conducts. These are the two definitions

of the same thing. This has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals

or groups to evolve modes of co-operation.

J. Baird Callicott, the most dedicated exponent of Leopold’s Land Ethic,

argues that Leopold’s attempt for an extension of ethic may be traced back even to

the traditional moral philosophy, classically articulated in the eighteenth century by

David Hume and Adam Smith, in which ethics are shown to be rooted precisely in

altruistic feelings, like benevolence, sympathy, and loyalty.3 The chronology of

this development of ethics from Hume and Smith to the Land Ethic is explored by

Callicott. According to him, Leopold just takes over Darwin’s recipe for the origin

and development of ethics, and adds, following Elton, an ecological ingredient,

namely, a ‘community’ concept. Darwin, in turn, might have taken over a

sentiment-based theory of ethics from Hume and Smith. We, however, do not find

any clue to affirm that Leopold have studied Hume or Smith. But he surely did

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read Darwin and allude in the Land Ethic to Darwin’s account of the origin and

development of ethics, and thus the theoretical foundations and pedigree of his

Land Ethic are traceable though Darwin to the sentiment-based ethical theories of

Hume and Smith.4

So the Land Ethic, on Callicott’s interpretation, is, of course, a value theory,

but it does not seem to accept the notion of inherent value as it is presently

understood, since Leopold’s value has its source in human feelings. Callicott

suggest that Leopold here follows David Hume (may be unknowingly), for whom

morality is grounded in our feelings and sentiments, not merely in reason. Leopold

thus concludes that collective entities, such as ecosystems, are appropriate objects

of moral value. He criticizes the individualistic approach in general, as it fails to

accommodate conservation concerns for ecological wholes.

Anyhow, Leopold held the view that the earth’s linked communities of life

can actuate the moral sentiments of affection, respect, love, sympathy, etc. Leopold

then, develops a concept of community, following Elton,5 to summarise Darwin’s

natural history of ethics. All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise, and

that is, the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. This

community concept of Land Ethic, in addition to changing our perception of Land

as having only instrumental value to something with value in itself, changes the
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role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and

citizen of it.6 It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the

community as such.

Leopold tends to depict the Land community as a living thing. The

characteristics of the Land determine this fact quite as potently as the

characteristics of the man who lived on it. So it would be deemed unethical—

rather wrong—to regard the nature as our slave, just as some hundred years ago we

came to regard as wrong to treat other human beings as slaves.

For Leopold, the perception of Land and the life it sustains as constituting a

large and complex entity functioning through interactions of its components is the

outstanding discovery of the twentieth century. Mankind’s technological capacity

has caused it to lose sight of this discovery, with the result that some entire species

has been, and are still being extirpated. This would continue, and ecological

disharmony would gain momentum, unless a change in our attitude could be

effected.10 He, therefore, summarized his moral prescription in this way: ‘A thing

is right when he tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic

community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.’8

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 Obviously, the focus of Leopold’s Land Ethic is upon ecosystemic integrity.

And this focus upon larger interdependencies rather than individual life units thus

results in behavioral prescriptions that differ from those advanced by sentientists,

like Singer and Regan. For Leopold, the passing of a complex ecosystem or an

entire species is more deplorable than the passing of an individual organism, and as

such ethical injunctions should be so shaped. This focus is gradually sharpened.

The insights of scientific ecology supply a capacity to view the natural

environment as a community, and with this, we have an eco-centric environmental

ethics. Much emphasis is placed upon the communal implications of the ‘Land

community’. All contemporary forms of life are represented to be kin, relatives,

members of one extended family. All are equal members in good standing of one

society or community, the biotic community or global ecosystem.9

An ethic to supplement and guide us to see the Land community as a living

thing, or what Leopold calls ‘a biotic mechanism’ is the need of the day. He first

sketches the pyramid as a symbol of Land, and later develops some of its

implications in terms of Land-use. The energy flows through a circuit which

represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil, then a

plant layer that rests on the soil, insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer

on the insects, and so on up through various higher animal groups. Each

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successive layer depends upon those below it for food. This line of dependency for

food and other services are called food-chain. The pyramid of this food-chain is

very complex, so as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it to

be a highly organized structure. Its functioning depends on the co-operations and

competitions of its diverse parts.10

This sketch of Land as an energy circuit conveys three basic ideas: i) The

Land is not merely soil. It is the fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of

soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which help moving

energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. ii) The native plants and

animals keep the energy circuit open; other may or may not. iii) That man-made

changes are of a different order than evolutionary changes, and thus they have

effects more comprehensive than is intended or foreseen.11 Nevertheless, some

biota seem to differ in their capacity to sustain violent conversion. Leopold takes

an example in Western Europe that some large animals are lost, swampy forests

have become meadows or plough-land, many new plants and animals are

introduced, some of which escape as pests, the remaining natives are greatly

changed in distribution and abundance.

The Land Ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and

this, in turn, reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the
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Land. Health is the capacity of the Land for self-renewal. According to Leopold,

conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity. But what does it

mean for the health of the land sometimes makes us confused. Leopold

differentiates two groups of people from the point of view of how they see the

Land, this is what he calls as the A-B cleavage.12 One group A regards the Land as

soil, and its function as commodity-production. Another group B regards the Land

as a biota, and its function as something broader. Group A sees the Land as

agronomy or in economic sense, while group B, on the other hand, prefer natural

reproduction. Group B is worried about the biotic as well as the economic grounds

about the loss of species. Leopold said that group B feels the stirrings of an

ecological conscience.

This version of Land-ethical holism would be the supreme deontological

principle. In this theory, the earth's biotic community per se is the sole locus of

intrinsic/inherent value, whereas the value of its individual members is merely

instrumental and dependent on their contribution to the ‘integrity, stability, and

beauty’ of the larger eco-community. A straightforward implication of this version

of the Land Ethic is that an individual member of the biotic community ought to be

sacrificed whenever that is needed for the protection of the holistic good of the

eco-community.13 But, to be consistent, the same point also applies to human

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individuals because they are also members of the biotic community. Not

surprisingly, this imminent misanthropy implied by land-ethical holism has been

widely criticized and regarded as a reductio of the position.

As a matter of fact, a group of moral philosophers have strongly criticized

Leopold’s Land Ethic. Sentientist Tom Regan, for example, has condemned the

holistic Land Ethic's disregard of the rights of individuals as ‘environmental

fascism’. Australian Philosopher H.J. McCloskey said that there is a real problem

in attributing a coherent meaning to Leopold’s statement, one that exhibits his

Land Ethic as representing a major advance in ethics rather than a retrogression to

a primitive morality. Echoing McCloskey, Attfield went out of his way to deny the

philosophical respectability of Land Ethic. And Canadian Philosopher L.W.

Sumner has called it ‘dangerous nonsense’. Frederick Ferré echoes the same

concern in much more clear terms: “Anything we could do to exterminate excess

people…would be morally “right”! To refrain from such extermination would be

“wrong”!...Taken as a guide for human culture, the Land Ethic—despite the best

intentions of its supporters—would lead toward classical fascism, the submergence

of the individual person in the glorification of the collectivity, race, tribe, or

nation.”14

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 Obviously, if the Land Ethic implies such a monstrous consequence, it should

be summarily rejected. But we think that this is hardly true an apprehension. A

comprehensive reflection on it would reveal that those critics who make such

allegation are more interested to read and quote Leopold piecemeal than to explore

and see its theoretical framework, i.e., foundational principles and premises which

lead, by compelling argument, to the moral precepts of Land Ethic. They fail to see

that Leopold does not put forward the Land Ethic as the only alternative to

traditional human ethics. He refers to different stages of the development of ethics

as ‘accretions’, that means, ‘increase by external additions or accumulations’. It is

true that he somehow bases his ethic on the theoretical foundations that he found in

Darwin, who speaks of evolutionary social ethics. But it should as well be borne in

mind that with the advent of a new stage in the process of accretions, the older

stages are not erased or totally rejected. We should understand that the duties—to

preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community do not cancel

or replace the duties, e.g., to respect human rights, attendant on us as members of

the human community.

Anyhow, eco-feminist Karen J. Warren holds in his essay The

Philosophical Foundation of a New Land Ethic that Leopold’s Land Ethic is an

ethic that makes ‘the land itself’—and not just its instrumental, useful, utilitarian,

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efficient value to humans—valuable in its own right. She presumes four radical

truths in Leopold’s Land Ethic: First, humans are co-members of the ecological

community. She thinks humans as ecological beings and not merely rational self-

interested persons. Second, an ethical relation to the Land requires both rational

and emotional ingredients. We can be ethical only in relation to something we can

see, feel, understand, love or have faith in. The evolution of a Land Ethic is an

intellectual as well as an emotional process. Third, an ethical relationship to the

land cannot exist without the development of an ‘ecological conscience’.

Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the

extension of the social conscience from people to the Land. Fostering a Land Ethic

is intimately interconnected with changing people’s ‘loyalties, affections, and

convictions’ to love and respect the Land. Fourthly, Leopold articulates as moral a

maxim the ethical principle most often associated with him—his definition of a

‘Land Ethic’.15

Anyhow, it is no gain denying that Leopold himself hardly provides us a

systematic moral theory to support his ethical ideas concerning the environment.

But, nevertheless, his views presented a challenge and an opportunity as well for

moral theorists to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biosphere. This

holism of Land Ethic has come out as ‘the first paradigm’ of contemporary

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environmental ethics. But with a paradigm shift of ecology from the notion of

static equilibrium to the notion of nature as dynamic flux,16 Leopold’s proposal

seems to become invalid. But commentators, like Callicott, hold that recent

development of paradigm shift from ‘the balance of nature’ to the ‘flux of nature’

may necessitate some revision, but this fact does not make it outdated. The moral

prescription of the Land Ethic is to be made dynamic in the light of development of

ecology. Here also we should keep in mind that Leopold did acknowledge the

change in the natural environment, but he thought of it as very slow. He thought of

it primarily on a very slow evolutionary temporal scale. According to Callicott, we

may thus make some revision of Leopold’s famous formula in the following way:

‘A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal

spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.’17

The Gaia Theory

The traditional holistic idea of the Earth as an integrated whole, a living being, has

found an expression in the Gaia theory. The mythical Gaia was the primal Greek

goddess personifying the Earth, the Greek version of ‘Mother Nature’, or the

‘Earth Mother’. James Lovelock gave this name to his hypothesis after a

suggestion from the novelist William Golding.

According to the Gaia theory, all organisms and their inorganic surroundings

on this planet are closely interrelated to form a single and self-regulating complex
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system, maintaining favourable conditions for life on the Earth. The scientific

investigation of the Gaia hypothesis (as initially formulated by Lovelock) focuses

on the modalities of the biosphere and the evolution of life forms contributing to

the stability of global temperature, ocean salinity, oxygen in the atmosphere and

other factors of habitability in a better homeostasis.

The Gaia hypothesis was co-developed by the microbiologist Lynn Margulis

in the 1970s. Lovelock formulated the Gaia hypothesis in a journal article in the

1970s, followed by a book titled Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth published

in1979. Until 1975 the hypothesis was not given importance by the scientific

community. An article in the New Scientist of February 15, 1975, and a popular

book length version of the hypothesis, published in 1979 entitled The Quest for

Gaia, began to attract scientific and critical attention.

Although the proposal was not well received by the scientific community, it

is now studied in the different disciplines like geophysiology and earth system

science, and some of its principles have been accepted in fields like

biogeochemistry and systems ecology. This holistic proposal has also inspired

analogies and diverse interpretations in social sciences, politics, philosophy and

literature under an enchanting mythical-theoretical clout.

The Gaia theory reiterates that the earth's atmospheric condition is kept at a

dynamically steady state by the presence of life. Presently the Gaian homeostatic
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balance is being disturbed by high increase of human population and the impact of

their activities to the environment. The multiplication of greenhouse gases may

cause an opposite turn of the Gaia's negative feedbacks into homeostatic positive

feedback. Lovelock holds that this could bring an accelerated global warming and

mass animal mortality, including humans. In fine, the Gaia hypothesis accords that

the temperature, oxidation state, acidity, and certain aspects of the rocks and waters

are kept constant, and that this homeostasis is maintained by active feedback

processes operated automatically and unconsciously by the biota in general.

As already stated, Lovelock called his first proposal the Gaia ‘hypothesis’,

but the term established now-a-days is the Gaia theory. Lovelock explains that the

initial formulation was based on general observations, and so lacked a scientific

explanation. It is interesting to note that the initial Gaia hypothesis has now been

supported by various scientific experiments and provided a number of useful

predictions, and hence is properly referred to as the Gaia theory. But it should also

be mentioned that wider research proves the original hypothesis somewhat wrong,

in the sense that it is not life alone but the whole earth system that does the

regulating functions.

Anyhow, it is possible to regard the earth's ingredients—soil, mountains,

rivers, atmosphere, etc.—as organs or parts of organs of a coordinated whole, each

part with its definite function. And if we could see this whole, as a whole, through
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a great period of time, we might perceive not only organs with coordinated

functions, but possibly also that process of consumption as replacement which is,

in the language of biology, called metabolism. In such a case we would have all the

visible attributes of a living thing, which we do not realize to be such as it is too

big, and its life processes passing so slowly.

Some contemporary environmental philosophers have argued for a

pantheistic version of the Gaia hypothesis, which in its extreme form holds that not

only is the earth a self-regulating Superorganism, but it is capable of deliberation

in terms of its own ideals.18 Although no philosopher is seen to develop normative

theory directly on the basis of the Gaia theory, it is, and will remain, in the

background of any form of ecocentric thought.

Systemic Holism

Although Holmes Rolston-III is sometimes projected as a supporter of biocentrism,

he argues for greater weight to collective entities, like species, ecosystem, etc. For

this some environmentalists call his theory ‘Systemic Holism’, while Taylorian

biocentrism and animal liberationists’ sentientism are individualistic. Rolston

contends that an ecological consciousness requires an unprecedented mix of

science and conscience, of biology and ethics. According to him, there is moral

value in all parts of nature, and so we have no escape from moral responsibilities.
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Not only animals, but all trees and plants, species, ecosystems, etc. have moral

worth, and so attract our moral consideration. Rolston strongly upholds that

ecological wholes, like species, merit moral respect, in addition to that owed to the

individual members of the species. He introduces the notion of ‘objective good’:

all living things as having objective ‘good-of-their-own-kind’. Plants do not have a

subjective life, he contends, like a higher animal or a human being. But they have

objective lives, and when we utter ‘Let flowers live!’ we indirectly refer to an

evaluative system that conserves good of its own kind and, in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, is really good. He writes: “An organism is a spontaneous,

self-maintaining system, sustaining and reproducing itself, executing its

programme, making a way through the world….[DNA-coded information] gives

the organism a telos, ‘end’ a kind of (non-felt) goal….The DNA is thus a logical

set, not less than a biological set, informed as well as formed.”19 He, of course,

admits that all organisms are not moral agents like us, but that fact does not free us

from moral responsibility towards them. In defense of our obligation to species, he

reiterates, although species exists only as instantiated in individuals, they are as

real as individual members. That there are specific forms of life historically

maintained in their environments over time is almost as certain as anything else we

believe about our mundane world. Similarly, ecosystems generate and support life

forms, enhance situated fitness, and allow congruent beings to evolve in their
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places with sufficient containment. In this sense, an ecosystem is the fundamental

unit of any survival, and so we must give it a moral thought. He explains that some

values are anthropogenic, some are biogenic, and again, some are in the natural

systems. Value is there across the whole continuum, though it increases in the

emergent climax. It should be kept in mind that human evaluators are among its

products. Values may, accordingly, be objective, as are subjective. A little thought

will reveal that any ecological system is a value-transformer, where form and

being, process and reality, fact and value are inseparably conjoined. Rolston

upholds that ecosystems, as the generators and perpetuator of life, have a kind of

value which he describes as ‘systemic value’.

Such value is not any instrumental value, which uses something as a means to

an end. Neither is it inherent/intrinsic, which is worthwhile in itself. E.g., a warbler

does not survive to be eaten by a falcon—it defends its own life as an end in itself.

A life is thus important intrinsically or inherently, without further contributory

reference. As a matter of fact, neither terminology is satisfactory in a genuine

environmental discourse, and so says Rolston. An ecosystem has value in itself, it

does not have any value for itself. It is value-producer, but not a value-owner.

Different ecological systems, though instrumentally valuable as fountains of life,

are equally valuable in themselves. This value can neither be explained as intrinsic,

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as though the system defend some unified form of life. And so Rolston calls this

‘systemic value’.20

Some critics, like Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop, take Rolston’s view as a

form of ecocentrism, and contend that although Rolston’s environmental theory

relies on a number of values that systemically make nature valuable, ecosystem

integrity and stability are central among them.21 What Hettinger and Throop mean

to say is that as the theory of stability and integrity has been rejected by majority of

contemporary ecologists, who take instead an ecology of instability to be true, the

foundation of ecocentric ethics, like that of Leopold, seem to be very shaky. They

explain, an eco-ethic based on the balance of nature does not corroborate with the

most of the insights of recent ecologists. As we note in Notes and Reference

(no.16) below, contemporary ecology supports an ‘ecology of instability’, which

accords, disturbance is the norm for many ecosystems and that some systems of

nature do not tend towards the so called stable and integrate states. The ecology of

instability, on the other hand, argues that disturbance is the norm for many

ecosystems, and that natural systems typically do not tend toward mature, stable,

and integrated states. Contemporary ecologists no longer assume a tight correlation

between stability and diversity. They take nature as in a continuous change, in a

flux. With flux taken to be the norm on a variety of levels, it becomes more

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difficult to interpret natural systems as well-integrated. Michael Soulé, for

example, thinks it positively dangerous to emphasize the equilibrial, self-

regulating, stability producing tendency of ecosystems. 22

Deep Ecology

Although Leopold’s Land Ethic is the first paradigm of contemporary

environmental philosophy and ethics, although we speak of Rolson’s Systemaic

Holism and of James Lovelock’s Gaia theory, Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology is

perhaps the most influential environmental ethics and philosophy of nature in

contemporary times. Deep Ecology is a radical and holistic environmental theory

that brings thinking, feeling, spirituality and action together in tackling the

imminent eco-catastrophe. As the name suggests, Deep Ecology goes beyond the

(western) tradition of speciesist anthropocentrism, and also individualist

biocentrism, in so far as it takes into consideration the abiotic part of the

environment as well, along with the biotic. It places intrinsic/ inherent value on

non-human species, ecosystems and processes in nature

Anyhow, Arne Naess in his article ‘The Shallow and The Deep, Long-Range

Ecology Movement: A Summary’ published in Inquiry in 1973 (which is based on

a talk he gave at a Third World Future Research Conference held in Bucharest in

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1972), Naess first makes a distinction between shallow ecology and Deep Ecology,

and at the same time, formulates, though summarily, the basic ideas and principles

of his Deep Ecology.

Deep Ecology comes out as the form of ecology movement which raises

deeper questions concerning environmental matters. Here the adjective 'Deep'

signifies the fact that this environmentalism asks ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions in a

more comprehensive fashion, while other environmental theories fall short of it. If

we make a survey of Deep Ecology environmentalism, we would find that it

signifies at least three things. First, it leads into deeper questioning about

environmental issues. It probes into the roots of environmental problems and the

underlying world-views. The real solutions of these problems must involve a

change at the fundamental level of our thought and action. It may here be

mentioned that historian Lynn White, Jr. argued as early as in 1967 that the basic

(theoretical) cause of environmental problems is rooted in our traditional world-

views. He writes: “What people do about their ecology depends on what they think

about themselves in relation to things around them.”23 Deep Ecology follows this

orientation and reflects critically on the fundamental assumptions of these world-

views. It thoroughly examines our deep-seated assumptions and views on nature,

and proposes, at the same time, a radical alternative. Secondly, Deep Ecology

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refers, in addition, to a platform—Deep Ecology Platform—for collective activities

worldwide based on some minimum fundamental principles. The third and most

common meaning of Deep Ecology is a philosophy of nature that goes in line with

this Platform, but is more specific in exploring views and values. As a matter of

fact, Deep Ecology refers to the notions, views and principles—in a word, a

distinct philosophy of nature and environment, first integrated by Arne Naess, and

then followed by a number of environmentalists, like Bill Deval, George Sessions,

Warwick Fox and others.

Shallow Ecology and Deep Ecology

Naess identifies two different strands in contemporary environmental thought and

movement. One he calls ‘shallow ecology’ and the other ‘Deep Ecology’. He

described shallow ecology as a short-term reform-approach engaged only with

prevention of pollution and resource depletion. One of the pillars of shallow

ecology view-point is the belief that the environmental crisis can all be

technologically resolved. Thus shallow approach keeps faith in technological

optimism, economic growth, and scientific management and the continuation of

existing industrial societies, and so it is limited to the traditional, more or less

anthropocentric, moral frame-work. It also presupposes that men would not accept

any significant change of their traditional life-styles. Actually, the supporters of

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shallow ecology think that reforming human relations towards nature can be done

within the existing structure of society. It does not challenge the philosophical

presuppositions and fundamental validity of the industrial social paradigm of

reality. According to Naess, its concerns are relatively local and selective, only for

‘the health and affluence in the developed countries.’24

Deep Ecology, on the other hand, proposes a major reshuffling of our

philosophy and world-views, cultures, life-styles consistent with the new

ecological perspective. It aims at preserving the integrity of nature for its own sake,

irrespective of its benefits to any privileged species, like humans. It is based on this

conviction that the Earth ‘does not belong to humans.’25 Rather we have to change

of our life-styles, if required. Deep Ecology is thus concerned with deeper, more

basic questions upon our interactions with the nature, rather than with a narrow

view of ecology as a branch of biological science. Deep Ecology thus transcends

the limit of any particular science of today, including systems theory and scientific

ecology. Deepness of normative and descriptive premises characterises the

movement. Deep environmentalism attempts to avoid traditional utilitarian

approach to environmental issues, which is concerned with resource management

of the environment for human purposes. For the shallow thinkers, the resources of

Earth belong exclusively to the human beings who have the technology to exploit

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them. Accordingly, the resources should not be depleted, as they would get rarer,

and a high market price may be required to conserve them. But they are convinced

that substitutes for them would be found through technological progress. Thus

natural objects are valuable only as resources for humans, but for the supporters of

Deep Ecology no natural object should be conceived as mere resource for humans.

Naess’s Deep Ecology initiates an ecocentric approach in contemporary

environmentalism, rather than a platform for consideration merely of isolated life-

forms or local situations.

The supporters of shallow ecology may, for instance, be concerned about

(human) over-population in developing and under-developed countries, but may

not be worried about over-population in an industrially developed country. Deep

Ecology moves forward with a definite universal goal: it puts emphasis not only on

stabilizing human population but also of reducing it to a sustainable minimum by

humane means, which do not require violence or dictatorship. In shallow approach

one may condone, or even may applaud, population increase in one’s own

(developed) country for short-sighted economic, military, or for other purposes. An

increase in number of humans may be considered as valuable in itself or as

economically profitable. Deep Ecology recognises that excessive pressure on

planetary life stems from the human population explosion. And so population

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reduction should be given the highest priority in all societies, be it developed,

developing or underdeveloped. It may also call for a redistribution of excess

population across low-populated nations.

Similarly, the shallow approach toward pollution seeks higher technology to

purify air and water. In Deep approach pollution is evaluated from a total

biospheric point of view. Its supporters do not focus exclusively on its effects on

human life and health, but rather on planetary life as a whole. It also reminds us

that technology is not an all-bliss matter. Change in technology implies change in

culture. The degree of self-reliance and local autonomy diminishes in proportion

with the nature and extension of technology. Men gradually lose his spiritual eye,

and get swayed by the passivity and unnecessary dependence on technocracy.

A deep analysis would show that shallow ecological movement tends to

repair only some of the worst consequences of our lifestyles and social structures,

but fails to address the fundamental root-questions embedded in them. By contrast,

the supporters of Deep Ecology are committed to the view that it is our

responsibility to save the nature for both present and future generations, be they

human or non-human. As Naess puts it, ‘the aim…is not a slight reform of our

present society, but a substantial reorientation of our whole civilization.’26

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 Deep Ecology is actually founded on two basic principles: one is a scientific

insight into the interrelatedness of various systems of life on the earth, together

with the rejection of anthropocentrism as a misguided way of seeing things.

According to Deep Ecology, the ecocentric attitude is more consistent with the

truth about the nature of life on earth. Instead of regarding humans as some beings

completely unique, or as chosen by God, it sees all things and beings as integral

threads in the fabric of planetary life. Arne Naess, the proponent of Deep Ecology,

believes that we need to develop a caring—rather than dominating and

aggressive—attitude towards the Earth, if the planet, including humans, is to

survive. The second basic idea of Deep Ecology is the need for Self-realisation.

Instead of identifying with our small individual egos or merely with our immediate

families, we should learn to identify ourselves with all animals, trees and plants—

to say, ultimately with the whole ecosphere. This may require a pretty radical

change in our consciousness, but it would make our behavior more consistent with

what science tells us and is necessary for the well-being of life on Earth.

From these two principles of Deep Ecology we have two basic normative

principles.27 One is that every life form has, at least in principle, a right to live and

blossom. Naess holds that in some compelling situations we may not find better

option than to kill some living beings in order to survive, but it is a basic intuition

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that we have no right to destroy them without sufficient reason. The second norm

of Deep Ecology is that with maturity, human beings would experience joy when

other life forms experience joy, and sorrow when other life forms experience

sorrow.

Basic Principles of Deep Ecology

To integrate his Deep Ecology Naess formulates the following seven basic

principles. 28

1. Rejection of the ‘man-in-environment’ image in favour of the relational,

total-field image

According to Naess’s Deep Ecology, organisms are knots in the biospherical

net or fields of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation is defined here as

relation between two things A and B such that the relation belongs to the

basic constituents of A and B, and as such, without the relation, A and B are

no longer the same things. The total-field approach dissolves the ‘man-in-

environment’ concept. Instead, it draws a relational, total-field image based

on metaphysical interrelatedness of things and beings. All organisms are

seen as knots in a field of intrinsic relations and mutualities. Obviously this

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 total-field model dissolves not merely human chauvinism, but also the

concept of pure, absolutely autonomous individual.

2. Biospherical egalitarianism ‘in principle’

Deep Ecology believes in biospheric egalitarianism: all biotic communities,

including the abiotic nature, have equal right to live and blossom. The

ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration,

for ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker, according to

Naess, the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious

value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with

detrimental effects on the life quality, even of humans themselves. The

quality of life depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we

receive from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore

our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the

alienation of man from himself. Anyhow, the ‘in principle’ clause is later

inserted, as it was felt that any realistic praxis necessitates some killing,

exploitation, and suppression. We have no right to destroy other living

beings without sufficient reason.

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3. Diversity and symbiosis

It upholds the interrelated principles of diversity and symbiosis. Diversity

increases the level and potentiality of survival, thereby enhancing novelty

and richness of life forms. According to Naess, ‘To maximise self-

realisation…we need maximum diversity and maximum symbiosis.’29 It also

favours diversity of human ways of life and culture, of occupations, of

economies. Accordingly, we should subscribe to the cause against economic

and cultural domination as well as against annihilation of seals and whales.

Symbiosis means living in harmony with other fellow members. We

should remember that ‘live and let live’ is more powerful ecological policy

than ‘either you or me’. The so-called Darwinian theory of struggle for life

and survival of the fittest implies mutual co-existence as well. Anyhow, we

may interpret it in the sense of ability to coexist and cooperate in complex

relationships, rather than the ability to kill, exploit, and suppress. The

principle ‘either you or me’ tends to reduce and destroy the multiplicity of

kinds of forms of life. Ecologically inspired attitude is ‘live and let live’,

which favours as well diversity of human ways of life.

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4. Anti-class posture

It is sometimes thought that the enhancement of life-quality of humans

depends on suppression and exploitation of other life forms. But

contemporary ecological investigations demonstrate that this mode of

thinking is wrong; rather, symbiosis enhances the potentialities of survival,

the chances of new modes of life, and the richness of forms. In contrast, the

class posture adversely affects their potentialities of Self-realisation.

The principle of diversity does not favour differences due merely to

certain attitudes or behaviours forcibly blocked or restrained. The principles

of ecological egalitarianism and of symbiosis support the anti-class posture.

The ecological attitude favours the extension of all three principles to any

group conflicts, including those of today between developing and developed

nations. These principles also favour extreme caution toward any over-all

plans for the future, except those consistent with wide and widening

classless diversity.

5. Fight against pollution and resource depletion

In the fight against pollution and resource-depletion shallow ecologists find

a lot of supporters. But their endeavours do not comply with the ‘total stand’
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 when they focus on pollution and resource depletion of a country or of a

locality in isolation, without taking other related matters seriously. When

projects are implemented to reduce pollution, the project-managers do not

take other associated problems into account that might surface. For example,

they sometimes install some anti-pollution devices popular pressure, but do

not take into account its effects in distant future. Naess rejects such shallow

ecological stand, and advocates for sustainable policies of Deep Ecology.

Again, if prices of essential commodities of life increase because of the

installation of anti-pollution devices, class differences may increase too. An

ethic of responsibility implies that ecologists should not follow the shallow

path, but follow the Deep Ecology Platform.

6. Complexity, not complication

Deep Ecology makes a distinction between what is really complicated

without any unifying principle and what is merely complex. Multiple factors

may be operative to form a unity. But when we fail to find the unifying

principle then it seems to us to be complicated. In ecological matters, due to

our gigantic ignorance of the biospheric interrelationships, we often mistake

the complex as complication, and try to get rid of the complex.

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 The theory of ecosystems contains an important distinction between

what is complicated without any Gestalt or unifying principle and what is

complex. A multiplicity of, more or less, lawful, interacting factors may

operate together to form a unity, a system. Organisms, ways of life, and

interactions in the biosphere in general exhibit complexity of such an

astoundingly high level as to colour the general outlook of ecologists. Such

complexity makes thinking in terms of vast systems inevitable. It also makes

for a keen, steady perception of the profound human ignorance of

biospherical relationships and therefore of the effect of disturbances.

7. Local autonomy and decentralisation

The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of

influences from outside the local region in which that form has obtained an

ecological equilibrium. But the efforts to strengthen local autonomy

presuppose an impetus towards decentralisation. Pollution problems,

including those of thermal pollution and recirculation of materials, also lead

us in this direction, because increased local autonomy, if we are able to keep

other factors constant, reduces energy consumption. Local autonomy, in

socio-political life, is strengthened by a reduction in the number of links in

the hierarchical chains of decision. Even if a decision follows majority rule

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 at each step, many local interests may be dropped along the line, if it is too

long.

Anyhow, the norms and tendencies of Deep Ecology movement are not

derived from ecology of facts by logic or by induction. Ecological knowledge and

the life-style of the ecological field-workers have suggested, inspired, and fortified

the perspectives of the Deep Ecology movement. Many of the formulations in the

seven-point survey are rather vague generalisations, only tenable if made more

precise in certain directions. But all over the world the inspiration from ecology

has shown remarkable convergences. The survey does not pretend to be more than

one of the possible condensed codifications of these convergences.30

The significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are clearly and

forcefully normative. They express a value priority system only in part based on

results of scientific research. There are political potentials in this movement which

should not be overlooked and which have much to do with pollution and resource

depletion. As to the approach of Deep Ecology, Naess holds, ‘The direction is

revolutionary, the steps are reformatory’32.

Insofar as Deep Ecology movement deserves our attention, they are eco-

philosophical ( or ecosophical) rather than ecological. Ecology is a limited science

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which makes use of scientific methods, and gives us some information.

Philosophy, as we know, is the most general forum of debate on fundamentals,

descriptive as well as prescriptive. In a sense, philosophy means ‘one’s own

personal code of values and view of the world which guides our own decisions.’32

When applied to questions about ourselves and nature, we may then call it

‘ecosophy’. Thus eco-philosophy, like Deep Ecology, or an ecosophy, includes

‘norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and hypotheses concerning

the state of affairs in the universe’33, and, along with it, a direct practical

orientation to act accordingly.

Along with George Sessions and others, Arne Naess has set up a Deep

Ecology Platform, which is based on the perception that some philosophers alone

cannot make a significant change in this planet, and as such, we have to organise

people from all walks of life and take into our fold scientists, activists, scholars,

artists and other lay people. This umbrella Platform is based on eight point

programme of environmentalism. If we can largely agree with the Platform

statements, we fall within the umbrella of Deep Ecology movement and we can

place ourselves within the ranks of its supporters. The Platform is not meant to be a

rigid set of doctrinaire statements, but rather a set of discussion points, open to

modification by people who broadly accept them. Some Deep Ecology supporters

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regard the Platform as the outline of a comprehensive ecosophy in its own right.

Here first level statements of wide identification (points 1—3) are represented by

the first three points, which incorporate the ultimate norm of intrinsic value. Points

4 to 7 are seen as a bridge between the ultimate norm and personal lifestyles, with

Point 8 relating specifically to concrete actions in the world. These eight points

are:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have

value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These

values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human

purposes.

2. Richness and diversity of life forms34 contribute to the realization of these

values and are also values in themselves.

3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy

vital needs.

4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial

decrease of the human population.35 The flourishing of non-human life

requires such a decrease.

5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the

situation is rapidly worsening.

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 6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,

technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will

be deeply different from the present.

7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling

in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher

standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference

between big and great.

8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or

indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes. 36

These eight principles are endorsed by people from a diversity of

backgrounds who share common concerns for the planet earth, its various life-

forms and ecological communities. The supporters of this Platform may come from

different religious and philosophical backgrounds. Even their political affiliations

may differ considerably. What unites them is a long-range vision of what is

necessary to protect the integrity of the earth’s ecological communities and values.

To say, the supporters may have a diversity of ultimate beliefs, i.e., with regard to

their values, life-styles and actions. Different people with their distinct cultures

have different ways of life, mythologies and social and religious practices.

Nonetheless, they can broadly support the Platform-principles and work for

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solutions to our shared environmental crisis. The slogan is: ‘Think globally, act

locally.’37 He also reminds us: ‘[I]n order to participate joyfully and

wholeheartedly in the deep ecology movement, you have to take your life very

seriously.’38 That life should be ‘a life simple in means but rich in ends’.39

Identification with nature and consequent Self-realization later became the

basic norm of Deep Ecology movement. Naess goes to the extent to say that ‘Deep

ecology may be said to have a religious component, fundamental intuitions that

everyone must cultivate if he or she is to have a life based on values, and not

function like a computer’, while ‘shallow ecology, if taken to its logical extreme, is

like a computerised cost-benefit analysis designed to benefit only humans.’40 Arne

Naess’s Ecosophy T is one exemplification of personal ecophilosophy, the

discussion of which can give us a concrete example in formulating our own

ecosophy.

Ecosophy-T

Here the letter ‘T’ refers to Tvergastein, a mountain-hut, where Naess lived for a

long period keeping in direct touch with the nature. He read Spinoza, Gandhi, etc.

and wrote many of his favourite books and articles sitting at this mountain home.

The title reflects a personal orientation towards nature.

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 ‘Ecosophy’ literally means ‘the wisdom of the household place’. It refers to the

individual wisdom to dwell harmoniously at home in a place on the earth. It

involves being receptive and responsive to the needs of a place and the wisdom

that nature has enfolded into it, with its many beings and communities.

Communities which live there ecosophically evolve unique practices of forest and

land use that are called vernacular technologies. For example, shelters are built to

fit the place to take full advantage of the natural heating and cooling characteristics

there. Ecosophy deepens throughout one’s life, and throughout a culture’s life.

Anyhow, Naess suggests that everyone should develop his own philosophy. To

develop one’s personal ecosophy is to articulate one’s ultimate values and

philosophy of life as an Earth dweller. And it does not mean that anyone has to

agree on all the points and with all ecophilosophers. Naess writes: “You are not

expected to agree with all of its value and paths of derivation, but to learn the

means for developing your own systems or guides, say Ecosophies X,Y, or Z.

Saying ‘your own’ does not imply that the ecosophy is in any way an original

creation by yourself. It is enough that it be a kind of total view which you feel at

home with, ‘where you philosophically belong’”.41 Obviously, a person’s ecosophy

may well be based on a traditional culture, or a religion, such as Hinduism. But to

practise that personal ecosophy, we must have a comprehensive understanding of

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ourselves, contexts and relationships with fellow beings, the values that guide us,

the commitments we honour and the compassion we show and live. The

development of ecosophy is demonstrated by Naess through some such chart, as

follows:

Level I Ultimate Premises Taoism, Christianity, Ecosophy T, etc.

Peace Movement, Deep Ecology Movement, Social

Level II Platform Principles
Justice Movement, etc.

Level III Policies A, B, C, etc.

Level IV Practical Actions W, X, Y, etc.

In the above scheme of things we can find that a high level of cross-cultural

agreement is possible in Level II, the level of Platform principles. In Level I we

can articulate our own ecosophies of our choice. That means, this Level I is based

on one’s own belief-system, like Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, or may

be from an indigenous culture and tradition, or even from one’s own very personal

eco-intuitions, as in case of Naess’s Ecosophy-T. In Level II there may also be

peace movement, social ecology or social justice movement, etc. simultaneously

with Deep Ecology movement. From this Level II we can derive specific policy

formulations and recommendations, as policies A, B, C, etc. that constitute Level

III. Such Level III applications lead us to practical actions at Level IV. At Level III

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and Level IV there is a considerable diversity. In the process of derivation we

move towards the Platform and develop policies and practical actions. But the

ecological policies may vary with changing natural conditions.

Anyhow, Naess’s Ecosophy-T may be summarized into these five themes:42

• The narrow self (ego) and the comprehensive Self (written with capital S)

• Self-realisation is the realisation of comprehensive Self, not the cultivation

of the ego

• The process of identification as the basic tool of widening the self and a

natural consequence of increased maturity

• Strong identification with the whole of Nature in its diversity, and

interdependence of parts as a source of active participation in the Deep

Ecology movement

• Identification as a source of belief in intrinsic values.

Later Naess put Ecosophy T into one ultimate norm and that is ‘Self-

realisation!’ Self-realisation, accordingly, is a process through which people come

to understand themselves as existing in thorough interconnectedness with the rest

of nature. In order to understand Naess’s concept of Self-realisation, Joseph R. Das

Jardins makes a general distinction between needs, interests, and wants43. Needs

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could be understood as those things that are necessary for survival, like food,

clothing, shelter and non-toxic air and water. Interests are those factors that

contribute to our well-being, such as interests to have friendship, education, and

good health. Wants are the immediate desires and goals toward which a person is

inclined. We may want for a week holiday, want a glass of lime-juice, or a light

dinner. If we reflect a little, we will find that these categories may overlap. Food

with adequate calories that I need, have an interest in getting, and in fact, I want

this. But there may also be tensions among them. Although it is my interests to

improve my academic insight and therefore study at home, I want to go out for a

travel-trip with some of my friends. Jardins goes on to explain, wants are typically

seen as subjective choice, specific to one’s own culture and society. These are

undoubtedly superficial and temporary, and different moral codes encourage us to

separate these transitory wants from our basic interests as rational and ecologically

responsible beings. The good life is defined in terms of pursuit of these higher

level genuine interests. When we move along this line, we gradually come to

realise our self. ‘Self-Realisation!’ or in other words, ‘Know thyself!’ is the

injunction to get beyond the level of these three categories with a view to realising

our true Self. It is a process through which a person comes to understand that there

is no firm ontological divide between humans and non-humans, between my own

limited self and the universal Self.

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 Again, Naess also speaks of ‘identification’ with the whole eco-sphere.

Before the process of identification begins, one feels a lack of greatness,

equanimity in one’s empirical self. One sees oneself in the other, but it is not the

empirical self, but the Self one would aspire to have. The essential sense of

common interest in identification is comprehended spontaneously and is

internalised. He writes: “Identification is a spontaneous, non-rational, but not

irrational, process through which the interest or interests of another being are

reacted to as our own interest or interests. The emotional tone of gratification or

frustration is a consequence carried over from the other to oneself: joy elicits joy,

sorrow sorrow. Intense identification obliterates the experience of a distinction

between me and the sufferer.”44

From the identification stems unity, and since the unity is of a Gestalt

character, the wholeness is attained. It looks abstract and vague. But it offers a

framework for a total view or a central perspective. The maxim like ‘unity in

diversity’, or ‘live and let live’ suggests a class-free society in the whole world, we

can speak about justice, not only with regard to human beings, but also for animals,

plants and landscapes. This presumes a great emphasis upon the

interconnectedness of everything and that our egos are integrated whole, not isolate

parts. By identifying with the greater whole, we partake in the creation and

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maintenance of this whole, we as an ego, have an extremely limited power within

the whole, but it is sufficient for the unfolding of our potential, something vastly

more comprehensive than the potential of our ego. So, we are more than our ego.

The egos develop into selves of greater and greater dimensions, proportional to the

extent and depth of our processes of identification.

The intensity of identification with other life depends upon milieu, culture

and economic conditions. The ecosophical outlook is developed through

identification: ‘I identify with the universe—the greater the universe the greater I

am.’45 So deep that one’s own self is no longer adequately delimited by the

personal ego. One experiences oneself to be a genuine part of all life. Each living

being is understood as a goal in itself, on an equal footing with one’s own ego. But

Naess’s equality to each living being is ‘in principle’. It means that the statement

must not be taken at the face value. Killing may be necessary so long as to satisfy

one’s own vital need. But we should always keep in our mind that when we harm

others, we also harm ourselves.

Notes and References:

1. Aldo Leopold. “The Land Ethic.” Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Hugh La Folltte,
ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1997. p. 635.
2. Ibid.

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3. J. B. Callicott. “Introduction.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to
Radical Ecology. Michael E. Zimmerman, et al., eds. New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
1993. p. 96.
4. J. Baird Callicott. “The Land Ethic.” A Companion to Environmental Philosophy.
Dale Jamieson, ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. p. 208.
5. Ibid.
6. Aldo Leopold. “The Land Ethic.” op. cit., p. 635.
7. Peter Hay. A Companion to Environmental Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2002. p. 15.
8. Aldo Leopold. “The Land Ethic.” op. cit., p. 639.
9. Peter Hay. A Companion to Environmental Thought. op. cit. p. 54.
10. Aldo Leopold. “The Land Ethic.” op. cit., p. 636.
11. Ibid., p. 637.
12. Aldo Leopold. “The Land Ethic.” Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to
Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 106.
13. Brennan, Andrew and Lo, Yeuk-Sze. “Environmental Ethics.” 30 May 2012
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ethics-environmental/>.
14. Frederick Ferre'. “Persons in Nature: Toward an Applicable and Unified
Environmental Ethics.” Ethics and the Environment. vol. 1, 1996. p. 18.
15. Karen J Warren. “The Philosophical Foundation of a New Land Ethics.” Published
originally by The Wilderness Society at its website. 30 May 2012
<http://www.eoearth.org/article/Aldo_Leopold's_Land_Ethic>.
16. It may here be noted that the ‘ecology of stability’ were developed by Frederic
Clements and Eugen Odum, among others, who tend to view natural systems as
integrated, stable wholes that are either at, or moving towards, mature equilibrium
states. The terms ‘equilibrium’, ‘balance’, ‘stability’ and ‘integrity’ are used in
different senses in ecology. We may, however, say that a system is in equilibrium if
the various forces acting on it are sufficiently balanced that the system is constant and
orderly with respect to those features under consideration; thus ‘balance’ and
‘equilibrium’ are closely related. Again, a system is stable (i) if it is relatively

145
constant over time, (ii) if it resists alteration (i.e., not fragile), iii) if upon being
disturbed it has a strong tendency to return to pre-disturbance stage (i.e., resilient), or
iv) if it moves toward some end point (‘matures’), despite differences in starting
points. Whether a system is in equilibrium and /or stable depends on the features
under consideration and the scale at which the system is described. Furthermore,
integrity generally refers to the idea that the elements of the ecosystem are blended
into a unified whole. It is associated with the view that ecosystems come in fixed
packages of species whose coordinated functioning creates a unified community. A
system which has integrity is characterized by a high degree of integration of its parts.
But in the ecology of stability, natural systems do undergo some changes, such as the
populations of predators and prey, but usually such changes are regular and
predictable. Disturbances are considered atypical, and when they occur, ecosystems
resist upset. In an ecocentric ethic like the Land Ethic that emphasizes these
properties, our duties to normal systems seem to arise from the nature of ecosystem
themselves, rather than from human preferences concerning natural systems.
The ‘ecology of instability’, on the other hand, contends that disturbance is the
norm for many ecosystems and that natural systems typically do not tend towards
mature, stable and integrated states. On a broad scale, climatic changes show little
pattern, and they ensure that over the long term, natural systems remain in flux
Although the natural systems are fully deterministic, accurate predictions about them
are impossible because tiny differences in initial conditions can produce drastically
different results. Some ecologists suggest that many interacting populations are
chaotic systems, in the mathematic sense of chaos. Moreover, the ecologists do not
assume a tight correlation between stability and diversity. There is evidence that an
intermediate level of disturbance can increase diversity. Thus with flux taken to be
the norm on a variety of levels, it becomes more difficult to interpret natural systems
as well-integrated, persisting wholes, much like organism. (Cf: Environmental Ethics:
Readings in Theory and Application. Louis P. Pojman & Paul Pojman, eds. Belmont:
Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. pp. 187-89).

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17. J. Baird Callicott. “The Land Ethic.” A Companion to Environmental Philosophy. op.
cit., 2003. p. 216.
18. Cf. “Gaia Hypothesis.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. 30 May 2012
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaia_hypothesis>.
19. Holmes Rolston III. “Challenges in Environmental Ethics.” Environmental
Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 142.
20. Ibid., p. 153.
21. Nel Hettinger and Bill Troop. “Refocusing Ecocentrism: De-emphasizing Stability
and Defending Wilderness.” Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and
Application. Louis P. Pojman & Paul Pojman, eds. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth,
2008. p. 188.
22. Ibid., p. 190.
23. Lynn White Jr. “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis.” Environmental
Ethics: What Really Matters What Really Works. David Schmidtz & Elizabeth
Willott, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 10.
24. Arne Naess. “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A
Summary.” Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy.
Nina Witoszek and Andrew Brennan, eds. Lanham: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 1998. p. 3.
25. Arne Naess. “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects.”
Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 203.
26. Arne Naess. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. David
Rothenberg, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 45.
27. Arne Naess. “Simple in Means, Rich in Ends.” Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 184.
28. Arne Naess. “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A
Summary.” op. cit., p. 3.
29. Arne Naess. “Simple in Means, Rich in Ends.” op. cit., p. 185.
30. Arne Naess. “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A
Summary.” op. cit., p. 6.

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31. Arne Naess. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. op. cit. p.
156.
32. Ibid., p. 36.
33. Arne Naess. “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A
Summary.” op. cit., P. 6.
34. The term ‘life’ is used here in a comprehensive non-technical way to refer also to
things biologists may classify as non-living: rivers (watershed), landscapes, cultures,
ecosystems, ‘the living earth’ (Arne Naess. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle:
Outline of an Ecosophy. op. cit., p. 29).
35. ‘Humankind’ is the first species on Earth with the intellectual capacity to limit its
numbers consciously live in an enduring, dynamic equilibrium with other form of
life.’ Ibid., p. 23.
36. It may be noted here that the set of Platform-principles has specifically been adopted
by radical environmental groups, such as ‘Earth First!’ as their guiding philosophy,
but deep ecology may have reached its greatest popular prominence when Senator Al
Gore wrote in his 1989 book “Earth in the Balance” that, “We must change the
fundamental values at the heart of our civilization” in order to solve global ecological
problems. Many other groups acknowledge these, even though they do not realize
where these come from.
37. Arne Naess. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. op. cit., p.
31.
38. Arne Naess. “Simple in Means, Rich in Ends.” Environmental Philosophy: From
Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. op. cit., p. 191.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 186.
41. Arne Naess. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. op. cit., p.
37.
42. Cf. Peter Hay. A Companion to Environmental Thought. op. cit., p. 47.
43. Joseph R. Das Jardins. Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental
Philosophy. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997. p. 212.

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44. Arne Naess. “Ecosophy T: Deep versus Shallow Ecology.” Environmental Ethics:
Readings in Theory and Application. op. cit., p. 222.
45. Arne Naess. “Simple in Means, Rich in Ends.” op. cit., p. 182.
Special acknowledgement: In preparing this chapter I have also taken help of I Gede
Suwantana unpublished thesis From Ecology to Ecosophy: A Study of Arne Naess’s
Environmental Philosophy. Burdwan: The University of Burdwan, 2010 in
systematizing the matters.

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 Chapter-V

Critique of Anthropocentrism

As we have stated in the Preface, our critique with the observation that

contemporary environmental philosophy has developed through critiquing

traditional (speciesist) anthropocentrism. It needs no reiteration that contemporary

findings of ecology have undermined man’s view of himself as the centre of the

universe, showing him instead as a product of natural evolutionary process, having

considerable affinities with other creatures, and to have vulnerable dependence on

ecological conditions of existence. Thus considered, a human being occupies no

special position on this planet, and this naturally calls into question his prerogative

to use non-human aspects of nature as ‘resources’ in whatever way they like. This

draws widespread moral intuitions that animals, plants and even the so called

abiotic nature, have value in themselves, that means, they have intrinsic or inherent

value. Many human practices, like cruelty to animals, destruction of habitats,

endangering species, and disturbing ecosystemic balances are now being criticised

on this ground. Most environmentalists see anthropocentrism as speciesism and

human chauvinism, with narrowness of sympathy comparable to sexual and racial

discrimination and chauvinism. As a matter-of-fact, it involves the core belief that

underpins the human relationship with the natural world. And many of the

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traditional human practices are concerned only for human interests, even for trivial,

non-basic human preferences, over and above any consideration of interests—even

basic or crucial ones—of animals, plants and so called material nature. The most

significant trend of present-day environmentalism is to rise above this closed,

misguided view-point, and this means, among other things, focusing on locus of

moral value other than on humans.

Anyhow, Tim Hayward in his Political Theory and Ecological Values has

seen this anthropocentric view from a critical but comprehensive perspective. He

considers anthropocentrism as a ‘misunderstood’ problem. He holds that the

attempt to overcome anthropocentrism surfaces from the European Enlightenment.

The basic idea of the Enlightenment leads us to the direction that the right way to

live is to seek progress, through reason, through the development of greater and

matured insights, from a narrow, self-absorbed perspective to a wider and more

inclusive perspective. According to Hayward, the blunt, unqualified criticism of

anthropocentrism, however, is not only conceptually unsatisfactory, it may also be

counterproductive in practice.1

We may begin, following Hayward, our critique of anthropocentrism by

enquiring into what it means to overcome anthropocentrism. We recall here the

distinction between cosmological anthropocentrism and moral or ethical

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anthropocentrism, as we have already noted in Chapter-II. Cosmological

anthropocentrism commits an error in taking man to be at the centre of the

universe, and thus it fails to see that ‘the way things are in the world takes no

particular account of how human beings are, or how they choose to represent

them’.2 We should see the Homo sapiens as one part of a greater order of being.

Humans can overcome anthropocentrism in this sense by having more knowledge

about their actual place in the world. Such Enlightenment can be arrived at either

by a deeper study of the scientific discourses or by a mystical route.

But while enlightened self-interests may lead a human to identify harm to

other beings and its causes, it may not provide a motivation to do anything about

them unless they also harm the self; and this does not necessarily offer very secure

guarantee for the welfare of other species. In practice, the connection between the

pursuit of particular human goods and the welfare of the rest of nature may be too

loose and contingent to offer adequate protection for the latter.

As a matter of fact, anthropocentric assumptions have now gradually been

challenged by the findings of modern science of ecology, which undermine

humans’ cherished picture of themselves as the centre of the universe, and show

them instead to be a product of natural evolutionary processes. Contemporary

ecological studies have shown that we are related to each other and that we have a
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crucial dependence on existential conditions, like members of other species. The

Darwinian theory of evolution has, again, tended to undercut claims for the

uniqueness of certain human faculties and characteristics. Overcoming

anthropocentrism, in this sense, has been an integral part of the Enlightenment

project. But this seems to be paradoxical: the overcoming of anthropocentrism in

science has been brought about by just those developments which are now seen by

many as lying at the root of unacceptably anthropocentric attitudes and values! But

this would appear paradoxical, says Hayward, if one expects to find a necessary

correlation between cosmological and moral anthropocentrism. But there is no

good and sufficient reason to expect this: even if humans do not in fact occupy a

privileged place in the natural order, this fact does not necessarily prevent them

from trying to act as they have so far been doing, viz., to ‘dominate nature’ even

when they can get away with it.3

Of course, it is not only modern Western science that throws challenge to

anthropocentric cosmology. Non-anthropocentric worldviews are also present in

the Eastern forms of enlightenment. For examples, the worldviews of the Hindus,

the Bauddhas, and the Jains, combine a humbler estimate of the human place in

nature with a greater solicitude for other living beings. Thus it is surprising that the

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supporters of contemporary Deep ecology often appeal to a more Eastern, and

sometimes mystical, worldviews in raising their environmental philosophy.

Thus we may find that the Eastern and Western forms of the Enlightenment

point into the same direction. The basic idea common to both, as we have just

noted, is that the right way to live is to seek progress, through the rational,

scientific methods, from a self-centred perspective to a wider, more liberal,

perspective. But the problem is that the understanding of science as thus striving

for detachment and objectivity, it involves a tendency to be dispassionate as

opposed to compassionate, be it with regard to humans or with non-humans. There

may be some mystics and scientists, who keep faith in the intrinsic/inherent value

of all beings.

What is important here to note, according to Hayward, is that this view is no

more entailed than its contrary by the rejection of an anthropocentric cosmology4

(or ontology). All these demonstrate that the critique of moral anthropocentrism is

to be taken up in its own terms. According to the moral criticism, anthropocentrism

is the mistake of giving exclusive or arbitrarily preferential consideration to human

interests as opposed to the interests of other beings. Anyhow, it may be said that

one could hold onto that ethical view without subscribing to an anthropocentric

cosmology. And thus the reasons for refusing an anthropocentric ontology do not
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necessarily have any direct bearing on moral anthropocentrism. An independent

analysis is needed to see why moral anthropocentrism is wrong. We have also to

account for what it could mean to overcome anthropocentrism in morals.

Let us now turn to what is not wrong with moral anthropocentrism. A

reflection will reveal that anthropocentrism in ethics derives its negative normative

force on analogy with egocentrism. It may be noted that just as it is thought

morally wrong to be self-centred in the collective case, so it is wrong to be

anthropocentric. But the difficulty of such comparison is that moral

anthropocentrism cannot simply be equated with human-centredness, if it is to

perform the critical function envisaged of it, since there are many respects in which

human-centreedness cannot be avoided. These cases are unobjectionable or even

desirable. If we want to have a precise idea of what is wrong with

anthropocentrism, it is imperative to take note of these respects.

Anyhow, there are some ways in which humans cannot help being human-

centred. Our view of the world is shaped and limited by our position and way of

being within it. From the perspective of any particular being or of any species there

are really some respects in which they are at the centre of it. Thus to the extent that

humans have no choice but to think as humans, to see through human eyes, is what

Frederick Ferré called ‘perspectival anthropocentrism’.5 It would appear to be

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inescapable. It also appears to be unavoidable that we should be interested in

ourselves and our own species. Ferré writes, “We have no choice but to think as

humans, to take a human point of view even while we try to transcend egoism by

cultivating sympathy and concern for other centres for intrinsic value.”6 There are

some actual respects in which human-centredness is nowise objectionable. As

Mary Midgley writes, ‘We need…to recognize that people do right, not wrong, to

have a particular regard for their own kin and their own species…I don’t, therefore,

see much point in disputing hotly about the rightness of ‘anthropocentrism’ in this

very limited sense.’7 She also share us with the view that human-centredness may

in some respects be positively desirable. It may, for example, be noted that the

term ‘self-centred’ has been used metaphorically in the past to describe a balanced

conception of what it means to be a human, and of how humans take their place in

this world. This refers to that type of conception bound up with normative ideas of

‘humanity’ and ‘humaneness’. It has been pointed out that self-love, properly

understood, can be considered a precondition of loving others. By analogy, it could

also be maintained that human well-being as such need not necessarily preclude a

concern for the well-being of non-humans, including the natural environment;

rather it may even serve to promote it.

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 All these considerations are not intended to show that anthropocentrism as

such is not a problem at all; rather they lead us to spell out more carefully what is

supposed to be wrong with it.

Keeping truck with this move, let us explore what exactly is wrong with

moral anthropocentrism. It should first be noted that what is problematic in moral

anthropocentrism, in environmental ethics, is a concern with human interests to the

exclusion, or at the expense, of interests of other species of the biosphere.

Following Richard Ryder’s terminology Hayward suggests here that the various

illegitimate ways of giving preference to human interests may adequately be

captured by the terms ‘speciesism’ and ‘human chauvinism’.8 These two terms are

sometimes used as equivalents of anthropocentrism in the literature of

environmental philosophy; but, as Hayward rightly points out, it is important to

distinguish between them as they are not equivocal and, sometimes, misleading in

the ways anthropocentrism seems to be.9

‘Speciesism’ is a term coined by Ryder, on analogy with sexism and racism,

to mean arbitrary discrimination on the basis of species-membership.10 A little

thought would, however, reveal that it is possible to discriminate between human

and non-human interests without being arbitrary in reasoning, and as such, it is

possible to promote human interests without being speciesist. This means that any
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one of us can take a legitimate interest in other members of his or her own species

without necessarily being detrimental to the interests of the members of other

species.

But humans can rightly be accused of spiciesist behaviour when they give

preference to interests of members of their own species over the interests of

members of other species for morally arbitrary reasons. As for example, if it is

wrong to inflict avoidable physical suffering on humans as they are sentient beings,

then it would surely be morally arbitrary to inflict avoidable suffering on other

sentient beings. For this reason cruel and degrading treatment of animals is

condemned as speciesist. As a matter of fact, purely instrumental considerations of

non-humans fall into this category of behaviour: as long as they are considered in

terms of their instrumental value to humans, they are not considered ‘for their own

sake’ – that is, in terms of their own good or interests. Hayward, however, reminds

us that the problem lies not with the giving of instrumental consideration as such to

non-human beings, but in according them only instrumental value.11It may be

noted here that instrumental consideration of other beings as such need not always

be opposed to their well-being. Let us consider a human case where a doctor gives

instrumental consideration to a patient’s physiology in order to improve her well-

being. There is nothing objectionable in it; rather it is necessary and positively

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desirable. But it is also necessary here on part of the doctor to keep in mind that the

patient is also a person with dignity and worthy of respect, not simply an object to

be manipulated.

The only question which is relevant here is whether non-humans are also

beings of dignity and worthy of respect. If they are, then denying them such

consideration must be speciesist. To answer this question one has to move to the

level of mataethics and explain what it is that constitutes a being’s dignity and

worthiness of respect. It is at this metaethical level that the problem of human

chauvinism can be identified.

‘Human chauvinism’ is a term which is used to refer to mindset which gets

expressed in attempts to specify difference in ways that invariably favour humans.

Richard Routley and Val Routley call it ‘class chauvinism’ and define it as

‘substantially differential, discriminatory, and inferior treatment…of items outside

the class, for which there is no sufficient justification’.12 According to them, the

stronger forms of human chauvinism ‘see value and morality as ultimately

concerned entirely with humans, and non-human items as having value or creating

constraints on human action only in so far as these items serve human interests or

purpose’.13 Anyhow, the problem here is that what counts as ‘being worthy of

respect’ is specified in terms which always favour humans. Thus a human

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chauvinist may quite consistently maintain that the moral arbitrariness of

speciesism is always wrong, and still may persist in denying claims of relevant

similarities between humans and other species. On his judgement, other animals,

e.g., may not be deemed ‘worthy of respect’, as they allegedly lack certain

features, like rationality, language and subjectivity, which define beings as worthy

of respect.

Such attempts of denials as such cannot be objected to as speciesist in case

the factual claims about the animals’ capacities and the normative assumptions

about worthiness of respect are supported by good reasons. But if the definition is

formulated in such a way that intentionally excludes non-humans, then there is a

legitimate scope for rethinking. Human chauvinism is thus essentially a

disposition, and as such requires a kind of hermeneutic to uncover. Thus whereas

‘speciesism can be conceptualized as a clear-cut form of injustice, human

chauvinism involves a deeper and murkier set of attitudes’.14

It may here be mentioned that most writers of moral philosophy ignores the

distinction between speciesism and human chauvinism, but Hayward thinks it

important to observe the distinction. It is inappropriate to label as speciesist a

systematically developed argument to the effect, e.g., that animals lack a morally

relevant characteristic necessary for worthiness of respect. Obviously we need a

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precise criterion in terms of which discrimination might be claimed to be arbitrary

or otherwise. Therefore, in order to defy such an argument one must either prove

that the animal does in fact possess the relevant feature, or else has to demonstrate

that the attribute is not a necessary condition of worthiness of respect. It may,

however, seem difficult to present a definitive and irrefutable argument either of

these sorts.

According to Hayward, what is involved in overcoming the defects

associated with anthropocentrism, then, is the overcoming of speciesism in

normative ethics and of the human chauvinist disposition which tends to reinforce

speciestst reasoning. 15 What this means, at least in principle, may thus be restated:

“Overcoming human chauvinism requires primarily a degree of good faith and the

development of a sympathetic moral disposition; overcoming speciesism requires a

commitment to consistency and non-arbitrariness in moral judgement combined

with the development of knowledge adequate to ascertaining what is and is not

arbitrary in our consideration of nonhuman beings.”16

It is possible to overcome human chauvinism and speciesism in principle.

But when we attempt to overcome it in practice we face with some limitations.

Hence it is imperative to account for these limitations, if they are not to be

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confused with those aspects of anthropocentrism which are ineliminable but

unobjectionable.

A reflection will show that there is an inseparable element of moral

anthropocentrism as such which needs to be recognised. To show this, it will be

useful to explain why speciesism and human chauvinism are not ineliminable in

the way that anthropocentrism is. That speciesism is avoidable can be shown by

referring to the analogy with racism and sexism: a white man cannot but see the

world with the eyes of a white man; but this does not mean that he cannot help

being a racist or sexist. It may, of course, so happen that despite his best efforts he

exhibits attitudes which draw criticism from a black woman. As because the black

woman could specify what makes his attitudes racist or sexist, such attitude is, in

principle, curable. Similarly, speciesism is also corrigible.

In spite of all this, there is a significant dissimilarity between speciesism

and racism (or sexism): whereas the black women in our example can articulate

criticisms against the white man in a language which the latter could understand,

there is a scope for misunderstanding the interests of non-human beings, of whose

interests humans, quite literally, do not have the ears to hear. That means, even

with the up-to-date knowledge of biology, we could never be, in principle, in a

position when we could declare, quite unambiguously, that we understand all of

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their interests. Consequently, however good our intentions be, we can never be

sure of being completely free of speciesist attitudes. Thus it shows that avoiding

speciesism is much more difficult than getting rid of racism. But these practical

difficulties of avoiding speciesism can be differentiated from the impossibility of

avoiding anthropocentrism.17

A little thinking could reveal that difficulties with avoiding speciesist

arbitrariness are due to the contingent limitations on the degree of knowledge

available to us at any particular time. Thus one might not yet know, for example,

whether a certain species of animal does or does not have a particular capacity

which might be affected by a particular human action, and so not know whether

that action should be allowed or not. This sort of limitation may however be

progressively overcome. But, in practice, the overcoming of speciesism may only

be accomplished within the limits of currently available knowledge about non-

human world.

But, even if the project of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some

expectation of success, this is not the case with the overcoming of

anthropocentrism as such. Accordingly, what makes anthropocentrism unavoidable

is a limitation of a quite different sort, one which cannot be overcome even in

principle as it involves a non-contingent limitation on moral thinking as such. Any

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attempt at overcoming speciesism involves a commitment to the search of

knowledge of relevant similarities and dissimilarities between humans and non-

human species, the criteria of relevance will always haunt us. And this constitutes

the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism.

The ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is characterised by the

impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to cases which bear no

similarity to any aspect of our own cases. And if the ultimate point of an ethic is to

yield a determinate guide to human action, the human reference is inseparable,

even when extending moral concern to non-humans. So it follows that one cannot

know whether any judgement is speciesist, as one has no yardstick against which

to test arbitrariness: as long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criterion

of value will be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of

a completely non-anthropocentric ethics. Any attempt to construct a radically non-

anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary but also to be more

dangerously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact

are selected by a human course. This anthropomorphism goes against any attempt

to wipe out anthropocentrism from ethics altogether.18

But the admission of this unavoidable element of anthropocentrism does not

indicate the unavoidability of human chauvinism. What is unavoidable is that

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human beings as valuers make use of anthropocentric yardstick, as he has no

alternative to embrace. But in doing so they may, for instance, give priority to vital

non-human interests over more trivial human interests. For a human chauvinist, by

contrast, human interests must always take precedence over the interests of non-

humans. Human chauvinism ultimately values humans, as they have some specific

features that only humans have. What it demonstrates is the ineliminable element

of anthropocentrism, that is an asymmetry between humans and other species,

which is not the product of chauvinist prejudice.

It is interesting to note here that what is unavoidable about anthropocentrism

is precisely what makes ethics possible at all. It is a basic feature of the discourse

of obligation: if an ethic is a guide to action; and if a particular ethic requires an

agent to make others’ ends as his for the purposes of action, then they become just

that –they become the agent’s own ends. This is a non-contingent but substantive

limitation on any attempt to construct a completely non-anthropocentric ethic.

Values are always the values of the valuer, so as long as the class of valuers

includes human beings, human values are ineliminable. Having argued that this is

unavoidable, Hayward contends that it is not something bad.19

Finally, we come to see what is wrong with overcoming anthropocentrism.

The argument so far extended suggests that the aim of fully overcoming
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anthropocentrism in moral philosophy has only rhetorical value, since all that can,

in fact, be achieved is to draw attention to problems which are in fact better

conceptualized in narrower and more precise terms, ‘speciesism’ or ‘chauvinism’.

Anyhow, the proposals for the rejection of anthropocentrism are not helpful

as they could miss the real problem we like to address. The real problem is our

sheer lack of concern with non-human animals and the environment in general,

while ‘anthropocentrism’ can be understood as meaning an excessive concern with

humans. The latter, however, is not exactly the problem we are facing. On the

contrary, a cursory look around the world would confirm that humans, in practice,

show a lamentable lack of concern for the well-being of their fellow humans.

Furthermore, even when the interests, not of other humans, but of other species or

of the environment, are harmed, it is not appropriate to state that those committing

the harm are being ‘human-centred’. In order to see this, we only have to consider

some typical practices which are adequately criticized. A few instances would

suffice: hunting a species to extinction; devastating a forest-cover to build

infrastructure and factories; subjecting animals into experimentation. The case of

hunting a species to extinction, for example, may be seen as anthropocentrism; but

this is not helpful or appropriate predication, since it involves one typical group of

humans who are, as a matter of fact, condemned by the majority of humans who

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see this practice, not as serving human interests in general, but the interests of a

very short group, like poachers or whalers. Similar is the case with the destruction

of the forest: for those who make economic benefit from so doing go not only

against human interests of indigenous peoples whose environment is thereby

destroyed, but also the interests of all humans who rely on the oxygen such a forest

produces. The case of animal experimentation, however, brings to the fore a

feature which looks more plausible to characterize as anthropocentric, for it would

seem to be a clear case of humans benefiting as a species from the use and abuse of

other species. But still then, it may be added that the benefits may in fact not

accrue for humans in general, but only for those who can afford to pay to keep the

drug company in profit. There is, according to Hayward, no need to describe the

practice as anthropocentric when it is quite clearly speciesist. Here we are not

actually concerned with human welfare per se, but with the arbitrary privileging of

that welfare over the welfare of members of other species. 20

Again, if we take this way of argumentation a step further, it becomes

evident that anti-anthropocentric idiom is in some cases positively

counterproductive. It is conceptually mistaken, and also a practical and strategic

mistake, to criticize human race generally for practices of some particular groups

of humans, viz. the poachers, the whalers, etc. According to Hayward, the real

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opponents of such concerns are ‘the ideologists who, in defending harmful

practices in the name of ‘humans in general’, obscure the real causes of the harms

as much as the real incidence of benefits: the harms seldom affect all and only non-

humans; the benefits seldom accrue to all humans.21

Having thus shown why criticisms of anthropocentrism can be counter-

productive, Hayward shortly makes explicit why criticisms of speciesism and

human chauvinism are not so counter-productive. While criticisms of

anthropocentrism sometimes become counterproductive in failing to distinguish

between legitimate and illegitimate human interests, criticisms of speciesism, by

contrast, are applicable precisely in those cases where species criteria are

illegitimately positioned. It may be noted here that there is no legitimate form of

speciesism that can be defended. Hence any particular speciesist attitude or

practice might well promote a sectional interest—rather than interests of the human

species as a whole; but this fact does not weaken the criticism. The reason behind

is that, given that the arbitrary setting of species criteria is already illegitimate, the

fact that it does not even serve the interests of the whole human species does not

mitigate the objection.

One main reason why criticisms of anthropocentrism are equivocal seems to

be that it is not self-evident what exactly it means to be human-centred. The idea of

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anthropocentrism is often understood in terms of egocentrism: but just as the latter

is problematic, if it implies a simple, unitary, centred ego, so too is

anthropocentrism, for the human species is all too at odds with itself. If the project

of bringing humanity to peace with itself, of constituting itself as a body which is

sufficiently unified to be considered ‘centred’ is anthropocentric, it is

anthropocentric in a sense that should be applauded rather than condemned.

More on Speciesism:

Let us examine the issue of speciesism more minutely. As Donald A. Graft puts it,

‘Speciesism is discrimination, prejudice, or differential treatment justified by

consideration of species membership.’22 It supposes that moral status of an entity

derives from consideration of species membership only. Jeremy Bentham in his An

Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation first argued as early as in

1789 against speciesism, though he did not use the term. The term is coined by

British psychologist Richard D. Ryder in 1973 to denote a prejudice based on

physical differences. As he explains, “I use the word ‘speciesism’ to describe the

widespread discrimination that is practised by man against other species.

Speciesism overlooks or underestimates the similarities between the discriminator

and those discriminated against.”23 As we see, this attitude of speciesism is often

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understood on an analogy with racism and sexism. Racism is a prejudice based on

race membership, while sexism is prejudice based on sex-identity.

The term 'speciesism' is used mostly by advocates of animal rights, who

believe that it is irrational or morally incorrect to regard animals (at least sentient

ones) as mere objects or properties. The view is motivated by an acceptance of

Darwinism—and its logical corollary— which suggests that humans as they are

today have evolved from animals which are their lesser evolved earlier forms.

Moral philosophers, like Tom Regan and Peter Singer, argued against speciesism.

Regan believes that animals have intrinsic/inherent value and that we cannot assign

them a lesser value because of a perceived lack of rationality, while assigning a

higher value to infants and the mentally impaired solely on the grounds of their

being members of the supposedly superior human species. Singer's philosophical

arguments against speciesism are based on the principle of equal consideration of

consideration of interests.

It is interesting to note that we find some philosophers and scientists in

defence of speciesism: Carl Cohen, a Professor of Philosophy at the Residential

College of the University of Michigan, does not hesitate to write: “I am a

speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible; it is essential for right conduct,

because those who will not make the morally relevant distinctions among species
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are almost certain, in consequence, to misapprehend their true obligations.”24

Jeffrey Alan Gray, a British psychologist at Oxford, similarly writes: “I would

guess that the view that human beings matter to other human beings more than

animals do is, to say the least, widespread. At any rate, I wish to defend

speciesism...”25 Anyhow, if we go through such defenders we will find that they

support the disastrous conclusion that humans have the right to exploit other

species to preserve and protect their own species.

The excuses generally adduced to justify speciesist practices are varied and
numerous:
Only humans can have rights.

Animals cannot make claims.

Nobody suggests giving rights to plants (or insects or bacteria); so it is

hypocritical to give them to animals.

Animals do not respect human rights.

There is no such thing as natural rights; we have to choose to confer them.

Morality is subjective; the notion that animals have rights is just one
opinion.

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Morals are based on reciprocal agreements; because animals cannot agree to
anything, they cannot be encompassed by morality.

Animals do not care about us so we need not care about them.

The law gives us the right to exploit animals.

The Bible gives humans dominion over animals.

Animals are raised to be eaten (or otherwise used).

Many animals would not exist if we did not raise them for our use.

We do not try to stop predators from killing, so we should not be stopped.

Jobs, customs, and traditions would be lost if we stopped exploiting animals.

Humans are at the pinnacle of evolution; this gives them the right to exploit
other species.

Humans are at the top of the food chain.

Animals are just machines.

Animals have no souls.

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In nature animals kill and eat each other. The world is made up of predators
and prey; we are just another predator.

Natural selection is at work and we should not try to overcome it.

The animals are killed so fast that they do not feel or know anything.

Evolution and natural selection justify a species-oriented approach to

morality; as the human species, we have the right to exploit other species to
benefit and safeguard our own species.

Animals do not feel pain. Animals do not suffer. There is no adequate

definition of suffering. Humans suffer more.

People are more important than animals.

Human lives have more potential than animal lives.

Just as mothers owe a special duty to their children, we owe a special duty to
humans.

Animals are not rational.

Animals cannot talk.

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 Morals are exclusively human construction, and so to try to apply morality
to non-human world is meaningless;

and so on and so forth.26

In view of the diverse range of possible differences of treatment that might

follow from speciesism, we should be cautious in accepting one single overriding

reason in justifying or rejecting all speciesist practices. A speciesist, for example,

who speaks of moral significance of reasoning must offer a relevant threshold for

reasoning ability at which moral consideration comes into play, as well as he has to

supply objective measurement scheme by which performance to the threshold can

be meaningfully determined. John Tuohey, a moral philosopher, asserts that the

logic behind charges of speciesism fails to hold up, and he goes on to argue that,

although it has been popularly appealing, it is philosophically flawed. Tuohey

contends, even though the animal rights movement has got a significant progress,

no one has offered a clear and compelling argument for the equality of species.27

Likewise, feminist moral philosopher Nel Noddings has criticised Peter

Singer's arguments against speciesism for being too simplistic. She argues that his

arguments fail to take into account the context of species preference as context of

racism and sexism, which have taken into account the context of discrimination

against a section of humans. Some people, who work for racial or sexual equality,

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have taken such comparisons between speciesism and racism or sexism to be

insulting. The universal civil rights movement and the women’s movements—both

of these social movements have been initiated and driven by members of the

dispossessed and excluded groups themselves, not by some benevolent men or

white people acting on their behalf. Both movements are built precisely around the

idea of reclaiming and reasserting a shared humanity in the face of a society that

had deprived it and denied it. No civil rights activist or feminist ever argued,

‘We’re sentient beings too!’ They argued, ‘We’re fully human too!’ Noddings

holds that animal liberation doctrine, far from extending this humanist impulse, has

directly undermined it.28

As already noted, Carl Cohen argues that racism or sexism is wrong because

there are no relevant differences between the sexes (human males and human

females) or races (the white and the black). Between man and animals however,

there are significant differences. As the latter do not qualify for Kantian

personhood, they should have no rights. Animal rights advocates, of course, point

out that there are many humans who do not qualify for Kantian personhood, and

yet have rights, and so this cannot be taken as a morally relevant difference.

Another thinker Camilla Kronqvist sympathizes with Singer’s aims and

intentions, but does not accept his arguments. She contends, to say that our
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morality depends on attending to someone’s pleasure and pain also seems to be a

pretty crude description of what it is to be a moral being. She comes to the

conclusion: “I also find it highly unlikely that a polar bear would care for my

interests of leading a long, healthy life if it decided to have me for lunch, and I

wonder if I would have time to present it with Singer’s arguments when it started

to carry out this intention.”29 Singer however responds to Kronqvist and contends

that the fact that animals are not moral agents does not prevent them from being

moral patients, just as humans who are not moral agents remain moral patients, so

that their ability to be harmed remains the characteristic that should be taken into

consideration. Another point is put forward by Felipe Fernandez-Armesto who

reminds us that early hunter-gatherer societies, such as the Innu and many animist

religions, lacked a precise concept of humanity and have placed non human

animals and plants on an equal footing with humans.30

Anyhow, we may distinguish among three major forms of speciesism based

on justifying reasons adduced: raw speciesism, strong speciesism and weak

speciesism.31

Raw speciesism appeals simply to species membership, and nothing else. Its

supporters just contend: whether one views humans as animal or not, the fact

remains that non-humans are, in fact, non-human. They just declare: ‘They are just
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animals and animals are animals, humans are humans!’ Due to total lack of

plausible justifying reasons, it may safely be said, the raw speciesist doctrine does

not carry any rational or moral weight to be explored into. Raw speciesism, to say

the truth, is not rationally or morally defensible.

Strong speciesism, on the other hand, makes appeal to species membership,

but it supplies additional considerations with the intent to show why the species

boundary is so relevant in discriminating between humans and non-humans. There

are, more or less, four arguments that are generally adduced in favour of strong

speciesism.

First, the biological argument, which supports strong speciesim by pointing to

to the biological competition between species or genes. For example, someone may

argue that human species has an inherent right to compete with and exploit other

species to preserve and protect the human species. Moral status then becomes

limited to the members of human species only. If someone contends to generalize

the scope of moral status, that should be no problem; but that would be limited

within that species only.

The main criticism against such an argument concerns the absence of

unanimity on the concept of species. Species is generally defined in some such

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language as this: if two animals cannot interbreed to produce viable off-spring,

then they are different species. But it may be mentioned as a counter example that

lion and tiger are regarded as two separate species, even though they can

interbreed. On the other hand, a species of owl-monkey contains several groups

that cannot interbreed! Now, if the concept of species is itself problematic, how

can it bear the great moral weight of such a crucial discrimination?

Second, the importance argument, that comes to the effect that humans are

much more important than non-humans. Thus we often allow to experiment on

primates or any other animals as they are less important than us. We also presume

that our greater importance allows us to use, kill and eat animals. But the

lamentable fact is that we do not always consider humans to be more important

than animals. For example, humans in some developed countries spend billions of

dollars per year on their pets, rather than donate the same money to assist the

millions of poor humans suffering throughout the world. Given all these, the

promoter of this importance argument is forced to retreat to raw speciesism, to

disavow speciesism and embrace utilitarianism, and to assert another similar strong

speciesist argument similar to the third argument that follows.

Third is the special relation argument, which goes in the direction that a

mother, e.g., being faced with the choice of saving one of two children from a fire,
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one of whom is her own, chooses her own child. J. A. Gray argues that no one

would find it morally repugnant if the mother chooses her own child to save.32 So,

a special relation between humans, like that between that the mother and the child,

that justifies our choosing to benefit humans rather than non-human animals and

plants.

And the fourth argument is related to the Divine command theory. It simply

declares that the practice of speciesism is morally acceptable as God approves of

this, and this is expressly evident in the Genesis of the Bible. But this view seems

to be philosophically problematic. If the millions of people claim that their God

has told them that we should not abuse or kill them, how can they be discredited?

If millions of animal-lovers contend that their God has told them not to abuse or

kill animal for food, how can they be restrained?

Weak speciesism, on the other hand, appeals to contingent facts regarding

traits of the parties concerned, here of different species, for its justification. A

supporter of weak species may argue, for example, that a certain level of rationality

is necessary for claiming moral status, and as current animals are devoid of such

rationality, they do not merit moral status. Anyhow, the traits that are generally

used to ground weak speciesist doctrine are varied. The inclusion of sentience or

capacity of experiencing pleasure and pain, e.g., by the animal ethicists form the
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foundation of several major animal rights philosophies, which are usually

considered to be antispeciesist. The following traits are commonly used to ground

weak speciesist creed:

To merit moral status, a being must…

…have desires and preferences.

…be able to communicate.

…be able to speak with complex grammar.

…be self-aware.

…be able to make claims for its rights.

…be able to respect others’ rights.

…be rational.

….be sentient, be capable of experiencing pleasure and pain.

…be autonomous.

…have a soul.

…have a mind.

…be able to participate in a social contract.

…be capable of forethought and planning.33

It will fulfill our purpose here if we consider only the argument based on appeal to

rationality often made to support speciesism.

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The Appeal to Rationality34

We can begin our discussion on the appeal to rationality (henceforth to be referred

as the ‘rationality doctrine’) by raising the question, ‘why is rationality so

important for acquiring moral status?’ We have no problem in admitting that that

normal humans exhibit rationality (perhaps in the minimal sense of ‘rationality’) in

such a way most animals fail to do. Why do we not then consider that, just as

human have distinctive traits that members of other species lack, like rationality

and moral agency, the members of non-human species also have distinctive traits

that humans lack, like the homing ability of pigeons, the speed of the cheetah, and

the ruminative ability of sheep and cattle? Why do we not take into account the

fact that chimpanzees, for example, are better climbers than humans, or they are

stronger than humans? Why is the particular trait of rationality taken to be crucial

one for deserving moral status?

It is often claimed that only humans are capable of performing the analysis

required for Kantian determination of the moral correctness of an act–determining

whether a maxim is capable of being universalised. A chimpanzee, after all, cannot

conceive of such a maxim. Or it might be held that animals are not smart enough to

comprehend the notion of rights. So it would be absurd to grant them moral right.

This rationality doctrine is, however, subject to, at least, two criticisms, and

these are related with the moral agent/moral patient distinction and the argument
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from marginal cases. Both allow us to question the assumption that a being must

be a rational to deserve moral status.

i)The Moral Agent/Moral Patient Distinction

A moral agent is an individual who possess the sophisticated conceptual ability to

bring moral principles to bear in while deciding what to do, and having made such

a decision, can exercise his or her free will to choose to act that way. By virtue of

this ability, it is fair to hold moral agents accountable for their acts. The

paradigmatic moral agent is a normal adult human being. Moral patients, in

contrast, lack the capacities of moral agents and thus cannot be held accountable

for their acts. But it is contended that they possess the capacity to suffer harm and

to benefit from moral status, and, because of this, they can be regarded as proper

objects of moral consideration. Human infants, young children, the mentally

deficient or deranged, and animals are instances of moral patienthood. Given that

animals are moral patients, it might be argued, they also fall within the purview of

moral consideration.

ii)The Argument from Marginal Cases

The rationalists may, of course, respond to it by saying that they accept that

animals as moral patients, yet they remain adamant in demanding moral agency for

attribution of moral status to them. This response runs headlong into the argument

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from marginal cases, which can be articulated by making a simple substitution in

the statement of the rationality doctrine: Infants, e.g., do not understand morals;

therefore, they do not deserve of moral status and we may kill to eat their flesh,

and perform experiments on them! Yet, our moral intuitions tell us that these moral

patients are also objects of moral consideration. We refrain from harming infants

and children, for the same reasons that we do so for adults. That they are incapable

of conceptualizing a system of morals and realizing its benefits becomes here

irrelevant.

Many positions, such as Singer’s utilitarianism, Regan’s rights theory, etc.

reject speciesist anthropocentric view-point. Anthropocentric assumptions are

challenged also by modern science, which casts a less exalted light on the humans’

place within nature. Darwin’s theory of origin of species through natural selection,

provides evidence to refute the idea that non-human nature exists to serve man,

arguing instead that natural selection cannot possibly produce any modification in

a species exclusively for the good of another species.

From what we have so far discussed we find that

i) Arguments for restricting moral considerability within humans are not

persuasive.

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ii) Being human as a criterion of moral standing is no longer useful or self-evident

as it once appeared to be.

iii) The argument that only humans are moral agents and therefore only humans

have moral standing ignores the distinction between moral agent and being with

moral standing (beings that owe duties to others and beings to whom those duties

are owed.)

iv) All these lead us to adopt some non-speciesist moral world-view.

Notes and References:

1. Tim Hayward. Political Theory and Ecological Values. Cambridge: Polity Press (in
association with Blackwell Publishers), 1998. p. 43.
2. Bhaskar Roy. Reclaiming Reality. London: Verso, 1989. p. 154.
3. Tim Hayward. Political Theory and Ecological Value. op. cit., p. 44.
4. Ibid., p. 45.
5. Frederick Ferré. “Personalistic Organism: Paradox or Paradigm.” Philosophy and the
Natural Environment. Robin Attfield & Andrew Belsey, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994. p. 72.
6. Ibid.
7. Mary Midgley. “The End of Anthropocentrism.” Philosophy and the Natural
Environment. op. cit., p. 111.
8. Tim Hayward. Political Theory and Ecological Values. op. cit., p.46.
9. Ibid.
10. Richard Ryder. “Painism: The Ethics of Animal Rights and the Environment.” Animal
Welfare and the Environment. Richard Rider, ed. London: Duckworth (in association
with the RSPCA), 1992. p. 197.
184
11. Tim Hayward. Political Theory and Ecological Values. op. cit., p. 47.
12. Richard Routley and Val Routley. “Against The Inevitability of Human Chauvinism.”
Environmental Ethics Robert Elliot, ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. p.
104.
13. Ibid.
14. Tim Hayward. Political Theory and Ecological Values. op. cit., p. 48.
15. Ibid., p. 49.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 50.
18. Ibid., p. 51.
19. Ibid., p. 52.
20. Ibid., p 53.
21. Ibid.
22. Donald A. Graft. “Speciesism.” Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. Ruth Chadwick, et al.,
eds. San Diego: Academic Press, 1993. vol. 4, p. 192.
23. Richard D. Ryder. Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research. Oxford: Davis
Poynter, 1975. p. 16.
24. Carl Cohen. “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical research.” The New
England Journal of Medicine. vol. 315, no. 14. 1986. p. 867.
25. Jeffrey Alan Gray. “In Defense of Speciesism.” Behavioral and Brain Science, vol. 13,
no. 1. 1980. “Speciesism.” 04 April 2012 < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speciesism>.
26. Cf. Donald A. Graft. “Speciesism.” Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. op. cit., p. 196.
27. John Tuohey. “Fifteen Years after “Animal Liberation”: Has the Animal Rights
Movement Achieved Philosophical Legitimacy?.” Journal of Medical Humanities. vol.
13. no. 2. June, 1992. “Speciesism.” 05 April 2012 <
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speciesism >.
28. Nel Noddings. “Fifteen Years After “Animal Liberation”: Has the Animal Rights
Movement Achieved Philosophical Legitimacy?.” Journal of Medical Humanities. op.
cit.

185
29. Camilla Kronqvist. “Speciesism –Argument for Whom?.” Articles: Ethics, Agency &
Love for Bryn Browne. ed. University of Wales Lampeter: Department of Philosophy. pp.
4-5.
30. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto. Ideas That Changed the World. London: Dorling Kindersley
Adult. 2003. p. 138.
31. Cf. Donald A. Graft. Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. op. cit., p. 198.
32. Jeffrey Alan Gray. “In Defense of Speciesism.” Behavioral and Brain Science. vol. 13.
no. 1. 1980. quoted in Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. op. cit., p. 201.
33. Cf. Donald A. Graft. “Speciesism.” Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. op. cit., p. 203.
34. Ibid.

186
 Conclusion

From the whole discussion it becomes clear that speciesist anthropocentrism is a

parochial, narrow-minded approach to nature which is indirectly responsible for

the environmental pollution and resource depletion. As a kind of species egoism

and species selfishness, moral anthropocentrism takes the non-human world as

mere resource for us, devoid of any intrinsic or inherent value. As biased against

other life-forms, it fails to recognise that we are part of the same integrated life-

community, and other things and beings, having independent value, also belong to

it. Our human self in its deepest sense integrated with the earth from which we are

grown, as contemporary ecology and western ecocentrism teaches us. The same

outlook is also present in ancient and traditional Indian culture. Anyhow,

anthropocentrism is surely objectionable when it emphasizes ‘human first!’,

regardless of the consequences to other beings and the environment in general.

Besides, it is based on an absolutist dualism of man and nature, which

contemporary science and ecosophy has shown to be false.

Nevertheless, some thinkers still take anthropocentrism as somehow valid

and unavoidable point of view for mankind for consideration of his place in nature.

187
They argue that our current ecological problems do not directly stem from an

anthropocentric attitude per se, but from one too narrowly conceived attitude.

Anthropocentrism is consistent with a philosophy that affirms the essential

interrelatedness of things and that values all items in nature since no event is

without some effect on the whole of which we are parts. The ecological crisis

should be viewed as an inevitable crisis in human evolution. Through cultures

knowledge becomes cumulative. A crisis occurs when our knowledge of nature,

which determines our power to exploit nature, exceeds our knowledge of how to

use this cognitive capacity for our own survival and for improvement in the quality

of our lives. An anthropocentric belief in the value, meaningfulness, and creative

potential of the human phenomenon is considered a necessary motivating factor to

participatory evolution which, in turn, may be requisite to the future survival of the

human species and its cultural values.

But anthropocentrism, even in its moderate forms, can be criticised both on

the strategic ground that it fail to offer secure guarantee, given that self-interests

for the most part is not yet, and may never be, sufficiently enlightened, and on the

principled ground that non-human nature has intrinsic or inherent value which

anthropocentric ethics do not recognise. Being under this misguided moral attitude,

contemporary industrial consumer society encourages us to satisfy consumption

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and production to meet not only our vital needs but also inflated desires whose

satisfaction requires more and more consumptions.

Hence, we have to transcend the speciesist ideology. But, even if the project

of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some expectation of success, this is

not the case with overcoming of anthropocentrism as such. What makes

anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation of a quite different sort, one which

cannot be overcome, even in principle, as it involves a non-contingent limitation

on moral thinking as such. As any attempt at overcoming anthropocentrism

involves a commitment to the search of knowledge of relevant similarities and

dissimilarities between humans and non-human species, the criteria of relevance

will always haunt us. And this constitutes the ineliminable element of

anthropocentrism. Actually, the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is

characterised by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to

cases which bear no similarity to any aspect of our own cases. And if the ultimate

point of ethics is to yield a determinate guide to human action, the human reference

is inseparable, even when extending moral concern to non-humans. So it follows

that one cannot know whether any judgement is anthropocentric or speciesist, as

one has no yardstick against which to test arbitrariness.

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 So long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will

be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of completely

non-anthropocentric ethics. Any attempt to construct a radically non-

anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary but also to be more

dangerously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact

are selected by a human course. This anthropomorphism goes against any attempt

to wipe out anthropocentrism from ethics altogether. This is what Frederic Ferré

calls ‘perspectival anthropocentricity’.

It may here be recalled that Deep Ecology’s direction of ‘look to the East’

and its ‘primacy of the ontological over the ethical’ has initiated a new phase in

contemporary environmentalism. It has initiated to look into the non-western

cultures, philosophies and religions in its endeavour to overcome this global eco-

crisis via some eco-spiritualism. (As we have already noted in Chapter-I, mere

admission of value does not necessitate morally adequate action to the entity

valued. For that we may have to adopt a holistic, spiritual worldview which, in our

case, we may call ‘spiritual ecocentrism’.) Just in this connection we may refer to

the Vedic Hindu tradition.

The Vedic Hindu tradition reflects an attitude towards nature which is not

dominating like the Christian tradition. Its philosophy, mythology, values, and
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moral codes have accorded reverence for all that exist in nature. It did not hesitate

to declare ‘Vasudhaiva kutumbakam’. That means, all that are— from plants to

human species—belong to a single family. Again, the Atharvaveda (12.1.12) says:

‘Mātā bhūmiḥ putro’ham pṛthivyāḥ’, which means ‘The Earth is my mother and I

am Her child.’ In later Hindu thought this earth or universe is understood to be

God’s body:

‘Ihaikasthaṁ jagat kṛtsnaṁ paśyādya sacarācaram /

Mama dehe gudākeśa yaccānyat draṣtumicchasi //

(The Bhagavadgītā (11/7)

What it means is this: God’s universal body can show us whatever we desire to see

now and whatever we may want to see in the future, everything– moving and non-

moving– is here completely, in one place. Thus we find that Hinduism focuses on a

close relation between nature and humanity. It is also said that a perfect human

being sees his self in the nature and the nature in him. And it is interesting to note

that even the western proponent of Deep Ecology, Arne Naess, takes refuge in

Advaita spiritualism. He quotes, in particular, this following verse of the

Bhagavadgītā:

Sarvabhūtathamātmānaṁ sarvabhūtāni cātmani /

Ikṣate yogayuktātma sarvatra samadarśanaḥ // (6/29)

191
 We may thus conclude that an ecocentric view with a spiritual flavour

(strengthened by deep ecological Self-realization and/or advaita theory of

samadarśana) is the only way to protect the nature with its diversity and richness.

Even the so called ‘enlightened’ anthropocentrism cannot help us in the long run,

as it is based on instrumentalism. Nevertheless, we must take into account the

‘perspectival’ aspect of anthropocentricity without which no ethics is possible. But

we must be cautious of the ideologues who insistently preach (speciesist) human

chauvinism.

192
 Bibliography

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Attfield, R., and Belsey, A. eds. Philosophy and the Natural Environment. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Batchelor,M.,and Brown,K.eds.Buddhism and Ecology. London: Cassell Publishers,1992

Bentham, Jeremy. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: Russell, 1962.

Chadwick, Ruth et al., eds. Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. San Diego: Academic

Press, 1998.

Dwivedi, O. P. Environmental Ethics: Our Dharma to the Environment. New Delhi:

Sanchar Publishing House, 1994.

Elliot, Robert, ed. Environmental Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

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