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2023 Jurists Pre-Bar Notes On Criminal Law 1

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2023 Jurists Pre-Bar Notes On Criminal Law 1

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

CRIMINAL LAW 1

Mala inse and Mala Prohibita Crimes

Test to determine whether the crime is mala in se or mala prohibita. Although an act
prohibited by a special law does not automatically make it malum prohibitum, the act of
unauthorized occupancy of seashore without the necessary permit punished under Article
91(B)(3) of PD 1067 is considered malum prohibitum. The test to determine when the act is
mala in se and not malum prohibitum is whether it is inherently immoral or the vileness of
the penalized act. The mere occupancy and construction of various structures by accused-
appellants on the subject foreshore land without the necessary permit is not inherently immoral
but constitutes a violation of and penalized by Article 91(B)(3) of PD 1067. Hence, as malum
prohibitum, accused-appellants' pending foreshore lease application over the subject area with
the DENR is not a defense to exculpate them of the criminal charge. (People v. Constantino, et.
al., G.R. No. 251636, February 14, 2022, Hernando, J.)
See Sama v. People, G.R. No. 224469, January 05, 2021, Lazaro-Javier, J. where the
Supreme Court distinguished betwee crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibita. When
the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that
are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden.

xxx

Volition, or intent to commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or
voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done [in contrast to knowledge of
the nature of his act]. On the other hand, criminal intent — which is different from motive, or
the moving power for the commission of the crime — refers to the state of mind beyond
voluntariness. It is this intent that is being punished by crimes mala in se. (Diosdado Sama v.
People, G.R. No. 224469, January 05, 2021, Lazaro-Javier, J.)

Lascivious conduct punished under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 is malum prohibitum.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed (Michael John Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733,
September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 651).

The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733,
September 21, 2007, was clarified in the case of People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12,
2019, as follows, to wit: “While Malto is correct that consent is immaterial in cases under R.A.
No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age, We clarify that consent of the child
is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases involving violation of Section 5, Article
III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 under
special circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove that the said victim
engaged in sexual intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.”

The same reason holds true with respect to acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct
when the offended party is less than 12 years old or is demented. Even if such party consents to

Lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610 and Rape under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code. In case of the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and
is deemed to be a child "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to
indulge in sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group," the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because
this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and that there was consent. Instead, the
offender will now be penalized under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610, and not under Article 335 of
the RPC [now Article 266-A]. But if the said victim does not give her consent to sexual
intercourse in the sense that the sexual intercourse was committed through force, threat or
intimidation, the crime is rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC. (People v. Tulagan,
(G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, Peralta, J.).

However, if the same victim gave her consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money,
profit, consideration, coercion or influence is involved, then there is no crime committed, except
in those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted by "moral
ascendancy or moral authority," like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it is punished
under the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 or simple seduction under Article 338
(People v. Tulagan, (G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, Peralta, J.).

Take note: RA 11648 amended Section 5(b) of RA 7610 as follows: (b) Those who
commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under sixteen (16) years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 2, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as "The Revised Penal Code", for rape, or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under sixteen (16) years of age shall be reclusion perpetua in its medium period
(Sec. 5,b, RA 7610, as amended by RA 11648)

Hitting a child without intention to debase his “intrinsic worth and dignity” as a
human being is not child abuse. With the loss of his self-control, accused lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. It is not trite to remind that under the well-
recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. Thus, the Court
should consider all possible circumstances in his favor (Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533,
March 20, 2013).

Bongalon doctrine was reiterated in the case of Jabalde v. People, to wit: The laying
of the hands on the victim was an offshoot of the accused emotional outrage after being informed
that her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. The
spontaneity of the acts of the accused against the victim is just a product of the instinctive
reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from harm and danger as manifested only by mild
abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any intention on inflicting
physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so
essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential element of intent was not established
with the prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 (Jabalde v. People, G.R. No.195224, June 15, 2016, Reyes, J.).

The anti-hazing law is malum prohibitum. The act of hazing itself is not inherently
immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited.
Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the
defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution (Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464,
July 1, 2015, Mendoza, J.).

Is a violation of Section 195 of the OEC mala in se such that good faith and lack of
criminal intent can be raised as valid defenses against its conviction? According to the
Supreme Court, Section 195 of the OEC to be mala in se. The applicable portion of Section 195
forbids the intentional tearing or defacing of the ballot or the placement of a distinguishing mark.
A distinguishing mark is one, whether a letter, figure, or character, which shows an intention on
the part of the voter to distinguish his particular ballot from others of its class, and not one that is
common to, and not distinguishable from, others of a designated class. However, not every mark
made by a voter on his ballot, which may separate and distinguish it from other ballots cast at the
election, will result in a declaration of invalidity. To constitute a mark a distinguishing mark,
it must be placed on a ballot with the deliberate intention that it shall identify the ballot
after the vote has been cast, unless a statute enumerates certain marks as illegal or
distinguishing regardless of the question of intent. (Without the physical evidence of
the corpus delicti, i.e., the allegedly marked ballots, the trial court was not given the opportunity
to appreciate the nature of the markings made. Thus, the prosecution was not able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the markings were deliberate and made for the purpose of
identifying the ballot. It is basic in criminal law that a conviction "must rest, not on the weakness
of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his[/her] innocence.) (Amalia
Cardona v. People, G.R. No. 244544, July 06, 2020, Carandang, J.)

The doctrine of continuing crime is not applicable to mala prohibita cases. The
applicability of continuing crimes to transgressions, under the RPC is straightforward because
the crimes under the RPC are generally, mala in se, that is, they are wrong in themselves. In
these crimes, the intent of the offender is crucial. In a continuing crime, it is the singularity or
multiplicity of this criminal intent that determines the penalty to be imposed, without any regard
to the number of criminal transgressions. In contrast, offenses punishable by special penal laws
are generally mala probihita, in which case, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When an act
is declared illegal by law, the intent of the offender in committing the same is immaterial. In
crimes which are mala prohibita what need not be . proved is criminal intent, that is, intent to
commit the crime. In such cases, criminal intent is conclusively presumed to exist from the
commission/omission of an act prohibited by law and therefore need not be proved. In order to
hold the offender guilty or accountable for the offense it is sufficient that there is a conscious
intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. The essence of mala prohibita is
voluntariness in the commission of the act constitutive of the crime. (People v. Ramoy and
Padilla, G.R. No. 212738, March 9, 2022, Gaerlan, J.)

The doctrine of absorption may be applied to mala prohibita cases. In applying the
doctrine of absorption, although there have been multiple violations, that crime that is
ascertained to be an inherent part, an element, or that is made in furtherance of the other crime is
not treated as a separate offense but is deemed included in the other crime. The crime which the
offender originally or primarily intended to commit absorbs the offense which is executed in its
furtherance. To illustrate, the Court has applied the doctrine of absorption in the crime of
rebellion; in that common crimes, such as murder, and offenses under special laws which are
perpetuated in furtherance of the political offense, are not penalized as distinct crimes. They are
deemed part and parcel of the rebellion itself. The Court has determined that the crime of

Intentional and Non-intentional Felonies

Felonies

General elements of crimes. Every crime has two elements: the act or omission (actus
reus) and the mental element which is commonly referred to as criminal intent (mens rea).

Mens rea is the mental element of a crime or the required state of mind for the
commission of the crime by the accused. Take note that there is no single state of mind, or mens
rea, that will suffice for purposes of imposing criminal liability. Rather, the requisite state of
mind is defined separately for each specific crime (Dix, G., Gilbert Law Summaries: Criminal
Law, 1997:24).

Intent means a state of mind which willingly consents to the act that is done, or free will
choice, or volition in the doing of the act; it means that the act is voluntary, and that it proceeds
from a mind free to act (22 CJS 1).

There are two types of criminal intent

General criminal intent which consists of the volition doing of a prohibited act.
Accordingly, the only state of mind required is an intent to commit the act constituting
the crime; the defendant need not have intended to violate the law, nor need he have been
aware that the law made his act criminal.

Specific criminal intent. Certain crimes require--in addition to general intent--an

intent to do some further act or cause some additional consequence beyond that which
must have been committed or caused in order to commit the crime. These are so-called
specific intent crimes, and the additional mens rea required is referred to as a “specific
intent”. (Drix, id., 25).

Firing a gun on a person is not attempted homicide without proof of intent to kill.
Petitioner, Clarion and Gabelino were neighbors in Batulos, Bangkas Heights, Toril, Davao City.
On 28 February 2007, petitioner passed by Clarion's house and uttered some demeaning words
against the latter's mother who was then tending her store. When petitioner passed by once again,
Clarion confronted her. Enraged, petitioner went straight to Gabelino's house to get a gun.
Gabelino then urged petitioner to shoot Clarion and said, "Barila, Barila" (Shoot her, shoot her).
Petitioner eventually fired the gun but missed Clarion, who immediately dropped to the ground.
She attempted to fire the gun anew but failed. Some people then intervened, thereafter petitioner
and Gabelino scampered away towards the latter's house. Meanwhile, Estrella Fuentes (Fuentes)
testified that her grandchild was playing near Clarion's house at the time of the incident. After
hearing the gun shot, she ran towards Clarion's house where she saw petitioner pointing a gun at
Clarion who was, by then, on the ground. Fuentes then rushed back to her house and called 911.
Held: It is clear that Fuentes arrived immediately after the first gunshot and was able to see
petitioner still pointing her gun at Clarion. She candidly explained where she was in reference to
petitioner and Clarion and why she did not run after seeing the incident. Evidently, Fuentes'
failure to give the exact time it took her to run from her house to the Clarions' did not diminish
the veracity of her identification of petitioner and her narration of what she saw when she arrived
at the scene. Absent a showing of ill-motive on her part, this Court gives her testimony full
credence. Nonetheless, despite proof of petitioner's act of firing a gun at Clarion, her intent to kill

Falsification of Public Documents is an intentional crime. Settled is the rule that

Falsification of Public Documents is an intentional felony committed by means of "dolo" or
"malice" and could not result from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus - that the act or omission be done
willfully,maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. This felony falls
under the category of mala in se offenses that requires the attendance of criminal intent. In fine,
criminal intent is required in order to incur criminal liability under Article l 71 of the RPC.
(People v. Gil-Roflo, et.al., G.R. Nos. 249564 & 249568-76, March 21, 2022, Hernando, J.)

Mens rea and actus reus for the crime of Grave Threats. Like any other crime defined
by The Revised Penal Code, grave threats must have an actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus
is the actual speaking or uttering of the threats of, say, death or serious bodily harm. The mens
rea is that the accused intends that the recipient of their words to feel intimidated by their words
or that the accused intended the words to be taken seriously. The words must be meant by the
accused to convey a threat; in other words, the utterance is meant to intimidate or to be taken
seriously. It is not necessary that the recipient themself actually feels intimidated or actually
takes the words seriously. To repeat, all that needs to be proven is that they were intended by the
accused to have that effect.

Mens rea for Grave Threats. The test of mens rea is whether a reasonable
person would consider the utterance as threats by regarding the utterance objectively and
reviewing it in light of the circumstances in which they were uttered, the manner in which
they were spoken, the person to whom they were addressed, the relationship between the
accused and the complainant, and the recipient's reaction to the accused's words. All these
and other factual details form part of the context and circumstances surrounding the
crime. But whether the recipient of a threat takes the threat seriously is not, in and of
itself, an element of the mens rea of the accused, though it is relevant to the extent that it
assists in understanding the accused's intention in speaking the words at issue. (Garma v.
People, G.R. No. 248317, March 16, 2022, Lazaro-Javier, J.)
In crimes by culpa under Article 3, the mental element of the crime refers to the
requirements of freedom, intelligence, lack of foresight or skill, and the voluntariness of the
act. (US v. Feliciano Divino, G.R. No.L- 4490, December 4, 1908, Arellano, CJ; People v.
Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001,Mendoza, J.).

Culpa is not only a mode of committing crimes but a punishable offense under the
Revised Penal Code. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate
crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime (see Jason Ivler y Aguilar v. Hon.
Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, et. al, GR 172716, November 17, 2010). What is penalized
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code “is the mental attitude or condition behind the acts
of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might have
produced several effects or consequences,” (Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13,
2014, Reyes, J.).

The I’vler doctrine was affirmed by the SC En banc. According to the Supreme
Court: We rule that Ivler is a good law, notwithstanding the few stray cases that allowed the
"complexing" of the effects of a single quasi-offense. Forbidding the application of Article 48 of

Principle of Territoriality

Criminal jurisdiction over transitory crimes under R.A. 9262. As can be gleaned
from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against
women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some
acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality
or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's
essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory, crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. It is necessary, for Philippine• courts to have
jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) 26 in relation to
Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory that the victim be a
resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a
material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of
respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig
City may exercise jurisdiction over the case. Certainly, the act causing the information relates to
BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging
the husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It
likewise remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns
itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may
even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed
abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach
of Philippine courts (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018, J. Tijam).

Accused and the complaining witness executed a Memorandum of Agreement in

Makati City. Simultaneous with the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement, accused
issued and delivered a post-dated check in Makati City. Later, the check was presented for
payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati City. Can the case of estafa thru the
issuance of post-dated check be filed in some other criminal jurisdiction other than
Makati? No. Case law provides that in this form of estafa, it is not the non-payment of a debt
which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. Thus,
while the victim is not wrong in saying that the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory
offense and may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential ingredients of the
crime took place, the pieces of evidence on record point only to one place: Makati City.
Time and again, the Court has ruled that "in criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the
elements of the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise,
a mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him
criminally liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be made equivalent to
proof." Thus, since the evidence adduced during the trial showed that the offense allegedly
committed by the accused was committed somewhere else, the trial court should have dismissed
the action for want of jurisdiction (Cabral v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019,
Peralta, J.)

The principle of generality was reiterated in the case of Trillanes, Jr. v. Pimentel, to
wit: All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice
their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law (Trillanes, Jr. v. Pimentel,
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, Carpio-Morales, J.).

Functional immunity. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a

diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts,
whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any
offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials
of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary for
the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfilment of its purposes (Liang v.
People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000, Ynares-Santiago, J.).

Immunity from criminal jurisdiction for foreign armed forces allowed to enter the
Philippines. The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one's
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon (Nicolas v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009, Azcuna, J., Enbanc).

Interpretation of Penal Statutes

Pro reo principle. The fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal
laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be
presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt (Intestate
Estate of Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11,
2010, Corona, J.).

Principle of lenity. Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of
lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls
for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused (Intestate Estate of
Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010,
Corona, J.).

Facial challenge on penal statutes. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only
statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially
challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of
crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against
employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would
effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised (Romualdez v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 639, 645). Note: The void-for-
vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, this Court has
imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an on-its face invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate (Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167011,
April 30, 2008, Chico-Nazario, J., Enbanc).

2023 Jurists Pre-bar Notes on Criminal Law 1. For exclusive use of Jurists Bar reviewees. © 2023 by
Jurists Review Center, Inc. Unauthorized copying, dissemination, sharing, uploading, downloading, and
storage strictly prohibited and will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including the filing of
administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, IBP, and SC as well as the filing of criminal
charges. Page 7 of 35
Application of the Republic Act 10951 to the PD 1612 will be a judicial legislation.
The Court notes the recent enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 10951 which adjusted the values
of the property and damage on which various penalties are based, taking into consideration the
present value or money as compared to its value way back in 1932 when the RPC was enacted.
RA 10951 substantially amended the penalties prescribed for Theft under Article 309 of the RPC
without concomitant adjustment for the offense of Fencing under PD 1612. The Court is not
unaware that the recent development would then result on instances where a Fence, which is
theoretically a mere accessory to the crime of Robbery/Theft, will be punished more severely
than the principal of such latter crimes. However, as can be clearly gleaned in RA 10951, the
adjustment is applicable only to the crimes defined under the RPC and not under special penal
laws such as PD 1612. The Court remains mindful of the fact that the determination of penalties
is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch of the government which is beyond the
ambit of judicial powers. Thus, this Court can not adjust the penalty to he imposed against the
petitioner based on RA 10951 considering that the offense of Fencing is defined under PD 1612,
a special penal law. ( Estrella v. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020, Inting, J.)

The concept of in flagrante delicto arrests should not be confused with warrantless
arrests based on probable cause as contemplated in the second instance of Sec. 5 of Rule
113. In the latter type of warrantless arrest, an accused may be arrested when there is probable
cause which is discernible by a peace officer or private person that an offense "has just been
committed." Here, the offense had already been consummated but not in the presence of the
peace officer or private person who, nevertheless, should have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested had committed it. More importantly, there is
durational immediacy between the offense that had just been committed and the peace officer
or private person's perception or observation of the accused's presence at the incident or
immediate vicinity. Such is why probable cause is required to justify a warrantless arrest in cases
where the peace officer or private person did not catch or witness the accused in the act of
committing an offense. (People v. Olarte, G.R. No. 233209, March 11, 2019, Gesmundo, J.)

Error in personnae and Aberratio ictus, or the Principle of Transferred Intent. This
is the legal doctrine that holds that, when the intention to harm one individual inadvertently
causes a second person to be hurt instead, the perpetrator is still held responsible. To be held
legally responsible, a court typically must demonstrate that the perpetrator had criminal intent,
that is, that they knew or should have known that another would be harmed by their actions and
wanted this harm to occur. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transferred_intent). Under the
Revised Penal Code, this principle is embodied in the concepts of error in personnae and aberatio
ictus, two principles of criminal liability derived from the first paragraph of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Criminal liability

Aberratio ictus

Four armed men alighted from a Toyota Corolla and started shooting at the driver of a
CRV. During the shooting, a bystander, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit
by a stray bullet. Then the four men hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left the
scene. Both the driver and the bystander died due to the shooting. The accused is guilty of the
death of the victim under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine
of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and
for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been the
accused's intention to shoot the victim, this fact will not exculpate him. The victim’s death
caused by the bullet fired by the accused was the natural and direct consequence of the latter’s
felonious deadly assault against his target (People v. Adriano, G.R. No.205228, July 15, 2015,
Perez, J.).

2023 Jurists Pre-bar Notes on Criminal Law 1. For exclusive use of Jurists Bar reviewees. © 2023 by
Jurists Review Center, Inc. Unauthorized copying, dissemination, sharing, uploading, downloading, and
storage strictly prohibited and will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including the filing of
administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, IBP, and SC as well as the filing of criminal
charges. Page 8 of 35
The ruling in the case of People v. Adriano, G.R. No.205228, July 15, 2015, was
reiterated in the case of People v. Nestor Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 08, 2020. In this
case, the accused shot at his intended victim who was closing the front door of his house but
instead, the bullets hit a seven-year old girl and her sister. In upholding the conviction of the
accused for the death of the girl, the Supreme Court held that what happened to this seven (7)-
year-old was a clear case of aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow. Under the doctrine of
aberratio ictus, as embodied in Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is imposed for the acts
committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom. The Supreme Court also highlighted that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
attended girl’s killing. “As pointed out by Justice Mario V. Lopez during the deliberation,
although appellant did not intend to kill Jonabel, treachery may still be appreciated in aberratio
ictus, pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Flora. There, the accused fired his gun at his
target, but missed, and hit two (2) other persons. The Court appreciated treachery as a
qualifying circumstance and convicted the accused for murder and attempted murder because
even if the death and injury of the two (2) other persons resulted from accused's poor aim,
accused's act of suddenly firing upon his victims rendered the latter helpless to defend
themselves. This is applicable here. Just because Jonabel was not the intended victim does not
make appellant's sudden attack any less treacherous.” (People v. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016,
September 08, 2020, Lazaro-Javier, J.)

Take note of the case of People v. Inocencio Gonzales, G.R. No. 139542. June 21, 2001.
In this case, accused fired his gun during a traffic altercation. Unfortunately, the bullet hit a
woman passenger in the Tamarraw Fx and the two other children with her. The woman died but
and children sustained physical injuries. The trial court convicted the accused of murder for the
death of the woman and frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by the children. On review,
the Supreme Court modified the conviction to homicide for the death of the woman and two
counts of slight physical injuries for the injuries sustained by the children. The Supreme Court
took note that the gun was not aiming at anybody when the accused fired it. Also, the Supreme
Court ruled that no treachery attended the incident because there was an altercation between the
accused and his adversary. (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139542. June 21, 2001, Gonzaga-
Reyes, En Banc).

In the case of P02 Bernardino Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 08, 2020, the
accused shot the motorcycle rider after having exchanged of words with the latter. Unfortunately,
a child was also hit by the bullet and died as a result. The trial court convicted the accused for the
death of the child as charged. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction. According to the Supreme Court: Considering that the death of
Torralba was caused by the same felonious act of shooting at Bernardo, the OSG is correct when
it argues that Cruz should be held guilty of homicide as originally charged. Torralba, an eight-
year old boy, was at the wrong place and time during the shooting incident. While Cruz did not
intend to end the life of this child, the latter's death is a crime of homicide in accordance with
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and prevailing jurisprudence. Under Article 4,
criminal liability is incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended." Accordingly, the author of the felony shall be
criminally liable for the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof, whether intended or
not. For this provision to apply, it must be shown, however, (a) that an intentional felony has
been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. The Court finds these elements
present in this case. It has already been established that Cruz committed an intentional felony
when he fired multiple shots at Bernardo. The death of Torralba, who was hit by one of those
bullets intended for Bernardo, is a direct, natural, and logical consequence of said intentional
felony. The death of Torralba is an example of aberratio ictus. (P02 Bernardino Cruz v. People,
G.R. No. 216642, September 08, 2020, Caguioa, J.) (Note: Even if the victim in this case is a
child, the Supreme Court did not hold that his killing constituted murder. This is so since the

Praeter intentionem

An accused mother who killed her son after hitting him several times with a hanger and
the wooden handle of a broom cannot claim the mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong. (People v. Salve Gonzales, G.R. No. 217022, June 3, 2019, Lazaro-
Javier, J.). This case reiterated the ruling in People v. Noel Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3,
2011, where the accused father hit his two sons with a piece of wood several times for
disobeying his command. Unfortunately, one of the victims died as a result of the injuries
inflicted to him. The Supreme Court held: In order that a person may be criminally liable for a
felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensable (a) that a felony was
committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt accused, in beating his son and
inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. The child expired as a direct
consequence of the beating. The criminal liability of the accused for the death of his son is clear
(People v. Noel Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011, Del Castillo, J.).

Impossible crimes

Legal impossibility. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there
is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act;
and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category (Intod v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992, Campos, Jr.).

Factual Impossibility. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty (Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 58). See Sulpicio Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119,
October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52 and (Gemma Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009,
Peralta, J.). In the Intod case, the fact that the victim was not in her house at the time of the
assault is a factual impossibility which prevented the consummation of the crime. On the other
hand, the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded prevented the crime from being
produced in the Jacinto case.

There is no impossible crime in the absence of proof that the victim was already dead
when the accused stabbed him (People v. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018,
Caguioa, J.).

Distinctions between attempted or frustrated felonies and impossible crimes.

The evil intent is attempted or frustrated felony is possible of accomplishment, while in
impossible crime, it cannot be accomplished because of its inherent impossibility. In
attempted or frustrated felony, what prevented its accomplishment is the intervention of a
certain cause or accident independent of the will of the perpetrator or offender.

Stages of commission
Frustrated and Attempted Homicide/Murder. If the wound/s sustained by the

Remember: Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be
fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared
as attempted, not frustrated murder (People v. Costales, G.R. No. 141154-56, January 15,
2002, Bellosillo, J., Enbanc). The principle was reiterated in Etino v. People, G.R. No.
206632, February 14, 2018, Del Castillo, J., where the Supreme Court said that it is settled
that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not
medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful," and such doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused. “

In the case of Quijano v. People, G.R. No. 202151, February 10, 2021, the Supreme
Court held that it is not enough that the attending physician state that the injuries sustained by
the victim is fatal. He or she must explain the nature of the wounds and the reasons why the
same should be considered fatal before an accused may be convicted of the crime of
frustrated homicide or frustrated murder as the case maybe. (Quijano v. People, G.R. No.
202151, February 10, 2021, Gaerlan, J.)

Essential act of execution in rape. In the crime of rape, penetration, however slight,
is an essential act of execution that produces such felony. Thus, for the accused to be
convicted of the crime of attempted rape, he must have already commenced the act of
inserting his sexual organ in the vagina of the victim, but due to some cause or accident,
excluding his own spontaneous desistance, he wasn’t able to even slightly penetrate the
victim. Rape and acts of lasciviousness are crimes of the same nature. However, the intent to
lie with the woman is the fundamental difference between the two, as it is present in rape or
attempt of it, and absent in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed when the
‘touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there
can only be acts of lasciviousness (People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11,
2013, Leonardo-De Castro, J.).

Intent to insert his finger inside the vagina of the victim is essential before an
accused be convicted of attempted rape. In the case of Lutap v. People, G.R. No. 204061,
February 5, 2018, the Supreme Court held that the accused;s direct overt act of touching the
victim’s vagina by constantly moving his middle finger cannot convincingly be interpreted as
demonstrating an intent to actually insert his finger inside her sexual organ which, to
reiterate, was still then protectively covered, much less an intent to have carnal knowledge
with the victim. An inference of attempted rape by sexual intercourse or attempted rape by
sexual assault cannot therefore be successfully reached based on the act of the accused of
touching the victim;s genitalia and upon ceasing from doing so when the victim swayed off
his hand. Instead, his lewd act of fondling the victim’s sexual organ consummates the felony
of acts of lasciviousness. The slightest penetration into one's sexual organ distinguishes an
act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape (Lutap v. People, G.R. No. 204061, February 5,
2018, Tijam, J.).

There is no crime of frustrated theft (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June
21, 2007,Tinga, J.; Canceran v. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 2, 2015, Mendoza, J.)

Consummated robbery. In robbery, there must be an unlawful taking or

apoderamiento which is defined as the taking of items without the consent of the owner, or

Consummated sale of illegal drugs. In actions involving the illegal sale of

dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the
transaction took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
as evidence. To prove that a sale transaction had taken place, the following elements must be
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. The commission of the offense of illegal sale
of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction which
happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. So long as the police officer
went through the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the seller and the drug was
delivered to the police officer, the crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods. In
other words, what is important is that the poseur-buyer received the drug from the accused
(People v. Tumulak. G.R. No. 206054, July 25, 2016, Brion, J.).

Conspiracy

Community of criminal design as essence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two

or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not
individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations. Accordingly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be
presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design,
concerted action, and community of interests (People v. Elizalde, et al. G.R. No. 210434,
December 5, 2016, Peralta, J.)

Wheel conspiracy. The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group
(the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares
a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each
spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies. An
illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the
conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his
co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other
accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, Puno, J.; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 220598-220593, July19, 2016, Bersamin, J.).

Chain conspiracy. Chain conspiracy exists when there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer
and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This involves
individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain
conspiracy was that involved in United States v. Bruno, of the US Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. There, 88 defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess
narcotics. This case involved several smugglers who had brought narcotics to retailers who, in
turn, had sold the narcotics to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what transpired was a single chain

Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy must

be proven as convincingly as the criminal act itself - like any element of the offense charged,
conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. For a co-conspirator to be
liable for the acts of the others, there must be intentional participation in the conspiracy with a
view to further a common design. Except for the mastermind, it is necessary that a co-conspirator
should have performed some overt act-actual commission of the crime itself, active participation
as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime, or moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy
over the other co-conspirators (People v. Amar, G.R. No. 194235, June 8, 2016, Leonardo-De
Castro, J.; People v. Pepino and Gomez, G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016, Brion, J.).

Conspiracy is legally presumed in hazing. R.A. No. 8049 presents a novel provision
that introduces a disputable presumption of actual participation; and which modifies the concept
of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof provides that the presence of any person during the
hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal, unless he prevented the commission
of the punishable acts. This provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from the
mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by proving that the
accused took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing (Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464,
July 1, 2015, Mendoza, J.).

The ruling in the case Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, was reiterated in
the case of Fuertes v. The Senate, et. al., G.R. No. 208162, January 07, 2020. According to the
Supreme Court in that case: This Court has upheld the constitutionality of disputable
presumptions in criminal laws. The constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated when
there is a logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. When
such prima facie evidence is unexplained or not contradicted by the accused, the conviction
founded on such evidence will be valid. However, the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of a disputable presumption does not preclude
the presentation of contrary evidence. (Fuertes v. The Senate, et. al., G.R. No. 208162, January
07, 2020, Enbanc, Leonen, J.)

Receipt of ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in kidnapping for ransom.

(People v. Octa, G.R. No. 195196, July 13, 2015, Sereno, CJ).

Conspiracy may be deduced from the conducts of the perpetrators during the
commission of the crime. Jurisprudence consistently teaches us that conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated showing that at the time of the
commission of the offense, all the perpetrators have the same purpose and were united in its
execution. The records show that Carlo and his three (3) companions successively raped AAA
and that while one of them had carnal knowledge of the victim, the others held her arms and kept
her from struggling. Viewed in its totality, the individual participation of each perpetrator
pointed to a joint purpose and criminal design. (People v. Diega, et. al., G.R. No. 255389,
September 14, 2021, Lopez, M.J.)

Only convincing evidence is required to establish elements of self-defense. It must be

stressed that the defense is not required to prove, with absolute certainty, the facts constituting its
defense. The accused is required only to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the justifying
circumstances he has invoked. Clear and convincing evidence has been described as more than
mere preponderance, but the proof required is less than that required of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In this regard, the Court holds that the defense was able to demonstrate that Apolinario
acted in defense of a relative when he shot Crisanto. He also acted in self-defense and defense of
a relative when he shot Lorico, which unfortunately resulted in the latter's death. (PO1
Apolinario Bayle v. People, G.R. No. 210975, March 11, 2020, Reyes, J. Jr., J.)

Unlawful aggression. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he
puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense.
There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is present only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not
constitute aggression warranting self-defense (People v. Gamez, G.R. No. 202847, October 23,
2013, Reyes, J.).

Two kinds of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or
material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful
aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means
an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like
aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such
as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot (People v. Gunda, et. al., G.R. No. 242883, September
03, 2020, Peralta, CJ; People v. Nogas, G.R. No 172606, November 23, 2011, Bersamin, J.).

Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not
consist in a mere threatening or intimidating attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must
be offensive, menacing and positively strong, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause
injury (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a
motion as if to attack. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof: which puts the accused's life in real peril (People v. PFC Enrique Reyes, G.R. No.
224498, January 11, 2018, Tijam, J.).

Accused and victim grappled for the control of a weapon which the latter pointed to
the former at first. The accused was able to wrestle the weapon from the victim. He went to
the house of his neighbor but the victim followed him and allegedly, they grappled again
for the possession of the weapon. It was this time that the accused stabbed him to death.
Prosecuted for Homicide, accused claimed self-defense. Is the accused criminally liable for
homicide? Yes. Even if the victim still went after the accused despite the latter going inside the
house of his neighbor, where they again grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the
weapon did not amount to aggression from the victim for it was still the accused who held
control of the weapon at that point. Whatever the accused did thereafter – like stabbing the
victim with the weapon – constituted retaliation against the victim. In this regard, retaliation was
not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased
when the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the
accused injured the aggressor. As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the

The existence of imminent danger to one’s life should be assessment from the
viewpoint of the person attacked. In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the
courts should not demand that the accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under
imminent threat of fatal harm. He had no time to reflect and to reason out his responses. He had
to be quick, and his responses should be commensurate to the imminent harm. This is the only
way to judge him, for the law of nature - the foundation of the privilege to use all reasonable
means to repel an aggression that endangers one's own life and the lives of others - did not
require him to use unerring judgment when he had the reasonable grounds to believe himself in
apparent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury. The test is whether his
subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger was reasonable or not, and
the reasonableness of his belief must be viewed from his standpoint at the time he acted. The
right of a person to take life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so;
and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the circumstances as
they then appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances as they would appear to others or
based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the
danger and the necessity to kill (People v. Olarbe, G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018, Bersamin,
J.).

The determination of whether the accused exceeded the reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel unlawful aggression depends on various factors such as the nature and
quality of the weapons used, the physical condition and size of the aggressor and the person
defending himself, as well as other circumstances surrounding the particular case. The means
employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the
means of attack and the defense. This is a matter that depends on the circumstances.(PO1
Apolinario Bayle v. People, G.R. No. 210975, March 11, 2020, Reyes, J. Jr., J.)

To repeat "the right of a person to take life in self--defense arises from his belief in the
necessity for doing so,· and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light
of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances as they
would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature
and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill." Indeed, petitioner must be exonerated for
he had acted only in self-defense. (Prudencio Ganal, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 248130. December
2, 2020, Lazaro-Javier, J.)

Minority

Discernment. Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the

consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. An
accused minor who covered the mouth of a rape victim with a handkerchief and conspired with
co-accused in raping her is found to be acting with discernment (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No.
199270, October 21, 2015, Peralta, J.; People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009,
Leonardo-De Castro, J., Enbanc).

Intent and discernment distinguished. The terms "intent" and "discernment" convey
two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the
former refers to the desire of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person
ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently
handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor
above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be

In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is
worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied
in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on
the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second
element of [dolus], Albert has stated: "The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this
power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act,
no crime can exist, and because x x x the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him)
from criminal liability (CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019, Caguioa, J.)

Suspended sentence is applicable even if the accused who committed the crime in his
minority had reached the age of beyond 21 years old. The Supreme Court had extended the
application of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative
intent of the said law (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015; People v.
Sisracon, G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018, J. Peralta).

Suspension of sentence reiterated. Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant

was qualified for suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A. 9344
provides that the same extends only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years old. Nevertheless, in extending the application of RA No. 9344 to
give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law, we ruled in People v. Jacinto, as cited
in People v. Ancajas, that the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she
committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community. Thus, accused-appellant is
ordered to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities, in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344. (BBB
v. People, G.R. No. 249307, August 27, 2020, Lazaro-Javier, J.)

Service of sentence in an agricultural camp by minors should be for the duration of

the full-sentence. The Court declares XXX and YYY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, for which they are
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. On account of minority of accused-
appellants when they came in conflict with the law, they may serve their sentences in an
agricultural camp or training facility in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Thus, this case shall be REMANDED to the court of origin to effect the imposition of the full
service of their sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facility. (People v. XXX and
YYY, G.R. No. 242474, September 16, 2020, Carandang, J.)

Remember the following principles from the Juvenile Justice Act:

Basis for determination of age. The age of a child may be determined from the

Release of children below 15 years of age. Under Sec. 20 of RA 9344, children

below the age of criminal responsibility (15 years and below) shall be immediately
released to their parents or guardians or to the child’s nearest relative subject to the
appropriate rehabilitation programs to be conducted by the local social welfare officers.

Diversion program. Children above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) and who
acted with discernment shall be referred to appropriate diversion program (see sec. 22,
RA 9344).
a. Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than six (6)
years imprisonment, the diversion program shall be conducted by the law
enforcement officer or punong barangay with the assistance of the local social
welfare or development office.
b. In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6)
years imprisonment, the diversion shall be conducted by the local social
welfare or development officer.
c. Where the imposable penalty for the crime exceeds six (6) years
imprisonment, diversion may be resorted to only by the court (see sec. 23, RA
9344).

Take note: Rehabilitation programs are mandated by the law for children below 15 years
of age and those above but below 18 years of age. Meanwhile, diversion programs are only
available to CICL above 15 years of age who acted with discernment.

Insanity

Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability (People v. Ernesto
Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, June 29, 1981, Aquino, J.).

Tests to determine insanity. To determine whether an accused was legally insane during
the commission of the crime, two distinguishable tests are used: (a) the test of cognition –
whether there was a “complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act” and
(b) the test of volition – whether there was a “total deprivation of freedom of the will.” Case law
shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed
to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived
of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying “complete deprivation of intelligence.”
This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is
represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by
a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist (People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004, Davide, Jr., CJ).

Article 12, paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code exempts insane persons from criminal
liability, unless it is shown that they acted during a lucid interval. Under our present legal
regime, persons are presumed to be sane and to have intended the ordinary consequences of

Accident

Before an accused may be exempted from criminal responsibility on the ground of

accident, the following requisites must be established: (a) He must be performing a lawful act;
(b) with due care; (c) he causes injury to another by mere accident; and (d) without fault or
intention of causing it.

Accused, a police officer, was charged of shooting the deceased, a master teacher at
the Concepcion College who was arrested for robbery. He claimed that the shooting was due to
accident which happened when the deceased tried to grab his gun. Is the accused criminally liable?
No. The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with
due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was
no fault or no intent to cause the injury. From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At
the time of the incident, accused was a member -- specifically, one of the investigators -- of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was
in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior,
he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation. Again, it was in the lawful
performance of his duty as a law enforcer that accused tried to defend his possession of the weapon when
the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, accused was duty-
bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his
custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the
vicinity, including accused himself. Accused cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the
necessary precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so
assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its
holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working area. At no instance during his
testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. The
participation of accused, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the course of
the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster,
the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of
the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the
control of accused. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latter’s
culpability (Pomoy v. People, G.R. No. 150647, September 29, 2004, Panganiban, J.).

If life was taken by misfortune or accident while the actor is in the performance of lawful act
executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability (U.S. v. Tanedo,
G.R. No. L-5418, February 12, 1910, Moreland, J.).

Compulsion of irresistible force

One who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force and under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury acts without voluntariness and free will.
Although a crime was committed, no criminal liability arises. (People v. Tamayo, G.R. No.
234943, January 19, 2021, Carandang, J.)

Voluntary surrender

The requisites of voluntary surrender are (a) that the offender had not actually been
arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent;

Analogous mitigating circumstances

Accused executed an extrajudicial confession via the personal letter she wrote where
she admitted to have misappropriated the money belonging to her employer and which she
collected from the latter’s debtors. She was charged of qualified them. May the
extrajudicial confession be considered as a mitigating circumstance? Yes. Based on the same
extrajudicial confession, the accused is also entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong under paragraph 3 again in relation to paragraph 10 both of
Article 13. Based on her letter, the petitioner misappropriated the redemption payments under
her custody and control because she was constrained by extreme necessity for money. This is not
to promote monetary crisis as an excuse to commit a crime or to embolden a person entrusted
with funds or properties to feloniously access the same, but rather to underscore the utmost
consideration in the Court’s exercise of its discretional power to impose penalties, that is - a
guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances and commensurate with the
gravity of the offense committed (Frontreras v. People, G.R. No. 190583, December 7, 2015,
Reyes, J.).

Restitution as analogous mitigating circumstance. Although restitution is akin to

voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of
the same Article of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should be treated as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present in a case, which is
similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even though
the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part
of the accused, it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of petitioner (Legrama v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 178626, June 13,
2012, Peralta, J.).

Schizophrenia as mitigating circumstance. Although schizophrenia is not exempting if

it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, it may nevertheless
be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of his will power. In this
case, however, the defense failed to prove that accused-appellant was suffering from
schizophrenia or any mental illness at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of
the commission of the crime that could diminish his will-power (People v. Baez, G.R. No.
125849, January 20, 1999, Mendoza, J.).

Aggravating circumstances

Dwelling

Dwelling is not inherent in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and should be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance since the author thereof could have accomplished the
heinous deed without having to violate the domicile of the victim." Dwelling is aggravating
because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. Here, the prosecution
established the fact that Robbery with Homicide was committed inside the victim's home,

Evident premeditation

Evident premeditation is attendant when the following requisites are proven during
trial: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that he/she clung to his determination; (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution, to allow him/her to reflect upon the consequences of his/her act,
and to allow his/her conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. It presupposes a deliberate
planning of the crime before executing it. The execution of the criminal act, in other words, must
be preceded by cool thought and reflection. There must be showing of a plan or preparation to
kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his/her decision to execute the crime.
In the case at bar, the following circumstances indicated the presence of evident premeditation:
(1) the meeting of all the accused at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of July 29, 1997 at Binago Forest,
Salimbal, Tinagpoloan to plan the killing of Pepito; (2) the act of buying and drinking alcohol
and arming themselves with four homemade guns known as paleontods, an improvised pistol and
bolos; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time, that is, six hours from the time of their meeting at 3
o'clock in the afternoon until the time of killing of Pepito at 9 o'clock in the evening.(People v.
Natindim, et. al., G.R. No. 201867, November 04, 2020, Hernando, J.)

Abuse of superior strength

To take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely excessive force that
is out of proportion to the mean’s of defense available to the person attacked. In the present
case, the evidence gathered shows that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked by accused,
who were not only superior in number but had access to, and in fact used, a weapon in form of a
knife. Moreover, it was established that when the victim was already defenseless and weak from
the stab wound and the mauling, he was unnecessarily hit with a big stone that ensured his death.
Thus, the fact that the victim was outnumbered without means to put up a defense as he was
taken to a place where rescue would be close to impossible and the fact that accused’s used
Weapons out of proportion to the defense available to the victim, i.e. a knife and a big stone,
fully establish the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. (People v.
Padilla, G.R. No. 247824, February 23, 2022, Hernando, J.)

There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense. Here the accused and his four
companions not only took advantage of their numerical superiority, they were also armed with
knives. The victim, on the other hand, was unarmed and defenseless. They executed the criminal
act by employing physical superiority over the victim. Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of
superior strength should not result in qualifying the offense to murder. When abuse of superior
strength obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is to be regarded as a
generic circumstance, robbery with homicide being a composite crime with its own definition
and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code (People v. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, September
22, 2014, Del Castillo, J.).

The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no
proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victims. The evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use
this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of

The killing of a young woman by two accused is with abuse of superior strength.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength necessitates a showing of the relative
disparity in the physical characteristics of the aggressor and the victim such as age, gender,
physical size and strength. We agree with the trial court that the killing of Rosemarie was
committed with abuse of superior strength. As found by the court a quo, two grown-up men
against a young fragile woman whose ability to defend herself had been effectively restrained
revealed a shocking inequality of physical strength. The victim was much weaker in constitution
and could not have possibly defended herself from her stronger assailants. Such disparity was
manifest in the contusions in the chest and hands, wounds on the fingers, a stab wound on the left
side of the face and multiple fractures in the ribs of the victim. The abuse of superior strength
was obvious in the way Rosemarie was mercilessly beaten to a pulp. (People v. Dodoy, et.
al., G.R. No. 149368, April 14, 2004, Corona, J., Enbanc)

Treachery

Facts constituting aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information.

Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance - in which the law
uses a broad term to embrace various situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited
to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty - is present,
must state the ultimate facts relative to such circumstance. Otherwise, the Information may be
subject to a motion to quash under Section 3 ( e) (i.e., that it does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules [on] Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a
bill of particulars under the parameters set by said Rules. (People v. Alegre, G.R. No. 254381,
February 14, 2022,Hernando, J.)

Treachery must be proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
even where all indicia tend to support the conclusion that the attack was sudden and unexpected,
yet no precise data on this point exists, treachery cannot be taken into account. Thus, when the
witness did not see how the attack was carried out and cannot testify on how it began, the trial
court cannot presume from the circumstances of the case that there was treachery. Circumstances
which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable
or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence.

Once it appears that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and instead of
fleeing from it, met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated. Treachery presupposes a sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on
the victim. (People v. Archivido, G.R. No. 233085, September 21, 2020, Gaerlan, J.)

There must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how
it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the

Use of motor vehicle

The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to
facilitate escape, but not when the use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely
sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier
and his apprehension difficult (People v. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016,
Peralta, J.).

Rules on the appreciation of mitigating and aggravating circumstances

Mitigating or aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account for the purpose of
diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

(1) Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable

by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty
therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
Examples: unlawful entry or breaking of doors in robbery through force upon the thing
(Art. 299, Art. 302) and abuse of confidence in qualified theft (Art. 310).

(2) The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Examples: relationship in parricide (Art. 246); sex in crimes against chastity (Art. 333),
and abuse of public position in bribery (Art. 210).

(3) Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the
offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal
cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices
and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant. Examples: Passion and
obfuscation are circumstances arising from the moral attributes of the offender. Minority
is a circumstance pertaining to cause personal to offender.

(4) The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those
persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their
cooperation therein (see Art. 62, RPC). Examples: Treachery and cruelty in murder
would aggravate the liability of persons who had knowledge thereof at the time of
execution.

Principals

Principal by inducement

The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the

inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2)
that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor
(Ambagan, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015, Velasco, Jr., J.).

Take note of the case of People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012.
According to the Supreme Court in this case: To be a principal by indispensable cooperation,
one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and
cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would
not have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show
that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape.
The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until
appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the
crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in
exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her
own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this
disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered
that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a
fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed." (G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012,
Peralta, J.) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that Dulay should be convicted under Section
5(a) of RA 7610, not as principal by inducement for the crime of Rape, but for “acting as a
procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution.”

Accomplice

Distinction between conspirators and accomplices. Conspirators and accomplices

have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators,
however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such
course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the
decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a
crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its
accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their
instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense. (People v. De
Vera, et. al., G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999, Panganiban, J.)

Requisites. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following

requisites must concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2)
that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3)
that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice. (People v. Apura, G.R. No. 222892, March 18, 2021, Peralta,
CJ)

Even if the accused was the first one to assault the victim, his criminal liability might
that of an accomplice only. In the case of People v. Apura, G.R. No. 222892, March 18,
2021, Peralta, CJ, the Supreme Court downgraded the liability of an accused who assaulted
the victim first from that of a principle to a mere accomplice. According to the Supreme
Court: “The evidence shows that Apura struck Enriquez with a beer bottle in the head from
behind. In fact, he was the first to assault the victim. Thus, even if he was not a co-
conspirator, the incontrovertible fact remains that he did an act which started the chain of
events that culminated in the shooting of the victim by Que. By his act of striking Enriquez
with a beer bottle in the head, he is deemed by this court to have cooperated in the execution
of the offense by a previous act, albeit not indispensable as it was not necessary for him to do
it in order that Que could carry out his criminal design to kill Enriquez. This fixes Apura's
criminal liability in this case as that of an accomplice in the commission of the offense under

Criminal liability of second spouse in bigamy. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.

Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a person, whether man or woman,
who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock
is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy.” Therefore, her conviction should only be
that for an accomplice to the crime (Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015,
Sereno, CH).

Liability of the wife who fed the victim kidnapped by her husband. The act of
giving food by the wife to the kidnapped victim was not essential and indispensable for the
perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for ransom by the husband but merely an expression
of sympathy or feeling of support to her husband. Moreover, this Court is guided by the
ruling in People v. De Vera, where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of
the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal
(People v. Yao, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014, Mendoza, J.).

Accessories

Corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body, foundation or substance of a crime. It

refers to the fact of the commission of the crime, not to the physical body of the deceased.
Because corpus delicti may be proven by circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary for the
prosecution to present direct evidence to prove the corpus delicti. Nevertheless, the
prosecution must present the following elements: (a) that a certain result or fact has been
established, i.e., that a man has died; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it
(People v. Omilig, et. al., G.R. No. 206296, August 12, 2015, Perez, J.).

As the body of the victim could not be found, the accused claimed that the
corpus delicti of the crime with which he was charged was not proven. Is the corpus
delicti proven despite the non-presentation of the kidnap victim during trial. Corpus
delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime which may be proved by the testimony of
the witnesses who saw it. The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact
that an individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person. To prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for
the prosecution to be able to show that (1) a certain fact has been proven — say, a person has
died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally responsible for
the act (People v. SP01 Catalino Gonzales, G.R. No. 192233, February 17, 2016, Perez, J.).

In the case of People v. Bacares, G.R. No. 243024, June 23, 2020, the accused raised
the argument that the prosecution's failure to present as evidence the shirt that he was
wearing and prove that the same was indeed stained with blood, as testified to by the
witnesses, and the weapon used to kill the victim is fatal to the case. However, the Supreme
Court dispelled the argument. According to the Supreme Court, “Corpus delicti is the body,
foundation or substance of a crime. It refers to the fact of the commission of the crime, not to
the physical body of the deceased. Because corpus delicti may be proven by circumstantial

Under paragraph 2 of Article 19, the reason for concealing or destroying the body of
the crime or its effects or instruments must be to prevent its discovery. If the crime was
already discovered when the effects or instruments of the crime were concealed or destroyed,
the accused could no longer be held criminally liable as an accessory. (see Padiernos v.
People, G.R. No. 18111, August 17, 2015, Brion, J., where the Supreme Court found the
accused liable for obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 instead.

An accused charged as a principal may be convicted as an accessory only.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under
Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for
the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt
that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie
Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have
known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter,
he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when
they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to
these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's
liability is that of an accessory. (Vino v. People, G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989,
Gancayco, J.)

Complex crimes

Accused’s right to bail subsists in spite of the possibility of being imposed with
capital punishment as proper maximum penalty for the graver crime in a complex
crime. Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the
constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of official/public documents, the
RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in
Republic Act No. 7659. If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should have already
considered it as a special complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape
with homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have prescribed penalty
of reclusion perpetua (People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 216007-09, December 8, 2015, Peralta,
J.).

Accused knocked on the house of the victims and asked whether she could use
their telephone. After a while, she was joined by the other accused. She then excused
herself for the comfort room. When she came back, she sat in the sofa. Thereafter, the
other accused poked a gun on the victim’s neck. Their other companions proceeded to
the kitchen and herded the maids, the victim’s niece and cousin inside the bodega.
Accused and her companions were able to take away valuables in the total amount of
P2,701,000.00. What crime was committed? Complex crime of robbery in inhabited house
and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons (Fransdilla v. People, G.R. No.
197562, April 20, 2015, Peralta, J.; this clarifies the ruling in People v. Sebastian and
Pangilinan, 85 SCRA 601, where the Supreme Court held that where robbery, though
committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor “supplies the

Special complex crimes

Complex crimes vis-à-vis composite crimes. In a complex crime, two or more crimes are
committed, but in the eyes of the law there is only one criminal resolution; thus, there is only one
crime and only one penalty is imposed. A complex crime is either: a) a compound crime or delito
compuesto which arise when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
b) a complex proper or delito complejo when an offense is a necessary means for committing
another offense.

Aside from these, there is also what is called as a special complex crime. Although
similar in terminology, it is different from the complex crime that is provided for under Article
48 of the RPC. A special complex crime is one that is defined and given a specific penalty under
the Code. Similar to complex crime, in a special complex crime two or more crimes are
committed but the law expressly treats them as a single indivisible and unique offense as the acts
are a product of a single criminal impulse. It is legislative wisdom which treats and classifies the
attendant crimes as a unique offense, that is, a special complex crime. (People v. Ramoy and
Padilla, G.R. No. 212738, March 9, 2022, Gaerlan, J.)

Distinctions between Complex Crimes and Composite Crimes. Composite crime is truly
distinct and different from a complex or compound crime. (a) In a composite crime, the
composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the
combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or
one offense being the necessary means to commit the other; (b) In a composite crime, the
penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or compound crime
the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period; (c) A light felony that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime
may be made the subject of a separate information, but a light felony that accompanies a
composite crime is absorbed (People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015, Bersamin, J.).

Accused brought away the baby without her parents’ consent and then, abused her.
What crime was committed? Kidnapping with rape. In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent
of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established
by indubitable proof. And in this case, the actual taking of the baby without the consent of her
parents is clear proof of his intent to deprive the baby of her liberty. It has been established that
the accused committed kidnapping and on the occasion thereof, he raped the victim (see People
v. Magno, G.R. No. 206972, December 2, 2015, 776 SCRA 35).

Remember: Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of
the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. This provision gives rise to a special complex crime. People v. Elizalde, G.R.
No. 210434, December 5, 2016, Peralta, J.).

Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is
because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness
of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is

Forcible abduction with rape. When the girl is defiled, the forcible abduction becomes
the means to commit the rape, and since rape is the more serious offense, under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is committed and
penalized by reclusion perpetua, the penalty proper to rape (People v. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100,
July 18, 2014, Perez, J.).

Remember: If the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several
times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as
the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape
constitutes distinct and separate count of rape (People v. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417,
July 27, 2011, Perez, J.)

Accused with his two co-conspirators abducted the victim and took turns in raping
her. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction for one Forcible Abduction with Rape and three
separate crimes of Rape: Accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape. He should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three
co-accused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted
efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused
helped one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her,
the other three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted
cigarettes to stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not
only for the rape committed personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well.
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus,
the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible
abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible
abduction. Therefore, Accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape. People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
141125, February 28, 2002, Per Curiam, Enbanc).

Robbery with Homicide. The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1)
the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2)
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by
reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is
committed. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if
it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime. In robbery with homicide, the
original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery (People v. Orosco,
G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015, Villarama, J.).

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside
from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is

Take note: The term "homicide" in paragraph 1 of Article 294 is used in its generic sense,
that is, any act that results in death. Any other act producing injuries short of death is integrated
in the "homicide" committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, assuming, of course,
that the homicide is consummated. If no death supervenes, the accused should be held liable
for separate crimes of robbery and frustrated or attempted homicide or murder (provided
that there was intent to kill) if the latter offenses were not necessary for the commission of
the robbery, or for a complex crime of robbery and frustrated or attempted homicide or
murder under Article 48 of the Code if the latter offenses were the necessary means for the
commission of robbery. (People v. Labuguen, et. al., G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020,
Hernando, J., citing People v. Tidong, 296-A Phil. 323, 339 [1993])
Note: The crime is always robbery with homicide if homicide shall be committed on
occasion of or by reason of robbery regardless if other crimes are committed also during the
course of robbery like rape, serious physical injuries, mutilation, and others. These other crimes
are deemed absorbed in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide; nevertheless, they
may be considered for purposes of determining the additional civil liability of the accused.

Robbery with rape. For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must
be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the
other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain,
personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an
accompanying crime (People vs. Evangelio,G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011, Peralta, J.).

Person who committed the rape must also be the one who committed the robbery.
The use of the words "accompanied by" suggests that for the accessory crimes of rape, mutilation
and arson, the robbers themselves must have committed such crimes. On the other hand, the use
of the words "by reason or on occasion of the robbery," evinces that the law merely requires that
a homicide was committed by reason or occasion of the robbery. Notably, the difference in
phraseology within the same paragraph of the law is crucial. Fundamental is the principle that
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated. The legislature would not have deliberately used different modifying phrases within
the same paragraph if it intended similar treatment for the accessory crimes. Further, in Article
294, paragraph 4, the legislature identified who the perpetrator and the victim must be in the
special complex crime of robbery with serious physical injuries. It specified that in the course of
the execution of robbery, "the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for
its commission any of the physical injuries" covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263. The
law explicitly used the term "offender" evincing that the physical injury must be committed by
the same person who is guilty of robbery.(People v. Casabuena and Formaran, G.R. No. 246580,
June 23, 2020, Lazaro-Javier, J.)

Continued crime

A continued (continues or continuing crime) is a single crime consisting of a series of

acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Under sound principles, the act of taking two
roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion, is not
susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the article unlawfully taken
belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for the accomplishment of
different purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence

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of only one crime (People v. De Leon,G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376, October 8, 1926, Villamor,
J.).
There is a continued crime when two public documents were falsified on the same
date to commit the crime of estafa. Although there are series of acts, there is only one crime
committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed. The crime of estafa thru falsification of
public document committed by Consuelo Mallari, although consummated through a series of
acts, was 'set on foot' by the single intent or impulse to defraud Remegio Tapawan of a total
amount of P3,000.00. And contrary to the appellate court's observation, there was only one
deceit practiced by petitioner on the two (2) victims, i.e. that being in need of money, Leonora
Balderas was willing to mortgage two (2) lots as security for a loan of P3,000.00. It was, in fact,
by mere play of fate that the second victim, Julia Saclolo, should be dragged into the swindle by
reason of Tapawan having only P1,500.00 at that time. That there were two (2) victims, however,
did not accordingly convert the crime into two separate offenses, as the determinative factor is
the unity or multiplicity of the criminal intent or of the transactions for "the fact should not be
lost sight of that it is the injury to the public which a criminal action seeks to redress, and by
such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to individuals." The singularity of the
offense committed by petitioner is further demonstrated by the fact that the falsification of the
two (2) public documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the same date, in
the same place, at the same time and on the same occasion. This Court has held in the case
of People v. de Leon, 10 that the act of taking two or more roosters in the same place and on the
same occasion is dictated by only one criminal design and therefore, there is only one crime of
theft even if the roosters are owned by different persons. (Mallari v. People, G.R. No. L-58886
December 13, 1988, Fernan, CJ)

Several acts of diversion of payments of clients of the employee’s employer could not
be considered a continuous crime.The diversions of accused-appellant of the payments made
by Dasman Realty's clients, on fourteen occasions, i.e. from September 13, 2011 to January 19,
2013 cannot be considered as proceeding from a single criminal act since the taking were not
made at the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable dates. Each occasion of
"taking" constitutes a single act with an independent existence and criminal intent of its own. All
the "takings" are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal resolution, because each
taking is a complete act by itself. Each taking results in a complete execution or
consummation of the delictual act of defalcation.50 There is nothing of record to justify that the
intention of accused-appellant when she took the collection in September 13, 2011 was the same
intention which impelled her to commit the subsequent "takings" on the following months and
years until January 19, 2013. Her intent to unlawfully take the cash collections may arise only
when she comes in possession of the payments made by individual clients. As a result, there
could be as many acts of "taking" as there are times the accused-appellant diverted the payments
to her own personal use and benefit. The similarity of pattern resorted to by accused-appellant in
making the diversions does not affect the susceptibility of the acts committed to divisible crimes.
(People v. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020, Peralta, C.J.)

Prescription

Article 90 of the RPC provides that the period for the prescription of offenses commences
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents. But if the offense is falsification of a public document punishable under Article 172 of
the RPC, the period for prescription commences on the date of registration of the forged or
falsified document. As consistently applied in land registration proceedings, the act of
registration serves as a constructive notice to the entire world, charging everyone with
knowledge of the contents of the document (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 226590, April 23, 2018,
Reyes, Jr., J.).

Blameless ignorance doctrine. Under the rulings in the Behest Loans Cases, the
discovery rule, which is also known as the blameless ignorance doctrine, stipulates that: x x x
the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the
existence of a cause of action (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018,
Bersamin, J.).

If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall,
therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law
prevent the filing thereof or should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly
through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned
from the date of discovery thereof (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018,
Bersamin, J.).

Habitual delinquency

A person shall be deemed a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the
date of his last release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener
(art. 62, RPC).

Destierro

Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places
designated in the sentence, nor with the radius therein specified, which shall not be more than
250 and not less than 25 kilometers from the place designated (art. 87). A person who evades the
sentence of destierro by entering the prohibited area is not entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (People v. Jose de Jesus,G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948,
Montemayor, J.).

Three-fold rule

The maximum of the convict’s sentence shall no be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to
which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same
maximum period. Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (Art. 70).

Simultaneous service of sentence

When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if
the nature of the penalties permit. Otherwise, the order of their respective severity shall be
followed (Art. 70).

Disqualified offenders. Offenders who are disqualified from the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law
1) Those convicted of offense punishable with death penalty or life imprisonment.
2) Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason.
3) Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition, espionage.
4) Those convicted of piracy.
5) Habitual delinquents
6) Persons who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
7) Those who have been granted pardon but violated the terms thereof.
8) Those convicted by maximum prison term of one year.

Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the Indeterminate Sentence

Law, the basic goal is "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[.]" However, it has also
been held that "penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the
individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order." Hence,
this Court must look at certain factors when imposing penalties: Considering the criminal as an
individual, some of the factors that should be considered are: (1) His age, especially with
reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his
mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life
(and criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his
proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial and his
attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the
crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts
certain grave crimes — this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for
analogous crimes). In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first,
toward his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and second, his
relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors. The State is concerned
not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal
acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to individualize the
administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore known in these Islands. With the
foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention
of the Legislature. (Matalam v. People, G.R. No. G.R. Nos. 221849-50, April 04, 2016, Leonen,
J.)
How to determine the maximum and minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence.
Crimes punished under the RPC, the maximum term shall be taken in the penalty that can be
properly imposed under the RPC considering the attending circumstances. The minimum penalty
shall be taken within any period of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law.
For offenses punished under special laws, the maximum term shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the said law.

Application of the Indeterminate Sentence of Law in cases where the prescribed

penalty is life imprisonment. Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 provides that the penalty for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs is imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or
more but less than ten (10) grams of x x x methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu". Since
appellant was found to have been in illegal possession of 5.921 grams of shabu, appellant should
have been meted the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
life imprisonment and a fine ranging from P400,000.00 to P500,000.00. As such, the penalty of
twenty (20) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to thirty (30) years, as maximum, and a fine of

What prescribed penalty is. The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general
prescription for the felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is
what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC, the
prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day
to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying
circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the
penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the
"imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a
single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually imposed" on a
convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve (People v. Beth Temporada, G.R. No. 173473,
December 17, 2008, Ynares-Santiago, En Banc). Note: For purposes of computing the
indeterminate sentence law, the basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty and
not the impossable penalty. According to the Supreme Court: The determination of the
"minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the
extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the
factors and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum
penalty within the ascertained limits (People v. Beth Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December
17, 2008, Ynares-Santiago, En Banc).

Illustrations

Supposed the crime committed is homicide, where the prescribed penalty is reclusion
temporal.

Fixing the indeterminate sentence, will require the fixing of the minimum sentence
which must be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, prision mayor. The
indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision Mayor in any of its period to Reclusion Temporal in its proper period.

Remember the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are considered only in the
maximum term.

Supposed the crime is only frustrated homicide

Lower the penalty for homicide by one degree first in accordance with the rule on
determining the penalty for frustrated crimes. Thus, the prescribed penalty will be prision
mayor.

Then fix the indeterminate sentence, following the procedure in the first illustration.

The indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision Correccional in any of its period to Prision Mayor in its proper period.

Supposed the crime is a complex crime of homicide with direct assault

Considering Art. 48 provides that the penalty for complex crime must be the penalty for

The indeterminate sentence must take into consideration also the prescription of Article
48 to fix the penalty in its maximum period, thus the indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision mayor maximum period in any of its period to Reclusion Temporal maximum in
its proper period.

Indeterminate sentence for Robbery in an Inhabited House without any modifying

circumstances. Section 79 of R .A . No. 10951 provides: SEC. 79. Article 299 of the same Act.
as amended by Republic Act No. 18, is hereby further amended to read as follows: ART. 299.
Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. -Any armed
person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to
religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken
shall exceed Fifty thousand pesos (PS0,000). and if -(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or
building in which the robbery was committed, by any of the following means: xxxx xxxx 2. By
breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window. When the offenders do not
carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (PS0,000) the
penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. The same rule shall be applied when the offenders
are armed, but the value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (PS0,000).
When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken docs not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (PS0,000), they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two (2) next preceding
paragraphs, in its minimum period.

xxx

There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the Robbery in an

Inhabited House, Bansilan should be meted an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
which shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor in its minimum period, ranging
from six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven (7) years and four (4) months. On
the other hand, the minimum term, under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall be
"within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The
penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without regard to any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
minimum penalty can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. Accordingly, the minimum term
of the penalty in the case at bench shall be taken from the entirety of prision correccional,
ranging from six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day to six ( 6) years, which is the penalty next
lower in degree to the prescribed penalty of prision mayor. It may be argued that the
minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in its maximum period, which ranges
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one ( 1) day to six ( 6) years, inasmuch as the same is
one degree lower to prision mayor in its minimum period. This proposition, however, is
incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the deliberate design of the legislature in. Section 79 of R.A.
No. 10951 is to prescribed a lower penalty against unarmed robbers vis-a-vis robbers who are
armed. To take then the minimum term from prision correccional in its maximum period will
possibly create an absurd situation wherein the minimum term of the penalty against the unarmed
robbers is much higher than that against armed robbers considering that in case of the latter
offenders, the minimum term is anywhere within the range of prision correccional (6 months and
1 day to 6 years). Indeed, a ridiculous situation will arise if the courts impose the penalty of four
( 4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, against robbers who are not armed
while imposing only the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, against anned

Civil Liability Arising from Crimes

Dual nature of crimes. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character:
(a) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (b) as an
offense against private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason,
rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the
offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person
injured by the crime) (Nuguid v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 150785, September 15, 2006, Corona, J.).

Damages arising from crimes. When death results from the commission of a crime, the
heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual
or compensatory damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d)
exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances
(People v. Parba, G.R. No. 214506, October 19, 2015, 773 SCRA 83, 93).

Civil liability in spite of acquittal. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability
in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist (Abellana v. People, G.R. No. 174654, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 683, 689).

Effect of death on the civil aspect of criminal cases. The death of an accused pending
appeal extinguished not only his criminal liability but also his civil liability arising from the
crime he committed. The civil action instituted for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action (People v. Layag, G.R.
No. 214875, October 17, 2016; People v. Antido, G.R. No. 208651, March 14, 2018).

a) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,] based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

b) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the
civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission namely: (1) Law; (2)
Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; and (4) Quasi-delicts.

c) Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and

d) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. (People v. Robles, G.R.
No. 229943, July 10, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J.; People v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166,
June 5, 2017, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

No civil liability if dismissal of estafa case was based on the fact that the transaction
between the parties is civil in nature. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded if there is no
act or omission punished by law which can serve as the source of obligation. Any civil liability
arising from the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex contractu. It does not pertain to the
civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case (Dy v. People, G.R. No. G.R. No. 189081,
August 10, 2016, Jardeleza, J.).

Accused was convicted of libel for which she was imposed fine and directed to pay
complainant the amount of P3,000,000.00 as moral damages. She questioned the propriety
of P3,000,000.00 moral damages. Is the award proper? No. the Court finds the award of
P3,000,000.00 as moral damages to be unwarranted. Such exorbitant amount is contrary to the
essence of moral damages, which is simply a reasonable recompense to the injury suffered by
the one claiming it. It was neither meant to punish the offender nor enrich the offended party.
Thus, to conform with the present circumstances, the moral damages awarded should be
equitably reduced to P500,000.00 (Visitacion v. People, G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018,
Martires, J.).

Liability of parents for the civil liability ex-delicto of a child-in-conflict with the law.
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Rules Regarding Civil Liability in Certain
Cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of
article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivisions 1,
2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and
by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor
shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law. (CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019,
Caguioa, J.)

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2023 Jurists Pre-Bar Notes On Criminal Law 1

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2023 Jurists Pre-Bar Notes On Criminal Law 1

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

Mala inse and Mala Prohibita Crimes

Intentional and Non-intentional Felonies

There are two types of criminal intent

Specific criminal intent. Certain crimes require--in addition to general intent--an

Falsification of Public Documents is an intentional crime. Settled is the rule that

Accused and the complaining witness executed a Memorandum of Agreement in

Functional immunity. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a

Interpretation of Penal Statutes

Factual Impossibility. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

Distinctions between attempted or frustrated felonies and impossible crimes.

Consummated robbery. In robbery, there must be an unlawful taking or

Consummated sale of illegal drugs. In actions involving the illegal sale of

Community of criminal design as essence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two

Conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy must

Receipt of ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in kidnapping for ransom.

Only convincing evidence is required to establish elements of self-defense. It must be

Discernment. Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the

Suspension of sentence reiterated. Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant

Service of sentence in an agricultural camp by minors should be for the duration of

Remember the following principles from the Juvenile Justice Act:

Release of children below 15 years of age. Under Sec. 20 of RA 9344, children

Before an accused may be exempted from criminal responsibility on the ground of

Compulsion of irresistible force

Analogous mitigating circumstances

Restitution as analogous mitigating circumstance. Although restitution is akin to

Schizophrenia as mitigating circumstance. Although schizophrenia is not exempting if

Abuse of superior strength

Facts constituting aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information.

Use of motor vehicle

Rules on the appreciation of mitigating and aggravating circumstances

(1) Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable

The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the

Distinction between conspirators and accomplices. Conspirators and accomplices

Requisites. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following

Criminal liability of second spouse in bigamy. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B.

Corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body, foundation or substance of a crime. It

An accused charged as a principal may be convicted as an accessory only.

Special complex crimes

A continued (continues or continuing crime) is a single crime consisting of a series of

Simultaneous service of sentence

Application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the Indeterminate Sentence

Application of the Indeterminate Sentence of Law in cases where the prescribed

Supposed the crime is only frustrated homicide

The indeterminate sentence shall be:

Supposed the crime is a complex crime of homicide with direct assault

Indeterminate sentence for Robbery in an Inhabited House without any modifying

There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the Robbery in an

Civil Liability Arising from Crimes

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