14 Claimant 0800 Final 12072006
14 Claimant 0800 Final 12072006
CLAIMANT RESPONDENT
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................4
III. PARAGRAPH 34 OF THE CONTRACT CALLS FOR ARBITRATION UNDER THE ARBITRATION
RULES OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ATTACHED TO THE
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY OF ROMANIA. ..................................................................8
A. The parties agreed to institutional arbitration.......................................................................................... 9
B. The parties agreed to institutional arbitration under the Romanian Rules. ...................................... 10
C. The parties agreed to institutional arbitration administered by the Court of International
Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Romania. .......... 11
IV. THE PARTIES’ DISPUTE FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND
IS ARBITRABLE. ...................................................................................................................................12
A. The dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement............................................................. 12
B. The Claim is arbitrable............................................................................................................................... 12
i
A. The Boards were not of the quality and description required by the Contract................................ 13
1. Respondent was bound by the notes on the Drawings. ................................................................................14
a. Respondent knew or could not have been unaware of Claimant’s intent to incorporate the notes on the Drawings....14
b. A reasonable person in Respondent’s position would have understood Claimant’s intent. ........................................15
2. Respondent failed to deliver Fuse Boards containing Chat JP fuses...........................................................16
a. The Contract did not require fuses directly from the maker Chat............................................................................16
b. Respondent should have been aware that the distinction between JP and JS fuses was important. ............................17
3. Respondent failed to deliver fuse boards lockable to Equalec requirements.............................................18
a. The Contract required fuse boards lockable to Equalec requirements. .....................................................................18
b. The Contract incorporated Equalec’s connection requirements to the extent that they were pre-requisites for locking the
Fuse Boards. .....................................................................................................................................................19
B. The Fuse Boards were not fit for a particular purpose made known to Respondent..................... 20
1. Claimant made known the particular purpose of connecting to Equalec’s grid........................................20
2. Claimant relied on Respondent’s skill and judgment. ....................................................................................21
3. Claimant’s reliance was reasonable. ...................................................................................................................21
II. THE CONTRACT WAS NOT MODIFIED TO PERMIT DELIVERY OF JS FUSES. ............................22
A. The 14 July 2005 phone call did not modify the Contract. ................................................................. 22
B. Respondent did not reasonably rely on the 14 July 2005 phone call. ................................................ 23
1. Hart did not have actual authority to modify the Contract...........................................................................23
2. Respondent could not reasonably have believed Hart to have the authority to modify the Contract. .24
B. Respondent could reasonably be expected to have taken the lack of complaint into account
beforehand................................................................................................................................................... 28
1. The parties did not explicitly agree to exonerate Respondent’s failure.......................................................29
2. The parties implicitly understood performance would be required despite an impediment...................29
3. Respondent could reasonably have anticipated the fuse policy beforehand. .............................................29
C. Respondent could reasonably be expected to have overcome Claimant’s lack of complaint or its
ii
consequences............................................................................................................................................... 30
1. Respondent itself could reasonably have complained to the Commission. ...............................................30
2. Respondent could reasonably have provided timely substitute goods........................................................30
D. Respondent is fully liable for its failure to give timely notice under Art. 79(4) CISG. ................... 31
1. Respondent was obliged to give specific and timely notice of any impediment to its ability to perform
from Claimant’s lack of complaint.....................................................................................................................31
2. Respondent failed to give specific or timely notice of impediment.............................................................32
E. The scope of Art. 79 CISG precludes the application of external hardship principles. ................. 32
II. RESPONDENT IS NOT EXCUSED UNDER ART. 80 CISG BECAUSE NO PART OF ITS FAILURE
WAS CAUSED BY CLAIMANT. ............................................................................................................33
III. COMPLAINT TO THE COMMISSION WAS NOT REQUIRED AS A MITIGATION MEASURE UNDER
ART. 77 CISG. ....................................................................................................................................34
iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
iv
Mfg. Manufacturing
Neth. Netherlands
No. Number
NY Convention United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of 7 June 1959
OGH Oberster Gerichthof [Supreme Court—Austria]
OLG Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal—Germany and Austria]
¶ / ¶¶ paragraph / paragraphs
Para. paragraph
PRC People’s Republic of China
Pty. Ltd. Proprietary Limited
Re. Respondent
RCCP Romanian Code of Civil Procedure
Rep. Report
Romanian Rules Rules of Arbitration of the Court of International Commercial Arbitration
attached to the Chamber of Commerce of Romania
Rus. Russia
§ Section
SBGH Schweizerisches Bundesgericht [Federal Supreme Court—Switzerland]
S.A. Société Anonyme [France]
SpA Societate per Azioni [Italy]
S.r.l. Societate a Responsabilitate Limitata [Italy]
S.D.N.Y. Southern District of New York [Federal District Court—USA]
Switz. Switzerland
Swiss Rules Swiss Rules of International Arbitration
U.K. United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNCITRAL UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985
Model Law
UNIDROIT International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
UNIDROIT UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts of 1984
Principles
UNIDROIT UNIDROIT Arbitration Rules
Rules
USA United States of America
$ United States Dollars
v. versus [against]
Vol. Volume
v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Bianca, Cesare COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, THE 1980 VIENNA
Massimo and SALES CONVENTION
Bonell, Michael Milan: Giuffrè, 1987
Joachim (eds.) cited as: Bianca/Bonell
Bishop, R. Doak “A Practical Guide for Drafting International Arbitration Clauses,” available
at: <http://kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop9.pdf>
cited as: Bishop
vi
Bund, Jennifer M. “Force Majeure Clauses: Drafting Advice for the CISG Practitioner”
17 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE 381 (1998)
cited as: Bund
Cavalieros, “Note: Sentence arbitrale du 18 avril 2000 dans l’affaire CCI no. VB/99130
Phillippe rendue à Budapest”
REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE (4-2002), pp. 1020-33
cited as : Cavalieros
CISG Advisory CISG Advisory Council Opinion no. 2, “Examination of the Goods and
Council Notice of Non-Conformity: Articles 38 and 39,” 7 June 2004
cited as: CISG-AC2
DiMatteo, Larry A. “The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen
et al. Years of CISG Jurisprudence,”
34 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS (Winter
2004) 299-440
cited as: DiMatteo04
vii
Eiselen, Sieg REMARKS ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS MAY BE USED TO INTERPRET OR
SUPPLEMENT ARTICLE 29 OF THE CISG 2002
cited as: Eiselen
Electric Utility “Wisconsin Electric pays $25.2-Million in settlement of electric injury case,”
Week 30 Mar. 1992
cited as: Electric Utility Week
Enderlein, Fritz “Rights and Obligations of the Seller under the UN Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” in INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES (eds. Petar Šarčević & Paul Volken)
New York: Oceana Publications, 1996
cited as: Enderlein96
Ferrari, Franco “Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano
(Italy), 12 July 2000,”
REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME (2001-1) 203-15
cited as: Ferrari01
Ferrari, Franco THE 1980 UNIFORM SALES LAW: OLD ISSUES REVISITED IN THE LIGHT OF
(ed.) RECENT EXPERIENCES
Milan: A. Giuffrè ; Sellier : European Law Publishers, 2003
cited as: author in Ferrari03
Flambouras, “Remarks on the Manner in Which the PECL may be Used to Interpret or
Dionysios P. Supplement Article 79 CISG” (May 2002)
available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/anno-art-79.html>
cited as: Flambouras02
viii
Friedland, Paul “The Relevance of International Standards in the Enforcement of Arbitration
and Hornick, Agreements under the New York Convention,”
Robert 6 AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1995) 149-90
cited as: Friedland/Hornick
Hillman, Robert Article 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
A. International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal Effect of
“No Oral Modification” Clauses
21 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOUrnal (1988) 449-466
cited as: Hillman
Honnold, John UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION, 3d ed.
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999
cited as: Honnold
Hyland, R. “Conformity Of Goods To The Contract Under The United Nations Sales
Convention And The Uniform Commercial Code”
in SCHLECHTRIEM, P., EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALS
OBLIGATIONENRECHT: REFERATE UND DISKUSSIONEN DER FACHTAGUNG
EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT
Freiburg i. Breisgau (16./ 17. February 1987) 305-41
cited as: Hyland/Freiburg
ix
Jenkins, Sarah "Exemption for Nonperformance: UCC, CISG, UNIDROIT Principles -- A
Howard Comparative Assessment,"
72 TULANE LAW REVIEw (1998) 2015-2030
cited as: Jenkins
Lookofsky, Joseph UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE
and Bernstein, 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
Herbert INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 2nd ed.
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004
cited as: Lookofsky04
National “Material Price Increases: Strategies For Recovery And Protection,” 21 Oct.
Electrical 2005
Contractors available at:
Association <http://www.necanet.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&ARTICLEID=2
393>
cited as: NESA
x
Neumayer, Karl CONVENTION DE VIENNE SUR LES CONTRATS DE VENTE
and Catherine INTERNATIONALE DE MERCHANDISES: COMMENTAIRE
Ming Lausanne: CEDIDAC 1993
cited as: Neumayer
Nicholas, Barry Nicholas, Barry in Galston, Nina M. and Hans Smit (eds.), INTERNATIONAL
SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
New York: Matthew Bender, 1984
cited as: Nicholas84
Perillo, Joseph M. “Force Majeure and Hardship under the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts” in CONTRATACIÓN INTERNACIONAL.
COMENTARIOS A LOS PRINCIPIOS SOBRE LOS CONTRATOS COMERCIALES
INTERNACIONALES DEL UNIDROIT
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México—Universidad Panamericana
(1998) 111-32
cited as: Perillo
xi
Scalbert, Hugues “La Clause d’Arbitrage Pathologique,”
and Marville, REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE (1-1998) 117-36
Laurent cited as: Scalbert/Marville
Schäfer, Friederike “Commentary on whether and the extent to which the UNIDROIT
Principles may be used to help interpret Article 80 of the CISG” (July 2004)
available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/anno-art-80.html
cited as: Schäfer
Shihata, Ibrahim THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN
JURISDICTION: COMPÉTENCE DE LA COMPÉTENCE
The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965
cited as: Shihata
Stoll, Hans and in Schlechtriem, Peter and Ingeborg Schwenzer (eds.), COMMENTARY ON
Gruber, Martin THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG),
2nd ed.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005
cited as: Stoll/Gruber
xii
Tallon, Denis in Bianca, Cesare Massimo and Michael Joachim Bonell (eds.), COMMENTARY
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES
CONVENTION
Milan: Giuffrè, 1987
cited as: Tallon
Tunc, André “Commentaire sur les Conventions de La Haye du ler juillet 1964 sur la
Vente internationale des objets mobiliers corporels et la Formation du
contrat de vente” in Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands (ed.), DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE ON THE UNIFICATION OF LAW GOVERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (THE HAGUE, 2-25 APR. 1964) - RECORDS
AND DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE, VOL. 1 – RECORDS
The Hague (Government) (1966) 355-91
cited as: Tunc
Utter, Robert F. “Judicial Review in the New Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some
and Lundsgaard, Thoughts from a Comparative Perspective,”
David C. 54 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL (Summer 1993) 559-607
cited as: Utter
xiii
Zeller, Bruno DAMAGES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 2005
cited as: Zeller
xiv
INDEX OF CASES
Austria Landesgericht [District Court] Salzburg 2 Feb. 2005 (Hydraulic crane case)
cited as: LG Salzburg 2 Feb. 2005 (Aus.)
Bulgaria Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Arbitration Award case No.
56/1995 of 24 Apr. 1996
cited as: Arb. No. 56/1995 (Bulg.)
Canada Globe Union Industrial Corp. v. G.A.P. Marketing Corp (British Columbia
Supreme Court, 18 Nov. 1994)
cited as: CLOUT Case 114 (Can.)
xv
Caito Roger v. Société française de factoring, Cour d'appel [Appellate Court]
Grenoble 13 Sept. 1995 (CLOUT case No. 202)
cited as: Caito (Fr.)
Landgericht [State Court] Aachen 14 May 1993 (43 O 136/92; CLOUT case No.
47)
cited as: LG Aachen 14 May 1993 (Ger.)
xvi
Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe 1987
cited as: OLG Karlsruhe 1987 (Ger.)
Hong Kong Lucky-Goldstar International (H.K.) Ltd. v. Ng Moo Kee Engineering Ltd.,
(CLOUT Case 57: High Court of Hong Kong (Kaplan J.), 5 May 1993)
cited as: Lucky-Goldstar (H.K.)
Italy Bielloni Castello S.p.A. v. EGO S.A., Corte di Appello di Milano, 11 Dec. 1998
cited as: Bielloni (Ita.)
Tribunale Civile [District Court] Monza 14 Jan. 1993 (R.G. 4267/88; CLOUT
case. No. 54)
cited as: TC Monza 14 Jan. 1993 (Ita.)
xvii
Thermo King (Fr.); TD 15 Jan. 1998
cited as: Thermo King (Switz.)
United Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v. Noblee & Thorl GmbH (1962) Appeal Cases 93,
Kingdom House of Lords
cited as: Tsakiroglou (U.K.)
Fowler v. Merril Lynch (June 10 1982) High Court, Queen's Bench Division
(Commercial Court)
cited as: Fowler v. Merril Lynch (U.K.)
United States I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Brothers, 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981)
cited as: I.T.A.D. Associates (USA)
Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.1975)
cited as: Georgia Power (USA)
Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359
(N.D. Ill. 1990)
cited as: Zechman v. Merrill Lynch (USA)
Samson Resources Co v. Int’l Business Partners, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 624 (N.D.
Okla. 1995)
cited as: Samson Resources (USA)
Lark Int., David L. Threkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. 923 F.2d 245, 248
(2d Cir 1991)
cited as: Lark, Threkeld & Co. (USA)
xviii
Pepsico Inc v. Oficina de Asesoria y Ayuda Tecmica Ca, 945 F. Supp. 69 (SDNY
1996).
cited as: Pepsico Inc (USA)
Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179
N.E. 383 (1932)
cited as: Canadian Industrial (USA)
Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 642 F.Supp. 1155, 1156-57 (N.D.
Ill. 1986)
cited as: Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc. (USA)
xix
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Equatoriana Office Space Ltd. (“Claimant”) is a property developer incorporated and based in
Equatoriana [Statement of Claim ¶1]. For a development in Mountain View, Equatoriana, Claimant
required five primary distribution fuse boards (“the Fuse Boards”) to connect the development to
the electrical grid of the only local supplier, Equalec [Statement of Claim ¶5; Clar. Q. 31]. Claimant
prepared detailed engineering drawings for the Fuse Boards (“the Drawings”) based on comments
from Equatoriana Switchboards Ltd. (“Switchboards”) [Statement of Claim ¶9]. The Drawings
specified that the fuses were to be “Chat Electronics JP type,” that is, JP type fuses made by Chat
Electronics (“Chat”), and that the Fuse Boards were “to be lockable to Equalec requirements” [id.].
Switchboards quoted a price of US$180,000 for the Fuse Boards [Statement of Claim ¶10].
In search of a lower price, Herbert Konkler, Claimant’s Purchasing Director, contacted Peter Stiles,
Sales Manager for Mediterraneo Electrodynamics S.A. (“Respondent”), on 22 Apr. 2005 [Re. Ex.
1]. Claimant asked Respondent, who has specialized in the fabrication and distribution of electrical
equipment for over forty years [Answer 2; Re. Ex. 1], whether it could fabricate the Fuse Boards.
Respondent replied, “we would certainly be able to do it,” but requested the Drawings before
quoting a price [Re. Ex. 1]. After Respondent reviewed the Drawings, the parties agreed to a price
of US$168,000, and concluded a written contract (“the Contract”) on 12 May 2005 [Cl. Ex. 1]. The
Contract stated that the Drawings “are attached and made part of the contract” [id.] and that
“amendments…must be in writing” [id. ¶32]. It also included an arbitration clause. Initially,
Respondent offered its standard arbitration clause, calling for institutional “arbitration at the
Mediterraneo International Arbitration Center” [Answer ¶5; Re. Ex. 1]. Claimant, however,
substituted its own clause, which required disputes to be “settled by the International Arbitration
Rules used in Bucharest” [Cl. Ex. 1 ¶34]. Respondent acknowledges that it “did not object to its
inclusion” [Answer ¶5; Re. Ex. 1].
Sometime that spring, Respondent ran out of Chat JP fuses [Re. Ex. 1]. Respondent tried to order
the Chat JP fuses it needed to fulfill the Contract but learned that Chat could not deliver Chat JP
fuses until at least mid-August due to production problems [id.]. On 14 July 2005, Stiles attempted
to contact Konkler, who had exclusively handled the negotiations [Re. Ex. 1; Cl. Ex. 2]. Konkler
was away on a business trip [Cl. Ex. 3]. Stiles spoke instead with Steven Hart, an employee in
Claimant’s Purchasing Department. Stiles said that delivery of the Fuse Boards would be delayed
until “early September at the earliest” [Re. Ex. 1], and that the only “three possible actions” were to
wait for Chat to deliver JP fuses, use a different brand of JP fuses or use Chat JS type fuses [Re. Ex.
1
1]. Hart replied that it was not possible to wait for Chat to fix its problems since the development
had an occupancy deadline of 1 Oct. 2005, and the Fuse Boards were required to connect to
Equalec’s electrical grid in order to allow occupancy [id.]. Hart said that Claimant preferred Chat
equipment [Cl. Ex. 2], but that he himself was “not very well versed” in electrical goods [Re. Ex. 1].
Hart sought Stiles’ recommendation. Stiles explained that JS fuses are larger than JP, so that “once
one type is installed it cannot be replaced by the other” [id.], and that only JS fuses are available at
ratings of more than 400 amps [Re. Ex. 1; Re. Ex. 2]. As the fuses here were all less than 400 amps
[Statement of Claim ¶9; Re. Ex. 1; Clar. Q. 27], Stiles assured Hart that “it really did not matter which
type was used,” but that Respondent needed to know “promptly” [Re. Ex. 1]. Stiles suggested using
Chat JS fuses as the “better solution” [Cl. Ex. 2]. Hart said that that “was probably the best way to
proceed” [id.]. Neither party ever submitted a written amendment request [id.].
The Fuse Boards, using Chat JS fuses, were delivered on 22 Aug. 2005 and installed on 1 Sept. 2005
[Statement of Claim ¶14]. The Fuse Boards could not be properly inspected until they were connected
[Clar. Q. 32]. On 8 Sept. 2005, Equalec personnel refused to make the electrical connection
[Statement of Claim ¶14]. Claimant immediately complained to Equalec [Cl. Ex. 3]. Equalec explained
that it had adopted a policy (“the Fuse Policy”) in July 2003 of connecting to JS fuse boards only
for loads greater than 400 amps, to reduce the safety risk of improperly rated fuses [Cl. Ex. 4].
The next morning, Claimant demanded that Respondent provide conforming goods [Cl. Ex. 3; Re.
Ex. 1], but Respondent stated that it “might be several months yet” before it could deliver [Re. Ex.
1]. As Respondent already knew, an electrical connection for the Fuse Boards was essential to
meeting the development’s impending occupancy deadline of 1 Oct. 2005; otherwise, Claimant
risked significant penalties and lost profits [Re. Ex. 1; Statement of Claim ¶16]. Respondent suggested
complaining to Equalec or the Equatoriana Electrical Regulatory Commission (“the
Commission”), but Claimant had already complained to Equalec to no avail, and there was not
enough time to start a Commission proceeding [Re. Ex. 1]. Claimant informed Respondent of its
intent to find another supplier and to hold Respondent liable for its costs [Cl. Ex. 3; Re. Ex. 1].
Within three weeks, Claimant removed the original Fuse Boards to install substitutes from
Switchboards, paying US$180,000 for the substitutes and US$20,000 for installation [Cl. Ex. 3;
Statement of Claim ¶18]. On 15 Aug. 2006, Claimant submitted this dispute (“the Claim”) to the
Court of International Commercial Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry
of Romania, located in Bucharest [Notice of Arbitration].
2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
3
ARGUMENT
PART ONE. THE TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION.
1. The Tribunal has jurisdiction over Claimant’s claim. Generally, an arbitral tribunal may assume
jurisdiction over a claim when it determines that a valid arbitration clause exists. According to the
kompetenz-kompetenz principle, it is generally recognized that the tribunal itself is empowered to make
this determination. This Tribunal is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction (I). Moreover, the
Tribunal should determine that a valid arbitration agreement exists (II) and that the parties agreed to
the application of the Romanian Rules (III). Finally, the Tribunal should find that the claim falls
within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement and is arbitrable (IV).
3. Even if the Romanian Rules did not apply to this arbitration, a determination by the Tribunal of its
own jurisdiction is in keeping with established practice in international arbitration [Gaillard/Savage
213; Redfern/Hunter ¶¶5-39 to 5-44; see Rule 4(6) of the ICC Rules; see Art. 21 of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules; see Art. 23 of the LCIA Rules]. Indeed, where an arbitration agreement fails expressly
to provide for such authority, it is generally accepted that the authority exists as an inherent power
of the arbitral tribunal [Redfern/Hunter ¶5-38 (the power of the arbitral tribunal “to investigate its own
jurisdiction…is a power inherent in the appointment of an arbitral tribunal”); Shihata 47; Arfazadeh 46-8].
4. Additionally, the Tribunal may look to the law of the arbitral situs [Redfern/Hunter ¶¶2-10, 2-14; Born
84; see also ICC Case No. 5294; Derains/Schwartz 200; Gaillard/Savage 254]. Here the parties chose to
site their arbitration in Danubia, which has adopted the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law in its entirety
without amendment [Statement of Claim ¶21]. The above-referenced kompetenz-kompetenz principle is
codified in Art. 16 of Danubia’s Arbitration Law, which states that an arbitral tribunal may “rule on
its own jurisdiction, including any objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration
4
agreement.” Determinations by arbitral tribunals under identical provisions of the UNCITRAL
Model Law have repeatedly been upheld by national courts reviewing such awards [see, e.g., CLOUT
Case 114 (Can.), CLOUT Case 403 (Rus.), CLOUT Case 27 (Arg.)]. There is no reason to believe that
Danubian courts would rule otherwise.
II. THE TRIBUNAL SHOULD FIND THAT THE PARTIES CONCLUDED A VALID ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT.
5. The arbitration agreement concluded by the parties in Para. 34 of the Contract is both valid and
enforceable. Art. II of the New York Convention governs the formation of the arbitration
agreement (A). Para. 34 of the Contract is an arbitration agreement under Art. II(1) of the New
York Convention (B) and is legally valid under Art. II(3) of the New York Convention (C).
A. The arbitration agreement is within the scope of Article II of the New York
Convention.
6. The Tribunal should apply the standards in the New York Convention because those standards are
the ones that national courts look to, in the absence of other applicable law, in deciding whether to
compel arbitration and to recognize and enforce awards. The standards articulated in Art. II are the
threshold requirements for a determination that a valid arbitration agreement exists. The New York
Convention is directly applicable because Equatoriana, Mediterraneo, and Danubia are all parties to
it [Clar. Q. 1, Statement of Claim ¶21; Statement of Claim ¶2]. Therefore, the parochial nuances of
national law are not relevant to a threshold determination of whether a valid arbitration agreement
exists, so long as the requirements of Art. II of the New York Convention are satisfied [van den Berg
123, 282-4; Friedland/Hornick 149-60]. In international commercial arbitration, tribunals often look
to Art. II of the New York Convention because an arbitration agreement in conformity with the
requirements of Art. II ensures that any award will not be refused enforcement for reasons of ex ante
invalidity [van den Berg 177; Gaillard/Savage 124; Redfern/Hunter 10-25; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 159; Born
168; see also ICC Case No. 6149].
5
8. Both Claimant and Respondent agreed to submit disputes “arising out of or in connection with” the
Contract to arbitration [Cl. Ex. 1 ¶34]. It is common ground that the parties intended to submit
their dispute to arbitration [see Answer ¶15]. The contract originally prepared by Respondent
contained an arbitration clause calling for arbitration at the Mediterraneo International Arbitral
Center [Re. Ex. 1]. In its counter-offer (ultimately accepted by Respondent and reflected by the
Contract), Claimant replaced Respondent’s arbitration clause with the one providing this Tribunal
with jurisdiction. Respondent acknowledges that it “did not object to its inclusion” [Answer ¶15.].
6
that cannot be realized or where the terms of an arbitration agreement are so vague, indefinite, or
internally contradictory that the Tribunal cannot ascertain the parties’ intent [Born 160; Corte di
Appello, Salerno 31 Dec. 1990 (Ita.); Wilson v. Lignotock (USA); Fowler v. Merril Lynch (U.K.)]. Such
clauses are commonly referred to as “pathological” [Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 154; see also Eisemann 129
(origin of the term “clause d’arbitrage pathologique”)].
13. Tribunals and courts have found arbitration clauses to be pathological in the following
circumstances: 1) equivocation as to whether binding arbitration is intended; 2) designation of an
arbitrator who is deceased or refuses to participate; 3) designation of an arbitral institution that does
not exist or refuses to organize an arbitration; 4) conditions specified by the parties cannot be met
by the arbitrators; and 5) the agreement specifically provides for procedures that are mutually
exclusive or indiscernible [Bishop 18-19; see also Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 154-9; Davis 367-8, 378]. Even a
pathological clause will be upheld, however, as long as the court or the tribunal can discern and give
effect to the parties’ intent [Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 156-7; Gaillard/Savage 264]. Respondent alleges only
that the arbitration agreement fails to indicate clearly the applicable rules of procedure and/or an
arbitral institution and therefore is so unclear as to be a “nullity” [Proc. Ord. No. 1 ¶4]. This
argument fails.
14. As will be discussed below (see infra ¶¶16-28) the arbitration agreement is not so ambiguous or vague
as to be pathological. The arbitration clause is valid because the parties unequivocally agreed to
submit disputes “arising out of or in connection with” the Contract to arbitration [Cl. Ex. 1¶34].
Never during the negotiations did the parties consider submitting their dispute to an alternative
forum. Moreover, the procedures chosen by the parties do not render the agreement invalid. As
will be discussed below (see infra ¶¶16-28), the parties’ intent to arbitrate under the Romanian Rules
and under the aegis of the Court of International Commercial Arbitration attached to the CCI of
Romania is discernable and should be given effect.
15. Moreover, if the Tribunal were to find that the arbitration agreement is so ambiguous or vague as to
be pathological, it should nevertheless give expression to the parties’ intent by curing the ambiguity
[Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 156-7; Gaillard/Savage 264-6; Davis 378]. Ambiguities in the wording of an
arbitration agreement are usually not fatal (see infra ¶¶16-28). Where, as is the case here, it is clear
that both parties intended to submit their dispute to arbitration, the Tribunal should interpret the
agreement in a manner that favors validity and respects the parties’ intent [Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 155;
(when clauses “show clearly that the parties intended to submit their disputes to arbitration…courts and tribunals are
7
reluctant to consider these clauses void for uncertainty.”); Gaillard/Savage 264].
III. PARAGRAPH 34 OF THE CONTRACT CALLS FOR ARBITRATION UNDER THE ARBITRATION
RULES OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ATTACHED TO
THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY OF ROMANIA.
16. The Tribunal should respect the parties’ intent to submit their dispute to institutional arbitration at
the Court of International Commercial Arbitration attached to the CCI of Romania. The New York
Convention favors party autonomy and places strong emphasis on the interpretation of party intent
[van den Berg 282; Broches ¶3; Gaillard/Savage 125]. Tribunals and courts dealing with contested (and
allegedly pathological) clauses similar to the one before this Tribunal generally seek to uphold the
parties’ intent to arbitrate and interpret the clauses so as to render them effective [Gaillard/Savage
262-3; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 155-6]. This Tribunal should do the same.
17. Where a party has alleged that the terms of an arbitration agreement are ambiguous, ascertaining the
parties’ intent requires the Tribunal to consider the following factors: whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate, whether they intended institutional or ad hoc arbitration, and where and under which rules
the arbitration should take place [see, e.g. Geneva CCI, Case No. 193, Interim Award of 21 Oct.2002
(Switz.); Partial Award in ICC Case No. 7920, 1993; OLG Hamm, 27 Sep. 2005 (Ger.); see also Born 185-9;
Scalbert/Marville 118-9, 128-9; Gaillard/Savage 264]. Evidence of such intent can be found in both the
language of the arbitration agreement and in the surrounding circumstances [Gaillard/Savage 262-3;
Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 155-6].
18. Once a tribunal has established that the parties intended arbitration, it will give effect to that intent
by construing the language of the clause broadly [see, e.g. Lucky-Goldstar (H.K.) (reference to a non-existent
institution and rules disregarded by J. Kaplan and ad hoc arbitration instituted, in order “to give effect to the clear
intention of the parties [to arbitrate].”); Laboratorios Grossman (USA) (no clear designation of an arbitral
institution or procedural rules, but a dominant purpose by the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration; the court
cured the agreement and directed arbitration before the “most appropriate” tribunal in the circumstances.)]. A broad
construction of an arbitral clause will look to the geographical specifications included in the parties’
agreement in order to choose between ad hoc and institutional arbitration and to determine the
institution and rules most likely intended by the parties. For example, in Lucky-Goldstar, the tribunal
held a clause providing for arbitration in a “third country” under non-existent rules (those of the
International Commercial Arbitration Association) to commit the parties to ad hoc arbitration
[Lucky-Goldstar (H.K.)]. By contrast, where the agreement included specific geographical indications,
such as “Tribunal de la Seine” [Craig/Park/Paulsson 159 n.4] or “Court of Arbitration of Budapest,
8
Hungary” [Cavalieros 1022-5], arbitrators and courts have referred the parties to arbitration before a
tribunal most clearly linked to that geographical location. Arbitral clauses have not been given effect
only in those instances where the parties explicitly designated a non-existent or non-inferable
institution [see, e.g. Scalbert/Marville 128; Gaillard/Savage 264-8; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 155-9)].
19. In this case, both the language and the circumstances indicate that the parties not only agreed to
institutional arbitration (A), but also to institutional arbitration under the Romanian Rules (B),
administered by the Court of International Commercial Arbitration attached to the CCI of Romania
(C).
22. Not only does the text of the parties’ agreement indicate that institutional arbitration was intended,
but it is also reasonable to presume that the parties wished to avail themselves of the benefits of
9
institutional arbitration. Institutional arbitration offers, among other benefits, advantages such as
the security of established procedural rules and professional supervision of the proceedings, recourse
to independent review and revision of the award, greater certainty with regard to costs, and a body
of practice and commentary to inform the resolution of complex issues that may arise
[Redfern/Hunter ¶¶1-101 to 1-102; Born 12]. This reasonable presumption in favor of institutional
arbitration, in combination with the language of the arbitration agreement and the circumstances
surrounding its formation, indicates that the parties intended institutional arbitration in this case.
24. The term “the International Arbitration Rules used in Bucharest” also indicates party intent to select
the rules most closely associated with Bucharest and constitutes an attempt to distinguish the rather
ambiguously-named “Arbitration Rules” from similar procedural frameworks. As noted above (see
infra ¶17), tribunals have relied on the geographic location specified by the parties to determine party
intent to arbitrate under the rules most commonly associated with that geographical location [see, e.g.,
Preliminary Award of 25 Nov. 1994, Zurich CC (Switz.) (“international trade arbitration organization in
Zurich” interpreted as Zurich Chamber of Commerce International Arbitration Rules); ICC Case No. 5103
(reference to Paris Chamber of Commerce interpreted as reference to ICC)); see also Gaillard/Savage 262-3;
Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 156 (where designation of the institution under the rules of which an arbitration should take
place was unclear, “the reference to a particular city…allowed the courts to identify the chosen institution.”)]. There
10
is no other organization in Bucharest that conducts international commercial arbitrations [Clar. Q.
10]. The CCI of Romania most often organizes arbitrations according to the Romanian Rules [Clar.
Q. 12]; in fact, the letter of 28 Aug. 2006 from the Court of International Commercial Arbitration to
Respondent refers to the Romanian Rules as “our rules” [Letter to Re., 28. Aug. 2006, p.16]. No
procedural rules other than the Romanian Rules satisfy the parties’ express requirements that the
rules be specific to international commercial arbitration and have a particular attachment to
Bucharest.
25. Respondent incorrectly alleges that the arbitration agreement is ambiguous because “International
Arbitration Rules” could mean either the Romanian Rules themselves or allow for the operation of
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules [Art. 72(2) Romanian Rules]. This interpretation is circular and, if
accepted, would endanger the viability of the Romanian Rules themselves. While Art. 72(2) does
provide that the parties are “free to decide either for these Rules, or for other rules of arbitral
procedure,” it goes on to say that, “in case the parties have opted for UNCITRAL Rules of
Arbitration, the Arbitrator Appointing Authority shall be the President of the Court of International
Commercial Arbitration.” Thus, the drafters of the Romanian Rules anticipated that if parties
intended arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules in Romania, they should so designate in the
arbitration agreement. In fact, Art. 5 of the Romanian Rules specifies that, where organization of
the arbitration has been entrusted to the Romanian Court of International Commercial Arbitration,
the Romanian Rules apply by default. Art. 72(2) simply codifies the freedom of parties to agree to
an institutional arbitration organized by the CCI of Romania but not subject to the Romanian Rules.
The parties did not designate the UNCITRAL rules in this case. Moreover, these rules are almost
never used by tribunals organized by the CCI of Romania [Clar. Q. 12].
27. Courts have refused to compel arbitration where an arbitration agreement refers specifically to a
11
non-existent institution, e.g. the “CCI of Utopia” [see infra ¶17; see furthermore Scalbert/Marville 119;
Astra Footwear (USA); Bayerisches Oberstes LG, 28 Feb. 2000 (Ger.)]. However, where the agreement
permits an interpretation that accords with both party intent and logic, the agreement should be
construed in favor of arbitration at the institution that best effectuates the parties’ intent
[Gaillard/Savage 262-3; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 155-6; see also Cour de Cassation, 14 Dec. 1983 (Fr.) (Belgrade
Chamber of Commerce interpreted as Foreign Trade Arbitration Court at the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia)].
An agreement stating no more than “arbitration: Hamburg, West Germany” was interpreted by the
Arbitration Court of the German Coffee Association as conferring jurisdiction based on its
reference to a geographical location and party intent expressed outside the agreement. This award
was recognized by a German court [Hanseatisches OLG (Hamburg), 24 Jan. 2003 (Ger.)]. In the present
case, the arbitration agreement not only designated a geographical location, but a set of rules specific
to that location, i.e. the International Arbitration Rules.
28. In sum, both the language of the arbitration agreement and the surrounding circumstances indicate
that the parties agreed to institutional arbitration under the Romanian Rules administered by the
Court of International Commercial Arbitration at the CCI of Romania.
IV. THE PARTIES’ DISPUTE FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
AND IS ARBITRABLE.
29. Not only is the parties’ agreement to arbitrate valid and sufficiently specific in designating an arbitral
institution and a set of procedural rules, but the scope of the agreement is broad enough to
encompass the issue in dispute (A) and the Claim is arbitrable (B), both as required by Art. II(1) of
the New York Convention.
12
York Convention in Art. II(1), dealing with validity, and Art. V(2)(a), dealing with recognition and
enforcement of awards. Both articles require that the subject matter of the arbitration be “capable
of settlement by arbitration” in connection with the formation of a valid arbitration agreement [van
den Berg 152-4; Born 243]. Typically, tribunals have found that claims dealing with “anti-trust and
competition, securities transactions, insolvency, intellectual property rights, illegality and fraud,
bribery and corruption, and investments in natural resources” are incapable of settlement by
arbitration, although even these claims are being increasingly recognized as arbitrable
[Lew/Mistelis/Kröll 201; Gaillard/Savage 339-42]. The subject-matter of the present dispute, a breach
of contract claim for delivery of non-conforming goods, does not fall within any of these categories.
32. Respondent may argue that the Tribunal would be required to consider the legality of Equalec’s
refusal to connect the JS Fuse Boards, and that, therefore, the claim is not arbitrable. This, however,
does not present an obstacle to arbitrability. The legality of Equalec’s Fuse Policy under ESRA has
no effect on the parties’ obligations to each other (see supra ¶70).
A. The Boards were not of the quality and description required by the Contract.
35. Respondent breached the Contract because it did not provide goods of the required quality and
description. Under Art. 35(1) CISG, the seller must deliver goods that are of the “quantity, quality
and description required by the contract.” In other words, parties must comply with the terms of
their contract [Bianca in Biance-Bonell 271; Honnold 254; Lookofsky 90; Sacovini (Fr.); LG Paderborn 25
13
June 1996 (Ger.)]. The seller must respect the particularities of each sale and do all that is necessary
to make the goods usable and conform to the parties’ agreement [Neumayer 275-6]. The agreement
between the parties is the primary source for assessing conformity [Henschel §c, citing UNCITRAL
Secretariat Commentary, UNIDROIT Principle 7.1.1 and PECL Art. 8:101; see also Kritzer 282; Schwenzer in
Schlechtriem98 276]. Once the buyer has made the claim of non-conformity, the burden of proving
conformity shifts to the seller [Schlechtriem05 481]. Respondent cannot meet this burden. The
Contract required Respondent to deliver “five primary distribution fuse boards” [Cl. Ex. 1]. The
quality and description of the Fuse Boards were defined by expressly incorporating the Drawings
[id.]. The descriptive notes on the Drawings thereby became binding terms of the Contract under
Art. 8 CISG (1) and obligated Respondent to deliver fuse boards that contained Chat JP fuses (2)
and that were “lockable to Equalec requirements” (3).
14
were an integral and necessary part of the Drawings. The quality and description of the Fuse Boards
could not be complete without them. These notes specified both that the fuses were to be “Chat
Electronics JP type” and that the Fuse Boards were “to be lockable to Equalec requirements”
[Statement of Claim ¶9]. After Respondent had depleted its inventory of Chat JP fuses, it attempted to
order the Chat JP fuses that it “would need to fulfill the contract” with Claimant [Re. Ex. 1].
Respondent admitted, “engineering drawings…attached to the contract indicated that the
fuses…were to be Chat Electronics JP type fuses” [id.]. If a change of fuse type was merely a
“minor adjustment…made all the time” [id.], Respondent had no reason to contact Claimant on 14
July 2005 [Cl. Ex. 2; Re. Ex. 1].
38. Even if Respondent was not actually aware of Claimant’s intent, it “could not have been unaware”
of it. This standard is met when the intent was expressed clearly enough to be apparent without
further inquiry, i.e. “facts that are before the eyes of one who can see” [Honnold 260; LG Kassel 15
Feb. 1996 (Ger.)]. Claimant’s intent was literally “before the eyes” of Respondent in the form of two
plain notes on the Drawings. Understanding them did not require further investigation or even
significant effort on the part of Respondent.
40. Respondent’s skill and experience implied strict adherence to specifications. Respondent has been a
specialist in the fabrication and distribution of electrical equipment for over forty years [Answer ¶2;
Re. Ex. 1]. It is well aware that Fuse boards are “fabricated to meet the specific requirements of
each customer” based on “detailed engineering drawings” [Fuse Boards “need to be specially fabricated,”
Re. Ex. 1; see also Statement of Claim ¶9]. Such highly customized goods demand exacting adherence to
15
the specifications or, otherwise, fabricators risk creating useless goods of marginal resale value. The
Fuse Boards here are a good example. Their residual value was essentially that of the constituent
fuses [Clar. Q. 34]. There were 300 to 450 fuses in the Fuse Boards [Statement of Claim ¶¶5-6]. All the
fuses were Chat JS type at ratings of 100 to 250 amps [Re. Ex. 1; Clar. Q. 27] with a retail price of
US$37.05 each [Re. Ex. 2]. Assuming the fuses could be resold for retail price, the residual value for
the Fuse Boards was US$11,115 to $16,672.50—at most, less than one-tenth of the $168,000
Contract price [Cl. Ex. 1].
41. Respondent was required to strictly adhere to specifications as a trade usage of the electrical
industry. In addition to the relevance of usages in determining reasonableness under Art. 8(2), Art.
9(2) CISG directly applies a “usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type
involved in the particular trade concerned” [see also Honnold 128-9]. The technical handbook of a
major global distributor, for example, states that an “electrical contractor’s proposal shall be based
upon the fuses specified…as called for in the specification or on the drawings” [Bussmann 177]. The
“type, class and manufacturer specified” of parts are vital to electrical design [id.]. Respondent knew
or ought to have known of this usage as an experienced fabricator of customized fuse boards (see
supra ¶40) and as a frequent exporter [“We have often supplied…to customers in Equatoriana,” Re. Ex. 1].
42. Whether by the subjective test of Art. 8(1) or the objective test of Art. 8(2), the conduct of the
parties and the circumstances show that the Contract incorporated the notes on the Drawings. The
Contract thus obligated Respondent to deliver Fuse Boards containing Chat JP fuses and lockable to
Equalec requirements. Respondent failed to do either.
a. The Contract did not require fuses directly from the maker Chat.
44. There was no contractual requirement that Respondent had to directly obtain the fuses from the
maker Chat by any interpretation under Art. 8 CISG. Parties cannot be held to a purely subjective
intent if it was not expressed or not expressed clearly [Schlechtriem05 421]. The Contract required
Chat JP fuses [Statement of Claim ¶9], but the fuses did not need to come directly from the
16
manufacturer, Chat. There is no hint of such a requirement in the record. In the 14 July 2005 call,
for example, Hart stated that there was a “preference in the firm for Chat Electronics equipment”
[Cl. Ex. 2]. Even if he had “seemed to insist” [Re. Ex. 1], there was no mention that fuses had to be
directly from Chat. In fact, the circumstances point to an implicit understanding that Respondent
was free to obtain Chat JP fuses from Chat or secondary sources. The record shows that Chat fuses
were generally available from at least three suppliers: Chat, Respondent, and Switchboards [Cl. Ex.
3; Re. Ex. 1]. In all likelihood, there were significantly more suppliers than this because of Chat’s
reputation for quality [Clar. Q. 26]. Respondent also knew that Claimant faced tight time pressures
[Re. Ex. 1]. In these circumstances, restricting where Respondent could obtain Chat fuses could not
have been in the interests of either party nor served any reasonable purpose. There is no evidence,
for example, that the Chat fuses from Switchboards were inferior in any way. There is no evidence
that either party considered or ever had reason to favor restricting the source of Chat fuses. Even if
Respondent had intended that the fuses must come directly from Chat, this intent falls far short of
either subjective or objective intent under Art. 8.
b. Respondent should have been aware that the distinction between JP and JS
fuses was important.
45. JP type fuses differ significantly from JS type fuses in safety and economic risks. Contrary to
Respondent’s assertions that a change of fuse type is a “minor adjustment” and that “it really did not
matter which type was used” [Re. Ex. 1], the “type, class and manufacturer specified” of parts are
vital to electrical design [Bussmann 177]. A JP fuse fixing center is 82mm, while that of a JS fuse is
92mm [Re. Ex. 2]. “[O]nce one type is installed it cannot be replaced by the other” [Re. Ex. 1], short
of replacing the entire fuse board at significant time and expense [Cl. Ex. 3; Statement of Claim ¶18].
Only JS fuses are available at ratings more than 400 amps [Re. Ex. 1; Re. Ex. 2]. In the context of
the Fuse Boards, where all the fuses were intended to be less than 400 amps [Statement of Claim ¶9;
Re. Ex. 1; Clar. Q. 27], there is a significant safety difference in fuse types. Unlike JP fuses, JS fuses
pose the safety risk that fuses at ratings more than 400 amps could be inadvertently or illegitimately
used [Cl. Ex. 3; Cl. Ex. 4]. This risk is both in initial installation and in any subsequent replacement
of the fuses. Whenever a fuse blows in a primary distribution fuse board, for example, Equalec is
responsible for replacing it [Statement of Claim ¶6]. Even if the likelihood of improperly rated fuses is
small, the safety and economic consequences are substantial. A properly rated fuse is a safety valve
that keeps the flow of current at safe levels [Wright/Gordon; Bussmann 1]. A fuse rated at 100 amps,
for example, lets through current of up to 100 amps [Bussmann 1,3]. When the current exceeds 100
17
amps, the fuse melts, breaking the circuit and preventing the power surge from damaging the rest of
the circuit and any connected equipment [id.]. Putting an 800 amp fuse, for example, in a circuit
designed for 100 amps, would allow currents of up to 800 amps to pass through. Such overcurrents
could cause equipment damage, fires, blackouts, and severe monetary losses, if not injury or death
[Lohbeck; Bussmann 1]. It was because of such risks that Equalec adopted its Fuse Policy in July 2003,
requiring JP fuses in circuits rated less than 400 amps [Cl. Ex. 2; Cl. Ex. 3]. Respondent’s delivery
of Fuse Boards with JS rather than JP fuses was far from a “minor change;” it implied substantial
safety and economic risks in breach of the Contract.
48. Respondent was obliged to meet Equalec requirements despite the fact that Equalec's policies only
apply in Equatoriana. If a seller has been informed of the country in which the goods will be used,
18
the seller must “accommodate the characteristics required for the actual use of the goods in this
country” [Schwenzer in Schlechtriem05 420; see also Honnold 256]. In one case, for example, the court
ruled that a seller of cheeses, in dealing with the buyer for several months, must have known that the
cheese was destined for the buyer's country and was thereby bound to meet the marketing
regulations of the buyer's country [Caito (Fr.)]. Similarly here, from the day that Respondent
received the Drawings around 4 May 2005, through months of dealing with Claimant, Respondent
must have known that it was bound to observe Equalec requirements in the country of Equatoriana
(see supra ¶37). Respondent was expressly aware of where the Fuse Boards were to be used even
before the conclusion of the Contract (see infra ¶53). The only use of the Fuse Boards was for
connecting the Mountain View development to Equalec's electrical grid. Equalec's requirements
were "characteristics required" for such use. Respondent was then obliged to deliver Fuse Boards
meeting Equalec's requirements.
50. Regardless, Respondent neither asked for clarification of the Equalec note on the Drawings nor
indicated that it had not understood it. Where one party finds the other party’s expressed intent
vague or ambiguous, it should inquire as to its meaning [Junge in Schlectriem98 71; Neumeyer 114].
Consistent with the trade usage that electrical contractors strictly adhere to specifications (see supra
¶41), the Equalec note at least put Respondent on notice that Equalec’s requirements were relevant
to the Contract. In the circumstances, especially given Respondent’s skill and experience (see supra
¶40) as well as its knowledge of Claimant’s tight time pressures [Re. Ex. 1], the note would have
19
prompted a reasonable party to investigate by accessing the Equalec website [Clar. Q. 24], consulting
with Equalec, knowledgeable suppliers or industry groups, or, at least, by requesting clarification
from Claimant itself.
51. Respondent was bound to observe Equalec’s connection requirements in so far as they were pre-
requisites for Equalec to lock the Fuse Boards. Equalec’s refusal to connect and lock the Fuse
Boards on 8 Sept. 2005 [Statement of Claim ¶14] shows that the Fuse Policy was such a pre-requisite,
giving independent grounds for Respondent’s breach.
B. The Fuse Boards were not fit for a particular purpose made known to
Respondent.
52. Even if the Fuse Boards were of the quality and description required by the Contract under Art.
35(1) CISG, they were not fit for the particular purpose of connecting Mountain View Office Park
to Equalec’s electrical grid. Goods do not conform to the original contract under Art 35(2)(b) when
they are not “fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the
time of the conclusion of the contract.” This means that regardless of the express terms of the
Contract, the goods should fulfill any particular purpose communicated to the seller [Schwenzer in
Schlechtriem05 421; Neumayer 278; Bianca in Bianca/Bonell B 275; Marques (Fr.), cited in Lookofsky 93].
However, Art. 35(2)(b) provides an exception where “the circumstances show that the buyer did not
rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgement” [see also Bianca in
Bianca/Bonell 274; Schlechtriem in Galston/Smit 6-20; Lookofsky 92; Henschel §m; Helsinki CA (Fin.)].
Claimant expressly or impliedly made known to Respondent the particular purpose of connecting to
Equalec’s electrical grid (1). Claimant relied on Respondent’s skill and judgment (2) and this reliance
was reasonable (3).
20
an electrical grid. The Fuse Boards were not merchantable to any other buyer or for any other
purpose, given their highly customized nature [Re. Ex. 1; Statement of Claim ¶9] and minimal residual
value (see supra ¶40). One court has held that such a total lack of merchantability implies that the
goods are not fit even for ordinary use under Art. 35(1) CISG [Arb. Case No. 2319 (Neth.), cited in
DiMatteo04 397-8]. From the first call on 22 Apr. 2005, Respondent knew that the Fuse Boards were
for a project in Mountain View [Re. Ex. 1]. Together with the notes on the Drawings, Respondent
knew that the Fuse Boards were to connect the development to the electrical grid of Equalec, the
sole power supplier in the area [Clar. Q. 31]. Expressly or impliedly, Claimant made known to
Respondent the particular purpose of connecting to Equalec’s electrical grid.
21
knowledge” [Schlechtriem05 422; see also Bianca in Bianca/Bonell 276]. Respondent is an experienced
specialist with particular knowledge of electrical equipment [Answer 2; Re. Ex. 1], implying much
greater knowledge of primary distribution fuse boards than Claimant. Claimant reasonably relied on
Respondent’s skill and judgment to provide fuse boards that would be fit for the particular purpose
of connecting to Equalec’s electrical grid.
56. The Fuse Boards delivered by Respondent were neither of the quality and description required by
the Contract under Art. 35(1) CISG nor fit for a particular purpose made known to Respondent
under Art. 35(2)(b). Art. 36 CISG provides that the “seller is liable in accordance with the contract
and this Convention for any non-conformity which exists at the time when the risk passes to the
buyer, even though the non-conformity only becomes apparent after that time” [see also
Enderlein/Maskow 149]. Respondent is therefore fully liable for its breach of contract to Claimant.
A. The 14 July 2005 phone call did not modify the Contract.
58. The 14 July 2005 conversation did not amend the Contract to permit Respondent to provide JS
instead of JP fuses. The Contract itself and the applicable substantive law governing its
interpretation do not allow for oral modifications. According to Art. 29(2) CISG, “a contract in
writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or termination by agreement to be in
writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated by agreement.” The purpose of Art. 29(2) is
to protect the intent of the parties, ensure clarity of obligations, and prevent any confusion during
performance by rendering oral modifications void where the parties have prescribed formalities
[Schlechtriem05 333; Eislen (d); Hillman 449]. Here, Respondent and Claimant agreed to just such a
protective measure. Para. 32 of the Contract reads: “Amendments to the contract must be in
writing” [Cl. Ex. 1]. Consequently, regardless of any oral statements made during the 14 July 2005
conversation, any modification of the Contract had to be in writing. Since there was no writing, the
Contract was never modified to allow delivery of JS fuses.
59. In accordance with the terms of the Contract, which includes this no-oral-modification term,
Claimant had a policy requiring that any proposed modifications to a contract be submitted for
22
review and “circulated to all interested persons…including the engineering department” [Cl. Ex. 2].
Therefore, had Respondent submitted a written proposal for a contractual modification for JS
instead of JP Fuses, Claimant’s engineers would have noted the substitution and, accordingly,
reviewed the conformity of the modification with Equalec’s Fuse Policy. Claimant’s losses could
have been avoided or diminished. However, because Respondent proceeded to deliver non-
conforming goods without submitting the change in writing, Claimant never had an opportunity to
perform this review.
60. Respondent may argue that Art. 29(2) CISG does not apply because it uses the word “modification,”
while Para. 32 of the Contract uses “amendment,” but these two words are not different in this
context. “Where it has been agreed that writing is necessary to modify or terminate a contract, 29(2)
requires all such amendments to comply with the formal requirements agreed.” [Schlechtriem05 331-2].
According to this wording, “amendment” includes both modifications and terminations. Thus, the
14 July 2005 phone call did not—because it could not—“modify,” “amend,” or “terminate” any
term of the Contract as written and agreed to on 12 May 2005.
B. Respondent did not reasonably rely on the 14 July 2005 phone call.
61. Respondent cannot raise the defense that it reasonably relied on Claimant’s oral conduct. Under
the second sentence of Art. 29(2) CISG, “a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting [a
no-oral-modification clause] to the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct.” For a
breaching party to invoke the second sentence of Art. 29(2) CISG, the reliance must have been
reasonable under the circumstances [Eiselen §i; Hillman 459; Enderlein/Maskow 124]. The nature of
the contract and the circumstances of the case are relevant factors to take into consideration when
assessing reasonableness [Eiselen §j; Kritzer 126; Vilus]. It was unreasonable in this transaction for a
sophisticated party like Respondent (see supra ¶40) to rely on the oral statements of an employee with
neither actual (1) nor apparent (2) authority under domestic law or the Convention on Agency
[Enderlein/Maskow 123]. No other conduct is relevant to the validity of the amendment.
23
agent [Schlechtriem05 332; OLG Karlsruhe 1987 (Ger.); HG Zürich 1998 (Switz.)]. Here Konkler is the
principal and Hart his agent. Since this representation occurred in Equatoriana, Equatoriana law
governs. Equatoriana has adopted the Convention on Agency as its national law [Clar. Q. ¶16].
According to Art. 14(1) thereof, “[w]here an agent acts without authority or acts outside the scope
of his authority, his acts do not bind the principal.” Hart did not have the authority to change the
type of fuses since he had “no responsibility for the contract with Mediterraneo Electrodynamics”
[Clar. Q. ¶17]. While Hart did have the authority to sign contracts limited to US$250,000, he did not
have any authority over this Contract, as he did not work in the area of electrical goods [Clar Q. ¶17;
Answer ¶8]. At no point did Konkler grant Hart the actual authority to modify or amend this
Contract, even during his absence. Hart was merely one “member of the Purchasing Department”
and therefore, had no actual authority to modify the Contract [Answer ¶7].
2. Respondent could not reasonably have believed Hart to have the authority to modify
the Contract.
63. Konkler, the principal, did not act in any way that could reasonably cause Respondent to believe
Hart was authorized to modify the Contract. The second sentence of Art. 14 of the Convention on
Agency clarifies that “when the conduct of the principal causes the third party reasonably and in
good faith to believe that the agent has authority,” the principal cannot invoke lack of authority. [See
also USA REST 3d AGEN § 2.03 (“an agent has apparent authority where it is reasonable for a third party to
believe that an agent has authority, so long as the belief is traceable to manifestations of the principal.”) See also
CEM Freighter 2005 (Ger.) (interpreting §164(1) BGB to mean that a principal is only liable for his agent’s
actions under apparent authority when the principal could have known of and prevented such conduct)]. Konkler at
no point before, during, or after his vacation indicated or suggested to Respondent in any manner
that Hart had any authority in the transaction [Clar. Q. ¶17]. Furthermore, when Stiles called on 14
July 2005, he asked to speak to Konkler. Konkler’s secretary told Stiles that Konkler was
unavailable, but that he “could” speak to Hart, noting that Hart was merely a “procurement
professional” [Clar. Q. ¶18]. That Hart did not have authority should have been clear based on the
fact that. Konkler alone had handled all prior negotiations regarding the Contract [Cl. Ex. 2].
Indeed, Hart specifically informed Stiles that “he was not particularly knowledgeable about electrical
equipment” and that “it was not the area in which he worked” [Answer ¶ 8]. None of Konkler’s
conduct was sufficient to cloak Hart in the authority necessary to alter the Contract. Therefore, it
was unreasonable for Respondent to rely on a phone conversation with someone lacking knowledge
of the subject matter, especially given the highly technical nature of proposed change.
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64. As the Contract was not amended to permit the delivery of JS fuses, Respondent breached the
Contract and is liable to Claimant.
67. Even if exemption applies in principle to Respondent’s defective performance, Respondent is not
excused under Art. 79. No part of Respondent’s failure to perform was due to the fact that
Claimant did not also complain to the Commission (A). Even if this lack of complaint caused
Respondent’s failure to perform, Respondent could reasonably be expected to have taken it into
account beforehand (B). Respondent could reasonably be expected to have overcome the
consequences of any impediment through its own complaint or substitute goods (C). Respondent
failed to give timely notice per Art. 79(4) CISG (D). The exhaustive scope of Art. 79 precludes the
25
application of external hardship principles (E).
1. Respondent’s failure to deliver Chat JP fuses was not due to the lack of complaint.
69. There was no prospect of complaint until Equalec refused to connect the Fuse Boards on 8 Sept.
2005 [Statement of Claim ¶14; Cl. Ex. 3]. Neither party was aware of the Fuse Policy until that time
[Cl. Ex. 3; Clar. Q. 24-5]. Claimant could not have complained about a policy it was not aware of
and had no obligation to be informed of (see supra ¶52-55). Respondent delivered the non-
conforming Fuse Boards without Chat JP fuses on 22 Aug. 2005 [Statement of Claim ¶14]. As early as
14 July 2005, Respondent had committed itself to using Chat JS fuses [Re. Ex. 1]. On 9 Sept. 2005,
when Claimant demanded that Respondent provide conforming goods, Respondent objected solely
on the basis of Chat’s production problems, not because of the lack of complaint [id.]. Simply as a
matter of timing, Respondent’s failure to deliver Chat JP fuses could not have been due to the lack
of complaint or the Fuse Policy.
2. Respondent’s failure to meet Equalec’s requirements was not due to the lack of
complaint.
a. Respondent was required to meet Equalec’s requirements regardless of their
validity under Equatoriana law.
70. Respondent neither inquired into Equalec’s requirements nor objected to their incorporation into
the Contract, so it was bound to deliver fuse boards meeting those requirements (see supra ¶¶49-50).
This is so regardless of whether the Fuse Policy was valid under Equatoriana’s domestic law. The
relevant law in Equatoriana is the Electric Service Regulatory Act (“ESRA”). The ESRA only
governs the provision of electric service in Equatoriana; this Contract is not for the provision of
26
electric service.
72. The Equalec Fuse Policy was designed to prevent the use of improperly rated fuses thereby reducing
safety risks (see supra ¶45). The Fuse Policy does not obstruct or evade the requirements of the
ESRA or any safety standards of the Commission; it improves on them. There is no reason to
believe that policies such as Equalec’s would be considered “undue or unjust” under Art. 14 ESRA.
73. Claimant reasonably relied on Equalec’s justification of the Fuse Policy [Cl. Ex. 4] and the policy’s
general acceptance. “What is ‘reasonable’ can appropriately be determined by ascertaining what is
normal and acceptable in the relevant trade” [Honnold 101; see also Lando 127 ref. PECL 6:104, 6:105
and 6:106(2)]. The Fuse Policy had been in place since July 2003 without Commission challenge
[Clar. Q. 29]. Equalec insisted on its policy even after Claimant’s complaint [“Equalec had said that that
was their policy,” Re. Ex. 1] and confirmed the policy in writing by letter dated 15 Sept. 2005 [Cl. Ex.
4]. The general commercial acceptance of the Fuse Policy since its inception is strong evidence of
reasonability. Claimant acted no differently than any other firm in the trade [Clar. Q. 29]. The Fuse
Policy remains in effect today [id.].
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power in Mountain View [Clar. Q. 31]. After Equalec insisted on its Fuse Policy [Re. Ex. 1],
Claimant gave Respondent the opportunity to provide conforming goods [Statement of Claim ¶17; Cl.
Ex. 3; Re. Ex. 1]. Respondent was unwilling to promise timely delivery of conforming goods [Re.
Ex. 1 (suggesting a delivery timeframe “in several months yet”)]. As Respondent knew, an electrical
connection for the Fuse Boards was essential to meeting the development’s occupancy deadline of 1
Oct. 2005 [Re. Ex. 1; Statement of Claim ¶16]. Otherwise, Claimant risked significant penalties and
lost profits [id.]. Claimant was left with no reasonable option but to find another supplier.
75. Claimant reasonably declined to complain to the Commission. On 9 Sept. 2005, Respondent did
not mention the ESRA [Re. Ex. 1]. Even if Claimant was familiar with ESRA or had time to
investigate applicable laws, Claimant had no reasonable basis to suspect illegality (see supra ¶73). The
required time for Commission action indefinitely ranged from one week to over two years [Clar. Q.
30]. There was not enough time for Claimant to arrange representation and a properly documented
complaint to even initiate a Commission proceeding [“there was not sufficient time to start a proceeding,”
Re. Ex. 1]. Rather than running the substantial risk of greater damages, for which Respondent
would ultimately be liable, Claimant prudently limited losses and secured a connection to Equalec’s
electrical grid by promptly obtaining substitute fuse boards [Cl. Ex. 3; Statement of Claim ¶18].
28
performance would be required despite an impediment (2). Even if there was no such
understanding, Respondent could reasonably have anticipated the Fuse Policy beforehand (3).
29
(PRC)]. At the time of contracting, the obligor “must be expected to assure himself by all normal
and reasonable methods that there is no impediment to his performance” [Stoll in Schlechtriem98 609
ref. McRae (Aust.)]. The Fuse Policy, underlying any theory of exemption, had been in place since
July 2003 [Cl. Ex. 4]. A prudent businessperson in Respondent’s situation would have been aware
of the Fuse Policy through the “normal and reasonable” method of accessing the Equalec website or
by contacting knowledgeable parties (see supra ¶50).
30
greater effort to obtain Chat JP fuses. On 9 Sept. 2005, Respondent stated that it could not deliver
fuse boards with Chat JP fuses within any period better than “several months yet” because of Chat’s
production problems [Re. Ex. 1]. Though the Contract required “Chat Electronics JP type” fuses, it
did not require that the fuses come directly from Chat (see supra ¶44). Chat JP fuses were readily
available from other distributors, such as Switchboards [Statement of Claim ¶14; Cl. Ex. 3; Clar. Q. 33].
Even Claimant, which is not an industry specialist like Respondent (see supra ¶40), had no difficulty
in obtaining proper fuses [Statement of Claim ¶14; Cl. Ex. 3].
83. Even if other sources were not available or the Contract required fuses directly from Chat,
Respondent, as the seller, bears the “acquisition risk” that its supplier will not timely deliver the
goods [BGH 24 Mar. 1999 (Ger.); see also SGH Hamburg 21 Mar 1996 (Ger.); Lookofsky04 127; ICC
Case No. 8128]. In a similar case, the tribunal denied Art. 79 exemption to a seller because it should
have foreseen or overcome an emergency production stoppage at its own supplier’s plant [Arb. No.
155/1994 (Rus.)]. In another notable case, under the related doctrine of impossibility, it was
physically impossible for the contractually specified refinery to produce the required quantity.
Nonetheless, the court ruled that the seller was not excused because it had failed to show what
efforts it had made at fulfilling the contract [Canadian Industrial (US), cited in Perillo 121]. Respondent
here similarly failed to show reasonable effort at providing timely substitute goods.
D. Respondent is fully liable for its failure to give timely notice under Art. 79(4)
CISG.
84. Even if Respondent satisfies all the requirements of exemption under Art. 79(1), it must still “give
notice to the other party of the impediment and its effect on his ability to perform…within a
reasonable time” or otherwise, be held “liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt” [Art.
79(4) CISG]. Respondent was obliged to give specific and timely notice of any impediment from the
lack of complaint (1). Respondent failed to do so (2).
1. Respondent was obliged to give specific and timely notice of any impediment to its
ability to perform from Claimant’s lack of complaint.
85. The central purpose of notice requires that notice be precise. Notice under Art. 79(4) is meant “to
enable the [non-defaulting party]…to take all the steps necessary to overcome the consequences of
the failure” [Tallon 586; see also Zeller 186]. This is the same underlying policy goal as notice of non-
conformity under Art. 39(1) CISG, where courts have held that a notice of non-conformity must be
specific enough to enable the seller to take remedial steps [BGH 3 Nov. 1999 (Ger.); LG Salzburg 2
Feb. 2005 (Aus.); HB Gent 28 Jan. 2004 (Belg.); Rheinland (Italy) cited in Ferrari01 212; see also CISG-AC2
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Case Annex; Enderlein96 171-2]. The alleged impediment here is the fact that Claimant did not also
appeal to the Commission about Equalec’s refusal to connect the Fuse Boards [Proc. Order No. 1
¶11]. Mere awareness of the Fuse Policy did not reasonably alert Claimant to the need for steps
beyond what it had already taken (see supra ¶74). Any claim that the Fuse Policy itself was an
impediment is excluded in this stage of arbitration; “[o]nly those issues set out in paragraph 11 of
Procedural Order No. 1 are to be discussed” [Proc. Order No. 2].
87. Respondent is then still liable for the full amount of damages under Art. 79(4). Generally, there is a
distinction between damages that result from the failure to give notice under Art. 79(4) as opposed
to those from non-performance [Secretariat Art. 65 ¶15; Stoll/Gruber 834; Audit 176]. In this case,
however, the two are equal because the lack of notice precluded Claimant from taking steps to
alleviate the lack of complaint.
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laws, especially domestic provisions such as Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage or imprévision, would produce
greatly divergent results, contravening the uniformity mandate of Art. 7(1) CISG [Tallon 593-4;
Stoll/Gruber 807; Flambouras02 §2]. Second, gap-filling principles do not allow the introduction of
external principles here because there is no relevant gap; the CISG drafters considered the problem
of hardship and deliberately omitted it from the CISG [Honnold89 349-50; Tallon 593-4]. For both
these reasons, where the parties have chosen the CISG, courts have declined to apply outside
hardship principles [LG Aachen 14 May 1993 (Ger.); TC Monza 14 Jan. 1993 (Italy); Bielloni (Italy); see
also Winship 509-10]. Even if external principles could apply, hardship requires unforeseeable
circumstances “so severe and fundamental that the promisor cannot be held to its promise in spite
of the possibility of performance” [Jenkins 2027; see also Perillo 114-6]. The lack of complaint here is
neither exceptional nor unforeseeable (see supra ¶¶79-80).
89. Respondent can neither satisfy the necessary elements of causality, unforeseeability, unavoidability,
and notice under Art. 79, nor resort to hardship in principle or on the merits.
II. RESPONDENT IS NOT EXCUSED UNDER ART. 80 CISG BECAUSE NO PART OF ITS
FAILURE WAS CAUSED BY CLAIMANT.
90. Art. 80 CISG does not excuse Respondent because Claimant caused no part of Respondent’s failure.
Art. 80 provides: “[a] party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that
such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission.” It is a “concrete manifestation” of the
general principle of good faith that a party may not contradict its own behavior [Enderlein/Maskow
335; see also Stoll/Gruber 838; Tallon 596]. The concept of conduct under Art. 80 is broad [Schäfer
§2(a)], but the “decisive criterion” is that it was highly probable that the conduct would lead to the
failure to perform [Tallon 599]. The breach of contract must be a “characteristic consequence” of
the act [Enderlein/Maskow 337]. Where a legal act “by a completely unusual chain of cause and
effect, leads to the breach of contract, there will be no reason for exemption” [Enderlein/Maskow
338]. Claimant’s lack of complaint did not cause any part of Respondent’s failure (see supra ¶68).
Even if it had, Respondent’s failure to deliver conforming goods was not highly probable or a
“characteristic consequence.”
91. Any excuse under Art. 80 would be partial at most because Respondent contributed to the failure to
perform. If both parties to a contract have contributed to the failure to perform, Art. 80 requires an
“apportionment of the causes depending on their degree of objective causation” [Tallon 599; see also
Enderlein/Maskow 339; SGH Hamburg 21 Mar 1996 (Ger.)]. If damages are at issue, they are to be
33
allocated by the portion each party contributed to the failure [id]. Irrespective of its contractual
obligations, Respondent contributed to the failure in at least three ways: first, it failed to investigate
Equalec requirements; second, it failed to make a reasonable effort at finding other sources of Chat
JP fuses (see supra ¶74); and third, it failed to complain to the Commission (see supra ¶81). In
particular, Respondent’s failure to meet Equalec requirements and to further the contractual purpose
of connecting to Equalec’s electrical grid are both characteristic consequences of Respondent’s
neglect in investigating applicable requirements and other sources of fuses.
34
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
In light of the above submissions, Counsel respectfully request that the Tribunal find that:
• The Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the dispute between Equatoriana Office Space Ltd
and Mediterraneo Electrodynamics S.A.;
• The Fuse Boards did not conform to the Contract;
• The Contract was not amended to allow the delivery of JS fuses;
• Respondent’s liability is not excused by Claimant’s failure to complain to the Commission
about Equalec’s refusal to connect the Fuse Boards;
Consequently, Equatoriana Office Space Ltd requests the Tribunal to order Mediterraneo
Electrodynamics S.A. to pay:
• Equatoriana Office Space Ltd as damages the sum of US$200,000, calculated US$180,000 as
the cost of the replacement distribution fuse boards purchased from Equatoriana
Switchboards Ltd and US$20,000 for the cost of removing the non-conforming fuse boards
and replacing them with conforming ones;
• Interest at the prevailing market rate in Equatoriana on the said sum from the date of breach
to the date of payment; and
• All costs of arbitration, including costs incurred by the parties.
(signed)
7 December 2006
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