Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications

P. Saskia Bayerl
Ruža Karlović
Babak Akhgar
Garik Markarian Editors

Community
Policing - A
European
Perspective
Strategies, Best Practices and Guidelines
Advanced Sciences and Technologies
for Security Applications

Series editor
Anthony J. Masys, Centre for Security Science, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Advisory Board
Gisela Bichler, California State University, San Bernardino, CA, USA
Thirimachos Bourlai, Statler College of Engineering and Mineral Resources,
Morgantown, WV, USA
Chris Johnson, University of Glasgow, UK
Panagiotis Karampelas, Hellenic Air Force Academy, Attica, Greece
Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, ON, Canada
Edward C. Morse, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
David Skillicorn, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada
Yoshiki Yamagata, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Tsukuba, Japan

bayerl@rsm.nl
The series Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
comprises interdisciplinary research covering the theory, foundations and
domain-specific topics pertaining to security. Publications within the series are
peer-reviewed monographs and edited works in the areas of:

– biological and chemical threat recognition and detection (e.g., biosensors,

aerosols, forensics)
– crisis and disaster management
– terrorism
– cyber security and secure information systems (e.g., encryption, optical and
photonic systems)
– traditional and non-traditional security
– energy, food and resource security
– economic security and securitization (including associated infrastructures)
– transnational crime
– human security and health security
– social, political and psychological aspects of security
– recognition and identification (e.g., optical imaging, biometrics, authentication
and verification)
– smart surveillance systems
– applications of theoretical frameworks and methodologies (e.g., grounded
theory, complexity, network sciences, modelling and simulation)

Together, the high-quality contributions to this series provide a cross-disciplinary

overview of forefront research endeavours aiming to make the world a safer place.
The editors encourage prospective authors to correspond with them in advance of
submitting a manuscript. Submission of manuscripts should be made to the
Editor-in-Chief or one of the Editors.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5540

bayerl@rsm.nl
P. Saskia Bayerl Ruža Karlović
•

Babak Akhgar Garik Markarian

•

Editors

Community Policing - A
European Perspective
Strategies, Best Practices and Guidelines

123
bayerl@rsm.nl
Editors
P. Saskia Bayerl Babak Akhgar
Rotterdam School of Management CENTRIC, Sheffield Hallam University
Erasmus University Sheffield
Rotterdam UK
The Netherlands
Garik Markarian
Ruža Karlović School of Computing and Communications
Police Academy Zagreb Lancaster University
Zagreb Lancaster
Croatia UK

ISSN 1613-5113 ISSN 2363-9466 (electronic)

Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
ISBN 978-3-319-53395-7 ISBN 978-3-319-53396-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017931352

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
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bayerl@rsm.nl
Foreword

Community Policing is a long-known concept in Europe. Many countries have

implemented it, depending on the problem areas that manifest and the needs that
emerge from society. The various police systems and strategies in these countries
also influence the way in which Community Policing is organized.
During a CEPOL course in Ireland in May 2016 one of the central themes was
Community Policing. The various countries presented their implementation of
Community Policing and those insights aroused curiosity and led to a nice
exchange of knowledge. An important conclusion was that police organizations
throughout Europe use many different forms of Community Policing. Following
this course, I was asked to write a foreword for this book on Community Policing in
Europe. I feel honoured and want to emphasize from personal experience the
importance of this kind of research and comparisons.
As a young officer, I first came into contact with Community Policing when a
community police officer explained to me how he approached certain visible and
potential problem areas in his district. His main starting point was to initiate
cooperation between citizens, organizations and local government, including
sharing responsibilities and to motivate involvement. His vision was to cope with
security issues from a problem-oriented approach and not only to focus on
incident-oriented policing.
Much later, as a police chief, I used these gained insights to deal with safety and
security issues in the municipalities for which I was responsible. Again, I saw that
community policing officers initiate solutions for such issues by cooperating with
partners in different ways. An essential difference was that the police was not
always in the directing role, but the city council and various social organizations. In
the Netherlands the leading role lays with the city council; the police took a more
stimulating, participatory and motivating role. It was not always clear what the
problem analysis was and which insights were used in the development of these
initiatives. Much was taken from successful projects elsewhere, nationally and
internationally. It lacked scientific research and clear indicators that can determine
success.

bayerl@rsm.nl
vi Foreword

Today we are faced with new challenges like terrorist threats and attacks,
refugees, radicalization, conflicts between groups in society, the impact of (social)
media and blurring boundaries between countries, resulting in the fact that security
issues are not explicitly local. It is therefore important that research on Community
Policing based on international orientation, finding indicators for success and
insights into good practices, takes place.
This publication “Community Policing in a European Perspective” provides that
insight. The wide palette of themes, profound insights, European comparisons and
good practices gives many partners in security a great opportunity to expand their
knowledge and possibilities to deploy solutions.

Freddy Weerdmeester
Chief Superintendent
Senior Lecturer/Researcher
Police Academy of the Netherlands

bayerl@rsm.nl
Acknowledgements

The editors wish to thank the multidisciplinary team of experts who have
contributed to this book, sharing their knowledge, experience and latest research.
We further want to thank Maria Athanasiadou for her support in the editing of the
large amounts of text in this book.
Our gratitude is also extended to the following organizations and projects:

• CENTRIC (Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and

Organised Crime Research), UK
• CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Netherland
• Police Academy, Croatia
• Rinicom Ltd., UK
• University of Applied Sciences for Public Administration in Bavaria,
Department for Policing, Germany
• National University of Public Service, Hungary
• National Academy of Sciences, Institute for Computer Science and Control,
Hungary
• Hungarian Competition Authority
• Ministry of Education Malaysia and Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia
• EU-H2020 project UNITY
• EU-H2020 project INSPEC2T
• EU-H2020 project TENSOR
• EU-H2020 project NEXUS

vii

bayerl@rsm.nl
Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
P. Saskia Bayerl, Babak Akhgar, Ruža Karlović and Garik Markarian

Part I CP Context and Processes

2 Community Policing in Support of Social Cohesion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Ines Sučić and Ruža Karlović
3 ‘One for All and All for One’: Fostering Accountability
in Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Bankole Cole
4 Community Policing: The Relevance of Social Contexts. . . . . . . . . . 35
Mark van der Giessen, Elisabeth Brein and Gabriele Jacobs
5 Community Policing as a Social System and Its Components . . . . . 51
Jarmo Houtsonen, Jari Taponen, Pirjo Jukarainen and Olavi Kujanpää

Part II European CP Practices and Case Studies

6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation and
European Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Holger Nitsch and Sarina Ronert
7 Police Liaison Approaches to Managing Political Protest: A
Critical Analysis of a Prominent UK Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
David Waddington
8 Community Policing and Public Perception: Belgian Expectations
and Images of the Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Isabel Verwee

ix

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x Contents

9 Joining Forces for Our Security in Austrian

Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Barbara Pusca, Gerhard Lang and Ricarda Kutschera
10 Security as the Basis Behind Community Policing:
Croatia’s Community Policing Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Ruža Karlović and Ines Sučić
11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Georgios Leventakis, George Kokkinis and George Papalexandratos

Part III CP in an Interconnected World

12 New Crime Landscapes and New Technologies for Community
Policing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Bogdan Vasile Diţu
13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator
of Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
C.C.M.T. Broekman, A. de Vries, M.A.A. Huis in ’t Veld, R. Mente
and J.H. Kerstolt
14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Garik Markarian, V.C. da Rocha Jr., D. Zvikhachevsky
and M.L.M.G. Alcoforado
15 Importance of Cyber Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Alex Tarter
16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community
Policing and Forensic Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Azliza Mohd Ali and Plamen Angelov
17 Evaluating the Design and Implementation of CP-Support
Technologies: A Participatory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
P. Saskia Bayerl and Gabriele Jacobs
18 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Babak Akhgar, P. Saskia Bayerl, Garik Markarian and Ruža Karlović

bayerl@rsm.nl
Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

P. Saskia Bayerl is Associate Dean of Diversity and Associate Professor of Technology and
Organizational Behaviour at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, the
Netherlands. She further acts as Co-Director of CESAM (Centre of Excellence in Public Safety
Management, Erasmus University, NL) and Visiting Research Fellow at CENTRIC (Centre of
Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organized Crime Research, Sheffield Hallam
University, UK). She is a regular speaker at police and security conferences and workshops and
member of advisory boards of EU projects as well as program committee member for international
conferences. Her research lies at the intersection of human–computer interaction, organizational
communication and organizational change with a special focus on the impact of technological
innovations and public safety. Her research has been published in journals such as MIS Quarterly,
Communications of the ACM, New Media and Society and Journal of Organizational Behavior as
well as international conferences in psychology, management, computational linguistics and
computer sciences and books. Her most recent books as co-editor are Application of Big Data for
National Security (Elsevier) and Open Source Intelligence Investigation: From Strategy to
Implementation (Springer).
Ruža Karlović Ph.D. Chief Police Inspector, is a lecturer at the Police College, Police Academy
Zagreb, Croatia. She graduated from Zagreb Police College in 2002. The following year she
started working as a research assistant at Police College, Department of Criminology and Juvenile
Delinquency. In 2007, she graduated with a licentiate from the Faculty of Humanities and Social
Sciences, University of Zagreb where she eventually defended her Ph.D. thesis in 2012. Her
research interests focus on police status and duties in society, crime prevention and sociology of
crime. She has participated in the implementation of project activities in the Twinning Light project
IPA HR/2008/IBJH/04TL, strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Interior in the field of
crime prevention between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Croatia. In the
field of police sciences, she has authored a number of articles, scientific papers, conference
abstracts and books. She taught CEPOL courses on community policing and crime prevention. She
is a member of the European Society of Criminology (ESC).
Babak Akhgar is Professor of Informatics and Director of CENTRIC (Centre of Excellence in
Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organized Crime Research) at Sheffield Hallam University,
UK and Fellow of the British Computer Society. He has more than 100 refereed publications in
international journals and conferences on strategic information systems with a specific focus on
knowledge management (KM) and intelligence management. He is member of editorial boards of

xi

bayerl@rsm.nl
xii Editors and Contributors

several international journals and has acted as chair and program committee member for numerous
international conferences. He has extensive and hands-on experience in the development, man-
agement and execution of KM-projects and large international security initiatives (e.g., the
application of social media in crisis management, intelligence-based combating of terrorism and
organized crime, gun crime, cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism and cross-cultural ideology polar-
ization). In addition to this, he acts as technical lead in EU security projects (e.g., projects Courage
on Cyber-Crime and Cyber-Terrorism and Athena on the Application of Social Media and Mobile
Devices in Crisis Management). Currently, he is the technical lead on EU H2020-project TENSOR
on dark web. He has co-edited several books on intelligence management. His recent books are
Strategic Intelligence Management (National Security Imperatives and Information and
Communications Technologies), Knowledge Driven Frameworks for Combating Terrorism and
Organised Crime, Emerging Trends in ICT Security, Open Source Intelligence Investigation and
Application of Big Data for National Security. Professor Akhgar is board member of the European
Organisation for Security (EOS) and member of the academic advisory board of SAS UK.
Garik Markarian holds the Chair in Communication Systems in the School of Computing and
Communications at Lancaster University, UK and is the CEO and Founder of Rinicom Ltd. (www.
rinicom.com). Prior to joining Lancaster University, he spent over 10 years in the wireless
broadband industry, working in senior executive positions for UK, USA and Canadian technology
companies. He is one of the founding members of the IEEE802.16 standard, where he chaired a
number of working groups aiming at selecting PHY Layer solutions and actively contributed to the
EUROCAE WG-82 (AeroMAX), EUROCAE WG-72 and IEEE802.16m standards. His current
research interests include IMT-advanced systems, wireless broadband for aviation security
applications, nonlinearity mitigation for OFDM/OFDMA, QoS and QoE, cross-layer optimization
techniques and ad hoc mesh networks. He has co-authored over 700 publications including 42
patents, 4 textbooks and 12 standard contributions. He is Fellow of the National Academy of
Sciences in Armenia and for a long time served as the Chair of the IET Professional Panel in
Communications. Under his management, Rinicom grew up to become one of the world’s leading
technology companies supplying its products to first responders and security agencies around the
world. In recognition of these achievements, Rinicom was awarded with the Queens Awards for
Excellence in Business.

Contributors
Babak Akhgar CENTRIC, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
M.L.M.G. Alcoforado University of Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil
Azliza Mohd Ali Lancaster University, School of Computing and Communiation,
Lancaster, UK
Plamen Angelov Lancaster University, School of Computing and Communiation,
Lancaster, UK
P. Saskia Bayerl CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus
University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Elisabeth Brein CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University,
Rotterdam, The Netherlands

bayerl@rsm.nl
Editors and Contributors xiii

C.C.M.T. Broekman TNO, The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific

Research, The Hague, The Netherlands
Bankole Cole Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
V.C. da Rocha Jr. Federal University of Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil
A. de Vries TNO, The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research,
The Hague, The Netherlands
Bogdan Vasile Diţu Romanian Police, Bucharest, Romania
Jarmo Houtsonen Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu, Tampere, Finland
M.A.A. Huis in ’t Veld TNO, The Netherlands Organisation for Applied
Scientific Research, The Hague, The Netherlands
Gabriele Jacobs CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus
University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Pirjo Jukarainen Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu, Tampere, Finland
Ruža Karlović Croatian Police Academy, Zagreb, Croatia
J.H. Kerstolt TNO, The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific
Research, The Hague, The Netherlands
George Kokkinis KEMEA—Center for Security Studies, Athens, Greece
Olavi Kujanpää Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu, Tampere, Finland
Ricarda Kutschera Federal Ministry of the Interior Criminal Intelligence Service,
Vienna, Austria
Gerhard Lang Federal Ministry of the Interior Criminal Intelligence Service,
Vienna, Austria
Georgios Leventakis KEMEA—Center for Security Studies, Athens, Greece
Garik Markarian Rinicom Ltd., Lancaster, UK; School of Computing and
Communication, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
R. Mente TNO, The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research,
The Hague, The Netherlands
Holger Nitsch Department for Policing, University of Applied Sciences for Public
Administration in Bavaria, Fürstenfeldbruck, Germany
George Papalexandratos KEMEA—Center for Security Studies, Athens, Greece
Barbara Pusca Federal Ministry of the Interior Criminal Intelligence Service,
Vienna, Austria
Sarina Ronert Department for Policing, University of Applied Sciences for Public
Administration in Bavaria, Fürstenfeldbruck, Germany

bayerl@rsm.nl
xiv Editors and Contributors

Ines Sučić Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Croatia

Jari Taponen Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu, Tampere, Finland
Alex Tarter Thales Cyber and Consulting, Thales Group, Thales, UK
Mark van der Giessen CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus
University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Isabel Verwee Faculty Law and Criminology, Department of Criminology, Vrije
Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
David Waddington Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
D. Zvikhachevsky Ascom Network Testing Ltd., Godalming, UK

bayerl@rsm.nl
Chapter 1
Introduction

P. Saskia Bayerl, Babak Akhgar, Ruža Karlović and Garik Markarian

Community Policing (CP) is embedded in the daily life of European citizens; e.g.,
when police officers aim to solve local problems to improve the quality of life and
ensure a favourable state of security in the community. However, there are still
debates about the difference between ‘traditional’ policing and community policing.
Furthermore, community policing in Europe with its diversity of cultures, tradi-
tions, religions and practices did not evolve into a unified ‘one for all’ procedure
and is continuing to develop differently in various EU countries. It is therefore
unrealistic to expect that community policing in Europe could be harmonised and
that the same rules and procedures will become mandatory in all EU states. Instead,
different countries will continue to develop their own ways of delivering commu-
nity policing, which will need to be incorporated into the daily life of EU society
with its ideal of open borders and freedom of movement. This process of individual
developments within an economically and socially interlinked European society
brings many challenges and opens numerous opportunities for optimizing the way
community policing in Europe is delivered. In this book, we outline the challenges
and differences and suggest ways for developing community policing, which will
meet the requirements of EU citizens in the 21st century.

P.S. Bayerl (&)

CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
e-mail: bayerl@rsm.nl
B. Akhgar
CENTRIC, Sheffield Hallam University, Cantor Building, Sheffield, UK
R. Karlović
Croatian Police Academy, Zagreb, Croatia
G. Markarian
Rinicom Ltd, Lancaster, UK
G. Markarian
School of Computing and Communication, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 1

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_1

bayerl@rsm.nl
2 P.S. Bayerl et al.

Our book is based on the premise that developing successful CP procedures

depends on the overall socio-political state in each country (see Chaps. 6–10 in this
book). In other words, an important determinant for public safety is the lifestyle and
culture of members of that society. Citizens are expected to abide by the rules and
laws and to be responsible for themselves and each other, while services and
institutions care for those that are incapable of doing so. In order for a society to
function, individuals must accept certain limitations to their personal freedoms
allowing a minimal consensus about how to protect the public interests of the
various communities in their country. Community Policing is a concept that aims to
bring communities and the police together to enable co-creation of safety.
We live in an interconnected world which brings significant benefits and chal-
lenges to our society. Community Policing cannot be delivered without utilizing the
benefits of this interconnected world and without addressing the challenges that it
brings (Byrne and Marx 2011). Therefore, this book also considers existing and
emerging information and communication technologies (ICTs), which could be
used for enhancing CP operations. New and emerging technologies change the
landscape for community policing, providing new opportunities for improving the
effectiveness of problem-solving and partnership initiatives and for assisting in the
implementation of organizational changes designed to institutionalize these pro-
cesses (Scheider 2008). Secure information and communication technologies that
deliver real time and accurate data to analysts and CP officers can contribute sig-
nificantly to enhanced CP operations.
This book provides insights into the multi-dimensional nature of Community
Policing, which varies depending on the social contexts across European countries.
It provides important conceptual discussions as well as case studies and real-life
examples of European Community Policing practices. It further provides insights
into how the (primarily locally focused) concept of Community Policing fits into an
increasingly interconnected world. Our book is intended for professionals working
in Community Policing, academics and policymakers developing CP procedures. In
addition, the book aims to provide information for readers who are new to the
subject of CP. The large number of examples and case studies make it also an
excellent source for teaching materials.
The book is organised in three parts. In Part 1 we discuss the influence of the
social context on policing in general and Community Policing in particular with a
specific focus on the context-specific nature of ‘European’ Community Policing
(e.g., Chaps. 2 and 3). The conclusion is that CP is an ambiguous concept. The
local implementation is highly contingent on the local context, mutual trust and
perceived legitimacy between the police and the local community, both in the
traditional policing sense and the expanded CP conceptualization. It is thus highly
improbable that just simply ‘importing’ CP best practices developed in a given
context and at a given time to another place and time could produce the same
positive results. Still, to develop country-specific approaches it is informative to
consider experiences with more or less successful practices and experiences in other
countries (e.g., Chap. 6).

bayerl@rsm.nl
1 Introduction 3

Part 2 therefore provides a wide range of examples and case studies of

Community Policing approaches across Europe. These range from addressing
radicalization using CP concepts in Germany to understanding citizens’ perceptions
of police in Belgium to mediation of conflicts at public events in the UK. Further
examples address a review of current approaches to organize citizen participation in
Austria and key changes to policing practices after the introduction of CP in
Croatia. Many of these examples address modern technologies at the heart of
community issues (e.g., in the case of radicalization) or as support for Community
Policing efforts (e.g., Chaps. 7 and 8).
In Part 3 of this book we therefore discuss the role of information and com-
munication technology both in terms of professional and consumer technology
platforms. We show drawbacks of the existing professional technology platforms
and identify ways for improving these system, enabling more efficient CP processes
and hopefully outcomes. We also analyse emerging consumer technology platforms
and show how these could be incorporated within the existing professional tech-
nology platforms to improve interaction between the public and police. This third
part starts with an overview of Geographic Information Systems applications for
CP, followed by a description of wireless communication systems and the appli-
cation of social media for vital Community Policing tasks. We further pay attention
to both the benefits and the challenges of cyber security in daily life in general and
CP in particular (e.g., Chaps. 11 and 14). Furthermore, we present novel techniques
for automated identification of unusual behaviours, which could dramatically
simplify and enhance the delivery of CP. Finally, we provide a framework for the
design and evaluation of technologies meant to support Community Policing (see
Chap. 17).
We hope that our book can encourage ‘tailor-made’ CP approaches. CP requires
courage and genuine interest from police and communities, and we believe that this
courage can lead to resilient communities and lasting partnerships to deal with local
needs in the areas of safety and security. For Community Policing to function
properly, the community needs to have social capital, implying the intangible
resources of a community. Recent research has demonstrated that in addition to
police websites, which provide extensive information, web tools to support
Community Policing should be designed to adhere to and support communication
that allow residents to share personal experiences, strengthen social ties with other
residents, engage in collective problem-solving discussions and to informally reg-
ulate social norms—while also addressing crime and community concerns (Lewis
and Lewis 2012). Community security and social cohesion mutually reinforce each
other. Overall, in order for Community Policing to support social cohesion, pro-
grammes should aim at continually decreasing tensions between police and the
community, increasing the quality of police services, police visibility, efficiency in
dealing with community problems and accountability to the community.
Throughout the book the reader will find an emphasis on equal accountability of
all CP participants. Police and community members need to share common goals
and expectations and must be held equally accountable. Police control mechanisms
need to be strengthened and community members need to be included in the

bayerl@rsm.nl
4 P.S. Bayerl et al.

processes of control and evaluation of police work, thus contributing to the

strengthening of the democratic nature of police procedures and the police organ-
isation. Police control mechanisms are very complex and vary from country to
country. The police are liable when they break policing rules, the law or when they
violate human rights, but are also responsible for the actions they take for protecting
the community from crime, and in general or the public safety results they achieve.
It is emphasized that structures of accountability are common to all police systems
in Europe: Democratic accountability and the legitimacy of the police is strength-
ened, where both the police and the communities are accountable to each other and
accountability is not enforced only by punishments but also by some kind of
rewards. Our book promotes an approach based on participatory governance and
accountability, where CP is managed not only by the police, but by all community
stakeholders, and where accountability is mutual. The results achieved in CP, being
positive or negative, are thus not only the responsibility of police, but equally
shared and owned by all stakeholders.

References

Byrne J, Marx G (2011) Technological innovations in crime prevention and policing. A review of
the research on implementation and impact. CPS 3(20):17–40
Lewis S, Lewis DA (2012) Examining technology that supports community policing. Conference
on human factors in computing systems—proceedings, pp 1371–1380. doi:10.1145/2207676.
2208595
Scheider M (2008) The role of technology in community policing. Community Policing Dispatch
1(11). Published online: http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/November_2008/nugget.htm

bayerl@rsm.nl
 Part I
CP Context and Processes

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Chapter 2
Community Policing in Support of Social
Cohesion

Ines Sučić and Ruža Karlović

2.1 Communities and Crime—The Role of Social (Dis)

Organisation, Social Cohesion, Community Cohesion,
Integration and Resilience

Concepts of safety, crime, policing and community are frequently used in profes-
sional but also laypersons’ discourse. However, definitions and the interrelatedness
of these concepts are often very complex and vary between different theoretical
perspectives and research fields. Thus, this chapter first gives a short overview of
the core concepts together with the relations among them.
Higher levels of concerns about neighbourhood safety are correlated with higher
levels of perceived physical incivilities (e.g., Taylor 1997), higher levels of crimes
against people and property (e.g., Taylor 2002), lower levels of community care and
vigilance and lower levels of place attachments/territoriality (Sampson and Graif 2009).
Crime rates in communities are strongly related to the extent of community social (dis)
organisation (Sampson and Groves 1989), and both disorder and crime should be
treated as outcomes of disorganisation, not as causes of one another (Sampson and
Raudenbush 1999). Social capital generally refers to the intangible resources of a
community (Saegert and Winkel 2004) such as mutual trust, patterns of reciprocity,
communalism, shared norms and identity (Flora et al. 1997) produced in “relations
among persons that facilitate action” for mutual benefit (Coleman 1988, p. 100). Social
disorganisation erodes social bonds and increases social disruption in communities

I. Sučić (&)
Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Croatia
e-mail: Incs.Sucic@pilar.hr
R. Karlović
Croatian Police Academy, Zagreb, Croatia
e-mail: rkarlovic@fkz.hr

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 7

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_2

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8 I. Sučić and R. Karlović

(Brewer et al. 1998), resulting in a lack of common values and social cohesion within
the community.
The level of cohesion determines the level of collective efficacy. Collective efficacy
is the driving force for residents to take an active role in modelling their communities
(Sampson and Raudenbush 1999) and in maintaining effective and collective social
control of crime and security (Sampson and Groves 1989). High collective efficacy is
negatively associated with crime rates and neighbourhood disorder, and it reduces
neighbourhood disadvantage, residential instability and fear of crime (Sampson and
Raudenbush 1999). Even neighbourhoods with weak social ties can have low crime
rates if they have high levels of collective efficacy; so networks and resources may be
necessary but not sufficient for social control (Morenoff et al. 2001). The breakdown of
social cohesion and erosion of social capital can both be causes and consequences of
increasing levels of insecurity (see also Chaps. 3 and 17).
Social cohesion is an ordering feature of a society and, according to Durkheim,
represents the interdependence between the members of society, shared loyalties
and solidarity (Jenson 1998). The term social cohesion is thus often used to
describe how well people who live in the same area are integrated into their local
ethnic or religious community (Robinson 2004) or as the amount of individual
participation in social groups in the community. There are two principal dimensions
of social cohesion: (1) social inclusion, i.e., the reduction of disparities, inequalities
and social exclusion and (2) social capital, i.e., the strengthening of social relations,
interactions and ties (Berger-Schmitt 2000).
The term ‘social cohesion’ has occasionally been used synonymously with the
term ‘community cohesion’ though they should be differentiated (Cantle 2001). The
term community cohesion was established following riots and disturbances in the
northern towns of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham (UK) in 2001 and the subsequent
Report of the Independent Review Team in which the problem of ‘parallel lives’
was identified (Cantle 2001; see also Chap. 7). This emerged as a policy response to
the perceived need for strengthened community identity and purpose in the context
of increasingly differentiated identities, transnational attachments and a general
climate of fear and marginalisation (Cantle 2005). According to Cantle (2001),
social cohesion assumes that all societal differences are essentially determined by
social class and economic inequalities while community cohesion assumes that
problems between identifiable groups, based on ethnic, faith or cultural divisions,
create a sense of unfairness and undermine solidarity among community members.
Community cohesion describes how well micro-communities are knitted together as
a whole, and its focus is on the existence of shared social values that enable all
communities to work together for common goals and to feel a sense of belonging
and citizenship (Robinson 2004).
Recently, policymakers have turned their attention from ‘community cohesion’
to issues of ‘integration’ and ‘resilience’. Integration means creating the conditions
for everyone to play a full part in national and local life (Department for
Communities and Local Government 2012), while resilience refers to the extent to
which a community is able to adapt to (economic) shocks and (cultural) changes
(Centre for Local Economic Strategies 2014).

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2 Community Policing in Support of Social Cohesion 9

The (limited) academic literature has been quite critical of the policy of com-
munity cohesion (Lowndes and Thorp 2011). It was criticized for its lack of clarity
and consistency (Flint and Robinson 2008; Joppke 2007) and seen as representing a
new form of governmentality (McGhee 2003). Also, community cohesion was
considered a ‘new buzz phrase in policing and community safety’ (Chainey 2005).
Community cohesion is “undermined by the disadvantage, discrimination and
disaffection experienced by the identifiable community as a whole” (Cantle 2005,
p. 52), and a lack of social cohesion results in increased social tensions, violent
crime, targeting of minorities, human rights violations and, ultimately, violent
conflict, etc. (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 2009). Socio-economic
status and deprivation (90% of participants), access to services and facilities (70%
of participants), and crime (58% of participants) were considered the factors with
the greatest impact on community cohesion and resilience (cp. Centre for Local
Economic Strategies 2014).
Enhancing community security and cohesion has been identified as one of nine
outcomes under the broader Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) outcome area in
the UNDP Strategic Plan (2008–2013) (Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
2009). Cohesive and resilient communities are less likely to experience neigh-
bourhood problems such as anti-social behaviour, crime and waste mismanagement
(Centre for Local Economic Strategies 2014). The concepts of community security
and social cohesion are mutually reinforcing. If communities feel physically secure,
they are likely to act in more cohesive ways and vice versa (Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery 2009). However, community cohesion does not neces-
sarily mean that there is an absence of conflict but that the community has ‘a
collective ability to manage the shifting array of tensions and disagreements’
(Gilchrist 2004). Consequently, it can be argued that to some extent the relationship
between crime and collective (dis)organisation may be mediated by the role of
police in community (cooperative or conflicting) (Skogan 1989), since police are
society’s first-line defence in dealing with conflicts among people (Trojanowicz and
Bucqueroux 1991) and the function of the police involve more than just enforcing
the law (Goldstein 1987).

2.2 (In)formal Crime Control and Community Policing

Controlling crime is performed either through formal controls or informal controls.

Formal controls are imposed by Law Enforcement Agencies. Informal social
controls are usually imposed by family members, friends, teachers, neighbours,
etc., who use sanctions such as shame, condemnation, corporal punishment, iso-
lation and other detrimental consequences, which are not formally specified by law
or pronounced by a judge (Benson 1989). The importance of informal control in
shaping neighbourhood crime rates is widely accepted (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003),
and there is strong evidence that social ties and social control help to lower
neighbourhood crime rates (e.g., Bellair 1997, 2000; Sampson 1997). However, the

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10 I. Sučić and R. Karlović

effectiveness of informal social sanctions depends on different factors including low

economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility and family disruption
(Sampson and Groves 1989).
Studies also show that formal sanctions and other external institutions do not
work effectively within disorganised communities (Bishop 1984; Jiang and
Lambert 2009), that formal sanctions work well when they are supported by
informal sanctions—the police need the support and assistance of private citizens
(Meares 2002), but that the role of formal control cannot be neglected (Kubrin and
Weitzer 2003).
Formal control may influence crime and disorder directly and indirectly by
influencing residents’ informal control practices (Kubrin, and Weitzer 2003). The
amount and quality of police activity in a neighbourhood can significantly affect its
crime rate. Visible proactive policing influences residents’ perceptions of the
probability of arrests for illegal acts (Sampson and Cohen 19881), and at the
neighbourhood level increases in police activity in a community reduces residents’
risk of crime victimization after controlling for other factors (Velez 2001).
Insufficient or excessive formal control by the police may lower the residents’
desire or capacity to fight crime and disorder, deflate the sense of collective efficacy
among law-abiding residents and their willingness or ability to engage in informal
control or/and invite illegal retributive practices by some community members
(Kubrin and Weitzer 2003).
Community Policing illustrates proactive policing in which formal and informal
social control can reinforce each other, helping to reduce crime (Greene 1999;
Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Community Policing aims to
deformalize the formal mechanisms of control by emphasising resident-police
interaction of social control (Hawdon and Ryan 2003) and by integrating the police
into the neighbourhood’s primary groups (Greene 1987). The ‘police officer–
community residents’ interaction also diminishes the anonymity residents may have
relied upon to perpetrate their illegal activities. As police officers identify with an
area and become familiar with its residents and lifestyle, it is argued that their work
reinforces the informal social controls of the area (Wilson and Kelling 1982).
Unfortunately, however, to date very little research has addressed this
formal-informal control relationship (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003).

2.3 Community Policing in Support of Social Cohesion

Community Policing emerged as a means of addressing high crime rates in the early
1990s (Lewis and Lewis 2012) and of improving the relationship between the
police and the public (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994). Community Policing was

1
Sampson and Cohen (1988) found that robust arrests for disorderly conduct and drunk driving
had a deterrent effect on an unrelated crime—robbery.

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2 Community Policing in Support of Social Cohesion 11

governed by the ideal of ‘policing as community problem solving’ and ‘policing by

consent’ (Goldstein 1987) in order to be more responsive to the needs and
expectations of citizens (Hesketh 1992). Today, Community Policing has become
an internationally widespread paradigm of contemporary policing (Oliver 2000).
Different names have been used to capture the term that refers to a broad and
heterogeneous set of policing strategies and program concepts such as
problem-oriented policing, community-based policing, neighbourhood policing and
service style policing (Goldstein 1990; Toch and Grant 1991). Community Policing
refers to the partnership between residents and police to address
neighbourhood-specific issues (e.g., graffiti, gang violence, burglaries), where res-
idents are involved in decision-making processes and engage in local problem
solving. Thus, Community Policing consists of two complementary core compo-
nents: (1) community partnership with the goal of establishing and maintaining trust
(Trojanowicz and Moore 1988) and (2) problem solving (Goldstein 1979), a pro-
cess by which the specific concerns of communities are identified and the most
appropriate remedies to abate these problems are found (Bureau of Justice
Assistance 1994). To develop community partnership, the police aims to (Bureau of
Justice Assistance 1994):
1. Develop positive relationships with the community (interactions with residents)
2. Involve the community in the quest for better crime control and prevention
(participation of residents in their own protection by collective action against
crime)
3. Pool their resources with those of the community to address the most urgent
concerns of community members.
According to Meares (2002) the combination of these three substantive practices
should be supplemented with organizational adaptation in the form of implemen-
tation of specific practices required by the relationship between community part-
nership and problem solving as well as requirements of rapid societal change
(Verschelde and Rogge 2012).
Activities surrounding Community Policing serve to promote social cohesion
and to reduce the fear of crime and neighbourhood disorder. These activities range
from neighbourhood crime watches by residents to neighbourhood surveys that
identify local problems and evaluate police satisfaction. Broader measures of police
performance were partly a result of the shift from traditional policing to Community
Policing (Rena et al. 2005). The management of public confidence has become
almost as important as the management of crime itself (Home Office 2009), because
if citizens do not have confidence in the police they are less likely to defer to police
authority, to report crimes, to provide witness information or to obey the law
themselves (Hough and Roberts 2004; Tyler 2004).
Research suggests that public confidence in policing is less about the effec-
tiveness of police services to reduce crime and provide safety (Tyler 2006) than
about the perception of police “as old-fashioned representatives of community
values and norms—as symbols of moral authority who address everyday problems”

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12 I. Sučić and R. Karlović

(Jackson et al. 2009, p. 6), and strengthen social order, cohesion and informal social
control (Jackson and Bradford 2009; Jackson et al. 2009; Cooper and Innes 2009)
and the belief that the police are fair in their procedure and just in their treatment
and decision making (Jackson et al. 2013). Thus, public confidence is based less on
instrumental concerns about crime (in terms of crime-rates, perceived chances of
victimisation or fear of crime) and more on expressive ‘day-to-day’ concerns about
neighbourhood stability and breakdown (in terms of cohesion and collective effi-
cacy; see also Chap. 8).
Reiner (2000) suggested that the police are faced with the paradox that they are
judged by the lack of need for them and by public diagnoses of local values and
moral structures that shape perceptions of crime. In essence, low confidence in
policing expresses not only an unfavourable assessment of police activities, but also
an unfavourable assessment of the strength of the ties and bonds within the local
community. As such, narrow attempts to reduce fear and to communicate the reality
of crime did not significantly improve public confidence (Jackson and Bradford
2009). However, Community Policing strategies that look to take active part and
engage more with the day-to-day social order of civil public space and civil society,
seeking to increase the visibility, accessibility and familiarity of the police (Innes
2004) may address both fear of crime and public confidence in policing (Jackson
et al. 2009).
Cooperation between police and citizens is the central premise of Community
Policing (Goldstein 1987; Hawdon and Ryan 2003) and the key factor for suc-
cessful implementation of a Community Policing programme in support of social
cohesion (Greene and Pelfrey 1997; Goldstein 1987; Williams 1998). Again, there
is the question whether certain crimes will ever come to the attention of police
without Community Policing. Community Policing empowers citizens by enrolling
them as partners in efforts to make their communities a better and safer places to
live: They are expected to identify problems in their community, to give input into
decision making on the forms of required police services and to provide feedback
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of police services. Police officers should be
sensitive and responsive to residents’ concerns.
Usually, the problems of disorder and low-level crime—and not high profile
index crimes—pose an immediate and direct threat to residents and their families
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1991). Thus police officers should be able to deal
with the full range of community problems and not only violations of the law. They
should participate in peacekeeping and/or maintaining order (Goldstein 1987) as
well as supporting community-based efforts to reduce neighbourhood incivilities
and improve its physical appearance (see Chap. 7) Policing also empowers police
officers to be more independent and creative in developing alternate solutions to
community problems and to blend aspects of social work with police work
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1991) providing residents with what they really want
—crime prevention, i.e., to be spared from becoming a victim (Trojanowicz and
Bucqueroux 1991).
According to Lewis and Lewis (2012), two major perspectives on crime pre-
vention can be differentiated—those based on victimization theory and those based

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2 Community Policing in Support of Social Cohesion 13

on social control theory (Lewis and Salem 1981). While victimization theory
focuses on understanding crimes as events that occur between a potential victim,
offender and the environment (Lewis and Salem 1981), social control theory sug-
gests that social interactions influence criminal acts through the informal enforce-
ment of social norms (Hirschi 1969). From the victimization perspective, a potential
victim or offender assesses the risk of being victimized or caught, respectively
(Lewis and Salem 1981), while from a social control perspective, social norms
shape the morals and values of a community that influence criminal behaviour.
While social control theory is the basis for crime prevention from the community
perspective, police primarily embrace the victimization theory as a method to
understand and prevent crime (Skogan 2006). Thus by developing prevention
strategies, police mainly focus on changing the behaviours of potential victims and
offenders by impacting how they assess the risk of being victimized or being
caught.

2.4 Challenges of Community Policing in Support

of Social Cohesion

The results of evaluations of Community Policing programs have generally been

mixed and disappointing, regardless of the particular type of approach implemented
(Kerley and Benson 2000). Community Policing was mostly criticised because of
its failure to strengthen broader community processes of community cohesion and
organization (Kerley and Benson 2000). Observed failure of Community Policing
programs was attributed to structural factors such as improper implementation of
Community Policing programs (e.g., officer resistance), limited community
involvement, greater effectiveness in communities that are already somewhat
organized and cohesive (Buerger 1994; Kerley and Benson 2000), lack of perma-
nent assignment of police officers to a given area and lack of devotion and effort to
outreach (Goldstein 1987). Failure of Community Policing programs was linked by
some researchers to more substantial factors such as the flawed basic premise of
Community Policing that communities exist (Jiao 1997) and that communities are
easily identifiable and homogeneous, that police and community share the same
interests (Walker 1984) and that residents are willing to cooperate with the police
(Hawdon and Ryan 2003).
In order for Community Policing to be effective (e.g., visibility of police officer
and familiarity), the community for which a patrol officer is given responsibility
should be a small, well-defined geographical area (Bureau of Justice Assistance
1994). However, major technological changes (mass transportation, mass com-
munication and mass media) have contributed to the breakdown of the geographic
connection in the traditional definition of community (Trojanowicz and Moore
1988).

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14 I. Sučić and R. Karlović

Community Policing assumes that residents trust the police and are willing to
cooperate with the police, which is often far from the truth in many poor or minority
neighbourhoods (Manning 1997), high crime areas (Bartollas and Hahn 1999) and
disorganized communities (Langworthy and Travis 1999). The more crime and risk
factors a neighbourhood faces, the less likely it is to develop any organized activity
to fight crime, and residents are more reluctant to take the risk of intervening in
neighbourhood problems (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). In disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods, there is often a lack of the value consensus and resident cooperation that
Community Policing needs to succeed in reducing crime (Hope 1995; Walker
1992). Their residents consider that police have an ‘outsider’ perspective of the
neighbourhood (i.e., residents are often seen as ‘deserving victims’ whose lifestyles
invite victimization) and they are dissatisfied with police services (e.g., police
respond less vigorously to residents’ calls, there are higher rates of officers’ mis-
conduct than in more affluent areas) (e.g. Kane 2002; Mastrofski et al. 2002; Reisig
and Parks 2000; Smith 1986; Velez 2001; Weitzer 1999, 2000). Also, there is
distrust, a poor relationship and low support of the police and high resistance to
crime prevention programmes, since they do not see the benefit of community
programs and consider those programmes to be ineffective in controlling the crime
problems in their community (Stein and Griffith 2015). In disorganized commu-
nities, informal networks of social control are lacking. Thus, local offenders often
try to administer their own form of informal control or ‘justice’ to others in the
community (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003) or communities tend to employ more for-
mally organized responses to crime (Skogan 1989) or the police is forced to use
more traditional styles of policing (Hawdon and Ryan 2003).
Recent research speaks in favour of socio-economic deprivation as a cause of
poor community cohesion in disadvantaged areas rather than differences in ethnic
groups (Centre for Local Economic Strategies 2014). High crime rates exist not
because oppositional values are anchored in the community, but because limited
opportunities make it difficult for residents to pursue conventional goals and
because they lack the willingness or capacity to prevent deviance (Kubrin and
Weitzer 2003; Skogan 1989). Thus, the major challenge for the government is to
mobilise communities to participate in fighting crime (Lewis and Lewis 2012).
Local authorities and police forces should take the lead in establishing effective
multi-agency arrangements to develop and deliver a coordinated response to crime.
Shared moral values strengthen the connections between citizens and institutions
(Jackson et al. 2013), so residents should have opportunities for their conflict with
or animosity towards the police to be openly addressed (Gilchrist 2004). This can
be achieved by establishing channels of communication between residents and
between residents and police. Sharing information related to crime among com-
munity residents reciprocally and freely is crucial to crime prevention and control
(Manaliyo and Muzindutsi 2013). Shared experiences and activities allow people to
identify enough of a community of interest to establish a bond of trust. People are
linked by geography, but their affluence allows them access to technologies that
frees them to exercise a community of interest with those who live elsewhere.

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2 Community Policing in Support of Social Cohesion 15

To make the effective flow of information possible, residents should be

well-networked among themselves, physically or virtually. One way to enable
community residents to know, interact and connect with one another is by using
technology to (re)build communities (e.g., web forums or social networking sites).
As information and communication technologies (ICTs) have increasingly pervaded
our lives, so have they transformed Community Policing efforts. To date, there have
been many efforts to design crime prevention technologies (e.g., the mobile phone
application CLEARpath that allows residents to tag and share areas of the city on a
virtual map where they feel unsafe) for increasing feelings of safety and decrease
the risk of victimization by providing the user with the information that aims to
influence their behaviour—in alignment with victimization theory (Lewis and
Lewis 2012).
However, it was found that crime prevention technologies that give individuals
information will not necessarily foster communication amongst residents, afford a
richer interaction or increase active participation (Lewis and Lewis 2012). Thus,
researchers shifted their focus to communication or the transmission of social norms
within a community via technology (Lewis and Salem 1981). Hampton and
Wellman (2003) found that electronic networks positively impacted neighbour-
hoods by affording access to information and resources, linking groups and pro-
viding social identities. Lewis and Lewis (2012) proposed that in addition to police
websites, which provide extensive information, web tools to support Community
Policing should be designed to adhere to and support communication that allows
residents to share personal experiences, strengthen social ties with other residents,
engage in collective problem solving discussions and to informally regulate social
norms, while also addressing crime and community concerns.
Overall, in order for Community Policing to support social cohesion, pro-
grammes should aim to continually decrease tensions between police and the
community, increase the quality of police services, police visibility, effectiveness in
dealing with community problems and accountability to the community (Goldstein
1987; Hawdon and Ryan 2003). Police efforts should be aimed towards acting in
procedurally just ways helping them to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the residents
(Jackson et al. 2013). Community Policing needs strong neighbourhood associa-
tions that operate independently of the police (Friedman 1994) in order to increase
resident participation in Community Policing programs (Skogan and Hartnett
1997). Therefore, if a grassroots organization does not exist, the police could
encourage the creation of such an organization (Hawdon and Ryan 2003). Also, the
limits of Community Policing should be more clearly defined by some articulable
criteria (e.g., defining the level of a police officer’s responsibility for all that goes on
in the neighbourhood; Goldstein 1987) and police efforts should be accompanied by
appropriate resources.

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16 I. Sučić and R. Karlović

2.5 Conclusion

Community security and social cohesion mutually reinforce each other. Since along
with socio-economic status, deprivation and access to services and facilities, crimes
also have significant impact on community cohesion and resilience, a cooperative
role of police in a community is very important in securing that communities stay
safe and cohesive. Community Policing represent proactive policing in which
formal and informal social control reinforce each other helping to reduce crime by
employing prevention activities that serve to promote social cohesion and reduce
neighbourhood disorder.
To reduce observed failure of existing Community Policing programs in their
efforts to strengthen community cohesion and organization, police should overcome
obstacles emerging out of its structural features but it should also more vigorously
mobilise communities to participate in fighting crime by establishing effective
multi-agency arrangements and communication channels to share information
among community residents reciprocally and freely by using information and
communication technologies. Overall, in order for Community Policing to support
social cohesion, programmes should aim to continually decrease tensions between
police and the community and aim to increase the quality of police services, police
visibility, effectiveness in dealing with community problems and their account-
ability to the community.

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Chapter 3
‘One for All and All for One’: Fostering
Accountability in Community Policing

Bankole Cole

3.1 Introduction

The accountability of the police is imperative if the use of their powers is to be seen as
legitimate. One of the key principles of democratic policing is that the police operate in
the best interest of the public; therefore, it is essential that the police secure public trust
and confidence in whatever they do. Nonetheless, policing functions in Europe have,
historically, been diffused with the police having been involved in a variety of duties
that included the enforcement of welfare provisions and tax laws in addition to their
basic crime control, prevention and order maintenance duties (Denys 2010; Emsley
1983, 1987). More importantly, European communities are increasingly becoming
multicultural and multi-faith, therefore, the policing needs and demands of the ‘public’
in modern Europe have become much more complex.
Since the 9/11 terrorist incidents in the United States, the police in Europe are
also increasingly dealing with security and public safety issues, as counter-terrorism
progressively becomes a key part of their everyday law enforcement duties.
Alongside this development has been the growth in Community Policing initiatives
to bring the police closer to the communities they police and to engage the public
much more in police work that is directly related to the crime, disorder, public
safety and security problems experienced in specific communities. In all their
duties, the police are regarded as servants of the public who are expected to police
in the public interest. Accordingly, the monitoring of police activities and their
accountability have become key features in policing discourse since modern
policing was introduced in Europe in the 19th century. Who should the police be
accountable to and what should be the role of the public in police accountability?
Although structures are in place to ensure the accountability of the police, the
centrality of community participation in Community Policing has raised important

B. Cole (&)
Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
e-mail: B.Cole@shu.ac.uk

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 21

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_3

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22 B. Cole

questions of the extent to which community involvement should be prioritised in

police accountability.
This chapter will critically examine the concept of police accountability and its
application to Community Policing in Europe. It will examine current police
oversight systems in Europe in order to assess the extent to which the police are
directly accountable to communities. Community policing is defined in this chapter
as local policing arrangements whereby, at municipality, commune or neighbour-
hood level, the police work in partnership with civilian community representatives
and other public agencies (such as social services, youth work, schools and busi-
nesses), in a shared responsibility to address crime prevention, public order, safety
and security problems. In this definition, the police play the role of an equal partner
in a network that is jointly put together to address community needs according to
mutually agreed approaches in which each member of the partnership has clearly
defined roles to play (see Terpstra 2005; Service 2012).
This definition recognises the fact that Community Policing does not automat-
ically exist simply because a local, neighbourhood or municipal policing structure
exists (an example of such are the UK’s neighbourhood policing teams).
Community policing is not local policing per se. Instead, Community Policing is a
locally driven policing initiative, formally instituted with public consent. It will be
argued in this chapter that accountability is crucial to Community Policing if the
principles of democratic policing and the legitimacy of the police are to be main-
tained. However, it will also be argued that the nature of Community Policing
requires new structures of accountability to be considered besides those that cur-
rently exist in Europe, to ensure that the community element in Community
Policing and the equal partnership that is essential and crucial in Community
Policing arrangements are reflected in the mechanisms to which the police are
accountable in Community Policing (see also Chaps. 2, 4 and 5).

3.2 Accountability

The need for the police to account for their actions has been at the centre of policing
debates and politics since the inception of modern policing in Europe in the 19th
century. Whereas the forms of accountability varies depending on how modern
policing emerged and the roles that the police are expected to play, the concept that the
use of police powers is not without question is central to the development of European
policing (Critchely 1967; Emsley 1991; Mawby 1999). As more European states strive
towards democratic governments with the emergence of universal human rights after
the Second World War, the question concerning accountability of the police and their
legitimacy has become an important topic in the assessment of the growth and
development of democratic governance in Europe.
The topic of police accountability has grown even more significantly in the last
fifty years or so, generating substantial political interest in terms of legislation, the
creation of structures of police governance and codes of professional practice and

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3 ‘One for All and All for One’: Fostering Accountability … 23

ethics. As Walsh and Conway (2011, p. 61) argued, the reason for this growth in
interest is because “policing itself has changed immensely over the past 50 years in
response to the demands imposed upon it by an increasingly diverse, technological,
urbanised, globalised, mobile, sophisticated, rights-conscious and knowledge-based
society.” In addition, police powers have increased significantly over the years with
an increase in the following: the use of new technologies, a significant shift towards
intelligence-led policing, the development of highly trained and heavily armed
combat units, the use of lethal and semi-lethal weaponry in forces that were tra-
ditionally unarmed, the blurring of the boundaries between civil policing and
security, the adoption of managerial strategies and methods from private sector
business organisations, a greater input from the private sector in the delivery of
policing services and the growth in direct cross-border cooperation between police
forces in Europe. All of these changes mean that professional and ethical standards
have become an important and integral part of policing. Therefore, mechanisms of
police accountability or oversight of policing have to be a priority if Europe is to
sustain an identity of democratic policing (Walsh and Conway 2011; see also Bigo
2006; Block 2008; Cope 2004; Council of Europe 2002, 2003; Loader 2000, 2002a,
b; Loader and Walker 2007; Neyroud and Beckley 2001; Reiner 2010; Rijken and
Vermuelen 2006; Sheptycki 2000; Stenning 2000, 2009).
Police accountability is usually discussed alongside police governance. Both
concepts are multi-faceted and multi-dimensional and they are often used inter-
changeably. The confusion arises from the fact that accountability and governance
are frequently discussed within the broader concept of police oversight systems. In
reality, these concepts are significantly different (see Ranson 2003; van Kersbergen
and van Waarden 2004; Walker 2002). According to Walsh and Conway (2011,
p. 62f), police governance can be defined as “encompassing the procedures and
methods aimed at ensuring the efficient discharge of the policing function. As such,
it includes key management issues such as: policy formation and implementation;
the determination of priorities and strategies; deployment choices; the allocation of
resources; the maintenance of standards. It follows that governance can be asso-
ciated with the promotion of values such as transparency, responsiveness and the
maintenance of professional, ethical and human rights standards in policing.” Police
governance, therefore, is usually the domain of politicians (both national and local),
and it relates mainly to making the police an efficient, effective force that operates
according to accepted ethical and professional standards. Police accountability
refers to the mechanisms in place, usually within police governance structures,
under which the police can be called to account and disciplined for not complying
with stated performance requirements, legal duties and professional standards (see
also Chap. 12).
To be accountable to someone means that one is answerable to that person for
one’s actions and that obligation is subject to disciplinary action if one’s actions are
disapproved of by the person to which one is accountable. That A is accountable to
B implies that B has the power to call A to account and to impose sanctions on A if
A’s actions are unacceptable to B. Accountability is much more than simply ren-
dering the account of one’s performance to another person such as a line manager or

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24 B. Cole

a review body. The key word in police accountability is the disciplinary clause,
which may range from direct punishment or reprimand for specific acts or omission,
misconduct or abuse of power to recommendations for a change in policing
approach, methods or policies following an inquiry or review into police actions.
Central to police accountability therefore, is the principle that police powers are not
absolute and that policing can only be fair and just where police actions are subject
to democratic review. However, although accountability bestows some degree of
authority on the person answerable to it does not imply a relationship of control. As
Card explained, “the fact that A is accountable to B does not necessarily give B
control over A” (Card 1979, p. 9f).
All European countries have oversight mechanisms in place to ensure that the
police are managed effectively and held to account for their actions (see den Boer
and Fernhout 2008). Indeed, police governance and accountability arrangements in
Europe are quite complex—incorporating a mixture of national and local govern-
ment bodies and administrative structures with varying powers to oversee police
work and call the police to account. The ultimate authority over policing is of
course the state, who through parliament has the supreme power to make legislation
that defines the boundaries of police powers. This is significant as the police can
only be called to account on points of law. However, a parliament cannot instruct
the police on how to carry out their policing functions as that would be unconsti-
tutional (see Ayling et al. 2009; Jefferson and Grimshaw 1987; Stenning 2007).
Instead, powers have been delegated to state departments in charge of policing,
usually the Ministries of Internal or Home Affairs such as the British Home Office,
that have the sole authority for the management of the police and the provision of
general direction on policing operations, nationally.
These powers vary but they generally include powers to set up policing plans
and standards, discipline officers, determine police budgets and state police per-
formance indicators. The Ministries of Internal Affairs usually act as the sole
national police authority and may make decisions independently but at times may
be subject to parliamentary approval. In some countries, some of the Ministers’
decisions are made only after consultation with a national advisory group such as
the Polish Political Advisory Committee (Haberfeld 1997). The police are
accountable to the Ministers in charge of police affairs (Ministers of Internal
Affairs) in the sense that the final authority on disciplinary control of the police lies
with this governmental department. These powers are exercised via regulatory laws
and procedures such as those provided in Police Acts. In England and Wales, for
example, the Home Secretary has wide ranging powers to dismiss chief police
officers and to cut the budgets of an ‘inefficient’ local police force (Brogden 1982;
Jones and Newbum 1997; Reiner 2010). In addition, the police are accountable at
national levels to national bodies in charge of specific areas of policing such as
public complaints against the police and police ethics (see Brodeur 2007).
Nevertheless, the accountability of the police at the national level exists beyond
the domains of the Ministries for Internal Affairs. As public servants, the police are
also subject to oversight mechanisms that public servants face to ensure that public
funds allocated to policing are used in the best interest of the taxpayer and the

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3 ‘One for All and All for One’: Fostering Accountability … 25

general public. In the United Kingdom, the police must additionally comply with
national ‘value for money’ standards to ensure that the costs of policing meet
specified criteria in terms of quality of service, efficiency and effectiveness in the
interest of communities (see for example, Department of the Environment 1997, on
the Principles of Best Value in the UK Public Service).

3.3 Local Accountability

There are very few countries in Europe where the police operate only as a national
organisation. Most countries in Europe have multiple layers of police forces,
operating either nationally, locally or at both levels, covering various areas of law
enforcement both criminal and civil (Italy and France are typical examples). In
countries where local policing exists, either distinctly or as local arms of the
national police, structures to manage the police at local government level and to
ensure their accountability also exist.
In this regard, it is common in European countries with diversified policing
structures to have the police managed by local authority bodies or elected local
political figures charged with the responsibility of administering the police on
behalf of the local community. These include municipality Mayors, Police and
Crime Commissioners (in the UK) or a local government body in charge of local
policing such as a Police Board (e.g., in Belgium) (see Brodeur 2007). In theory,
these bodies represent the local voice in policing, which includes the power to call
the police to account for not complying with national policing priorities at the local
level or failing to meet agreed specific local policing needs. In practice, however,
research and experience have shown that the powers of these local bodies are
restricted mainly to administrative governance. Local Mayors, Police and Crime
Commissioners and local Police Boards cannot hold the police to account without
the approval or consent of central government (for the British experience, see
Brogden 1983; Spencer 1985).
In other words, the police in Europe are not directly accountable to local gov-
ernments. Whereas local governments in England and Wales for example, have
acquired powers to contribute to and agree local policing plans and targets with the
police (Jones and Newbum 1997), the local police and crime commissioners do not
have the direct power to discipline the local police chief constables where disputes
have occurred over how the police are carrying out their duties locally. Any deci-
sions to hold the police to account by direct disciplinary means must receive national
consent for it to be effective. Similarly, neighbourhoods or communities have no
direct powers to hold the police to account. Community grievances regarding the
police are usually dealt with by locally elected representatives (Mayors, etc.) who
would have to establish the normal channels for redress recognised in law by central
government or take the matter to the courts (see Fig. 3.1).
Furthermore, police accountability is discussed at two levels: (1) the account-
ability of individual police officers for their actions on and off duty and (2) the

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26 B. Cole

National Government (central government

department in charge of policing, e.g.,
Ministers of Internal Affairs/Home Secretary),
National Advisory Committees,
National Commissions,
National Committees (e.g., on standards
in public life)

Overall management,
Performance Indicators,
Ethical Guidelines, Policing Plans,
Police Complaints and Discipline,
Financial Oversight and Management

Performance Local
Police Administration Government,
Assessments,
Professional POLICE Governance Mayors, Police
Professional
Bodies Resources and Crime
Standards
Commissioner

Through the Law,

the Courts and
Complaints
Systems

Citizens,
Communities

Fig. 3.1 Police governance and accountability structure in Europe

accountability of the police institution itself with regard to their overall responsi-
bility for law enforcement and the maintenance of public order, peace and security.
A police officer can be called to account only on points of law; for example, on the
grounds that their actions are illegal, excessive, discriminatory and malicious or
done in bad faith. The avenues for calling individual police officers to account are
via established police complaints structures or the courts, both criminal and civil.
Chief police officers are also accountable for their performance or misdoings that
may lead to their removal from office. As mentioned above, the authority to dis-
cipline police forces as a whole or heads of police forces is beyond communities or
their local representatives but lies with central government departments in charge of
policing.
It is an obvious fact that the police in Europe are held accountable on several
grounds. Indeed, in Europe, police accountability supersedes police governance—
the structures to which the police are accountable are generally more than those

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3 ‘One for All and All for One’: Fostering Accountability … 27

with the responsibility for their governance. In summary, the following structures of
accountability are common to all police systems in Europe:
1. Accountability to the law that is the very basis of police powers: In this regard,
individual police officers, a police department or a local police body may be held
accountable for violations of the law in terms of deliberate omission, incom-
petence, misuse, abuse, unreasonable or excessive use of legal powers (for
example, the use of unreasonable force) and misconduct or actions unbecoming
of a police officer (for example, the involvement in a criminal offence or
corruption).
2. Accountability to citizens: Where police action is in violation of a citizen’s legal
or human rights and measures are in place, for example, through police com-
plaints systems and Ombudsman structures, for the aggrieved parties to call the
police to account and request redress or punishment if the police are found to
have misused or abused their powers, acted in a manner that is discriminatory
against a particular social group or acted in excess of the powers conferred upon
them by law (for example, the use of lethal force during arrests).
3. Accountability to international laws and conventions on human rights with
regards to the administration of justice and law enforcement (for example, the
UN codes of conduct for law enforcement officers, and the Council of Europe’s
Code of Police Ethics—see Council of Europe 2002; Crawshaw and Holmstrom
2008).
4. Accountability to professional bodies that monitor compliance with professional
standards (for example, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary in the U.
K.).
5. Accountability to national treasuries for how police budgets have been spent
and resources used. This includes measures to ensure that the police use public
funds and other resources allocated for policing equitably and in line with the
principles of value for money in the interest of the taxpayer.
6. Accountability to other public bodies with general democratic oversight powers.
This includes parliamentary, public or judicial enquiries, committees, civilian
ombudsmen, and public or judicial enquiries with statutory powers to impose
sanctions on public bodies.
A key issue with the current approach to police accountability is that questions
of accountability are often raised only where the police are perceived to have failed
to carry out their duties effectively according to law or where there are allegations
of misconduct or abuse or excessive or unacceptable use of their powers.
Invariably, the general perception is that police accountability is relevant only
where the police are believed to have done something wrong and the state or
whosoever has the authority to do so, calls the police to account for their actions.
This approach to accountability complies with what Terpstra (2011a) described as a
Hierarchist culture of police governance and accountability, which is a system
whereby:

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28 B. Cole

Problems are attributed to poor compliance with rules and procedures; remedy is more,
strict procedures and rules, better coordination, more control and more ‘grip’ by the
authorities at the top. (Terpstra 2011a, p. 90)

This presupposes a ‘master-servant’ police-public relationship that may become

problematic where the police are expected to work with communities as equal
partners, which is a key requirement of Community Policing (see Chaps. 5–10 for
alternative examples).

3.4 Democratic Accountability

As aforementioned, policing in Europe is founded upon the concept that police

powers are used for the benefit of the state and its citizens. This is often described as
democratic policing whereby the police are managed by and accountable to
democratically elected representatives of the public, both at national and local
levels. However, democratic accountability is discussed in more detail and is often
used to refer to the accountability of the police to representatives of the public at the
local level. It could be argued that this form of accountability can only be truly
democratic if there is a direct community input into police accountability.
Democratic accountability does not exist simply because the police are accountable
to local political representatives such as Mayors and Police and Crime
Commissioners. Although it is not uncommon for these local representatives to
seek local opinions on policing via different forms of police consultative processes
and surveys, there is little evidence that these processes are effective in calling the
police to account.
Muller (2002) argues that in the Netherlands, democratic accountability is
essentially non-existent or ineffective; the Dutch police have no formal obligation
of accountability to the elected municipal council. The Council only has a right to
call upon the Mayor for information about decisions made in the Regional Board
and to offer advice about the annual policy plan (Terpstra 2004, 2011a, b). Similar
conclusions have been reached with regards to the practice of democratic
accountability in the United Kingdom where the British Home Office (representing
central government) is the most powerful in the tripartite structure of governance
and accountability in that country. The introduction of the Police and Crime
Commissioners (PCCs) in 2012 has not altered this situation. PCCs are responsible
for the general administration of the local forces and may, like their Dutch coun-
terparts, make a contribution to policing plans. Many of the provisions in the British
Police Acts that allow the PCCs to call chief constables to account on policing
matters must be ratified by the Home Office for these to be effective.
There is no historical or research evidence that European citizens have felt that
their local or national police forces are directly accountable to them through their
Mayors, local councils or PCCs. The only avenues through which citizens could
directly call the police to account are through the courts or via a police complaints

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3 ‘One for All and All for One’: Fostering Accountability … 29

structure or Ombudsman. There is no direct neighbourhood or community oversight

of police actions anywhere in Europe. Hence, the extent to which the police are
answerable to communities in Europe is still unclear.
Terpstra (2011a) argued that Community Policing does present its own distinct
governance and accountability challenges. Many key writers on Community
Policing have expressed doubts about whether making the police accountable in a
Community Policing set up is workable or even desirable (see for example,
Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Kelling et al. 1988). This critical view rests on several
arguments:
1. The disciplinary clause that is central in the definition of accountability implies
that communities will be empowered to discipline police officers for not com-
plying with community demands. A possible consequence of this is that the
constitutional position of the police as a non-political independent law
enforcement authority may be compromised where they are seen to be pun-
ishable for non-compliance with community-defined policing demands.
2. It has been argued that governance and accountability are difficult to implement
in Community Policing because relations between the police and members of
the Community Policing networks are “horizontal and more or less egalitarian”
(Terpstra 2011a, p. 99). Presumably, police accountability can only work where
the relationship between the police and society is hierarchical, i.e., where
governance is by command and accountability by sanctions as opposed to
accountability by negotiation, persuasion, consultation or even reward.
3. It has also been argued that making the police accountable for Community
Policing might incur an additional level of accountability on community police
officers who, like police officers in other police departments, are already
accountable on various other fronts. As Terpstra (2011a, p. 87) explains, “local
community police officers, for example, can find themselves stretched between
the accountability demands of the local community and those flowing from
professional, managerial and central government sources.”
4. Moreover, the fact that Community Policing is a partnership agreement that may
include several other actors, raises important questions about how accountability
would be structured as the other actors may be subject to different structures of
accountability. More importantly, would the police then be expected to be
accountable to all of the other partners?
Thus, a key argument in the debate on police accountability in Community
Policing is whether the accountability of the neighbourhood police officer should be
determined within the overall framework of existing accountability structures or
whether an additional or different form of accountability should be imposed for
Community Policing, to which only community police officers would be liable.
Terpstra (2011a) talked about a “democratic deficit” in current police account-
ability structures. Many would support the view that the community voice in the
current accountability structures is minimal and therefore, democratic policing is
not practiced in full anywhere in Europe. Whereas many police forces in Europe are

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30 B. Cole

encouraging their police to work more closely with communities epitomised in the
emergence of various modern policing initiatives such as ‘citizen-focused policing’,
it is interesting that the need to make the police directly accountable to citizens has
received very little or no political support.
Many authors have argued that different types of accountability may accompany
different types of relationships. Indeed, accountability can take several forms
—“internal and external, local and centralized, vertical and horizontal, upwards and
downwards” (Terpstra 2011a, b, p. 89; see also Hupe and Hill 2007; Somerville
2009; Walker 2002).
Terpstra (2011a, p. 90) further argued that “various forms of governance and
accountability may be understood as reflecting different underlying cultures:
fatalist, hierarchical, individualist and egalitarian.” As discussed above, the
European approach to police accountability appears to be traditionally enshrined in
the hierarchist culture. Terpstra described two of the remaining three cultures of
accountability: ‘egalitarian’ and ‘individualist’—as less rigid forms of account-
ability and governance. In the egalitarian culture of accountability, there is room
for ‘participation’ in decision-making and in co-production of ‘equal’ members, and
more trust is put “in the participation of lower-level members” (Terpstra 2011a,
p. 90). An individualist culture would emphasise market-like incentives to guide
individual action and define success. The individualist culture of accountability
might further be interpreted as implying that the ‘official and bureaucratic’ approach
in the hierarchist culture and the ‘people-centred’ approach in the egalitarian model
are non-existent as all those involved in Community Policing are equally
accountable to mutually agreed performance goals.

3.5 A Roundtable of Accountabilities: Accountability

Among Equals

Community policing is about making policing “everybody’s business” (cf. Walsh

and Conway 2011, p. 71). Whereas a Community Policing initiative may be
managed by a local authority department, it is still essentially an assembly of
equals. Thus, what is important in Community Policing is not whether police
powers are being used legally or appropriately but whether agreed aims and aspi-
rations are being complied with as expected. Implicit in this perception is the
responsibility requirement that is binding on all involved. Community police offi-
cers may have to use their discretion much more than other beat officers, as the
terrain within which they work is flexible and involves different partners.
Accordingly, whether they are acting responsibly, considerably and fairly may be
more important than whether they are abiding by the letters of the law. More
importantly, the brunt of whether a Community Policing initiative is successful or
not, should not lie on the backs of the police alone. Those who stand to benefit most
from Community Policing are the communities themselves. Unfortunately, it has

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3 ‘One for All and All for One’: Fostering Accountability … 31

never been a key issue whether communities themselves could be held accountable
for the success or failure of Community Policing initiatives in their neighbour-
hoods. All those that have the power to hold others to account must themselves be
prepared to be held accountable for their own actions.
The egalitarian nature of Community Policing is its key strength that makes it a
part of police work most akin to democratic policing. It would be appropriate,
therefore, if the approach to accountability in Community Policing embraces this
egalitarian nature by making accountability in Community Policing mutual—
whereby each member of the partnership is empowered to hold the others to
account for actions taken in respect of meeting stated aims and objectives (see
Fig. 3.2). To use a medical analogy, “it makes physician and patient accountable to
each other for the patient’s health” (Kelling et al. 1988, p. 4).
Sanctions will be imposed collectively for mutually agreed misdoings or inef-
ficiencies. Rewards might also be given in order to encourage better performance
(see Kelling et al. 1988). Thus, accountability will project a less judgemental pose
and will be seen as a positive approach towards effectiveness and efficiency. This
approach may need to be managed or ‘overseen’ by the local authority, however,
the Community Policing partners will not be accountable to the local government

Other Agencies

Community
Representatives Social Services
(Local Authority)
Community Policing
Priorities
Responsibility-focused
Accountability by negotiation,
deliberation and consensus

Business Sector Police

Fig. 3.2 ‘Roundtable’ accountability in community policing

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32 B. Cole

but instead to the policing goals that have been set for their Community Policing
project. In addition to closely resembling the egalitarian culture in Terpstra’s
(2011a) typology, this approach to accountability also embraces the individualist
culture whereby accountability is not dictated top-down but seen as the individual
responsibility of all those guided by mutually agreed goals. This approach will
strengthen citizen empowerment, encourage transparency and increase public
confidence in Community Policing. The fact that communities themselves might be
held accountable where Community Policing objectives are not being met as a
result of inefficiency on their part, would be a radical departure from current
practice. Community’s representatives could then be called to account and made to
put right what is required of them in order for a Community Policing project to run
as planned. In addition, this approach allows ‘face-to-face’ contact with the person
to whom one is accountable, not a distant Mayor or PCC and accountability is
through dialogue, negotiation and consultation.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, it has been argued that democratic accountability and the legitimacy
of the police is strengthened where both the police and the communities are
accountable to each other and accountability is not enforced by punishments alone
but also by rewards. The chapter advocates what is essentially a participatory
governance and accountability approach where local Community Policing initia-
tives are managed by the representatives of the agencies constituting the
Community Policing partnership, including the police, who are accountable to each
other in a ‘roundtable’ fashion whereby accountability is mutual and complemen-
tary as it should exist among equals. In this framework, the burden of the success or
failure of Community Policing will be borne not only by the police alone but the
communities also.

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Chapter 4
Community Policing: The Relevance
of Social Contexts

Mark van der Giessen, Elisabeth Brein and Gabriele Jacobs

4.1 Introduction

Even though crime rates have been declining in Europe since the mid-1990s, the
perception of many is that crime rates have in fact been increasing (Millie and
Herrington 2005; see also Kappeler and Gaines 2015; Lee and McGovern 2014 for
discussions on fear of crime). Furthermore, elevated levels of fear of crime correlate
with a decreased confidence in the functioning of police forces and organisations
(Millie and Herrington 2005). The feeling of insecurity combined with the per-
ception that crime is rising in communities is also called the reassurance gap
(Millie and Herrington 2005). Traditionally, the perceived increase of crime and
corresponding decreased levels of confidence in police functioning has underpinned
a need for reassurance of the public as a means of gaining legitimacy for policing
decisions (Millie and Herrington 2005; see also Hamilton-Smith et al. 2014;
Mazerolle et al. 2013). This change in policing climate has led to far-reaching
changes in policing style and raised important questions regarding what the
expansion of the traditional policing role to Community Policing (CP) means to
various communities and police forces. Research shows that a reduction of inse-
curity or risk experienced by people has a positive impact on their perception of
crime, thus reducing this reassurance gap (Millie and Herrington 2005). This means
that the police should tackle volume crime effectively but also target risks identified
by the public in order to address the reassurance gap and (re)define

M. van der Giessen (&)
E. Brein
G. Jacobs

CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam
The Netherlands
e-mail: vandergiessen@rsm.nl

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 35

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_4

bayerl@rsm.nl
36 M. van der Giessen et al.

CP. Contemporary Community Policing is then instrumental in reassuring citizens

and reinforcing trust in and legitimacy of the police (cp. Chap. 3).
Community Policing is commonly introduced as the policing antidote to con-
temporary problems of crime and safety and has even been called the “most
important development in law enforcement in the past quarter century” (Skogan
2006, p. 3). However, CP is not a uniform concept, as there are almost as many
definitions as there are books and articles published on the subject and CP has
different meanings to different people (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Kappeler and
Gaines 2015). Because modern day communities are increasingly complex, diverse
and multi-cultural, no one single approach to delivering public safety and security
can prove successful for everyone all of the time. Community Policing invariably
has to be adapted to the local context, where “history and social context add to the
complications” (Brogden and Nijhar 2005, p. 230). The export of CP practices and
technologies from the UK and North America to other states has shown to be
problematic, as it is not clear how CP could be implemented in these different social
contexts (Casey 2010; Hail 2015a).
A lack of recognition for the diversity present even within neighbourhoods, with
a plurality of communities that may or may not wish to engage with statutory
authorities, is a common problem among CP approaches (Skogan 2006). Because
any form of collaboration and partnership requires mutual trust and understanding,
trust and confidence building have been both a requirement and a goal of CP efforts
across Europe (Van der Giessen et al. 2016). Care must be taken in assuming that
any community wants to be involved in policing activities as many in the public
may not in fact trust the police sufficiently to collaborate. Similarly, care must be
taken in assuming that local police forces trust (all segments of) communities
sufficiently for collaboration and empowerment. The European CP landscape is
exceedingly complex because the disparate social contexts of local trust and per-
ceived legitimacy of police roles in CP efforts do not lend themselves to a uniform
operationalization or implementation of CP strategies.
With social context, also known as social environment, we mean the immediate
physical setting in which people live. It includes the political, economic, social,
technological, legal and economic conditions of a community. Although
Community Policing continues to develop in both its conceptualization and
implementation, providing positive outcomes for the public and the police, the lack
of attention to the complexity of the European CP landscape has resulted in
unintended consequences (see for example Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Beck 2002;
Dvoršek 1996; Fruhling 2002; Innes 2004; Staniforth 2015). The implementation of
Community Policing has been fraught with difficulties and its effectiveness is often
under dispute as a result (Kappeler and Gaines 2015; OSCE 2008). It is possible to
overcome these complexities, but both practitioners and academics must take heed
of the importance of local context as well as mutual trust and perceived legitimacy
of the police’s role in CP. In this chapter, we offer a discussion of these require-
ments for Community Policing (see also Chaps. 5 and 17).

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4 Community Policing: The Relevance of Social Contexts 37

4.2 The Context-Specific Nature of ‘European’

Community Policing

Community Policing as an ideology commonly draws on two historical views: a

‘golden isles view’ where somewhere in the modern world CP works well and a
‘golden age history’ where sometime in the past the relationship between police and
citizens was harmonious (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). The truth is more nuanced,
however, as in reality CP has never been singularly successful anywhere. CP has
developed gradually and in a very localized and fragmented manner over the past
two centuries, where every instantiation has been an effort to build on previous
lessons learned.
The CP philosophy prevalent in Europe today, sometimes referred to as the
Anglo-American model, originated in eighteenth century England and America
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005). The socio-economic backdrop throughout Europe was
such that riots were occurring over food shortages, high prices, religious prejudice
and a strong divide between the isolated rich and the newly made poor (Kappeler
and Gaines 2015; Richardson 1974). It was during these tumultuous times that
newly appointed Home Secretary for the UK Robert Peel, now commonly con-
sidered the father of modern policing, established the Metropolitan Police Act in
1829 (cp. Chap. 3). The act drastically restructured the prevalent police forces,
uniting a previously fragmented policing system and establishing a police office
staffed by paid constables (Kappeler and Gaines 2015). This move constituted the
first contemporary instance of institutionalization of policing by consent, where the
police officer is conceptualized as a local citizen who is selected from—and held
accountable by—his peers and police power stems from the community (Brogden
1982; Brogden and Nijhar 2005):
Police at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the
historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police, the police being
only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are
incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
(Metropolitan Police Act 1829)

Although the development of the American tradition of CP can be traced back to

this English origin, the American police reform and institutionalization of CP
principles did not start until later and proved to be far more gradual. There was no
single event for the American police institution to trigger the transformation of
policing toward a model of consent and community relationships. Instead, CP
emerged over the years as historical forces set the stage: “isolation of the police
from the public and a growing use of overt and symbolic violence to control select
groups in society” (Kappeler and Gaines 2015, p. 89). As was the case in Europe,
the backdrop was one of civil unrest, where racial tensions, civil disorder, fear of
crime and a series of riots sparked and pushed the institutionalization and devel-
opment of CP principles. It was 1845 when full-time police forces started forming,
and 1929 when the Police Chief of Berkeley California, August Vollmer, spear-
headed the American police reform movement (Kappeler and Gaines 2015).

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38 M. van der Giessen et al.

However, even after the reform, the American police was still very much iso-
lated from the public they served, relying on personal rather than constitutional
authority, and lacking the relationship with the public necessary for the creation of
safety through CP (Greene 2000; Kappeler and Gaines 2015). It was not until the
1970s that the basic issues and ideas that would ultimately be considered
Anglo-American CP became prevalent in the American police discourse and
practice (Goldstein 1979; Trojanowicz 1973; Trojanowicz and Dixon 1974;
Trojanowicz et al. 1975). Rising crime rates, loss of confidence in traditional
policing methods, increased social polarisation and city riots seemed beyond the
ability of law enforcement control, sparking discussions regarding the effectiveness
of traditional policing and the proper role of the police in a democratic society
(Zhao et al. 1995).
Community Policing came to be seen as a suitable reaction to the perceived
failures of traditional policing as police practitioners, academics and policy-makers
in the Western world agreed that the traditional style of policing, which focused
mainly on law enforcement, was no longer sufficient to tackle emerging crime and
safety concerns of contemporary societies (OSCE 2008). The police simply did not
have the resources or capabilities to deal with the increasingly complex underlying
causes of crime without the assistance of other state and non-state agencies—and of
key importance, the public (see also Chaps. 2, 3, 5 and 12). This is particularly the
case in our increasingly multi-cultural society where certain (less privileged, low
income, minority) segments are especially vulnerable to crime and disorder and
enforcement demands prevention, partnership working and problem solving (OSCE
2008). The subsequent widespread adoption and further development of
Community Policing during the late 1980s in Europe, America and England has
been described by many as a policing paradigm shift away from a reactive,
task-driven approach toward a community focused one where policing involves
non-enforcement tasks and assistance for and with the community (Hail 2015a). It
is clear however that, even when adopting a historical view of ‘European CP’, it has
never been uniform in its underlying social philosophy, implementation or
effectiveness.

4.3 Contemporary Community Policing in Europe

Community Policing has been a popular buzzword in Anglo-American policing

since the 80s (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). However, as with many other policing
models, Community Policing is an ambiguous concept. As European policing is
comprised of multiple contexts and people, it should come as no surprise that there
are also numerous strategies, practices and approaches adopted across Europe with
the label of Community Policing, which sometimes have very little in common
(OSCE 2008). It includes approaches such as multi-agency policing, focused
policing, reassurance policing and problem-oriented policing.

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4 Community Policing: The Relevance of Social Contexts 39

Comparing different labels employed by police organisations across Europe,

England and Wales have adopted the label of neighbourhood policing to describe
their proactive local policing activities, whilst the French police have adopted the
label police de proximité and the Spanish policia de proximidad. In Scotland, the
label attached to locally delivered policing is Community Policing, including both
community and neighbourhood policing concepts in the overarching concept of
reassurance policing (Hail 2015a; Hamilton-Smith et al. 2014). To date, there has
not been a singular definition to describe Community Policing. It is therefore
difficult to determine, which developments and activities fit the definition of
‘Community Policing’.
Although the philosophy of CP has changed considerably throughout the years
and will continue to develop further, contemporary Community Policing is based
on the assumption that tackling contemporary problems related to crime and safety
requires a reframing of the police’s role in society and (enhanced) relationships with
the local community (Kappeler and Gaines 2015). Narratives on contemporary
policing have evolved in recent times to situate the concept of local policing as an
overarching term, which includes a variety of policing strategies: from a reactive
style of response-based policing to a more proactive style, all with a focus on the
local area or community. Approaches range from the grand policing philosophy of
Community Policing to specific forms of problem solving by for example the local
beat officer (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). At its core however, Community Policing
constitutes a reframing of the role of the police in society, where a previously
narrow role of reactive policing focused on crime and law enforcement is expanded
to include a myriad of proactive community oriented solutions to contemporary
problems of crime and safety (Hail 2015a; Kappeler and Gaines 2015; OSCE 2008;
Skogan 2008).
Some authors have expanded on the ‘role for the public’ in CP, stating that it is
“with and for the community rather than policing on the community”, emphasizing
the police-community partnership aspect in problem solving strategies (Barnes and
Eagle 2007; p. 162, see also Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Skogan 2008). Taking the
roots of policing by consent to heart, Community Policing not only embodies
partnership for solving local problems but can also enable the empowerment of the
community rather than dictating needs and requirements from a position of
authority (Kappeler and Gaines 2015). Other prominent elements of CP are the
importance of proximity (Terpstra 2009), dealing with community-specific needs
and problems and developing trust and reassurance through local accountability and
transparency (Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Regardless of its exact form, the objective
of CP is tackling criminality in all its forms and reassuring communities through
partnership, problem solving and an enhanced relation with the public (Barnes and
Eagle 2007; Crawford et al. 2003; Kappeler and Gaines 2015; OSCE 2008; Skogan
2008; Terpstra 2009).
When practitioners and community members across Europe are asked what they
consider Community Policing to entail, they describe Community Policing prac-
tices largely in terms of building relationships of trust and understanding, working
together, communication and interaction and addressing local needs and issues

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40 M. van der Giessen et al.

(Bayerl et al. 2016; Van der Giessen et al. 2016). However, although it is clear that
a common understanding of the general CP philosophy exists, there are consider-
able differences across countries and subgroups regarding the prioritization and
implementation of specific CP elements (cp. case examples in Part 2).
Although trust and mutual understanding are almost unanimously considered
important, there are still local differences in terms of how best to actually promote
trust, confidence and understanding across Europe (see also Hail 2015a; Kääriäinen
and Niemi 2014). In a recent study on CP practices in Europe, Belgian police
officers for example operationalized the promotion of trust primarily through pro-
moting accountability and transparency of police functioning, while local minority
community members in Belgium prioritized improving social cohesion and
embeddedness (Van der Giessen et al. 2016; see also Chap. 8).
In the Anglo-American model, Community Policing is often implemented in a
way to contribute to a visible presence in the streets as a means of providing
reassurance and a source of security to the public. Police should be both locally
accountable and transparent where they must have discretion and should use this
positively to maximize community confidence in the police (Brogden and Nijhar
2005). Similarly, although there is a consensus on the notion that no single agency
is equipped to deal with the complex and convoluted reality of local community
safety and crime problems, some emphasize law enforcement agency and service
provider cooperation, while others emphasize police–community partnership (Hail
2015a; Van der Giessen et al. 2016). Combined these two approaches are com-
monly referred to as the mixed economy of policing, where the inclusion of
non-police agencies in the creation of safety increases the opportunities to resolve
local issues (Skogan 1994).
Ideally, Community Policing involves a combination of the two approaches. The
basic premise of German CP, for example, is that a network of engaged partners is
required, where the community itself will “take responsibility and do its part to
prevent crime” (Marin 2011 p. 21; see also Hail 2015a). This generally involves
consulting, engaging and mobilizing the community in order to identify and tackle
local community problems and their underlying causes, setting priorities for actions,
multi-agency policing, reassurance policing and other pro-active problem solving
strategies (OSCE 2008).
When it comes to communication and interaction between the police and local
communities, similar differences in prioritization and implementation occur. When
Bulgarian police officers were asked about their implementation of CP, they for
example predominantly mentioned actions related to information gathering and
sharing between not only police and community partners but also with other local
partners. This can be contrasted with the Community Policing actions desired by
local community members in Finland, who preferred CP initiatives related to
improving the availability, accessibility and approachability of local community
officers (Van der Giessen et al. 2016). These differences can be attributed in part to
specific local needs and concerns (see also case studies in Chaps. 5–11).
The traditional response to crime and disorder is maintenance policing. However,
this requires agreement about policing priorities in specific neighbourhoods and

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4 Community Policing: The Relevance of Social Contexts 41

communities where this may not exist. There is a substantial body of research that
suggests there is often disagreement even within communities on what priorities for
Community Policing should be (Kappeler and Gaines 2015). Adopting a
one-size-fits-all approach to dealing with these community problems would likely not
deal with the different issues and priorities that exist. Depending on these local
requirements, some practitioners emphasize the importance of proactive policing for
Community Policing, while others emphasize the importance of cooperation to address
local needs and issues reactively as they emerge (Van der Giessen et al. 2016). Police
organisations in England and Whales for example have adopted the label of ‘neigh-
bourhood policing’ to refer to proactive local services (Hail 2015a), and CP practi-
tioners in some other European countries also prioritize Community Policing focused
on prevention, protection and intervention (Van der Giessen et al. 2016; cp. Chaps. 5
and 10). On the other hand, others still maintain a reactive modus operandi, provided
that local needs and issues remain central. ‘Soft’ policing activities related to providing
assistance and service are sometimes considered as more influential to improve
police-community relations than reactive or prevention oriented policing efforts (Van
der Giessen et al. 2016). Such differences require different communication strategies.
In short, although countries and groups seem to agree on the main core concepts,
considerable differences exist regarding what constitutes Community Policing in
practice. Police forces and communities thus have differing perspectives within and
across countries on what ‘community partnership’ entails (Hail 2015a). As such, the
local needs, requirements and therefore implementation of Community Policing
could differ drastically depending on the country, community and background of
local CP officers. Hence, Community Policing efforts need to content with an
inherent multi-contextuality in tasks, processes and objectives.

4.4 The Multi-contextuality of European Community

Policing

A long tradition in management research shows that the social context has a major
impact on the meaning, interpretation and implementation of specific governance
practices (Hofstede 1993). Policing, and CP practices specifically, are no exception.
For example, Terpstra and Fyfe (2015) have recently shown for the Scottish and
Dutch police that policies and strategies change their meaning quite a bit on their
way to implementation. Jacobs and colleagues (2008) found similar effects within
the German policing context. Neighbourhoods serve as the primary focus of police
organisations where community consensus and structures guide the police response
to the community’s crime and security problems. Community Policing is thereby
embedded in its respective communities and the success of Community Policing is
contingent on the requirements and expectations of these communities. Here we
refer to such contingencies as the multi-contextuality of CP, and it is the primary
reason that the export of Anglo-American CP principles to other contexts is so

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42 M. van der Giessen et al.

challenging (see for example Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Dvoršek 1996; Hail 2015a;
Kääriäinen 2007; Van der Giessen et al. 2016).
Although differences between countries, groups and individuals are innumer-
able, one specific factor deserves special attention: Citizen support significantly
enhances police efforts and citizen support is contingent on the trust between police
and their communities (Jackson and Gau 2016; Kääriäinen and Siren 2012; Skogan
2006). The joint pursuit of safety by the police, local communities and other
partners is dependent on the mutual trust between the stakeholders and the per-
ceived legitimacy of the police as a partner in CP. As Myhill put it, the effective and
continuous engagement of local neighbourhoods in CP requires their “willingness,
capacity and opportunity to participate” (Myhill 2012, p. 1, cited in Hail 2015b).
Trust is often used synonymously with legitimacy, although there is an impor-
tant distinction. According to Jackson and Gau (2016, p. 3), trust concerns “peo-
ple’s predictions that individual officers will (and do) do things that they are tasked
to do”, whereas legitimacy “is the property or quality of possessing rightful power
and the subsequent acceptance of, and willing deference to, authority.” Trust thus
refers to the expectation that a person will perform whatever his or her task is, while
legitimacy refers to the extent to which that person is perceived to have the right to
perform that task. For example, a local police force can be both perceived to have
the right to participate in local community events (perceived legitimacy of police
action in the community) and to be effective in offering preventive information
during these events (trust in positive behaviours and outcomes). Vice versa, a local
community can be perceived to have the right to set its own safety priorities and be
trusted to deal with these safety issues when empowered to do so. It is when trust
and legitimacy overlap and exist mutually between the relevant stakeholders that
these CP efforts are most likely to result in partnership and cooperation for CP (see
Jackson and Gau 2016 and Kääriäinen and Niemi 2014 for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the importance of these concepts combining for attitudes toward legal
authorities).
There is a social contract between citizens and government, which ‘legitimates’
the police to have moral and ethical authority (cp. Chap. 3). Citizens give up certain
rights and entrust the police with the expectation that it will carry out expected
activities in a positive manner (Kappeler and Gaines 2015). It is therefore important
to what extent the community accepts police ‘interference’ in the sphere of com-
munity relations and safety. As Virta puts it, “the political culture (and within that,
the specific police culture) provides for an acceptance of state police officers
conducting activities outside more traditional public order and crime-related
functions” (Virta 2002, p. 191). This is central, as Community Policing takes
advantage of police discretionary powers to enable them to conduct a variety of
tasks that were previously not regarded as falling within the orbit of traditional
police work.

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4 Community Policing: The Relevance of Social Contexts 43

There are two presumed underlying trains of thought: instrumental justice and
procedural justice (Kääriäinen and Niemi 2014). Many studies suggest that positive
attitudes toward the police are predominantly due to successful police work and
reductions in crime. This is known as the instrumental approach. Others suggest
that legitimacy and trust are predominantly due to perceived fairness and respectful
treatment by the police. This is the procedural approach (Bradford 2012; Sunshine
and Tyler 2003; Tyler 1990, 2001, 2005). An important complication to note here is
that the public constructs their view of the police not only through their personal
experiences, but also through the experiences of others. For example, members of
ethnic minority groups may not have direct, personal negative experiences with the
police, but because it is common to share experiences in close-knit communities,
first-hand negative experiences can be shared to create a larger culture of distrust
(Kääriäinen and Niemi 2014; Weitzer and Tuch 2005). The police being viewed as
a legitimate organisation not only by an individual, but also by the individual’s
community is therefore paramount in order for support for cooperation with
policing efforts to develop (Bradford et al. 2013; Tyler 2003; Lai and Zhao 2010;
Worral 1999).
With these aspects of trust and legitimacy in place, it is possible to consider the
differences between countries, communities, stakeholders and individuals regarding
(mutual) trust and perceived legitimacy for Community Policing activities.
Community Policing embodies a rapid change in policing where the role of police
has been extended beyond law enforcement, placing additional demands on the
community, which may or may not perceive this extension as legitimate (Bittner
1970; Manning 1997; Wilson 1968). The same applies to perceptions of community
responsibility, where Community Policing can embody responsibilities of com-
munities in safety issues where this was not previously the case. Therefore, when
looking at the implementation of Community Policing across Europe, it is impor-
tant to take into account the political history. Examples where the implementation
of CP has proven difficult due to lacking police legitimacy (among other factors)
include Spain and Italy, where centralized Napoleonic traditions have made it
challenging for both the police and the public to accept CP roles (Hail 2015b).
Differences in perceived legitimacy and trust also seem to exist due to
socio-economic factors, as evidenced by differences between countries and specific
communities. Even within communities, there are numerous groups and subgroups
of people, which may have differing perceptions of the police and their effective-
ness in Community Policing (Brown and Benedict 2002). Nordic countries par-
ticularly evidence relatively high levels of trust in the police; according to
Kääriäinen at least in part due to a generally perceived equality and fairness of
society as well as a high standard of public administration, low level of corruption
and even income distributions among the population (Kääriäinen 2007; Kääriäinen
and Niemi 2014; cp. Chap. 5).

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44 M. van der Giessen et al.

Furthermore, differences also exist between sub-groups within communities. In

Europe, trust in police among ethnic minorities and different socio-economic layers
of society have been studied predominantly in Finland, the Netherlands and Great
Britain (Kääriäinen and Niemi 2014). Generally speaking, middle and upper-class
layers of society show greater levels of trust for their police than do the poor and
minority communities (Kappeler and Gaines 2015; see also Carter 1985; Kappeler
et al. 1998; Scaglion and Condon 1980). This is attributed to several factors,
including perceptions of, for example, racial profiling, frequency of victimization,
injustice, lack of concern on the part of the police and ineffectiveness of policing
efforts (Bowling and Philips 2003; Chan 2011; Roh and Robinson 2009; Warren
2011; Wu et al. 2009).
Kääriäinen and Niemi (2014), for example, found that the longer Somalis lived
in Finland, the less trust they had in the police, predominantly due to experienced
victimization, improper treatment by the police, discrimination and the general
social context of their close-knit community. Another minority community in the
same country, the Russian community, showed similar levels of trust in the police
as the native population despite anti-Russian attitudes and prejudices (Kääriäinen
and Niemi 2014). The factors underlying trust and legitimacy are highly complex,
and further theory building and analysis is needed to identify the factors driving
differences between minority groups in comparable socio-economic settings.
If the implementation of Community Policing occurs without considering these
local requirements, problems invariably arise. For example, a highly visible and
accessible police presence may help reduce fear of crime within some groups of the
community (Brogden and Nijhar 2005), but it may also induce feelings of insecurity
and lowered levels of trust towards the police in other groups of the community due
to the perception of being discriminated against through these specific police
actions (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Staniforth 2015). Furthermore, if these visibility
attempts at legitimacy management are so strong that they could be experienced as
intrusive, they could be considered disingenuous or even lead to suspicion rather
than to trust (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Community Policing can also become
problematic if it deviates from a genuine problem solving ethos towards ‘pseudo’
problem solving through simply appeasing public appetites for enforcement that
may function as unduly exclusionary (cp. Chap. 7). Worse yet, CP can become a
vehicle for the practical implementation of local punitive attitudes against
marginalized or minority groups, if the local political context allows for disin-
genuous policing efforts, causing a deterioration of the police-community
relationship.
Other authors have highlighted that the Western model of Community Policing
is often not related to the requirements of former members of the Eastern block and
that the implementation has occurred irrespective of local requirements (Fruhling
2002). The danger with this form of assistance is that the agenda is set more by
what is available rather than by what is needed, and it often suits sellers rather than
consumers. Such attempts to transfer knowledge to Eastern European countries are
shallow and generally do not bring anything new (Beck 2002; Dvoršek 1996;
although see Chap. 10 for a dziscussion of CP in Croatia).

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4 Community Policing: The Relevance of Social Contexts 45

4.5 Integration of the European Perspectives and Context

of Community Policing

We argue that integrating the above insights regarding European CP practices and
the importance of local context in terms of perceived legitimacy of CP roles and
mutual trust allows for a more comprehensive model of police–public CP efforts in
Europe. In Fig. 4.1, described and shown below, we depict the interplay between
local context, perceptions of legitimacy and trust and CP partnership for local safety
discussed throughout this chapter. As previously stated, Community Policing is not
a uniform concept and the local implementation is highly contingent on the local
context and mutual trust and perceived legitimacy between the police and local
community, both in the traditional policing sense and the expanded CP conceptu-
alization. As such, although local CP efforts are based on Community Policing
principles and generally include elements of trust, communication, cooperation and
addressing local needs and issues, the exact conceptualization and implementation
varies from country to country and community to community.
This variation in Community Policing conceptualizations and implementation
throughout Europe can be attributed to several factors. First and foremost, the
community’s readiness to cooperate, collaborate and partner with the police for CP
is dependent on the community’s trust and perceived legitimacy of the police. As
depicted in Fig. 4.1, a community member is willing to cooperate if the police is
trusted and perceived as legitimate in its traditional role performance, is willing to
collaborate with the police if the police is trusted and considered legitimate in its
expanded role in the community and is willing to accept the police as a partner in

Fig. 4.1 Model of context-specific community policing in Europe

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46 M. van der Giessen et al.

CP efforts when the police is trusted and considered legitimate both in its traditional
role as law enforcer and in the expanded community-oriented role of CP. Similarly,
Community Policing requires an acceptance of the local community role in local
safety issues by the police. Furthermore, Fig. 4.1 also depicts how perceived
legitimacy and trust are highly dependent on the environmental context and per-
ceived justice, which include the political, social and economic context as well as
the individual’s and/or community’s experiences with police treatments and
policing outcomes.
Lastly, it should be emphasized that the local CP context not only has a strong
influence on CP practices, but successful CP practices also influence the local
context. This self-enforcing loop between the local CP context and joint CP efforts
by the police, their partners and the communities (also shown in Fig. 4.1) is the goal
of Community Policing. This involves partnership, shared agenda setting, problem
solving and an enhanced relationship between the police in the public in order to
jointly improve the local situation. As such, Community Policing has the potential
to deal with contemporary problems of crime, safety and reassurance as long as the
requirements of these diverse communities and contexts are met.

4.6 Summary and Recommendations

In this chapter we discussed the high context-dependency of Community Policing.

Community Policing is by definition part of the community where it takes place,
thus it derives its specific meaning, goals and priorities from its communities.
Communities are social and complex phenomena consisting of different composi-
tions of sub-groups and experiences with police. As a consequence, Community
Policing needs to address each specific community with tailor-made approaches.
We argued that a one-size-fits-all approach is not suited for CP, as no single
community is like another. Furthermore, as communities change over time,
Community Policing has to change with them. In this chapter we conceptualized CP
as a process, which is largely determined by mutual trust and legitimacy perceptions
between police and communities. These in turn are dependent on the social context
of the (subgroups within) communities.
Our model leads to the following recommendations:
1. Because the local context has a strong impact on perceptions of justice (fairness
of the treatment by police and satisfaction with policing outcomes) by members
of the community, CP efforts have to consider the social context of each specific
(sub)community in order to be successful. Community Policing needs to be
defined and adapted to each social context in order to deal with local needs and
issues. As such, it is not possible to simply ‘export’ CP best practices developed
in a given time and context and assume positive results.

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4 Community Policing: The Relevance of Social Contexts 47

2. Satisfaction with the performance and outcomes of core tasks of policing and
Community Policing in the broader sense strongly drive the readiness of
community members to cooperate and collaborate with the police to tackle local
concerns related to safety and security. Signs of dissatisfaction of community
members with these core tasks therefore have to be taken seriously. This
includes adequately dealing with, for example, perceptions of racial profiling,
frequency of victimization, injustice, lack of concern on the part of the police
and ineffectiveness of policing efforts.
3. Local communities are not homogenous entities and social complexities within
communities need to be acknowledged. Pleasing the majority or
over-emphasizing needs and expectations of one sub-group over another can
trigger dissatisfaction within other segments of the community. This means all
needs and concerns of local communities, not just those of a majority, must be
taken into account when agenda setting, empowering local actors or visibly
enforcing the law.
4. Community Policing involves an expansion of the social contract between cit-
izens and government placing additional requirements on trust and legitimacy
throughout the whole community. Joint CP efforts can only work when the
community accepts police involvement within their community and the police
accepts the community as a partner for local safety and security. It is important
that all stakeholders acknowledge this, particularly when the socio-political
context is such that police and community roles have historically been very
distinct. Community Policing should therefore involve not only an empower-
ment of local actors, but it might also include an effort to embed police actors
within local communities if the context demands it.
5. Though it is not possible to generalize CP practices developed in a certain
context to other settings without considering the local context, it is desirable to
learn from various local contexts to subsequently apply these lessons to own
communities and CP practices. We have adopted a European perspective to
Community Policing, as we should learn from each other’s approaches to CP
with specific communities in specific policing contexts and subsequently adapt
and adopt those lessons learned. There is a great deal of diversity within Europe,
which is reflected in the diversity within local communities.
Though to date Community Policing has had mixed results and has led to
undesirable side effects, it is our hope that it is possible to overcome these com-
plexities if both practitioners and academics consider the complexities of CP for the
implementation and evaluation of Community Policing efforts in Europe. We hope
we can encourage tailor-made CP approaches. Although Community Policing
requires courage and genuine interest from police and communities, we believe that
this courage can lead to resilient communities and lasting partnerships to deal with
local needs in the areas of safety and security.

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48 M. van der Giessen et al.

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Chapter 5
Community Policing as a Social System
and Its Components

Jarmo Houtsonen, Jari Taponen, Pirjo Jukarainen

and Olavi Kujanpää

5.1 Introduction

Community policing is regarded as a principle that guides police’s efforts, together

with various stakeholders, to proactively identify, address and solve those com-
munity issues that bring about insecurity, crime and disorder.
In this chapter Community Policing is approached within a systemic framework.
Community policing is modelled as a concrete social system that is analysable into
its four components, namely elements, environment, structure and mechanism
(Bunge 1999, 2004). The purpose of this chapter is to give readers—practitioners,
students or other interested individuals—some simple and general tools to under-
stand and analyse particular Community Policing arrangements. A reader should
bear in mind that Community Policing as a social system is a conceptual construct,
but any particular Community Policing arrangement is a concrete real thing.
Although the idea of Community Policing is widely, even globally spread, it
seems to be a generic idea consisting of shared vocabulary rather than a uniformly
implemented strategy and practice (Gill et al. 2014; see also Chap. 4 and cases in
Part 2). Given the possible diversity of Community Policing implementations, the
advantage of this chapter is a common conceptual framework within which one can
think of any particular constellation of Community Policing, regardless of whether
it is a local, regional or national adaptation. Moreover, a common systemic
framework makes possible comparisons between various Community Policing
implementations.
The components of a system can be given the following brief definitions, which
will be expanded in the next section. Elements or members of the system constitute
a system’s composition. The system is relatively autonomous and organized around

J. Houtsonen (&)
J. Taponen
P. Jukarainen
O. Kujanpää

Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu, Tampere, Finland
e-mail: jarmo.houtsonen@poliisi.fi

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 51

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_5

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52 J. Houtsonen et al.

the system’s purpose, but it is embedded in an environment that provides a broader

context with its opportunities and constraints. Structure is a set of relations between
the system elements in addition to the elements’ relations with the elements in the
system’s environment. Finally, mechanisms are various processes that keep the
system running.
In the first section of this chapter these initial definitions are expanded further.
The second section aims to demonstrate the power of these constructs or conceptual
tools by exploring how a concrete Community Policing arrangements are imple-
mented in the city of Helsinki in Finland. The chapter aims not so much to offer an
account of what Community Policing is, or should be, but rather to give the reader
some intellectual and conceptual tools to reflect on Community Policing as a
practice. The systemic framework and its elements are indented to be general,
neutral and abstract concepts without any specific content unless they are applied to
particular cases. The tools are simple, but not superficial. To make them more
complex, one should also consider more explicitly legislation, norms and beliefs in
addition to available resources, capacities and capabilities.

5.2 System Components

A community can be defined both objectively and as a sense of belonging to a

particular social group. Such a community can be a specific neighbourhood or some
other spatial area, a self-identified social group or even a virtual social network.
Nowadays, the border between the local and global, and therefore the internal and
external security is changing, for instance, because of immigration across borders and
the internet. More important than defining the community is that the police work in
partnership with people and organizations to identify and resolve issues that affect
safety and security. Particularly the movement of people requires integrative social
policy measures, cultural competencies and trust between various social groups.
The ‘community’ can be seen as consisting of and covering all those individuals,
civic associations and public and private organizations that are in some way related
to a particular safety and security problem, being a victim or a producer of the
problem. Thus a pragmatic approach to community has to start with the
security-related problem and, rather than the community, see who are the stake-
holders—individuals and groups with an interest in the issue and its outcome—and
work from there to build partnerships to further identify, analyse and solve the
problem (COPS 2014).
Different individuals and organizations can have a variety of relations to a
security problem. First, someone can be a potential or actual source of the problem.
Think, for instance, about drug dealing in a neighbourhood or potential antisocial
behaviour of socially marginalized young men and women (e.g., being without jobs
or schooling) in an area. Second, the problems of these individuals usually affect
many other individuals such as their relatives and friends. Third, safety and
property of some other people might have been directly harmed due to petty crimes

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5 Community Policing as a Social System and Its Components 53

that often follow the use of drugs. Fourth, people living in the neighbourhood,
although not directly involved in any of the incidents, may start feeling insecure and
might want to stay at home in the evenings causing losses to local businesses.
Finally, there are various organizations and associations that provide services and
can help to identify the roots of the problem and find sustainable solutions. These
actors can, for instance, be local civic associations, youth workers, social workers,
local schools, psychiatric nurses and the police.
When we observe a concrete Community Policing system within the systemic
framework, the most immediately noticeable elements (i.e., members) are those of
police officers who are engaged in community related policing functions and their
contacts within different communities. Such community members or stakeholders
can be active or potential individuals, public agencies, community groups,
non-profit and civic service providers and private businesses. The most pertinent
elements and community members are the ones that have an interest in the outcome
of the particular security problem.
Concerning the structure of the Community Policing system, or the relations
between the elements, only such relations are relevant for our purpose that make a
difference within the system in the sense that they have an important effect on the
elements of the system. For instance, if individuals (elements) engage in commu-
nicative relations they change in the process. Communication is regarded as an
important type of relation in Community Policing, while trust is regarded as the
foundation of partnerships needed for solving security problems (COPS 2014).
Indeed, trust between the police and citizens are one of the key properties of
Community Policing relations. Trust is both a prerequisite for and an outcome of
relations between members of the Community Policing system.
We are interested here in relations that involve actual or potential activities such
as communication, collaboration and joint problem solving, since open and recip-
rocal communication between the citizens and Community Policing officers has
positive consequences on trust. Increased confidence between the parties then feeds
back into improved communication, which is likely to have a positive influence on
other Community Policing activities and outcomes.
In a widely spread conception, community-oriented policing is seen as con-
sisting of three key components, namely community partnership, problem-solving
and police organizational transformations (COPS 2014; Gill et al. 2014; Keppeler
and Gaines 2015). Although there are similarities, the three-component constructs
should not be equated with the systemic perspective presented here. One should
note, for instance, that the term community partnership actually merges the two
components that are used here to describe Community Policing as a system—
elements and their relations. With neutral terms, such as an element and a relation,
we can identify all relevant individuals and organizations and also the quality of
their relations, which could even include distrustful or non-existent relations.
Successful implementation of Community Policing, including partnership and
problem solving, presupposes transformations in the police organization.
Management, processes, skills and capabilities should support the building of

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54 J. Houtsonen et al.

partnerships and the application of problem solving to community security issues

(COPS 2014).
The relevant question here is: What is the purpose of Community Policing, and
what are the mechanisms or processes through which Community Policing aims to
achieve its expressed purposes? The prevailing purpose of Community Policing
seems to be the prevention of crime and disorder, increasing police legitimacy and
citizens’ sense of security and wellbeing within their community through various
processes of problem solving. Thus, we argue that the prevailing mechanism of
Community Policing that keeps the system running is problem solving, which can
consist of various sub-processes, methods and techniques. This requires the police
to actively engage in various social relations such as cooperation, collaboration,
communication and information exchange with the relevant community partners in
order to proactively tackle factors that likely contribute to crime, disorder and fear
(Gill et al. 2014; Keppeler and Gaines 2015). The outcome and quality of those
active social relations such as communication and cooperation can be described
with terms such as trust and confidence.
Of the three key components mentioned earlier, problem solving can thus be
regarded as the main Community Policing process. We can also identify various
sub-processes, such as building trust, that can be necessary and supportive but at the
same time subordinate to the main process of problem solving. Indeed, trust
building without any other purpose such as solving security-related issues becomes
a pointless exercise. Problem solving means proactive and systematic identification
and analysis of problems leading to crime, disorder and insecurity and then
developing and evaluating effective responses (COPS 2014; Gill et al. 2014;
Keppeler and Gaines 2015). Such an approach to problem solving requires that
crime, disorder and fear be responded to before they occur or escalate. Moreover,
problem solving requires a thorough understanding of the processes and conditions
that lead to the problems. It also requires the pooling of all relevant capacities and
capabilities available from different public, private and non-profit organizations.
Finally, there are multiple systematic and formalized tools and techniques that can
be used to support problem solving.
Social systems such as Community Policing can be seen as nested and organized
into different levels (see Fig. 5.1). This gives the analyst much flexibility in
selecting the object of analysis based on his or her purposes, while maintaining the
systematic and neutral character of the construct of a system. This flexibility means,
firstly, that Community Policing arrangements in a particular police department
could be viewed and analysed as a system in its own right. Secondly, such
Community Policing arrangements and activities can be regarded as a component of
a higher-level system of general policing in that department. Finally, specific
Community Policing arrangements, resources and methods with respect to a par-
ticular problem and community, say the use of drugs in a particular residential area,
can be analysed within the systemic framework as a specific social system with its
own elements, structure, environment and mechanisms (see also Chap. 2).

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5 Community Policing as a Social System and Its Components 55

Fig. 5.1 System and its components at two levels

5.3 Community Policing in Finland

Community policing as a social system which fits our components—elements,

environment, structure and mechanisms—is a conceptual construct. In the fol-
lowing the construct and concepts will be illustrated by describing a concrete
Community Policing arrangement in the city of Helsinki, Finland.
Finland is part of the Nordic countries and a Member State of the European
Union. The number of inhabitants in Finland is slightly over 5.4 million. The
official languages are Finnish and Swedish. Only 5–6% of the inhabitants speak
some other language as their mother tongue (mainly Russian, Estonian or Somali).
Finland is often called the land of a thousand lakes, and it has a large countryside
where distances between urban areas can be hundreds of kilometres. The police are
a state authority under the Ministry of Interior. It consists of 11 Local Police
Departments, the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Police University College.
The Police Commissioner together with the National Police Board supervises these
units at a strategic level. The number of police officers has been in decline due to
the state’s cost-saving policy. The number of police officers today is approximately
7.000, which is one of the lowest rates in Europe compared to the population.
However, in comparison to other European countries recorded crime rates are fairly
low (Brogden and Nijhar 2005).
The strategic goals of the Finnish Police are ensuring safety and security, pre-
venting crime, the efficient provision of services and maintaining trust as well as
influencing the overall development of the society. Preventive policing is the pre-
ferred overall approach to police work. Community policing and collaborative

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56 J. Houtsonen et al.

security problem solving are one of the basic tools of preventive police work. They
cover cooperation with other authorities, local communities and residents. Building
bridges and trust between the police and citizens, especially in vulnerable com-
munities, is seen as an important task of the police organization. Generally speaking
96% of all Finnish people trust the police very much or somewhat (Vuorensyrjä and
Fagerlund 2016).
The following historical sketch outlines the changing environment of the
Community Policing system in Finland. The concept and modes of preventive
police work has been transformed through the decades. In the 1950s, when Finland
was still mostly an agrarian society, village constables were a very close part of the
civil society. Constables lived in their own district and knew practically all residents
in their area. Village cops solved different kinds of security issues and social
problems and mediated tensions and conflicts between villagers (Brogden and
Nijhar 2005; Virta 2013).
Increasing urbanization doubled the amount of crimes in the cities. As a con-
sequence so called ‘Block Policing’ was introduced. Block constables’ main tasks
were maintaining law and order in towns by foot or bicycle patrolling in certain
blocks in the centres, i.e., they were trying to prevent accidents, disorder and crime
in particular town blocks. The preferred methods of prevention were early identi-
fication and intervention in addition to youth and school policing in the form of
legal education and advice (Ministry of the Interior, the Report of the Block
Policing 1979).
The continued urbanization and migration from the countryside to suburbs in the
1970s brought block policing to an end. The number of police officers was reduced
and foot patrols could not respond to the demands of a changing society. Foot and
bicycle block patrols were replaced by car patrols, whose area of operation
expanded to suburban neighbourhoods. The main tasks of Area Policing were equal
provision of preventive police services in every region or town, rationalization of
preventive policing, building bridges to the communities and gathering regional
intelligence. In principle, however, the major difference between block and area
policing was only the extended area of operation. Both activities were regarded as
forms of Community Policing, the purposes of which were to bring the police
nearer to the citizens (Mantila 1987).
Over the decades, Finland has also had other concepts of preventive policing
such as youth constables, school liaison officers and community liaison officers
depending on the period of time and local conditions and needs. The purpose of
these diverse roles has always been to prevent crime and public disturbances by
maintaining a public presence and interacting with citizens and communities
(Poliisihallitus 2015).
Currently, the Anglo-American model of Community Policing has been adopted
in adjusted form in Finland starting in 1996. However, an exact literal translation
for Community Policing does not exist in the Finnish language. Therefore, the
concept was translated as lähipoliisi (‘Proximity Policing’) when it was initially
presented in 1978 (Virtas 2002). In addition, partly due to a much smaller police
force in Finland, the Anglo-American Community Policing model has been

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5 Community Policing as a Social System and Its Components 57

transformed to adjust to the Finnish reality. Policing is generally viewed as

high-quality, citizen-focused proactive policing at the local level. It is more or less a
way of thinking that should pass through all policing practices so that the police can
better serve citizens, meet their security needs and create a safer society (Virta
2013).
Community and preventive policing has tended to have a somewhat ambiguous
position and low status within the Finnish police. In many countries, not only in
Finland, preventive work is perceived as a secondary type of policing conducted by
community or school constables. Preventive policing applies ‘soft’ methods that are
seen in opposition to ‘hard’ methods used in ‘real’ crime fighting and law enforcement
(Virta 2013). Furthermore, although the Ministry of the Interior has issued general
strategies of Community Policing and preventive work during the past forty years (see
e.g., Sisäasiainministeriö 1979, 1987; Sisäministeriö 2014), the work itself has been
carried out in the absence of much guidance or supervision. The community constables
have developed preventive police work methods rather independently and locally
without a larger strategic framework or a general purpose. Finally, the systematic
organization and management of Community Policing were neglected and resources
allocated to proactive work were limited. (Brogden and Nijhar 2005).
During the past few years the environment of Community Policing has changed
quite drastically. The Finnish government has had to readjust the scope of public
services in the context of a downward national economy and a diminishing state
budget. For the police this meant austerity measures and administrative restruc-
turing such as merging police departments (districts) and closing down police
stations. The newly established National Police Board has reinforced the supervi-
sion of police departments, for instance, by standardizing the policing organization
and processes (Haraholma and Houtsonen 2013). For preventive policing these
administrative changes have meant efforts to unify management principles and
supervision by results in order to improve the effectiveness of preventive work. In
addition to administrative and managerial changes, the increasing movement of
people, services and capital, and the digitalization of life have created a very
complex operational policing environment. Crime has become more transnational
and the forms of crime and fear of crime have diversified. This uncertain and
multidimensional environment puts the police in an ambiguous situation with many
options and goals. Hence, it became crucial to build a sense of a shared purpose or
direction that can combine various practices, principles and traditions into a
coherent whole to achieve common goals.
The Finnish Ministry of the Interior launched a new preventive policing strategy
in 2014. The strategy ordered the National Police Board (NPB) to make a more
detailed implementation plan. NPB decided to develop preventive policing work
through a program the aim of which is to improve societal security and prevent
crime. According to NPB preventive policing consists of two aspects: First, there is
general preventive work. Daily policing work, both patrolling and crime investi-
gation, should be carried out in ways that prevent crime and disorder and improve
the citizen’s feeling of security. Second, there is specific preventive policing work.
Here preventive policing is a specific policing function that proactively improves

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58 J. Houtsonen et al.

security. This specific type of policing should be organized, managed and supported
by uniform structures and processes. Such preventive policing, or Community
Policing, includes also the Internet police and annually selected specific projects
such as the prevention of radical extremism (Poliisihallitus 2015).
Social and health policy measures that promote equality have a strong preventive
impact against crime and disorder (e.g., Pike 1985). Effective crime prevention
requires a credible criminal policy and legal system in addition to well-functioning
social policies. The public, private and non-governmental organizations producing
welfare services strive for equal opportunities for all to well-being and good life.
These services can be regarded as the mainstay of the Nordic welfare states. Within
this framework the police are not only a crime fighting tool, but also an agent
together with other agents that try to prevent crime, social disorder and deprivation
and increase the sense of security and well-being of citizens. As a Nordic welfare
state Finland invests much more resources in the social and welfare services than
public safety services including the police. The emphasis on social rather than
safety services is likely one of the explanations why citizens in the Nordic countries
have such a strong trust in the police (Kääriäinen 2007).
The Finnish welfare society has been quite stable so far, but now, as a result of
weakening economic growth and increasing unemployment rates, politicians and
the public sector struggle to ensure social integration and equality while cutting
spending on public services. Growing unemployment and social exclusion increase
the sense of insecurity and social tensions and complicate the integration of
marginalized individuals and groups into the society.

5.4 Community Policing in Helsinki

At the turn of the year 2015, the population of Helsinki was about 620,000, while
there were 1.1 million inhabitants in the Helsinki Metropolitan area. Since 2010 the
annual growth was about 10,000 persons leading to a population growth forecast of
100,000 new residents by the year 2035.1 Demographics of Helsinki differ from the
rest of the country. The largest age group in Helsinki comprises young adults
between 23 and 33 years of age, whereas in the whole country 56 to 66 year olds
form the largest group.2In addition, the birth rate and increase in foreign-born
immigrants is much faster here than in the rest of the country. Almost 90% of the
Finnish migration falls upon the Helsinki region. About one third of this is
immigration. In Helsinki, the proportion of people whose first language is neither of
the two official language, Finnish of Swedish, is about 13.5% (Helsinki 2016).
Although there are wealth differences, the socio-economic composition of the
residential areas in Helsinki is relatively equal compared with some other European

1
Statistics Finland, www.stat.fi (accessed October 25, 2016).
2
Helsinki by district 2014, www.hel.fi (accessed October 25, 2016).

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5 Community Policing as a Social System and Its Components 59

metropolitan areas. A well-functioning social policy in conjunction with equality in

urban planning has prevented the development of grossly deprived areas. However,
the current economic recession together with the increasing immigration may
increase and accelerate the segregation of particular residential areas and
neighbourhoods.
Finland received more than 35,000 asylum seekers in 2015, especially from Iraq,
who were distributed across the country in refugee centres run under the national
reception system for asylum seekers. It is likely that asylum seekers will later move
to Helsinki region due to better job opportunities and already existing migrant
communities. Immigrants live more likely in the outskirts of Helsinki in tenement
blocks than Finns who have spread more evenly in rental flats and owner-occupied
detached houses. In addition, immigrants live in cramped flats and in the margins of
poverty more often than Finns (Nieminen et al. 2015).
The growth of asylum seekers in the context of weak national economy and
scarce employment affects the social climate and the way many Finns perceive their
social and economic opportunities. Experts do not see a swift economic growth on
the horizon, while the integration of immigrants into the Finnish society due to
scarce employment opportunities seems difficult. Hate speech and hate crime has
been building up (Tihveräinen 2016). An anti-immigration National Socialist
movement named ‘Suomen vastarintaliike’ (‘Finnish Resistance’) has become
active in street demonstrations and on social media. Also anarchist and anti-fascist
groups have taken part in demonstrations that have escalated into acts of violence.
All these changes in the police operation environment mean that capacities and
capabilities have to be pooled together. The police need to identify all relevant
members (elements) and establish operating relations with these stakeholders to
support the goals of preventive and Community Policing. There are a number of
such potential partners among governmental agencies and non-governmental
organizations, the purpose of which is to prevent deprivation and social exclusion
and various social and individual maladies that may result.
The new preventive policing strategy (Sisäministeriö 2014) and its implemen-
tation plan (Poliisihallitus 2015) require eleven police departments to prepare their
own preventive action plans. NPB aims at clear and unified management, structures
and processes, which will lead to effective preventive policing. This requires also
improvements in personnel development and training, improvements in analysis
and intelligence, a stronger integration of internet policing (particularly social
media) into preventive work and periodically changing specific projects such as the
prevention of cross-border crime or radicalization.
As mentioned above, a proactive working approach should be integrated into
daily police patrolling and crime investigation. In practice, this means active and
targeted interventions by the police and, if necessary, cooperation with relevant
stakeholders, preferably before the occurrence of crime or disorder. Some such
preventive measures have already been successful. For example, there is a noted
connection between young men’s alcohol consumption and street violence.
Compared to other European countries Finland is characterized by above average
levels of violent behaviour and alcohol consumption. In almost 80% of batteries the

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60 J. Houtsonen et al.

victim or the offender is under the influence of alcohol. A typical battery on public
streets occurs in front of a restaurant around closing time. Also about 70% of
homicide offenders and victims are under the influence of alcohol. Particularly
aggravated violence by young people is strongly associated with alcohol, substance
abuse, mental and social problems, and hence social exclusion (Rikollisuustilanne
2015).
In 2012 police changed its intervention strategy from visible, emergency-based
car patrolling to proactive intervention that meant zero tolerance for underage
alcohol assumption. Since 2012 police has intervened very strictly in minors’
alcohol consumption on the streets. Before, hundreds of intoxicated youngsters
posed a threat to the public safety in parks during the weekends. By controlling
young men’s alcohol consumption, street violence reduced rapidly. This has
required a change in the attitudes and working methods of patrol police and has
been successful despite the inertia and resistance of old school police officers. The
result is that youngsters do not consume alcohol on the streets any longer. At the
same time, according to several studies, young people’s attitudes towards alcohol
have changed to the negative. Indeed, alcohol use has decreased and alcohol
abstinence has increased among the young since the beginning of the 2000s
(Kinnunen et al. 2015).
When daily work of local police patrols is done in a proactive fashion, the
specifically appointed community police officers are free to concentrate on special
proactive work in order to improve safety. These police specialists are able to target
wider and tougher security challenges by creating relations with other relevant
stakeholders (elements in the system) without the requirement to respond reactively
to emergency calls. That is to say, community police officers are involved in solving
proactively deep-rooted security problems. Effective proactive policing requires
new problem solving methods, which can include, for instance, risk assessment,
analysis and evaluation of security measures. It also requires encouraging stake-
holders to take ownership and responsibility of the problems and develop solutions
proactively and independently.
Virtual Community Policing is an example of special proactive police work.
There are two types of preventive online police methods in Finland. First, the
Virtual Community Police, established at the Helsinki Police Department in 2008,
consists of three full-time virtual police officers working to solve problems and
prevent crimes by using Community Policing methods online. Full or part-time
virtual police officers were established also in other police departments in Finland.
The second method uses social media as a Community Policing tool. Police officers
have their own Facebook profiles, which they use for communication and infor-
mation sharing purposes with different online communities and individuals.
A further example of special proactive police work is the multi-professional
Anchor Team model. The first team was established in 2004 in the Kanta-Häme
Police Department (Sisäministeriö 2014) from where the model spread to other
police departments in Finland. Anchor Team is a proactive working model through
which the police have establish operational working relations with other relevant
public agencies including social work, health care, child welfare and youth work.

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5 Community Policing as a Social System and Its Components 61

The initial goals were timely intervention of underage criminal behaviour, domestic
and intimate partner violence, but has extended to prevention of extremism and
improvement of internal security through cooperation with multiple partners.
In Helsinki the multi-professional Anchor Team works on the premises of the
Helsinki Police Department. They search, offer and develop services for diverse
needs of various customers. On the basis of the specific expertise and information
of each member the team produces a comprehensive assessment of customers’ often
very tough life situation and finds customer-oriented solutions. The Anchor Team
has extensive operational relations with many other stakeholders (elements) ranging
from public authorities to association offering social services and support.
The Anchor Team handles about one thousand customers per year, the most of
whom are young persons with minor offences. Other customers are offenders that
are guilty of domestic or intimate partner violence or individuals who hold
extremist viewpoints. The starting point is a customer’s desire to achieve a change
in his or her life. A preliminary assessment indicates that about 75% of the cus-
tomers have benefited from the Anchor Team’s services and have given up com-
mitting crimes.
The third example of special proactive work is the organized Proactive Policing
Unit at the Helsinki Police Department. The unit was founded in 2012 and set as its
main goal the enhancing of security in the city of Helsinki, the early prevention of
phenomena that pose a threat to the security and the building of partnership rela-
tions with other members of the system. In practice this means cooperation with
other local and national police units, public authorities, non-governmental organi-
zations, civic association and citizens of Helsinki. An important measure that
ensures that these goals are realized is to build trust with other stakeholders and
collectively try to tackle possible security challenges. Security cooperation and
planning is based on reciprocity that benefits all parties. Early intervention requires
active and target-oriented cooperation with relevant partners. Although policy and
action planning is usually developed centrally by authorities in Finland, preventive
action plans needs to be adjusted to the local conditions and requirements.
Consequently, local communities and their representatives need to be actively
engaged in the development and implementation of action plans, and the com-
munities need to collaborate with the police and other public authorities. In other
words, local communities need to take ownership of the problems and action plans.
Proactive policing in Helsinki is organized into two different teams, both having
their own focus.
The task of team one is to create and maintain relations of trust between the
police and groups coming from various linguistic and ethnic groups. A special task
is to prevent politically or ideologically based violence. Team two focuses on those
security threatening phenomena that require more thorough investigations into the
root of the problems, which may not be possible by the more traditional law
enforcement methods. By means of local problem solving this team first tries to
identify the factors behind crimes and disorder and then moves on to influence
those factors in collaboration with other police units, public agents, civic organi-
zations and residents of particular areas. In its work, the team especially tries to

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62 J. Houtsonen et al.

build and maintain trusting relations between the young and the police. Young
people are met during the police fieldwork and in social media. The team collab-
orates with schools, youth clubs and associations in the Helsinki region. The team
also works with the Anchor Team focusing especially on young first-time offenders
and socially marginalized individuals who are in a vulnerable position or at risk of
committing increasingly serious crimes or of moving into criminal careers.
Although the two teams have a somewhat different focus, they will apply similar
methodologies and techniques of local problem solving that are well tested, for
instance, in the prevention of extremism and multi-professional cooperation.
One of the specific tasks of the Proactive Policing Unit is to prevent violent
extremism. This includes individuals that are prepared to use violence to further
their ideological goals, which could be religious or political radicalism (left-wing
and right-wing extremism), individuals with hardline and extremist views and lone
actors such as potential school shooters.
In their daily work, police officers in the Proactive Policing Unit, who work both
in uniform and in plain clothes, meet individuals and representatives of various
communities, talk to young people, participate and help organize community
events, work as negotiators in demonstrations and arrange seminars and Q&A
sessions together with the communities. The multi-professional approach is often
the preferred method when the teams encounter an individual and his or her family
who tend to have a multitude of other social and psychological problems than mere
antisocial behaviour or petty crime.
The effectiveness and outcomes of preventive policing work in Helsinki has not
been evaluated so far. Based on Gill et al. (2014) one could expect that at least
people are more satisfied with the police and the police legitimacy will become
stronger, whereas it is likely harder to prove that Community Policing will reduce
fear of crime or crime rates.

5.5 Conclusions

In this chapter Community Policing was approached within a systemic framework.

A concrete Community Policing system can be understood as a social system
consisting of elements, or members of the system, environment, or context of the
system, structure, or relations between system elements, and mechanism, or pro-
cesses that keep the system doing what it is supposed to do. The readers can use
these simple tools to analyse local, regional or national Community Policing
arrangements. The systemic framework and tools are general and neutral without
any specific content unless they are applied to particular cases. In order to illustrate
how this conceptual tool can be applied in a real case, the chapter also included a
description of Community or Preventive Policing in Finland and particularly in the
city of Helsinki.
The overall ambition of Community Policing is usually to prevent crime and
disorder, increase police legitimacy and citizens’ satisfaction with the police and

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5 Community Policing as a Social System and Its Components 63

reduce citizens’ fear of crime. In order to accomplish those purposes the police
needs to build active relations with all relevant players among public, private and
non-governmental organizations and individual citizens. The fact that the relations
are active means that they are functional, i.e., they have been created for some
activity goal-driven. For instance, there can be relations of communication and
collaboration in order to ahieve the goal. Engaging in such relations changes the
parties and the quality of the relation. Thus, trust between the police and the
community, which is often mentioned as a crucial aspect of Community Policing, is
a consequence of communication but also a prerequisite for engaging in commu-
nication in the first place. Mechanisms are processes through which community
policy attempts to achieve its purpose. The most generic mechanism in Community
Policing is problem solving, which can include various sub-processes or particular
methods and techniques such as multi-professional interventions, prevention of
radicalization or facilitated invention of solutions.
The operative environment of a Community Policing system is constantly
changing and Community Policing has to be aware and adjust to the demands of the
environment. One important sub-process of problem solving is the strategic analysis
of the operational environment to identify the opportunities and challenges the
organization has to come terms with. Such environmental forces and trends are
often analysed into political, economic, social, technological, environmental and
legal aspects. Strategic planning and analysis includes also the exploration of the
environment inside the organization in order to identify strengths and weaknesses.
Through this type of strategic analysis of external and internal organizational
environments one can suggest improvements in Community Policing services and
thereby create more public value for citizens and fulfil the police mission (Bryson
2004).
Adding new components into the model can further develop the systemic
framework presented in this chapter. Consequently, the analysis becomes more
detailed. For instance, the model could be extended by various actual and potential
organizational capacities and capabilities that various members can bring into the
system and thereby improve the effectiveness of a community. These capabilities
and capacities include, for instance, management, organizational structures and
processes, personnel and information technology.

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toiminnasta ja sisäisen turvallisuuden tilasta (Police Barometer 2016, Citizens Perceptions’ of
Police Activities and the State of Internal Security). Sisäministeriön julkaisuja 27/2016

bayerl@rsm.nl
 Part II
European CP Practices and Case Studies

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Chapter 6
Community Policing and Radicalization:
Evaluation and European Examples

Holger Nitsch and Sarina Ronert

6.1 Introduction

The 21st century Europe is marked by various challenges, ranging from war in the
Middle East to a tremendous refugee crisis to the omnipresent threat of terrorism.
The large migration of the Muslim population to Europe, triggered by war and
terror in Syria and Iraq, entails next to challenges also risks. On the one side, radical
Islamist Groups are trying to win traumatized, lonely and therefore easy to influence
refugees for their ideology. On the other side, radical left and right wing groups are
taking advantage of the refugee crisis to underpin their propaganda and to spread
their body of thought. In order to prevent individuals from the germination of
radical ideas and the drift into a radical group, security authorities throughout
Europe need a new approach to meet the threat at an early stage and successfully.
Stakeholders and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) need to cooperate and
communicate, because radicalisation that leads to terrorism is a threat to community
security and not only to state security.
Communities are stakeholders and partners of the police in preventing radical-
isation and therefore need to be involved into the workflows to reduce the risk of
radicalization. Community Policing with its multidisciplinary approach seeks the
cooperation of local communities and the broad range of public authorities to
counter radicalisation that leads to terrorism. The interaction between police and
communities can not only provide an important source of information about crimes
and suspicious behaviour, it can also prevent all kinds of radicalisation, be it right,
left, politically or religiously motived.

H. Nitsch (&)
S. Ronert

Department for Policing, University of Applied Sciences for Public
Administration in Bavaria, Fürstenfeldbruck, Germany
e-mail: Holger.Nitsch@fhvr-pol.bayern.de
S. Ronert
e-mail: Sarina.Ronert@fhvr-pol.bayern.de

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 67

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_6

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68 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

6.2 Community Policing

Community Policing (CP) can be understood as a strategic method within tradi-

tional policing practices. Its objective is to establish a partnership between the
police and the citizens and to strengthen the cooperation between the entire police
organisation, all governmental agencies and the communities they serve in order to
solve problems more quickly and efficiently (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1949).
To enable the building of ties and the close interaction with members of the
community, the police needs to be visible and accessible to the public, listen to the
citizens’ concerns, respond to the communities’ needs and to know and be known
to the public. Community Policing aims to interlink Law Enforcement Agencies
with other organizations like government agencies, community members,
non-profit service providers, private businesses and the media. Especially the
media, with its quick and far-reaching transfer of information, can strengthen the
communication between police and communities. Many LEAs have already
recognised the opportunities of media and use the internet and social media to
spread information as well as strengthen their image and communicate with citizens
(cp. Chaps. 11 and 13).
All in all, Community Policing aims to change the role of LEAs from a static,
reactive, incident-driven bureaucracy to a more dynamic, open, quality-oriented
partnership with the community (Brown and Wycoff 1987). Common elements
within different community-oriented approaches are the exchange of trust, an
increased officer-accountability to civilians and the fostering of trust. These
police-citizen partnerships will strengthen the cooperation and communication
between LEAs and communities and will improve the prevention and the investi-
gation of crimes, increase the subjective feeling of safety and reduce the risk of
radicalisation (OSCE 2014). Especially in times of a refugee crisis and social
changes, these aims are more important than ever. Law Enforcement Agencies are
regularly facing different forms of radicalisation, which are arising in all kinds of
social classes, age groups, nationalities and political groups (cp. Chaps. 3 and 4).

6.3 Radicalization

The term radicalization originates from the Latin word radix, which means root.
Radicalization can be understood as a process, i.e., a progress in the course of
which people or groups change their point of view and/or their behaviour (Mandel
2009).

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6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation … 69

6.3.1 The Process of Radicalization

Radicalization describes all political orientations, which are aiming to change the
existing social order fundamentally. However, radicalization does not necessarily
mean that a person is on the way to becoming a violent extremist. In the past, there
were also examples for non-violent political movements like organisations advo-
cating for women’s suffrage or civil-rights (Leuprecht et al. 2010), which were also
classified as radical. Therefore, the term radicalisation is describing a process,
which is not always ending in violence and extremism and is used in various
contexts. While radicalism identified liberal reformers and freedom and democracy
movements in the 19th century, in the early 20th century it often was a description
for Marxist, Leninist and anarchistic groups (Mandel 2009). Accordingly, central
characteristics of radicalism are striving to realize a social utopia and its incon-
siderate enforcement.
Today the term radicalism can be understood more as an insistence on an initial
position, which rejects every other position, opinion or value and which supports
acts of violence. However, of course the process of radicalization can also lead into
violent extremism and violent political behaviour like jihadi Salafis or extreme
right-wing groups are demonstrating today. The increasing amount of people who
are travelling from western countries to Syria in order to support and fight next to
the Islamic State make this abundantly clear. At the moment of writing, experts
consider that 4500–5000 Europeans travelled to Syria with the intent to join the
radical terrorist group.
To reduce this kind of radicalization, LEAs and stakeholders need to understand
the process of becoming an extremist with violent behaviour. Unfortunately, no one
can explain this process in an accurate and extensive way. However, many experts
on the subject of sociology agree on the view that people are shaped by their social
surroundings. That means that an individual is formed by its immediate social
conditions mostly within a group (Schulze 2000). Imagine that a young Muslim is
on the search for his/her identity, because s/he grew up in a non-Muslim society and
doesn’t know where s/he belongs to—a typical identity crisis; a group of radical
Muslims would assign him/her to a role and give him/her an identity. S/He would
be surrounded by people with the same opinions and experiences. This familiar
structure will lead to a feeling of strength and moral superiority against outsiders
(Abou-Taam 2011). By promoting the solidarity of a radical group, members will
begin to distinguish between fellows and non-fellows, between ‘we’ and ‘they’. The
group will develop a collective identity, which eventually will overshadow the
individual identity.1 The fusion with a radical group will isolate the individual from
its ‘normal’ surrounding in a psychological and physical way2 and relationships of

1
This group dynamic also simplifies the strength of recruitment.
2
One example is the full body veil of the Salafis. The women will literally be isolated from their
surroundings, which will lead little by little to a total encapsulation from her former social
environment.

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70 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

trust will only exist within the group (Abou-Taam 2011). But of course there are
numerous other factors that can lead to radicalization.

6.3.2 Factors and Mechanisms of Radicalization

As mentioned above, radicalization is a sometimes slow, sometimes fast process,

which changes the point of view and the behaviour of an individual. But which
factors are encouraging or initiating this process? In the last years, scientist tried to
explain this phenomenon of radicalization and developed a number of radicalization
models from different scientific fields and perspectives. Even though some of these
models are very different in many aspects, they all agree on the principle of multiple
levels (see Fig. 6.1).

6.3.2.1 Individual Level

Considering the age of modern terrorists, it is striking that young people seem to be
more susceptible for radicalization than elderly people. Most of the people, who
join a radical group are between 16 and 59, the average age is 25. This is also
supported by general criminological investigations stating that young people are
more vulnerable for criminality than the elderly (Fuchs and Mähler 2015). The
same investigations also indicate that the male gender is predominant considering
radicalization and violent extremism (Fuchs and Mähler 2015). The reasons for this
may be a gender-specific perception or a different attitude towards violence in men
and women. Another significant factor for radicalization is the social environment.
According to different studies, family relations play a significant role in the process

Fig. 6.1 The different levels of radicalization

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6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation … 71

of radicalization, especially the loss of a family member or the absence of a father

figure in the moulding and imprinting years of childhood. Such a link cannot be
established regarding the level of education, as the educational background is
covering the entire spectrum. Nevertheless, it can be said that a poor education
supports the process of radicalization for numerous reasons. For example, it is more
difficult for poorly educated people to have success in the working world or to
integrate themselves successfully in a foreign society, which both may lead to
resentment. This also applies for migrant backgrounds, as migrants may have the
feeling of social inequality and an economic disadvantage (Fuchs and Mähler
2015).
Contrary to public opinion, in the majority of cases religion is not the trigger for
radicalization. Even though religion plays a central role in the process, religiousness
itself is not sufficient for the development into a violent extremist, as many
extremist lived a secular life before their radical transformation. Indeed, strictly
religious people are less susceptible for radical opinions, as the religious naivety is
missing. In many cases, the ‘religious renewal’, which leads to radical religious
ideas, arises with the beginning of the real radicalisation. On average, the tendency
towards criminality makes individuals more receptive for propaganda and radical
ideas than a religious attitude. Considering different terrorists’ biographies it is
striking that many of them had a long criminal carrier before they became an
extremist or terrorist (Fuchs and Mähler 2015).
In addition to these supporting factors, each individual passes a trigger moment,
a mechanism of radicalization, before s/he became addicted to an extremist or
terrorist body of thought. On the individual level, this includes inter alia the indi-
vidual resentment by which a person feels victimized and seeks revenge for
someone’s—in many cases the government’s—actions that harms himself or loved
ones.3 Similarly, an individual who has not personally experienced grievances may
radicalize him/herself by identifying with a group perceived as victims. This phe-
nomenon is called lone-wolf terrorism and appears more and more frequently in the
21st century (Fuchs and Mähler 2015). Another negative trigger or mechanism is
the feeling of fear. Especially in an environment of war, people may feel safer and
protected within an armed group. This can be observed in Syria and Iraq, where
numerous people joint militant groups like the Islamic State, the al-Nusra Front or
the Free Syrian Army (Volkan 1999). Next to these negative feelings, love can also
be a mechanism to start the process of radicalization. Individuals may join a radical
group because someone they love asked them or they want to aid and protect a
loved one. In recent years, various women travelled to Syria with the desire to join
the Islamic State and marry a mujahid,4 and in the majority of cases a member of
this radical group cultivated a personal connection with these young women and

3
An example are the so-called Black Widows. Black Widow is a description for widowed
members of Islamist terrorist groups, who are revenging the death of their husbands. This term first
became known at the Moscow theater hostage crisis of October 2002.
4
A person performing Jihad.

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72 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

pretended love (Erelle 2016). And last but not least, mechanisms like thrill, status
and money are driving individuals of each age-category into the clutches of radical
groups (Leuprecht et al. 2010).

6.3.2.2 Group Level

As mentioned earlier, group phenomena play a significant role in the process of

radicalization. An individual may focus on peer groups and makes him/herself
emotionally addicted to a radical group, which will cause peer pressure and group
dynamic processes. On the one hand, discussions among members of like-minded
people move members further in a radical direction because the individual does not
want to fall behind in representing group-favoured values. On the other hand, peer
dynamics can lead to radicalization, when different groups are competing; e.g.,
when non-state actors compete with a state or when factions of the same group
compete with another, as we have previously seen in 2014, when a small group
detached from al-Qaida and established an independent organization—today known
as the Islamic State. These peer dynamics can be multiplied, when a group is
exposed to different influences such as isolation or threats (Leuprecht et al. 2010).
A peer group may give the long-desired support and attention, so that the group
will turn into a personnel, spiritual and sometimes also financial supporting system.
For example, 80% of German jihadists were radicalized within social communities
like associations or mosques (Fuchs and Mähler 2015). These modern networks
often are very adaptable and dynamic and are often guided by a very charismatic
leader.5 By joining a peer group, individuals are surrounded by like-minded people.
We can observe this phenomenon, when we look at the hundreds of young men and
women who left their homes behind in order to travel to Syria and Iraq to join the
Islamic State.
However, some of these Syria travellers came back to their home countries and
some of them are languishing in jail, serving prison terms for the membership in a
terrorist organization. This makes prisons potential breeding grounds for radical
ideas. On the one hand, imprisoned people are isolated from society, which may
enhance their personal crisis and their resentment. On the other hand, they may be
in direct contact with radicals. Therefore, a prison environment can thoroughly
support active recruitment and passive radicalization (Bianchi et al. 2008; Fuchs
and Mähler 2015).
Considering this significant amount of variation in the socioeconomic frame, it
remains very difficult and highly controversial to broadly label individuals or
groups as being ‘at risk’ (Saltman and Smith 2015).

5
Ibrahim Abou-Nagie, a Salafi preacher in Germany, is such a charismatic leader. With his
community ‘Die wahre Religion’ (engl.: The true religion), Abou-Nagie is converting juveniles to
Salafi Islam. He became known through campaigns called “LIES!” (engl: Read!), where he and his
followers distributed their interpretation of the Quran to passengers.

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6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation … 73

6.3.2.3 Mass Level

External threats can lead to increased group identification and magnify the power of
leaders on both levels, the group and the mass level. An example for mass impact to
external threats is for example the reaction of American citizens after 9/11
(Leuprecht et al. 2010). Anti-Islamic and islamophobic communities and associa-
tions sprung up in the U.S. and won people like never before. We can observe a
similar reaction in 21st century Europe, since millions of Muslims fled from terror
and war in Syria and Iraq and settled down in the countries of Europe. After the
Paris attacks in 2015 and the Brussels bombing in 2016, people felt an external
threat which caused a shift to the right, which spread throughout Europe.
But there are also mechanisms within migrant communities in western societies
that can support the process of radicalization. As we know, the integration of
Muslims into western societies does not always succeed, and integration policies
are often perceived by Muslims as anti-Islamic. Current public policy debates about
Muslim communities and their probably failed integration are enhancing a feeling
of segregation and a negative attitude towards democracy among migrants. As a
result, especially Muslims who are living in the 3rd or 4th generation in a western
country are feeling a kind of rootlessness, as they often also lost contact to their
countries of origin. At this point it is very easy for recruiters or radical groups to
catch the person on the search for identity and to win her/him for their ideologies by
giving a new identity and affiliation (Fuchs and Mähler 2015).
But there is yet another mechanism on the group level. In most cases, individuals
in the process of radicalization develop a feeling of hate, because hate allows an
essentialized and dehumanised view at self-appointed enemies, which in turn
facilitates violating and killing of human beings (Leuprecht et al. 2010). This can be
seen in the ideology of radical Salafis who declare the whole western society as an
enemy of Islam and who are inciting hate against the West in all their recruits.6
Radical groups succeed in spreading this hate by talking directly to potential
recruits and by uploading their propaganda to the internet, where millions of people
will have access to this material.

6.3.3 The Internet

Only a few technological innovations had such far-reaching effects as the internet
and the World Wide Web, which revolutionized the communication by making the
exchange of information quicker, easier, cheaper and above all global. Because of
the easy access, the (potential) anonymity of communication, the fast flow of
information and many other advantages, internet usage by extremists and terrorists
is growing (Whine 1998). They are using this method of communication for

6
cf.: Osama bin Laden's Declaration of War.

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74 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

psychological warfare by spreading disinformation, threats or horrific images of

executions, but they are also using the internet for publicity and propaganda, data
mining, fund raising, recruitment and mobilization, networking, planning and of
course for coordination (Weimann 2004). The internet establishes a kind of social
connection to like-minded people, and especially in the frame of Islamist extremism
and terrorism it also represents a ‘visual trainings camp’.
Individuals have access to all kinds of ideological texts, instructions and guidance,
which is supporting potential radicalization within vulnerable communities. However, it
is very unlikely that an individual radicalizes him/herself to a violent extremist just
through the use of the internet. Exceptions are in fact the earlier mentioned lone-wolf
terrorists who identify themselves with a group perceived as victims without having
made a triggering experience before.7 Therefore, the internet cannot be underestimated
when exploring the process of radicalization (Bayerl et al. 2013).

6.4 De-Radicalization and the Role of Community

Policing

The term de-radicalization, also called counter-radicalization or disengagement, has

been used to imply a range of programs and projects. These programs are generally
directed at individuals who have become radical and aim to reintegrate them into
society or at least dissuade them from using violence (Saltman and Smith 2015). In
simple terms, de-radicalization describes the reversal of the process through which a
person became an extremist. To turn this process around, experts need to know
which influences lead to an individual’s radicalization, in order to create appropriate
impacts to counter the progress. As we have seen, the processes of radicalisation are
not universal, but individual, even though there exist similarities and common
elements from time to time. Indeed, there are no doubts that the experience of
resentment, discontent and conflicts contributes to the process, next to the
assumption of an ideology and the involvement into a radical group (Della Porta
and Diani 2006; Wiktorowicz 2005).
The de-radicalization of a person, i.e., an individual liberating him/herself from a
radical environment, giving up his/her extremist behaviour and ideological way of
thinking, is a very individual process. The radical person needs to relearn tolerance
and acceptance for dissidents and the nonviolent handling of conflicts. To achieve
these objectives there needs to be a network of experts and stakeholders—which
means police, youth welfare officers, schools/teachers, social workers, representa-
tives of religious communities and others must cooperate and communicate to win

7
Arid Uka can be identified as a lone-wolf terrorist. After he radicalized himself by watching
Islamist propaganda videos on YouTube and reading Salafi ideological texts in different forums, he
attacked US-American Soldiers at the airport of Frankfurt and killed two people (cp. Leenaars and
Reed 2016).

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6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation … 75

the extremist’s trust and liberate him/her from their radical surrounding and
thinking. These partnerships of police, stakeholders, experts and citizens would not
only be able to take appropriate measures in the case of an extremist, but also to
recognize the radicalisation of person at a very early stage and to counteract this
process. For this purpose, it is necessary to cooperate with schools, to start pre-
vention projects in affected communities, to develop opt-out programs and infor-
mation channels and to train multipliers. Here it is, where Community Policing can
find its main role and purpose.

6.4.1 Engaging with Youths

Considering that the average age of individuals being susceptible for radicalization
is 25, it is necessary for the police to engage with youths. But while it is easy for the
police to contact young people, it is often difficult to build up a cooperation.
Reasons for this may include grievances against the society and the state, which
lead to negative perceptions of the police and a reluctance to have any contact with
officers. But a positive perception of the police among young people is a perquisite
for a successful police-citizen partnership, as young men and women who feel
respected and valued by the police are much more willing to cooperate and
communicate.
Youth engagement activities are key components in the framework of Community
Policing, not only because they are susceptible for radicalization, but also because they
tend to use different methods of communication and get information from different
sources. Therefore, young people often have an excellent network and can provide
useful and important information. However, the communication among youths takes
place primarily on the internet and social-networking media. For that reason, the use of
social media can be an effective way to reach young people and to convey messages or
awareness-raising activities that can prevent young men or women from being drawn
into the process of radicalization. In addition, the police can also establish a presence on
social media to engage with youths, to improve the image of the police by giving an
insight into the daily police work or by organizing information events (OSCE 2014; see
also Chaps. 11 and 13).

6.4.2 Engaging with Faith-Based Organizations

and Religious Leaders

To implement de-radicalizing efforts in a successful way, it is important to avoid

stigmatization or discrimination against any particular religion or belief. Because
even if terrorists are justifying their actions with religion by referring, for example,
to the Quran, religion itself is not responsible for terrorism. In any case, there are

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76 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

numerous reasons for Law Enforcement Agencies to engage with religious leaders
or faith-based organizations. One of these reasons is the fact that religious com-
munities may be potential targets of terrorist attacks. In the beginning of 2016, for
instance, an attack was made on a Sikh temple in Essen, Germany during a wedding
celebration by two offenders of Turkish origin.
Next to the need for protection and security, religious communities can provide
crucial feedback on how de-radicalizing measures have affected their community
and how they are perceived. But religious leaders or faith-based organizations can
also help Law Enforcement Agencies to better understand their community, their
religion and their culture. And this in turn could facilitate the development and
implementation of counter-terrorism measures. However, the most important reason
to engage with religious communities is the opportunity of information exchange.
Especially religious leaders may be aware of individuals who are vulnerable for or
already are in the process of radicalization or of propaganda material circulating
within their community.
However, engaging with religious leaders or faith-based organizations should
not be underestimated, as there are some challenges. For instance, there may be a
history of tensions and distrust between the state and religious communities due to
real or perceived injustices like discrimination. Further, each religious community
has its own complex dynamics and characteristics regarding ethnicity, culture,
linguistic usage and regulations. Therefore, the multidisciplinary approach of
Community Policing is essential for Law Enforcement Agencies in order to con-
struct a new relationship based on mutual respect, solidarity and partnership (OSCE
2014).

6.4.3 Engaging with Minorities

Especially in times of the refugee crisis and large demographic changes, it is more
essential than ever to engage with minorities. Still, as is the case for engaging with
religious leaders and faith-based organizations, there are challenges in creating
relationships and partnerships with minorities. There may also be distrust between
police and ethnic minorities, especially as the result of practices perceived as dis-
criminatory by minority members. An exemplary case is the strained relationship
between the police and people of African and Latin origin in America, as in recent
months there were frequent incidents of real or perceived discrimination; and
therefore such communities may often have a negative attitude towards the police.
In the case of immigrants, negative experiences with the police sometimes are
imported from abroad. Various social workers stated that immigrants often feel
negatively towards or are even afraid of the police, as they have had negative
experiences with police officers in their country of origin (Egharevba 2014).
Therefore, it is important not to unwittingly stigmatize any particular ethnic
minority, turning them into a ‘suspect group’, as this behaviour will lead to a feeling
of displeasure, alienation and animosity towards police. This in turn will reduce the

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6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation … 77

willingness of ethnic minorities to engage with and support police in preventive

measures.
Nevertheless, engaging with minorities can provide numerous opportunities.
Firstly, police may be able to build on existing efforts to implement good practices
for policing in multi-ethnic societies and other initiatives. On the other hand, ethnic
minority communities can help LEAs to better understand their culture and needs
and may have knowledge and information about individuals who are vulnerable for
radicalization or about people who try to recruit members of their community.
Yet, successful engagement activities with minority groups require some pre-
requisites. Police officers should be provided with clear guidance and training on
intercultural competence. In addition, complaint mechanisms should be made
sufficiently known and be accessible to the public, and cases of discrimination by
police officers should be dealt with quickly and transparently. Afterwards, outcomes
should be communicated to members of the concerned ethnic minorities to prove
that they are taken seriously and in turn to increase their trust in police. In engaging
with minority communities, the police may be able to encourage ethnic minorities
to support de-radicalizing measures and to jointly denounce terrorist violence
(OSCE 2014).

6.5 European Initiatives in the Field of De-radicalization

As there exists no specific methodology for the work within the scope of
de-radicalization, countries’ approaches differ greatly. But it can be said that European
de-radicalization strategies tend to differ from strategies outside Europe, as they tend to
focus more on deconstructing radical theologies that lead to radicalization than pros-
ecuting supposed terrorists or extremists (Saltman and Smith 2015). In addition,
counter-radicalizing strategies are often influenced and triggered by major events like
terror attacks.8 Nevertheless, certain European countries have been streamlining efforts
that are combining official counter-terrorism strategies and Community Policing
approaches by increasing the responsibilities of stakeholders like teachers, social
workers, NGO’s, associations and authorities (OSCE 2014). In the following we
describe some approaches to give an overview of current practices.

6.5.1 Germany

The first official development of German prevention strategies began in the year
2003, which mainly entailed the distribution of informative material to education

8
For example, the large expansion of the preventive strategy in the UK was planned and imple-
mented shortly after the bombings in central London in 2005.

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78 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

institutes and the civil society. In addition, workshops and trainings for stakeholders
were organized on recognizing extremism. In 2010, a hotline was established for
individuals who wanted to exit radical or extremist groups—which, however,
remained strikingly underused. In relation with the Syria crisis and the high amount
of individuals that left Germany to fight,9 the Department of Information on
Radicalization (Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung) was established within the
German government and the development of the before mentioned exit mechanisms
was delegated to de-radicalization programs and society groups (Saltman and Smith
2015). In 2015, the Bavarian Criminal Investigation Agency (Bayerisches
Landeskriminalamt) established the Competence Centre for De-Radicalization
(Kompetenzzerntrum für Deradikalisierung) and at the same time brought the
Network for Prevention and De-Radicalization (Netzwerk für Prävention und
Deradikalisierung Gegen Salafismus) into life to counteract radicalization in the
field of Salafism. Their aim is to coordinate de-radicalization approaches in order to
minimize the danger of religiously motivated radicalized individuals.
For this purpose, the Competence Centre cooperates with the Bavarian coun-
selling centre of the association Violence Prevention Network e. V. Within the work
of de-radicalization, the Competence Centre firstly acts as the coordinator for
de-radicalizing measures. In addition, the Centre is a contact point and advisor for
all public authorities concerning questions of de-radicalization in Bavaria and
ensures the exchange of information between partners of the prevention network.
Furthermore, representatives of the Competence Centre are cooperating and fos-
tering the dialogue with Muslim communities. In this context, the Bavarian
counselling centre of the association Violence Prevention Network e. V. also
assumes the role of contact point and advisor for relatives of possibly religiously
motivated extremists. Moreover, it offers anti-violence and competence trainings in
youth prisons for vulnerable inmates and an assistance program for persons who
want to leave the Salafi scene.10 Therefore, the Competence Centre for De-
Radicalization combines various partners and stakeholders in the field of Salafism
and de-radicalization in order to prevent and counteract the increase of religiously
motivated radicalized individuals. The Competence Centre is also actively con-
tacting stakeholders and communities to inform them about their work and their
activities. This Community Policing approach opens a communication channel with
otherwise difficult to reach minority communities.

9
Experts suggest that by now about 800–900 Germans travelled to Syria with the intention to fight
and about 300 of these came back to Germany (see: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/
arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten-islamismus/zuf-is-
reisebewegungen-in-richtung-syrien-irak, 09.10.2016).
10
See: http://www.violence-prevention-network.de/de/aktuelle-projekte/beratungsstelle-bayern,
https://www.polizei.bayern.de/muenchen/schuetzenvorbeugen/index.html/232038.

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6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation … 79

6.5.2 Denmark

Denmark has a long history of targeted intervention strategies, mainly using

mentoring schemes next to prevention talks and awareness raising campaigns and to
counsel individuals disengaging from a radical or extremist group. This allows the
creation of natural resilience towards violent extremism within young people with
the help of mentors and through education. In this framework, a mentor is expected
to cater for the needs of their clients and this particularly in the early stages of the
de-radicalization process. Currently, mentors provided with centralized training
schemes from Denmark’s biggest cities, Copenhagen and Århus, are selected to
align their approaches and safety procedures. This approach is very different to
many de-radicalization strategies in Europe; for this reason it gathered considerable
international media attention in the past two years and became known as the
Århusmodel.
Summarized, the Århusmodel uses a soft-handed approach, which aims to
reintegrate returned fighters into Danish society by treating returnees more like
rebellious teenagers than terrorists. This approach is rooted in the concepts of social
inclusion and reintegration rather than legal prosecution. This concept works
because it is not illegal in Denmark to engage in combat abroad and to fight with
outlawed groups like the Islamic State. Through this ‘forgiving’ approach it is
possible to offer extensive support towards the returnees and efforts to reintegrate
into the society and the local community. In addition, it is no longer an objective to
force individuals to renounce their extremist and radical views, they rather are
encouraged to disengage from the social networks that proliferate these views and
reject the use of violence to establish their objectives this way. Through the
cooperation of police, social workers and stakeholders, this community-oriented
approach encourages a more balanced viewpoint and allows the individual to feel
that their beliefs are compatible with living in a Danish society (Saltman and Smith
2015).

6.5.3 Sweden

Historically, the Swedish government concentrated upon extremism in the context

of extremist threats to Swedish domestic security. This attitude changed after
numerous threats and attacks by domestic violent jihadists in response to the
publication of Muhammad cartoons by the Swedish artist Lars Vilks in 2010. The
Swedish security service Säpo stated that threats posed by individuals engaging
with overseas conflict—physically, mentally or financially—are of growing con-
cern and have been prioritized by revising their preventive and de-radicalization
approaches towards Islamist extremism (Saltman and Smith 2015). In the subse-
quent years, various initiatives have been developed and funded in order to
intensify the preventive de-radicalization work. Since the Syria crisis, numerous

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80 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

individuals left Sweden to fight and several returned, which added new challenges
for organizations on how to de-radicalize returnees.
One of these organizations dealing with prevention and de-radicalization is
called Exit Sweden and is located within the large youth centre Fryshuset. It
originally was established in 1998 to support individuals who wanted to exit
neo-Nazi or racist groups, provided that they are attracted to white supremacist
groups more as a product of social and emotional conditions rather than by ide-
ology. The aim of this project is “to help individuals leave White supremacy
groups, and to support them in establishing new lives with economic and social
support structures to make their new lives sustainable.”11
Exit Sweden concentrates on aiding the disengagement process by dealing with
radicalization supporting issues like the search for identity or power, looking for a
reason in life and social exclusion. The majority of the Exit employees have
experiences with far-right extremism, which gives credibility and legitimacy to their
voices for the purpose to de-radicalize others. In addition, a number of qualified
psychotherapists support individuals and encourage their families to ensure sus-
tainable support to the networks. Experiences made by these employees are relayed
directly to stakeholders in order to better inform policy and practices around
countering radicalization and violent extremism on the ground. Considering this
multidisciplinary approach in the framework of far-right extremism and
de-radicalization, the project Exit Sweden is also qualified to confront Islamist
extremism in a similar manner (Saltman and Smith 2015).

6.5.4 England

After the 9/11 attacks the UK brought the Contest programme into life, which is
based on the four P’s prepare, pursue, protect and prevent. In 2015, the UK
government elected to pass the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill in response to
the 700 individuals that left the UK to fight in Syria and Iraq and the 300 returnees
that came back. This decision gave new life to the de-radicalization programme
Channel, which was established in 2007 and aims to provide support to people who
are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. During 2012, the
Channel project was extended across England and Wales with the remit to adopt a
multi-agency approach to identify and assess cases of radicalization and to support
the de-radicalization process. This approach intends to be adaptable to different
forms of extremism and radicalization, as it deals with individuals on a
tailored-as-appropriate basis.
This counter-radicalization process begins with the identification or the referral
of an individual at risk of radicalization to their local police. This referral can come
from different stakeholders like community members, social services, family

11
See: www.exit.fryshuset.se.

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6 Community Policing and Radicalization: Evaluation … 81

members or school authorities. The government then tries to determine potential

indicators of vulnerability like peer pressure, influence from other people or via the
internet, family tensions, anti-social behaviour, lack of self-esteem or personal or
political grievances. The panel of Channel then collectively decides the suitability
of the case and, depending on the detail, refers the case for example to the local
authority representative, social workers, an educational institution, youth offending
services, the Home Office Immigration Department, the Border Force or prison.
A requirement for these panel members is the completion of an eLearing course in
addition to a 1.5 h lecture called WRAP (‘Workshop to Raise Awareness of
Prevent’) in order to acquire concrete knowledge on the issue of radicalization.
Activities offered by Channel are, like many de-radicalization initiatives, quite
varied. They range from direct, one-on-one mentorship, housing support and anger
management to family support. Thereby the mentorships are administrated by the
Home Office, which is tasking certain individuals as appropriate for providing
ideology or theology intervention. Like the mentors of the Swedish Århusmodel,
they often are former extremists and have experiences with being a member of a
radical group or with sharing a radical ideology. Because of this, the mentors of
Channel can leverage their knowledge and experience of their own
de-radicalization process to guide clients to a healthier attitude towards social issues
(HM Government 2015; Saltman and Smith 2015).

6.6 Conclusion

War, terror and demographic changes are creating new challenges and issues that
cannot be met by police on its own. Almost every European country faced serious
threats from domestic terrorism, be it left, right or Islamist over the past years.
Because of the various different religions, cultures, ideologies and attitudes that
exist within every society, it is almost impossible for Law Enforcement Agencies to
prosecute the numerous cases of radicalization and to prevent individuals from
sliding into a radical group or into a radical ideology. In addition, many police
authorities have a lack of in-depth knowledge in the fields of religion, culture and
ideology and simply lack sufficient resources. At this point it is inevitable to
integrate the multidisciplinary concept of Community Policing into the daily police
work to support preventive approaches. Each community with its multi-dimensional
nature, knowledge and influence can provide a powerful and active support for
preventing and countering radicalization. Police-citizen partnerships are necessary
to cover the wide spectrum of monitoring radicalization, implementing
de-radicalization measures, supporting dropouts and preventing individuals from
being radicalized. The approach of Community Policing will therefore not only
strengthen the effective engagement and cooperation between police forces and the
communities, it will also support the creation of safer communities for all.

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82 H. Nitsch and S. Ronert

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Bianchi Sergio et al (2008) Jihadist radicalisation in European prisons. Experimental project for
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Homegrown Terrorists. In: Artkämper H, Clages H (eds) Kriminalitätsbekämpfung—ein Blick
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bayerl@rsm.nl
Chapter 7
Police Liaison Approaches to Managing
Political Protest: A Critical Analysis
of a Prominent UK Example

David Waddington

7.1 Police Liaison: Contemporary Nature and Origins

This chapter focuses on a highly illuminating example of the way in which the
principles of Community Policing have recently been incorporated into the police
handling of major protest throughout the United Kingdom. This highly significant
sea change regarding the nature and underlying philosophy of public order policing
in the UK was induced by controversy surrounding the Metropolitan Police
Service’s (MPS’s) handling of the anti-G20 demonstration in London on 1 April
2009. Mass media and ‘citizen journalism’ coverage of this event emphasised how
police officers had reacted to protesters in a sometimes violent and allegedly
indiscriminate manner and had resorted to the controversial tactic of ‘kettling’
(corralling or ‘containing’) demonstrators into a confined space and detaining them
for several hours (Greer and McLaughlin 2010; Rosie and Gorringe 2009).
A subsequent official inquiry urged the police to adopt more tolerant methods of
handling political protest with the aim of facilitating, rather than subjugating, the
‘right’ to protest (HMCIC 2009a, b). This directive was wholeheartedly embraced
by the Association of Chief Police Officers and Association of Chief Police Officers
in Scotland, whose Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace
(ACPO/ACPOS/NPIA 2010) stipulates that crowd order tactics and strategy must
be designed and implemented in such a way as to facilitate protest, adequately
differentiate between the ‘innocent’ and ‘guilty’, and generally aspire to a ‘no
surprises’ approach to engaging with the public.
Underpinning the contents of the new manual was a justificatory social psy-
chological rationale (Stott 2009), predicated on the Elaborated Social Identity
Model (ESIM) (e.g., Drury and Reicher 2000; Stott and Drury 2000). The basic
tenet of the ESIM is that any form of police intervention perceived as indiscriminate

D. Waddington (&)
Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
e-mail: D.P.Waddington@shu.ac.uk

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 83

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_7

bayerl@rsm.nl
84 D. Waddington

and/or illegitimate by crowd members will almost certainly induce a strongly

unified opposition towards all attending officers. Such feelings of solidarity and
‘common identity’ will, consequently, make it easier for advocates of social conflict
to exert their influence and make it less likely that appeals for restraint will be
heeded by the crowd.
The ESIM model has given rise to four specific principles of effective public
order policing (Reicher et al. 2004, 2007). These are:
1. Education: understanding the various ‘social identities’, values, beliefs and
objectives of the different sections of the crowd
2. Facilitation: striving to help protesters to achieve their legitimate aims
3. Communication: maintaining contact and employing negotiation, both prior to
and during the event, with the intention of forging agreements and avoiding any
misunderstandings or unpleasant surprises
4. Differentiation: avoiding the tendency to treat all members of the crowd in a
uniform manner, regardless of their actual ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’.
It is indisputable that the ESIM itself and the associated prescriptions advocated
by Reicher and his colleagues have become a hegemonic component of contem-
porary UK police doctrine for the management of protest. Stott’s (2009) commis-
sioned review of relevant literature scarcely alludes in fact to alternative theoretical
approaches. “There are”, he maintains, “other important and influential theories of
public disorder most notable of which is the ‘Flashpoints’ model of David
Waddington. But whilst consistent with ESIM these do not focus upon the social
psychological dynamics of the events themselves rather the broader contextual
determinants” (Stott 2009, p. 8ff).
One major purpose of the present chapter is to present further evidence in
support of Reicher et al.’s four principles. However, it is a further intention in what
follows to take issue with Stott’s downplaying of the relevance and significance of
the Flashpoints Model (Waddington et al. 1989) by arguing that it is precisely this
focus on ‘broader contextual dynamics’ that is required if we are to fully understand
the reasons why particular forms of police communication and liaison with the
public—both prior to and during protest events—are likely to have the effect of
preventing (or, at least, limiting) the occurrence of disorder. The first substantive
part of this chapter will attempt to consolidate this argument by outlining a par-
ticular application of the present author’s Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder in a
case study of the policing by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) of the ‘anti-Lib Dem’
protest rally, held in the northern city of Sheffield in March 2011.

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7 Police Liaison Approaches to Managing Political Protest … 85

7.2 The ‘Anti-Lib Dem’ Protest Rally in Sheffield, UK,

2011

The demonstration in question was called and organised by a coalition of local trade
union groups and political activists calling itself the Sheffield Anti-Cuts Alliance
(SACA). Following the formation one year earlier of a Coalition Government
between the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties, Nick Clegg (the newly
appointed Deputy Prime Minister, Lib Dem leader and MP for Sheffield Hallam)
had nominated Sheffield City Hall as the venue for his party’s Annual Spring
Conference in what was regarded, at the time, as a benevolent gesture to his ‘home
town’. It is fair to say, however, that the perceived part played by Mr. Clegg and
other Lib Dem members of the Coalition cabinet in endorsing a series of highly
contentious ‘austerity measures’ had served to generate considerable local anger
and indignation.
To SYP’s great relief and satisfaction, the two days of protest were virtually
trouble-free. A relatively small crowd of 800 protesters gathering on the afternoon
of Friday, 11 March, in anticipation of the arrival of Lib Dem delegates, posed no
real problems for the police. Then, on the following morning, a larger crowd of
2000–3000 people (which subsequently grew in size to around 5000) set off on a
two-mile march through the city before finally assembling on Barker’s Pool, a
pedestrian concourse directly in front of the City Hall. The only noteworthy inci-
dents occurred when 30 members of UK Uncut were ejected from a handful of
stores and the branch of a well-known High Street bank, and when a 24-year-old
man ignited a firework flare and scaled a police protective barrier in what resulted in
the only arrest of the entire event.
Fundamental to the success of SYP’s ‘Operation Obelisk’ was a newly-created
and assigned 15-person Police Liaison Team (PLT), which was centrally
co-ordinated on the day of the event by a remote ‘Silver Command’ team consisting
of the Silver Commander himself and an assistant Negotiator Co-ordinator (a
female colleague of equal rank). This pair worked in close conjunction with a
5-person Social Media Team (SMT), led by a female inspector, whose function was
to monitor and respond to relevant messages appearing on Twitter, Facebook and
the Sheffield Forum blog, and to transmit informative and reassuring messages to
protesters and members of the wider general public (cp. Chaps. 11 and 13).
While immediate overall authority over the PLT was assigned to a Bronze
commander at Chief Inspector level (the ‘PLT Bronze’), during the protest proper
the team was divided up into equal sub-groups of five. The first of these consisted of
four lower-ranking officers (sergeants or police constables) under the direct
supervision of the PLT Bronze, and the remaining two of similar groups of junior
officers, which each reported to a ‘sub-Bronze’ commander of Inspector level. In
addition to each having experience of public order leadership, the PLT Bronze, two
sub-Bronzes and Negotiator Co-ordinator were all highly trained ‘crisis negotia-
tors’. It will soon become apparent that, just as important as the role they played on
the day of the actual rally, was the work carried out by the PLT Bronze and his two

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86 D. Waddington

sub-Bronzes in liaising with the demonstration organisers in the build-up to the

event.
The relevant data on which the following discussion of the nature and effec-
tiveness of the police operation is based derive from an ethnographic study (see also
McSeveny and Waddington 2011; Waddington 2013, 2016), in which the author
and ten volunteer academic colleagues acted as participant observers, while a
full-time research assistant engaged in retrospective and contemporaneous tracking
of police Twitter messages and other social media channels of relevance to the
protest (e.g., Facebook, Indymedia and the local Sheffield Forum). Eleven in-depth
interviews were also carried out with police personnel (the Gold, Assistant Gold
and Silver Commanders, a Silver negotiator/co-ordinator, two Public Order Bronze
Commanders, the Bronze, two sub-Bronzes and a police constable forming part of a
‘Police Liaison Team’ and a Social Media Officer) and three protest organisers (the
SACA Chair, a SACA Steering Committee member and the President of Sheffield
Hallam University’s Students’ Union).
This body of research will also be used as evidence in the second substantive
section of this chapter, which addresses a related controversy, highlighted in a
recent article by Baker (2014), who is justifiably concerned with the issue of
whether the growing emphasis on ‘liaison’ or ‘dialogue policing’ represents a
sincere police commitment to promoting the ‘right’ to protest or should be more
realistically regarded as a form of ‘symbolic theatre’ by the police or—to put it even
more bluntly—a ‘ritualistic sham’. Certainly, the latter position resonates with the
views first expressed more than two decades ago by PAJ Waddington (1994),
whose in-depth study of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) highlighted the
extent to which senior MPS public order commanders routinely employed various
forms of ‘guile’ and ‘interactional ploys’ in order to induce (or even outfox) protest
organisers into staging their marches and demonstrations more often in accordance
with police interests and objectives than those of the protest participants. This
arguably more cynical side of police liaison work will be addressed, according to
the same body of interviews and observations outlined above, once we have
completed the following explanation of the nature and effectiveness of Operation
Obelisk.

7.3 Operation Obelisk: Understanding Its Nature

and Effectiveness

The Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder (e.g., Moran and Waddington 2016;
Waddington 1992, 2007, 2010, 2011a; Waddington et al. 1989) provides a general
framework for explaining those contextual factors and dynamic processes, which
help to determine why it is that disorder breaks out or, alternatively, fails to ignite in
any given instance. It incorporates seven interdependent levels of analysis: struc-
tural, political/ideological, cultural, institutional/organizational, contextual,

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7 Police Liaison Approaches to Managing Political Protest … 87

situational and interactional. These levels encompass the broadest societal context
to specific patterns of face-to-face interaction. The fundamental premise of the
model is that public disorder cannot be reduced to a single explanatory variable:
“To understand why a ‘spark’ sets off a ‘fire’ we need to analyse the principles of
combustion. It is not the presence or absence of an individual element which is
important so much as how elements fuse and interact” (Waddington et al. 1989,
p. 167).

7.3.1 The Setting

The first five levels of analysis are concerned with the ‘setting’ in which the protest
took place. The model’s most macro-social structural level refers to the various
forms of material inequality, inferior life chances and political impotence under-
lying the collective grievances in society, which induce protest activity and have the
potential to bring dissenting groups into conflict with the police. The relevance of
this level to the present study is reflected in the fact that SYP preparations for the
rally were predicated on their existing knowledge that the local standing and
popularity of the Lib Dems (and of the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, in
particular) had progressively nosedived since the general election, due to the part
they had played in agreeing to massive cuts in public spending and a raising of
university tuition fees. Each of these measures ran contrary to Lib Dem pre-election
promises and were looked upon as treacherous acts of betrayal in a city, which
provides a home for two major universities and whose economy is disproportion-
ately reliant on public sector employment in comparison to other cities of such size.
The model’s second tier of analysis—the political/ideological level—is con-
cerned with the way in which various forms of political and ideological pressure are
influential in shaping police policy towards those sections of society who may be
harbouring such grievances. Sometimes this pressure is implicit, as on those
occasions when the police feel an almost instinctive professional obligation to resort
to firm—and, if need be, confrontational measures—in defence of politically
symbolic ‘occasions, locations and personalities’, such as government buildings,
national monuments, foreign embassies and royal ceremonials. A classic example is
the fortification mentality surrounding the protection of the Internationally
Protected Persons attending world summit meetings. On other occasions, political
pressure is more overtly exercised—as in the form of direct governmental inter-
vention, or where public opinion is brought to bear by (say) local politicians, the
mass media or local pressure groups. It is possible that such policies will be further
guided, and possibly constrained, by relevant aspects of domestic and international
law or pronouncements or documents issued by legal authorities, also obliging the
police to act in particular ways.
Several such overt and more tacit factors of this nature were in evidence in the
build-up to the Lib Dem rally:

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88 D. Waddington

Among the various and often contradictory political/ideological pressures influencing

SYP’s strategic and tactical approaches to the demonstration were local political briefings
emphasising the City Council’s determination both to exploit the economic benefits of
hosting the event (in terms of enhanced hotel and restaurant bookings and retail trade), and
showcase its potential as a conference and tourist centre. Implicit pressure on the police to
ensure the safety of visiting Lib Dem delegates (several of them cabinet ministers), and the
security of expensive and symbolically significant civic and retail property in the vicinity of
the protest were underscored by relevant aspects of the law. Counterbalancing the legal
obligations on the police under the European Convention on Human Rights to uphold the
rights of property and business owners during a protest, and avoid any foreseeable risks to
life during such an event (Article 2), was a similar onus on them to protect people from the
possibility of arbitrary arrest and detention (Article 5), and promote the right to peaceful
assembly (Article 11) (Waddington 2013, p. 53).

Interviews with senior SYP personnel confirm that the force commitment to
adopting a relatively permissive (i.e., facilitating) approach in their handling of the
protest was further influenced by important institutional/organisational factors.
This level of analysis encapsulates a range of formal structures, systems, rules,
regulations and documentation, concerning such variables as the availability and
nature of public order legislation, the degree of police paramilitarism inherent at
local and national levels, the extent and quality of relevant training regimes and
methods and of police accountability and the nature and pervasiveness of any
policing traditions, philosophies or ‘missions’ embodied at national or local levels
of policing.
It was one such formal mission statement—exhorting all SYP staff to do their
utmost to re-establish and uphold public confidence and trust in the wake of the
force’s controversial handling of the 1984-5 miners’ strike and the 1989
Hillsborough stadium disaster (Waddington 2011b)—which, according to interview
respondents, consolidated their enabling approach towards the protesters. There is
no doubt that the abiding influence of this statement was recently reinforced by the
publication of the ‘Keeping the Peace’ manual, which was signed off by the Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire in his capacity as Head of ACPO Uniformed
Operations Business. The chief officer’s personal endorsement of such a liberal
police doctrine was commonly held to have strengthened the local ethos towards a
tolerant style of public order policing.
Equally liable to affect police attitudes and conduct towards protesters are factors
residing at the cultural level of analysis. Here we are concerned with the ways in
which sections of society make sense of the social world based on shared material
conditions, experiences and position in the social structure. This includes not only
people’s definitions of themselves and others, but also incorporates the rules
informing their attitudes to using violence and recipes of action of relevance to
particular situations. For all their underlying similarities, the particular cultural
outlook, which any group of police officers might harbour is likely to be moderated
according to, among other things, generation or career trajectory or more structural
factors such as their rank, assignment and specialisation.

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7 Police Liaison Approaches to Managing Political Protest … 89

Thus the overall predilection towards a permissive style of protest policing,

resulting from key factors at the institutional/organisational level was further
underscored by the cultural composition of the Police Liaison Team. Indeed,
The occupational values adhered to by members of the PLT emphasised a preference for
using communication and gentle persuasion, rather than direct force, as a way of gaining
compliance. Both the (female) Silver negotiator/co-ordinator and her (male) Bronze
counterpart who had overall charge of the PLT were trained police negotiators, as well as
experienced public order commanders. These two PLT Leads had chosen a further 14
colleagues to form the basis of three sub-teams of five officers, one led by Bronze, and the
others by sub-Bronzes who were also trained negotiators. The remaining members of the
team were hand-picked on the grounds that they were ‘people with a certain communicative
warmth who wouldn’t be slow about talking to the public’ (Waddington 2013, pp. 54–55).

It speaks volumes about their cultural orientation that, in choosing what they
considered to be the most appropriately coloured bib to wear over their conven-
tional uniform, the PLT universally opted for a ‘softer’ pale blue tabard with the
objective of making it apparent that they ‘were somewhat different in role and
character to their colleagues’ (ibid.).
The contextual level concerns those dynamic communication processes occur-
ring in the build-up to an event, which can serve to elevate or attenuate any
potential for disorder. Examples of this might include a negative history of inter-
action and/or controversial incidents between the police and a dissenting group or
the arousing effects of rumour, media sensitization or threatening statements by one
or both sides. The possibility of disorder is more likely to be averted due to the
presence of advance liaison and negotiation between police and protest organizers.
The model recognises that, when carried out successfully, this process helps to
generate mutual trust, safeguard against the possibility of police over-preparation
and pave the way for a set of mutually understood ‘ground rules’ designed to
accommodate both parties’ objectives. The absence of such dialogue generally
involves the police having to resort to preliminary intelligence and surveillance
gathering (inevitably varying in terms of accuracy and authenticity) and making
contingency plans based on ‘worst case scenarios’ with the accompanying danger
of creating a self-fulfilling prophesy (see also Chaps. 2–4).
It is in this particular regard that the Police Liaison Team was to play such a
highly significant role. The PLT could count itself particularly fortunate in that they
already enjoyed extremely confiding and cordial relationships with local students’
union officials at both main universities. Moreover, organisers of the SACA
coalition were already well-known to, and respected by, the police, and it came as
no surprise when the protest leaders fulfilled their legal obligation by informing
SYP of their intention to stage a march. This presented ample opportunity for the
PLT Bronze commander and two of the trained negotiators to discuss with student
union and SACA representatives the idea of employing officers in such a way as to
liaise between the crowd and their own public order commanders. The marsh
organisers and student officers were entirely receptive to this proposal and were
equally accepting of the need to erect perimeter fencing around the City Hall.

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90 D. Waddington

The PLT clearly strove to accommodate and/or facilitate the type of activities
likely to be engaged in by the various protest groups. One potential sticking point
concerned the fact that at least one protest organiser was eager for the march to set
off from the city’s customary gathering point on Devonshire Green and proceed
along Devonshire Street in keeping with local tradition:
And we said, ‘Well, you can’t because that entrance is going to be where the delegates go
in,’ so what I tried to do was to present it as honestly as possible in terms of: ‘Well, I’m
afraid you can’t really go that way. However, if you look at this route, there are some
distinct advantages to it. The roads are much wider, so the police can keep you safe, and
from a photographer’s and TV camera’s point of view, whenever they take a picture or shot
of you, it’s going to look like there are more people here than there are.’ Also, when they
got to Charter Square, which is raised slightly, the photographers would be able to focus
down on them with their cameras and emphasise the length of the march. The other thing I
discussed with them was that, ‘You’re passing the front of the Town Hall, which is the seat
of local democracy, and then you’re passing into the rear of the designated safe area’ (PLT
Bronze Commander).

It was within this general climate of mutual co-operation and problem-solving

that the march organisers also volunteered such information as the number of
people likely to be present and who (if anyone) was likely to cause trouble. It was at
this point in the proceedings that both students’ unions and SACA reiterated their
commitment to a non-violent form of protest. The preliminary briefings, which
were presented to attending officers of all ranks, were correspondingly geared
towards ensuring that the forthcoming protest would be peaceful but effective. Such
briefings emphasised that at least two possible forms of behaviour—the ransacking
of shops or the breaching of the perimeter fence—were not to be tolerated, since
they each constituted important strategic ‘lines in the sand’. Otherwise, as the
Public Order Bronze Commander explained in interview, “I think it reflected the
ethos of the operation, which was ‘Come on, then. Let them shout, let them have a
meaningful protest.’”

7.3.2 Situated Interaction

This host of significant factors residing at the first five levels of the Flashpoints
Model were pivotal to the creation of a favourable context for the protest, which
was highly conducive to the emergence of beneficial instances of situated inter-
action (Waddington 2013). In order to fully understand this assertion, it is necessary
to dwell on remaining variables at the situational and interactional levels of
analysis.
The situational level draws attention to relevant physical, dynamic and sub-
jective aspects of the spatial location or setting in which the event actually occurs.
Most fundamentally, it might relate to the degree to which a particular location
facilitates accurate police surveillance and therefore improves the police capacity to
intervene with due reasonableness and discrimination. Equally, the presence of

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7 Police Liaison Approaches to Managing Political Protest … 91

targets of derision (e.g., representatives of a rival political faction or detested for-

eign politician) may enhance the prospect of disorder.
Of corresponding importance, however, are the ways in which the relevant space
is perceived and managed by those present. Regarding the former, it is often the
case that police and protesters will arrive at discrepant interpretations of each
other’s behaviours. Thus, while police officers may justify their decision to clear the
road of protesters and provide a protective cordon for delegates entering a National
Front meeting as ‘upholding the right to free speech’, on-looking demonstrators
might regard such conduct as disgracefully pro-fascist. These and related actions,
such as the speed with which serials are introduced, send out important (and often
unintended) messages to protesters regarding police motives and their willingness
to accommodate the former’s goals and interests.
Disorder is generally more likely to be averted where self-stewarding has been
agreed, crash barriers are deployed to limit direct contact between police and
protesters, policing is avowedly ‘low-profile’ with reinforcements in riot gear kept
well out of sight of protesters, and where there are clear lines of communication and
command, not only between police units but between senior police and demon-
strators (thus ruling out the possibility of misunderstandings or unpleasant and
disconcerting surprises).
Many of these important prescriptions were in evidence during the Lib Dem
rally. It is indisputable, to begin with, that the presence of the steel barrier was
fundamental to the success of the police operation, insofar as it helped limit direct
contact between police and protesters, while still enabling the latter to remain
within seeing and hearing distance of the arriving Lib Dem delegates. The close
proximity of tall buildings offered the police welcome vantage points from which to
observe the crowd and therefore complement the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
pictures reaching Silver Command from a variety of different angles.
Perhaps most crucially of all, the presence of the PLT provided Silver Command
with an unerring communications platform from which he could confidently gauge
the mood and intentions of different sections of the crowd, make accurate risk
assessments and deploy his resources accordingly. A second major advantage
accruing from the use of the PLT is that liaison officers were able to provide
feedback on the nature (and likely consequences) of police actions from the per-
spective of the crowd. At one point, for example, the PLT Bronze contacted his
Public Order Bronze counterpart to inform him that a humorous conversation he
appeared to be having with a Lib Dem delegate outside the City Hall was poten-
tially inflammatory:
It was like having an extra insight through the eyes of the crowd. At one point in the
proceedings, [the PLT Bronze] phoned me up while I was stood with somebody on the
steps at City Hall, watching what was going on with two other people behind us, and he
said, ‘I’m sure you’ll tell me he isn’t, but from here it looks as if the person behind you is
laughing at the crowd.’ So I turned to this person and said, ‘Just pay a bit more attention to
what you’re saying and how, because it might be misread as contempt for the crowd’
(Public Order Bronze Commander).

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92 D. Waddington

This ability to create a favourable protest atmosphere by affecting the situated

definitions being formulated by protesters was reflected in the particularly vital role
carried out by SYP’s Social Media Team, who not only scotched such highly
pernicious rumours as the allegation that a police ‘spotter’ positioned on the roof of
the overlooking John Lewis department store was an armed sniper, but also took
charge whenever it was being suggested that a potentially uncompromising police
intervention was imminent. As one students’ union officer explained,
It tended to accentuate the positive and was generally reassuring; and whenever any gossip
started running round the grapevine, they were very quick to interject that ‘There’s been no
arrests’, ‘There won’t be any kettling’, and other messages of that nature to help defuse any
simmering controversy. It was very upbeat and positive, and it helped to clarify any
confusion or misapprehension regarding their tactics, particularly in relation to kettling… In
fact, we tweeted back to them that we felt they were doing really good work, and that sort
of friendliness soon became contagious.

This brings us on to the final, interactional level, which is concerned, as its name
suggests, with the quality of interaction (whether respectful, co-operative,
provocative or restrained) between the parties involved. This is the level of analysis
where ‘flashpoints’ (precipitants of escalatory conflict) are apt to occur. The model
maintains that consistently fraternising and non-confrontational behaviour by police
officers will induce the type of tolerance and co-operation, which will ensure that,
even where police interventions are necessary, wider conflict will not occur:
The turning point is when one side sees the actions of the other as unreasonable. What is
defined as unreasonable on the day depends on what has gone on before. What is reacted to
violently in one setting, with particular structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual
and situational features, may evoke a less dramatic response in another (Waddington et al.
1989, p. 166).

The activities of the PLT in the build-up to the demonstration clearly had an
important bearing, insofar as they had endeavoured with the help of the organisers
to propagate a set of ‘ground rules’, extensively communicated before and during
the demonstration, which forbade the mounting of the protective barrier. The
solitary arrest that occurred when the protester lit up a flare and scaled the perimeter
fence was in clear violation of these mutual expectations. Thus, it came as no
surprise when both the resulting arrest and a further police intervention when a
second flare was ignited went unopposed by the crowd. Clearly, these outcomes
were a testament to the rapport established between the crowd and the PLT as well
as the overall perceived legitimacy of the police operation.

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7 Police Liaison Approaches to Managing Political Protest … 93

7.4 Sincerity or Sham?

It is debatable to what extent the type of police liaison strategy and tactics employed
by SYP can justifiably be regarded as innovative or seminal. Students of public
order policing will no doubt recall the considerable insights provided by Peter
Waddington’s two-year participant observation study of public order policing in the
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) (PAJ Waddington 1994, 1998). This study
skilfully highlights the methods employed by senior officers during pre-event
negotiations to ensure that, on the day of any given demonstration, groups of
protesters not only obligingly followed the police’s preferred route of the march,
but invariably did so in a peaceful manner, which caused minimum disruption and
inconvenience to everyday city life.
Such outcomes were typically achieved as part of a process whereby, in the
build-up to a protest, experienced police negotiators would draw upon a repertoire
of ‘communicative ploys’—such as displaying spurious friendship towards
organisers, donating helpful guidance and advice or extending apparently uncon-
ditional favours:
Thus, negotiations are conducted with the amicability and good humor [sic] that would
seem more appropriate to arranging a loan from a bank…Such amicability is not the
product of genuine liking for or agreement with the organizers, the campaigns they rep-
resent, or their cause. It is a studied performance designed to dispel any tension, hostility or
antagonism that the organizer might harbour [sic]. Once negotiation begins, the police
stance is one of proffering help and advice—‘How can we help you?’—‘help you,’ that is,
to ‘do it our way.’ Many organizers are inexperienced and so the police ‘organize it for
them.’ They recommend routes along which to march, provide the telephone numbers of
officials in other organizations that need to be contacted and suggest how difficulties might
be resolved (PAJ Waddington 1998, p.120f).

Waddington further emphasises how, on the day of the march itself, the police
assign only their most trusted and experience commanders and ensure that junior
officers are thoroughly briefed beforehand in terms of the requisite ethos and
objectives. Such commanders deliberately exude an ostentatious bonhomie towards
protest leaders and ceaselessly propagate a friendly and collaborative relationship
with civilian stewards and their marshals. Both they and more senior police
strategists are aware that studied benevolence of this nature is fundamental to police
attempts to engaging protest organisers in a position of ‘mutual responsibility’ for
any problems that might occur.
While pointing out that police public order commanders are sincerely committed
to ‘recognising the unquestioned right’ to protest and would automatically ‘recoil
from the suggestion that they are sometimes deceitful’ (PAJ Waddington 1994,
pp. 102 and 129), Waddington nonetheless recognises that, by virtue of the fact that
demonstrations are generally conducted on police terms, the interests of the pro-
testers are apt to be compromised: “Protest is [thus] emasculated and induced to
conform to the avoidance of trouble. In police argot, protest organisers are ‘had
over’” (PAJ Waddington 1994, p. 198).

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94 D. Waddington

Echoes of this underlying philosophy and approach clearly resound in the

interviews conducted with SYP officers involved in Operation Obelisk. We have
already alluded to the fact that, in his preliminary briefings of the PLT, the Silver
Commander outlined a preference for the direction of the march to depart from
custom and practice by taking an unusually circuitous route to the City Hall via the
lower end of town, rather than following the traditionally shorter and more direct
path from nearby Devonshire Street. Pre-event liaison with organisers was therefore
carried out according to the types of scenario observed by PAJ Waddington twenty
years previously. Similar sets of negotiating skills were duly brought to bear in such
a way as to not only gain the demonstrators’ compliance with the preferred route,
but also to optimise police intelligence and thereby ensure that there would be ‘no
surprises’ on the day of the event.
We have these things called ‘bunches of fives’ in negotiator terms, which are basically
reasons to do something. If you’re negotiating with someone over the phone or face-to-face,
it’s always good practice to have these bunches of fives: five reasons not to kill yourself;
five reasons to go this way down the street; five reasons to let hostages go, and so on. We
also have something else called PPAs—‘Positive Police Actions’—where it’s a kind of
reciprocity thing, really: ‘This is what we’ve done for you. What can you do for us?’ So, we
were looking round in terms of, ‘What can we bring from negotiating, from crisis and
hostage intervention, into dealing with people who aren’t overtly hostile, but who are not
anticipating police in their midst’. It was a case of: ‘How can we sell what we want to
happen on that day, rather than enforcing it?’ So, we’d got rehearsed bunches of fives as to
why they should take that route (PLT Sub-bronze).

As planned for and anticipated, this pre-event liaison gave rise to a mutually
beneficial exchange relationship, on the basis of which SYP received such
high-grade intelligence as to enable them to formulate a very good idea of what to
expect on the day of the demonstration and to reassure themselves that the main
groups of protesters were seeking both to avoid and, indeed, distance themselves
from the type of violence that might prove detrimental to the messages they were
hoping to convey:
We certainly had groups who weren’t that open in their communication and were quite
covert in their ambitions, so there was always that element of the unknown. But overall, we
felt pretty secure from meeting their representatives that we knew just how 80 per cent of
the people wanted the protest to turn out… The brief was to come up with a way to
communicate more effectively with the protest groups… to show that, as a police service,
we’d made a measured approach and been sort of proportionate. If people then chose not to
listen to what we were asking them to do to work together with us in what we were trying to
achieve, then we’d at least have some legitimacy for any more robust police action that
might eventually prove necessary (Negotiator Co-ordinator).

On the actual day of the march, the most senior PLT commander exchanged first
names and phone numbers with any organisers and stewards he had not previously
come into contact with. Considerable effort was then devoted to maintaining an
amicable working relationship for the duration of the event. The above sentiments
and activities are very much in keeping with those described by PAJ Waddington,
insofar as they reflect a sincere commitment to upholding the ‘right to protest’,

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whilst ensuring that the event is conducted strictly in keeping with police
objectives.
Other findings of this study are consistent with those of Swedish academics such
as Holgersson and Knutsson (2011) and Wahlström (2007), who highlight feelings
of animosity and resentment on the part of more conventionally deployed public
order officers towards their counterparts in ‘dialogue policing roles’, based on
perceptions that the latter invariably become over sympathetic towards, and far too
tolerant of, even the most unruly of protesters. In contrast to the view shared not
only by their colleagues in the PLT, but also by their Gold, Silver and Bronze
commanders—that a communication-based ‘dialogue’ approach was best suited to
the objective of ‘facilitating the right to protest’—rank-and-file officers in ‘tradi-
tional’ police support units were highly critical of the “over-appeasing attitudes
being extended to protesters, accused their PLT colleagues of implicit disloyalty,
and objected to being asked to stand around while sections of the public were
allowed to behave in a sometimes unlawful and atrocious manner” (Waddington
2016, p. 41).
Related British studies highlight an enduring reticence within UK police forces
to cede the requisite degrees of operational authority and autonomy to dialogue or
liaison teams resembling those deployed in Sheffield, with the result that such
initiatives have been consistently ineffectual (Gorringe et al. 2012a and b). In the
minority of cases where more latitude has been allowed, most notably in the cases
of the MPS and Sussex constabulary, police liaison methods have contributed
significantly to more effective police decision-making and simplified the task of
defusing potential conflict (Stott et al. 2013).
Even the most ardent proponents of police liaison methods would not regard
their distinctive approach to public order policing as somehow utopian—a panacea
in itself. Rather, they would prefer to look upon their relevant skills as comple-
mentary to more traditional forms of managing protest and disorder. Few if any of
the officers we interviewed would object to the presence of adequately equipped
riot-trained colleagues, available on stand-by; neither would they contest the right
of conventional public order commanders to assume ultimate authority in the
context of political protests. Indeed, PLT officers accept that a large part of their
function is to help establish and constantly remind protesters of the existence of
‘lines in the sand’, which may be used to legitimise and politically justify
uncompromising police interventions (cp. Chaps. 3 and 4).
These final remarks are generally in accordance with the conclusions drawn by
Baker (2014 p. 100) who maintains that liaison-based public order policing typi-
cally “creates the context for a better understanding, a greater chance of negotiated
outcomes, and protester compliance, and enhanced predictability for the parties
involved.” This comment clearly re-emphasises the value of adopting a Community
Policing orientation in the handling of large-scale public protest.

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96 D. Waddington

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Chapter 8
Community Policing and Public
Perception: Belgian Expectations
and Images of the Police

Isabel Verwee

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter we start with the contextualization of the implementation of com-

munity oriented policing in Belgium. This model was written down in legal doc-
uments in which, amongst others, the police needs to adjust her functioning to the
interests of society and her communities. This means it is necessary to gather an
insight into the expectations and needs of these communities (Frank et al. 2005;
Mastrofski 1998).
We continue this chapter with the study of the role of the police in today’s
society. Three orientations are distinguished, which contributed to an important
knowledge in the police field:
1. Reducing the role of police to maintaining order and fighting crime
2. The servant of the state and the monopoly of violence
3. Attention for police tasks
However they deal with some reductionism and partialities. In our research the
role of the police was studied from a sociological viewpoint. From this point of
view the role is defined as a bundle of expectations (Elchardus 2007). If we look at
the broad range of who can expect something of the police, the citizen is an
important factor in this domain. Moreover they determine police work to a large
extent. The relation between the public and the police became important from a
policy and academic perspective. The police needs the public and vice versa. The
importance of having good relations between both was made explicit by taking
Community Policing (CP) as a police model in Belgium.

I. Verwee (&)
Faculty Law and Criminology, Department of Criminology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel,
Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: Isabel.verwee@vub.ac.be

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 99

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_8

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100 I. Verwee

This chapter presents research results of the expectations and images people
have of the police in Belgium. By means of interviewing 120 citizens of different
ages and living in a rural or urban area, we discovered a kaleidoscope of expec-
tations and meanings.

8.2 Community Policing in Belgium

In the nineties, the Belgian government, like in other countries, became more and
more aware of the importance of the perception of the Belgian public towards the
police. This was enhanced by the lack of trust between the public and the police as a
result of major incidents caused by the compartmentalized way of working of the
former police forces. Although there were specific incidents in the mid-nineties that
lead to the CP police structure, there was already a long debate on CP in Belgium.
As in the USA, the UK and other countries, CP in Belgium is a reaction to the
dominant classic police model that is referred to as bureaucratic, centrally organ-
ised, quick response on law enforcement but low on interaction with the public,
reactive, not preventive, etc.
New ideas were improving the relationship between the police and the public
and implementing a more democratic, participative police model. A wider range of
police tasks became equally important (Van den Broeck and Eliaerts 2002).
In 2001, the Belgian police underwent a fundamental structural reform that
created a new police system. By law, the Belgian Integrated Police is organised on
two levels: the local and federal police. Together they provide CP to the public, in
that they provide basic police services (local police) and specialized police service
(federal police). To guarantee a minimum service to the population, Belgian law
specifies seven basic functions for the local police: Community Policing, respon-
siveness, intervention, victim support, local criminal investigation, traffic and
maintaining public order. Community Policing consists of developing neighbor-
hood relations and maintaining police visibility. This mission is not merely one of
maintaining a physical presence, but also of local dialogue, exchange of ideas and
personal relationships.
The community oriented policing model prefers a police organisation in which a
policy is developed related to the needs of the community (Ponsaers 2001). The
new relationship was characterised as, “the relationship between the police and the
public, although a concern since the formalization of the police function, has taken
on added significance under Community Policing with its emphasis on police-
citizen reciprocity. Community policing seeks to build trust between the police and
the communities and influence the perceptions of citizens” (Frank et al. 2005). The
police wants to adjust her functioning to the interests of the society and all her
communities. That is why it is necessary to gather an insight into the expectations
and needs of the community (Frank et al. 2005; Mastrofski 1998).
This resulted, amongst others, in the creation of the Security Monitor. By means
of this monitor people were questioned on police and security topics. For the first

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8 Community Policing and Public Perception: Belgian … 101

time, the public was seen as an important partner in the creation of a new vision on
policing, the community oriented police model. Yet, although opinion surveys were
done, they had some problems like surveying people in a quantitative way, which is
not going in sufficient depth (Verwee 2012). This was one of the reasons our
research preferred a qualitative approach by means of interviewing people in depth
on their expectations, meanings, thoughts, emotions, perceptions, etc. of police.

8.3 Perspectives on the Role of the Police

A thorough literature review of police theory and research with regard to the role of
the police points to a rather narrow perspective, wherein the role is often reduced to
three main aspects. The police and what the police are doing are often reduced to
the force for maintaining order and fighting crime. This is considered as a first
reduction, because the police are involved in a much more complex area of tasks,
for example, social tasks. Punch and Naylor (1973) even talk about a ‘social secret
service’.
By pronouncing the importance of the monopoly of violence, the police are
perceived in a very state-centric way. Using the argument of a power monopoly as a
core element with regards to defining police, however, leads to a second reduction.
The police force is considered as the servant of the state, while research points out
that police mainly meets the demands of the people (e.g., Bittner 1980; Brodeur
2007; Eliaerts et al. 1987; Ericson 1982; Hauge 1979; Lundman 1980; Manning
1978, 1997; Newburn 2005; Reiss 1971; Van Altert and Enhus 2009; Verwee 2009;
Wadman 2009). Hence, the tasks police are doing are mainly asked by citizens
instead of the state (e.g., administrative instances). The reactive character of police
work is very large.
A third reduction can be found in research which was putting police tasks as a
central subject. The question ‘what does the police do?’ became an important
research theme, which made it possible to shift from the normative debates (What
should the police do?) to a more neutral study of daily police practice (What does
the police do?) (Bayley 1994; Bittner 1980; Monjardet 1996). The way police corps
are registering tasks and try to define which kind of mission task A or task B is, is
not uniform. In this way it can be considered as a reduction of the reality
(cp. Chaps. 3–5 for alternative perspectives of CP).
Although the three discussed orientations to study the police role suffer in our
opinion from partiality and reductionism, they have provided important knowledge
for understanding the role of police. In the search to tackle the above mentioned
problems, we started from the definition of the role concept. We found answers in a
sociological perspective defining roles as bundles of expectations (Elchardus 2007).

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102 I. Verwee

8.4 Police as Viewed Through the Glasses of the Citizen

Starting from the sociological definition of a role as a bundle of expectations, we

reflected on which kinds of partners have expectations of the police: e.g., local and
federal authorities, companies and the citizen. Research on what is happening in
daily practice shows that the citizen determines daily police work to a large extent:
The general public obviously initiates a lot of day-to-day police tasks. The police
force mainly responds in a reactive way (e.g., Bittner 1980; Brodeur 2007; Eliaerts
et al. 1987; Ericson 1982; Hauge 1979; Lundman 1980; Manning 1978, 1997;
Newburn 2005; Reiss 1971; Van Altert and Enhus 2009; Verwee 2009; Wadman
2009). Because the work of the police is determined to a large extent by the citizen,
one of the conclusions is that the police role is strongly related to what citizens
expect of the police.
The role, as a bundle of expectations, is in an inherent relationship with social
meanings. Loader (1997) suggested that if we want to study the role of the police,
we need to focus on the social meanings people give to the police. By means of
offering a sociological insight into the role concept and its interweaving with
meanings, two central research questions can be differentiated:
• What do people expect from the police?
• What does the police mean to people?
These research questions can be separated in an analytical way, but are in an
inherent relationship and in permanent interaction with one another.

8.4.1 Methodology of the Research

The research, of which some results are presented in this chapter, can be described
as a qualitative research with an inductive character. The goal of this research is to
explore the expectations people have of the police and to offer an insight into the
meanings people give to the police. This helps to understand the implementation of
Community Policing. The central concepts of expectations and meanings need to be
studied in a very profound way, because of the precarious and multi-layered
character of these concepts. This involves doing in-depth research into expectations,
meanings, images, values, norms, etc. In the literature a number of indicators are
described, which influence citizens’ attitudes towards the police: demographic
characteristics, the contact one had with the police and neighbourhood character-
istics (Schafer et al. 2003). These indicators influenced the decision process of
which kind of people would be interviewed.
A disproportional stratified sample was drawn in a rural and urban area. The
stratum on which was stratified was age. Three age categories were distinguished:
young people (between 16 and 20 years), middle aged people (between 40 and
50 years) and elderly people (between 65 and 75 years). We did not have any other

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8 Community Policing and Public Perception: Belgian … 103

Table 8.1 Research sample Urban area Rural area Total

16–20 years 20 20 40
40–50 years 20 20 40
65–75 years 20 20 40
Total 60 60 120

information such as language1 or experience with the police in advance. In total 120
people were interviewed in a face-to-face way. Table 8.1 represents the number of
respondents, which were interviewed differentiated in terms of age and living in a
rural or urban area.
The questions asked to respondents were based on a checklist. We asked open
questions (e.g., What do you expect of the police? What does the police mean for you?
Which symbols do you think about?) and closed questions (e.g., Which police tasks are
the most important ones? Do you make a difference between local and federal police?
How do you evaluate the functioning and behaviour of police?) and presented also
some vignettes with daily police practices and photo material with images of the police.
All 120 interviews were typed word by word and integrated in the software pro-
gramme Maxqda 2. This is a qualitative software programme, which makes it possible
to code text parts of the interviews and analyse them in a very accurate way. The
researchers’ analysis is based on coded text and words, perceptions or emotions
expressed by the respondents. This resulted in following research outcome.

8.5 Research Results

8.5.1 What Does One Expect from the Police?

The expectations, which were expressed by the interviewees could be differentiated

at three levels: behaviour, task and contact.2 There was a consensus amongst the
respondents that behaviour was the most important expectation. At the level of
tasks and contact we found a lot of variation. First, we explore the behavioural
expectations, which respondents agreed upon, namely a police officer needs to be
friendly, objective and neutral. This last behavioural expectation refers to the idea
that a policeman/woman needs to treat people in an equal way regardless of their
race or gender. Being correct is another expectation, which was often expressed.
This is related to honesty, integrity, respect, etc. While there was a consensus on the
behavioural expectations, the respondents did not agree upon the tasks the police
should do and the contact they want with the police.

1
The letter which selected people received was made up in Dutch, but contained also a small
French and English explanation.
2
A general remark can be made that it is often not very clear if the respondents are talking in terms
of expectations, which they express with regard to themselves or with regard to others.

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104 I. Verwee

TASK
EXPECTATION

Safety Crime figh ng and Emergency calls

problem solving

Control and patrol Crime figh ng Problem solving When I need the
police, they need to
come

Take care of safety (Emergency) help

Inform and The police do their

communicate job/I expect nothing

Traffic control

Fig. 8.1 Summary of task expectations mentioned by respondents

Figure 8.1 represents the task-related expectations. Three main tasks are dis-
tinguished: The police need to provide safety, fight crime and solve problems and
react to emergency calls. By means of exploring what the respondents meant by
concepts like safety, criminality, help, control, patrol, information, communication,
etc., Figure 8.1 was created and these levels were differentiated.
The task ‘safety’ consists of four levels. It involves the fact that the police need to
control and patrol, take care of the safety of citizens, inform and communicate and
control traffic. The respondents not only talked about a safety task, but also about the
idea that the police need to fight crime and solve problems. Lastly, a major police task
is responding to emergency calls. This means that the police need to come when
necessary and/or offer help when people are in an emergency situation. Those who
answered that the police need to do their duty are also placed in this category.
Lastly, a clearly pronounced expectation of the respondents was the contact they
want with the police. Many respondents prefer to have more contact with the police.
This contact is often related to concepts like street visibility, the wish for more
control, more patrolling and more communication. A police, which is communi-
cating with the public is considered very important. Mainly elderly people prefer to
have more contact with the police. The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, they
prefer close contact because they think it is important; this is not necessarily
associated with problems. Secondly, respondents believed that by having good or
close contact with the police, they are better informed about what is happening in
their local area. Thirdly, the respondents hoped that, by means of close contact, the
police would be able to respond more quickly when problems arose.

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8 Community Policing and Public Perception: Belgian … 105

Two expectations which were expressed can be explicitly related to the ideas of
Community Policing, namely the task of safety and the wish for more contact with the
police.

8.5.2 Which Image Do People Have of the Police?

A second major research question was related to meanings people give to the police.
By means of presenting pictures representing different situations with police involve-
ment respondents were asked which picture corresponds with their image of the police.
Five pictures3 were presented to each age group: a traffic situation, a public order
situation, an arrest, a water cannon and two police officers who have a friendly talk
in the park. Three of these five pictures were different and adapted to the age group
(for example, the picture of an arrest given to a youngster was representing an arrest
of a youngster). The reason why pictures were adapted to the age group was to
avoid conversations like ‘it is always youngsters who are driving too fast’ by for
example elderly people.

Fig. 8.2 Typical police behaviours according to respondents 16–20 years of age

3
©federal police.

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106 I. Verwee

The question was asked which picture does (not) present the image you have of
the police. The images which are closely connected to the youngsters’ ideas of
police are traffic control and arrest shown in Fig. 8.2 (pictures with a green border).
The reason why traffic control was chosen is because youngsters often see and meet
police in a traffic situation. The arrest was chosen, because it corresponds to their
expectations towards the police: youngsters want a more reactive and repressive
police.
Their image does not correspond with a police who is friendly and talks in a
more spontaneous way to people (picture with the red border in Fig. 8.2). They
consider this activity as strange, and some youngsters even talked about ‘a waste of
time’. “They need to catch criminals instead of walking in the park”, was said. The
friendly talk is not representing the model of Community Policing as such, although
the close and good contact between the public and the police is an important factor
of the Community Policing model. This research result suggests that the youngsters
who were interviewed do not want a police, which is investing into the relationship
between the public and the police. The question arises if the ideas of Community
Policing are sufficiently related to what young people want from the police.
Within the age category of 40–50 a lot of respondents indicated the picture of
traffic control as the picture, which is closely connected to their police image
(Fig. 8.3, picture on the top left with green border). The traffic task is dominating
the other tasks as on overall widely present image one has of the police. This can
not only be concluded from the picture question, but also in the open questions
traffic was almost a synonym of the police. In the eight months of participant
observation we did in two local police corps,4 the traffic task was often a part of
discussions amongst police officers and the researcher. Police officers think people
perceive the police as a very negative instance, which is pre-occupied with giving
fines. In the open questions related to the image of the police, there were indeed a
lot of traffic related answers. Though this was not only related to fines; traffic is
more than fines and related to aspects such as traffic accidents, control of papers,
alcohol or drug control, safety of their kids, etc. Besides the traffic picture also the
friendly talk was indicated as an image this age group has of police (Fig. 8.3,
picture on the top right with green border). A very remarkable thing in general is
that more than half of the respondents of all age categories are looking for a
negative aspect in the friendly talk picture. They actually do not expect the police to
be busy with ‘positive’ things. The picture which is not representing the image of
40–50 year olds is the one of the arrest (Fig. 8.3, picture with red border). It can be
related to the gender issue, namely that a woman is arrested. The arrest picture was
the one closely connected to the youngsters’ image. A clear difference is thus found
in how the two age groups perceive the police.
For the age group of 65–75 again the picture of the traffic control is seen as the
picture, which presents the police (Fig. 8.4, picture on the top left with green
border). One of the reasons was that a lot of elderly people have already met a

4
During the preparation of the interviews phase, we observed 8 months in two local police corps.

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8 Community Policing and Public Perception: Belgian … 107

Fig. 8.3 Typical police behaviours according to respondents 40–50 years of age

police officer who is busy in traffic: accidents, control, fines, etc. A remarkable
discourse is taking place: on the one hand elderly think there is enough control and
on the other hand they want more control, for example, on youngsters who are
driving too fast. The friendly talk is the second picture which was marked by 13
respondents in this age group (9 of them living in the city) as their image of the
police (Fig. 8.4, picture on the top right with green border). While youngsters say
they never saw this kind of task, elderly participants considered this as a task, which
is often seen and closely connected to their police image and to the expectations
they have of police. Elderly people start to talk about the fact that it was better in
earlier days, when a police officer knew everybody, had a chat, had a coffee, had
some time to talk with people and prevented problems in this way. In general a lot
of the expectations of this age group are related to the wish for more contact
between citizens and the police. This contact-issue is central in the CP model. The
question rises if the CP model is only serving the elderly people? The picture with
red border in Fig. 8.4 was the picture, which did not correspond to the idea of the
police of this age group, i.e., this age category does not prefer a too reactive police.
A remarkable difference is noticeable between respondents living in the city and
those who are living in rural areas. While the people who are living in rural areas
preferred the traffic picture, respondents from the city referred to the friendly talk
picture as their image of the Belgian police. Are police officers more occupied with
traffic in the rural area than in the urban area? Are police inspectors more occupied
with a friendly talk in the city than in the country? Or is it what people do not have,
what they want more of?

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108 I. Verwee

Fig. 8.4 Typical police behaviours according to respondents 65–75 years of age

8.6 Conclusion: A Kaleidoscope of Expectations

and Meanings

The community oriented policing model prefers a police organisation in which a

policy is developed related to the needs of the community (Ponsaers 2001). It is
necessary to have an insight into what people think and want from police. This was
one of the reasons why a research was set up, which explored the expectations and
meanings people have of the Belgian police.
We found that the respondents had a kaleidoscopic view of expectations and
meanings of police. Concerning the expectations a consensus was found on core
behaviours, yet there was no consensus on the level of tasks and contact. The
respondents agreed on the behaviour-related expectations, namely that the police
need to be friendly, neutral, objective, correct, etc., but the interviewees did not
agree about the tasks the police should do. A large variety of tasks was distin-
guished on the level of safety, crime fighting and problem solving and responding
to emergency calls. A last expectation was related to the contact people want with
the police. While some people want to have very close contact with police, others
do not want to have contact with the blue uniforms at all.
The second research question ‘What does the police mean to people’ was
strongly related to these expectations. The young interviewed people in Belgium

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8 Community Policing and Public Perception: Belgian … 109

prefer a police that is fighting crime and consider the police as a traffic service. The
picture of traffic corresponded to the image youngsters, middle age people and
elderly people have of the police, so there was a consensus on the traffic issue
amongst the interviewees. The friendly talk in the park corresponded more with the
idea of people between 40 and 50 year and even more with the image of people
between 65 and 75 years. The friendly talk picture did not at all correspond to the
image youngsters have of the police. Some considered communicating, contacting,
talking, etc. with people as a waste of time. This result is not only based on the
meanings expressed by the interviewees, but corresponds to the contact-related
expectations. This communication and contact issue is important from a CP per-
spective, but does not fit into the idea of the interviewed youngsters. The question
arises, if the CP perspective is adapted to all communities? Besides, it generates
questions for the implementation process of CP: If it is not adapted to the needs of
the community, it will be difficult to implement the CP model.
To make it even more complex, we point out that this kaleidoscopic view is
influenced by many factors: age, gender, rural or urban living area, context, situ-
ation, contact, life stage, meaning of the police, etc. Some expectations and
meanings are expressed, which can switch depending on one of these factors into
another expectation or meaning. This study of expectations and meanings suggests
a complex story which can be influenced by a lot of factors (Verwee 2012). By
means of studying the role from a basic perspective, we want to encourage dis-
cussions and debates in this context.

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Monjardet D (1996) Ce que fait la police: Sociologie de la force publique, Collection Textes a
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andere politiemodellen. Handboek Politiediensten 57:21–62
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Verwee I (2009) Wat doet de politie? Onderzoek naar de dagelijkse politiepraktijk, In: Verwee I,
Hendrickx E, Vlek F (eds) Wat doet de politie? Cahiers Politiestudies, Maklu, Antwerpen
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Chapter 9
Joining Forces for Our Security
in Austrian Community Policing

Barbara Pusca, Gerhard Lang and Ricarda Kutschera

9.1 Introduction to Community Policing in Austria

Strengthening and developing closeness and confidence in the law enforcement

authorities is one of the key concerns and tasks of modern police work. Until the
1970s a comparatively strict law-and-order approach prevailed within the Austrian
police forces, de facto linking any contact with the population to a legal mandate
and dissociating the police from the general public. Following the 1968 movement,
voices were raised in the late 1970s and in the 1980s calling for opening up social
structures and challenging conventional attitudes and stereotypes. As a result, tra-
ditional ways of thinking and acting changed, and civil society representatives
called for a ‘co-operative State’ (Pusca 2013). The government’s law-and-order
approach was gradually supplemented with an adaptive strategy aimed at popular
responsiveness, crime prevention, partnership and involvement of the general
public (Becker-Oehm 2010). This development also changed the police
self-conception to the effect that justice and protectiveness were combined in a new
policing strategy (Behr 2008).
If the current level of public security is to be maintained and enhanced in times
of growing requirements due to socio-demographic developments like increasing
life expectancy and growing diversity of the Austrian population through migration,
it will be necessary to further open police activities to the civil society. In light of
the aforesaid, police organizations are requested to frame sustainable concepts and
grasp the nettle of public security jointly with the citizens with a view to dispel fears
and build confidence. Safety is an important individual basic human need that can
only be established through joint efforts by the stakeholders, including law
enforcement. This approach is supported by the thesis that the police holds the
monopoly on force, but not the monopoly on security (Olschok 2010).

B. Pusca (&)
G. Lang
R. Kutschera

Federal Ministry of the Interior Criminal Intelligence Service, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: barbara.pusca@bmi.gv.at

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 111

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_9

bayerl@rsm.nl
112 B. Pusca et al.

The concept of Community Policing is based on the idea of bringing together

public actors to form a ‘community partnership’, which serves as a framework for
crime prevention and effective crime control close to the citizens (Frevel and
Kuschewski 2008). The idea of a partnership involving the citizens in crime pre-
vention and crime control is echoed in the Austrian pilot project ‘Joining forces for
our security in Austria’: “The initiative ‘Joining forces for our security [in Austria]’
is intended to proactively advance a dialogue of equals between citizens, the
municipal authorities and the police”, the Austrian minister of the Interior Mag.
Wolfgang Sobotka said during a presentation in Eisenstadt on 23th of April 2016
(cp. also case studies in Chaps. 6, 7, 10 and 11).1
When public security is seen as a societal task, interested citizens should be
given the possibility to participate in the project. To that end, the communication
between the population, the stakeholders and the law enforcement services needs to
be stepped up in order to strengthen the feeling of safety and to reduce the level of
reluctance to pass on observations of deviant behaviour and negative developments
to the competent public authorities and private institutions.
The challenge is to solve various regional problems, which do not necessarily
fall within the exclusive competence of the police and which are based on the
participation of citizens. Under the coordination of the police a specific situation is
analyzed, the nature of the problem is identified and agreement is reached on a
problem solving process involving all stakeholders. The role of the police in this
context is that of coordination and exchange of information with both governmental
and private actors. This understanding of Community Policing is closely related to
crime prevention, which has been an integral part of crime control in Austria for
many years.2 The ultimate goal of crime prevention is to create a climate of soli-
darity and to take measures preventing citizens from becoming offenders or victims,
bolstering up potential victims and supporting and encouraging moral courage in
public life. Such activities are necessary to create a feeling of safety and bring about
a positive influence on behaviour of the public (cp. Chaps. 2, 4 and 5).3
This chapter provides an introduction to Community Policing in Austria,
expanding on the structure and the communication methods used in the pilot

1
Initiative Gemeinsam Sicher in Eisenstadt vorgestellt, (BMI Website Artikel Nr: 13567), 2016,
http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi/_news/bmi.aspx?id=3763346E502F54636C514D3D&page=
0&view=1. Accessed 5 July 2016.
2
See Bundesministerium für Inneres, Innen Sicher. Für Sicherheit. Für Österreich. 2013, Wien
(2013).
3
See Sect. 25 Public Security Police Act, „Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der
Sicherheitsverwaltung und die Ausübung der Sicherheitspolizei (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz SPG)
StF: BGBl. Nr. 566/1991 idF BGBl. I Nr. 5/2016 §25“, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/
GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005792. Accessed 6 July
2016.

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9 Joining Forces for Our Security in Austrian Community Policing 113

project. Subsequently, it discusses the necessity and the standardization of citizen

participation as a fundamental element of Community Policing. In the light of these
theoretical considerations, the recruitment of security citizens in the test districts of
the project and their activity profile are described further on, and the measures that
have been implemented are detailed. Finally, further developments and the
implementation of the Community Policing project in Austria are examined.

9.2 The Pilot Project ‘Joining Forces for Our Security

in Austria’: An Example of Community Policing
in Austria

Community policing was introduced in Austria after international projects had been
evaluated and pertinent expertise had been obtained from countries with experience
in Community Policing such as Canada, Great Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands,
France and the USA. The results of this evaluation were integrated in the findings
made in Austria. In April 2016 a Community Policing pilot project styled ‘Joining
forces for our security in Austria’ was set up and implemented in the following
Austrian regions: Mödling, a populous administrative district, selected urban dis-
tricts in the city of Graz, Schärding, a rural border district, and the provincial capital
of Eisenstadt. In July 2016 the Austrian capital Vienna was included. All of these
regions take part on a voluntary basis. This pilot project has been academically
supervised and evaluated.4

9.2.1 Structure of the Project

The project was given a legal basis and built around the principles of transparent
information and voluntary participation of civil society in maintaining public
security. The focus is on institutionalizing a dialogue between state and citizens at
local level as far as security in their living environment is concerned, rather than the
state imposing and the citizens resisting. This dialogue involves building confi-
dence and collaborating in finding solutions for local and regional security issues
and is considered a cornerstone of Community Policing in Austria.5

4
See Richtlinie für die Aufgaben, Organisation und Vollziehung des Probebetriebes Gemeinsam
Sicher in Mödling, Schärding, Graz Stadt und Eisenstadt – Bundesministerium für Inneres
Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit, Wien (2016), p. 1ff.
5
See Ibid., p. 2ff.

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114 B. Pusca et al.

New structures and workflows were integrated in day-to-day police work, so as

to ensure the proper functioning of Community Policing, even in the medium and
long run. The following central actors were established6:
1. Community citizen
2. Community police officer
3. Community policing coordinator
4. Security councillor.
These actors provide a framework for standardized procedures involving citi-
zens, public and private organizations as well as law enforcement services and for
delimiting responsibilities within and outside the police services. Community police
officers and Community policing coordinators are the law enforcement interface
with the population or civil society.
Community police officers are personal contacts for security citizens within the
police forces. They can be found at each police station in the four test districts and
deal with safety-critical issues that the security citizens report to them. Such an
issue may be, for instance, a feeling of unsafety in a dark park, where drunken
teenagers are accosting people. Furthermore, they initiate working groups for
finding solutions for identified problems jointly with the security citizens and the
representatives of public and private bodies concerned (e.g., local authority, youth
welfare service, employment agency or police services). This process is intended to
result in an arrangement that is binding for all stakeholders and is implemented by
the responsible persons or bodies. A close cooperation between different groups of
population is, therefore, imperative to achieve this goal. The societal approach to
the prevention of crime and deviant behaviour has been adopted by 1200 crime
prevention officers in Austria for many years now. These officers stand out by their
dedication and commitment for the benefit of the population, as they instil in the
population security expertise in different specialist areas.7 In order to make the best
possible use of their skills they will be recruited as community police officers.
Community policing coordinators are used as an interface between community
police officers and crime prevention officers on the one hand and local authorities
and the general public on the other. In this capacity they maintain contacts, take part
in public meetings and events and coordinate security-related activities in their
district. They benefit from their knowledge of regional conditions and from their
local contacts when coordinating prevention activities in the district.8 The creation
of a dedicated position for Community Policing coordination can be seen as a
commitment of the law enforcement sector to the entrenchment of Community
Policing in Austria. The community police officers and the Community Policing

6
See Ibid., p. 1.
7
See Bundesministerium für Inneres, Bericht der Kriminalprävention, 2015, Wien (2016), p. 8.
8
See Richtlinie für die Aufgaben, Organisation und Vollziehung des Probebetriebes Gemeinsam
Sicher in Mödling, Schärding, Graz Stadt und Eisenstadt – Bundesministerium für Inneres
Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit, Wien (2016), p. 4ff.

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9 Joining Forces for Our Security in Austrian Community Policing 115

coordinators are required to receive a modular training developed by the Criminal

Intelligence Service and covering the principles of Community Policing and crime
prevention, communication, moderation, intercultural dialogue, conflict resolution
strategies and legal knowledge.
The mayor or the local council of a community appoints a security councillor as
a liaison between the local police stations and the local government. This standard
procedure is, however, dependant on the regional conditions.9

9.2.2 Communication Methods Used Within the Project

A core element of the on-going Community Policing project is the creation and
expansion of responsiveness to citizens at grassroots. In addition to tried-and-tested
methods of communication such as meetings, appointments and platforms, social
media like Facebook are used for communication between the police and the
general public, reflecting modern communication behaviour and the modern
self-conception of the police.
In 2010 the Criminal Intelligence Service started using the private network
Facebook, which is a key communication tool of the twenty-first century, especially
for young people. Social media bring added value, because citizens interested in
public security need no longer make great efforts to find pertinent information, but
can retrieve it directly through their Facebook accounts. The only requirement is
that they are registered Facebook friends of the Criminal Intelligence Service.
Facebook had been used previously for prevention purposes, as it facilitates com-
municating with members of the public (see Chaps. 11 and 13).
Within the framework of the project ‘Joining forces for our security in
Austria/Community Policing’ a Facebook profile named ‘Joining forces for our
security in [name of district]’ is created for each participating district, so that each
community police officer can make regional information available for the Facebook
community and thus to the general public.
In June 2013 the Criminal Intelligence Service made available a police app for
the most common smartphone and tablet hardware and operating systems (Apple,
Android, Windows). Initially, it contained the following functions: news, wanted
persons/stolen items, police finder, prevention, reporting, feedback and crime
map. In future, ‘Joining forces for our security in Austria’ will be included in the
app as an additional function. It will provide users with information on Community
Policing activities and contact persons in their region. At a later stage, it is
envisaged to integrate WhatsApp groups as a direct communication gateway
between community police officers and security citizens ensuring smooth time
scheduling and easy information sharing. Furthermore, it is planned to use the video
portal YouTube as a communication and information channel. According to recent

9
See Ibid., p. 1ff.

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116 B. Pusca et al.

statistics the uploading of video clips on the YouTube platform has risen from an
average of 48 clips per minute in May 2011 to 400 clips per minute in July 2015.10
This is an increase of more than 670% in five years. Given this five year increase,
there is every reason to expect a further increase in the years to come.
Consequently, short films and video clips will be placed on YouTube, so as to
provide the public with information about Community Policing in general and the
implementation of the strategy in Austria in particular. In addition, information on
Community Policing and crime prevention is available on a dedicated Website.

9.3 Community Policing and Citizens’ Participation

in the Project

Citizens’ participation is generally understood to be the “voluntary and gratuitous

participation of citizens in policy-forming and decision-making processes”.11 In the
law enforcement sector, volunteering citizens should be involved in prevention
activities on the basis of transparent information and targeted co-operation.12 In the
Austrian pilot project citizens are involved in the form of what is called security
citizens. These are members of the public who are interested in collaborating in
organizing public security and in acting as ‘seismographs’ for security-related
concerns of the population and for social problem areas as well as liaison between
the general public, the police and other public and private organizations concerned.
It is hoped that the police can thus reach groups of populations that typically have
little or no contact with law enforcement and public organizations. Regular contact
and exchange of information is expected to create a relationship of trust between the
police and civil society.
While security citizens are participating in civic life and voluntary projects, they
do not receive any orders from law enforcement authorities, nor do they carry out
any official acts; that is to say the role of police as state security body preventing
dangerous attacks on life, health, liberty and property remains unchanged.13

10
See Upload of videos on YouTube per minute from May 2008 to July 2015 (in hours), (Statista)
(2016), http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/207321/umfrage/upload-von-videomaterial-bei-
youtube-pro-minute-zeitreihe/, (accessed 6 July 2016).
11
Was bedeutet Bürgerbeteiligung, (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden – Würtenberg)
(2016), http://buergerbeteiligung.lpb-bw.de/begriff.html, (accessed 6 July 2016).
12
See Richtlinie für die Aufgaben, Organisation und Vollziehung der Kriminalprävention–
Bundesministerium für Inneres (GZ.: BMI-EE1500/0017-II/2/a/2005), Wien (2005), p. 4ff.
13
See Sect. 25 Public Security Police Act, “Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der
Sicherheitsverwaltung und die Ausübung der Sicherheitspolizei (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz SPG)”
StF: BGBl. Nr. 566/1991 idF BGBl. I Nr. 5/2016 §25, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.
wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005792, (accessed 6 July 2016).

bayerl@rsm.nl
9 Joining Forces for Our Security in Austrian Community Policing 117

Security citizens are invited to take part in public briefing sessions and to act as
multipliers, passing on the information obtained to other citizens. When security
citizens approach the police with criminal information, the principle of ex-officio
prosecution applies.14
The role of security citizens is not conclusively defined in the directives for the
trial operation ‘Joining forces for our security in Austria’ in Mödling, Schärding,
Graz Stadt and Eisenstadt. However, they clearly stipulate that confusion and
uncertainty among the population and the creation of private patrolling groups are
to be avoided. They state that security citizens are
multipliers who present the security-related concerns of the population to community police
officers and who receive crime prevention information from the community police officers
and the Community Policing coordinators, which they pass on to their fellow citizens on a
voluntary basis and in a targeted way.15

The Directive is a framework that describes general structural elements and

leaves scope for taking account of local circumstances such as the number of
inhabitants, the crime rate, urban or rural structures and a different rationale behind
operations, when putting the concept into practice. The essence of Community
Policing is regional security work. If this principle is disregarded it will not be
successful and accepted by the general public. As a result, there are different local
approaches to implementing Community Policing, selecting security citizens and
defining their role.

9.4 Investigation of Specific Cases

In what follows the different selection procedures for security citizens in the four
trial districts of the project ‘Joining forces for our security in Austria’ are described.
In the few months since the project has started some measures have already been
carried out and successfully completed. One measure for each district will be
described. For our study the single case study was chosen as analysis tool. This
research design is characterized by the fact that a contemporary phenomenon is
investigated in depth, using a real-life social unit, which may be a person, a group,
an organization, a political party or a behavioural pattern and which is observed at a
single point in time or over some delimited period of time (Lamnek 2010). In this
particular instance, the security citizen was chosen as the object of investigation,
because citizen participation is a key element of the Community Policing strategy.
Reports forwarded by the community coordinators to the Austrian Criminal
Intelligence on a monthly basis were used as material for the analysis.

14
See Richtlinie für die Aufgaben, Organisation und Vollziehung des Probebetriebes Gemeinsam
Sicher in Mödling, Schärding, Graz Stadt und Eisenstadt – Bundesministerium für Inneres
Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit, Wien 2016, p. 7.
15
Ibid., p. 6.

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118 B. Pusca et al.

9.4.1 Trial District Mödling

9.4.1.1 Analysis of the Recruitment and the Specific Activity Profile

of Security Citizens

In the trial district Mödling a large number of inhabitants volunteered to become

security citizens in the first and second month of the trial operation, following
media coverage on a regional and local level and security meetings in the six most
populous communities. Most of them were proposed by the local governments and
police services. Those who made themselves known because of the media coverage
were contacted personally by the Community Policing coordinator after consulting
the local government representatives and were invited to an interview held in the
presence of the district police commander. In that interview, the project and the role
of a security citizen were presented, questions of the candidates with respect to
tasks, rights and obligations, cooperation with the police and expenditure of time
were answered and their interests were addressed.
The key selection criterion was an honorary function in the community, e.g., as a
volunteer for a charitable organization or the fire and rescue service, as a parent
representative in a school, as a coach in a sports club or a former political office as
mayor or local councillor. If a candidate has no honorary function, particular
attention is paid to his or her background and motivation.

9.4.1.2 Example of an Implemented Operative Measure

A successful operative measure that was implemented in the trial district Mödling
are ‘regional security meetings’ attended by the mayor, a member of the local
council, the security councillor, the district police commander and his deputy, the
Community Policing coordinator, the community police officer, the commanders of
the police stations, all active security citizens and local stakeholders. The current
security and crime situation and crime statistics are presented and topical security
problems are addressed. Recent topics were the sociocultural challenges linked to
the sharp rise in the occupancy of the reception centre for refugees located in the
district and the fact that most asylum seekers come from African and Arab countries
and have cultural peculiarities and display special behaviour patterns. The cultural
differences have resulted in an increased feeling of uncertainty among the local
population.
The general objective of the regional security meetings is networking among
local stakeholders. In addition, they are intended to give a realistic picture of the
security and crime situation and the police activities related to it and to rectify any
distorted image created by the media with a view to bring the participants
up-to-date and to reduce fears. When there are specific problems, the participants
are invited to contribute to problem-solving.

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9 Joining Forces for Our Security in Austrian Community Policing 119

9.4.2 Trial District Eisenstadt

9.4.2.1 Analysis of the Recruitment and the Specific Activity Profile

of Security Citizens

In Eisenstadt a call to become a security citizen was published in the official gazette
of the town and in local printed and broadcast media and was additionally made
during a public information session. Likely candidates were approached directly.
For the actual selection of candidates hearings were conducted and subsequently a
workshop was organized for the future security citizens. Strong emphasis is placed
on the communicative and social skills of the candidates. Selection criteria are
voluntariness, sociableness, reliability and seriousness. Most candidates attached
great importance to having their tasks specified and not to be considered a kind of
‘acting sheriffs’.

9.4.2.2 Example of an Implemented Operative Measure

Two landholders from Eisenstadt applied to their community police officer and
reported an increasing instance of disturbance of the peace. They alleged that
homeless people were making unauthorized use of a decrepit garden shed on their
land and would steal vegetables from a neighbouring plot of land. A number of
talks between the property owners and the community police officers took place and
revealed that the decrepit garden shed was no longer needed and could be pulled
down. The community police officer also talked to the homeless people, who were
subsequently referred to social institutions. This was a typical Community Policing
approach leading to the restoration of public order and the feeling of safety among
local residents.

9.4.3 Trial District Schärding

9.4.3.1 Analysis of the Recruitment and the Specific Activity Profile

of Security Citizens

In Schärding a two-stage procedure was used for recruiting security citizens: First,
the mayor proposed potential security citizens to the Community Policing coordi-
nator, then the mayor and the Community Policing coordinator jointly conducted
interviews with the candidates and met with them again to collect contact details
(e-mail addresses, mobile phone numbers, etc.) and to define the tasks for the
security citizens in the following months. The mayor often proposes local

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120 B. Pusca et al.

government employees, because they are in regular contact with citizens and are
actively involved in community life and enjoy the confidence of the local popu-
lation. In an increasing number of instances civil defence commissioners are
proposed.
Candidates sought clarification of their tasks and roles, expenditure of time and
were afraid to be labelled as police informers or deputy sheriffs. One volunteer was
rejected, because he seemed to have a radical political attitude. Experience has
shown that it is important to involve all those with responsibility when selecting
security citizens and to conduct interviews following a presentation at a briefing
session.

9.4.3.2 Example of an Implemented Operative Measure

A security citizen contacted his community police officer and informed him of a
road safety problem. At a road intersection the insufficient mounting height of a
traffic mirror had brought about a situation in which visibility was obstructed for
motorists. The informer and the community police officer advised the mayor of the
problem, who immediately arranged for a higher mounting position of the traffic
mirror. This measure resulted in improved visibility at the intersection and thus in
enhanced traffic safety.

9.4.4 Trial District Graz

9.4.4.1 Analysis of the Recruitment and the Specific Activity Profile

of Security Citizens

In these districts verbal propaganda and word of mouth in social media were used to
present the concept of security citizens to the public, yet no permanent security
citizens were appointed. Instead, they are selected on a case-by-case basis.
Whenever a security concern is reported to the police, an investigation is opened
and the stakeholders are contacted when the concern proves to be a security
problem. Subsequently, they are involved in identifying the cause of the problem
and possible solutions and in implementing measures. From then on the persons
involved are considered security citizens. They include municipal councillors,
county commissioners, members of senior citizens’ associations, residents of large
settlements, educators, school spokesmen, representatives of religious institutions
as well as private company staff and members of the Graz municipal fire brigade.
The following checklist has been drafted for solving problems:
• What is the (alleged) problem?
• What are its causes and impacts?

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9 Joining Forces for Our Security in Austrian Community Policing 121

• What are possible solutions?

• Can the envisaged solutions be funded? Are they feasible? Are they in com-
pliance with the law and with human rights? Are they useful or do they merely
shift the problem elsewhere?
This procedure has proved effective.
As security citizens are no longer active once the problem has been solved, there
is a permanent fluctuation in that district. To date this approach has not led to any
problems. Personal communication between community police officers and security
citizens goes smoothly. Nevertheless it is envisaged to appoint members of the Graz
fire brigade as security citizens, because they have a broad insight into the societal
challenges due to their wide-ranging professional activities and their varied oper-
ations. It should be noted that a private association styled ‘Safety in life’ has existed
in Graz for many years and now collaborates in Community Policing.

9.4.4.2 Example of an Implemented Operative Measure

Recently, a resident reported to the police that there was a growing number of
unemployed adolescents loitering in his vicinity and approaching passers-by
without reason. Particularly elderly citizens and women felt uncomfortable in this
situation. Community police officers brought the issue forward at a meeting of the
youth network in Graz and discussed possible corrective measures including the
creation of common facilities and employment measures for young people. The
community police officers try to establish a relationship of trust between youth
welfare workers and young citizens to enhance the subjective feeling of safety
among local residents and to exchange different worlds of experience.

9.4.5 Trial District Vienna

9.4.5.1 Analysis of the Recruitment and the Specific Activity Profile

of Security Citizens

The capital Vienna is composed of 23 districts and has more than 14 CID offices
and police commands, five of which take part in the present Community Policing
project. The security citizens are appointed by the county commissioners for each
district, who have proved to be competent and reliable cooperation partners in
public security matters. The security citizens selected are chiefly local government
councillors, but also other citizens. Their tasks are outlined in a decree issued by the
Vienna Police Directorate:

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122 B. Pusca et al.

Security citizens act as seismographs for ensuring a general feeling of safety and are
required to report observations, to make suggestions, to provide feedback to the police and
to help solving problems and ensuring safety in their local environment.16

The party spokesmen on public security in the regional parliament are consid-
ered security councillors, because they permanently deal with public security issues
in the city of Vienna.

9.4.5.2 Example of an Implemented Operative Measure17

More than 400,000 people from 170 countries live together in social housing
complexes in Vienna. In 2014 this situation led to increasing neighbourhood
conflicts and a declining feeling of safety there. The housing cooperative contacted
community police officers—then called networking officers—within the Vienna
police. The latter found that the problem could only be solved by a package of
measures: networking with the general public, information sessions, increased
police patrolling, preventive measures and an early warning system for adminis-
trative, criminal and security-related problem areas. Advertisements were placed in
the printed media and on television calling for mutual courtesy and respect for other
cultures and lifestyles. Although the police measures offered were only reluctantly
accepted, a significant, lasting reduction in police operations was recorded (in a
particular residential complex police operations decreased by more than 60%).
The Vienna Police Directorate is conducting a dialogue with a major German
coffee house chain about the organization of regular security sessions in their
branches for interested citizens to exchange and obtain information from local
community police officers and security citizens in matters relating to public security
in the districts.

9.5 Outlook

A broadly positive assessment can be reached from the three months trial operation,
the monthly evaluation reports, numerous personal conversations and project
activities so far, both inside and outside the law enforcement services. Community
Policing has proved to be an added value for both police officers and members of
the public. The joint measures taken have resulted in enhanced mutual acceptance,
legitimacy and understanding for the Community Policing strategy among the

16
Kurzbrief LPD Wien “GEMEINSAM SICHER Aufgaben, Organisation und Vollzug des
Probebetriebs bei der Landespolizeidirektion Wien”, GZ P4/157530/2016 (2016), p. 4.
17
Note: The Vienna Police Directorate is still in the preparation phase for the projects and no op-
erative measures have been taken yet. Therefore, the authors draw on an example outside
the project, where the Community Policing strategy has been partly applied.

bayerl@rsm.nl
9 Joining Forces for Our Security in Austrian Community Policing 123

population and within the police forces. The guiding and coordinating role of the
police makes it a key actor in the field of public security.
From the outset the project was academically supervised and evaluated by stu-
dents from the Wiener Neustadt University. In addition, it is evaluated by the
Project Office within the Austrian Criminal Intelligence Service. The findings will
be incorporated in the planning process for a nationwide implementation of the
project ‘Joining forces for our security/Community Policing’. In fact, based on the
positive experiences it is envisaged to terminate the trial operation in late 2016 and
to incorporate the Community Policing strategy in the police organization in 2017.
The Director of Public security Konrad Kogler has emphasized the commitment to
Community Policing during a ‘Joining forces for our security in Austria’-themed
event as follows:
We would like to see our citizens approach the police with their concerns. The community
police officers will make sure that these concerns are dealt with in cooperation with the
competent bodies and the security citizens.18

Enhanced involvement of key players at regional level is expected to lead to

closer cooperation with interested citizens. In fact, crime prevention and coopera-
tion in the public security sector can only be fully effective, if all those involved act
in the interests of public welfare. Interior Minister Sobotka put it as follows: “A
permanent exchange between police, local governments and citizens will create a
higher level of security.”19

References

Becker-Oehm S (2010) Crime and Crime Policy-Kriminalität und Kriminalpolitik. Die

Kriminologische Kriminalanalyse – Notwendige Ausgangsbasis für die kommunale
Kriminalprävention?, Bochum, Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer
Behr R (2008) Veränderungsprozesse des Gewaltmonopols. Organisationssoziologische
Anmerkungen zum Transformationsprozess der staatlichen Vollzugspolizei. In: Ostermeier L
(ed) Policing in Context – Rechtliche, organisatorische, kulturelle Rahmenbedingungen
polizeilichen Handelns. LIT Verlag, Wien, pp 53–72
Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Sicherheitsverwaltung und die Ausübung der Sicherheitspolizei
(Sicherheitspolizeigesetz SPG) StF: BGBl. Nr. 566/1991 idF BGBl. I Nr. 5/2016 §25, https://www.ris.
bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005792. Accessed
6 July 2016
Frevel B, Kuschewski P (2008) Kommunale Kriminalprävention zwischen Anspruch und
Wirklichkeit – Erkenntnisse aus dem Forschungsprojekt “Kommunale Sicherheitspolitik in
Mittelstädten”. In: Ostermeier L (ed) Policing in Context – Rechtliche, organisatorische,
kulturelle Rahmenbedingungen polizeilichen Handelns. LIT Verlag, Wien, pp 73–102

18
Gemeinsam Sicher in Eisenstadt – Landeshauptstadt Teil des Pilotprojektes des
Innenministeriums, (Eisenstadt Landeshauptstadt) 2016, http://www.eisenstadt.gv.at/home/news/
details/article/gemeinsam-sicher-in-eisenstadt.html, (accessed 7 July 2016).
19
Ibid.

bayerl@rsm.nl
124 B. Pusca et al.

Gemeinsam Sicher in Eisenstadt – Landeshauptstadt Teil des Pilotprojektes des

Innenministeriums, (Eisenstadt Landeshauptstadt), 2016, http://www.eisenstadt.gv.at/home/
news/details/article/gemeinsam-sicher-in-eisenstadt.html. Accessed 7 July 2016
Initiative Gemeinsam Sicher in Eisenstadt vorgestellt, (BMI Website Artikel Nr: 13567), 2016,
http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/bmi/_news/bmi.aspx?id=3763346E502F54636C514D3D&page=
0&view=1. Accessed 5 July 2016
Lamnek S (2010) Qualitative Sozialforschung. Beltz Verlag, Basel
Olschok H (2010) Gewaltmonopol vs Sicherheitsmonopol. In: Kischewski S (ed) Polizei und
Sicherheitsmanagement—60 Jahre Grundgesetz. LIT Verlag, Berlin, pp 101–123
Pusca B (2013) Das berufliche Selbstbild von Wiener Polizistinnen und Polizisten des exekutiven
Außendienstes im Kontext der organisationalen Leitbilder. Fachhochschule Wiener Neustadt,
Diplomarbeit (MA)
Upload of videos on YouTube per minute from May 2008 to July 2015 (in hours), Durchschnittlicher
Upload von Videomaterial bei YouTube pro Minute in ausgewählten Monaten von Mai 2008 bis
Juli 2015 (in Stunden), (Statista) 2016, http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/207321/
umfrage/upload-von-videomaterial-bei-youtube-pro-minute-zeitreihe/. Accessed 6 July 2016
Was bedeutet Bürgerbeteiligung (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Würtemberg) 2016,
http://buergerbeteiligung.lpb-bw.de/begriff.html. Accessed 6 July 2016

Internal Documents of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Not

Available for the Public)

Bundesministerium für Inneres (2016) Bericht der Kriminalprävention 2015, Wien

Bundesministerium für Inneres (2013) Innen Sicher. Für Sicherheit. Für Österreich. 2013, Wien
Kurzbrief LPD Wien GEMEINSAM SICHER Aufgaben, Organisation und Vollzug des
Probebetriebs bei der Landespolizeidirektion Wien, GZ P4/157530/2016, 2016
Richtlinie für die Aufgaben, Organisation und Vollziehung der Kriminalprävention –
Bundesministerium für Inneres (GZ.: BMI-EE1500/0017-II/2/a/2005), Wien, 2005
Richtlinie für die Aufgaben (2016) Organisation und Vollziehung des Probebetriebes Gemeinsam
Sicher in Mödling, Schärding, Graz Stadt und Eisenstadt – Bundesministerium für Inneres
Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit, Wien

bayerl@rsm.nl
Chapter 10
Security as the Basis Behind Community
Policing: Croatia’s Community Policing
Approach

Ruža Karlović and Ines Sučić

10.1 Introduction

Security is of vital interest, not only for those dealing with it professionally, but also
for laymen around the world. It covers every aspect of life, and its importance can
be seen in its wide-spread use in daily life and in a range of scientific disciplines.
The need for citizens’ security is shared by all cultures. Security means the range of
measures taken to protect humans and property from danger such as accidents,
disasters or crime, while safety is the state in which someone or something is safe
from danger or harm (Coursen 2014). Security is the process of ensuring our safety,
or more accurately the measures performed to maintain our protection and to
prevent danger, so we can enjoy the feeling of safety. However, the fact is that the
security standard has become the central and fundamental value in society and is
accompanied by political measures, technology, rights and insurance (Čaldarović
2011).
Every society, including Croatia, has its own culture, its specificities and men-
tality, all of which reflects upon the cooperation between the police and citizens. In
democratic societies, security is based on the protection of social values and the
fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. Those dealing with the issues of
security—or the lack thereof—agree that it is necessary to consider the broadest
social changes, which are the consequence of the recent globalisation of society. If
security is jeopardised at the global level, it will also be jeopardised to a certain
extent at the local level (Giddens 2007). In 2010, the European Union adopted the

R. Karlović (&)
Croatian Police Academy, Zagreb, Croatia
e-mail: rkarlovic@fkz.hr
I. Sučić
Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Croatia
e-mail: Incs.Sucic@pilar.hr

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 125

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_10

bayerl@rsm.nl
126 R. Karlović and I. Sučić

Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe. This
Strategy is based on the values of the European Union and lists all areas that should
be integrated in order to face specific security challenges: law enforcement, justice,
border management and civil protection (EU International Security Strategy in
Action 2010, 2015). However, security is a multi-dimensional construct (Ziegleder
et al. 2011) and also a subjective category, as it is subject to constant change that
implies the feeling of security or the absence of fear or threats to the values of a
society. Social changes, such as the political situation, cultural processes, popula-
tion, migration, other needs and issue of modern society (e.g., alienation in big
cities, anonymity) affect police work. The mechanisms of informal social surveil-
lance are failing and are becoming weaker due to the present day lifestyle and are
even disappearing in large cities (cp. also Chap. 8).
Today’s society is marked as an unsafe society and is characterised by risk (Beck
2004). In the context of personal security, which refers to the creation of conditions
in which people do not suffer threats such as crime, violence or discrimination, the
partnership between police and the community has been recognised. In a survey
conducted by the Special Eurobarometer (2015), a sample of 28,082 respondents
from different social and demographic groups in all EU Member States were
interviewed face-to-face at home in their mother tongue. About nine in ten
respondents stated that they felt the police and the judicial system were chiefly
responsible for ensuring the security of citizens. Data from surveys conducted in
2014, 2015 and 2016 on nationally representative random samples of adults in
Croatia (1,000 in 2014 and 2015; and 750 in 2016) showed that citizens when asked
how much they trust each of the eight institutions army, president, police, UN,
European parliament, legal system, Croatian parliament, government and political
parties have relatively stable levels of trust in police over time, and that they only
trust the army and the president more than police. But since levels of trust of
Croatian citizens in institutions is generally relatively low, they actually neither
trust nor distrust police (Pilar’s barometer of Croatian society 2014, 2015, 2016).
It is possible that such an ambivalent attitude towards the police is more the
consequence of the prior, strictly traditional work of the police in which the police
had a more distant stance towards citizens. Therefore, the concept of Community
Policing, as a modified model of police work, facilitates the return of citizen faith in
the police. The modified role of the police in Croatian society has been based on
cooperation with citizens and creating better conditions for life without fear for
one’s personal safety. Police aim to include citizens, so as to work together to
contribute to designing and implementing prevention measures and activities, to
reduce problems and the crime rate and to create a stronger sense of personal
security among citizens, which in turn improves the overall quality of life of the
community as a whole (see Chaps. 2 and 3). The development of Community
Policing in Croatia together with the most relevant programs is presented in this
chapter.

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10 Security as the Basis Behind Community … 127

10.2 The Croatian Community Policing Approach

In Croatia, the police, as part of the Interior Ministry, is traditionally responsible for
public safety, and its tasks above all are the protection of life, rights, liberty and
security of persons, protection of property and protection of public order and peace
(OG 76/09, 92/14). In terms of organisation, the Police Directorate has been
established at the national level and police administrations at the regional level for
the performance of police tasks. Police stations are responsible for citizen security
at the local level and for the resolution of local issues.
The democratisation of Croatian society, in the sense of changes to the political
system from a Socialist regime to a democratic system, began in 1990. The new
democratic Constitution of the Republic of Croatia was adopted in December 1990.
In addition to changes to the political system, the democratisation of society also
implied the establishment of democratic institutions. The basis for this new
approach to the work of police were laid down in 2000 with the new Police Act,
which introduced new provisions defining the cooperation of police with local
government bodies in order to achieve the security of persons and property. The law
also prescribes that police are required to cooperate with other bodies, organisa-
tions, citizens, associations and self-organised citizen groups, in order to develop
cooperation aimed at preventing or detecting illegal behaviour. Therefore, the 2000
Police Act (OG 34/11, 130/12, 89/14, 151/14, 33/15) laid the foundations for the
work of the police in the local environment. These legal provisions gave certain
guidelines for the creation of tighter bonds between the police and society, the local
community or city. Today this is present in Article 8 of the Police Duties and
Powers Act (OG 76/09, 92/14).
The Strategic Plan of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Croatia, which
encompasses the work of police and other institutions for the purpose of protection
for the period 2014–2018 outlines that the scope of the Interior Ministry and other
institutions in the function of protection comprises tasks of maintaining public order
and security (Strateški plan MUP-a 2016). The Legal Dictionary (2007) defines
public security (Croatian: javna sigurnost, German: öffentliche Sicherheit, French:
sécurité publique) in a narrow sense (state, divided into internal and external) and a
wider sense (situation free of illegal activities and actions that can have a conse-
quence of jeopardizing the fundamental rights and freedoms and fundamental
factors of the public social order) and finally states that pursuant to the Act on the
Organisation and Scope of Central State Administration Bodies and the Police Act
public security affairs imply police duties.
The objectives of the Strategic Plan are to improve the prevention of criminal
behaviour, improve the combatting of crime, increase road safety, strengthen the
security of state borders in air transport and navigation, improve services to citizens
in administrative matters, improve relations in the internal and foreign spheres, etc.,
while the prevention of crime is listed as a specific objective.
The Strategic Plan states that for every society the prevention of criminal
behaviour is more economic than combatting crime or dealing with the

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128 R. Karlović and I. Sučić

consequences of criminal behaviour. For this reason, the Croatian police has
increased its proactive principles in its activities. The bodies of the Interior Ministry
responsible for prevention and the bodies of other organisational units are entrusted
with the implementation of the objectives of the Strategic Plan and for the pre-
ventative activities as listed in other strategic national documents of the
Government of the Republic of Croatia that include the Interior Ministry. Therefore,
all organisational units are obliged to focus on the prevention of crime within the
scope of their authorities.
In terms of the organisation, the Crime Prevention Service was established in the
police within the Police Directorate in the year 2010 and is primarily entrusted with
the prevention of crime. This service is in fact a successor of the Community
Policing Strategy that was adopted in 2003 (Cajner Mraović et al. 2003).
Community police officers were introduced to police organizations with the addi-
tion of two positions added to the police work force, i.e., the community police
officer and the police officer for prevention.
The activities by which the Crime Prevention Service plans to strengthen the
prevention of crime in Croatian society include strengthening and improving the
work of the Council for Crime Prevention at the local level, initiating the foun-
dation of new councils within local communities, continuing the implementation of
prevention programmes at the local level, improving the capacity of information
centres for crime prevention, educating police staff with secondary school qualifi-
cations about the content and tactics for crime prevention, adopting the good
practices of other police services in crime prevention, etc. The public order service
within the police administrations lists certain activities for the prevention of crime
and other illegal activities. This includes the monitoring and analysis of objective
safety indicators relating to the security of persons and property, certain subcultural
groups, intensive collection of operative information and accordingly proposing or
taking preventative measures to remove threats.
In the Republic of Croatia, there is no national crime prevention strategy, though
for the purpose of achieving the set goals in the area of public security, there are
national strategies and programmes in which the Ministry of the Interior participates
as the leader or sub-leader in the implementation of measures and activities. Based
on these, the Prevention Department within the General Police Directorate under-
takes prevention activities. There are several such strategies: the National Strategy
to combat domestic violence, National Road Safety Program, National Roma
Inclusion Strategy, National Strategy for the Prevention of Drug Abuse, National
Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking and others (MUP RH 2016).
A decade after the adoption of the document ‘Community Policing Strategy’, the
Police Directorate adopted the Guidelines for Crime Prevention. These guidelines
describe the premises for crime prevention, the leaders in crime prevention in the
police, cooperation with external partners at the national and international level, etc.
It should also be stressed that the Croatian police is centralised in terms of its
organisation, meaning that organisational units for prevention in police adminis-
trations must request the consent or opinion of the Prevention Service of the Police
Directorate for all prevention activities that include work with the media, for the

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10 Security as the Basis Behind Community … 129

Fig. 10.1 The concept map of the Croatian community policing approach

creation of promotional materials, when planning joint projects among multiple

police administrations, etc.
With the adoption of the Community Policing Strategy 16 years ago, the
Ministry of the Interior opted to continue the development and sustainability of this
Strategy. The Croatian Community Policing approach is based on three dimensions
(see also Fig. 10.1): organizational, functional and partnership.

10.2.1 Organizational Dimension

The organisational dimension implies the introduction of police officers, called

contact police officers in Croatia. These officers have passed special training with an
emphasis on communication and social skills. Therefore, the implementation of the
Community Policing Strategy in 2003 has been continued through the project
‘Reforms to the operational and prevention work of uniformed officers’. Following
this, a work unit for crime prevention was organised at the level of the Police
Directorate and police administrations. One of the most recent aspects implemented
by the Croatian police was the introduction of new technologies to improve

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130 R. Karlović and I. Sučić

interaction with citizens and to facilitate police work (reducing the amount of time
police officers spend doing paperwork). An example of these new technologies is an
application called the e-reporting application (webmup 2015). In general, for dif-
ferent countries and organisations it makes sense to include technological advances
into the community in form of Community Policing applications to enhance and
strengthen bonds between the police and communities, because in the community
most individuals will have a smartphone (James et al. 2016).

10.2.2 Functional Dimension

The functional level of the Croatian Community Policing approach is seen in the
fact that Community Policing consists not solely of contact police officers and
prevention officers, but that it is an overall modification of the traditional model of
the Croatian police into the model of Community Policing. In other words, the
relationships result in changes in the organisational culture and the individual
conduct within the organisation. Community policing is a contemporary method of
performing police duties, and it is a demanding method. The work model for
community policy propagates the proactive work of the police and the community.
In the relationship between proactive and preventative, the proactive is a form of
preventative action that aims to minimise the appearance of the fundamental risk
factors for criminal behaviour.
The range of proactive action in crime potential is very broad: from various
educational activities for children and youth to various projects directed at
empowering children and youth in order to prevent their readiness for criminal
conduct to participating in urban planning and creating urban infrastructure and
architecture (Karlović 2012). This is perhaps the reason why some police officers at
all levels continue to feel uncomfortable with and show resistance against the
further development of Community Policing. It is possible that they are bothered by
the idea of ‘community police’, since at a superficial level it may have an associ-
ation of police that deal with exclusively non-police tasks and are more involved in
the work areas of other services.
However, cooperation with the community and mutual trust based on integra-
tion, responsibility and partnership is necessary, because otherwise citizens will not
provide information to the police. In today’s technologically advanced society
information is a key instrument in police work. For example, the most offending
criminal acts (murder, rape, assault, burglary) are rarely discovered by police
patrols. Police spend the majority of their time in passive patrolling and responding
to emergency calls. A rapid appearance at the scene after a call does not signifi-
cantly raise citizen satisfaction, as citizens expect the police to, above all, prevent
crime and then to arrest offenders. The perpetrators of criminal acts are most often
revealed when and if police receive useful information from witnesses who have
observed an important detail. If the police do not receive such information, there is
only a 1:10 likelihood of discovering the perpetrator. Therefore, the police must

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10 Security as the Basis Behind Community … 131

improve relations with residents, victims and witnesses in order to obtain infor-
mation and to be able to better prevent crime (Palmiotto 2000).
In the context of implementing Community Policing in Croatia, in cooperation
between the police force of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Istrian Police
Administration in Croatia, the typical tasks of Community Policing were described
in detail. These include: contact with citizens, resolving local issues, monitoring the
state and trends of crime, providing assistance to victims of criminal acts, emer-
gency situations, etc. Another important point discussed regards the fundamental
conditions for performing these tasks, which are: constancy of contact, support of
superiors, motivational contact of police and the support of the local community
(Borovec et al. 2013). Of course, all local centres have their specificities and
problems, and police officers are required to modify their work accordingly.
As the most important resource in the implementation of the Community
Policing strategy, police officers are mostly responsible for the success they
achieve. In other words, the competency and selection of police officers is of critical
importance, not only in the explanation of Community Policing in these three
dimensions, but also for the protection of other police officers and for the purpose of
protecting the communities they serve (Coutts 1990). Orlović (2013) stresses that
supervisors, in the context of managerial functions, have standards at their disposal
as instruments that can act on the motivation of the employees within the Croatian
police.

10.2.3 Partnership Dimension

The partnership dimension implies the development of mutual relations among all
interested parties: the police, government institutions and citizens and cooperation
at the international level (IPA HR 2008 IB JH 04 TL 2013). Different authors stress
that there is no unified definition of community policy, though there are some
definitions that are commonly used (cp. Chap. 4). In the Community Policing
Strategy, the Croatian experts refer to the definition of Trojanowicz and
Bucqueroux (1990): “Community policing is a new strategy of the police action
based on the idea that the police officers and community members work together,
and they use different innovative ways to solve ongoing problems at the local
community level in connection with crime, fear of crime and other different social
deviations. Achieving these goals requires from the police the development of new
relationship with law abiding citizens, in which they will get the opportunity to
define priorities and to include themselves in different activities in order to improve
the quality of life in their neighbourhood. So, the Community Policing moves the
focus of the police work from reacting to incidents to proactively solving the
problems” (cited in Cajner Mraović et al. 2003).
The new work model for uniformed police officers has been implemented in all
20 police administrations with about 700 community police officers in the field and
some 60 police officers working on prevention. As part of the project ‘Organising

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132 R. Karlović and I. Sučić

prevention in the local community’ 225 Prevention Councils have been established
in Croatia, of which 114 councils were formed at the city or county level and 111 at
the municipality or neighbourhood level (Buchheit and Karlović 2015).

10.3 Significant Examples of Prevention Projects, CP

Programmes and Campaigns

In the following we present a range of projects in the context of the Croatian

Community Policing approach. Additional information about them can be found on
the website of the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN).
The European Commission gave its remarks to the Council and the European
Parliament on crime prevention in the European Union (COM (2004) 165; 2004/C
92/02). Following this, the Council Decision on the adoption of the European
Network for Crime Prevention (2001/427/JHA) was adopted and explains the
concepts of crime prevention, preventative measures and activities. For the purpose
of these remarks, the Commission proposed the use of the definition of crime
prevention as presented in the 2001 Council Decision at the time of the estab-
lishment of the European Union Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN). The Council
Decision (2009/902/JHA) of 30 November 2009 outlines the objectives, tasks,
responsibilities, structures and means of activities and the evaluation of the
European Union Crime Prevention Network. Of particular importance is Article 2
of this document, which requires that the EUCPN contributes to the development of
various aspects of crime prevention at the level of the European Union, which also
requests that this body supports the European Union Crime Prevention Strategy.
The EUCPN is expected to support the crime prevention activities at the national
and local level. Paragraph 2 of the same Article states that crime prevention should
include all measures that can contribute, in any way, to reducing crime and feelings
of insecurity among citizens, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
It is important to stress that through its multi-year strategy, the European Union
Crime Prevention Network envisages the development of a general concept of
crime prevention, as based on the cited Article 2 of the 2009 Council Decision. It is
also necessary to stress the continuity of this approach, considering the fact that
crime prevention is regulated in an identical manner in Article 1, paragraph 3 of
Council Decision (2001/427/JHA) of 28 May 2001, and that this is the platform
upon which the EUCPN is founded:
Crime prevention will encompass all measured directed at reducing crime and the feeling of
insecurity among citizens, qualitative and quantitative measures, through any direct
detection of criminal activity, through any policies or interventions directed at reducing the
potential and possible causes of crime. It includes the joint efforts of government, relevant
institutions, law enforcement agencies, local authorities, specialised institutions, the private
sector, non-governmental organisations, and scientific and research institutions, and is
supported by the media” (MUP 2005 and Council Decision 2009 Article 2, paragraph 2).

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10 Security as the Basis Behind Community … 133

As a new European Union Member State since 2013, Croatia has become an
active and equal member of EUCPN. As such it is worth mentioning several of the
projects that have been implemented, particularly those for which the Croatian
police won awards from the European Crime Prevention Network.

10.3.1 ‘Less Arms, Less Tragedies’

The project started in 2007 and is ongoing.‘Less Arms, Less Tragedies’ is a national
prevention campaign initially carried out in collaboration with the UNDP and now
implemented in cooperation with local and regional governments and relevant
entities.
It is conducted throughout the territory of the Republic of Croatia, especially in
areas where there is a certain risk of unexploded explosive devices. The project also
aims to raise awareness of the dangers of improper handling of weapons, mines and
explosive devices.
The aim of the campaign is to encourage citizens to voluntarily hand over any
weapons they have in their possession. During its implementation, over 50,000
pieces of different types of weapons and explosive devices were collected from
citizens in a one-year period. With education carried out by police officers for
prevention in cooperation with police officers from the Bomb disposal department,
organized in certain areas in the Republic of Croatia, the project aimed to raise
awareness among citizens, especially parents and children, of the potential dangers
of mines and explosive devices left behind in their surroundings.
The campaign message is that illegal weapons endanger human lives, leave
lasting consequences and represent a potential tragedy that could happen to anyone,
especially children. An educational comic book was created for children and a
number of public events were held to introduce these risks and procedures to take if
such a weapon was encountered.
It should be emphasized that one of the EU’s strategic priorities is ‘Reducing the
risk of firearms, including combatting illegal arms trafficking’, which is precisely
the goal of this campaign. Meanwhile, the project contributes to the fulfilment of
policy measures on the EU scene in this area as follows: ‘Strengthening prevention
by building awareness, collaboration and sharing best practices and knowledge
between all interested entities.’ More specifically, since the launch of the campaign
in September 2007 until 31 December 2015, the following amounts of weapons
were collected:
• 3681.32 kg of explosives
• 10,385 pieces of firearms (rifles and short-barrelled weapons)
• 95,534 pieces of various explosive devices
• 4,340,820 pieces of ammunition of different calibre

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134 R. Karlović and I. Sučić

10.3.2 ‘Living Life Without Violence’

The National Prevention Programme, active since 2010, is aimed at preventing

violence against women, domestic violence, peer violence and building a culture of
non-violence and tolerance. The project is being implemented in partnership with
the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, celebrities, NGOs and Crime
Prevention Councils. The target group is primary school students. The Programme
is tailored to children and includes three components:
1. Interactive workshop
2. Artistic and educational programme
3. Interactive discussion (‘parlaonica’)
All three Programme components have been implemented in all 20 of Croatia’s
counties and the City of Zagreb, including 35 primary schools for a total of 3768
students between the age of 13 and 14, 1661 of which actively participated in all
three programme components. The Programme has been officially evaluated, and all
activities have been rated as high quality and appropriate for the target group. In
fact, the project received the European award for crime prevention as the best
project in the primary prevention category (ECPA 2013). There is a Facebook page
for photographs and news about the Programme: https://www.facebook.com/zivim.
zivot.bez.nasilja/.

10.3.3 ‘Healthy for 5’

The national prevention project ‘Healthy for 5’ was launched in 2012, and since
2013 it has been implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Science,
Education and Sports, the Ministry of Health (Croatian National Institute of Public
Health) and the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection. The project is
designed and adapted for children and youth aged 14–16 years. Its goal is to
prevent addition to alcohol, drugs and gambling and to raise awareness of the
importance of environmental protection and nature with the promotion of healthy
lifestyles.
The police, doctors and teachers are working together to implement the project
activities in all educational institutions across the Republic of Croatia with edu-
cational lectures and interactive workshops with students aged 14–16 years. In
addition to education, children are participating in public events designed to raise
awareness on the preservation of the health and safety of ourselves and others. To
date, 70,000 students have taken part in the project, and the joint national survey
has been conducted among students about their habits and attitudes regarding the
harmful effects of alcohol, drugs and gambling.

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10 Security as the Basis Behind Community … 135

10.3.4 ‘Together’

The project started in October 2013 and is ongoing. The Ministry of Interior in
cooperation with other competent government bodies, institutions and NGOs is
strongly focused on the establishment of an efficient national referral mechanism of
prevention and repression of trafficking of human beings (THB) as a part of
organized crime. Coordinated, proper and targeted education, awareness raising and
systematic prevention are the crucial and most efficient instruments in resolving this
issue, which are incorporated within the preventive project ‘Together’. It combines
numerous relevant expert institutions, NGOs and the private sector, which con-
tribute jointly within the scope of their competences to achieve the planned
objectives.
The project activities and target groups are, in accordance with the character-
istics of each county (defined as critical points with respect to THB recruitment,
transit and/or exploitation), determined for each police administration separately
through 20 components containing different preventive measures and are always
accompanied by the application of four key modules:
• Module 1: Police officers should be proactive
• Module 2: Together in the community
• Module 3: Knowledge is power
• Module 4: Don’t be passive
The primary objective of this project was to connect the key components of
society and to motivate them to act jointly to prevent THB through a
multi-disciplinary and alternative approach, alongside developed cooperative and
targeted initiatives and the systematic activity of all relevant participants. Secondary
objectives encompass striking the dark number in terms of ensuring a timely
reaction of responsible institutions, NGOs and the private sector, thus having real
insight into the actual situation and types of crime, elimination of potential critical
points, motivation of passive individuals and social subjects to react to socially
unacceptable behaviour and empowerment of potential victims in terms of
enhancing their self-protection.
The evaluation of the project showed that the project and its activities were well
received with positive results. Of particular note is the evaluation that was con-
ducted among the adolescent population aimed at determining the position of
secondary school students on the role of the police in daily life and in the pre-
vention programmes the Zagreb Police Administration implemented in conjunction
with the City of Zagreb in primary and secondary schools in the city. Among the
population of first grade students in Zagreb’s secondary schools (n  11,200), a
sample of 1705 young men and women participated in the survey. In general, the
position of students on the role of the police was very positive. A large majority
(78%) mostly or completely agreed with the claim that “The police help to prevent
crime”, 71% agreed with the statement “The police is an important part of society”
and 73% with the statement “The police protect citizens.” A similarly high

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136 R. Karlović and I. Sučić

percentage (60%) stated that they believe that “A community police officer would
really do something if approached with a problem.” However, only 46% of the
students surveyed mostly or completely agreed with the statement that “Community
police officers are important in my neighbourhood.” It can be observed that the
youths feel that community police officers have a role and would do something to
help if approached with a problem, but that a significantly smaller number considers
community police officers to be an important and useful part of their own neigh-
bourhood (Razum et al. 2015).

10.3.5 ‘Tours’

Another example worth mentioning is police cross-border cooperation—an inter-

esting project that the Croatian police has been implementing from 2006 on.
‘TOURS’ (Safe Tourist Season) is a project aimed at making tourists in Croatia feel
safer and more comfortable. Tourism is one of the most developed activities in the
country, especially on the coast and the islands (which number more than one
thousand). That is why every year for the past 10 years, the Croatian police brings
foreign police officers (e.g., 74 in 2016) to major tourist destinations during the
tourist season. For that reason foreign nationals and tourists are usually very happy;
they stop and have a chat with their police officers, they know where to find them
and they feel safer. This is what policing should be about, making people feel safe.
There is a Facebook page for photographs and news about the project: https://www.
facebook.com/sigurna.turisticka.sezona.

10.4 Conclusions

The objective of this chapter was to provide an overview of key changes in the
work of the Croatian police after the implementation of the Community Policing
Strategy. Security is the reason for the existence of the police, and security is the
state that all societies strive for and an essential need for all individuals with the
exception of those who place other priorities before their own security. Reforms to
police work in the Republic of Croatia began after the transformation of the political
system from a Socialist region into a democratic system. In order to resolve the poor
characteristics of the pseudo-military model of the former police system, which was
marked by a large distance between police and citizens, the experts in the Croatian
police developed the Community Policing strategy, which has since become an
official document.
The concept of Community Policing was primarily developed in democratic
environments, and the introduction of this model into the Croatian system, still a
young democracy, has truly proven to be an ongoing process. Community policing,
as a modified model of police work in comparison to the traditional model, differs

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10 Security as the Basis Behind Community … 137

in the social interactions and structural components. In the Croatian Community

Policing Strategy the differences between these two models in the approach to
certain duties is outlined. For example, the focus of police activities in the classic
model implied the exclusive enforcement of the law, while the modified
Community Policing model implies improving the quality of life through activities
to prevent crime. Furthermore, with regard to the flow of information, the classic
model implies the one-way flow of information, i.e., from the police towards the
community, while Community Policing implies a two-way flow of information, i.e.,
mutual flows between citizens and police (Green 2000).
The current state of the Community Policing concept in the Croatian society and
Croatian police is shown though three levels: the organisational, functional and
partnership level. This is the result of the strategic commitment of the Croatian
police to ensure the further development and sustainability of the key elements
within the levels of the concept of Community Policing. In today’s society, citizens
are increasingly acting as individuals, they are more informed and they will not
facilitate police work and work to build the ties between police and citizens if they
feel the police are not responsible towards them. Citizens will not trust the police if
they feel in any way that the police culture and organisational structures are not
aligned with the Community Policing strategy. This forms the foundation for the
continuation of more comprehensive work in Community Policing.

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bayerl@rsm.nl
Chapter 11
Community Policing Case Studies:
Proposing a Social Media Approach

Georgios Leventakis, George Kokkinis and George Papalexandratos

11.1 Introduction

Community policing (CP) is not a general and coherent model, but rather an
ambiguous concept, not adequately defined and open to multiple interpretations.
The lack of clarity has led to a marked diversity in its application in different
contexts and has contributed to misunderstandings, frustrations and confusion in the
implementation of CP reforms (cp. Chaps. 4 and 5). From one perspective CP is a
strategy of the police, which facilitates intelligence gathering; from another, it is a
philosophy, which is based upon accountability and public participation in the
setting of policing agendas. Whilst the former perspective focuses upon increasing
the productivity of existing institutions, the latter necessitates a fundamental
transformation of governance provision where communities have a normative voice
in how they are policed. Both perspectives will be studied with a number of selected
case studies.
A case study is defined as “a process or record of research into the development
of a particular person, group, or situation over a period of time”1 and is recognised
as a research tool in community based problems (Johnson 2006). As a method it
enables researchers to closely examine data related to the CP context. In most cases,

1
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/case-study.

G. Leventakis (&)
G. Kokkinis
G. Papalexandratos

KEMEA—Center for Security Studies, Athens, Greece
e-mail: gleventakis@kemea.gr
G. Kokkinis
e-mail: g.kokkinis@kemea-research.gr
G. Papalexandratos
e-mail: g.papalexandratos@kemea-research.gr

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 139

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_11

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140 G. Leventakis et al.

a case study method selects a small geographical area or a very limited number of
individuals as the subjects of study. Yin (1984) defines the case study research
method “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (p. 23).
The examination and documentation of each test case is based on work com-
pleted as part of the INSPEC2T research project.2 Data was collected through desk
research of documents, online surveys aiming to capture citizens, academia, police
practitioners and their trainers’ views, focus group discussions, reports and other
available written materials and through follow up meetings and interviews with
members of an external advisory board made up of experts in CP topics like police
practitioners, CP visionaries, criminologists and neighbour watch associations. The
external advisory members are currently involved with CP practises and have a
sound concern in ethical, legal, societal and data privacy topics sourced from the
application of different CP approaches.

11.2 Methodology

The eight case studies in this chapter will look at existing CP implementations for
different CP approaches and for a variety of residential environments. The purpose
is to extract valuable knowledge from the study of real life CP implementations and
understand the conditions of why and how a CP project was/was not successful and
how it met the intended outcomes. Central to this will be an understanding of how
the various actors involved in a CP project define its success and how their different
interests intersect and produce a change process.
Wherever possible, the most diverse examples of CP implementations will be
selected for investigation in order to highlight the variety of practices. The case
studies will be situated within the broader policing context of the country. Specific
focus is important in allowing researchers to examine in depth the political, societal,
economical and other underlying factors of why community–police relations are
formed the way they are and what is required from national/local governments,
police and communities to improve those relations. Specifically, for a small number
of case studies an overview of the following (where data are available) will be
attempted:
• How are community–police relations defined?
• What are the objectives of the various actors involved in a CP program?
• What does the Community Policing practice/initiative look like/involve?
• What is the effect of the Community Policing practice?

2
http://www.inspec2t-project.eu.

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 141

11.3 Case Study Selection

The Belgium West Coast case study was selected as a good example to showcase
that implementing a successful and recognised CP methodology is not enough. The
special context is affecting the implementation and its success. A well performing
CP initiative was adapted and enriched with nodal orientation. Although the case
study was successful, it outlines a number of ethical, societal, legal and data pro-
tection issues that should be addressed.
Next, three pre-reform case studies from Scotland CP projects are presented to
highlight a number of concerns arising from CP initiatives. The subsequent case
study from Netherlands showed similarities with the case studies from Scotland
regarding the CP officer’s role, responsibilities and overlapping duties with front
line policing officers. However, the case study in the Netherlands presents a
policing transformation and an approach to overcome the aforementioned restric-
tions. Next in sequence are two case studies from England. The case study from the
Manchester police in the UK is about the successful implementation of a com-
munity based strategy. The case study presents the results of an ambitious program
to restore the feeling of safety and increase the security in a dense urban area. The
case study from Lancashire constabulary, UK which in 2015 was rated as ‘out-
standing for CP’, is focused on the use of social media in a modern Community
Policing program.
The final case study presents an EU-funded research initiative for a next gen-
eration and social media based Community Policing project.

11.3.1 Nodal Orientation in CP, West Coast, Belgium

The first case study is focused on CP impacts resulting from the Schengen agree-
ment. The reduction and removal of barriers between national borders in order to
facilitate the flow of goods, capital, services and labour has demographic impacts.
This case study examines the seasonal variation of population and how it affects the
CP program.
Belgian police during the 1998–2001 reforms decided to adopt the UK and the
Dutch Community Policing model. CP demands that police departments reform
their relationship with local communities and that police officers change their
attitudes and behaviours toward citizens and police work (Law Library, n.d.). In this
respect, the West-Coast Police Department (WCPD) has implemented a CP pro-
gram, which has proven successful. The police department’s jurisdiction spans
across three municipalities and serves a population of 44,000 residents. The
majority of them are senior citizens (60% of the population is older than 55 years).
Given the location of the area (the border with France is located 20 km away)
during the summer months hundreds of thousands of tourists visit the area on a
daily basis to enjoy themselves. Furthermore, the area also serves as a transit zone,

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as the motorway A18 is part of the European route E40 that connects Northern
Europe with the United Kingdom via the tunnel in Calais, France. Therefore, there
is a seasonal variation of the community population, mainly in the summer months,
with the number of visitors outnumbering the local population.
The fact that the local community is dependent upon tourism makes it extremely
important to effectively combat safety and security issues with a recognised CP
program. For a uniform type of population the CP model works properly, as the
local community is enjoying their life in a nice and tranquil environment. However,
on a seasonal basis, when the number of seasonal residents outnumbers the local
community, the results of the CP program are questioned. Frequently both the
criminals and victims are only visiting the area for a limited time (often a few
hours); therefore it becomes extremely difficult to proactively address safety and
security issues effectively. For example, consider the theft of a purse of a tourist by
a hit-and-run criminal who is most likely commuting across the Schengen area. If
both the perpetrator and the victim do not linger at the crime scene, it becomes
extremely difficult to prevent or even solve this crime.
To overcome the underperformance of a well-known to work CP model, the
WCPD decided to compliment and enrich their activities with the introduction of
Nodal Orientation Policing (van Sluis et al. 2010). Nodal orientation offers
awareness of the incoming and outgoing citizens and vehicles and information
about their movement within a monitoring area. The nodal orientation introduced at
WCPD consists of the following steps: (1) monitor flow of vehicles, (2) identify
vehicles of potential criminals, (3) evaluate information and (4) take appropriate
action (Acknowledge—Do not take action, Intercept, Monitor).

11.3.1.1 Case Study Outcomes

The introduction of a CP program necessitates the transformation of a police

department:
1. The WCPD adapted their CP program and transformed it from a narrow com-
munity model to a broader community model. This was achieved by adopting a
nodal orientation to monitor and control the flow of movement within parts of
the community.
2. A successful approach to combat crime is unthinkable without the coupling of
local action (signalling in the community) with relevant (inter)nationally known
movements/traffic of offender groups, money, information and goods.
3. Communities are not bound by borders and are not geographically limited.
Therefore, what is needed is a community model of policing combined with a
nodal orientation that can be applied at different levels within any community,
irrespective of its size and/or location.
4. The system would be much more efficient if it could be implemented nationally
or internationally in the EU, as this would allow the movement of offenders to
be tracked over the whole of Belgium or the EU.

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 143

5. There is a number of Data Privacy, Ethical and Societal issues that need to be
addressed on the local, regional and continental level considering the possibil-
ities of misuses of such a system to minimise the possibility of evolving into a
police state. However, if closely monitored, this can be detected at an early
stage, so that corrective action can be taken.

11.3.2 Three Pre-reform CP Case Studies, Scotland

Over the last decade, developments in Scotland have brought CP to the forefront of
the government and policing discourse. The Public Reassurance Strategy (ACPOS,
2007) had considerable influence on the direction taken both by individual Scottish
forces and national policies. The Scottish Parliament Justice Committee report
(2008) on its inquiry into CP in Scotland set out3 how CP could be improved and,
in light of the Committee’s view that the majority of the eight forces did not have
clear CP strategies, made more consistent across Scotland. The publication of the
Scottish Community Policing Engagement Principles4 aimed to establish this level
of consistency and called for each police force to produce its own Community
Policing engagement standard based around the seven principles listed below:
1. Being visible, accessible, present and readily identifiable in the community and
discrete when that is appropriate
2. Communicating as widely as possible using all appropriate means
3. Consulting, listening and responding
4. Recognising individual needs and prioritising support to those groups of people
most vulnerable to harm
5. Working closely with other public and voluntary services and businesses to
encourage people to take responsibility for their actions and how they affect
others
6. Being involved in a problem solving approach to local crime issues and
accountable to communities for local policing
7. Working in partnership with other public and voluntary services and businesses
on the ground to make people feel safer.
These principles appeared to generate a significant amount of re-organization of
CP activity around Scotland and an expansion in the number of officers involved in
CP.

3
http://www.sipr.ac.uk/downloads/Research_Summaries/Research_Summary_18.pdf.
4
Scottish Government, 2009. http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/254432/0081965.pdf.

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144 G. Leventakis et al.

11.3.2.1 Dumfries and Galloway

Policing in Dumfries and Galloway was delivered by operational officers and a

smaller number of CP officers in a ‘traditional’ manner. The local community
displays a commitment for engagement with police. Although members from the
community participated in police consultation for outlining priorities and jointly
identifying the police strategic priorities, the outcome of this process and its impact
on CP strategy was not fed back to citizens.

11.3.2.2 Grampian

The implemented CP approach involved the key activities of ‘Consult, Listen,

Respond and Feedback’ (third and fifth CP principle). The CP initiative was
delivered through the assigned police officers who were additionally assigned with
CP duties.

11.3.2.3 Strathclyde

The CP approach aimed to improve visibility and accessibility within communities

to ensure communities had a role in the identification of local policing priorities and
to enable working with the community and other partners to deliver sustainable
solutions. Problem solving would be achieved through enforcement, public reas-
surance and focused response policing.

11.3.2.4 Case Study Outcomes

There was a combination of roles and duties within all the case studies’ police
departments. Where local policing was delivered by separate response and CP
teams, there was a lack of understanding of the community role. As a result, police
forces failed to cooperate internally and approach the local community. Another
source of conflict was the time spent on foot patrolling between the operational and
CP officers. In conjunction with the coexistence of operational and CP officers in
the force, the conflict extended to the use of vehicle over foot patrol. A number of
factors such as tenure, staffing levels and time spent on paperwork were seen to
constrain local policing activity. No CP training was offered to assigned police
officers, nor were CP training requirements defined.
In all case studies, police officers conveyed different inputs about the community
expectation from a CP program. Moreover, there was no indication that the
effectiveness or the achieved results of the CP program were communicated to
participants (CP officers and residents).
Policing within local communities has again become a central focus of attention
in the new single force. These case-studies demonstrate that there is much good

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 145

practice on which Police Scotland can build. However, the constraints imposed by
the need for cost reduction and the tendency towards standardization of policing
styles generated by national strategies pose significant challenges in this crucial area
of police work.

11.3.3 The ‘Police in Evolution’, Netherlands

As seen in the previous case studies, there are different policing structures with
respect to the integration of the role of CP officers. In many police departments CP
officers are part of the basic unit, while in others they operate as rather isolated
individuals or as part of a neighbourhood team. Another common difference is that
in a number of police departments, community officers only perform specific CP
tasks, while in others their job includes front line policing tasks like criminal
investigations and emergency assistance.
Over the years, the image of the CP model in the Netherlands (van Sluis et al.
2013) has changed substantially. The new vision of CP was articulated in the
strategy document called the Police in Evolution5 (PIE). According to PIE, CP
officers not only have to act as sources of information for criminal investigations,
but they have an important ‘signalling and advice’ function in that they are
responsible for providing administrative authorities with information and early
warnings about significant societal trends, emerging problems, signs of terrorism
and radicalization. Moreover, CP officers frequently deal with social disorder
caused by youths, road safety issues and petty crime. The CP officers are now seen
more as police officers and not as social workers. They contribute to law and crime
investigations by taking on criminal investigations, enforcement and emergency
services as well as by working on prevention and problem solving. Furthermore,
intelligence-led policing has been incorporated in the CP officers’ duties.
The latter of the new CP assignments (intelligence-led policing) comes into
conflict with their mandate to solve problems by cooperating with representatives of
the community. Their role as law enforcers means that they are obliged to pass
privileged and sensitive information to other police departments for purposes often
outside of why it was provided to them. Community officers often report that this
dual role harms the relations they have developed in their neighbourhoods.
Furthermore, CP officers experience disappointment when they have to penalizing
the residential areas there are engaged in.6
Another topic, which required corrective actions is the ratio of time spent on CP
activities over the non-CP related police work. The PIE planned that CP officers
should spent approximately one fifth of their time on tasks related to neighbourhood

5
Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/50960.
6
International Police Executive Symposium, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces, Working Paper no 25.

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146 G. Leventakis et al.

policing. It has emerged that CP officers are one third of their shift hours (32%)
occupied on duties related to emergency response, surveillance and other front
policing tasks. Therefore, efforts planned and allocated to CP duties including
administrative tasks like maintaining contact through email or writing a weblog to
keep in contact with their neighbourhood is allocated to non-CP related activities
(see Chap. 13 for other examples in the context of Netherlands).

11.3.3.1 Case Study Outcomes

CP officers should have a good understanding of the concrete results they want to
achieve and perform their duties accordingly. This is required to set realistic
expectations and demands from their partners and the public. To this end, detailed
information about what is going on in communities is crucial. This is especially so
in efforts to fight radicalization and terrorism (cp. Chap. 6). CP officers are the first
link in the safety chain because they have ample access to community intelligence,
and it is through them that CP can effectively be combined with front line policing.
Special crime investigation units were assembled in most police districts in order to
improve the current level of collaboration and exchange of information between
front line police and CP officers as well as to deal with all kinds of petty crime. This
approach integrates better criminal investigations with CP.
There are some specific demarcations between the roles of the community officer
and specialists. As a rule, neighbourhood teams only deal with criminal offenses
that do not require imprisonment (so-called 6-h cases); however, CP officers also
serve as experts in community affairs during criminal investigations. Despite these
initiatives, only 12% (instead of 20%) of the CP officers’ time continues to be spend
on criminal investigations.

11.3.4 The Manchester Community Safety Program,

England

Manchester’s reputation as a tolerant and welcoming place for new arrivals results
in its growing population from 423,000 in 2001 to 518,000 in 2014. Although, this
is an indicator of the city’s development it brings additional challenges such as the
increasing pressure on school places and an enlarged demand for community ser-
vices. Furthermore, tensions can develop in communities that undergo rapid
demographic change, and these must be effectively managed. The city’s growing
population is also becoming younger, with a major increase in the number of
working-age residents.
The Manchester’s Community Safety Partnership (CSP) brings together the local
Council, Greater Manchester Police, Offender Management Services, GM Fire and
Rescue Service, Public Health Manchester, the universities, housing providers and

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 147

community and voluntary organisations. Collectively, the agencies of the CSP work
with one overriding objective—to make Manchester a safe place to live, work and
visit (Manchester City Council 2014). When Manchester city council produced
their first community safety strategy back in 1999, they managed to reduce crime by
45%, with the total number of crimes falling from 94,829 in 1998/99 to 51,828 in
2013/14. The new CSP strategy (Communities and Equalities Scrutiny Committee
2016) is focused on the following eight strategic objectives:
1. Tackling anti-social behaviour (ASBO)7
2. Tackling alcohol and drug related crime
3. Changing offender behaviour
4. Protecting vulnerable people
5. Tackling serious and organised crime
6. Tackling the crimes of highest impact
7. Tackling hidden crime
8. Making the city centre safer.

11.3.4.1 Actions for a Safer and More Secure Community

The CSP worked closely with the Ministry of Justice to develop a toolkit and set of
principles around neighbourhood justice panels. These panels aim to address
low-level offending behaviours and bring together the victim and offender of certain
crimes to agree a remedy to repair harm caused. Local vulnerability panels were
also established to prioritise and respond to cases that cause the most harm to
vulnerable people. The aim of the panels is to support victims and bring perpe-
trators to account, thereby increasing resilience and confidence in neighbourhoods.
Lastly, there is a strong emphasis on encouraging people to resolve differences and
conflicts through communication and mediation, rather than relying on public
agencies to intervene in minor disputes.
Violent crimes such as assault and domestic violence and abuse often involve
alcohol. Drug misuse and crimes such as burglary and robbery are closely linked,
and ASBO can also be related to alcohol and drug misuse. The CSP will develop
and implement the Local Alcohol Action Area (LAAA) program and ensure that the
LAAA supports the most effective services.
Reducing the number of offenders and the number of offences they commit
remains a significant priority and a significant challenge. This work stream is led by
three organisations: Manchester Youth Justice, the National Probation Service
(NPS) and the Cheshire & Greater Manchester Community Rehabilitation
Company (CRC). Collectively these three organisations are responsible for:
(1) reducing the harm caused to victims, offenders’ families and the wider com-
munity, (2) reducing re-offending amongst offenders, (3) ensuring that initiatives

7
https://www.gov.uk/asbo.

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148 G. Leventakis et al.

such as restorative justice are victim-led, (4) improving rehabilitation prospects by

developing access to accommodation, employment and health opportunities for
offenders and (5) reducing the number of young people entering the justice system.
Since mid-2014 the adult offender management is shared between the public
sector National Probation Service (NPS) and a series of private sector Community
Rehabilitation Companies. The NPS predominantly manages cases assessed as
posing high risk of serious harm and having significant complex needs such as
mental health concerns, drugs and alcohol dependency and relationship issues that
contribute to offending behaviour. Manchester Youth Justice Service supervises
those children and young people who have been charged with offences and sen-
tenced by a court. There has been a national drive to keep young people out of the
formal criminal justice system when a different approach can achieve a good out-
come. Many of these ‘out-of-court’ cases can be dealt with more effectively by
means of a Restorative Justice disposal.
The work of both the adult and youth offender management services is supported
by a number of initiatives commissioned by the CSP. This includes Community
Led Initiatives (CLI). CLI works with adult offenders to help them achieve a more
stable lifestyle away from offending. Typical activities include: (1) advocacy
through the benefits process, ensuring correct benefits are being claimed and
commitments are being met reducing the possibility of being sanctioned, (2) ob-
taining identification to allow clients to open bank accounts and complete exams to
improve employability, (3) exploring and applying for voluntary work and colleges
to improve employability and constructively fill time and (4) accessing local
resources including medical and leisure facilities.
The detailed plan of the CSP (Communities and Equalities Scrutiny Committee
2016) describes in detail the actions planned for the strategic objectives 4–8.
The CSP is focused on developing action plans associated with performance
indicators, and these continue to be monitored in order to measure the impact of the
activity. Furthermore, the strategy will contribute to the development of the
Integrated Neighbourhood Management (INM) programme. INM focuses on the
improved delivery of public services through public sector agencies strengthening
their partnership working arrangements at a local level. There are several key
drivers to change the way police works including:
• Greater community engagement
• Reduced duplication and waste
• Creation of more proactive services
• Reduced demand on services
• Reduced costs
• Improved outcomes for residents.

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 149

11.3.5 Lancashire Constabulary Community Engagement

and Social Media, England

Recently, the Lancashire Constabulary (LC) have been restructuring to become

more effective in communication and engagement both internally and externally. It
should be noted that Lancashire Police was rated ‘outstanding’ in 2015 for
Community Policing in the UK by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
(HMIC). The main external initiative is better engagement with local communities
as well as the wider public of Lancashire in an attempt to discover the public’s
values and priorities of policing. The first step in this initiative is gaining an insight
into how the public wants to find out about and contact the police, if at all. This
restructuring is part of the larger Future’s Programme in which there are four key
elements: local policing, crime investigation, resource management and business
support.
The findings of the ‘Surveying Lancashire: Expectations and experiences of LC
and its associated partners’ (Birdsall et al. 2015) indicated that the public within
Lancashire believes information from the police on crime in the local area and that
their local policing team is more important than them having their say to the police
(information out, rather than information in from a public perspective). When they
do have a say in the way policing works, the preference is for this to be focused on
their local area only. Many of the responses were around attempting to help the
police by providing information and reporting crime, but with little awareness
regarding who to contact and how.
LC utilises social media to engage with a vast number of people in one go.
Conversations are public, which promotes openness and transparency. The
Constabulary uses social media platforms to:
• Inform the public of Lancashire about what they are doing and why they are
doing it
• Publish news and information
• Appeal for help in solving crime and to find missing people
• Send out warnings and information to assist people in protecting themselves
when the need arises
• Encourage conversation, feedback and challenge where appropriate.
Additionally, the Constabulary uses a community messaging system called ‘In
the Know…about Lancashire’. It provides the community with a channel of closed
communication by encouraging people to subscribe to the system and to opt into
information about issues they are interested in. This can range from recruitment to
business crime and allotment watch to emergency alerts. This messaging system is
used to reach people with a certain interest or located in a defined geographic area.
This system promotes targeted, local information to people who can then take
action as a result of the communication.

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150 G. Leventakis et al.

The Constabulary’s main website8 has been redesigned with a user-centric

approach permitting its users to localise content, explore their area using interactive
maps, get directions to police stations, browse the events in their areas and contact
their local officers directly. It also provides people with the option of contacting
police online—via the Do It Online section—instead of having to call 101. Online
services include:
• Reporting crime (non-emergency)
• Reporting incidents
• Contacting an officer
• Giving compliments
• Making complaints
• Reporting lost or found property.
Another digital engagement approach used by LC is Police and Communities
Together (PACT). PACT are physical meetings, which are intended to highlight the
community issues that are having an impact on residents’ quality of life. These
meetings are now held online to encourage more people to get involved from the
comfort of their own homes or workplaces. Online meetings are held in a number of
different ways including:
• On local policing Facebook pages
• Via Google Hangouts
• Via Periscope.

11.3.5.1 Case Study Outcomes

The LC is continuing to see rapid growth in the use of its social media channels
with an on-going increase in likes and followers. LC is opening new accounts,
particularly Twitter accounts, to meet engagement gaps/needs (e.g., rural crime
issues, football supporters), and they are also exploring the use of new channels to
extend their reach and address specific issues; for example, an Instagram account to
target the younger demographic. The below are indicators of the achieved digital
media engagement:
1. LC social media channels are still seeing significant growth with no current
indication that they are reaching saturation point. Total Facebook likes grew by
over 50% in the 12 months from September 2014 to September 2015, whilst the
number of people following LC on Twitter increased by 80%.
2. LC regularly reaches around 5–6 million people on Facebook each month with
approximately 15% of people on average engaging with LC posts in some way.
In addition, over two million people see LC tweets each month (September
2015: 1.8 million; October 2015: 2.5 million). The regular increase in likes and

8
http://lancashire.police.uk/.

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 151

followers is very consistent with Facebook and Twitter, both growing at

between 2.5 and 3% per month.
3. Over a one-month period (figures from May 2015) the following number of
online forms were submitted to the LC website: Contact an Officer 3662; Report
a Crime or Incident 1133; Join us 4403; Lost Property 310; Complaints 186;
Compliments 136.

11.3.6 The INSPEC2T Approach and Next Generation

Community Policing Initiatives

This section aims to provide a foresight about the new trends in Community
Policing. Next generation Community Policing (NGCP) approaches do not con-
stitute a case study in the traditional sense, since the proposed practices to adapt
Community Policing efforts into the 21st century have not yet produced any
transformational impacts and case study outcomes. The proposed NGCP systems
are structured from best practices, lessons learned and the collaboration and part-
nership between law enforcement and other community stakeholders. NGCP
solutions9 aspire to provide modern, innovative and cost-effective means to CP via
leading technologies and social media platforms.
The EU via the funded second topic of FCT-14 research call is actively involved
with ‘Enhancing cooperation between law enforcement agencies and citizens—
Community Policing’. A number of proposals10 was selected to develop a tech-
nology, which will facilitate, strengthen and accelerate the communication between
the police and communities by making it possible for community representatives to
identify risks and immediately report them to police forces. The actions necessitate
that community representatives and law enforcement agencies should be actively
engaged in the research to ensure that their perspectives are well embedded in the
design of new technology and innovation. Further to the above, trainings for law
enforcement agents by means of serious games or simulations as well as on
awareness raising activities about Community Policing for all stakeholders should
complement the proposed NGCP solution.
One of the funded proposals is the INSPEC2T initiative,11 which bases its
conceptual foundations on EU crime prevention and member states’ specific
internal security policies and best practices from cooperation between police and
local, regional and national communities. The INSPEC2T consortium composed of
CP researchers, ELS experts, police academia, European police forces and tech-
nology pioneers after desktop research, online surveys and interaction with

9
http://www.iacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/AnnouncementofGrant.pdf.
10
http://cordis.europa.eu/programme/rcn/666332_en.html.
11
http://inspec2t-project.eu/en/.

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152 G. Leventakis et al.

stakeholders established the operational framework of the project. The review of the
research literature served as reference to design online surveys aiming at specific
beneficiaries of the NGCP system. Four online surveys were conducted, compliant
with EU Directive 1995/46/EC for data protection and handling. Each survey was
structured to aim at specific stakeholder groups.
The first survey was launched aiming at users from the ‘general public’. Citizens
across European countries are considered as potential users of the INSPEC2T
platform, so it is imperative to capture their needs and wants and understand the
reasons behind them. A second survey was aimed at NGOs, community workers,
city administrators and other actors who either professionally or on a voluntary
basis are involved with security and safety in communities. The participants were
asked to provide their experiences about CP and the use of social media. The third
and fourth survey sought to capture the views of police
colleges/universities/academies involved in the training of police students and
active CP practitioners from EU member states.
Further to the online surveys, focus group discussions and interviews were
conducted. These physical sessions were divided into two phases to assist
researchers in capturing experiences, lessons learned, best practices and also
recording suggestions. The focus group discussions took place in Greece, UK,
Cyprus, the Netherlands and Spain. The participants were selected from two distinct
groups: (1) the ‘official’ CP practitioners, which are LEAs assigned with CP tasks
and received appropriate training and (2) the general public consisting of citizens
with diverse backgrounds who may or may have not been accustomed to CP terms
and applications.
In addition to the online surveys and the focus groups, INSPEC2T utilised a
Stakeholder Advisory Group committee (SAG). This committee is made up of
LEAs (at national and EU level), government organisations, active citizen groups,
community organizations, commercial associations and CP visionaries. The well
experienced CP committee members participated in a workshop and discussed with
researchers the findings of the online surveys and the focus groups interviews.
Furthermore, they conveyed their professional view on certain CP topics via a
questionnaire and shared their vision for the Next Generation CP (NGCP) roadmap.
The result of the above was that against the background of cultural and ethnic
diversity the spread of new technologies injects an element of homogeneity and
seemingly a level playing field. Using social media for CP purposes provides the
opportunity to interact with all members of a community. However, differences
have to be taken into account with regard to language, technology, relations with
and image of the police and cultural understandings of crime, police, law and order.
Driven from accommodated transnational and multicultural best practices, it
adheres to an approach where social, cultural, legal and ethical dimensions are
embedded into core user-centric design specifications and implementation proce-
dures. Its conceptual architectural view is shown in Fig. 11.1.
The architecture of the INSPEC2T system is modular, expanding easily, while
information is not lost even if some internal process does not succeed or a pro-
cessing subsystem fails. The system operators are offered the maximum information

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 153

Fig. 11.1 INSPEC2T solution view

in real-time at each stage of processing and maintain total control on the infor-
mation to be published. Additionally, the operators have access to offline infor-
mation for investigating incidents ‘a posteriori’, perform data correlation, issue
reports and build expert knowledge for future alertness and CP actions.
Additionally, the system is designed to drop pseudo evidence, ‘decoy’ attempts and
to present information, alerts and maps. The differentiating factor of the system,
compared to commercial and enterprise social and data analytics platforms, is the
extensive and real-time handling and presentation of GIS (location, areas, naviga-
tion, maps) and multimedia (text, voice-audio, pictures, video) data. This is a core
functionality, embedded in a unified environment all over system blocks.
One of the key lessons learnt during the stakeholder requirements analysis and
architectural specification phase was that it is rather difficult to apply a single,
unified solution to all contexts or environments. There are a number of legal,
ethical, social and cultural factors that make a single approach difficult to apply, for
example, across the whole of the EU. This is why the INSPEC2T solution follows a
modular approach. The platform’s modularity allows various components to be
plugged and unplugged depending on the context applied. For example, the exis-
tence of a multimedia analysis component to process registered or unregistered user
supplied data within their reports, taking advantage of relevant technologies, may
not be specified in a legal framework for a given country or province. The
respective component will be disabled, while the remaining subsystems would
continue to interconnect and operate as per their design.

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154 G. Leventakis et al.

INSPEC2T enables direct communication and collaboration with community

members in real time. Police departments will use the system to disseminate
information to the public as well as to obtain information, especially for tactical
purposes such as gathering information about threats of mob violence, riots or
isolated criminal activity during otherwise lawful mass demonstrations. Citizens, on
the other hand, may be informed in real time about any incident in their neigh-
bourhood as well as report or give information back that may be of any use for their
local police department by a simple post, comment, photo or video (captured by
mobile smart devices). The whole concept builds on the bidirectional information
flow, so as to promote participation, motivation and engagement of citizens and
empower them to assist in their own public safety and security.
One of the weaknesses of current CP programmes is the establishment, and most
importantly, the preservation of a critical mass of participants. This is why popular
technologies like social media are being used allowing bidirectional and fast
communication between police and citizens. Serious games are also part of this
scheme raising awareness and attracting user participation. Additionally, a reward
system is included. Citizens that have aided in fighting crime, for instance, when
they have provided useful information to the police, are rewarded with thanking
messages from the police (additional, customizable information is also forwarded
after manual approval).
Interconnection of the CP system with already existing systems is also impor-
tant. In the examined system, an existing Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system
and connectivity to existing CADs of the police will be integrated to ensure smooth
migration to next generation initiatives and guarantee backwards compatibility with
existing incident reporting subsystems. Moreover, a web portal and a mobile
application focusing on bidirectional exchange of information and promoting col-
laboration between citizens and the police while serving as information, opinion
and idea exchange platforms is developed. Furthermore, multimedia processing
tools, case based reasoning, GIS systems and correlating tools are examples of
capitalizing on the benefits that technology can offer. Any Next Generation of CP
programs should provide such functionalities, of course respecting legal and ethical
barriers. The complete system is supervised from a secure portal, where system
operators are in control of CP operations making use of submitted intelligence and
controlling efficiently the assigned CP resources.
INSPEC2T will be demonstrated and validated in five EU cities by a wide range
of relevant stakeholders in 2017. INSPEC2T engagement and active participation is
stimulated through fully dynamic, interactive and immersive training Serious Game
applications that empower players to familiarize themselves with the system, gain
an intuitive understanding of its functionalities and motivate their engagement in
Community Policing activities. Special focus will be given to Community Policing
awareness raising activities for both police and citizens. The above activities and
associated results will provide a solid foundation for the evolution of the Next
Generation Community Policing roadmap in Europe.

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11 Community Policing Case Studies: Proposing a Social Media Approach 155

11.4 Conclusion

A selection of case studies was introduced to make clear that CP initiatives are not
limited to partnerships between the citizenry and the police. Often organizational
and sometimes administrative changes are required to make a CP program effective.
The implementation of successful CP programs is not an assurance that it will
produce the same results elsewhere (cp. Chaps. 4 and 17). For a CP program to be
effective, further to conducting literature reviews before selecting it, it needs to be
adapted to local contexts and take into account factors like the community demo-
graphics, culture and societal issues and the main source of crime (cp. Chaps. 2 and
5). Furthermore, a CP program applied to transforming a community in terms of
population, culture, ethical values, etc. can be very effective if carefully planned and
exercised to produce the desired results.
A CP project also requires police adaptation. Over recent years more people file
reports for crimes such as domestic abuse, child sexual abuse and modern slavery,
which have previously been under-reported. There is an urgent need to do more to
tackle the victimisation of vulnerable people and the devastating impact these
crimes can have (UK Home Office 2016). Furthermore, clear roles and responsi-
bilities should be given to police officers who will be assigned with CP duties, and
special attention should be paid to cases where normal policing duties will con-
tradict the friendly and approachable image of a CP officer. On the other hand, CP
is about partnership for safer neighbourhoods. Over the last 12 years the
Neighbourhood Watch movement has recorded a decline of more than a third in
membership (Neighbourhood Watch 2015). At the moment the movement is not
attracting enough new members, so the EUNWA12 should urgently plan a new
membership retention strategy. As the neighbourhood watch is a supporting
mechanism for many CP initiatives, a transformation program is required.
To conclude, a CP initiative should be based on the outcomes of community
consultative forums to facilitate public input. Any CP introduction will require the
reorganisation of the local police structures to ensure equality within the service and
to facilitate problem solving. Reducing crime and antisocial behaviour is an
important element in improving the lives of residents. Ways to achieve this are
through partnership working, particularly through early intervention and preven-
tion, challenging and changing behaviours and through the use of technology.
Increased openness and transparency are becoming increasingly mandatory—social
media platforms must be as effective when used by the police as they are by those
who seek to evade them. NGCP initiatives should use these new channels to help
identify priorities and targets and understand how well they are responding to
citizens’ needs.

12
http://www.eunwa.org/front_content.php.

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156 G. Leventakis et al.

In the current economic climate possibly the biggest challenge a CP initiative

faces is how to deliver its ambitious vision during a period of finite public sector
resources. A necessary reform strategy should promote new evidence-based inter-
ventions to be developed to reduce dependency on public services. A community
strategy should be resourceful to identify new ways that will have a positive impact
on community safety. Moreover, a long term safety strategy should include work
with repeat offenders, perpetrators of domestic violence and abuse and young
people who are persistently absent from school and committing ASBO.

References

ACPOS (2007) Public reassurance strategy. Association of Chief Police Officers, Glasgow (in
Scotland)
Birdsall N, McManus M, Brian D, Boulton L (2015) Surveying lancashire: expectations and
experiences of lancashire constabulary and its associated partners. University of Central
Lancashire
Communities and Equalities Scrutiny Committee (2016) Community safety overview, Manchester.
Retrieved from http://www.manchester.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/22657/community_
safety_strategy.pdf
Johnson R (2006) Decision models for the location of community corrections centers.
Methodologies, Stockholm (in Housing)
Law Library (n.d.) Police: community policing—definition of community policing. Retrieved 05
Aug 2016 from http://law.jrank.org/pages/1648/Police-Community-Policing-Definition-
community-policing.html
Manchester City Council (2014) Community safety strategy 2014–2017. Retrieved from http://
www.manchester.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/22657/community_safety_strategy.pdf
Nadeau SJ (2015) The many degrees of community oriented policing. Columbia Heights Police
Department, Columbia Heights, MN. Retrieved from http://www.ci.columbia-heights.mn.us/
DocumentCenter/View/1821
Neighbourhood Watch (2015) The way ahead for neighbourhood watch, 2–3 Dec 2015. Retrieved
28 July 2016 from http://www.ourwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-Way-Ahead-
2-3-Dec-2015-Summary-Report-Evaluation.pdf
Scottish Parliament Justice Committee (2008) Report on inquiry into community policing. Scottish
Parliament Archive. Retrieved 02 Aug 2016 from http://archive.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/
committees/justice/reports-08/jur08–18.htm#REPORT
The United States Conference of Mayors (2000, April). Retrieved from https://www.usmayors.org/
bestpractices/community_policing_0401/safer_neighborhoods_2.pdf
UK Home Office (2016) Modern crime prevention strategy, London. Retrieved from www.official-
documents.gov.uk
van Sluis A, Marks P, Bekkers V (2010) Nodal policing in the Netherlands. International Police
Executives symposium of armed forces
van Sluis A, Cachet L, van Os P, Prins R, Marks P (2013) Community policing in the Netherlands
a continuously changing constant. In: Global community policing problems and challenges.
CRC Press, pp 229–248
Yin R (1984) Case study research: design and methods. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif

bayerl@rsm.nl
 Part III
CP in an Interconnected World

bayerl@rsm.nl
Chapter 12
New Crime Landscapes and New
Technologies for Community Policing

Bogdan Vasile Dițu

12.1 Introduction

Police represents the institution empowered to ensure compliance with the law and
to maintain public order, to prevent, investigate and solve crimes and offenses.
A fundamental aspect of crime prevention activity is represented by police relations
with the community. To prevent crime, police is constantly looking into new ways
of achieving their main objectives, while continuously improving existing methods
in order to ensure greater efficiency. As mentioned in earlier chapters (cp. Part I),
Community Policing is an integrated part of policing focusing specifically on
community. From both a theoretical and a practical point of view, three ways of
delivering Community Policing have been identified:
• Reactive: in response to requests
• Proactive using specific means
• Co-active/interactive: based on community consultations and common actions.
The co-active (interactive) method consists of improving relations between
police and community, leading to true partnerships. This method aims at helping
citizens to better understand police activities, to build trust between citizens and
police, to engage them in supporting the fight against crime and to improve safety
and general well-being of the community.
Community Policing, or community-oriented policing, is a strategy focused on
police forces building ties and working closely with members of the community.
This involvement relies on their willingness to cooperate with all members of the
community to improve quality of social life. While positioning itself as a partner,
along with other organizations, the police is aiming at identifying the issues that the
community is facing and the causes that can lead to committing crimes. Some of the

B.V. Dițu (&)

Romanian Police, Bucharest, Romania
e-mail: bogdan.ditu@b.politiaromana.ro

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 159

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_12

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160 B.V. Dițu

issues identified within these activities may not relate directly to the core police
activities, yet often reveal states of tension, urgent personal problems or simply the
despair of an individual (see Chaps. 2, 3 and 5).
Community Policing is a policy that requires police to have a proactive approach
in addressing public safety concerns. It creates partnerships between Law
Enforcement Agencies and other organizations like government agencies,
non-profit organizations, private businesses, community members and the media.
The media are a very powerful partner, as they afford almost instant interaction with
the community.
From previous experiences in Romania and other European countries, we can
conclude that the main ways of achieving positive results in Community Policing
and crime prevention partnerships, are:
• Initiating national and local programs
• Developing targeted projects on specific issues
• Performing advisory and consultation activities
• Public discussions and interaction through direct meetings or surveys
• Media campaigns on crime prevention.
These steps help the community to be actively involved in the development of
problem solving solutions. The general objectives of such partnerships in general,
and Community Policing in particular, are:
• Reducing the number of crimes, offenses and the degree of hazards
• Lowering the number of participants (victims as well as perpetrators)
• Strengthening public safety
• Greater confidence in the police
• Awareness of tense situations in the community and efforts to prevent degen-
eration into conflicts by attracting the parties involved to a dialogue.
As an integrated part of Community Policing, police provide information, ini-
tiate and participate in programs to prevent crime and ensure the protection of
citizens in cooperation with other institutions. Community Policing partnerships
with other institutions (e.g., schools, church, local authorities) are helpful for citi-
zens, as they build mutual and beneficial cooperation between them (e.g., police can
inform these institutions to ensure immediate action). It needs to be emphasised that
police do not and cannot intent to substitute the activities of other services and
social institutions, but to support their actions. The main criteria regarding such
partnerships are:
• Legality
• Respecting the fundamental rights and freedom of people
• Equal treatment for partners, individuals and institutions involved in crime
prevention activities
• Community consultation in decision making over public and individual safety

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12 New Crime Landscapes and New Technologies … 161

• Continuity in operational activities

• Flexibility in adapting to diverse community problems
The philosophical, tactical and organizational characteristics of Community
Policing have generated a great deal of innovation in how we think about police and
how police work is performed. With this creative energy, there is every reason to be
optimistic about the possibility of improving policing in general and Community
Policing in particular in the next decades. New technologies as well as
technology-driven practice play an increasingly important role in this respect.

12.2 New Technologies and Practices in Support

of Community Policing

Today’s Law Enforcement Agencies are faced with numerous challenges to protect
life and property and to provide community safety. Police professionals must cope
with ever increasing demands including growing communities, tighter budgets and
limited resources to meet their goals. The rapidly changing social, economic and
political environment, both domestically and internationally, complicate these
problems.

12.2.1 Geographic Information Systems

In order to provide a successful and effective service, Law Enforcement Agencies

are using the best technology systems to deliver mission critical services.
Geographic Information System (GIS) technology is a powerful tool increasingly
used by agencies for daily operations and to optimize both strategic and tactical
planning. By adding GIS to their capabilities, they can transform their data into
actionable intelligence: “GIS is the software tool or a set of computer-based tools
that allow the police analyst to map crime in many different ways from a simple
point map to a three-dimensional visualization of spatial or temporal data” (Santos
2013).
Law Enforcement Agencies use GIS for crime analysis, criminal intelligence,
vehicle/personnel tracking, traffic safety, community corrections and many other
areas including Community Policing. GIS extends the capability of a simple map by
making the map intelligent, interactive and easily available.
Even more important, GIS provides the required information when, where and
how it is needed. For instance, all emergencies begin locally and elevate to county,
regional, state or national levels depending on the severity, complexity, size and
nature of the event. Therefore, GIS often operates in conjunction with the wireless
communication systems utilised by emergency services (see Chap. 14”).
Throughout the world, Law Enforcement Agencies use GIS to understand crime,

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162 B.V. Dițu

traffic and community issues. Many agencies are using geographic profiling to
determine the offender’s area of residence or the next crime target based on history
and patterns. Law enforcement managers need the right information at the right
time to deploy resources, to implement plans and to manage the incidents as they
unfold. GIS is used around the world in order to develop technology that vastly
improves the efficiency of law enforcement. It integrates and visualizes data to help
provide a comprehensive understanding in all types of emergencies.
GIS in law enforcement and Community Policing is not just about creating
attractive layouts for the annual report or slides for the budget presentation; it is
about helping agencies in their core mission of maintaining public safety, in which
Community Policing plays an important role. Geographic crime analysis enhances
the efforts of officers on the street and helps them do a better job. Additionally, Law
Enforcement Agencies can enhance the safety of their personnel not only through the
real-time tracking, for instance, of responding vehicles, but also by real-time
tracking of an individual officer in a foot pursuit. GIS provides command staff,
including watch and incident commanders, with the ability to visualize and share a
common operational picture or situational awareness in the event of a large-scale
disaster or when a major crime occurs. GIS can further be used to provide automated
emergency notification for evacuations, missing people or any other incident simply
by creating a message and selecting the appropriate geography. In short, virtually all
problems Law Enforcement Agencies are confront with have a geographic com-
ponent, and GIS provides the visual, analytical and data management capabilities to
more effectively manage resources and to provide better service (ESRI 2008).

12.2.2 Open Source Intelligence

A second development, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) lies at the basis of the
current transformations experienced by the intelligence segment, being both a rich
source of information and a technological innovation, responding to agencies’
various current challenges. It has been estimated that 90% of all data in the world
has been generated over the last two years (Dragland 2013), and an increasing
amount of data is becoming available on the internet. Each and every one of us is
constantly producing and releasing data about ourselves. We do this either by
moving around passively—our behaviour being registered by cameras or card usage
—or by logging onto our laptops and surfing the net.
Besides the operational advantages provided, open sources play an important
role in public communications, functioning both as a PR platform, encouraging the
relations with beneficiaries and academic circles and as a promoter of security
culture. OSINT manages to accomplish the transition from secret sources to open
sources, enabling a specific symbiosis between classified and public information.
The ability to disseminate information to large groups in real time has made Twitter
and Facebook important communications tools when major events take place

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12 New Crime Landscapes and New Technologies … 163

(see Chaps. 11, 13 and 16). For instance, when hunting for the Boston terrorists in
2013, the police, other authorities and traditional media used social media like Twitter,
Instagram, Reddit and Facebook to actively collect and disseminate information about
the incident (Helman and Russell 2014). Several volunteer groups were also set up via
social media in order to try and help the police (Helman and Russell 2014). However,
social media as communications channels proved not to be entirely beneficial, as they
were also an important source of confusion and misinformation (Brandtzag 2013).
Further, the World Wide Web is a rich source of information, but not all content
is easy to access. For instance, the deep web is the part of the internet that is not
necessarily malicious, but simply too large and/or obscure to be indexed due to the
limitations of crawling and indexing software such as like Google, Bing or Baidu.
The dark web is the part of the non-indexed part internet (i.e., deep web), which is
used by those who are purposefully trying to control access, for instance, because
they have a strong desire for privacy or because what they are doing is illegal.
Figure 12.1 illustrates this concept and interrelation between the various webs.
Because users are protected by a veil of technological anonymity, the dark web
is often portrayed as a space beyond the reach of law enforcement, where criminals
can run wild without fear of prosecution. This could not be more wrong. In fact,
police forces all over the world have deployed a wide array of different techniques
to identify and ultimately convict dark web drug dealers, weapon buyers, producers
of child pornography, etc. in the past years. If anything, Law Enforcement Agencies
have become more accustomed to working in this space and are likely to develop
even more ways to ‘bust’ technologically savvy criminals (Miessler 2015). To
achieve its goals and objectives, Community Policing needs to embrace these trends
and activities and utilise monitoring of dark web for the benefits of communities
they are protecting.

Fig. 12.1 Graphic representation of the World Wide Web and its components

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164 B.V. Dițu

12.3 European Union Cooperation in Community Policing

and the Fight Against Crime

For 20 years, European Union Member States were faced with the phenomenon of
criminal diversity on an alarming scale, targeting citizens and their property,
businesses and the public sector. This phenomenon is expensive for our society
(loss of life, social and political costs, economic costs, etc.). Globalization and open
markets for goods, services and capital acted as growth factors in Europe, but they
have also facilitated the expansion of cross-border organized crime.
Often developing independently from crime itself, a major problem is the feeling
of insecurity by individuals or the community of citizens. This feeling does not
necessarily correspond to reality, but it still is fundamental in evaluating the quality
of life of EU citizens. Against this phenomenon authorities became aware of the
limits of traditional measures and criminal sanctioning systems and have developed,
although in different degrees, additional initiatives to prevent and combat the crime.
Community Policing is one of the key elements of these proposed measures.
Many physical and legislative barriers were removed from the European Union.
However, in terms of criminal law, each Member State has its own regulations. This
makes the procedures for cross-border crime investigations more difficult.
Therefore, often vital time is lost and communication between the involved states
hampered. To simplify these issues—especially the legislative ones—a range of
European institutions such as Europol and Eurojust were created. They also ensure
coordination and cooperation for the fight against crime with major impacts on the
European Union or the Member States including in cases of serious crime
(Ambrozie 2014).
Organized crime, just as is the case with crime in general, does not spread
randomly. It is often a planned and deliberate activity. Accordingly, it depends a
great deal on the presence of motivated offenders, on the existence of the oppor-
tunity for crime and on the orientation of the work of those who seek to control
organized crime. In line with this so-called situational approach, the Member
States are exploring ways to ensure that committing crime is made more difficult,
that committing crime involves greater risks to the offender (in particular the risk of
detection and apprehension) and that the possible benefits to the offender of
committing a crime are decreased or eliminated.
Yet, even if the European Union Member States could effectively develop their
laws and systems to prevent and control organized crime within their borders, this
would not be enough. Preventing and controlling cross-border (organized) crime
requires global cooperation. We have come a long way from the period when
countries ignored crime beyond their borders. The speed with which the European
Union Member States have agreed on cooperation—and the commitment that is
being shown on a high political level on implementation—show that the Member
States are very mindful of the dangers that organized crime poses to the individual,
the community, the country and the international community. Over the past few
years, there has been remarkable, indeed unprecedented progress in the national and

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12 New Crime Landscapes and New Technologies … 165

international response to organized crime, as shown by the strengthening of leg-

islative frameworks, the reorganization of the criminal justice system, the growing
network of bilateral and multilateral agreements and the strengthening of formal and
informal international contacts. In the prevention and control of organized crime,
we all still have a long way to go. Nonetheless, the first steps have been taken, and
the experience in the European Union can help in charting out the possibilities as
well as pitfalls on the road ahead (Joutsen 2002).

12.4 Conclusion

This chapter describes the ways in which Law Enforcement Agencies and
Community Policing apply policies, models, managerial philosophies as well as
new technologies to facilitate the reduction of crime while ensuring greater effi-
ciency. More specifically, these issues are discussed in conjunction with challenges
and problems faced by Community Policing. These new tools ensure that managers
take the best possible decisions and enhance the efforts of police officers in the
street by helping them do a better job. The chapter further discusses the European
Union Cooperation in its fight against crime. Countries are aware of the fact that
crime goes beyond their borders and that they cannot limit themselves to the
national level in taking steps for the prevention and control of (organized) crime.

References

Ambrozie O (2014) The complex and dynamic nature of the security environment—Chapter:
European Institutions involved in the fight against serious forms of crime. “Carol I” National
Defense University Printing House, Bucharest, Romania
Brandtzag P (2013) Big Data—for better or worse: Trondheim. SINTEF, Norway
Dragland Å (2013) Big data, for better or worse: 90% of world’s data generated over last two
years, SINTEF, 22.05.13 https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm
ESRI (2008) GIS provides the geographic advantage for intelligence-led policing. Redland,
California, available at http://www.esri.com/library/fliers/pdfs/intelligence-led-policing.pdf
Helman S, Russell J (2014) Long mile home: Boston under attack, the city’s courageous recovery,
and the epic hunt for justice, published by Dutton, a member of Penguin Group (USA) LLC, a
Penguin Random House company, on April 1. 2014, Boston Globe Media Partners. https://
www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2014/03/28/how-marathon-bombing-manhunt-really-
happened/Fyv99o2D4WqT9my9BAYZDJ/story.html
Joutsen M (2002) International cooperation against transnational organized crime: the practical
experience of the European Union. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute
for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders
Miessler D (2015) The Internet, the deep web, and the dark web: San Francisco, California,
available at https://danielmiessler.com/study/internet-deep-dark-web/#gs.8g0LzvM

bayerl@rsm.nl
166 B.V. Dițu

Project teams from Bucharest police (Gavriș Radu and Dițu Bogdan Vasile), Katowice police
(WÓJCIKIEWICZ Wojciech) and Berlin police (KANDLER Dirk) (2015), Good practice
manual—LLP-LdV/PAR/2013/RO/170—European project with the theme “Developing the
competencies of specialized structures to combat serious crimes committed with a high level of
violence”, Internally Published using European Union funding, Bucharest, Romania
Santos RB (2013) Crime analysis with crime mapping. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks

bayerl@rsm.nl
Chapter 13
Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator
of Community Policing

C.C.M.T. Broekman, A. de Vries, M.A.A. Huis in ’t Veld, R. Mente

and J.H. Kerstolt

13.1 Introduction: Meet Wilco Berenschot, Modern

Community Policing Officer in Heart and Soul

Meet the Dutch neighbourhood officer Wilco Berenschot, the police officer in
Fig. 13.1 below. The picture reflects his nature, his personality. In an automatic
response he connects with a kid. It is important to make contact and build
relationships through which trust can be gained. Police officers like Wilco prevent
the society from falling apart. That’s the power of the neighbourhood officer.
For Wilco social media are a crucial ‘tool on his belt’. On a daily basis he
informs people about his experiences and what keeps him busy. He uses Twitter
(@WT_Berenschot) to announce were his pop-up police station is located. He
invites residents to pass by for questions or a simple cup of coffee. The pop-up
police station is his way to eliminate all barriers for residents to contact the police.
People come over to discuss diverse topics with him: These vary from nuisances
with neighbours to advice on theft to drunken wanderers. He also uses Twitter to
ask at whose place he is welcome to have his lunch (see Fig. 13.2 for examples
from his Twitter account).
In the same city of Rotterdam, the second largest city in the Netherlands, the
emergency control room of the police organized a ‘Twittathon’: from 7am until
10 pm on June 7th, 2012 all emergency calls1 that came in were tweeted (@poli-
tie24 and #politie24). As a consequence residents got a better picture of the
diversity of the work of police officers on an average day.

1
In case criminal investigation or privacy would be seriously harmed the call would not be shared
on Twitter

C.C.M.T.Broekman (&)
A. de Vries
M.A.A. Huis in ’t Veld
R. Mente
J.H. Kerstolt

TNO, The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, The Hague,
The Netherlands
e-mail: carlijn.broekman@tno.nl

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 167

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_13

bayerl@rsm.nl
168 C.C.M.T. Broekman et al.

Fig. 13.1 Wilco Berenschot, neighbourhood officer in Rotterdam (NL), helping a kid

These are just some simple examples of how social media can contribute to
Community Policing. Social media could be considered as a—or even as the—
critical success factor for implementing Community Policing (CP). This chapter
will show why social media are this critical for successful CP. After elaborating on
the characteristics of social media, the role of social media in implementing and
performing Community Policing is discussed. We further will elaborate on
implementation of social media for security purposes in general. Next, we move
towards practice, fitting social media in operational police tasks according to
Community Policing philosophy. The subsequent section presents best practices of
the use of social media supporting Community Policing. In all, this chapter illus-
trates benefits social media bring for Community Policing, but also dilemmas and
challenges to be dealt with. However, we conclude that they are key to the suc-
cessful implementation of Community Policing (cp. Chaps. 7 and 11).

13.2 Social Media, the Game Changer

The introduction and wide adoption of social media, offering services from Twitter,
WhatsApp and Facebook to Instagram and many more, have had a huge impact on
society. Social media are widely adopted in all cultures and countries with an
estimated number of 2.2 billion users worldwide in 2016 (Fig. 13.32).

2
http://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-social-network-users/ retrieved
on 07-13-2016.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 169

Fig. 13.2 Examples of tweets sent by Wilco Berenschot

The impact social media has had on society is much larger than for example the
impact of text-messaging (SMS). Social media provided a new range of possibil-
ities; opportunities, which before were not possible or only for a few people. Social
media enabled people to reach anyone in the world at any time and within seconds.
Until then, this was a privilege only of journalists and mass media. Social media
enabled everyone with access to the internet to reach all others. Social media
affected the nature of information and information sharing itself (Goldsmith 2015).

13.2.1 Strength and Weaknesses of Social Media

for Community Policing

Characteristics of social media can be identified using the SWOT method, mapping
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats Figure 13.4. Putting the SWOT
method in this context enables us to analyse why and how social media are useful
for Community Policing, and what threats should be dealt with. Several strengths of
social media can be identified such as the low barrier (to send messages), accessible
anytime and anywhere, direct communication channel (no intermediary is needed,
anyone can reach anyone and everyone), transparent, people can easily have a

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Fig. 13.3 Number of social media users world

Fig. 13.4 SWOT of social media, presenting the Strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
of social media

dialogue (instead of one-way communication), enriched communications with not

only text but even videos and personal communication (de Vries 2011a).

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 171

Opposing to these strengths stand the weaknesses of social media. Since they are
available anywhere at any time, social media can take lots of time. One can get lost in the
overload of messages. And even though there is a low barrier to use social media for most
people, to some people, for example the elderly, the barrier is (too) high. This can lead to
a small ‘forgotten’ group. Another weakness relates to the high diversity of social media.
Since the introduction of social media many different types of social media have been
developed: Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and Foursquare are only a few of the popular
media, all providing different features. Due to the diversity of social media and people
using all kinds of media, it does not suffice to send a message via one platform alone
when the objective is to reach all. A reverse side to transparency (one of the strengths) is
traceability: social media leaves many digital tracks, and privacy is often debated.
Though social media grows and evolves fast, it is still very immature and the general
public still has to learn how to use it, e.g., they have to learn to realize there is no such
thing as ‘delete’ on social media (despite of the new EU ‘right to be forgotten’). Once a
picture or message is on the internet, ownership of and control by the original sender is
lost (de Vries, 2011b, c). presents the complete SWOT analysis of social media.
This collection of strengths and weaknesses of social media enables the iden-
tification of opportunities for social media, but also of threats. Social media offer
public security planners and citizens new communication channels for contesting,
challenging, debating, aligning, organizing and participating in security processes,
independent of location and at minimal costs. One of the opportunities is the
support of Community Policing: It will increase chances for swift collaboration
between the police and the community, together aiming for a safe and secure
society. Collaboration of the police with the community can evolve into successful,
more effective and efficient policing. This can be achieved by informing the
community about how they can help and by explaining the legal boundaries for
their contributions. The police can make use of the strengths of social media, e.g.,
anywhere and anytime, low barrier, speed, richness and dialogue to support the
interaction with the public. Because of their characteristics social media make
applying Community Policing strategies easier. In fact social media can be con-
sidered a basic element in Community Policing. The next paragraph will show how
social media can positively effect Community Policing.

13.3 How Social Media Boosts Community Policing

Community policing and social media have one important element in common: They
are both not bounded to hierarchical structures. Where police organisations tradi-
tionally are organised hierarchically, social media enable anyone throughout the
organization to broadcast messages (Meijer and Thaens 2013). This is in conflict
with the hierarchical police organisation. However, it is exactly in line with more
innovative Community Policing practices in which local officers almost autono-
mously engage with the community. Social media not only assist Community
Policing, they even stimulate the introduction of Community Policing. Authentic,

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Fig. 13.5 The wheel of community policing reflects the core activities for (organizing)
community policing (Source INSPECT project, www.inspec2t-project.eu/en/blog)

individual communication has a positive impact on the relation between a police

officer and a community member and accordingly also on Community Policing
(Meijer and Thaens 2013). Improving the type and the nature of communication is
one important objective of Community Policing (Lieberman et al. 2013).
Communication is a way to mobilize citizens and to motivate them to become active
community members. Lastly, communication enables community members to offer
suggestions for solutions to community problems (Lieberman et al. 2013).
In the research project3 INSPEC2T (cp. Chap. 11) the core elements of
Community Policing are organized in a model (the wheel of Community Policing;
cp. Fig. 13.5). Based on this model, and the core elements it presents, this paragraph
will analyse where and how social media can add to introducing and executing a
Community Policing strategy.

3
Horizon 2020 project. Grand Agreement no 653749. Website: www.inspec2t-project.eu.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 173

The wheel of Community Policing reflects the core elements, or activities of

Community Policing. In the heart of the model a social platform is depicted sup-
porting all activities. Around this platform the five core (policing) processes, crucial
for introducing and maintaining Community Policing, are defined. Social media
have a key role in every single process, and support the interaction between all
actors involved.

13.3.1 Engage

Firstly, the community and the police need to become engaged. Brainard and Edlins
(2015) stated that engagement should be the core element of Community Policing.
Connections and trust are the basis for this engagement, and social media are crucial
to connect and form trust. Social media can facilitate contact between police and
community and between citizens amongst each other to get to know each other and
hence to create social capital (Brainard and Edlins 2015). Social media can help
police and community to develop a shared sense of purpose and a shared under-
standing of problems. These are crucial elements for Community Policing (Brainard
and Edlins 2015). In doing so, social media can help in the continuous engagement
between police and community.
Further, social media make it easy to find people with a specific interest
(longtail4). For example, people with an interest in criminal investigation can find
each other. Moreover, social media enable the police to be transparent and show the
community what activities keep them busy (Jamieson 2016). The Twittathon which
was organized by the control room of the Rotterdam police and the tweets Wilco
Berenschot sends are good examples of providing transparency on daily activities.
In reaction to the Twittathon many people responded on Twitter showing their
surprise about the number and variety of activities the police is working on during
the day (Kok 2012). The hashtag #Respect was used massively. The EU research
project COMPOSITE suggested that the use of social media can raise public trust in
the police by improving accessibility and transparency (Denef et al. 2012).
Social media are also useful to motivate local stakeholders and community
members in becoming enthusiastic about Community Policing. Members of the
community or police officers sharing their success stories on how they (were)
helped—for example, in solving a crime—inspire others to help as well.
Community members or other local authorities can use social media to ‘poke’
fellow community members to join in Community Policing efforts. Suggestions to
invite fellow community members can be based on interests of a person or this
could be matched automatically based on profile settings—while respecting privacy
legislation.

4
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_tail.

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13.3.2 Plan

Once there is a community, a plan has to be made: Goals need to be specified and
the progress of meeting these goals should be monitored. People tend to share
messages on things that bother them, amongst others on safety and security topics.
The municipality of Utrecht—in cooperation with TNO—conducted an experiment
to find out whether the so-called Veiligheidsmonitor5 (an annual survey assessing
amongst others the subjective safety for cities and regions in the Netherlands) could
be replaced by monitoring social media. Their experiment showed that, although
replacement will probably lead to missing some insights, social media provide
much relevant information on both subjective and objective safety and security
issues (de Vries 2015). In addition to monitoring what is sent by the public, police
can ask for specific input. If this option would be applied, it is crucial to com-
municate the frames and limitations to the community. This holds for follow-up
procedures as well: to ensure community members, who put effort in providing
input, will not become disappointed when follow-up procedures are not in line with
their expectations. Moreover, social media can be used for big data analyses, which
can also be input for prioritization of the safety and security agenda. Finally, social
media can be useful to share updates on progress in realizing the goals.

13.3.3 Prepare

Once the plans are on the table, preparations can start. Rules have to be set and
communicated and skills for Community Policing activities (e.g., engaging with the
community, problem solving for police officers and rules of the engagement for
community members) should be identified and developed or improved (e.g., with
training). Social media are a perfect medium to communicate the rules of engage-
ment. Furthermore, social media can be used to promote the diverse trainings
community members can follow. Relevant trainings could be suggested based on
skills summarized in a community members’ (e.g., LinkedIn) profile. Also profile
information and location information can help in suggesting what trainings might
suit a person, again respecting proper privacy settings. The activities above support
the operationalization of Community Policing. In order to make Community
Policing a continuous process, and not a one-time event, these activities should be
managed and measured continuously.
Operations of Community Policing can be split into: (1) daily security where
time is a crucial element with more short-term planning and (2) criminal investi-
gation, which per definition looks into past events and could take up to years. These
two are discussed below.

5
http://www.veiligheidsmonitor.nl/.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 175

13.3.4 Daily Security

Daily security may be defined by maintaining and getting back to peace as a status
quo and minimizing negative impact of disturbances. In daily security, social media
can be used to collaborate and share alerts. Transparency and communication
should lead to increased subjective safety and positive attitudes (Meijer et al. 2013).
Social media can be monitored for messages people shared, information can be
send, questions can be asked, and police can easily start collaborating with the
community on social media. Section 13.4 will further elaborate on these options for
using social media.

13.3.5 Criminal Investigation

In processes related to criminal investigations real-time is less of an issue than in

processes related to daily security: The golden hour has passed already. Social
media can be used to share (cold) cases or to ask for (eye) witnesses. Further, data
posted on social media by users might contain relevant information. Social media
can also be used to share updates of specific cases (if this is possible). Just as for
daily security, relevant information might be found in messages people send
through social media but specific questions can be asked as well, and collaboration
can be started easily with many community members. Although sending infor-
mation is also an option, this possibility is less likely for criminal investigations.
The following three paragraphs will zoom in even further into the uses of social
media for daily security and criminal investigations from a Community Policing
perspective. The next section will elaborate on the options for using social media:
monitor, send, ask and cooperate. The subsequent section will show how social
media usage can fit into a Community Policing strategy, while the final section will
provide best practices.

13.4 It All Starts with Monitoring

The prior sections analysed the characteristics of social media using the SWOT
analysis method, and how social media can add to introducing and executing a
Community Policing strategy. This section will present how using social media
should be implemented using the social media cycle (Fig. 13.6), and provides
examples of how social media can be relevant for Community Policing.

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Fig. 13.6 Social media cycle: activities to use social media

13.4.1 Monitor: There Is Too Much Information Available

to not Constantly Monitor Social Media

People share all kinds of information through social media, making this an extre-
mely rich source of content for authorities such as Law Enforcement Agencies.
People share what they see, smell, hear but also what they think, conclude, plan,
what they consider to be dangerous, suspicious, etc. Hence, social media not only
provide police officers with extra eyes and ears but also with extra intelligence. All
this information can be accessed by (intelligent) monitoring of messages, photos
and videos shared on social media. For example, information on crowdedness or a
tense atmosphere amongst the crowd during events can be found on social media or
information on stolen items but also irritations of people about garbage standing in
the way or people smelling gas.
In the Netherlands, messages on Twitter are used as an early warning system for
earthquakes. Analyses of the tweets sent by people living in the villages involved
can confirm the occurrence of an earthquake sooner than any official organization
can (de Vries 2014). It is evident that the large amounts of relevant information on
social media make it crucial for law enforcement to monitor social media with
proper filtering mechanisms. Accordingly, monitoring is in the centre of the
social-activities cycle (cp. Fig. 13.6). Two of the challenges that come with

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monitoring social media are that the overload of messages create a lot of (manual)
work, which is scarce in police organisations, and that there are many different
social media—so which platforms should be selected to monitor? The first con-
clusion of an experiment in which social media were used for early warnings during
events was not to expect to be able to see everything. Secondly, it became clear that
it is important to use proper social media monitoring tool(s) (Broekman and
Menkhorst 2013). Some tools are better in providing a general picture based on
many keywords, other tools are more focused on monitoring one or limited specific
keyword(s) or are specialized in monitoring the image of the police. The goal of
monitoring social media should be kept in mind in the selection of monitoring tools
(see also Chaps. 11, 12 and 17).
On social media different target groups can be found in different places as in the
physical world; for instance, one group of people may be Twitter users, while
another group uses Facebook and a third group can mostly be found on Instagram.
In a pilot at summer carnival in which Twitter was monitored many visitors were
Facebook users instead of Twitter users. Consequently, although Twitter was still
used frequently, some information came in later or not at all (Broekman and
Menkhorst 2013). In order to know which social media to monitor, one should start
with a target group analysis.
Moreover, different social media are used for different purposes (Jaitner and
Kantola 2014). People tend to use Twitter at specific times (e.g., during a festival),
while they use Facebook for planning activities and blogs to express opinions
(Jaitner 2013, cited in Jaitner and Kantola 2014). In order to use social media for
situational awareness it is crucial to have a complete overview of the platforms
used, by whom and for what purposes (Jaitner and Kantola 2014).

13.4.2 Send: At Minimal Cost and Directly Reaching

Anyone Information Can Be Shared

Secondly, the police can broadcast messages themselves and so share information
with the community. Similar to monitoring social media, the selection of social
media platforms depends on what the target groups are. An example of efficient
‘sending’ took place during the Summer Carnival in Rotterdam 2012 (Broekman
and Menkhorst 2013). Moreover, there are challenges in sharing uniform infor-
mation and not infringing on people′s privacy. A rumour was making the rounds
online that someone was shot during the festival and this ‘news’ spread very fast on
Twitter. After having verified that this was only a rumour, the police sent a tweet
stating that no one was shot. It appeared that the public identified that this tweet was
coming from a trustworthy source: The police message was retweeted massively,
and the rumour was refuted in a short time.

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Another initiative of ‘sending’ was organized by the police of Manchester: They

sent tweets on all emergency calls in a timeslot of 24 h6 (#GMP24, #GMP24_2 and
#GMP24_3), similar to the Police 24 initiative in Rotterdam mentioned in the
introduction of this chapter. Many people responded to the tweets, and they gained
a better picture of the work done by the police and tried to help where relevant.

13.4.3 Ask: The Wisdom of the Crowd Can Be Accessed

at Any Time

Thirdly, police can ask questions. This is where real Community Policing starts.
When police officers intentionally ask questions to the community, they access the
wisdom of the crowd and use social media in one of its strengths—as a bidirectional
communication channel. The concept of ‘asking the community’ is not new: For
many years television and radio shows have been broadcasting shows in which the
public is asked to help the police with all kinds of cases. Social media, however,
make it a lot faster and easier decreasing the threshold and the time it takes to ask
the community questions. An example of ‘asking’ is the police crowdsourcing to
access the cumulative knowledge of the community on cold cases using ‘webbed
investigations’.

13.4.4 Cooperate: Not Only the Wisdom but also Time Can
Be Accessed Directly and Worldwide

The fourth and last activity for which law enforcement can use social media is
cooperation: continuous back and forth communication between police and
citizens/community, debating and aligning and actually collaborating in security
processes. Social media are aimed to enhance dialogue and ‘many-to-many inter-
action’ (Bertot et al. 2012). The diverse neighbourhood-WhatsApp groups7 are an
example of using social media for cooperation in public safety. In these groups,
police and citizens cooperate on a structural basis to assure safety and security in
their neighbourhood. ‘Citizen journalism’ is another example of how the capacity of
the crowd can be activated and utilized. The MH17 report (Bellingcat 2015)
co-constructed by the crowd and initiated and led by the Bellingcat group, is a
perfect example of what a community can accomplish and how the crowd can be an
extension of the police.

6
http://www.gmp.police.uk/content/WebsitePages/653E722EAFEFB92780257D7300365D60?
OpenDocument, retrieved at 10-03-2016.
7
A WhatsApp-group among neighbours to share remarks related to safety and security of the
neighbourhood.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 179

Box 1 provides a summary description of the four activities with examples of social
media usage in the Netherlands. The following section will fit the usage of social
media into the daily activities of policing using a Community Policing strategy.

Box 1. Descriptions of the four activities in the social media cycle together with
examples of activities

Monitor: What do citizens publish on internet, without any question being posed by
the safety and security organizations? What concerns citizens (content network)?
And who are the people that make up the social network of those citizens (actor
network)?
Send: The government sends information but does not expect an answer per se.
Citizens are informed. They are asked either to take action or not. For example:
“There is a major fire: keep doors and windows closed.”
Ask: The security organization poses a question to citizens. Initiative and question
come from the government. Like an AMBER Alert: “Missing: Jan de Bruin:
14 years old from the Hague. Blond hair, black jacket, white shoes. Missing since
26-10-2011. Photo at http://amberalert.nl. If you have any information, twitter:
#missing @JandeBruin, Phone 0800-6070”.
Cooperation: A citizen or safety and security organization poses a question with the
aim of starting a dialogue or multilogue. This is not a one-off answer.
For instance, a tweet from @noniem: “@politie Why so many police at the #Dam in
#Amsterdam?” and the reaction “@noniem, nothing going on. Police present
because a #demonstration is expected today in #Amsterdam”. Citizens can react
again (dialogue) or more people can do that simultaneously (multilogue). (de Vries
et al. 2011)

13.5 Fitting Social Media into a Community Policing

Strategy

About two-thirds of the neighbourhood officers in the Netherlands state to have had
valuable information from Twitter. This can be related to diverse topics such as
nuisance, suspicious situations or tips on criminal investigations. One third of the
officers even stated to have had a golden tip on a crime case through Twitter (Meijer
et al. 2013). In their study on usage of social media for Community Policing
Brainard and Edlins (2015) found that:
• Facebook had a dominant role and was by far the most popular platform for the
police
• Police used YouTube only as a channel to send information
• Citizens were more active on social media than the police was

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• Police did not actively respond to citizens and so tended to end possible
conversations
• Only few threads were qualified as communication
Not only Brainard and Edlins (2015), but also Heverin and Zach (2010) con-
cluded that the police tends to broadcast information through social media rather
than interact and communicate with the community. If social media usage started
outside of the communications department, the usage had a stronger relation to real
police tasks (Meijer and Thaens 2013).
Social media can help in diverse police tasks, even more when a Community
Policing strategy is applied. This section elaborates on using social media for the main
police tasks daily security and criminal investigation while applying a Community
Policing strategy. In order to respect the diversity of the task of daily security, it is split
into the following sub-tasks: (1) prevention and surveillance, (2) early warnings and
(3) law enforcement after an incident or crisis. The section concludes with observa-
tions that illustrate that the community does not always know best.

13.5.1 Prevention and Surveillance

In the Netherlands, neighbourhood police officers were introduced in the late

seventies to get in touch with the community at a neighbourhood level. Today,
almost all of them use social media to get in touch with people they would not as
easily meet on the streets. The evaluation of the Dutch so-called ‘Twittercops’
showed that residents are enthusiastic about police officers’ use of Twitter (Meijer
et al. 2013). Furthermore, in several neighbourhoods a neighbourhood group app,
mostly using WhatsApp, has been introduced. In most cases these groups were
initiated by the residents themselves; e.g., neighbours use their social media con-
nection to warn each other in case they see something suspicious. Often the
neighbourhood police officer is somehow connected to the group. He or she can
answer questions or receive an extra patrol request from the neighbourhood. Also
the neighbourhood police officer can send tips, for example, on burglary prevention.
Nextdoor8 is a similar solution that is a great success in the United States and was
recently introduced also in the Netherlands. This app enables exchanges about all
kind of topics, next to safety and security related issues.
Another initiative of Community Policing using social media was introduced by
the security region of Utrecht. They initiated the WAAKS9 project in which
Community Policing would not cost any or only limited extra time for citizens. This
can enhance durable participation in Community Policing. Extra eyes and ears are
useful for the police. The idea is simple: People who have a dog regularly walk their
routes and know the neighbourhood well. They ‘patrol’ (walk the dog) on a daily

8
www.nextdoor.nl.
9
https://www.utrecht.nl/wonen-en-leven/veiligheid/wat-kunt-u-doen/doe-mee-aan-project-waaks/.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 181

basis including at night times. They can report not only on irregularities but also, for
example, the status of maintenance of a street. An app has been developed for the
security region of Utrecht aimed at dog owners to stimulate Community Policing.
Based on a similar philosophy neighbourhood officer Kor de Jong, who serves in
Rotterdam, started another initiative. In autumn 2016 he started a neighbourhood
WhatsApp group for PokémonGo hunters. The players of this popular game are
walking and searching the streets for Pokémons and might signal something sus-
picious or shoo criminals (NOS 2016).10
If local citizens share suspicious activities with each other or with the police,
these weak signals can be valuable information for police officers. Either citizens or
Law Enforcement Agencies can decide themselves whether they want to take
further action or not. And if citizens take action, law enforcement should keep an
extra eye, because solving an issue can be fine but can also move into citizens
taking the law in their own hands.

13.5.2 Early Warning

The community can function as an early warner for emergencies or emergent risks.
Open source data, social media being one of the significant contributors, enable big
data analyses. Incidents that emerge such as panic caused in and by crowdedness
can to a certain extent be signalled early by monitoring and analysing social media.
During the 2012 summer Olympics in London social media were monitored, and
when messages suggested unrest or conflicts police would check them out (Knibbs
2013). Sudden events, however, for example an explosion, are hard to predict based
on big data analyses (Bouma et al. 2012).

13.5.3 Law Enforcement After an Incident or Crisis

Especially in the so-called ‘golden hour’—the first hour after an incident or robbery
occurred—Community Policing can be of crucial help. It has the potential of
contacting high volumes of local ears and eyes around an incident. No medium can
activate these ears and eyes as quickly as social media can. Moreover, apps (e.g., an
SOS alarm app) are being launched to alarm bystanders who are able to provide first
aid in emergency situations. Social media are effective tools to reach out to a broad
audience. After the storm at the festival Pukkelpop on 18th August 2011 in
Belgium,11 victims and people living around the festival area found each other on

10
http://nos.nl/artikel/2124822-politie-werkt-samen-met-pikachu-en-co.html.
11
Dutch: https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noodweer_tijdens_Pukkelpop_2011, retrieved at 9-27-2016
English: https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noodweer_tijdens_Pukkelpop_2011, retrieved at 9-27-2016.

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social media. People living in the surroundings of the festival area offered help and
also offered their WiFi to make sure victims had access to the internet (Terpstra
et al. 2012).
During a crisis social media can be used to ask the community for help in
sharing information, e.g., on their situation, in order to create better situational
awareness. The website www.ushahidi.com is an initiative aimed at exploiting this
possibility, and digital humanitarian groups are increasingly involved. During crises
considerable information is provided by citizens (de Vries et al. 2011). Another
example of a crisis, were social media had a large impact, is the shooting incident at
Virginia Tech in 2007. Only two hours after the shooting found place university
students began a Facebook group called ‘I am OK at VT’, and within 24 h all
missing persons had been traced. Traditional authorities would have needed much
more time to make sure everyone was accounted for (de Vries et al. 2011).

13.5.4 Criminal Investigations

Social media can facilitate criminal investigations in different ways. Martine Vis, at
the time of writing national director of social media for the Dutch police, stressed
that social media are indispensable for both small and complex cases (de Vries
2012). Collaborating with the crowd can make the police more effective. Through
social media the community can help in the collection of evidence. Often, the police
are not the first at the scene of a crime, while bystanders share photos and infor-
mation with the world. Research shows that the chances that a crime is solved by
the police increases considerably based on the quality and quantity of information
provided by the public (Meijer et al. 2013). Foster (2016) found that 54% of the
responders in his study received information from the community through social
media.
Social media can help to easily and quickly share questions with the community,
and they help in letting the community know what exactly the police is looking for
and channel citizens’ efforts. Based on the number of retweets in a vast numbers of
cases (Heverin and Zach 2010), the community is willing to help in solving crimes
and incidents. For receiving information, social media might not always be the best
platform as an intake channel to receive reports or tips. It is arguable that the
transparency of social media, in case of providing (witness) information, is a risk. In
those cases social media can be used to spread the request for (eye) witness
information, while alternative secure intake channels can be offered to report
information to the police. The community can also help in validating (evidence)
material, as they can add information to information already gathered.
On the other hand, criminals also use social media. They leave traces of
themselves or of plans for a crime. Either smart searching software tools or
crowdsourcing with the public can help the police to find and validate missing
pieces of a puzzle. For example, the photo of a wanted person passing by on social
media can provide valuable information on where this criminal might be caught.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 183

Finally, the community can also help in solving cold cases. Not hampered by any
kind of tunnel syndrome they can help defining new scenarios. Meijer et al. (2013)
stated, based on their study on the effectiveness of social media usage by the police,
that social media increases effectiveness of police-work thanks to better
information-exchange between citizens and police. Box 2 showcases examples of
how social media have supported criminal investigations.

Box 2. Success stories of using social media in criminal investigations

“A teenager was taken into custody after bragging about a boozed up hit and run on
Facebook … Officers were alerted about the crime thanks to a private Facebook
message from another user.” (Knibbs 2013)
***
An arson could be solved thanks to a message through Twitter
***
Through a Direct Message sent on Twitter a man asked to meet. He told about his
suspicion of a weed plantation. (Meijer et al. 2013)

13.5.5 Community not Always Knows Best…

Sometimes, however, the community is moving in the wrong direction. Incorrect

information provided by the community can be shared massively online, and this is
how rumours are born.
In 2011 there was a shooting in the Ridderhof shopping centre in Alphen aan
den Rijn, the Netherlands, and several people were shot.12 Very quickly inaccurate
information spread via Twitter. The name of the shooter was revealed, but he
appeared to have a namesake which created confusion about the actual perpetrator.
Another rumour circulated as well: The shooter had also shot his mother. The safety
and security organisations were able to share their information online and quickly
dispel the rumours. Another example of a rumour making the rounds in the com-
munity was during Project X in Haren,13 the Netherlands (de Vries 2013). Two
rumours with great impact were created: One was that the Hell’s Angels were on
their way to join the riots, and the second was about a girl being killed during the

12
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alphen_aan_den_Rijn_shopping_mall_shooting.
13
A girl in Haren aimed to invite friends for her birthday party over Facebook. However, she
forgot to click the button ‘private’ for the message. A massive number of people went to the small
town of Haren, and the event ended in riots. For more on the events around Project X see: https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_X_Haren; accessed 10th March 2016.

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184 C.C.M.T. Broekman et al.

riots. Because of incomplete information and difficulties in validating, the police

was not able to refute the rumours.
Especially during a crisis, incorrect information that is spread widely in a
community is a challenge and causes extra pressure for operational policing
activities, particularly if media picks up on them. Panic can be caused by rumours
that are spread, which adds to the many reasons for monitoring social media.
Moreover, in case of an evident rumour, the best way to refute it is to stop it where
it started: on social media.
Elaborating on how social media can be used in a Community Policing strategy
as presented in this section, the next section will show some best practises of using
social media for Community Policing.

13.6 Best Practices of Social Media Use for Community

Policing

Many police officers in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands successfully
integrated social media into their daily work and post messages online on a daily
basis. Social media became one of the common tools to use (Denef et al. 2012).
This section paragraph will presents some of the best practices.

13.6.1 Many Eyes and Ears Activated in Burgernet

(‘Citizen-Net’)

Burgernet (‘citizen-net’) is a national Community Policing initiative of the Dutch

police. Citizens can use both the text messaging broadcast and the app to receive
location-based messages on missing or wanted persons. Burgernet was first intro-
duced after a successful pilot in 2009, and in 2011 around 280 Dutch municipalities
and 615.000 citizens (on average 6% of a municipality) were members (Meijer et al.
2013). Over 400 cases are broadcasted on a monthly basis, of which 40% concern a
missing person. Other messages shared may be about burglaries, raids or tips for
prevention. Information sent in by Burgernet members is in 10–11% of the
broadcasted messages relevant for solving a case (Meijer et al. 2013).

13.6.2 Amber-Alert: The More People Are Looking

for a Child that Is Missing the Better It Is

Another police initiated initiative is Amber Alert. Amber Alert is dedicated to

missing children. Again both text messaging and social media are used to spread a

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 185

message about a missing child, and community members are asked to look for it.
Amber Alert counts over one million Dutch members on a total population of 17
million. Moreover, some public organizations help spread the message (Meijer et al.
2013). A third police initiated Community Policing initiative that makes use of
social media is the app ‘police searches’ (de politie zoekt). Being downloaded over
100.000 times within the first three weeks, this app initiated by de police of
Amsterdam, was a success right from the start (Meijer et al. 2013). In half a year
(November 2011–May 2012) 665 cases were broadcasted. Some cases got a
response within only a few minutes. The Amsterdam police estimates that for
between 15 and 25% of all cases that were broadcasted community members sent
crucial tips for solving the case (Meijer et al. 2013).

13.6.3 Social Media Usage Is Much Appreciated by Citizens

Police activity on social media seems to be appreciated by the community. Meijer

et al. (2013) found a spectacular increase of citizens contacting the police and in
providing relevant information thanks to broad social media adoption by the Dutch
police. In a pilot in 2011, one neighbourhood officer saw his number of followers on
Twitter increase with 300 after just a few months. More than two-thirds of these
followers had not had any contact with the police before (Haan 2011). A positive
effect of police’s presence on Twitter is the image of the police being positively
affected (Mauritz 2011). The community members appreciate the transparent
character of Twitter, which provides a better picture of the everyday activities of the
police.

13.6.4 Large Scale Adoption of Twitter Allows Officers

to Reach All Types of People

Besides apps, the Dutch police uses social media massively with Twitter and
Facebook being most popular. Meijer et al. (2013) found that over thousand police
officers have a Twitter account. Hence, the Dutch police might well be the orga-
nization that holds the most Twitter accounts worldwide. According to M. van
Leeuwen (Dutch police), Dutch officers use their Twitter accounts a lot: In one year
over 400,000 tweets were sent. Followers of these accounts are diverse: They differ
in education, age and gender (Meijer et al. 2013). Meijer et al. (2013) also found
that community members consider contacting the police through Twitter as easier
and with a lower barrier than through the regular channels. Especially when a
community member is in doubt whether a suspicious circumstance is worth
reporting, Twitter is experienced as a channel with lower barriers.

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186 C.C.M.T. Broekman et al.

13.6.5 Thousands of People Can Easily Find the Needle

in the Haystack

The Dutch police uses Twitter and YouTube to gather information and use it to
solve crimes. They use social media for high profile cases, such as the Project X
riots in Haren, but also for petty crimes. For example, the police in The Hague
could identify the perpetrator of a crime after citizens recognised the perpetrator on
a YouTube video the police had shared (Meijer et al. 2013). In 2010 a girl was
indecently assaulted in the city Eindhoven. Camera footage of the assailant was
broadcasted on the local TV’s Crime watch program, which generated ten tips.
When the same footage was disseminated via Twitter three times as many tips came
in (de Vries et al. 2011). A further example of the power of crowdsourcing through
social media is provided in Box 3.

Box 3. Example of a Dutch case solved with the help of crowdsourcing through
social media

‘The head-kickers’
In January 2013 (Eindhoven, the Netherlands) eight teenagers started a fight with
one 22-year old student. They punched and kicked the victim, and left him for dead,
unconscious. But the whole fight was taped by surveillance cameras.
The police was clueless about the offenders and decided to ask the community and
shared the shocking video material. The community responded massively, the video
went viral, being referred to as ‘the head-kickers’. Within three days all eight of the
teenagers had turned themselves into the police.
Although asking the community was very effective, there were also downsides to this
case. In no-time the crowd took over control. The video was shared by many twitter-
accounts. The teenagers were on, what one could call a digital public pillory. One
innocent boy who appeared to have the same name as one of the offenders was
threatened. In the end the judge decided to reduce penalties on all perpetrators,
because their privacy was seriously affected.
Source: social media DNA (http://socialmediadna.nl/kopschoppers/)

This best practice chapter section showed a collection of examples on how social
media successfully stimulates Community Policing practices. Although social
media enable Community Policing, and although they can be considered a core
element, they also bring challenges and dilemmas. The next section will debate
some important dilemmas that come with everyday use of social media for
Community Policing.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 187

13.7 Dilemmas and Challenges

Considering the impact social media can have on our current lives, one might easily
forget that they were adopted only a few years ago. The fact that social media are
such ‘young’ media is a good explanation why diverse dilemmas and challenges
still exist. This final paragraph will reflect on some of these dilemmas.

13.7.1 Rules of Engagement

Law and legislation are trailing behind, jurisprudence is scarce and ethical
boundaries are vague and fickle. Social media are new to society. Neither indi-
viduals, nor organisations or society can oversee the real impact of social media.
Privacy is a hot item, of course, but so are for example citizen’s rights. The web
gives citizens more resources and information to find out about and take action on
all kinds of crime on their own. Not so long ago the Dutch government decreed that
business owners may not share their surveillance camera footage on the internet.
This caused dissatisfaction among citizens. If Community Policing strategy is the
aim, what are the (legal and ethical) options for the community members? The
agenda setting research project Medi@4sec14 looks into these dilemmas asking
questions like: To what extent are current ethical codes and laws and legislation
also valid in the new, partly digital, world? Do other standards and values apply,
and do we have to interpret things differently in the virtual domain? And if you
want to enforce standards and values, how do you deal with violators, especially
serious ones? There is always the possibility that a message is posted by someone
else or from an anonymous profile.

13.7.2 Liberty Above All or Limits and Restrictions?

Society’s general opinion is that criminal activity, offline and online, must be
restricted as much as possible. Having so much information online, should it be
allowed to constantly monitor criminals and terrorists or anyone? Where do you
draw the line? Is it permissible to monitor the digital behaviour of repeat offenders
and other risk groups? And when is someone a repetitive offender, and when do
they belong to a risk group? When can the community be asked to share images?
Are all community members allowed to make videos of other people? Where do we
draw the line with regard to privacy? And who decides to draw that line? Should the
police be allowed to examine all internet traffic, observe and record suspicious
conversations or behaviour or even record these? And can commercial

14
Horizon 2020 project, grand agreement no 700281. Website:http://media4sec.eu/.

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188 C.C.M.T. Broekman et al.

organizations do the same aiming to help the police (but possibly have a hidden
agenda)? Up to what limits do social media create an environment in which people
can communicate freely, happily and without consequences as is generally accepted
at home or in a bar? At what point may or must security organizations intervene?

13.7.3 Future-Proof, but Still Highly Capricious

Not all citizens are familiar with an officer online. Not everyone knows how to find
the police via social media. Similarly, many (neighbourhood) officers have a social
media account but definitely not all of them. Should it become mandatory? Most
officers use Twitter or Facebook, but what about other platforms used by other
target groups?
New technological possibilities (future internet) and transparency (open inno-
vation) are rapidly changing the landscape of social media. Increasingly, new media
with new up- and downsides are launched. Early adopters make full use of all the
applications and easily jump to new social media platforms. Within safety and
security organisations, too, there are significant differences in the extent to which
new media and new applications are being embraced. This results in inequalities to
police services and accessibility. Furthermore, policy departments as well as law
and legislation are late adopters. New applications are already in use before wider
adoption is officially allowed. The 112 notifications on Facebook are a good
example of what citizens expect from security organisations when it comes to the
speed of adopting social media.

13.7.4 Home and Work: Strict Separation or a Generally

Accepted Grey Zone?

New ways of working have already been blurring the line between home and work
for some time. Social media accentuate this blurring. Work is taken home, messages
are sent outside of work times and a response is easily sent. The same goes for
personal affairs being done in between jobs in a work environment. Finding a good
balance or separating work and home is not easy. One of the risks is that social
media can draw conflicts into the personal atmosphere and vice versa. For instance,
an angry citizen can use social media to find many personal details of a safety and
security service employee and can then post threats, or worse. Unfortunately this is
an increasing problem for civil servants in general.

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13 Social Media: Facilitator and Stimulator of Community Policing 189

13.8 Conclusion: Social Media Are Key to the Successful

Implementation of Community Policing

The speed and accessibility, anytime and anywhere, enabling anyone to contact
everyone and the transparency of it all make social media a facilitator and stimu-
lator of Community Policing. In every element in the wheel of Community Policing
social media can fulfil a significant role (cp. Fig. 13.5). Police officers can use
social media to engage with the community. They can do so by giving insights on
what keeps them busy during the day (transparency), being accessible (accessi-
bility) and create a shared sense of purpose and problems or solutions. Messages on
social media give information on subjective and objective safety and can lead to
collaborative planning of community activities. Rules of engagement can be
communicated through social media in the preparation phase. Moreover, necessary
trainings can be suggested to community members based on target group analysis.
Finally, social media are useful in executing operational activities of Community
Policing: daily security and criminal investigations. They can be used to monitor or
search for relevant information, send information, ask questions to the community
and start collaboration.
When starting to use social media, it is crucial to start with monitoring. Too
much information is available on social media; not paying attention to what is going
on online can be a risk. Once monitoring is started, and there is a picture on where
which (target) groups go at certain moments it can be fruitful to also share infor-
mation, ask questions and/or start collaboration with the community.
Social media usage fits well in the diverse police tasks when applying a
Community Policing strategy. Many police officers who use social media received
useful tips from the community. For prevention and surveillance social media
multiply the eyes and ears on the street. Analysing messages on social media can
provide early warnings of potential incidents, and during a crisis these analyses
often provide crucial situational awareness. Social media can show relevant pictures
of incidents more quickly than police can arrive at the scene. People in the sur-
roundings of an incident can be asked for help or as eyewitnesses. Also for criminal
investigations social media can be used and have shown repeatedly to be valuable,
e.g., for (anonymous) tips. Several best practises that were mentioned in this
chapter proved the usefulness of social media. The introduction and wide adoption
of social media is, justly, praised by Community Policing advocates, but dilemmas
and challenges have also arisen. Amongst others the immaturity and recent adop-
tion of social media seems responsible. Lack of regulations on social media usage
by law enforcement is one of the reasons these dilemmas and challenges still exist
(see also Chaps. 2, 3, 4 and 5).
Although there is still much to discover and regulations and legislation are not
up to date yet, the safety and security domain should profit from the opportunities
social media has to offer. Starting with searching and monitoring on social media,
most police officers can start to benefit fairly risklessly. As a next step, they can
start sharing messages about their daily activities to gain presence and personality

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190 C.C.M.T. Broekman et al.

and/or ask the community for help in low-profile cases. Moreover, Community
Policing can be boosted and justly receives much attention. Now is the time for
practitioners and academics to work together for best practices in the next gener-
ation of Community Policing.

Acknowledgements: With support of the MEDI@4SEC project, co-funded by the European

Union′s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme, under Grant Agreement no 700281.
With support of the INSPEC2Tproject, co-funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020
Research and Innovation Programme, under Grant Agreement no 653749.

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Chapter 14
Mobile Communications for Community
Policing

Garik Markarian, V.C. da Rocha Jr., D. Zvikhachevsky

and M.L.M.G. Alcoforado

14.1 Emergency Services Mobile Communications

in Europe

Community Policing is an emerging concept, which is utilising experience and

traditions of conventional policing (cp. Chapts. 3–5). From a technological per-
spective, it is unlikely that dedicated wireless communication systems will be built
for specific use of Community Policing (CP), especially as in the last decade
significant expenditure was allocated to the development and installation of the
wireless communication systems specifically dedicated to emergency services.
Therefore, common sense dictates that Community Policing will rely on the
existing wireless communication infrastructure developed for emergency services.
However, due to the nature of Community Policing, it is required that CP officers
should be easily accessible by the general public who have no access to the ded-
icated professional networks. Therefore, it is necessary that CP officers have access
to consumer technologies for communication with the general public.

G. Markarian (&)
School of Computing and Communication, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
e-mail: garik@rinicom.com
G. Markarian
Rinicom Ltd., Lancaster, UK
V.C. da Rocha Jr.
Federal University of Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil
D. Zvikhachevsky
Ascom Network Testing Ltd., Godalming, UK
M.L.M.G.Alcoforado
University of Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 193

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_14

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194 G. Markarian et al.

In this chapter we consider only wireless emergency communication networks

that enable communications between the first responders in the field, people
affected in the incident and command control staff. The focus of this chapter is on
wireless communication technologies, which are being used by the first responders
in Europe and worldwide and are intended to be used by Community Policing in
their day-to-day operations. We leave organisation procedures of how these net-
works are being utilised and what kind of information is transmitted over these
networks outside the scope of this chapter. Emergency dialling numbers (like ‘999’
in the UK or ‘911’ in the USA) and automated dialling broadcast emergency
notification services are also not considered here.
The emergency services networks can be classified as infrastructure-based and
infrastructure-less networks (Markarian 2016; Goldsmith 2005; Heine 1998).
Infrastructure-based wireless networks, as follows from their name, require a certain
infrastructure, which needs to be installed (and maintained) prior to any services to
commence. The most typical examples of infrastructure-based networks are cellular
networks and wireless local area (LAN) networks, which have base stations
installed in the required geographical area (in the case of LAN utilising wireless
fidelity (WiFi) networks these base stations are called access points/AP).
Installation of these base stations requires thorough planning (including radio fre-
quency (RF) planning, selection of best locations, etc.) and constitutes a significant
part of the overall cost of the network (Heine 1998). Such base stations enable radio
access for mobile terminals to a backbone network, which is also responsible for
control of the base stations. A typical infrastructure-based topology is shown in
Fig. 14.1 (Hossain and Leung 2008) and the following abbreviations are used: Base
Station (BTS), Base Station Controller (BSC) and Mobile Switching Centre (MSC).
Infrastructure-based networks have no backbone infrastructure, they do not require
costly installations and maintenance and could be established on an ad hoc basis, as
required. Typical infrastructure-less topology is also known as mesh networks
(Markarian 2016; Hossain and Leung 2008), where each user (also known as node) is
capable of relaying data for the network to other nodes by cooperating in the distri-
bution of data with the help of routing protocols (Campista et al. 2008). A wireless mesh
network is a wireless local area network (WLAN) that utilises decentralised connection
arrangements. The most common topologies are known as full mesh topology and
partial mesh topology. In a full mesh topology, each node is connected directly to each
of the other nodes in the network. In a partial mesh topology, only a few nodes are
connected to all the others, while most of the nodes are connected only to nodes with
which they exchange the data. These topologies are presented in Fig. 14.2.
Each of the architectures (infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less) have their
advantages and drawbacks. Infrastructure-based networks utilise network resources
more efficiently and can provide the required quality of service (QoS) to the registered
users (Markarian 2016; Goldsmith 2005). In infrastructure-based networks mobile
terminals communicate directly with the base station; there are no multi-hop paths
and as a result these networks have lower delay and loss, higher data rates and more
flexibility compared to infrastructure-less networks (Markarian 2016). Therefore, the
performance of infrastructure-based wireless networks in general is much better than

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14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 195

Fig. 14.1 A typical infrastructure–based network topology

(a) Full Mesh (b) Partial Mesh

Fig. 14.2 Infrastructure-less mesh network topologies

in networks without infrastructure (Goldsmith 2005). However, these advantages are

delivered at a significant cost of capital expenditures (CAPEX) and operating
expenses (OPEX) and even with these high costs, it is not always feasible (or prac-
tical) to install these networks in certain locations. This is where infrastructure-less
networks are the best (and sometimes the only) option (Markarian 2016).
Currently, infrastructure-based emergency services mobile networks deployed by
various agencies in Europe comprise a mix of analogue and digital professional

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196 G. Markarian et al.

mobile radio (PMR) and trunked mobile radio networks. In most countries the
legacy analogue networks, which were prone to eavesdropping and provided little or
no data capability, have been migrating to digital technologies such as TETRA1 and
TETRAPOL.2 The TETRA standard has been specifically developed to have a
scalable architecture allowing economic network deployments ranging from single
site local area coverage to multiple site wide area national coverage (see Footnote 1).
In the UK, for example, Airways Solutions Ltd. provided the first public safety
network based on the TETRA technology standard since 2001. The deployed
Airwave network is based on terrestrial trunked radio specifications, as defined in the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), TETRA standard (see
Footnote 1). Initially, the TETRA standard provided an attractive alternative to
analogue radio networks by delivering critical mobile voice communication services
supported by other specific services required by emergency services.3 These included
(but were not limited to) a group calling mode in which a single button push will
connect the user to the users in a selected call group and/or a dispatcher. It also
supports the use of the terminal in a one-to-one walkie-talkie mode, but without the
normal range limitation since the call still uses the network (see Footnotes 1 and 3).
TETRA terminals can act as mobile phones (cell phones) with a full-duplex direct
connection to other TETRA users or the public switched telephone networks (PSTN).
Emergency buttons, provided on the terminals, enable the users to transmit emer-
gency signals to the dispatcher, overriding any other activity taking place at the same
time. In addition to voice and dispatch services, the TETRA system supports several
types of data communication such as status messages and short data services. Unlike
legacy analogue systems, TETRA provides for authentication of terminals, protection
against eavesdropping, air interface encryption and end-to-end encryption.
Figure 14.3 shows the current status of TETRA networks in Europe.4 As follows
from Fig. 14.3, European countries predominately are deploying (or planning to
deploy) either TETRA or TETRAPOL, the exception being Latvia, which has
recently decided to upgrade its First Responder (FR) communications with a
Motorola ASTRO 25 system based on the North American Project 25 (P25)
standard (see Footnote 4).
The specific services offered by TETRA networks can be summarised as follows
(see Footnote 1):
• Wide area fast call set-up ‘all informed net’ group calls
• Direct Mode Operation (DMO) allowing ‘back to back’ communications
between radio terminals independent of the network
• High level voice encryption to meet the security needs of public safety
organisations

1
ETSI EN 300 392-2 v3.2.1.
2
www.tetrapol.com.
3
“TETRA Association”. TETRA Association. 2012-03-22. Retrieved 2012-03-28.
4
PPDR-TC White Paper. The Strategic Roadmap for Next Generation (Broadband) PPDR
Communication Systems (Final Report by the EU FP7 PPDR-TC Project).

bayerl@rsm.nl
14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 197

Fig. 14.3 Current status of digital mobile networks in Europe

• An Emergency Call facility that gets through even if the system is busy
• Full duplex voice for PABX and PSTN telephony communications.
However, requirements of emergency services and Community Policing are
growing fast (e.g., streaming live mobile video, upload/downloading high resolu-
tion still images, location based real-time services) resulting in the need of
on-demand mobile broadband services, and neither TETRA nor TETRAPOL can
meet these requirements in full. Therefore, emergency services around Europe are
looking for alternative solutions, which potentially could replace the existing
TETRA and TETRAPOL networks.
The infrastructure-less networks are not widely used, with an exception of a few
WiFi-based mobile ad hoc network systems (MANETs) (Loo et al. 2012; Boukerche
2008; Toh 2002), which were obtained for trial and piloting purposes. A MANET is
defined as a continuously configured infrastructure-less wireless network of mobile
terminals (nodes). MANET allows free movement of each node in any direction and
as such supports the establishment of new links with other nodes. Each node for-
wards all the traffic to corresponding nodes according to a routing protocol, which
constitutes a core part of MANET, as it defines its overall performance. MANET
could operate as a self-contained network or be a subnet in a larger network.
Combined with a capability for rapid configuration of network architecture,
MANETs are ideally suited for rapidly deployable scenarios faced by first respon-
ders and Community Policing officers. However, as the total throughput is shared
between all users, the performance of MANETs deteriorates as the number of users
in the network grows dramatically (Loo et al. 2012; Boukerche 2008; Toh 2002).

bayerl@rsm.nl
198 G. Markarian et al.

14.2 Requirements for the Next Generation Emergency

Networks

Limitations of the existing TETRA and TETRAPOL networks were addressed by

various governments in the EU and in a number of research projects sponsored by
the European Union FP7 Programme. For example:
• Project INFRA (Innovative and Novel First Responders Applications)5 devel-
oped interoperability layer allowing collaboration between the TETRA,
TETRAPOL and broadband networks.
• Project HIT-GATE (Heterogeneous Interoperable Transportable GATEway for
First-Responders)6 was concerned with the development and verification of the
gateway allowing communications across the various networks currently used
by first responders.
• Project PPDR-TC (Public Protection and Disaster Relief Transformation
Centre)7 was concerned with the definition of the most typical user scenarios
and identification of the most suitable candidate technologies for future emer-
gency service networks.
In the UK, after in-depth consultation with all stakeholders, the decision was
made in 2011 to initiate the Emergency Services Mobile Communications
Programme (ESMCP). This is a Home Office led, cross-government programme to
address the need to provide a new mobile communications capability to the
emergency services and other users in the UK, representing approximately 250,000
users. It is required that these new services support interoperability with the existing
systems, geographic coverage and availability. As it is stated in the relevant doc-
uments (Emergency Services Mobile Communications Programme (ESMCP)
2011), one of the main Programme’s objectives is to replace the existing TETRA
networks with an emergency service network (ESN) provided on a standard 4G
LTE (4G Long Term Evolution) commercial network, enhanced by special features
required by public safety, resulting in cheaper, better and smarter networks and
services.8
In the USA, the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC)
decided on LTE in 2009 as its platform for a national network operating in the
700 MHz band (Jackson 2009). Similar requirements were developed in the ECC
FM49 Report 199 (see Footnote 5) where eight generic operational communication

5
INFRA: Innovative and Novel First Responders Applications (Project reference: 225272).
6
HIT-GATE: Heterogeneous Interoperable Transportable GATEway for First-Responders Project
reference: 284940.
7
PPDR-TC: Public Protection and Disaster Relief Transformation Centre (Project reference:
313015).
8
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-emergency-services-mobile-communications-
programme/emergency-services-network.

bayerl@rsm.nl
14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 199

scenarios are defined for emergency network subscribers. These services are pre-
sented and grouped as following (see Footnote 9 and 13):
• Voice (common voice services)
– Push-to-talk
– Private call
– Group call
– Emergency/priority call
– Call retention/busy queuing
– Direct mode operation
– Ambience listening
– Voice over the public switched telephone network (PTSN)
– Area selection/dynamic group number assignment (DGNA)
• Narrowband data (data transmission up to 384 kbps)
– Messaging and notifications
– Low resolution photos
– Automatic telemetrics
– Location-based information
– Mobile workspace applications
– Access to internal databases
– Access to external sources
• Broadband data (data transmission above 384 kbps)
– Rapid file transfer
– High resolution photos
– Remote operations
– Mapping with geographic information system (GIS) layers
– Mobile workspace applications
– Access to internal databases
– Access to external sources
• Video (data transmission with tighter latency and coding requirements)
– Video transmission
– Video file transfer
– Video call
• Transversal services (extension of voice and data capabilities and
performance)
– Extension of coverage
– Extension of availability
– Security tools

bayerl@rsm.nl
200 G. Markarian et al.

• Challenging services (services enabled by the next generation of

technologies)
– Proximity services
– Augmented reality.
The operational needs for emergency services networks can be summarised in
the following categories (see Footnote 4):
• Typical coverage area requirements: The coverage area of the emergency
service network needs to encompass the whole geographic area of the mission,
which may have the dimensions of a metropolitan area network or be even
wider. In addition, on-demand indoor coverage configurations [utilising
infrastructure-less networks, (Markarian 2016)] must also be available, espe-
cially in basements, tunnels or large and crowded environments. If different
communication networks are implemented, effective interoperability or han-
dover conditions must exist.
• Required network topology: Availability and reliability are crucial for CP
applications, implying that the network topology must be resilient and
self-organising. The ideal in terms of performance is to have an
infrastructure-based network. However, if an infrastructure-based network is not
available (damaged or no coverage in the particular area), an infrastructure-less
configuration will be required in which all the nodes can be interconnected to
each other as well as with the command and control centre (CCC).
• Data throughput: The capacity requirements of CP applications vary
depending on the type of data and time required for transmissions. Uplink and
downlink bandwidth may vary from a few to several Mbps.
• Mobility requirements: Emergency services networks (both
infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less) can be deployed in highly dynamic
environments with a wide variety of mobility requirements.
• Interoperability requirements: Ideally, backward interoperability with legacy
networks and ability to roam from one type of network to another using different
technologies and protocols is required.
• Service availability, reliability and resilience: Service availability for
mission-critical applications must provide low start-up times and high levels of
operational availability (higher than 99.5%). Service reliability and resilience
depend on the mobile technology to be used, which must have sufficient levels
of built-in redundancy.
• Performance requirements: Emergency services networks should provide low
latency and high QoS in delivering real-time data communications.
• Security: Security requirements are dependent upon the nature of the data
exchanged. Using frequency bands exclusive to security agencies may not be
enough to ensure security. End-to-end encryption and the use of secure device
operating systems may be required. The implementation of data encryption
algorithms and user authentication methods is therefore essential to comply with
the security level of most PPDR applications.

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14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 201

• Specific voice communication requirements: Mission-critical voice commu-

nication should consider push-to-talk (PTT), full-duplex voice systems and
group call. Key elements for the definition of mission-critical voice communi-
cation are direct mode, talker identification, emergency alerting and audio
quality.
• Specific data communication requirements: Requirements capability to
transmit narrowband data (messaging), broadband data (images and video) and
location-based services (asset tracking and mapping).

14.3 Future Emergency Services and Community Policing

Networks

14.3.1 Infrastructure-Based CP Networks

Long Term Evolution (LTE) (Cox 2012) is the most promising networking tech-
nology capable of meeting all the requirements for ESNs. LTE or the E-UTRAN
(Evolved Universal Terrestrial Access Network) was developed by the 3GPP
standardisation group and finalised in release 8 (R8) of the standard.9 It has been
developed as a next generation of wireless mobile communication systems in
response of demands for high spectral efficiency, high peak data rates, short
roundtrip time as well as flexibility in frequency and bandwidth.10
The LTE access network is simply a network of base stations, also known as
evolved NodeB (eNB), generating a flat architecture as shown in Fig. 14.4 (see
Footnote 9). Unlike GSM or UMTS networks it has no centralised controller, and
the eNBs are normally interconnected. Such an architecture allows redistribution of
the network intelligence amongst the base stations leading to significant reductions
in the connection set-up and faster handover. This allows better user experience
during real time data sessions (see Footnote 9; Sesia et al. 2011; Dahlman et al.
2014). In a simplified explanation: unlike UMTS it is possible to install just one (or
a few) LTE base stations (eNBs) with evolve packet system (EPC) software and
organise a broadband wireless communication services between mobile terminals
without having a backbone network. This is a particularly attractive feature of LTE
for emergency services and CP applications, which often require rapid installation
of temporary base stations.
The attractive features of LTE for emergency services and CP applications and
the general improvements in real-time data services were achieved due to the
introduction of the evolved packet core (EPC) (see Footnote 9). Unlike UMTS
(Sesia et al. 2011) networks, where a subscriber is assigned an IP address when data

9
www.3gpp.org.
10
http://www.3gpp.org/specifications.

bayerl@rsm.nl
202 G. Markarian et al.

Fig. 14.4 Architecture of a

typical LTE network

service is established and released form this IP address when data service is ter-
minated, in a LTE network each subscriber unit is assigned an IP address during the
switch-on and released from this IP address when a device is switched off.
Therefore, EPC is purely IP based and both the real time and data communication
services are carried by the IP protocol with all its inherent advantages (Kevin et al.
2011).
Another strong argument in support of LTE for emergency services and CP
applications is a wide spread of already installed LTE networks, as shown in Fig. 14.5.
The wide availability of deployed LTE networks opens opportunities for first
responders and Community Policing efforts to lease a publicly operated LTE
infrastructure instead of managing their own private network infrastructure (see
footnote 4). This option may not be as easily found for alternative wireless
broadband technologies such as WiMAX11 (Noordin and Markarian 2007), which
is capable of delivering similar performance but is limited to a few specific
applications such as airport surface data links (AeroMACS)12 and telemedicine
(Zvikhachevskaya et al. 2009). As follows from Fig. 14.4 and LTE specifications
(see Footnote 9 and 10), LTE is the most promising technology for future emer-
gency services and CP applications as it is able to provide specific public safety
requirements and supports a high data rate, low latency network as outlined earlier.

11
https://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/802.16.html.
12
https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/content/documents/communications/aeromacs-
ectrl-briefing-012016.pdf.

bayerl@rsm.nl
14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 203

Fig. 14.5 LTE world coverage map Source http://www.worldtimezone.com/4g.html

To ensure that an LTE system can meet first responder and Community Policing
requirements and deliver the desired features and services, certain modifications to
the existing 3GPP specification are required. Such a modified network, called
enterprise private network, constitutes communications infrastructure that connects
computers and mobile devices being used by first responder and Community
Policing across the command chain, facilitating continuous rich data accessibility.
The key purpose of an enterprise private network is to interconnect both single
users and groups of users providing satisfactory performance of voice/video/data
signals combined with reliability and security. In the commercial world, enterprise
private networks are used by companies for enhancing and protecting business
operations (Minoli and Minoli 2002).
In response to market demand, HUAWEI has developed enterprise LTE (eLTE)
—LTE Broadband trunking system for first responder and CP operations13
(Enterprise LTE 2013). This is the first LTE broadband trunking solution to provide
voice and video dispatching, which meets almost all requirements outlined earlier
and greatly increases efficiency of first responder and Community Policing opera-
tions. The eLTE System utilises advanced wireless broadband technology, pro-
viding unprecedented data rates (100 Mbit/s downlink and 50 Mbit/s uplink) and
enabling previously impossible services. As a result, a single network can support
multimedia trunking, voice and video scheduling, high-definition video surveil-
lance, ultra-remote data acquisition and mobile office services.
Other features include a compact core network, distributed base stations and
terminal devices that can be used in harsh outdoor environments. The supported
services include:

13
http://e.huawei.com/en/products/wireless/elte-access.

bayerl@rsm.nl
204 G. Markarian et al.

• Mobile office
• Remote data acquisition
• VoIP
• Mobile Video streaming and video surveillance.
These services, combined with their ease of deployment, low CAPEX/OPEX
and high maintenance efficiency, make eLTE a strong candidate for future
infrastructure-based wireless networks for first responder and Community Policing
applications.

14.3.2 Infrastructure-Less Networks

As mentioned earlier, infrastructure-less ad hoc mesh networks cannot compete

with infrastructure-based networks on QoS characteristics. However,
infrastructure-less networks are finding more and more applications in scenarios
where either extension of the existing infrastructure-based networks or temporary
coverage is required (Markarian and Singh 2008; Panitzek et al. 2011). Typical
examples include rapidly deployable applications in the areas of no coverage
(basement, underground, rural areas) or scenarios where infrastructure-based net-
works are switched off deliberately (to prevent remote activation of explosive
devices) or due to natural disasters (flooding, earthquake, tsunami, etc.). There is
also a special case when infrastructure-less communication systems are used for
covert surveillance by security agencies as shown in Fig. 14.6.

Fig. 14.6 Infrastructure-less communication system in a typical covert surveillance application

(Picture curtesy of Rinicom Ltd [www.rinicom.com])

bayerl@rsm.nl
14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 205

The most common type of infrastructure-less communication system are IP

based ad hoc networks, which unlike conventional infrastructure-based wireless
solutions constantly monitor channel state information and reconfigures commu-
nication paths according to the predefined criteria and instant channel
condition. The system is intrinsically capable of self-healing, meaning that if
one node can no longer operate or its communication link is not suitable for
the selected service (e.g., real-time video transmission), the other nodes in the
network can still communicate with each other, directly or through one or more
intermediate nodes, which is done with the help of a routing algorithm.
As mentioned earlier, most of the legacy ad hoc mesh networks are WiFi based
and as such did not find a wide usage in first responder and Community Policing
applications due to well-known drawbacks of WiFi systems:
• Security: There were a number of reports proving limitations in WiFi security.
• Speed: Since WiFi has no provisions for QoS, users cannot be guaranteed the
desired data rates.
• Range: WiFi is developed as a LAN, and hence its range is limited to a hundred
metres.
• Reliability: When the number of users in the network exceeds the limit,
WiFi MAC implements the ‘First In First Out’ route, meaning that users could
be kick-out from the network without any prior warning.
However, recently a number of proprietary solutions have appeared on the
market utilising advanced technologies to eliminate drawbacks of WiFi systems
(Markarian and Singh 2008; Panitzek et al. 2011).14
The two most widely accepted infrastructure-less systems are those provided by
Rinicom Ltd. (UK) and Persistent Systems Inc. (USA). Both systems are capable of
supporting different types of services by allowing service priority that considers
various factors including radio path stability, expected battery life, packet loss,
jitter, delay, etc. This allows special applications that adapt to network conditions,
while service aware routing aligns to provide the desired quality of experience
(QoE) for the user, as shown in Fig. 14.7 (Markarian and Singh 2008; Panitzek
et al. 2011).
Typical characteristics of these systems are shown in Table 14.1.
Acceptance of these ad hoc mesh systems by first responders and for Community
Policing efforts is clearly divided by geographical areas, where majority of Wave
Relays are utilised in the USA, while the majority of PodNodes is used in the UK
and Europe (Marco et al. 2015).

14
http://www.logicbuy.com/features/7-disadvantages-of-using-public-wifi-and-public-wifi-solutions.

bayerl@rsm.nl
206 G. Markarian et al.

Fig. 14.7 Service oriented routing

14.3.3 Hybrid Infrastructure-Based and Infrastructure-Less

Networks

As already outlined, both infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less systems have

their own strong and weak points, and are widely used by first responders around
the world, while the selection of a system depends upon the existing operation
scenarios. However, there are still a number of scenarios where neither of these
systems can meet end-user requirements and provide the desired performance.
Some of these scenarios are listed below:
• Rapid installation of infrastructure-based system does not allow sufficient time
for installation of microwave or satellite-based backhauls.
• LTE base station (eNodeB) is installed on a vehicle and is moving or changing
its location in relation to other base stations in the network.
• eNodeB is installed at a challenging environment (relatively low height, near
line of sight (NLOS) or non line of sight (LOS)) and microwave point-to-point
link cannot provide the desired performance due to RF propagation limitations.
• A temporary ad hoc network needs to be seamlessly integrated with the existing
infrastructure-based network.
The above scenarios (and many more not mentioned here) can be summarised as
scenarios where mobile ad hoc mesh backhaul is required by the
infrastructure-based networks, which could be considered as a hybrid network
consisting of infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less components.
The idea of mobile mesh backhaul is not new and first publications have
appeared since 2007 describing various scenarios and solutions (Romain and Navid
2015; Marco et al. 2015; Rayment 2007; see Footnote 12). Figure 14.8 illustrates
current network topologies with mesh backhauling (Romain and Navid 2015).

bayerl@rsm.nl
 14
Table 14.1 Characteristics of the leading IP-based Ad-Hoc mesh systems
Category Variable PodNode-R-SD Wave relay 4 Wave relay 5 PodNode-R-HD-MIMO

Mobile Communications for Community Policing

Connectors Camera 12 pin female (neutrik N/A Fully integrated H.264 HD Fully integrated H.264 HD
MRF12) video encoding/decoding video encoder/decoder
Network 12 pin male (neutrik 10/100 ethernet (2) USB host, ethernet 10/100 ETHERNET (2),
MRM12) USB
Battery 4 pin male (binder 99 9207 3-pin twist lock Standard twist-lock connector 4 pin male (binder 99 9207
00 04) 00 04)
Power Power 22 W max Average −4.2 W Not on datasheet 15 W max
consumption Peak −16.5 W
Physical Dimensions 20.2 cm  12 cm  5.6 cm 19.8  7.6  3.2 cm 3.81 cm  6.6 cm  20.07 cm 5.6 cm x 8 cm  21 cm
Weight (excl., 1047 g, 1618 g 499 g, 844 g 490.5 g, <1 kg
including) battery 839.1 g
bayerl@rsm.nl

Enclosure IP rated IP67 rated IP68 Rated IP rated

Temperature −10 to +45 °C −40º to 85°C −40 to 85 °C −25 to +45 °C
RF Antenna TDMA transmit and receive Transmit and receive 3  3 MIMO technology 2  2 MIMO
Interfaces RF frequency UHF, L-Band, S-Band Full spectrum from UHF, L-Band, S-Band Full spectrum from
UHF to 4.9 GHz 450 MHz to 6 GHz
Modulation COFDM, QPSK, 16 QAM, OFDM, DSSS, CCK OFDM (64-QAM, 16-QAM, COFDM (with adaptive
64 QAM (adaptive) QPSK, BPSK) modulation up to 256
QAM)
Output power 30 dBm max (1 W) 33 dBm max (2 W) 6W 30 dMm as a standard,
higher output powers are
available on request
Output power 0.5 dB steps 1 or 5 db steps 0.5 dB steps
tuning
Bandwidth 5–20 MHz in 1 MHz steps 5, 10, 20 or 40 MHz 2.5 MHz, 5 MHz, 10 MHz, 2.5–40 MHz in 2.5 MHz
20 MHz, 40 MHz steps

207
Throughput/mesh Up to 50 Mbps (PHY layer 41 Mbps UDP 150 Mbps 180 Mbit/s
capacity throughput)
(continued)
 208
Table 14.1 (continued)
Category Variable PodNode-R-SD Wave relay 4 Wave relay 5 PodNode-R-HD-MIMO
MESH Routing Smart routing proven in over Proprietary wave No information Proprietary smart routing,
500 installations relay® MANET proven in over 500
routing installations
System Through standard web Secure web interface Android applications Web browser, dedicated
control browser network management
system
Audio Embedded within video 16 channels of 16 channels of voice, dual Embedded within the video
compression codec and/or dedicated Push-to-talk active PTT voice - key 2 encoder and/or dedicated
android/windows app (PTT) Voice channels & monitor up to 16 android/windows app
(PodCom) n; G.711 codec with channels at once (PodCom)
toll-quality audio
bayerl@rsm.nl

Video Video MJPEG/H.264 (MPEG-4 Fully Integrated H.264 HD An option to use build in
encoding compression Part 10/AVC) and/or video encoding/decoding H.264 video codec and a
dedicated app for standalone proprietary app
peer-to-peer (called PodCom) for secure
voice/video/data peer-to-peer
communications video/voice/data
communications

G. Markarian et al.
14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 209

Fig. 14.8 Network topologies with mesh backhauling

A number of solutions have been developed, including satellite based mesh

backhauling15 yet they are not able to meet mobility and ease of installation
requirements. One of the proposals is based on a solution where mesh backhauling
is achieved by transferring a share of network capacity from mobile users to
backhauling.16 In simple terms this means that each eNodeB includes a mobile
device, which communicates with the neighboring eNodeB and this link is used as a
backhaul. Although this partially solves the problem this solutions has the fol-
lowing drawbacks:
• Throughput reduction for mobile users, as some of the bandwidth initially
assigned to mobile terminals is now used for backhauling (eventually reducing
the number of supported mobile terminals)
• Overlapping of the cells, leading to a larger number of required base stations
(eNodeBs)
• Limited capacity of backhaul link, which constrains the achievement of full
performance offered by LTE.
Recently, Rinicom Ltd (UK) together with Horsebridge Defense and Security
Ltd (UK) have developed a novel hybrid infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less
system utilising LTE eNodeB and PodNode mesh technology described earlier. The
solution was developed as an integral part of the Dual Use Technology Exploitation
(DUTE) programme, sponsored by the UK Goverment and currently being tested
and validated in various operation scenarios.17 The topology of this solution is
shown in Fig. 14.9.
As follows from Fig. 14.9, each eNodeB incorporates a PodNode, which provides
robust, mobile and secure broadband backhaul networking with other eNodeBs by

15
http://www.gilat.com/dynimages/t_whitepapers/files/Cellular%20Backhaul%20with%20Mesh%
20-%20White%20Paper-2011-11.pdf.
16
http://deltenna.com/products/lte-basestations/.
17
http://www.dute.co.uk/news/.

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210 G. Markarian et al.

Fig. 14.9 Topology of LTE MESH backhauling with PodNodes (diagram is provided by
Horsebridge Defense and Security Ltd.)

utilising an alternative frequency band. Such a solution eliminates drawbacks18 and

enables first responders and CP applications with a solution, which meets all their
communication networking requirements.

14.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, we consider wireless communication systems for first responders,

which also can be used for CP applications. We provide an overview of the legacy
systems and show that the existing TETRA/TETRAPOL trunked systems cannot
meet the ever-changing operations requirements. We present both
infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less network topologies and outline their
advantages and shortcomings. More specifically, we show that infrastructure-based
networks in general provide better the desired QoS, while infrastructure-less sys-
tems have benefits of flexibility and rapid installation.
Furthermore, we point that current trends in Europe and the USA are geared
towards utilising wireless broadband LTE systems as infrastructure-based solution,
while IP-based ad hoc mesh networks are very attractive as an extension to these
networks in a number of operational scenarios. We describe key performance

18
http://deltenna.com/products/lte-basestations/.

bayerl@rsm.nl
14 Mobile Communications for Community Policing 211

parameters for LTE systems and provide a comparison between the two most
widely used infrastructure-less ad hoc mesh networking solutions.
Finally, we show that new solutions are emerging on the market, which utilise
advantages of both topologies by combining infrastructure-based and
infrastructure-less topologies in a hybrid network architecture. We outline main
advantages of these solutions in new, previously impossible services in challenging
operational scenarios.

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Rayment SG (2007) Bernard Herscovich Integrated wireless distribution and mesh backhaul
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bayerl@rsm.nl
Chapter 15
Importance of Cyber Security

Alex Tarter

15.1 Introduction

The 21st century has seen society embrace computers and the information age at a
staggering pace. In much of our daily lives we are never really more than a few feet
away from a computer, excluding the smartphone in our pockets and the PC on our
desk. We may not consciously realize it, but computers are embedded everywhere
from the cars we drive and the traffic lights we follow to the power and water
utilities we rely on every day. Society has welcomed the efficiency provided by
computer automation to the extent that we now rely on its security and integrity for
much of our lives. Unfortunately, as the early hacking community realized, the way
a computer was designed to work and how it actually works are typically two
different things. And what started as a fun underground activity has since evolved
into a multi-billion dollar cybercrime industry. As Community Policing (CP) is
closely correlated with the daily lives of citizens, it could be affected by the cyber
threats in the same way as the citizens it is supposed to support. Furthermore,
combating cybercrimes or dealing with its aftermaths could become integral part of
CP operations. Therefore, it is essential to understand the main concepts of cyber
security together with existing and emerging threats it possesses (see Chaps. 2–4).
This chapter outlines the genesis of cybercrime, their changing incentives and
the challenges involved in combating it. As we demonstrate, cybercrime has many
similarities and parallels with traditional fraud; however, cybercrime benefits from
two unique elements: scalability and anonymity. The same technological advances,

A. Tarter (&)
Thales Cyber and Consulting, Thales Group, Thales, UK
e-mail: alextarter@gmail.com

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 213

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_15

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which have allowed an account holder to check their bank balance anywhere in the
world, have also allowed criminals from around the world to target that person’s
bank account. Similarly, the same technologies that allowed distribution of news
and information are utilised by terrorists for radicalisation of certain groups in
society. Geography and time have traditionally constrained a criminal’s potential
target list; for instance, there are a limited number of houses a burglar can rob in a
single night. Therefore, criminals must choose their targets carefully.
A cyber-criminal, however, can reach thousands of targets at the push of a button,
completely altering their incentives.
This creates new types of challenges for Community Policing, which needs to
take into account the possible geographical separation of criminals and victims
while perpetrators of the crime are often unreachable to Community Policing due to
geographical constrains. Just as computing has made legal businesses more effi-
cient, it has done the same for criminal ones as well. The internet has made large
scale cybercrime possible, switching a cyber-criminal’s incentive from only tar-
geting smaller numbers of high value targets to also targeting large numbers of
lower value ones. In many ways scamming a small amount from a lot of victims is
less risky and more profitable than scamming a large amount from a few victims.
And this also brings new challenges to CP operations.
Technology and cybercrime are often viewed as intimidating and complicated
due to the lack of understanding of how computers work, and the way they are
portrayed in entertainment (e.g., TV shows and movies). This chapter clarifies
common terms and techniques from hacking and ransomware to the dark web and
cryptocurrencies like BitCoin and makes them accessible to a wider audience. More
importantly the chapter outlines why cyber-criminals have embraced these tech-
nologies, how they use them and how law enforcement—and more specifically
Community Policing—can realistically investigate and operate in this new age.
Simply put, the internet has made the world a smaller place with few adherences to
national borders and a higher degree of anonymity. This makes criminal attribution,
evidence collection and CP investigation more complicated, but not impossible (see
also Chap. 6” on radicalisation).
One of the key concepts outlined in this book is that technology does not exist in
isolation. The cyber world and the physical world are intertwined. We use the cyber
world to communicate between people in the physical world, and we use it to control
physical processes and machinery. Policy and procedures that affect the cyber world
ultimately also affect the physical world. For instance, encryption can be seen as a
double edged sword. It provides a high degree of protection to both national agencies,
corporations, citizens and criminals alike. Despite the desire and technical feasibility
of requiring legal intercept ‘backdoor’ into commercially encrypted devices, this type
of solution is destined to fail in practice leaving everyone except the criminals worse
off. As society continues to integrate and rely on the cyber world for their everyday
life, cybercrime will only become more prevalent and detrimental. The scalability
that computers and the internet provide gives cyber-criminals the ability to have an

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impact on society and citizens that is bigger than ever before. And this certainly will
be reflecting in CP operations of the future.
Now more than ever the physical and cyber worlds are becoming increasingly
intertwined. Without always realizing it, society is becoming increasingly reliant on
the security and integrity of computer systems. Almost all aspects of regular life
from shopping to banking or correspondence to socializing take place online and
via a computer. This means that for the general public, their online persona can
easily be as important as their real world one. Cybercrime that targets the privacy
and security of their online activity can have real world impacts on reputations, job
security, identity and finances. While this is becoming more well-known and
appreciated, the public often fails to realize just how dependent the real world is on
computers and cyberspace. Our power stations, cars, sewage systems and petrol
pumps are all computer controlled, and cybercrime that targets these computer
systems has the potential to impact large sections of society up to and including
nations (Zetter 2015). Protecting our critical infrastructure (financial markets,
utilities, healthcare, government and transportation) from cyberattack is therefore a
national priority and one that as we shall see requires an international response.
Hacking and cybercrime has been with us for almost as long as the internet itself.
However, it is only recently, as society has become reliant on cyberspace, that the
financial rewards of cybercrime and its effectiveness have become serious.
Unfortunately, as with most types of crime and malicious behaviour, there is not a
simple solution or technology that can mitigate the problem. In fact, in many cases
the technology used to benefit society has been repurposed by criminals for their
own gain. This chapter attempts to outline the different aspects of cyberspace and
some of the technologies used within it that can be used for both good and evil. The
better informed and comfortable society and law enforcement are at operating
securely within cyberspace the harder they make a malicious actor’s job.

15.2 Cybersecurity and Hacking

Cyber refers to anything involving computers—which is why, when people discuss

or think about ‘cyber’, they think of computer devices such as laptops, desktops,
smart phones and smart TVs. But as we have seen, cyber devices are much more
prevalent than laptops and smart phones; they also include cars (engine manage-
ment systems), elevators and medical pace-makers. However, cyber encompasses
more than just computing devices. There is the data that the computers process and
store, the networks that they communicate over and the interactions with the people
who use them. All together—data, devices, networks and people—create cyber-
space. It is the interactions between cyber/computer elements that defines cyber-
space, and it is this that hackers try to interfere with.
Computers and cyber systems have been designed by someone for a specific
purpose and to perform a specified task. However, these designers, being people,
are fallible and they do not always design systems that can only be operated as

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intended. As a result these systems can be operated and used in ways the designer
never imagined or anticipated. This is not always a bad thing; for instance, the
telephone system was originally designed to carry human voices, but some clever
engineers realized that you can use telephones also to carry machine voices (digital
data) and from there we created the internet. As such a hacker can be defined as
someone who attempts to make a cyber system work in a way that it was not
intended or designed to. The motivations, mission and actions of a hacker determine
whether they are a good (whitehat) or bad (blackhat) hacker, rather than the phi-
losophy itself of finding and exploiting flaws.
As we shall see, what makes hacking so dangerous is not the act of discovering a
flaw in a system, but the fact that it can be so easily reproduced and performed by
non-technical actors. As with most technical activities, finding flaws in a computer
system is both difficult and time consuming. To become good at it takes time, skill
and patience. However, once a flaw is discovered the predictable nature of com-
puters makes it easy to reproduce.
One of the early famous and reproducible ‘hacks’ was performed by John Draper
aka ‘Captain Crunch’. John realized that the US telephony system was controlled by
computers that used different tones to indicate different actions, from the fact that
money had been put into a telephone box to setting up a long-distance connection.
Therefore, if they could replicate these tones (or notes), they could make the tele-
phony system do whatever they wanted from making free phone calls to routing
other phone calls around the world. One such tone was 2600 Hz that, if whistled into
a telephone handset, would allow them to make free phone calls. Discovering how
the telephony system worked was complicated and not something just anyone could
do, but what made these hackers (or phreakers as phone hackers are called) famous
was that at the time ‘Cap’n Crunch’ cereal included a whistle in boxes as a free toy
that exactly produced the 2600 Hz tone. Now any child with the cereal box whistle, a
phone line and some simple instructions could make free phone calls whenever they
wanted (Rosenbaum 1971). While this is a fun story, it demonstrates that, while the
inner-workings of a ‘hack’ can be complex to discover and understand, reproducing
it once known and documented is pretty easy. In the same way that it takes a skilled
armourer to create a gun that works, once created anyone can fire it.
If hacking is all about making cyber systems work in unanticipated ways,
cybersecurity is the process of ensuring that technology only operates as intended.
Cyber security has fast become a buzzword in almost every industry and a concern
for everyone, and it is easy to see why. No matter how skilled a burglar is, there is a
real world limitation to how many buildings they can break into in a given night.
There is no way for the same thief to target lots of people in lots of countries around
the world at the same time. But in the case of a cyberattack it certainly is possible;
the attacker can program a machine to do the work and have it attack lots of people
at the same time all from the comfort of their home. As we shall see, technology has
made cyber-related crime scalable in a way that physical-related crime could never
be. As with every other industry, cybercrime has benefited from the information
revolution. Cybercrime is now more efficient, scalable, anonymous and

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international than pretty much any other criminal enterprise, which is why its
prevalence has dramatically increased in recent years (Goodman 2015).
The underlying principles of cyberattacks are not that different from fraud—it is
about tricking someone or something into acting in a way that is not in their best
interest. Cybersecurity attempts to prevent and detect when such a fraudulent
request is made and to protect both the data, devices, networks and people from the
attacker. While this seems straight forward it is in fact extremely difficult, because
computer systems are now so complicated and complex that their interactions
cannot always be fully understood even by their designers.
Thinking of hacking as fraud is a useful analogy, because an attacker will very
rarely target their victim directly. Instead they will first compromise an interim
system or computer and use that as a go-between (also called a proxy) to the target
system. In many cases there can be multiple layers of proxies, each providing a
degree of separation between the attacker and the victim. These proxy systems are
typically unaware that they have been compromised and so their owners fail to
realize that their systems are not completely under their control. As computers do
not remember anything unless instructed to do so, this can make cyber forensics
(i.e., the collection of cyber related evidence) challenging. Accurate and auditable
logs need to be maintained throughout cyberspace in order to track an attacker back
through their proxies. However, this challenge can be worth attempting, as there
have been many cases where an attacker has slipped up and left a footprint such as a
name, handle, credit-card number or other identifying information in the creation
and maintenance of their proxies.
When malicious hackers attack cyberspace, they can target a victim’s data,
devices, networks or the victim themselves. By sending them spam pretending to be
from their bank the attacker is attempting to hack (social engineer) the victim
themselves into revealing private and valuable information. In some of the early
days of criminal activity in cyberspace malicious hackers blackmailed gambling
sites into paying protection money (Menn 2010). If the sites did not pay, the
attackers would unleash a denial-of-service attack during large sporting events that
prevented legitimate users from placing bets, and the firms would lose a huge
amount of business. Denial-of-service attacks are attacks on a victim’s networks;
the servers tasked with handling customer requests are sent an overwhelming
amount of fake data so that the servers spend all their time handling the bogus
requests such that legitimate requests are ignored. The same style of attack was also
used recently as part of the cyberattack on the Ukrainian power grid on December
23rd 2015. The attackers launched a denial-of-service attack on the power com-
pany’s customer service centre telephone lines, so when the attack occurred none of
those affected could phone up and report the incident impacting the company’s
ability to provide a coordinated response. This attack demonstrates that cyber
attackers do not just target PCs and private data, they can also impact the supply of
electricity to people’s homes and their telephone lines.
However, it is attacks on data within cyberspace that has attracted
cyber-criminals the most, from stealing private or proprietary information to
manipulating bank transfers or encrypting someone’s data for ransom. Digital data

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is great from an attacker’s point of view, because it is easily duplicated, trans-

portable anywhere over the internet and stored in a USB drive no bigger than a
thumbnail. Data such as credit cards, company secrets, identity information and
classified information also has tremendous value to both their owners and malicious
third parties, so it can easily be sold once obtained.
What makes digital data so powerful and yet so vulnerable is that it can be
identically reproduced an infinite number of times. The cost of duplication is
effectively zero, which is why digital data sharing is so popular and difficult to
control. Each nation has a unique position regarding data privacy and how valuable
private data should be stored and distributed. Unfortunately, given the ease at which
data can be copied and disseminated across international boundaries, it is something
more easily legislated than controlled or enforced. Digital piracy (i.e., the act of
unauthorized distribution of protected material) is now commonplace and extremely
difficult to control. Data being stored on a server in one country or jurisdiction can
be viewed and copied by someone in another. Cyberspace for the most part does not
recognize or align to national boundaries, making law enforcement actions all the
more challenging.

15.3 Anonymity and Attribution

One of the most important aspects to remember about the internet and cyberspace
more broadly is that it ultimately is just machines talking to machines. Humans may
provide the input and direction, but once the keyboard characters are pressed and
the mouse button clicked, it is computers that run the instructions, send the com-
munications and perform the actions. While the intention is human, the action is
machine. Why this is so important is that one of the most challenging aspects of
cybersecurity is determining the attribution of an attack to a person or group. Law
enforcement can potentially see the impact of a cyberattack, review any log evi-
dence and potentially identify the identity of the machine initiating the attack, but
that initiating machine is very rarely owned or managed directly by the attacker.
Every computer directly connected to a network will have an IP address; for
computers directly connected to the internet this address will be unique across the
entire world, which is how computers are able to communicate with each other
anywhere in the world. Just as with a letter sent through the post with a sender’s and
receiver’s address on it, every packet on the internet has a source and destination IP
address. Through investigation of logs and records forensic investigators can often
find out the source IP address for a given cyberattack. However, knowing which
computer sent the packet is not the same as knowing ‘who’ instructed it to be sent.
Computers run the instructions they are given. In most cases these instructions
are installed by their owners (e.g., applications), so that they will operate in a
known and expected manner when certain keyboard strokes are made, mouse
buttons clicked or packets received. In an ideal world the actions of a computer
could be directly tied to the intentions of the owner through the applications they

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installed and the input they gave. Unfortunately this is not an ideal world; a
computer has no ability to correctly identify that the instruction it is asked to run
came from its owner or a hacker. From the computer’s point of view there is no
difference between a user sitting at a keyboard and malware running on the system.
A computer will run any instruction given to it—no matter how it got there. This is
how hackers get computers they do not own to perform actions on their behalf
without their owner’s knowledge or authorization.
One of the key challenges for an attacker wishing to use multiple proxy devices
is that they are not always online at the same time, new anti-virus signatures may
detect and remove the malware and for large botnets (a group of computers all
infected with the same malware) there are thousands and sometimes millions of
computers to individually manage. It becomes too risky and too time consuming for
an attacker to remain constantly online controlling their proxy devices, which is
why they delegate this task to a common type of proxy called a ‘Command and
Control’ (C2) server. A C2 server stays continuously online and waits for those
computers infected with malware to reach out to it. This way the attacker only
needs to contact the C2 server and leave instructions on what they wish the malware
to do. Then, whenever the malware checks in, the new instructions are downloaded
and executed. As long as the attacker is careful about how they connect to the C2
server, and they are able to keep the C2 server up and running, it is very difficult to
apprehend the attacker or prevent new malicious activity. Just like a regular crime
syndicate, the foot-soldiers (i.e., malware infected computers) never speak or hear
the commands directly from the boss (attacker), instead their instructions are dis-
seminated via a series of intermediaries. Regaining control of one of the
foot-soldiers is not necessarily going to be able to tell you or lead you directly to the
attacker.
What makes cybersecurity and law enforcement’s jobs harder is that criminals
frequently hide or continuously move their C2 servers and establish them in
jurisdictions and countries different from where they reside. An attacker can then
make multiple hops from their country to their C2 server and from there launch
their attack. Should law enforcement find and obtain the C2 server, they will still
have to work with other agencies to trace back the hops from the C2 server to the
attacker. Intentionally hampering police efforts by crossing national boundaries is
now considered standard practice for malicious hackers (Menn 2010).
So, as we can see, cyberspace has given an attacker a much greater capability for
anonymity and scalability by relying on machines rather than people to carry out
their activities, and attribution for an attack is hard to determine because the
machine which launches or coordinates the attack is often the first in a long proxy
chain back to the attacker. Within cyberspace, just because you may own a system,
it does not mean you are always in control of what it does. Cybersecurity techniques
such as application whitelisting, firewalls, antivirus and intrusion
detection/prevention systems are meant to prevent compromised and unauthorized
access, but there is no guarantee that they will always be successful.

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15.4 Malware

One of the most common weapons in a cyber attacker’s arsenal is malware.

Malware is typically the default term for a piece of malicious software running on a
system that takes commands from the attacker not the owner. However, by using
the term so broadly, some of the important nuances and aspects are lost.
Most modern malware is not a single piece of software; instead it is more like a
criminal gang of software—made up of different specialized components (Distler
2007). In most cases there is a dropper, an escalator, a cleaner and at least one
expert. The dropper is like the conman, great at fraudulently gaining access
somewhere without raising suspicions. In cyberspace this could be a compromising
website (Martin 2007), phishing email, a carelessly discarded USB stick or a Trojan
application. The dropper’s job is to get onto a victim’s system and for the system to
run it. Once the malware begins to run, it is the escalator’s job to embed the
‘expert’ into the system and give it persistence, so that it will continue to run even
after the user reboots the machine or attempts to remove it. If possible, the escalator
will also try and raise the privilege level of the ‘expert’ to allow it to do more than a
typical user is able to (known as gaining root privileges). Once the expert has been
successfully installed and embedded into the system, the cleaner’s job is to remove
all traces of the other components and the ‘expert’s’ installation, so that its presence
and how it got onto the system can remain hidden. Finally, the expert piece of
software is the specialist piece of software that will actually carry out the attacker’s
intentions.
Typical expert pieces of software include the ‘remote access trojan’ (RAT),
which allows the attacker to gain direct access to the system and to do anything they
want, from reading and copying files to grabbing screenshots and even turning on
the computer’s microphone and webcam. There are also more specialized ones that
attempt to capture online banking details, steal usernames and passwords and even
manipulate the operation of industrial control equipment such as those that run
power stations and control trains. Understanding all of these components can be
helpful in understanding how malware campaigns evolve and if an attack is truly
sophisticated or merely a recycling of an old technique.
Just as user files and digital music can be copied and reused, malware compo-
nents can be as well. Each component can be picked up and used again for another
task in a different piece of malware, which is why different pieces of malware with
different properties can share similar dropper or escalator components. Also once a
new piece of malware is identified, researchers and attackers alike attempt to
understand how it works in order to replicate its behaviour and reuse its components
for themselves. There is not always honour amongst thieves and malware authors
are no exception. If the current dropper is not proving to be successful, the attacker
just swaps it for another one and attempts the attack again. What methods and
components are available to an attacker often determines how advanced they are.
Due to the concern that if discovered their components will be stolen and reused by
everyone else, there is often a reticence on the part of the attacker to use their

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newest and most unique components if other more well-known methods will work
just as well.
This is how Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are denoted. Just as an attacker
will check to see if a window is open before attempting to pick a door lock, a cyber
attacker will attempt a more routine method of attack before escalating to using
something new. Unfortunately, this means that the advanced, potentially nation
state components of today, once discovered, rapidly become the regular compo-
nents of the cybercriminal and hacker of tomorrow.

15.5 Encryption and Key Management

One of the most powerful tools to maintain digital data and cybersecurity is
cryptography. Cryptography provides a variety of capabilities including encryption,
hashing and signing that are relatively straightforward to implement and when
combined in the right way can overcome some of the issues of data privacy and
cyber anonymity. Encryption is the practice of using mathematical techniques to
turn intelligible data into unintelligible data and back again through the use of
encryption keys. If performed correctly, encryption can be used to ensure that only
those who possess the correct key can decrypt the data and make use of it. This
helps mitigate some of the risks of data theft should an attacker steal encrypted data;
since as long as the key remains secret and the attacker does not guess it, the data
will remain unintelligible.
It can be inferred therefore, that encryption only provides protection if the
encryption key cannot be stolen or guessed by the attacker. This is why the most
important part of any encryption system is the way of creating, distributing and
securing its keys—what is referred to as key management. The majority of
encryption algorithms are what are called ‘symmetric’ key techniques—that is to
say, the key used to encrypt and decrypt is the same. Symmetric key algorithms are
analogous to a mortice door lock—they use the same key to both lock and unlock
and anyone with a copy of the key can both lock and unlock the door. While
symmetric key algorithms such as the famous ‘AES’ are used everywhere, there is
another family of techniques just as important. Much of cyberspace fundamentally
relies on a certain technique called asymmetric cryptography that uses two keys
instead of one: one that is public and the other that is kept private. This is a clever
technique that can be used to identify people and devices, securely distribute AES
encryption keys and provide validation of a digital document’s provenance.
While symmetric keys use the same key to lock and unlock, asymmetric keys are
slightly different and instead use two: one for locking and the other for unlocking.
A good analogy for this is a padlock and key. The padlock is the encryption key—
you can use it to lock something, but you cannot use another padlock to unlock the
first. Instead you need a key. Likewise the key can unlock a padlock, but you
cannot use it to lock something—that requires a padlock. What makes this so
powerful is that due to some clever mathematics, even if you have the padlock,

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you cannot work out what key unlocks it; and likewise if you have the key, you
cannot create the padlock. It is this simple concept that underpins everything from
the security of your online banking to the ability to digitally sign documents and
validate your identity. This is done by making one key ‘public’ and keeping the
other private and secret. If everyone knows my public key then they can use it to
lock something knowing that only my private key can unlock it, and likewise if I
lock something with my private key then everyone with my public key can unlock
it and thereby validate that it came from me.
In the real world we have multiple methods of authenticating that someone is
who they say they are such as checking their identity cards, their appearance, the
way they speak or asking them what they know. As we have seen in cyberspace this
is much more difficult to accomplish, as all digital data can be perfectly copied; in
other words a photocopy of an identity is indistinguishable from the original in
every way. This is a real problem for e-commerce, as if I want to do online banking,
I want to be sure that I am really speaking with my bank, and my bank wants to be
sure that it is really me and not an imposter. Now with public–private keys this
problem can be solved: If I know my bank’s public key, all they need to do is lock
some information using their private key and send it to me; if my copy of their
public key unlocks the data, then by inference I can be sure I am speaking with my
bank.
These simple tools have given us the means by which to create an entire
e-commerce industry that is both secure and easy to use. It also provides an
effective method to prove the real world identities of people, companies and devices
from within cyberspace. However, this only holds true as long as entities can keep
their private key secret. If you have someone’s private key, then you can imper-
sonate them at will—it is the digital equivalent of stealing and then using some-
one’s fingerprint. This is the single biggest issue in the role of encryption within
cyberspace—the ability to generate, and securely store private keys. Steal the key
and you steal the identity and protection it offers. If you steal a bank’s private key,
you can impersonate it on the web, and the general public will not be aware that
they are talking to a fraudulent site and not the real bank.
Key management in the real world is typically the biggest weakness in any
encryption system and the aspect most likely to be attacked. After all if a thief wants
to steal a bike, is it easier to cut through the chain, steal the key or use a duplicate?
In most airports you can buy a U.S. T.S.A. approved luggage lock that can be
opened by a TSA representative using a master key set. However, ensuring that
only authorized TSA representatives have those keys was never going to be suc-
cessful due to the wide number of people who needed authorization, how they were
handled and how they were made. Which is why you can now go online and buy
for yourself a set of master keys that can open any approved luggage lock, defeating
one of the primary reasons for using a lock.
This is where lawful access in cyberspace is incredibly difficult, if not impossible
to achieve in practice. While it is technically possible to build lawful access into a
commercial system such as a smartphone that uses a lawful intercept master
public–private key pair, such a system can never be operationally secured over its

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lifetime. It is flawed because encryption keys are digital and therefore easily copied
and reproduced, and like all digital data they are notoriously difficult to maintain
control over. If there was such a key that could unlock a highly popular product,
then knowledge of this key would be incredibly valuable and something that many
attackers would target. One slip in the handling, distribution and use of that key will
risk it to being exposed to unauthorized entities. Unfortunately a digital secret that
important has always leaked in the long run, either intentionally or unintentionally,
and once exposed it cannot be forgotten or changed. While the technical and
political desire is there, we do not know operationally how to make a digital secret
secure yet usable (Weitzner 2016; Blaze 2016).

15.6 Ransomware

Encryption is a great tool in the arsenal of cybersecurity. However, unfortunately

cybercriminals have also adopted it for monetary gain. The scalability of cyber, the
effectiveness of techniques such as encryption and the ease by which malware can
be obtained and used has culminated in a pernicious form of malware called
‘ransomware’. Ransomware is a form of malware that once installed onto a system
begins to systematically encrypt user files such as documents, spreadsheets, photos
and movies with strong encryption and then demands payment to obtain the
decryption key. Due to the strength and ease with which encryption can be
implemented, these malware payloads (i.e., expert components) are incredibly
effective, and so the encryption is typically impossible to break. Unless the victim
has a recent unencrypted backup from which to restore their files, their only
recourse is to pay the attacker and obtain the key.
The rise of ransomware has been swift, in part because of its financial model and
effectiveness. By infecting a large group of people and only demanding a relatively
small amount of money from each, the attackers are able to leverage the scalability
of cyber and make a lot of money. Victims make the calculation that it is easier and
less expensive to just pay the ransom than attempt to recover the data from backups,
recreate the data or just accept its loss. The attackers know that making it easy and
reliable to pay and get the decryption key helps reinforce the perception that
payment is often the best recourse.
Initially the victims of ransomware were typically regular users and their home
computers, but now larger organizations such as hospitals, schools, law enforce-
ment and local governments are being compromised. Therefore, the cost and impact
of these styles of attacks are growing and becoming increasingly an issue to law
enforcement. And due to the staggering amount of money these schemes are
generating for the attackers, there is no indication that ransomware is going away
(Chandler 2016).

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15.7 Cryptographic Anonymity

While ransomware could not have existed prior to the widespread knowledge and
availability of strong encryption techniques, it also could not have been as successful
without an easy, anonymous and universal payment system. There is no easy method
of sending physical cash over cyberspace, and most other methods from credit cards
to PayPal do not provide anonymity; that is, until the rise of crypto currencies such as
Bitcoin. Bitcoin can be thought of as cash for the internet—almost impossible to
forge but anonymous to use. The ownership of a Bitcoin (or piece of a Bitcoin) can
be tracked from creation to the current holder, which is what provides the currency’s
integrity and trust. A technical description of how Bitcoin works is beyond the scope
of this book, but the underlying concepts are easy enough to understand.
In crypto currencies your identity is denoted by a public–private key pair, which
you create. There is no central registration service in the real world, which means
there is no mechanism to associate a public key with a real person. In fact many
people can and do have multiple Bitcoin public keys, which combined gives a
Bitcoin identity a very strong and practical degree of anonymity in the real world.
A Bitcoin transaction uses these public–private keys to digitally sign a transfer of
Bitcoin, so that there is cryptographic proof that the sender authorized the transfer
and the correct recipient has received it. The sender can transfer one, multiple or
even a fraction of a Bitcoin to a recipient, and at certain exchanges these Bitcoins
can be converted into different national currencies based on the current exchange
rate.
This is how attackers were able to monetize ransomware so effectively. They
required their victims to send a small amount of Bitcoins to a specific public key.
The anonymous holder of the corresponding private Bitcoin key could then launder
that money through other Bitcoin identities and finally through an exchange system
into real money. While the ransom is being paid, law enforcement only has an
anonymous public key to go on, which means there is no bank account to freeze or
identities to go after. The owner of the Bitcoin wallet (what the private key and
associated data is commonly known as) can travel anywhere in the world and use
any exchange they wish, which makes law enforcement’s job much harder in
tracking the owner’s identity and preventing them from obtaining the ransom
money.
Bitcoin is now international with exchanges all around the world. As with all
financial instruments the value of a Bitcoin is only worth what someone is willing
to pay for it. Unfortunately for law enforcement there is an international demand for
an anonymous currency system to facilitate both legal and illegal transactions.
Accordingly there are exchanges around the world, where people are willing to pay
and exchange Bitcoins to hide private, embarrassing or potentially illegal transac-
tions. To associate a Bitcoin wallet (or private key) with a real person requires slow
tracking of Bitcoin transactions, what they are used for and ultimately infer the
identity of the owner.

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15 Importance of Cyber Security 225

Just as encryption can be used to hide the identity of the participants in a

financial transaction, it can also be used to hide the identity of communications. The
internet is a large network of computers all accessible using the TCP/IP protocol,
which basically means that they are all connected and capable of exchanging data.
What data they store and exchange depends on what service they support or—as an
analogy—what language they speak. The largest and most common service is the
World Wide Web (or web for short). You can access this service through your web
browser and link to any computer speaking this language. The web is also indexed
by public search engines such as Google, Bing and Yahoo. However, there are
additional networks not publically indexed or easily explored without specialized
software or authorized credentials. Other common networks include BitTorrent, one
of the most popular methods of transferring large files across the internet.
BitTorrent is regularly used by individuals, academia and companies to effi-
ciently distribute large files, but it unfortunately is also one of the most common
methods for distributing copy written material such as films and music. BitTorrent
splits up large files into tiny pieces and distributes copies of these pieces amongst
many computers. When someone wants a copy of the file, instead of going to one
location and copying all of it, they now go to lots of places to get small pieces of it.
The benefit of this is that you do not end up with a bottleneck with everyone
wanting to go to the same place (or server) to get the same file. Unfortunately, it
also means that when an illegal copy of a movie or music album is shared over
BitTorrent, there is not one specific server or computer that law enforcement can go
after to prevent additional downloads; the file is now shared across a group of
computers all over the world.
Another famous non-web service is ‘Tor’. Tor is part of the dark web, which is
just a fancy word for those parts of the internet that are not publicly indexed and
require specialized software to access. The dark web is so called, because it is not
easily seen, rather than because of the activities you find on it; although the dark
web and specifically Tor certainly help support illegal or malicious activity. To put
it another way, if Bitcoin provides an anonymous currency, Tor provides the
anonymous marketplace.
Just as encryption or Bitcoin are not inherently bad but can be used for malicious
purposes, so can Tor. The issue with the regular world wide web is that if you want
to access a website, you need to know its public IP address; and once you connect
to it, the website knows your IP address in order to send you a reply. Anyone
monitoring the website or the internet knows the IP address of everyone visiting
that site and who else they are communicating with. For those who wish to remain
anonymous this is a concern. Your public IP address is registered to a physical
location and associated with a physical computer, so identifying the participants in a
connection on the World Wide Web is relatively straightforward. Tor uses
encryption to hide the participants in a communication so the recipients, and anyone
monitoring the internet cannot tell who is speaking to whom.
The underlying concept of Tor is relatively straightforward and can be modelled
using the regular postal service. If I want to write a secret letter but do not wish the
postman to know who I am writing to, nor for the recipient to know who wrote it,

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I use three random relays to hide my activity: I first write my letter and place it in an
envelope addressed to the final destination, then I place that letter in another
envelope addressed to a random relay and then finally that envelope into a third
envelope addressed to another random relay. Therefore what I actually post is a
letter inside multiple envelopes each addressed to a random person. So the postman
sees me posting a letter to the first random recipient, who opens the envelope and
finds a letter addressed to someone else, so they put the enclosed letter back in the
post and it is delivered to the next random relay. This sequence is continued until
the final step, when the actual recipient receives their envelope and finds the letter
inside. If we use encryption to hide the contents of the letter and the enclosing
envelopes then neither the postman nor each recipient relay can open the letter and
peak inside at the contents. The more the number of messages and participants
grow, the more anonymity is obtained as it becomes logistically harder and harder
for someone monitoring the network to keep track of all the messages and potential
communications.
Despite their legitimate use cases, criminals have co-opted Tor, Bitcoin and
BitTorrent for their own version of e-commerce, buying and selling illegal products
and services anonymously over the internet. One of the most famous recent
examples of this was the so called ‘Silk-Road’. This was a criminal version of
Amazon, where you could buy illicit items such as drugs and even purchase illegal
services such as prostitution and murder for hire. The site became a popular des-
tination for black market activities, and it even had rating and customer review
sections to ensure a high customer satisfaction. Due to the anonymizing features of
Tor and Bitcoin, despite the site being up and accessible, it took law enforcement a
long time to discover the owner of it and build a case to shut it down.
Due to the strength of encryption, the anonymity cyber services can provide and
the easy scalability of internet activity, law enforcement is finding that it currently
takes more resources to take down illegal services and identify cyber criminals than
it does for criminals to begin to use them. Hence, while they continue to provide a
low risk means by which to illicitly make large sums of money, cybercrime will
continue to take its toll on victims.

15.8 The Future of Cybercrime

If there are three concepts to remember when thinking about cybercrime, they are
curiosity, fraud and scalability. Hacking for all its nefarious connotations is at its
heart curiosity. It is the human desire to understand how things work and how they
break that has spawned the hacking, security research and tinkering communities.
As long as humans remain curious, there will always be new and innovative ways
to use what they find for both good and bad purposes.
In some way, almost all cybercrime can be described as a type of fraud, whether
it is criminals pretending to be your bank, hackers masking their location via
proxies, malware pretending to be legitimate software or an attacker sending fake

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15 Importance of Cyber Security 227

messages instructing an electricity substation to shut off. The fact is that in

cyberspace it is easier to be anonymous and to just assume knowledge of the
identity of who you are talking to than to prove it explicitly. These assumptions are
what are exploited time and again (Schneier 2012).
Finally just as machines have made many human and business activities more
efficient and reliable, the same can be said for cybercrime. One attacker can now
rob exponentially more people in one night than a professional burglar could ever
dream of, and extortion is no longer restricted to a geographical area. Criminals can
also reach across the world and between national jurisdictions to carry out their
attacks making it more difficult for law enforcement to investigate and catch them.
As with most weapons the skill required to make them is not equivalent to that
required to use them. Malware and other cyber weapons can be easily deployed at
scale by a single malicious actor targeting thousands of people with nothing more
than the desire and knowledge of where to go to get the malware they need.
Ransomware is the perfect storm of many of these concepts. It can be pretty
certain that not many, if any at all, of the attackers truly understand the technical
details of the encryption algorithms or malware toolkits they use to such great
effect. However, their huge success through scalability has ensured that by targeting
many people for small amounts of money they can make a lot of money from
victims all around the world with very little risk. This style of attack works because
people value their data more than the monetary sum the attackers are asking for.
Just as the internet has enabled business to be conducted around the world, it has
also enabled cybercrime to do the same.
As David Autor from MIT so eloquently put it, “There is a long history of
leading thinkers overestimating the potential of new technologies to substitute for
human labour and underestimating their potential to complement it” (Autor 2015,
p. 7). Just as society has now become completely reliant on technology and to a
large degree cyberspace, criminals have realized that technology can make crime
more efficient and that there is a lot of value stored or connected to cyberspace that
can be exploited. Ransomware is just the first in a new wave of cybercrime, and we
can expect similar techniques and fast adoption amongst criminals around the world
due to the low risk and high reward cybercrime offers.
While many cybercriminals will be satisfied with just monetizing their fraud,
there are others who may have different motivations from destruction to political
interference. Data theft of private information (such as emails, private correspon-
dence, documents and presentations) can have real world impacts to reputations,
incur regulatory fines and impact a business’s profitability and viability, not to
mention the potential to disrupt the political process. More worrying to note is that
cybercrime has so far targeted traditional PCs, laptops and smartphones. However,
the number of these devices are just a fraction of the total number of computers.
There are vastly more smaller, embedded computers in everything from cars to
power stations, trains, reservoirs and pacemakers. These embedded computers
interact with the real world and attacking them, as was seen in the attack on the
Ukrainian electricity sector (happened on December 17th 2015), impacts the whole
society and causes real world damage, panic and political consequences.

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228 A. Tarter

Therefore, in addition to the concern of wide spread low level attacks (such as
ransomware), there is also the concern of targeted high impact attacks on critical
infrastructures and the switch to attacking more specialized embedded devices.
From a law enforcement perspective international cooperation is key. Even
though cyberspace provides a great deal of anonymity it is not always complete and
attackers still make mistakes. Forensics and investigative work typically focus on
the areas in which cyberspace and the real world interact. For instance, how a web
domain or hosting service is paid for, what email addresses are used, any meta-data
in the malware code or from which internet location (e.g., web café) a web-chat or
social media post came from. However, it is not always the case that the attacker
and victim are in the same location or under the same jurisdiction. Evidence must
be collected and processed from multiple jurisdictions in many cases.
As in all endeavours, humans are fallible and liable to make mistakes. Those
criminals who are comfortable operating in cyberspace for their illegal activity are
also highly likely to use it for entertainment and social activities. This gives an
increased chance that they use the wrong identity (or handle) in the wrong forum or
use the same IP address to buy a movie as they use to control a malware C2 server.
Finding and following those digital footprints in cyberspace is often the only way to
prosecute computer fraud, extortion, bullying or black-market activity.
It should be remembered that technology is blind to intentions, and those
techniques often created for legitimate and good reasons can be co-opted and used
to great effect for illegitimate activity. Bitcoin, BitTorrent, and Tor are three good
examples of this, and there are countless others. Because of the way cyberspace
works and the ease with which digital data can be replicated, it is very difficult if not
impossible to ensure an idea, concept or technology once created can be forgotten
or banned. Encryption is a prime example of this: despite the best intentions of law
enforcement in requesting lawful access, there are plenty of freely and easily
available alternative solutions on the Internet with no such access that criminals and
citizens alike can use, which are unbreakable. Criminals and attackers are just as
paranoid and protective of their private information as corporations and individuals,
and so use similar technologies and solutions to ensure their privacy against lawful
access.
Cyberspace is made up of machine-to-machine communication. We have
designed machines to do exactly what we tell them to do, we just forgot to be
explicit about who to listen to. This is why fraud and impersonation (spoofing) is
such an important part of any cyberattack. Cybersecurity is more like
counter-espionage than traditional military defence. An attacker attempts to
fraudulently gain access to a system, and once they have successfully compromised
it, they begin to subvert any abilities to detect and remove them. This is because,
while it is easy to tell a machine to do something, it is very difficult for a machine to
know who did the telling. Once an attacker is inside a system it is difficult to tell the
extent of the compromise or what parts of the system can be trusted; sometimes it is
very difficult to even tell that you are compromised. Therefore, even as we rely
more and more on technology and computers in our lives, we should also have a

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healthy dose of suspicion and scepticism of their integrity. We may be telling a

machine the truth, but there is no guarantee the machine is doing the same.
One final example that best demonstrates the reliance of people on technology
and the ways in which criminals can fraudulently exploit this, was the cyberattack
on the SWIFT banking system in 2015 and 2016. The Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a banking cyber network setup
to provide a secure and standard method for issuing payment orders. Banks can
issue SWIFT commands to withdraw or transfer money amongst themselves;
however, it is incumbent on the bank to ensure the commands are legitimate and
authentic. As there are over 15 million SWIFT messages per day people and
financial institutions have become used to trusting and being reliant on the integrity
of the system.
Over two years a number of cyberattacks were carried out against banks in
Bangladesh, Vietnam and Ecuador to obtain legitimate SWIFT credentials and gain
access to their systems. The stolen credentials were used to issue the necessary
SWIFT commands to steal funds, then the attackers ensured they removed any
records of those transactions. In the case of one Bangladeshi bank this even
included falsifying the records sent to a printer that was setup to provide hard copies
of all transactions. Close to $100 million was fraudulently transferred to accounts
the attackers controlled, and none of the banks identified the SWIFT computer
messages as fraudulent while the attacks were underway. Indications are that the
institutions did not know their credentials were compromised nor that the fraudulent
SWIFT messages were deemed suspicious by either entity. Cyberspace has made
activities such as banking more efficient and lower cost, but as a result bank
robberies can be much larger and with a lot less personal risk to the robbers.
The following is a summary of the main learning points from this chapter in
relation to Community Policing:
• Cyber attacks are a new and constantly growing threat, and successful
Community Policing needs to be aware of the risks of cyber and how to mitigate
them.
• Just as technology and computers have made business and daily life more
efficient, it has also made criminal activity more efficient. Attacks can target
many more people all around the world in cyberspace than they ever could in
the real-world. Community Policing needs to adopt to work in this new
environment.
• Most large sophisticated cybercrime is performed internationally with attacker,
victims and supporting elements located in different nations across multiple
jurisdictions.
• Cyberspace and cyberattacks are not just related to desktops, laptop and
smartphones. They also include the embedded computers in cars, power sta-
tions, medical devices, train signalling, equipment, financial markets and
communities. Hence, Community Policing needs to become ready to protect
these communities.

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230 A. Tarter

• Those who perform cyberattacks need not be sophisticated enough to create

them. It is almost much easier to launch an attack than to understand how it
works.
• Employing encryption is straightforward. The most challenging aspect is
ensuring the secure management of the keys. The weakness in most deploy-
ments is how the keys are managed during day to day operations.
• It is very difficult to identify clear cut evidence of attribution in a cyberattack or
a cyber incident as cyberspace provides many means of ensuring anonymity. As
Community Policing moves online, anonymity is one of the main challenges it
has to address.

References

Autor DH (2015) Why are there still so many jobs? The history and future of workplace
automation. J Econ Perspect 29(3):3–30
Blaze M (2016) Hearing on “deciphering the debate over encryption”. US House of
representatives, committee on energy and commerce subcommittee on oversight and
investigations. US House of Representatives, Washington, DC
Chandler A (2016) How Ransomware became a billion-dollar nightmare for businesses. The
Atlantic
Distler D (2007) Malware Analysis: An Introduction. SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room
Goodman M (2015) Future crimes: everything is connected, everyone is vulnerable and what we
can do about it. Doubleday
Martin A (2007) Exploitation kits revealed—MPack. SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room
Menn J (2010) Fatal system error: the hunt for the new crime lords who are bringing down the
internet. Public Affairs Books
Rosenbaum R (1971) Secrets of the little blue box. Esquire
Schneier B (2012) Liars and outliers: enabling the trust that society needs to thrive. Wiley,
Indianapolis
Weitzner D (2016) Hearing on “deciphering the debate over encryption”. US House of
representatives, committee on energy and commerce subcommittee on oversight and
investigations. US House of Representatives, Washington, DC
Zetter K (2015) Countdown to zero day: Stuxnet and the launch of the world’s first digital weapon.
Broadway Books

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Chapter 16
Applying Computational Intelligence
to Community Policing and Forensic
Investigations

Azliza Mohd Ali and Plamen Angelov

16.1 Introduction

Forensics is a science or body of knowledge using technical methods to answer

questions related to criminal, civil and administrative law (Tistarelli et al. 2014). It
has been used since the nineteenth century. Forensics is a post-event activity (Bera
et al. 2014), i.e., the process begins after the crime took place. Forensic processes
include forensic investigation, forensic evaluation, forensic intelligence, automated
surveillance and forensic identity management (Tistarelli et al. 2014). Most evi-
dence nowadays is in digital form. Therefore, digital forensics is introduced where
it can help forensic investigators get reliable results. According to Pratama et al.
(2014), digital forensic science is a method to preserve, collect, validate, identify,
analyse, interpret, document and present the digital evidence derived from digital
sources. The evidence has to reliable to be presented in the court. There are clear
differences between forensic and Community Policing operations. However, despite
these differences, numerous methods and technologies developed for forensics
could be applicable to Community Policing (CP). With the development of artificial
intelligence, it is anticipated that these advances could also benefit CP operations.
Therefore, it is essential to understand the basics of artificial (or computational)
intelligence, get a feeling of emerging new trends and their possible application to
CP operations.
Nowadays, digital forensic data (or information which are used by CP officers) are
often heterogeneous in nature, consisting of different types of data such as text,
number, image, signal or video. Forensic or CP data can be structured or unstructured

A.M. Ali (&)
P. Angelov

Lancaster University, School of Computing and Communiation, Lancaster, UK
e-mail: a.mohdali@lancaster.ac.uk
P. Angelov
e-mail: p.angelov@lancaster.ac.uk

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 231

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_16

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232 A.M. Ali and P. Angelov

(Guarino 2013). Structured data is easy to organize and process, while unstructured
data does not have a common structure (e.g., social media data, images and streaming
data). Unstructured data is computationally hard to combine and analyse. The
challenges in the big data era are how to process and integrate such heterogeneous
data (Jagadish et al. 2014). Social media data such as from Facebook or Twitter has
become an issue because the data have different modalities, is noisy and often too
short (e.g., data from text messaging and WhatsApp). Since the 2000s, there are
many applications that have been developed to support the introduction of iPhone
and Android. Thus, more digital data are being created every day. This revolution
increases the number of data and creates a big data issue (Qi et al. 2014).
Face recognition is a common system used in forensic investigations and could
bring significant benefits to CP operations. There have been many research studies
on face recognition over the past 20 years. Face recognition is mostly applied to
surveillance, identification and verification of identity (e.g., passports). To verify
the identity, two face images are compared and measured, leading either a match or
a non-match (Eidinger et al. 2014). The identification process compares a given
image with the entire image base where the top match will result in the identity of
the subject (Eidinger et al. 2014). Gender and age can be detected by face, but most
research is about soft biometrics. Soft biometric includes physical traits, which are
derived from the face (e.g., skin colour, hair colour, eye colour, beard, etc.), body
(e.g., height, weight) or accessories on the body (e.g., glasses or the colour of
clothes) (Dantcheva et al. 2011). Soft biometrics can distinguish individuals and
help significantly in the identification and investigation in forensic processes
(Dantcheva et al. 2011).
Gait recognition is another technique that recognizes how people walk. The gait
is one of the behavioural biometrics, which can be used from a distance and could
provide significant support to Community Policing operations. Types of gait
include (Bhowmik et al. 2016):
• Normal gait: normal walking style
• Propulsive gait: stooped and rigid posture, e.g., because of drugs, Parkinson,
etc.
• Spastic gait: foot dragging and stiff posture, e.g., because of stroke, brain
tumour
• Steppage gait: one foot hanging and scraping the ground
• Flexed hip and knee: legs are flexed at the hip and knees resulting in crouching
Gait can be used in surveillance and identification systems, which can help law
enforcement officers in forensic and/or CP investigation. Every biometrics (face,
fingerprint, iris, etc.) have limitations, which gait can help to overcome by com-
plementing the result from other biometrics. Sometimes the face cannot be iden-
tified, because of a cover over the face. Then gait can be critically important in
helping to recognize the suspect (Bouchrika et al. 2011).

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16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community Policing … 233

Computational intelligence can be applied to simplify the process of investiga-

tion and analysis of the criminal cases and in forensics, in that it can substitute or
augment the human intelligence (Pratama et al. 2014). There are many techniques
which involve computational intelligence such as knowledge representation, auto-
mated reasoning, inference, pattern recognition techniques and machine learning
that can be applied to digital forensic investigation and analysis (Ali et al. 2016).
Computational intelligence has a great potential in finding patterns and solving
issues in cyber security and digital forensics (Mitchell 2014). Let’s take for example
a situation, when a crime happened. Forensic or CP investigators have to collect all
possible evidence such as demographic information of the suspects, travels, phone
calls and financial information. Normally, they have to find anomalies in all the
types of data. Information can be overloaded, if suspects have two or three bank
accounts that need to be investigated, travel a lot and make a lot of phone calls. The
job for investigators becomes time consuming and tedious, if this has to be done
manually. Therefore, if there is a system, which can find anomalies automatically in
every type of data and later combine all suspected instances, the job becomes easier
and more efficient. Finally, such a computationally intelligent system can create
patterns, clusters, rules or diagrams, which can support the analysis and make the
investigators’ job easier in making decision and help solving the case. There is thus
a need or opportunity to automate heterogeneous data processing aiming at (semi)-
automatic identification or at least significantly reducing the time to identify sus-
pects or suspected activities.
Anomaly detection is one of the most important methods to process and find
abnormal data (Angelov 2014), as this method can distinguish between normal and
abnormal behaviour. Anomalies can be detected locally (i.e., in part of the data) or
globally (in all data). Anomaly detection has been applied in many areas such as the
medical sector (Mone et al. 2015), fraud detection in finance (Kim and Kogan
2014), fault detection in machines (Costa et al. 2014), intrusion detection in net-
works (Zuech et al. 2015), surveillance systems for security (Nater and Leuven
2012) as well as forensic investigations (Ali et al. 2016; Kim et al. 2013). In this
chapter, we propose a new method to detect abnormal behaviour in different
datasets and to combine anomalies and evidence from images automatically. We
demonstrate this method using an example of fuzzy rule for heterogeneous data
fusion.

16.2 Proposed Method

Data can be in the form of text, numbers, images, videos or signals. In reality, data
are heterogeneous, which means they often have several forms at the same time; for
instance, data can include text, numbers and images. Heterogeneous data can

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234 A.M. Ali and P. Angelov

produce rich and better information. However, the data processing for every data
type is different and becomes tedious and harder when the quantity of data is large.
Feature extraction is the pre-processing phase before processing the data.
Transformation techniques can be used as one way to do the feature extraction [e.g.,
PCA (Angelov 2013)]. Clustering can be used in pre-processing the data to produce
clusters (groups) or to identify patterns in the data. Data, which is not in the group
or cluster, can be considered as outliers or anomalies. In statistic data,
outliers/anomalies can cause errors and sometimes are removed to get better
clustering result (Canty et al. 2006). However, in forensics, outliers/anomalies
provide valuable information, i.e., point to suspicious facts.
Traditional methods to detect anomalies are by assuming a deviation of 3r from
a smooth and static Gaussian distribution. A threshold value is being set based on a
normal distribution of random variables. Based on traditional Chebyshev inequal-
ity, data is calculated using the average, then the threshold value is set. There are
many drawbacks to this approach such as: datasets must be large, it requires strict
prior assumptions, it relaxes conditions too much to avoid false positives to the
level where it misses many true positives (the 3r rule sometimes cannot detect
obvious outliers) and one data sample is compared with the average instead of
comparing pairs of data samples, therefore, the information is blurred and no longer
pointwise and local (Angelov 2014).
Empirical Data Analytics (EDA) is a new theoretical framework to analyse data
and detect anomalies without prior assumption (Angelov 2013, 2015). EDA tou-
ches the very foundations of data analytics for statistic and streaming data. It serves
as an alternative to the classical probability theory and analytics (Angelov 2013,
2015). Applications of EDA include but are not limited to data analysis, clustering,
classification, prediction and anomaly detection. Advantages of EDA are (Angelov
2013, 2015):
• It is entirely driven by the empirically observed data and based on their mutual
distributions
• Free from prior assumption and predefined parameters
• No need to assume any model of data generation
• No need to assume the observed data to be independent or identically distributed
• No requirement for an unlimited number of observations (it can work with only
two data samples)
• Free from some well-known paradoxes of traditional probability theory
• Quantities can be calculated recursively for many types of distance metrics.
In regards to anomalies detection, EDA proved to be more sensitive and flexible
than the traditional approach (Angelov 2013, 2015). In addition, it is very important
to analyse local anomalies rather than global one (Angelov 2014). Three EDA
quantities employed in this chapter include cumulative proximity, standardised
eccentricity and data density (Angelov et al. 2016).

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16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community Policing … 235

Let us consider the data point denoted as x. Cumulative proximity is a square of

the summed distance between all data points. It can be defined as (Angelov 2013,
2015):

X
N
pðxÞ ¼ d 2 ðx; xj Þ ð1Þ
j¼1

Standardised eccentricity is a measure of the ensemble property related to the tail

of a distribution. It is sensitive to abnormal data and thus plays an important role in
anomaly detection. It can be defined as (Angelov 2015; Angelov et al. 2016):

2NpðxÞ
eðxÞ ¼ PN ð2Þ
j¼1 pðx j Þ

Data density is a measure of the ensemble property related to the centre of a

distribution. Density can be defined as (Angelov et al. 2016):

1
DðxÞ ¼ ð3Þ
eðxÞ

Figure 16.1 shows the idea of the proposed autonomous analysis of the
heterogeneous data aiming to detect anomalous behaviour. The process begins with
acquiring the data. This method will accept many types of data such as signals
(GPS), financial (e.g., credit card or account transactions), text (e.g., email, instant
messaging) and image (e.g., video surveillance). Pre-processing will be applied to
extract the important features then the selected features will be processed to detect
anomalies. The anomaly detection phase will be conducted in an unsupervised
manner based on empirical data analytics (EDA). Images will be processed using
image processing techniques to identify the identity of a suspect aiming to verify
the information from the anomaly detection. Later, all the information from the
anomaly detection and image identification will be integrated using data fusion
techniques. Data can be integrated using a fuzzy rule based system, thus producing
contextually linked event sequences and story lines. It can be processed and
analysed efficiently, because the amount of data become smaller and better
organised and is represented in the form of human-intelligible information (e.g.,
rules, graphs, patterns, clusters, etc.). This approach can formalize expert knowl-
edge and construct sequences of events. Based on the small amount of highly
intelligible information, human experts are still required to verify the analysis and
make the final decision. The significance of the proposed method is to reduce the
processing time and facilitate and assist the human expert in making the right
decision on time.

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236 A.M. Ali and P. Angelov

Fig. 16.1 Proposed method

16.3 Case Study

To demonstrate the method, we apply a case study based on the well-known IEEE
Visual Analytics Science and Technology (VAST) Challenge 2014. The VAST
Challenge is based on fictitious (virtual) data, but is quite realistic and includes
many problems that need to be solved. The data are heterogeneous ranging from

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16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community Policing … 237

unstructured text (email) to geospatial data (GPS), financial data (credit and loyalty
card data) to video (streaming data). The (fictional) employees represented in the
dataset have company cars in which geospatial tracking software installed without
the employees’ knowledge. The dataset was available for two weeks from 6 January
2014 to 19 January 2014.

16.3.1 Feature Extraction

Financial data (credit card and loyalty card data) have the same attributes. This
includes timestamp, location, money spent, first name and last name. For our
purposes only the money spent is being processed in the next phase, as this attribute
is the most important feature in this dataset. Transactions recorded on the credit
card usually go hand in hand with the transaction recorded in the loyalty card,
because people will use the credit card together with the loyalty card especially
when they spent more.
After processing the data, additional features can be extracted from the datasets.
For example, the total spending for every person, total spends for every location,
total spending for every person every day and total spending for every location
every day. There are 45 staff members in the VAST datasets, therefore every
spending from every staff member has to be summed up. Then new features can be
extracted from the total spending for every staff member. Hence, we can easily find
which staff member spends more or less. From the location information, we can find
at which place people spend more and less. Further, we can extract total spends per
day in two weeks as well as total spending in every location per day. This will make
it easier to determine, which day and location are different from others, which
person has suspicious spending behaviour, where the suspicious spending took
place and when the suspicious spending happens.
There are four attributes in the GPS data, namely timestamp, ID, longitude and
latitude. Of these the most important features are longitude and latitude. From these
coordinates, trajectory information can be extracted such as the projection of the
trajectory, average speed, distance and ratio of trajectory angle.

16.3.2 Results and Analysis

We applied Empirical Data Analytics (EDA) on the selected features in all datasets.
Figure 16.2 shows the identified anomalies in the credit card transactions. There is
one anomaly identified in this figure. This anomaly is the staff member no. 31 who
spends $10,000 (ten thousand US Dollars). The value of eccentricity is extremely
high with more than 1378 (>37 r). Compared to other staff members and over
14 days, only staff member no. 31 spent this much, which is abnormal (see Fig. 16.3).
Figure 16.4 shows two further anomalies after we removed the first anomaly. These

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238 A.M. Ali and P. Angelov

Fig. 16.2 Anomaly on credit card data

14000

12000

anomaly
10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45

Fig. 16.3 Total spending per person using credit card data

are staff members, no. 43 and no. 40. Staff member no. 43 spent $600 (six hundred US
Dollars), which is more than 96% away from the mean (referring to Chebyshev
inequality). When we process the data in loyalty cards, staff member no. 43 appears
again as abnormal with the same amount (600) (see Fig. 16.5). Staff member no. 43 is
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and staff member no. 40 is the Chief Operating

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16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community Policing … 239

Fig. 16.4 Anomaly on the credit card after removing first anomaly

Fig. 16.5 Anomaly on loyalty card data

Officer (COO) of the company. Therefore, they can spend large amounts, as their
salary is normally higher than that of other staff members.
Figure 16.6 shows the amount of spending using loyalty card: There is no anomaly
detected during two weeks’ time across staff members. When we compare credit card

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240 A.M. Ali and P. Angelov

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43

Fig. 16.6 Total spending per person using loyalty card data

20000
Credit Card
18000
Loyalty Card
16000
14000
Total Spend

12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
LocaƟons

Fig. 16.7 Comparison between the usage of credit card and loyalty card from different locations

and loyalty card data, we find suspicious behaviour for staff member no. 31. The
higher spending of this staff member only appears in the credit card data but not in the
loyalty card data. Usually, when people use the credit card they will swipe it together
with their loyalty card to get points. The more you spent, the more points you will get.
The question for this transaction is why staff member no. 31 did not use his/her loyalty
card. Therefore, we can make an assumption that maybe (s)he forgot to bring his/her
loyalty card when spending 10,000 on the credit card.
Subsequently, we analysed the location where people spent their money.
Figure 16.7 shows the comparison between credit card and loyalty card spending.

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16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community Policing … 241

Most of the transactions for credit cards and loyalty cards indicate the same amount.
Nevertheless, location no. 11, Frydos Autosupply, shows a large difference between
credit card and loyalty card. Figure 16.8 shows the analysis of payments by credit
card at Frydos Autosupply, which shows one anomaly at day 8. No suspicious
behaviour can be identified in the loyalty card spending at Frydos Autosupply
within two weeks’ time (see Fig. 16.9). In the next step we analyse in detail the
spending behaviour of staff member no. 31 over two weeks (see Fig. 16.10). It
shows that on day 8 occurred the highest spending, as is quite obvious compared to
the remaining transactions. However, considering loyalty cards, there are two

Fig. 16.8 Total spending

12000
using credit card data per day
in Frydos Autosupply 10000
anomaly
8000

6000

4000

2000

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Fig. 16.9 Total spending

using loyalty card data per 1200
day in Frydos Autosupply 1000

800

600

400

200

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Fig. 16.10 Total spending 12000

for staff member no. 31 in anomaly
14 days using credit card data 10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

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242 A.M. Ali and P. Angelov

anomalies and the amounts are not as high (about 240–280; see Fig. 16.11) com-
pared to the credit card (where one anomaly was detected with an amount of more
than 10,000) (Fig. 16.10).
The biggest dataset in this case study is the geospatial data. This data produces a
large amount of useful information about the movement for staff members who have
a company car. Given the data about coordinates, we can extract information about
travel time, travel distance and ratio of the trajectory angle. All trajectory information
is combined and normalized to make the data comparable. Figure 16.12 shows only
two anomalies, which concerns staff member no. 18 with abnormal behaviour on 9
January and 17 January 2014. His/her travel pattern is abnormal compared to others,

300

250
anomalies
200

150

100

50

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Fig. 16.11 Total spending for staff member no. 31 in 14 days using loyalty card data

Fig. 16.12 Travel time, distance and trajectory angle

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16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community Policing … 243

indicated by a blue line as the normal travel pattern and a purple line as the abnormal
travel pattern in Fig. 16.12. When analysing the travel pattern for staff member no.
18 over time, it becomes apparent, however, that his/her travel pattern is consistent,
i.e., not normal for other people but normal for this staff member. Therefore, we
cannot consider staff member no. 18 as suspect.
Relating the information from credit card data to the trajectory data, we find that
staff member no. 31 spent 10,000 on 13 January 2014 at 19.20 o’clock.
Figure 16.13 shows the trajectory of staff member no. 31 (pink line) and staff
member no. 41 (blue line) on 13 January 2014. The credit card was charged at
Frydos Autosupply, but staff member no. 31 did not go to this location on this day,
while at the same time we can see staff no. 41 was at that location where the card is
charged (see Fig. 16.14). Our method thus detected something suspicious for staff
member no. 41. Staff member no. 31 is not using the credit card until 16 January
2014 after the card was being charged for 10,000 on 13 January 2014. We can make
an assumption that from 13 January to 15 January 2014, maybe his/her card was not

Fig. 16.13 Comparison between normal (blue line) and abnormal (purple line) trajectory patterns

Fig. 16.14 Trajectory of staff member no. 31 and staff member no. 41 on 13 January 2014

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244 A.M. Ali and P. Angelov

with the staff member. After 16 January 2014, the person starts using his/her credit
card again. We can assume that maybe staff member no. 31 left his/her credit card,
which was then (mis)used by staff member no. 41.
For this case study, we assumed that in addition to the data from the VAST
Challenge 2014 we also have data from CCTV cameras. In this case, information
regarding staff member no. 31 and staff member no. 41 can be confirmed or
rejected. Streaming data from CCTV cameras can be processed using image pro-
cessing techniques, which allows classifying the images with regards to face and
gait recognition. The suspect can be recognised, for example, by gender and age,
i.e., the system can classify between male and female and also whether the suspect
is young, middle age or old using fuzzy logic techniques. Figure 16.15 shows an
example of an image with people pay at the cash register. The system can detect the
gender of the people in the image. Using gait recognition, the system can classify
the way a suspect walks.
Once all anomalies have been detected, they have to be combined using data
fusion techniques. One way of combining the data is by using fuzzy rule based
systems. For example, if staff member ID is denoted as i:
Rimage 1 IF (gait_imagei is big_step) and (face_imagei is male)
THEN (genderi is male)
Rimage 2 IF (face_agei is middle)
THEN (agei is middle)
Rcombine IF (credit_card_spendingi is excessive) OR (loyalty_cardi is used)
AND (GPS_locationi is close to suspect location)
AND (genderi is male) AND (agei is middle)
THEN (staff_memberi is suspect)
As the above listing illustrates, the fuzzy rules are designed based on selected
features from the available datasets. There are three rules described above, which
are Rimage1, Rimage2 and Rcombine. The first rule, Rimage1 is a rule generated from face
recognition. Several studies have shown that face and gait recognition can deter-
mine gender (Eidinger et al. 2014). The second rule, Rimage2, determines the age
from the faces’ images. Age is a fuzzy value, which classifies into ‘young’, ‘middle

Fig. 16.15 Face recognition

—Detect gender and age.
image source Google Image
Female
Age : 20+

Male
Age : 30

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16 Applying Computational Intelligence to Community Policing … 245

aged’ or ‘old’. The final rule, Rcombine, is a combination of Rimage1 and Rimage2
together with the other datasets, which involves the process of checking credit card
spending, loyalty cards, GPS location and images. The credit card spending is a
fuzzy value, which can be classified into ‘excessive’, ‘moderate’ or ‘low’, while the
value of loyalty cards is a binary number, which represents ‘used’ or ‘not used’. The
next process is to generate a fuzzy value based on GPS location using the coor-
dinates of spending location and suspect location. The distance value is represented
by ‘far’ or ‘near’. Below is an example to illustrate the application of fuzzy rules:
If a staff member ID = i uses his/her credit card excessively but does not use
his/her loyalty card, the spending location is far from the suspect location; gender is
male; age is middle aged, therefore, staff memberi is not a suspect.
This final output can be analysed and verified by human experts. Verification or
validation of the result and analysis by experts is needed before reaching a decision
or judgement. The analysis and the results can be achieved (semi)automatically.
Therefore, the proposed technique can assist the expert in decision making or in
simplifying their task.

16.4 Conclusion

This chapter describes a new method for the autonomously detecting of anomalous
behaviour based on heterogeneous data and explains how this could be used by CP
in their daily operations. The method applied EDA to detect anomalies in various
heterogeneous data sets and was demonstrated using the VAST Challenge 2014
data. This data set includes credit card, loyalty card and GPS data. After analysing
data on trajectory and location the suspicious person was automatically discovered.
To confirm the suspect, face recognition can be applied to support information from
the EDA. Then, all the information can be integrated using fusion techniques to
produce the final outcome. The fuzzy rule based system can assist the forensic
investigator in making decision. In the future, the proposed method may also be
applied to more data sets with more complex problems. Images and text can be used
and with image processing techniques and natural language processing to contribute
to solving problems. This could become a very valuable tool for CP in the future.

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Chapter 17
Evaluating the Design and Implementation
of CP-Support Technologies:
A Participatory Framework

P. Saskia Bayerl and Gabriele Jacobs

17.1 Introduction

Modern-day European communities are increasingly diverse and multi-cultural and

the policing challenges grow along with these social complexities. In order to
facilitate innovative forms of Community Policing (CP), traditional communication
approaches are usually complemented by ICT solutions. This started with police
websites for information or online reporting and today relies heavily on social
media accounts such as Facebook for awareness campaigns, Twitter or Instagram
for recruitment drives or YouTube for entertainment.1 New communication tech-
nologies run by police forces have thus become an integral part in municipalities all
over Europe enabling online visibility as well as communication and information
exchange between police and their communities (see also Chaps. 6, 11 and 13).
CP practices and expectations differ considerably across countries: Some com-
munities appreciate personal, one-on-one contact with neighbourhood officers,
others a more ‘authoritarian stance’ with a larger distance between police and public
and more formal contacts; in some countries Community Policing is seen primarily
as a tool for crime-fighting, while in others it is a long-term endeavour for trust
building (cp. Chap. 4 and case studies in Part 2 of the book). Differences in the

1
E.g., accounts such as ggpd_recruitment by the Garden Grove Police, USA on Instagram or
videos such as the #runningmanchallenge by Wales Police: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
qELq8w6deuU or the Dutch National Police: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vd4PUZGCgC4,
accessed Sep 26, 2016.

P.S. Bayerl (&)
G. Jacobs

CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
e-mail: bayerl@rsm.nl

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 247

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_17

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248 P.S. Bayerl and G. Jacobs

understanding and impetus in Community Policing across countries and commu-

nities have an effect on the type of ICTs police officers and communities accept, the
way they use it and the type of outcomes they expect from them. This chapter
discusses how such considerations should and can be taken into account into the
design of technologies and their use by police forces. It further offers a framework
for implementers on how to evaluate, whether specific ICTs fulfil their expected
role within their specific social, cultural, national and/or local context.

17.2 Information Technology Design for Community

Policing in Complex Social Settings

One of the biggest challenges in ICT design and implementation is not the ‘hard’
side of technology developments, but the ‘soft’ side of social factors. Technology
implementation attempts often fail because of human and organizational—rather
than technological—issues, which were overlooked or underestimated in the
development of ICT solutions (Griffith 1998). Technology is always
‘technology-in-practice’ and therefore co-shaped by the social context2 in which it
is used (Orlikowski, 2000). That is, identical technologies do not lead to the same
processes and outcomes in different contexts. Such ‘soft’ factors multiply in their
complexity in cross-national settings. Bayerl et al. (2013), for instance, showed how
social contexts can influence the adoption and usage of technological instruments
within the policing context such as automatic number plate recognition and social
media depending on the legal and political European contexts in which they are
applied; and also how such contexts shape implementation strategies for tech-
nologies (Denef et al. 2011).
It is important to note that the relationship between the social context and
technology is not unidirectional but interdependent. Technology shapes our inter-
actions, as can be easily witnessed in the influence of mobile phones and social
media on our communication patterns. An analysis of the social context for the
design of an ICT tool therefore also needs to consider that technology can be a
vehicle to introduce new values in social systems. Technology “can be planted like
explosives under our interactions and lead to transformations, which had barely
been deemed possible before” (Magala 2009, p. 4).
This transformative power of technology is often one of the main reasons why it
is introduced in organizations and communities. The basic assumption behind many
ICT-implementations in CP is that the introduction of a technological tool can
transform CP for the better. Clearly, a full prediction of the social consequences of a
technological change is impossible. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the social

2
Social context, also known as social environment, refers to the immediate physical setting in
which people live. It includes the political, economic, cultural, technological, ecological and legal
conditions of a community.

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17 Evaluating the Design and Implementation of CP-Support … 249

context can help to understand the parameters of the environment in which the
technology will be used.
In this chapter we present a participatory framework that can help to make the
development and implementation of ICTs for police–community interactions more
effective. We base our evaluation framework on five main methodological char-
acteristics: consecutive piloting, longitudinal perspective, multi-stakeholder view,
multi-level approach and finally the triangulation of findings from various outcome
levels. We argue for a short-, mid- and long-term evaluation approach with con-
secutive pilots to account for the interdependent nature of the technology and its
social context. Next to this we give concrete examples for evaluation criteria of the
functionality, acceptance and impact evaluation of a tool. Finally we summarize our
chapter with recommendations for ICT evaluations in general.

17.3 ICT Design, Implementation and Usage as Socially

Bound

In developing our framework we start from the premise that social contexts affect
technologies from their design to their usage and that technologies impact their
social contexts from the adaption to the usage and operation (Bayerl et al. 2013;
Denef et al. 2011; Kappos and Rivard 2008). We therefore argue that the design of
information systems needs to consider the social context of both the developers and
users: Users’ goals, values, norms and beliefs determine the required information
types and processes (Choe 2004; Kappos and Rivard 2008) in a similar way as
designers’ goals, values, norms and beliefs affect how ICT solutions are shaped.
The social context of users requires specific design configurations, which need to
be considered for the design and implementation of ICTs (Choe 2004). ICTs that
are intended as collaborative support for CP efforts need to satisfy two basic
requirements. First, they need to be standardized as much as possible in order to
provide a meaningful tool across as many social contexts as possible (e.g., orga-
nizations, disparate social groups marked by variations in age, language, ethnicity
or socio-economic status, different usage situations such as work, family, leisure,
travel, etc.). Furthermore, they also need to be localized or localizable as much as
needed, in order to reflect appropriately the specific needs on the supply and
demand side. Knowing which tool requirements can be standardized and which can
be localized is crucial for tool developments.
The social context of IT tools for CP can be analysed from three different
perspectives (Kappos and Rivard 2008):
• Which elements of CP are shared across contexts and communities (e.g., do
citizens and police officers across countries agree on the main tasks, goals and
stakeholders of CP)?

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250 P.S. Bayerl and G. Jacobs

• Which elements of CP differ across contexts, but carry a shared meaning within
a community (e.g., would police officers within the UK versus Germany versus
France agree on the value of entertainment videos on YouTube as valid part of
Community Policing)?
• Which elements of CP are also seen differently by members within the same
community (e.g., would all police officers in Belgium agree on the necessity of
location tracking for Community Policing)?
In light of these complexities it is clear that the development of ICT solutions for
CP is a challenging and costly task. Policy makers and the general public have a
valid interest in a solid monitoring of the development and implementation of ICT
solutions in CP. Next to financial concerns that tax payers’ money is adequately
invested, there are also far-reaching ethical and societal implications of interven-
tions in CP (see also Hail and O’Neill 2016; O’Neill et al. 2015). ICT-facilitated
communication comes with specific risks and responsibilities around privacy and
data security. Connecting community members who are not (or negatively) inter-
acting with each other in the offline world can also create tensions in terms of
polarisation or hate-posts or other unintended side-effects online. Thorough eval-
uations of ICT interventions are needed in order to monitor the implementation and
to predict (as far as possible), or at least quickly spot, the implications of the
potential “explosives” (Magala 2009) planted under community social interactions.
The main challenge of ICT development for CP is the multi-contextuality of the
adaptation requirements. Multi-contextuality refers to “the co-existence of different
use contexts” (Henfridsson and Lindgren 2005, p. 96). Multiple contexts in CP can
occur in several forms: between police and communities, across communities,
among police and supporting organizations. For example, sub-communities can
differ in their experiences with the police, which might result in differing trust levels
or communication needs; e.g., young men of an ethnic minority might be more
likely to become subject of police searches than elderly women of the ethnic
majority. As a consequence, young men of this ethnic minority might become less
trusting and less open towards the police than the elderly women of the ethnic
majority in their environment—with consequences for their willingness to engage
with police generally and with police CP tools more specifically. Equally, different
professional groups may have specific expectations towards and experiences with
the police. Medical experts in emergency rooms might have other communication
needs with police than street workers, imams or teachers. The successful devel-
opment, implementation and achievement of intended outcomes depend on the
appropriate interpretation of such multiple social contexts. Hence, to understand the
success of ICT innovations in CP and possible points for improvements evaluations
should go hand in hand with the IT development.
Development and evaluation can accommodate for the influence of the social
context in two ways:

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17 Evaluating the Design and Implementation of CP-Support … 251

1. In the design phase

• First, a systematic analysis of the expectations, needs and requirements of all
(relevant) stakeholders should be conducted to provide developers with
information on the relevant social contexts and their specific requirements.
• Second, the tools should be developed by a diverse team, ensuring that all
(relevant) disparate perspectives are incorporated.
2. In the implementation/usage phase
• Evaluations should incorporate experiences and perspectives from all (rele-
vant) stakeholders that are involved in or affected by the CP efforts or
processes for which the new technology has been implemented.
This means, social context information needs to be integrated already in the tool
design and development phase in order to make the technology and the social
contexts more consistent with each other and facilitate the development of a tool
that can lead to the intended outcomes in CP (Kappos and Rivard 2008). Thus, the
development of technologies supporting CP is a step-wise procedure from concept
over functioning prototype and full implementation, and evaluations are an integral
part of this process at every step.
We hence advocate a participatory evaluation design. The premise of this
approach is to include (potential) users of the technology as early as possible and
optimally already throughout the design and development phase, following up with
evaluations after full deployment in the field.
Conducting evaluations in this setting is not a trivial task as evaluations need to
take into account that the technology develops over time, but also that the testing
spans multiple contexts such as different regions or countries and user groups.
Social diversity is an inherent element of CP-supporting technologies, which also
has to be reflected in the evaluations. In the following, we describe a high-level
framework that can guide readers in the planning and implementation of ICT
evaluations specifically in complex settings such as CP.

17.4 Participatory Evaluation Framework for the Design

and Usage of CP-Support Tools

Our framework is grounded in the prevalent literature and theories on change

evaluations, information system design, implementation and adoption as well as
CP. Its main premise is a strongly empirical focus emphasizing multi-group per-
spectives ranging from police, external stakeholders to developer feedback. All
evaluation efforts have to take into account the specific needs, expectations and
constraints of the chosen groups and the unique features of the local context (e.g.,
language, cultural norms, past histories in the contact with police or between
specific segments of the community, special skills or vulnerabilities, etc.). This

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means that an exact blueprint in which each evaluation is implemented in exactly

the same way is not possible. However, an overarching framework can provide
useful guidance to prepare evaluations across pilot implementations with the nec-
essary adoptions and modifications. This starts with the analysis of Community
Policing concepts and best/effective practices as necessary basis for decisions about
the purposes of an ICT platform, the relevant communities and the areas and
specific outcomes. Such decisions further need to be closely linked to ethical
considerations. In the following, we outline the methodological basis on which the
design of the framework is grounded. Then we describe the three areas—func-
tionality, acceptance, impact—which should (ideally) be addressed during an
evaluation process.

17.4.1 Methodological Basis of the Evaluation Framework

The suggested framework for evaluations is based on the following methodological

characteristics:
• Consecutive piloting approach
• Consideration of changes over time
• Multi-stakeholder view
• Multi-level approach
• Triangulation of findings from various outcomes levels

17.4.1.1 Consecutive Piloting Approach

Tool developments usually follow multiple iterations to allow for adjustments and
refinements in the form of pilots across several pilot sites/regions. Evaluations
should be a standard part of each of these pilots creating a consecutive record of
measures that allows to assess tool usage and tool features according to chosen
evaluation measures (for possible measures see Sect. 17.5).3

17.4.1.2 Consideration of Changes Over Time

The evaluation needs to combine single-point and longitudinal evaluations to

enable a view on how aspects vary with increasing maturity of the tool (e.g.,
changes in tool adoption rates or satisfaction). It further needs to take into account

3
By referring to a ‘link’ between changes in tool features and evaluation outcomes we do not imply
a deterministic or causal connection, as disparities in implementation processes, user character-
istics, national features, situational influences, etc. across pilot sites will impact results.

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that some effects may take time to materialize after the re-design or final imple-
mentation intervention (e.g., changes in trust between police and communities may
occur slower than changes in the rate of incident or crime reporting).

17.4.1.3 Multi-stakeholder View

A CP platform is per definition intended for multiple communities and groups.

These are (minimally) the police force(s) in the pilot regions, relevant citizen groups
(such as youth, elderly, people at risk) and potentially also partner organizations
that share in the responsibilities and tasks of CP (such as youth services, schools,
medical services or housing). The identification of the relevant stakeholders and
community groups is thus a vital part of the preparation for any evaluation. To
enable a comprehensive understanding of a platform’s usability and effects and to
understand how it may facilitate interactions between user groups, it is vital to
involve these multiple stakeholder groups simultaneously in the evaluation.

17.4.1.4 Multi-level Approach

Effects are likely to occur at different levels: starting with the individual (e.g.,
differences of acceptance in single users due to differences in terms of age, gender
or personal experiences with police) up to the group and organizational level (e.g.,
variations in adoption intensity due to disparate minority cultures or organizational
or national policies). Further, cross-level and inter-group effects may be expected.
We therefore advocate to explicitly include multiple levels in the evaluation. Below
is a list of the most important measurement levels that may be considered:
• Individual effects: effects that take place in individual citizens, police officers,
etc.
• Subgroup effects: effects located in smaller sub-parts of a team or community
(e.g., isolated elderly as a subgroup of elderly in a community)
• Group/organization-level effects: effects that affect a whole group/community
and/or organization (e.g., changes in reporting practices towards police in a
hospital or youth centre)
• Cross-level effects: effects in which characteristics on one level influence out-
comes on another level (e.g., when subgroup cultures or norms affect individ-
uals’ decisions to adopt the tool)
• Inter-group/inter-organizational effects: effects that are located in the interaction
between user collectives (e.g., changes in information sharing practices between
homeless shelters and police)

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17.4.1.5 Triangulation of Findings from Various Outcome Levels

Effects and impacts express themselves in various ways—from affects to changes in

knowledge and skills to concrete behaviours. These various modalities (emotions,
cognitions, actions, etc.) are not necessarily aligned (e.g., users personally in favour
of a technology may still not use it, if peers or superiors reject it or if the envi-
ronment does not provide the right infrastructure). We therefore advocate to always
assess multiple modalities and to triangulate them, i.e., compare results from dis-
parate measurements. In adapting a common evaluation framework used in training
evaluations (Freeth et al. 2002), we suggest to include the following aspects in
outcome measures:
• Reactions to the technology individuals’ subjective views and experiences with
the new technology (e.g., perceived usefulness of the tool for CP, satisfaction
with its functions, general acceptance of or resistance against its adoption)
• Modification of attitudes and emotions with respect to CP: for instance, changes
in the perceived value of Community Policing in general, trust in police and
their work or fear of victimization
• Acquisition of knowledge and skills relevant for successful Community Policing:
e.g., improved knowledge of relevant partners and their processes, better
cross-cultural competencies or better ICT skills
• Behavioural changes: concrete, observable reactions such as frequency of use,
increases or decreases in contacts between police and communities, amount and
type of information shared
• Changes in organizational practices with respect to Community Policing: e.g.,
changes in reporting or information sharing practices, modifications to officer
trainings, etc.
• Benefits to relevant groups/organizations such as higher effectiveness or speed
of service, higher citizen participation, improved relationships, etc.
The above considerations translate into minimally two core aspects for our
evaluation framework, namely a longitudinal setup of the evaluation and the
consecutive logic of pilots.

17.4.2 Timeline of the Evaluation

Technology implementation and adoption is a process that unfolds over time. For a
full understanding of the effects of CP-support tools, it is therefore vital to capture
the temporal and changing nature of the implementation, adoption and usage
processes (cf. Boudreau and Robey 2005). This implies a longitudinal approach in
which repeated measurements are conducted within the same group(s) of people.
To determine whether the technology implementation did lead to changes, we
advocate for a baseline measurement to capture attitudes, behaviours, performance,
etc. before the implementation. Subsequent measures after the new tools have been

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deployed will then be compared to this baseline to determine whether changes have
indeed taken place. This setup also allows to test for causal effects. Another benefit
of this longitudinal approach is that it takes into account that implementation and
adoption processes generally do not progress along a neat timeline of events.
Affective, cognitive and behavioural changes may occur at different times or change
at different rates; for instance, in that perceptions of social aspects adapt faster or
slower than perceptions of technology (Burke et al. 2002). A longitudinal per-
spective allows capturing such time-shifted reactions (McGrath and Tschan 2004).
The literature on longitudinal research does not provide clear guidelines on the
optimal length of the time lags between measurement points (e.g., Ployhart and
Vandenberg 2010; Ployhart and Ward 2011). Here, knowledge about the mecha-
nisms underlying the targeted outcomes should guide the selection of intervals
between measurement points. Intervals can be longer when a steady, linear effect is
expected, but intervals should be shorter if a higher dynamic of effects is expected
or impactful/hurtful effects may occur, which should be spotted quickly.
A possible spacing of measurement points for moderately dynamic outcomes is
three or four months to cover short-term and mid-term effects. This means that the
baseline measurement would be conducted three (or four) months before imple-
mentation, and subsequent evaluation rounds would follow in periods of three (or
four) months. Longer time intervals may come with higher attrition rates, since
people might move away or lose interest in the project; shorter intervals may lead to
unwillingness and ‘survey fatigue’. A final evaluation may be added after a longer
period when new processes have stabilized and become routine. This type of
longitudinal setup is presented in Fig. 17.1.

17.4.3 The Piloting Approach

Often ICT innovations for CP only reach communities once the technology is
deemed mature and stable enough. While on first view this may preclude immature
technologies to reach end-users, it also forestalls the chance to involve (potential)
end-users in the design phase and adjust to local needs and expectations, i.e., misses
the chance of tailoring the technology for usage across the multiple groups and
contexts that are such an integral part of CP efforts. To leverage the potential of user
feedback across the design and development process, we suggest to establish

Fig. 17.1 General setup for a CP-ICT evaluation (the indicated duration between steps are only
for illustration)

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Fig. 17.2 Consecutive piloting approach

consecutive piloting implementation in parallel to rapid development cycles as used

in industrial product development.
The results of the pilot evaluations form the basis for the (further) development
and refinement of the CP technology. A first pilot may function as a
proof-of-concept, while additional pilots test the increased maturity of functions and
overall design. User involvement in the design process from concept to functioning
prototype should thus remain integral part of the process and evaluations form
important milestones for the improvement of the platform and/or its components.
The design process consequently goes through several iterations, which ensures that
the technology increases in maturity over time while retaining a focus on
multi-contextually as integral part. Figure 17.2 illustrates this consecutive approach
in a schematic way.

17.4.3.1 Benefits of a Consecutive Piloting Approach

This consecutive approach has the considerable advantage that it allows testing the
technology directly in the field starting from the conceptual stage into a functional
prototype. This guarantees that the tool is designed with direct application in mind.
Further, because of the multi-stakeholder approach (simultaneously considering
various user groups such as police, community groups and supporting organiza-
tions) as well as the multi-context deployment (CP tools are ideally designed
around various communities to allow for data-connection), transferability across
contexts is part of the design and development process. This multi-contextual
design philosophy flows from the vision of a flexible and scalable Community
Policing model (cp. Chaps. 3 and 5).

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17.4.3.2 Considerations and Potential Challenges

While a very potent approach for the end-user driven development of CP tech-
nologies, the consecutive piloting approach also introduces challenges for a sys-
tematic evaluation of impacts and consequences.
Because of the continuous adjustments and modifications to the technology
across different pilots, the data that can be collected, the reactions of users as well as
the type and extent of effects on behaviours, practices and processes will necessarily
change with each pilot. For this reason, statements about aspects such as accep-
tance, adoption, impacts and unintended consequences will largely be limited to the
settings in which the data was collected. Further, establishing cross-contextual
generalizability of a technological tool for the complex social phenomenon
‘Community Policing’ is a challenging and potentially time- and cost-intensive
enterprise.
We propose the consecutive piloting approach to maximize cross-contextual
generalizability. Each pilot taking place in a different context creates the prereq-
uisites to test for the localization versus generalizability of technologies. Yet as
stated above, this approach also restricts the direct comparability of assessments
across pilots. This does not render assessments moot, but we are aware of the
challenges for the generalization of findings across (regional and/or national)
implementation contexts (e.g., issues of cross-cultural data collection for the
policing context, Jacobs and Bayerl 2015).
In a full-blown evaluation approach with baseline, short-, mid-term and long-term
measurements users would have a technology they can access and use on a regular
basis. In our suggested methodological setup we grasp step by step context-specific
constraints and directly feed this information into the next development stage of the
platform. In this scenario, the first pilot is primarily intended as proof of concept, i.e.,
no actual technology can be deployed to users. The second pilot is intended as
demonstration of a first prototype, and so on until the platform reaches sufficient
maturity for full-scale deployment. In consequence, we suggest to start with the full
evaluation cycle of short-, mid- and long-term assessments only, once the technology
is ready to be used in a realistic (field) context, may it be with limitations. The
objectives and approaches for the initial pilots would then look as follows:
• Evaluation in pilot 1: proof of concept through scenario-based workshop(s), no
short-and mid-term evaluation
• Evaluation in pilot 2: test of first prototype with focus on functionality testing
through scenario-based workshop(s), no short-/mid-term evaluation
• From pilot 3 on: deployment of the technology to the relevant communities and
end-users using the full evaluation process of baseline as well as short-,
mid-term and long-term evaluations.
Each pilot should take place in a different social and cultural context and
therefore inform the next pilot about possible culture- specific requirements of the
tool. This methodology broadens the cultural lens of the platform development.

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This approach is scalable, in that it can be applied within local communities of a

city or region, but also reach beyond national boundaries. That is, pilots could be
employed in a European context where developers and users come from disparate
countries and/or pilot implementations could be conducted sequentially in different
countries. The consecutive setup with pilots moving across countries introduces
considerably variation in terms of national (political, economic, legal, social and
technological) contexts as well as potential disparities in terms of norms, experi-
ences, knowledge, etc.
A complexity in handling such cross-national endeavours is that national and
contextual differences challenge the comparability of concepts, processes and
results across pilot sites. The task here is to establish “equivalent meaning of
concepts and data in different social and cultural contexts” (Craig and Douglas
2005); firstly, when it comes to the purpose of CP tools, but equally with respect to
the relevant outcomes of the tool and CP more generally.

17.5 Choosing Evaluation Criteria: Functionality,

Acceptance and Impact

The following sections list possible evaluation criteria and where applicable pos-
sible operationalizations and methods. Three areas of the assessment are addressed:
• Functionality and usability testing
• Technology acceptance and adoption
• Impact evaluation
We focus especially on impact evaluation, since this part is the most crucial one
from a societal perspective. Here we also suggest some operationalizations to
illustrate our evaluation roadmap. In addition, we also shortly discuss unintended
consequences and how to assess their effects.

17.5.1 Functionality and Usability Testing

Functionality and usability testing assesses whether a new technology meets the
requirements that guided its design and development, whether it responds correctly
to inputs, performs its functions within an acceptable timeframe, functions con-
sistently and reliably, recovers quickly from user errors and can be installed and run
in its intended environments. Functionality testing is generally conducted without
end-user involvement, while usability testing evaluates a product by testing it with
end-users. In this process software is tested to ensure that it conforms to all
requirements as laid out by the intended end-user(s).
Once the platform has been developed to an appropriate stage, a large number of
functional testing techniques exist, from which the most appropriate one(s) need to
be chosen based on the context of the testing. These techniques include smoke

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testing (an initial test to check whether the system is sufficiently ready/stable for
further testing) and white box testing (to tests the internal structures or workings
using test cases). Suggested methods for functionality testing include the creation of
test plans together with standard, erroneous and destructive testing to ensure that the
system is robust enough.
After the successful completion of this phase, applications and tools need to be
tested against users’ needs to demonstrate their benefits and usefulness for their
intended purpose. This process verifies that a solution works for the intended
end-user(s) and that they accept the solution. This step is related to questions of
technology acceptance and adoption, discussed in more detail in the next section.
Possible methods for usability testing are heuristics evaluations and A/B testing. The
multi-contextual nature of the design and development process further offers the
possibility for testing standardization versus localization of interfaces to ensure that
the tool can be adapted easily to various organizational, local or situational contexts.
In addition, the integration of the tool into existing systems has to be assured
through integration testing, which may be especially relevant on the police side.

17.5.2 Tool Acceptance and Adoption

Investigations into acceptance and adoption aim to understand:

• Whether and to what extent users are willing to adopt the newly developed tool(s)
• The factors that may influence the willingness or actual usage of the tool(s) by
individuals, groups and/or organizations
Acceptance and adoption thus touch on a wide range of potential aspects how
users perceive a new technology. To understand why a certain technology succeeds
or fails, it is important to consider possible prerequisites to acceptance and adop-
tion. Existing literature has studied a wide range of possible factors (cp. Jeyaraj
et al. 2006; Venkatesh and Davis 2000), which fall largely into four areas:
• Technology characteristics: features of the technology that is implemented (e.g.,
type of functionalities, ease of use)
• Characteristics of the individual: features of the (potential) end-user such as age,
gender, technological experience, computer anxiety, etc.
• Characteristics of the organization: features of the organization in which the
technology is implemented (e.g., size, infrastructure, management structure,
management support)
• Characteristics of the environment: features that describe the local, group,
national, etc. context of (potential) users or user groups (e.g., group cultures,
social pressures, communication norms, historical events, etc.)
Where ever possible, all four areas should be addressed.

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17.5.3 Impact Evaluation

This part of the evaluation aims to understand the impact of the tool or technology,
that is:
• Whether it achieves the intended results and
• Whether it leads to unintended consequences (positive and/or negative) for its
users.
Areas for impact assessment can be determined in different ways:
• Theoretically based on reviews of existing literature on technology acceptance,
adoption and continuance
• Empirically based on expert interviews with internal and external stakeholder of
the community
• Pragmatically based on impacts that have political and/or legal priority in the
community
In the following we will discuss possible areas and concrete indicators to assess
the impact of CP technologies focusing on operational outcomes, relationships,
acceptance of Community Policing, liveability and police-internal processes and
attitudes. This selection is not intended as representative, as depending on the case
additional or other areas may be more useful to assess impacts, but can provide
guidance into the type and range of feasible an available measures.4

17.5.3.1 Operational Outcome Criteria in Police Performance

Operational outcome criteria describe changes in police performance in terms of

potential key performance indicators. An overview of relevant concepts, their
possible operationalizations and methods for their measurement are provided in
Table 17.1. It should be noted that the list in Table 17.1 is only a selection in order
to illustrate our arguments. Evaluations may thus include different and/or additional
evaluation criteria. Further, although operational outcome criteria aim to ‘objectify’
police performance, it is well known that this is a problematic task (see for instance,
Tilley 1995 on the feasibility of crime prevention indicators).

17.5.3.2 Impact on Relationships Between Police, Community Groups

and Other Stakeholders

Citizen participation, and with this establishing and maintaining relationships

between police, community groups and other stakeholders, is an important element
of CP (Myhill 2012; also Chap. 4). Hence, assessing impact on various aspects of

4
For a more extensive overview of indicators, see Bayerl et al. 2015.

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Table 17.1 Possible indicators to assess operational outcomes

Concept Possible operationalization Possible measurement
Crime reduction Number of crimes on a local or national level Objective information in police
data
Increase in Number of solved crimes on a local or Objective information in police
solved crimes national level data
Faster solution Time taken for the solution of cases Objective information in police
of cases data; self-reports through surveys
or interviews
Citizens’ Degree of citizens’ satisfaction with police Self-reports through surveys or
satisfaction with work interviews
police work
Perception of Subjective impression of police work in Self-reports through surveys or
police terms of, e.g., effectiveness, quality interviews
performance
Reduction in Number of wrong convictions Self-reports through surveys or
wrong interviews; objective information
convictions in police data
Availability Extent to which police officers are available Self-reports through surveys or
for the public, e.g., in terms of ease of interviews; objective information
making contact or time spent for requests in police data
Visibility Extent to which police officers are present in Self-reports through surveys or
the public interviews; objective information
in police data
Crime reporting Number of crimes reported from the relevant Objective information in police
communities, people reporting crimes, data
quality of the information reported

relationships between police and these groups will often be an integral element of
pilot evaluations. Relevant criteria and their possible operationalizations are sum-
marized in Table 17.2.

17.5.3.3 Impact on the Acceptance of Community Policing

The success of Community Policing efforts is closely related to the willingness of

citizens to accept Community Policing as a concept and to engage with police
officers in their area. We therefore include acceptance of Community Policing as
part of an impact evaluation with respect to two aspects: general acceptance as well
as the willingness of the public to directly engage in Community Policing.
Table 17.3 provides possible operationalizations for both aspects.

17.5.3.4 Impact on Liveability

Liveability describes the extent to which citizens consider their environment as a

space that affords sufficient quality of life across various areas (e.g., work, family,

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Table 17.2 Possible indicators to assess the quality of relationship between citizens, police and
other stakeholders
Concept Possible operationalization Possible methods
Trust/Confidence Degree of trust/confidence in police as Self-reports through surveys or
organization interviews
Legitimacy Degree of perceived legitimacy of police Self-reports through surveys or
as organization interviews
Fairness Degree of perceived fairness in treatment Self-reports through surveys or
of community group members interviews
Respect by and Degree of reported respect towards Self-reports through surveys or
for police members of community groups; interviews; objective information in
number of respectful and/or disrespectful police data
acts towards police officers
Perceived Degree of perceived expertise of police Self-reports through surveys or
expertise in general and with respect to the relevant interviews
communities
Perceived Degree of perceived expertise of police. Self-reports through surveys or
professionalism In general in treatment of the relevant interviews
communities
Image of the Positive perception of police Self-reports through surveys or
police organization, degree of positive media interviews; objective data from media
coverage, positive feedback/comments analysis
by the public on social media
Closer Extent of collaborative activities between Self-reports through surveys or
cooperation police, citizens and other groups or interviews; objective information in
organizations, e.g. in terms of providing police and external data
information and assistance; reporting
(potential) crimes and disorder;
becoming a police volunteer [where
applicable depending on country context]
Willingness to Number of volunteers from the various Objective information in police data
work for the communities [where applicable
police depending on country context]; number
of applicants for police jobs [where
applicable depending on country context]
Complaints Number of official complaints against Objective information in police
about police police officers and/or governmental data [depending
work on country context]
Awareness of Degree to which individual or groups Self-reports through surveys or
security as perceive the creation of security as a interviews
common good common tasks

leisure, etc.). Liveability is thus linked to the well-being of individuals, families and
communities and in a more abstract sense also to those of organizations and society
as a whole. Community Policing can support liveability, for instance, by increasing
citizens’ feeling of safety or by improving social cohesion by fostering contacts
between diverse groups. Table 17.4 lists possible ways to assess liveability in
communities.

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Table 17.3 Possible indicators to assess acceptance of Community Policing

Concept Possible operationalization Possible methods
Acceptance of Degree to which activities for CP are accepted Self-reports through
Community and supported by citizens/external stakeholders, surveys or
Policing e.g., with respect to visibility/presence of interviews
officers in public space; emergency assistance
and aid; information gathering for crime
prevention (in person, through IT); reaction to
help requests; engaging with CP officers on the
street
Willingness to Willingness in the relevant community to share Self-reports through
help police information with police, voice concerns about surveys or
safety, report (potential) crimes and disorder, interviews
etc.

Table 17.4 Possible indicators to assess liveability

Concept Possible operationalization Possible methods
Feeling of Extent to which citizens perceive themselves, Self-reports through surveys
safety their group or their environment to be safe or interviews; media analysis
Effects on Responsibility for and ownership of Self-reports through surveys
society problems, crime and disorder or interviews
Improvements Better image of a group, city, area, etc. Self-reports through surveys
in image internally, by other citizens or by police or interviews; media analysis
Social Community cohesion and trust within the Self-reports through surveys
cohesion community or interviews; media analysis

17.5.3.5 Impact on Police-Internal Processes and Attitudes

As last area, we added effects within the police and for individual police officers in
terms of internal work processes and officers’ attitudes. While the previous sections
considered primarily effects in the environment of the police, this area thus
addresses changes in police processes and the police organization itself. Table 17.5
lists potential indicators to assess such changes.

17.5.4 The Challenge of Unintended Consequences

Technologies are implemented with a ‘general intent’ or purpose in mind regarding

the “values and goals underlying a given set of structural [technology] features”
(DeSanctis and Poole 1994, p. 126). Users, however, often deviate from this general
intent—ignoring features designers or their organization deem important,

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Table 17.5 Possible indicators to assess changes in police internal attitudes and processes
Concept Possible operationalization Possible measurement
Improved Amount of Objective information in police;
intelligence information/intelligence; quality self-reports through surveys or
gathering of information interviews
Efficiency Less resources needed in terms of Objective information in police;
personnel, time, budget, etc. self-reports through surveys or
interviews
Knowledge about Degree of knowledge about Self-reports through surveys or
communities relevant communities in terms of interviews
e.g., amount, validity, quality
Knowledge of Better problem solving; improved Self-reports through surveys or
problem causes assessment of CP effectiveness interviews
CP as integral part Degree to which Community Objective information such as
of the police Policing is integrated in structures and practices;
organizational structures, self-reports through surveys or
practices, trainings, etc. interviews
Localized approach Degree of localization of Objective information such as
Community Policing structures structures and practices;
and practices self-reports through surveys or
interviews
Less rights Frequency of official violations Objective information in police
violations, fewer and complaints, severity of data; self-reports through surveys
victims of police violations and complaints or interviews
violence

modifying them along own preferences or using them in unexpected ways. Next to
this, technology can also trigger social reactions that were not foreseen. Social
media provides-many such examples. Facebook was originally developed as a tool
to interconnect Harvard students. Within a few years it has grown into a tool that
facilitates riots and revolutions, helps people in international crisis situations as well
as supports criminal activities like scams, cyberbullying or the planning of rob-
beries. Few technologies do not have at least some unintended consequences either
in their usage or in social practices (McAulay 2007; Peters 2006).
Next to the intended effects, which we illustrated in our operationalization
examples above, evaluations therefore should aim to capture also such unintended
side-effects, or as we coined them in our introduction, “explosives under our
interactions”. These include particularly impacts of ethical and societal issues such
as pressures on privacy and trust, resistance from users or changes in online rela-
tionships and behaviours. For instance, more involvement with police can also lead
to a decrease in citizens’ safety perceptions (Scheider et al. 2003; Zhao et al. 2002),
which counteracts one of the main intensions of Community Policing. Further,
users may start (over)reporting issues that are of little value to police (e.g., minor
nuisances in their community or problems that are the responsibility of other
organizations), while more critical issues may become under-reported
(spiral-of-silence; Hampton et al. 2014).

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We suggest two ways of capturing unintended side-effects: Firstly, analysing

behavioural traces from tool use; secondly, conducting interviews and focus groups
on a regular basis with selected users in the community, support organizations and
in police forces. The first approach obtains concrete usage data to pinpoint unex-
pected patterns and uses, the second approach can identify users’ motivations,
concerns and interpretations of the tool, their rationales for (not) using it and how
the tools changed attitudes, knowledge and behaviours of themselves or their
group. Optimally interviews would therefore target individuals, which continue
using the tools (high or low usage) and individuals who discontinued the use.

17.6 Summary and Recommendations

The successful development, implementation and usage of technologies to support

CP depends on their fit with the social context in which they are going to be
employed as well as their fit with the specific CP functions they are meant to
support. Increasingly this means that ICTs for CP have to content with very
complex contexts and various, often highly diverse communities of users—all with
their own needs, requirements and expectations, as shaped by their own social
context (be it local communities, police or supporting organizations).
We argue that achieving the intended outcomes of CP tools depends on the
appropriate interpretation of the social context and on taking it into consideration
from the very first inception of ICTs through to their continued deployment in the
field. In this chapter we proposed an evaluation framework, which accommodates
for the influence of the social context in ICT evaluations in two ways. Firstly, a
systematic analysis of expectations and requirements across all (potential) user and
stakeholder groups is needed to provide the developers with information on the
various social contexts the tool will encounter. This social context information is
integrated in the tool development. Secondly, the tool needs to be developed by a
diverse group ensuring that various perspectives from all relevant end-user groups
are incorporated. The implications of the social context for the tool development
also need to be assessed in diverse settings. These reflection moments are included
in order to make ICTs for CP and the social contexts more consistent with each
other and to facilitate the development of technologies that can lead to the intended
outcomes in CP (Kappos and Rivard 2008).
In summary, our framework can be summarized in the following
recommendations:
• At the beginning of an evaluation a systematic analysis of the goals of the
technological innovation is needed. These goals need to be clearly defined for
the various internal and external stakeholders of the processes that will be
influenced by the new technology. A clear definition of goals allows for the
precise definition of performance criteria and indicators, which form the basis
for functionality, acceptance and impact measurements.

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266 P.S. Bayerl and G. Jacobs

• Evaluations need to acknowledge the inherent social complexity of ICT

implementations. This includes a thorough analysis of the social context in
which the implementation takes place as well as the consideration of possible
external developments that might influence the perception of the technology in
the course of its implementation and subsequent use.
• Multi-disciplinary expertise is needed to conduct evaluations. This covers ICT
experts, but also experts in change, social communication and Community
Policing in order to analyse the complex dynamic between ICT and the social
environment. Lastly, citizens need to be taken seriously as experts in their own
right and obtain a fixed part in the design and implementation of technological
innovations for CP efforts.
• A focus on the outcomes of an evaluation needs to be complemented by a
process evaluation, which in short-term and mid-term evaluations can capture
step-by-step the impact the technology has in the community and the unintended
(positive/negative) side-effects it may trigger.
• Last but not least evaluations need to capture the plurality of the social com-
munities that will use the technology. This implies that multiple stakeholders
need to be involved right from the start in the evaluation of any ICT develop-
ment and implementation.
Evaluations of ICTs in communities are a complex, costly and demanding
endeavour. Nevertheless we hope that they will become an integral part of ICT
implementations in police, since they provide essential design and development
information and can help to monitor the social effects new technologies have on
communities as well as the organizations involved in CP efforts. Evaluations can
significantly enhance the likelihood of successful ICT design and implementations.
This, in the end, makes evaluations actually cost-saving instruments and helps
communities to develop the tools they need and want.

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Chapter 18
Concluding Remarks

Babak Akhgar, P. Saskia Bayerl, Garik Markarian and Ruža Karlović

In 1829 Sir Robert Peel formulated his nine basic principles of policing. Amongst
them can be found the following instruction: “To maintain at all times a rela-
tionship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are
the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the
public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on
every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.”1
As the preceding chapters of this volume demonstrate, this principle as well as
others in the ‘General Instructions’ to officers are as alive and valid today as they
were nearly two hundred years ago—although, as our authors show, they regularly
undergo and may in fact require reinterpretation and adaptation to the specifics of
the historical, national and cultural contexts in which Community Policing is
enacted.
1
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-
consent.

B. Akhgar (&)
CENTRIC, Sheffield Hallam University, Cantor Building, Sheffield, UK
e-mail: B.Akhgar@shu.ac.uk
P.S. Bayerl
CESAM/Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands
e-mail: bayerl@rsm.nl
G. Markarian
School of Computing and Communication, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
e-mail: garik@rinicom.com
G. Markarian
Rinicom Ltd, Lancaster, UK
R. Karlović
Croatian Police Academy, Zagreb, Croatia
e-mail: rkarlovic@fkz.hr

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 269

P.S. Bayerl et al. (eds.), Community Policing - A European Perspective,
Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53396-4_18

bayerl@rsm.nl
270 B. Akhgar et al.

The chapters in this book have each been written towards the objective of
establishing the underlying principles and social, organizational as well as tech-
nological requirements for the realisation of Community Policing (CP) from con-
cept to deployment. We have established Community Policing as a vital element of
social cohesion, whereby CP components (e.g., citizens, Law Enforcement
Agencies, NGOs or civic associations) can form a social system with the security
and safety of citizen as its main objective. A wide range of case studies further
illustrated the practical realization of Community Policing across Europe, identi-
fying current practices, potential challenges and possible advantages CP could
deliver to European citizens. They further showcased the role of Community
Policing in today’s broader landscape of challenges such as radicalization, riot
policing and technological innovations.
As became clear throughout this book, Community Policing is a continuously
developing concept that—together with the accompanying CP practices—under-
goes significant changes over time, while the speed of its emergence and the
direction of its development vary from country to country. The main challenge that
emerged from all contributions is the clear message that Community Policing needs
to take into account regional, cultural, social, religious, etc. differences across
countries (and often even across contexts within the same country), while at the
same time it also needs to be harmonised across Europe to ensure that good
practises can be expanded to benefit all European citizens and that cross-border
cooperation can provide additional advantages to the way Community Policing is
delivered.
Our introduction to this volume not only highlighted the fact that developing
successful CP procedures depends on the overall socio-political context in each
country, but also emphasised the importance of Community Policing as an
instrument for bring communities and the police closer together to enable
co-creation of safety and the development of social cohesion (see also Chap. 2). In
addition, Chaps. 3 and 4” have highlighted the imperative role of ‘accountability’,
‘partnership’ and ‘trust’ to police by communities and their impact on the legiti-
matisation of police engagement and actions within communities. In various
chapters of this volume, our authors have further identified and elaborated on the
critical role of information and communication technologies (e.g., Chaps. 6, 12 and
15) and particularly of social media as a key facilitator and enabler of Community
Policing (cp. Chaps. 11 and 13), while Chap. 5 provided a systemic perspective of
Community Policing as a social system with four key components (elements,
environment, structure and mechanisms).
Synthesising the disparate case studies in Chaps. 6–13 and the evaluation criteria
identified in Chap. 17 we can identify critical success factors (CSFs) for the real-
isation of Community Policing (regardless of its implementation method), which
can be summarized into six fundamental principles:

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18 Concluding Remarks 271

1. Trust building
2. Timely information exchange
3. Accountability
4. Prevention of crime
5. Community cohesion
6. Engagement and partnership.
We therefore argue that the adaptation of any CP model, strategy, technology or
CP process for implementation within (general or specific) communities should
consider the above six CSFs as underlying principles for measuring the success of
Community Policing.
Many of the insights and discussions within the chapters of this volume derive
from national, European and international research initiatives. Particularly the book
benefited from numerous collaborative projects, sponsored by the European Union
within the FP7 and Horizon 2020 Research Frameworks. These projects (UNITY,
INSPEC2T, NEXES and TENSOR, to name just a few) are interdisciplinary
research projects involving numerous academic institutions, industrial companies
and Law Enforcement Agencies aiming to strengthen connections between the
police and communities in order to maximise the safety, security, freedom, justice
and quality of life of all European citizens. The projects take into account the
diverse nature of European society and propose new and innovative ways of
delivering Community Policing in Europe.
Yet, although the discussions and examples were framed within a European
context, the conceptual considerations as well as the practical insights, experiences
and lessons of this book are—in our estimate—just as valuable for practitioners and
(police) scholars outside Europe; especially with respect to the more general dis-
cussions around the concept and foundations of Community Policing and its
deployment and success within local contexts. With this our book provides the
conceptual foundations as well as practical guidance for how Peel’s requests for “a
relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police
are the public and that the public are the police” can be given shape in today’s
interconnected, multi-faceted and ever-changing world.

bayerl@rsm.nl