JUDICIAL MATERIAL

Precedent
A precedent is a statement of law found in the decision of a superior court and which is to be
followed by all courts inferior to that court. Needless to say, if each Judge was left to himself in
deciding cases, without any reference to similar cases decided in the past, the result would be
utter chaos and confusion. The law would then be uncertain and the fate of litigants would hinge
on the temperament of the Judge and his mood of the day.
Precedents are thus of the greatest importance in any system of law. As observed by Salmond, a
precedent is not merely evidence of law, but a source of the law. According to the declaratory
theory of precedent, the greatest proponent whereof was Blackstone, Judges never make the law;
they merely declare what the law is. However, this theory cannot hold good today, as Judges not
only administer and interpret the law, but also develop the law, and in the process, they do make
new law too.
The origin of the doctrine of stare decisis (that is, the binding force of precedents) can be traced
to the practice of reporting judicial decisions by law reporters. This doctrine is also recognised
by Article 141 of the Indian Constitution, which lays down that the law declared by the Supreme
Court of India shall be binding on all courts in India.
Precedents are of two kinds: authoritative and persuasive. An authoritative precedent is one
which the Judge has to follow whether he approves of it or not. It is binding upon the court and
excludes the court's judicial discretion in the matter. Thus, a judgement of the Supreme Court is
binding on all the High Courts and on all the inferior courts in India. A persuasive precedent, on
the other hand, is one which the Judge is not obliged to follow, but which he would take into
consideration and attach such weight as he deems fit. Thus, a decision of the Kerala High Court
would have only persuasive efficacy on the Bombay High Court.
Ratio decidendi and obiter dicta
Every judicial decision contains two aspects, one, a concrete decision binding on the parties, and
the other, a judicial principle which is the basis of the concrete decision. This judicial principle
which is general in nature operates as a precedent and has the force of law. The general principle
applied in a particular decision is known as the ratio decidendi (or simply, the ratio) of that case.
As pointed out by Salmond, the actual decision of the case is binding upon the parties, and is, of
course, of utmost interest to them. But, it is the abstract ratio of the case that lays down a rule or
principle of law and which is of great interest to all lawyers and Judges.
It is thus important to distinguish between what a case decides generally from what it decides
between the parties. It is only what is decided generally that constitutes the ratio decidendi or the
legal rule for which it is an authority. It is this part or aspect of the judgement that will bind other
litigants also in the future.
Obiter dicta, on the other hand, are observations of the court on matters which were not in issue
before it. These are statements made by the Judges by the way or are unwanted. In the words of
Keeton, they are statements made by a Judge in the course of a decision, arising out of the
circumstances of the case, but not necessary for the decision in that case. As obiter dicta are
statements made by the way, they generally possess persuasive efficacy only.
Three cases decided by the Supreme Court and involving matters of public importance are
discussed below, with particular reference to the guidelines laid down by the apex court in each
of these cases.
 Vishakha & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others
A.I.R. 1997 SC 301
1997 6 SCC 241
JT 1997 (7) SC 384

This Writ Petition, which was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court (namely,
the then Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice J. S. Verma, Justice (Mrs.) Sujata V. Manohar and Mr.
Justice B. N. Kirpal), was filed as a class action by some social activists and NGOS
(Non-Governmental Organisations), with the aim of focusing attention towards growing
incidents of sexual harassment and to find suitable methods for realisation of a true concept of
"gender equality". It also aimed at preventing sexual harassment of working women in work
places by laying down certain guidelines in the matter.
Although the immediate cause for filing this Petition was the gangrape of a social worker in a
village in Rajasthan, the judgement in this case sought to redress the violation of the rights of
working women under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India, which, in the words of
the court, had become "a recurring phenomenon". By giving the necessary directions, the court
has endeavoured to ensure "a safe working environment for women." After hearing all the parties
at length, the Court was of the view that there was an immediate need to lay down some
guidelines for the protection of the rights of working women to fill the "legislative vacuum" in
this regard in India.
The Court observed that the fundamental right to carry on any trade, business or profession
(under Art. 19 of the Indian Constitution) depends on the availability of a safe working
environment. Likewise the right to life guaranteed by the Constitution means a right to live with
dignity. Now, the primary responsibility for ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable
legislation and means for its enforcement is of the legislature and the executive. However,
instances of sexual harassment are on the rise and the resentment towards such incidents is also
increasing. The Supreme Court was, therefore, of the opinion that until appropriate law on this
aspect is enacted, some guidelines were needed for the protection of such rights. The Court was
also of the view that international conventions and norms could be relied upon to give a proper
shape to the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India, which
embodies the basics of gender equality in all spheres of human activity.
In the above background, the Supreme Court observed as under:
"In the absence of enacted law to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic
human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse, more
particularly against sexual harassment at work places, we lay down the guidelines and
norms specified hereinafter for due observance at all work places or other institutions
until a legislation is enacted for this purpose."
Taking note of the fact that the present civil and penal laws in India do not adequately provide
for specific protection of women from sexual harassment at work places and that the enactment
of such legislation would take considerable time, the Supreme Court laid down the following
Guidelines, directing that they would be strictly observed in all work places for the preservation
and enforcement of the right to gender equality of working women. The Court also called upon
the Central Government and State Governments to consider appropriate legislation to ensure that
these Guidelines are also observed by employers in the private sector. It was further clarified that
these Guidelines would not prejudice any rights available under the Protection of Human Rights
Act, 1993.
1. Duty of Employer or other responsible persons in workplaces and other institutions
It shall be the duty of the employer or other responsible persons in work places or other
institutions to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to
provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual
harassment by taking all required steps.
2. Definition of "sexual harassment"
For the purpose of these Guidelines, sexual harassment includes such unwelcome
sexually determined behaviour, whether directly or by implication, as:
a. physical contact and advances;
b. a demand or request for sexual favours;
c. sexually coloured remarks;
d. showing pornography;
e. any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature.
3. Preventive steps
All employers or persons in charge of the work place, whether in the public or private
sector, should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment. Without prejudice to
generality of this obligation, they should take the following steps:
(a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment, as defined above, at the work place
should be notified, published and circulated in appropriate ways.
(b) The rules and regulations of Government and Public Sector bodies relating to
conduct and discipline should include rules and regulations prohibiting sexual
harassment and provide for appropriate penalties against the offender.
(c) As regards private employers, steps should be taken to include the aforesaid
prohibitions in the standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946.
(d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work, leisure,
health and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile environment towards
women at work places and no woman employee should have reasonable grounds
to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection with her employment.
4. Criminal Proceedings
Where such conduct amounts to a specific offence under the Indian Penal Code or under
any other law, the employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by
making a complaint with the appropriate authorities.
In particular, it should be ensured that victims or witnesses are not victimised or
discriminated against while dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. The victims of
sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own
transfer.
5. Disciplinary action
Where such conduct amounts to misconduct in employment as defined by the relevant
service rules, appropriate disciplinary action should be initiated by the employer in
accordance with those rules.
6. Complaint mechanism
Whether or not such conduct constitutes an offence under law or a breach of Service
Rules, an appropriate complaint mechanism should be created in the employer's
 organisation for redress of the complaint made by the victim. Such a complaint
mechanism should ensure time-bound disposal of the complaints.
7. Complaints Committee
The complaint mechanism, referred to in clause 6 above, should be adequate to provide,
where necessary, a Complaints Committee, a Special Counsellor or other support service,
including the maintenance of confidentiality.
The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and not less than half of its
members should be women. Further, to prevent the possibility of any undue pressure or
influence from senior levels, the Complaints Committee should involve a third party,
either NGO or other body which is familiar with issues of sexual harassment.
The Complaints Committee must make an Annual Report to the concerned Government
Department regarding the complaints and action taken in the matter.
8. Workers' initiative
Employees should be allowed to raise issues of sexual harassment at workers' meetings
and in any other appropriate forum and it should be affirmatively discussed in
employer-employee meetings.
9. Awareness
Awareness of the rights of female employees in this regard should be created, in
particular, by prominently notifying the guidelines (and appropriate legislation, when
enacted on the subject) in a suitable manner.
10. Third party harassment
Where sexual harassment occurs as a result of an act or omission by any third party or
outsider, the employer and every person in charge should take all necessary steps to assist
the affected person in terms of support and preventive action.
 D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
AIR 1997 SC 610
(1997) (1) SCC 416
This case was decided by Justice Kuldip Singh and Justice (Dr.) A. S. Anand of the Supreme
Court on 18th December, 1996. The case dealt with custodial deaths and various forms of
custodial torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners and other persons
being questioned by the police.
Shri D. K. Basu, the Executive Chairman of Legal Aid Services, wrote a letter to the Chief
Justice of India, drawing his attention to certain news reports appearing in The Indian Express
and The Telegraph, regarding deaths in police custody and lock-ups. It was submitted that it was
imperative to develop "custody jurisprudence", and to formulate guidelines for awarding
compensation to the victim, and in case of his death, to his family members. The court was
requested to treat his letter, along with the published news items, as public interest litigation.
Considering the importance of custodial deaths, notice was issued to the State of West Bengal,
which filed its counter (that is, its written submissions or reply). It was stated therein that the
police was not hushing up any matter of deaths in lock-ups and that wherever police personnel
were responsible for custodial deaths, action was being taken against them. It was argued that the
Writ Petition was thus misconceived, misleading and untenable in law.
While this Petition was pending, another letter was received by the Chief Justice from Shri
Ashok Kumar Johri, drawing the attention of the Court to the death of Mahesh Bihari of Aligarh
in police custody. This letter was also treated as a Writ Petition and heard along with Shri Basu's
Petition.
The Court expressed its alarm at the frequency of deaths in police custody ("lock-up deaths")
reported by newspapers. It, therefore, issued notices to all the State Governments. Notice was
issued to the Law Commission of India, requesting it to make suggestions in the matter. The
Court also appointed a Senior Advocate, Dr. A. M. Singhvi, to assist the Court as amicus curiae.
Initially, the State Governments took a stand that "everything was well within their respective
States, but ultimately assisted the Supreme Court in examining various aspects of the issue and
made useful suggestions for formulation of guidelines by the Court:
(a) to minimize, if not prevent, custodial violence, that is, torture in lock-ups; and
(b) for award of compensation to the victims of custodial violence and to the kith and kin of
those who die in custody on account of such torture.
The Law Commission also submitted to the Court, a copy of its Report regarding injuries in
police custody and suggested incorporation of a new Section (Section 114-B) in the Indian
Evidence Act.
After commenting on the fact that the word "torture" has not been defined by any Indian statute,
the Supreme Court remarked that "torture" is, today, synonymous with the darker side of human
civilization. It observed that custodial torture is a naked violation of human dignity which
destroys the individual. It is a calculated assault on human dignity and whenever human dignity
is wounded. civilization takes a step backwards. What is of real concern in such cases is not only
the infliction of bodily pain, but also the mental agony which a person undergoes within the four
walls of the lock up or police station.
The Court observed that if the functionaries of the law themselves are law-breakers, it is bound
to breed contempt for the law and encourage lawlessness. Every man would tend to become a
law unto himself and this would lead to anarchism. The police is, no doubt, under a duty to arrest
a criminal and interrogate him; but the law does not allow the use of third degree methods to
torture the accused while in police custody with a view to solve the crime. As observed by the
Supreme Court, "The end cannot justify the means. No society can permit it."
In India, Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects life and personal liberty by providing
that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law". The Court observed that the expression "life or personal liberty includes the
right to live with human dignity, and thus it would also include within itself, a guarantee against
torture and assault by the State. Article 22 of the Constitution guarantees protection against arrest
and detention in certain cases, laying down the procedural requirements as well as the rights of
the person arrested. Detailed provisions are contained in the Criminal Procedure Code regarding
powers of arrest and the safeguards which are required to be followed by the police to protect the
interests of the arrested person. However, in spite of all these provisions, morning newspapers
carry. almost every day, reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and deaths in police
custody, and in the words of the Supreme Court. "Society's cry for justice becomes louder."
Eleven guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court
Before laying down the guidelines as preventive measures in this regard, the Supreme Court
made extensive references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Report of the
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (in England), the Third Report of the National Police
Commission (in India), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and several
Indian and foreign cases.
The Court then formulated the following eleven guidelines to be followed in all cases of arrest
and detention, until legal provisions are made on that behalf. The Court further directed that
failure to comply with these requirements would render the concerned Officer liable for
departmental action and such a person would also be punished for contempt of court.
1. The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee
should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags with their
designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the
arrestee must be recorded in a register.
2. The police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at
the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may be
either a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from
where the arrest is made. Such memo shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall
contain the time and date of arrest.
3. A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police
station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be entitled to have one friend or
relative or other person known to him, informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been
arrested and he is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the
memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.
4. The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the
police, where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town,
through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the Police Station of the area
concerned, telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
5. The person arrested must be made aware of his right to have someone informed of his
arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.
6. An entry must be made in the Diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the
person, which shall also disclose the name of the next friend of the person who has been
 informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose
custody the arrestee is.
7. The arrestee should, where he so requests, also be examined at the time of his arrest and
major and minor injuries, if any, present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time.
The "Inspection Memo" must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer
effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.
8. The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination every 48 hours during his
detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by the
Director, Health Services of the concerned State or Union Territory.
9. Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest referred to above should be
sent to the Magistrate for his record.
10. The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not
throughout the interrogation.
11. A Police Control Room should be provided at all district and State headquarters, where
information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee should be
communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest,
and such information should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board in the Police
Control Room.
Grant of compensation to victims of custodial torture
In every case where a man is wronged, he must have a corresponding remedy, i.e., Ubi jus ibi
remedium. When a fundamental right of a person is infringed by the State, a mere declaration of
the invalidity of an action or a finding of custodial violence or death would not be a meaningful
remedy. In the words of the Court. "To repair the wrong done and give judicial redress for the
legal injury is a compulsion of judicial conscience."
In such cases, mere punishment of the wrong-doer cannot give much solace to the victim or his
family members. Driving him to file a civil suit for damages would also be a long-drawn and
cumbersome judicial process. Therefore, monetary compensation would be a useful, and
perhaps, the only effective remedy "to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the
deceased victim, who may have been the bread-winner of the family".
The Supreme Court, therefore, examined the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 1966, as well as the observations in several Indian and English cases.
Thereafter, it came to the conclusion that pecuniary compensation would be the appropriate,
effective, and in some cases, the only suitable remedy for the infringement of a citizen's
fundamental right to life by a public servant. The State is vicariously liable for the acts of its
servants. In such cases, the claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability. The
citizen is thus entitled to compensation from the State.
Lastly, the Court observed that the quantum of compensation would depend on the peculiar facts
of each case, and no strait-jacket formula can be evolved for this purpose. However, in assessing
such compensation, the emphasis should be on the compensatory, and not the punitive element.
 M. C. Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others
&
Shriram Foods & Fertiliser Industries & Another v. Union of India & Others
AIR 1987 SC 965
(1986) 2 SCC 176
(1986) 1 SCR 312
Mr. M. C. Mehta, an Advocate and a leading consumer activist, filed a public interest litigation
where the Supreme Court had to examine the true scope and ambit of Articles 21 and 32 of the
Constitution. The Petition called upon the highest court of the land to lay down the principles
and norms for determining the liability of large enterprises engaged in the manufacture and sale
of hazardous products, the company in the present case being Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd, which runs
an enterprise in the name of Shriram Foods and Fertilisers Industries ("Shriram"). The Court also
had to consider whether such large enterprises should be allowed to continue to function in
thickly populated areas, and if yes, what measures should be taken to reduce the hazard to its
workmen and the community living in the neighbourhood, being in this case, about 2,00,000
persons within a radius of three kilometres. The 3-Member Court, consisting of Chief Justice P.
N. Bhagwati, Justice D. P. Madon and Justice G. L. Oza, had further to decide the basis on which
damages would have to be quantified if dangerous substances escape from such enterprises.
Although the Shriram plant was commissioned in 1949, until the Bhopal tragedy of Union
Carbide, neither its management nor the government appeared to have seriously considered the
hazardous character of this caustic chlorine plant. It was only pursuant to a question asked in
Parliament that the Delhi Administration appointed an Expert Committee headed by Mr.
Manmohan Singh. The Committee (the Manmohan Singh Committee) visited the plant, made an
exhaustive inquiry and submitted a Report to the Government, containing various detailed
recommendations to minimise the hazards and comply with safety and pollution control
measures.
Then, on the fateful day, the fourth of December, 1985, a major leakage of oleum gas took place
from one of the Shriram units, affecting not only its employees, but also all who lived around the
plant. It was also brought to the Court's attention that an Advocate practising in the Tis Hazari
Courts in Delhi had died by inhaling this gas. Hardly had the public got over the shock of the
disaster, when, two days later, another leakage (although a minor one, this time) took place when
the same gas leaked out again from the joints of a pipe of the plant. The immediate response of
the Delhi Administration was an Order dated 6th December, 1985, passed by the District
Magistrate, Delhi, under S. 133(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, directing Shriram to
immediately stop the manufacture and processing of hazardous and lethal chemicals and gases.
When Writ Petitions were filed in the Supreme Court, two teams of experts, one appointed by the
Court (the Nilay Choudhary Committee) and the other appointed by the Petitioner (the Agarwal
Committee) were directed to ascertain whether the recommendations of the Manmohan Singh
Committee had been carried out or not. Persons who were affected by the gas leak were also
allowed to file compensation claims before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Yet another
Committee, the Sethuraman Committee, was also appointed by the Lt. Governor of Delhi to
make an on-the-spot inspection of the plant and submit its recommendations.
All the Expert Committees were unanimous in their view that, by adopting proper and adequate
safety measures, the element of risk to the workers and the public could only be minimised but
not totally eliminated. The Committees used varying expressions to describe the inherent dangers
of such a plant, like "a worrying state of affairs", "a major hazard facility", and "a perennial
source of hazard". The Committees emphasised the danger to the persons living in the vicinity of
the plant and observed that there was considerable negligence on the part of the management of
Shriram in the maintenance and operation of the plant, as also in the structure and design thereof.
The first question before the Supreme Court was whether the hazardous plant should be directed
to be shifted and relocated at a safer place, and if so, within what time frame. Instead of seriously
considering this important question and giving a clear-cut answer, the Court preferred to make
the following observation on the point:
"This is a question which will require serious consideration and a National Policy will
have to be evolved by the the government for location of toxic or hazardous industries,
and a decision will have to be taken in regard to relocation of such industries with a view
to eliminating risk to the community likely to arise from the operation of such industries."
The second question, which the Court styled as "the immediate question", was whether the
caustic chlorine plant of Shriram should be allowed to be reopened, and if so, subject to what
conditions, keeping in mind that the operation of the plant should not involve a serious amount
of hazard or risk to the community.
Top lawyers representing the management of the company submitted that it had carried out all
the recommendations made in the reports of the Manmohan Singh Committee and Nilay
Choudhary Committee, and that, therefore, the possible risk to the workers and the persons living
in the vicinity was almost nil. It was urged that Shriram should, therefore, be allowed to reopen
its caustic chlorine plant. It was made clear that it did not intend to immediately restart the other
plants manufacturing sulphuric acid, oleum and related products. Thus, the Court was concerned
primarily with the question of whether the caustic chlorine plant could be allowed to restart
immediately and whether all the recommendations of the said two Committees in respect of that
plant were carried out by the management.
A Committee appointed by the Court confirmed that, barring the construction of a shed for filled
cylinders (which construction had begun and was to be completed at an early date), all the
recommendations of the Manmohan Singh Committee and the Nilay Choudhary Committee had
been complied with by the management. A hydraulic well as a mock drill, were also
satisfactorily carried out.
Both the Unions of the workmen urged, with equal force, that the said plant be allowed to be
restarted and that a permanent closure of the plant would mean unemployment for more than
4,000 persons.
On the other hand, the Petitioner, Mr. M. C. Mehta, who appeared in person, "vehemently and
passionately" urged that the Court should not allow the caustic chlorine plant to be restarted as
there was always an element of hazard or risk to the community at large. He urged that chlorine
is a dangerous gas, and even if utmost care is taken, the possibility of its accidental leakage could
never be ruled out.
After hearing all the parties at length, and after viewing the picture from the angles of air and
water pollution, the Court came to the conclusion, although with considerable hesitation, that it
would be in the interests of all concerned that Shriram be allowed to restart the caustic chlorine
plant, subject to certain stringent conditions (listed below), which were to be "strictly and
scrupulously followed by Shriram". It was made very clear that if any one or more of these
conditions were violated, the permission to restart the plant would be liable to be withdrawn.
Conditions imposed by the Supreme Court
The Court then laid down the following eleven conditions, which Shriram was obliged to
observe, so that the possible risk to the workmen and the community would almost be reduced to
nil.
1. An Expert Committee was appointed by the Supreme Court to monitor the operation and
maintenance of the plant and equipment. This Expert Committee would inspect the
caustic chlorine plant of Shriram at least once in a fortnight and examine whether the
recommendations made by Manmohan Singh Committee and Nilay Choudhary
Committee are being scrupulously implemented by the management.
2. One operator would be designated as personally responsible for each safety device or
measure and the Head of the Caustic Chlorine Division should be made individually
responsible for the efficient operation of such safety device or measure.
3. The Chief Inspector of Factories or any Senior Inspector duly nominated by him, would
inspect the caustic chlorine at least once in a week by paying a surprise visit plant without
any previous intimation, and examine whether the recommendations of Manmohan Singh
Committee and the Nilay Choudhary Committee are being complied with by the
management and whether the safety devices or instruments installed by the management
are operative and are properly functioning.
4. The Central Board would also depute a senior Inspector to visit the plant at least once in a
week, without any prior notice to the management, for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the effluent discharged from the plant, as also at the terminal outlet, complies
with the necessary standards.
5. The management of Shriram would obtain an undertaking from the Chairman and
Managing Director of the Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd., which is the owner of the various units
of Shriram, as also from the officer or officers who are in actual yd be management of the
caustic chlorine plant, that in case there is an escape of chlorine das resulting in death or
injury to the workmen or to the people living in the vicinity, they would be personally
responsible for payment of compensation for such death or injury.
6. There would be a Committee of three representatives of Lokahit Congress Union and
three representatives of Karamchari Ekta Union to look after the safety arrangements in
the caustic chlorine plant. The function of this Committee would be to ensure that all
safety measures are strictly observed.
7. There would be placed in each department or section of the caustic chlorine plant, as also
at the gate of the premises, a detailed chart in English and Hindi stating the effects of
chlorine gas on the human body, and informing the workmen and the people as to what
immediate treatment should be taken in case they are affected by a leakage of chlorine
gas.
8. Every worker in the caustic chlorine plant should be properly trained and instructed, by
audio-visual programmes, in regard to the functioning of the specific plant and equipment
in which he is working. He should also be educated and informed as to what precautions
should be taken in case of leakage of chlorine gas and what steps should be taken to
control and contain such leakage. Refresher courses should be conducted at least once in
6 weeks with mock trials.
9. Loudspeakers should be installed all around the factory premises for giving timely
warning and adequate instructions to the people residing in the vicinity, in case of any
leakage of chlorine gas.
 10. The management should maintain proper vigilance with a view to ensuring that workers
working in the caustic chlorine plant wear helmets, gas masks or safety belts, and regular
medical check-up of the workers should be arranged by the management in order to
ensure that the workers are in good health.
11. The management of Shriram would deposit in the Supreme Court a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs,
as and by way or security for payment of compensation claims made by or on behalf of
the victims of oleum gas. The management of Shriram would also furnish a Bank
Guarantee for a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs which would be encashed, wholly or in part, in case
there is an escape of chlorine gas within a period of three years, resulting in death or
injury to any workman or to any person living in the vicinity.
Payment of costs to the Petitioner
Considering that the Petitioner, though "lone and single", had fought "a valiant battle" against a
giant enterprise with substantial success, the Supreme Court directed Shriram to pay him a sum
of Rs. 10,000, by way of costs, "in token of our appreciation of the work done by him".