DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

(Article 36-51)

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND & NATURE

Part IV of the Constitution contains the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), which
act as fundamental principles to guide the functioning of the State in its goal of
establishing an economic and social democracy.

One of the most distinctive features of the draft constitution of India is its provisions on the
Directive Principles of State Policy. It is a general tendency after the World War I that most
of the written constitutions of modern States have provided therein some social and
economic policies.

 Section 45 of the Irish Constitution of 1937 enunciates some DPSP.

 The Constitution of China, by 33 articles, covers all fields ranging from national
defence, diplomacy, national economy, social security and education.
 The fourth chapter of the Constitution of Burma contains some principles of State
Policy.

The directive principles of state policy enunciated in part IV of the Indian Constitution are
nothing but principles of Raja Dharma (Raja Dharma includes variety of activities of kings,
including personal character and his public relations. It is a comprehensive phrase to which
no equivalent can be found in English literature).

Fundamental principles of governance mean dharma or the path of duty of the

government. Thus, these principles can be traced either to divine will or right reason. They
are equally fundamental with the fundamental rights. Article 37 specifically echoes as “the
principles laid down are fundamental in the governance of the country”.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar described Directive Principles as a “Novel Feature” of the

Constitution. They are in the nature of general directions, instructions or guidelines to the
State. Directive Principles embody the aspirations of the people, objectives and ideals which
Union and the State governments must bear in mind while making laws and formulating
policies.
The Sapru Committee Report was published in 1945. It was prepared by a committee
appointed by the Non-Party Conference in November 1944. Tej Bahadur Sapru, a well-
renowned lawyer headed the committee. The Report had a section on fundamental rights and
contained provisions that included: freedom of speech, freedom of press, religious freedom
and equality. It called for the future constitution body to precisely formulate these rights.
Interestingly, in the explanatory sections of the study, the Committee engaged with the issue
of dividing rights into justiciable (Fundamental Rights – which can be settled or enforced
by courts) and non-justiciable (DPSP – cannot be enforced by courts), though it did not
propose anything in its recommendations. It, however, alerted future drafters of the
Constitution to pay attention to this question. This was arguably the first time a constitutional
document brought up the question of justiciable and non-justiciable rights in Indian
constitutional history.

The Drafting Committee accepted the recommendation of Sir B.N. Rau, the Constitutional
advisor to the Constituent Assembly who recommended that the rights of an individual
should be divided into two categories- justiciable and non- justiciable. Hence, Fundamental
Rights which are justiciable in nature are incorporated in Part III of the Constitution and
Directive Principles which possess non- justiciable nature, are incorporated in Part – IV of
the Constitution.

There were several reasons for the framers of the Constitution to make Directive Principles
non- justiciable and legally non-enforceable –

 Unavailability of sufficient financial resources to implement them.

 The diverse nature of India and the backwardness of the country.

 India was just freed from the clutches of the British rule and would be crushed under
the burden until it was free to decide the time, place and the mode of fulfilling them.

Henceforth, the founding fathers of the Constitution believed more in an awakened public
opinion rather than in court as the ultimate sanction for the fulfilment of these principles.

FEATURES OF DPSPs:-

 Denote constitutional instructions to the State in dealing with legislative, executive,

and administrative matters.
  Serve as ideals to be kept in mind by the state while formulating policies and enacting
laws.
 Non-Justiciable: not legally enforceable by the courts for their violation and
the governments cannot be compelled to implement them.
 Aim at realizing the ideals of Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity as
envisaged in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution.
 Embody the concept of a „Welfare State‟.
 Constitute very comprehensive economic, social, and political programs that seek to
establish socio-economic democracy in the country.
 Allow for adaptation and innovation in governance to meet the objectives of socio-
economic development.

CLASSIFICATION OF DPSPs:-

SOCIALISTIC PRINCIPLES (Articles 38, 39, 39A, 41, 42, 43, 43A, 47)

Aim at providing social and economic justice and set the path towards the welfare state.

A.39: Land Ceiling Act, Bank Nationalization Act

A.42: Maternity Benefit Act

GANDHIAN PRINCIPLES (Articles 40, 43, 43B, 46, 47, 48)

Based on Gandhian ideology and used to represent programme of reconstruction enunciated

by Gandhi during the national movement.

Promotion of Cottage Industries

Minimum Wages Act

Ban on Slaughter of Cows

LIBERAL PRINCIPLES (Articles 44, 45, 48, 48A, 49, 50, 51)

Reflect the ideology of liberalism.

A.48A: Water Pollution Act, Forest Act, etc.

 DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE
POLICY

SOCIALISTIC GANDHIAN LIBERAL

38, 39, 39A, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 48A, 49, 50,
40, 43, 43B, 46, 47, 48
43, 43A, 47 51

PURPOSE OF CLASSIFICATION:-

 To point out that apart from the specific indigenous problems that the Indian society
faces the framers of the Constitution had definitely intended to introduce certain
humanitarian ideals which had been developed after centuries of adjustment in the
Western countries.
 During this long span of time these ideals had been tested and tried and emerged as
values which may be said to be purely human values irrespective of considerations
of race, language, and religion.
 The ideas of cooperative land farming, cottage industries, uniform society, separation
of executive and judiciary and democratic decentralization are all but attempts to
arrive at a working way of life which will take in the best of the old and the best of a
modern thought.

AMENDMENTS OF DPSPs:-

42nd Amendment Act, 1976

 A. 39(f): Opportunities for the healthy development of children.

 A. 39A: Equal Justice and free legal aid.
 A. 43A: Participation of workers in management of industries.
 A. 48A: Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and
wildlife.

44th Amendment Act, 1976

  A. 38(2)

86th Amendment Act, 2002

 A. 45: Provision for early childhood care and education to children below the age of 6
years.

97th Amendment Act, 2011

 A. 43B: Promotion of co-operative societies

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE

PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

The relationship between FRs and DPSPs can be understood through three possible
approaches in cases of conflict:-

 Supremacy of FRs over DPSPs

 Emphasis on the equal status of FRs and DPSPs
 Need to harmonize the two

The relationship between FRs and DPSPs arose in A.B.S.K. Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India1
in which the competence of the railway administration to reserve posts for members of the
SCs and STs was considered. Chinnappa Reddy, J., rejected as obsolete thinking that FRs
held a superior position under the Constitution than the DPSPs:

“It is now universally recognised that the difference between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
lies in this that FRs are primarily aimed at assuring political freedom to the citizens by protecting them against
excessive State action while the DPSPs are directed at securing social and economic freedoms by appropriate
State action… it becomes the duty of the Court to apply the DPSPs in interpreting the Constitution and the
laws… FRs should thus be interpreted in the light of the DPSPs and the latter should, whenever and wherever
possible, be read into the former.”

Chief Justice Chandrachud said, in delivering the majority judgment (Minerva Mills2):

“Part III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than the other. You snap one and the
other will lose its efficacy. The Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III &
IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony
and balance is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.”

1
AIR 1981 SC 298
2
AIR 1980 SC 1789
Judicial Trend:-

1. Initial Approach of the Supreme Court: Initially, the courts adopted a strict and

literal legal proposition in this respect. The Supreme Court adopting the literal

interpretative approach to Article 37 ruled that a directive principle could not override

a fundamental right, and, that in case of conflict between them fundamental right

would prevail over the directive principle.

In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan3, a Government Order in conflict with

Article 29(2), fundamental right was declared invalid, although the government did

argue that it was made in pursuance of Article 46, a directive principle. The SC

observed that: the directive principles of state policy, which by Article 37 are

expressly made unenforceable by courts cannot override the provisions found in Part

III which notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by

appropriate writs, orders or directions under Article 32. The chapter on fundamental

rights is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by legislative or executive act or

orders, except to the extent provided in the appropriate Article in Part III. The

directive principles of state policy have to conform and to run as subsidiary to the

chapter on fundamental rights. In our opinion that is the correct approach in which the

provisions found in Part III and IV have to be understood.

2. Change in Judicial Attitude: In course of time, a perceptible change came over the

judicial attitude on this question. The SC‟s view as regards the interplay of the

directive principles and fundamental rights underwent a change. The SC started

giving a good deal of value to the directive principles from a legal point of view and

started arguing for harmonizing the two- the fundamental rights and the directive

principles.

3
AIR 1951 SC 226
 In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh4, the Supreme Court relied on Article 39 in

deciding that certain Zamindari Abolition Act had been passed for a public purpose

within the meaning of Article 31. The SC came to adopt the view that: although the

directive principles, as such, were legally non-enforceable, nevertheless, while

interpreting a statute the courts look for light to the „lode star‟ of the directive

principles. In re Kerala Education Bill5, DAS, C.J., observed that “nevertheless, in

determining the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights...... the court may not

entirely ignore the directive principles of state policy laid down in Part IV of the

Constitution but should adopt the principle of harmonious construction and attempt to

give effect to both as much as possible.”

In Mohd. Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar6, a State Law which prohibits slaughter of

cows and calves and other cattle capable of work has been upheld because it was

meant to give effect to Article 48 of the Constitution. In this case a conflict was there

between Article 19(1)(g) and Article 48 of the Constitution. In Chandra Bhavan

Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore7, the SC asserted that “there is

no conflict on the whole” between the fundamental rights and the directive principles.

“They are complementary and supplementary to each other.”

In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab8, the SC emphasized that the fundamental rights

and directive principles formed an „integrated scheme‟ which was elastic enough to

respond to the changing needs of the society. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of

Kerala9, HEGDE and MUKHERJEE, JJ., observed: the fundamental rights and

directive principles “constitute the conscience of the Constitution”. There is no anti-

4
AIR 1952 SC 352
5
AIR 1958 SC 956
6
AIR 1958 SC 731
7
AIR 1970 SC 2042
8
AIR 1967 SC 1643
9
AIR 1973 SC 1461
 thesis between the fundamental rights and the directive principles...... and one

supplements the other.

In State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas10, the SC said that the directive principles and the

fundamental rights should be construed in harmony with each other and every attempt

should be made by the court to resolve any apparent inconsistency between them. In

Pathumma v. State of Kerala11, the SC has emphasized that the purpose of the

directive principles is to fix certain socio-economic goals for immediate attainment by

bringing about a non-violent social revolution. The Constitution aims at bringing

about synthesis between fundamental rights and directive principles.

In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India12, the SC observed that the fundamental

rights and directive principles together “constitute the core of commitment to social

revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the Constitution”. The

Constitution of India is founded on the bed-rock of the balance between the two. To

give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the

Constitution. This harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive

principles is an essential feature of the Basic Features of the Constitution.

In Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh13 JEEVAN REDDY, J., said that the

fundamental rights and directive principles are supplementary and complementary to

each other, and not exclusionary of each other, and that the fundamental rights are but

a means to achieve the goals indicated in the directive principles and that

“fundamental rights must be construed in the light of the directive principles.”

3. Directive Principles given status of Fundamental Rights: The integrative approach

towards fundamental rights and directive principles, or that both should be interpreted

10
AIR 1976 SC 490
11
AIR 1978 SC 771
12
AIR 1980 SC 1789
13
AIR 1993 SC 2178
 and read together, has now come to hold the field. It has now become a judicial

strategy to read fundamental rights with directive principles with a view to define the

scope and the ambit of the former. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India14, the SC has

held that the principle of equal pay for equal work [Article 39(d)] though not a

fundamental right is certainly a constitutional goal and, therefore, capable of

enforcement through constitutional remedies under Article 32.

4. Role of Article 21: By reading Article 21 with directive principles, the SC has

derived therefrom a bundle of rights.

In Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar15, the Supreme Court observed that

Article 39-A emphasizes that free legal service is an inalienable element of reasonably

fair and just procedure for, without it, a person suffering from economic or other

disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity for securing justice. The right of free

legal service is, therefore, clearly an essential ingredient of reasonably fair and just

procedure for a person accused of an offence and it must be held implicit in the

guarantee of Article 21. This is a constitutional right of every accused person who is

unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal service on account of reasons such as

poverty, indigence or incommunicado situation and the State is under a mandate to

provide a lawyer to an accused person, if the circumstances of the case and the needs

of justice so require, provided, of course, the accused person does not object to the

provision of such lawyer.

The Supreme Court in Khatri (2) v. State of Bihar16 reiterated that the right to free

legal aid is an essential ingredient of due process which is implicit in the guarantee of

Article 21 of the Constitution. In Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra17 , the

14
AIR 1982 SC 879
15
(1980) 1 SCC 98
16
(1981) 1 SCC 627
17
(1983) 2 SCC 96
 Supreme Court held that the legal assistance to a poor or indigent accused, who is

arrested and put in jeopardy of his life or personal liberty, is a constitutional

imperative mandated not only by Art. 39-A but also by Articles 14 and 21 of the

Constitution. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India18, the SC has stated that

right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the

directive principles of state policy.

Difference between FRs & DPSPs:-

18
AIR 1984 SC 802
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