EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 257401, March 28, 2023 ]

LINCONN UY ONG, PETITIONER, VS. THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS (BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE); HON.
SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE; HON. SENATOR VICENTE C. SOTTO III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES; MGEN RENE C. SAMONTE AFP (RET.), IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 257916

MICHAEL YANG HONG MING, PETITIONER, VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, RESPONDENT.

INTING, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court which ultimately plead for a clearer definition and delineation of the scope and extent of the
Senate's power of inquiry in aid of legislation.

G.R. No. 257401: The Ong Petition

Linconn Uy Ong (Ong), a member of the Board of Directors and the Supply Chain Manager of Pharmally
Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Pharmally) filed the first Petition1 for Certiorari and Prohibition with Very
Urgent Prayers for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

In the main, Ong assails the Order2 dated September 10, 2021 (Contempt Order), which respondent
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, or Committee) issued against him.3 In particular, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee cited
him in contempt and ordered his arrest for testifying falsely and evasively during the September 10,
2021 hearing conducted relative to the Commission on Audit (COA) Consolidated Annual Audit Report
for Fiscal Year 2020 4 (COA Report) relating to the expenditures of the Department of Health (DOH) on
the "fight against COVID."

Ong also challenges the constitutionality of: (1) Section 18 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, as amended5 (Senate Rules on Inquiries); and (2) Section 6, Article 6 of the
Rules of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee6 (collectively, assailed rules) insofar as they punish for
contempt his alleged act of "testifying falsely or evasively" is concerned.

G.R. No. 257916: The Yang Petition

Meanwhile, Michael Yang Hong Ming (Yang), a Chinese citizen with permanent residency in the
Philippines, a former Presidential Economic Adviser, and member of the Philippine Full Win Group of
Companies, Inc., filed the second Petition7 for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking the nullification of the Arrest Orders8 dated September 7 and 10, 2021. He also seeks for
the nullification of the Lookout Bulletin issued by the Bureau of Immigration in accordance with the
Committee's Letter-Request9 dated September 13, 2021. Further, he prays that the Committee be
ordered to desist from compelling him to disclose information involving his properties and business
interests, as embodied in the Committee's Letter-Request10 dated November 9, 2021.11

The Antecedents

Following the COA Report, the Committee resolved to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation
pertaining in particular to DOH's expenditures in relation to the "fight against COVID." Consequently, it
sent invitations via electronic mail to resource persons, referring to them matters subject of the inquiry
and requesting them to attend the hearings.12

On August 18, 2021, the Committee conducted its first hearing.13 In the course thereof, it found out that
Pharmally, the incorporators of which were identified to have personal links with Yang, was able to
secure a total of P8.868 Billion worth of contracts from the Procurement Service of the Department of
Budget and Management (PS-DBM).14

On August 23, 2021, Senator Risa Hontiveros (Sen. Hontiveros) delivered a privilege speech15 that was
later referred to the Committee. That same day until August 25, 2021, the following were filed:
(1) Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 858,16 by Senate Majority Leader, Juan Miguel F. Zubiri (Sen.
Zubiri); (2) PSR No. 859,17 by Sen. Leila M. De Lima (Sen. De Lima); and (3) PSR No. 880,18 by Sen.
Hontiveros. These PSRs were all referred to the Committee.19 The privilege speech and the subject PSRs
all pertained to expenditures relative to the government's response to COVID-19 and other health
concerns.

On August 26, 2021, the Committee issued Subpoena Ad Testificandum directing the following: Huang
Tzu Yen (Huang), Mohit Dargani (Mohit), and Twinkle Dargani (Twinkle), all of Pharmally; and Yang to
attend the hearing on August 27, 2021 and testify on the matter under inquiry.20 However, Huang,
Mohit, Twinkle, and Yang failed to attend the hearing set on August 27, 2021.21

On August 31, 2021, the Committee sent a Subpoena Ad Testificandum directing Yang to attend the
September 7, 2021 hearing.22 Similar subpoenas were sent on September 4, 2021 to Ong and Krizle
Grace Mago (Mago).23

On September 7, 2021, Ong, Mago, Yang, and other Pharmally officials failed and/or refused to appear at
the hearing. Accordingly, the Committee issued Orders24 citing Ong, Mago, Mohit, Twinkle, and Yang in
contempt for failure to appear in the scheduled hearings. It ordered their arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms (OSAA) until such time that they appear and give their testimony,
or otherwise purge themselves of the contempt.25

Incidents involving Ong

According to Ong, he learned from the media reports on September 7, 2021 that he was among those
cited in contempt and ordered arrested and detained for "refusing to appear, despite notice" at the
Committee hearings of August 27, 2021 and September 7, 2021. He alleged that he did not receive
any subpoena or invitation from the Committee. Still, he voluntarily attended the online
videoconferencing hearing on September 10, 2021.26

In the course of his examination during the hearing, the Committee again cited Ong in contempt and
ordered his arrest and detention for "testifying falsely and evasively." The assailed Contempt
Order27 dated September 10, 2021 was issued by the Committee,28 signed by Sen. Richard J. Gordon
(Sen. Gordon) as Chairperson and approved by Senate President Vicente C. Sotto III (Sen. Pres. Sotto III).

However, Ong was not immediately taken to the Senate premises because he was then suffering from
COVID-19. The Senators allowed him to stay at his residence but ordered the Sergeant-at-Arms to post a
guard outside his abode.29

Several hearings of the Committee were further conducted on September 13, 17, and 21, 2021, with the
attendance and participation of Ong.30

On September 21, 2021, the OSAA arrested Ong, who was attending the online Committee hearings
remotely at his residence, and detained him under its custody at the Senate Complex, Pasay City on
authority of the assailed Contempt Order.31

On September 22, 2021, Ong filed a Respectful Manifestation and Motion for House Arrest. However, the
Committee did not act on the manifestation and motion.32

On September 24, 2021, the Committee continued with its hearings with Ong in attendance through
videoconference. In the course of Ong's examination, Sen. Franklin M. Drilon (Sen. Drilon) moved,
seconded by Sen. Francis Pangilinan (Sen. Pangilinan), to transfer Ong to the Pasay City Jail.33

On October 5, 2021, Ong, through counsel, filed the present petition. Thereafter, respondents filed their
comment.34

On November 12, 2021, Ong filed his Motion to Resolve Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order or Temporary
Restraining Order.35

On November 29, 2021, the Committee transferred Ong, together with Mohit, to the Pasay City Jail.36

Incidents involving Yang

According to Yang, the Committee sent a subpoena on August 27, 2021 to his office, PAILI Holdings
Corporation (PAILI). While it required his attendance at the hearing scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, the
receptionist of PAILI received the subpoena only at 8:00 a.m. of the same day. Allegedly, Yang's secretary
was unable to contact Yang, who was in Subic where the telephone signal was poor, until the next day.
The secretary sent an email to the Committee informing it that Yang could not be contacted on such
short notice.37

Yang also alleged that he was: (1) not informed of and duly served with the subpoena served at PAILI on
September 2, 2021; (2) not notified that he had to appear before the Committee on September 7, 2021;
and (3) also not informed of the subpoena served at his residence at 19 Narra St., Forbes Park, Makati
City on September 3, 2021 because he was in Davao and there was no one in his Makati City residence
duly authorized to receive court processes in his behalf.38

Purportedly, Yang learned of the Committee's order for him to attend the hearing on September 7, 2021
only through friends and online news.1aшphi1 He insisted that it was only on September 6, 2021 that he
was able to hire a lawyer, who emailed the Director General of the Committee stating that "(a)lthough
[Yang] has not received a copy of the subpoena, he has expressed his full and complete cooperation to
provide information that [the] Committee may need from him in aid of legislation."39 A hard copy of the
letter of appearance was immediately sent to the Chairperson of the Committee.40
Nonetheless, the Committee issued a warrant for Yang's arrest in the afternoon of September 7, 2021.41

On September 10, 2021, Yang appeared before the Committee for the first time. In the course of the
hearing, it issued an Order placing Yang under arrest for allegedly giving evasive answers which
amounted to a contempt of the Committee.42

Thereafter, Yang attended the hearings on September 17, 21, and 24, 2021.43 Subsequently, a Look-Out
Bulletin was issued against Yang.44

On November 9, 2021 the Committee, through its Director-General, issued the letter-request asking Yang
to supply documents and information pertaining to his property and business interests.45

The Petitions

G.R. No. 257401: The Ong Petition

As grounds for his petition, Ong alleges:

I. THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE'S ORDER OF CONTEMPT AGAINST [ONG] HAS NO CONSTITUT1ONAL

BASIS;

I.A. THE ASSAILED RULES, WHICH ARE MADE THE BASIS FOR THE CONTEMPT ORDER, ARE VAGUE,
HAVING NO CLEAR STANDARDS AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES "TESTIFYING FALSELY OR EVASIVELY;" [and]

I.B. [ONG's) RIGHTS ... HA[VE] NOT BEEN RESPECTED, IN VIOLATION OF THE INJUNCTION UNDER
SECTION 21, ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION.

II. IN RULING ON THE FALSITY OF [ONG]'S TESTIMONY, FINDING HIM GUILTY THEREOF AND PUNISHING
HIM THEREFOR, RESPONDENTS ILLEGALLY ENCROACHED UPON THE EXCLUSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
DOMAIN OF THE JUDICIARY.

III. THE RESPONDENT COMMITTEE PROCEEDED AGAINST [ONG] UNDER AN ERRONEOUS CONCEPT AND
GRAVELY ABUSIVE EXERCISE OF ITS CONTEMPT POWER.46

Senates Comment

The Senate filed its Comment47 contending that the validity or constitutionality of the Senate Rules on
Inquiries may not be looked into by the court because it constitutes a political question. It likewise
asse1ts that Section 18 of the rules is neither vague nor impermissibly broad, and has complied with the
requirements of Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, it finds no sufficient ground to
justify the grant of status quo ante order, TRO or preliminary injunction.48

G.R. No. 257916: The Yang Petition

Meanwhile, Yang insists that the Committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction:

I.

x x x WHEN IT ISSUED ARREST ORDERS DESPITE LACK OF LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR, AS WELL AS CAUSING
THE ISSUANCE OF A LOOKOUT ORDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY CRIMINAL CHARGES FILED
AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN COURT.
II.

x x x IN THE ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF ITS INTERNAL RULES THAT HAS EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HIM OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

III.

x x x BY ITS HIGH-HANDED AND OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO

BE HEARD. SPECIFICALLY, PETITIONER QUESTIONS THE RESPONDENT SENATE COMMITTEE TREATMENT
OF RESOURCE PERSONS BEFORE IT, SUCH AS PETITIONER, WORSE THAN AN ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING.

IV.

x x x BY COMPELLING HIM TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND TO SUBMIT DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

THAT ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY AND IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS TO
PRIVACY.49

Senate's Comment

The Senate filed its Comment asserting that: (1) the Committee legally cited Yang in contempt, ordered
his arrest and detention, and validly caused the issuance of a lookout order against him; (2) the
Committee respected Yang's constitutional rights as required under the Senate rules; (3) the questions
propounded to Yang and the documents and information required from him during the proceedings are
within the scope of legislative inquiry and in consonance with his right to privacy; and (4) there was a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to Yang which he should have exhausted before filing the
instant suit with the court.50

OSG 's Comment on the Petitions

Invoking the mandate of its office, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deems it necessary to
intervene in the case as the present petitions raise the issue of constitutionality of the Senate Rules, as
well as a transgression of the Bill of Rights.51 The participation of the OSG is anchored on Section 35(3),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, entitling it to be heard in any action
which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation.52

The OSG argues:

I. Direct resort to this Honorable Court is proper because the instant Petitions present a matter of
transcendental importance.53

II. The Petitions fall within this Honorable Court's expanded power of judicial review.54

III. There is grave abuse of discretion when a branch of government has exceeded the exercise of its
powers vested under the Constitution.

A. The Respondents' powers under Secs. 21 and 22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution arise from the
exercise of the different functions of Congress.55

B. The Respondents' inquiries are pursuant to the power to conduct question hour, which is exercised as
an oversight function against the Executive Department.56
C. The Senate (i) Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, including any amendatory
Resolution; and (ii) Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations of the
present 18th Congress must be duly published.57

D. The power of contempt does not include the power to order arrest during the conduct of legislative
investigation.58

IV. The constitutional rights of the resource persons must be respected during Senate Investigations.59

A. The Senate Rules, in so far as they punish as contempt the act of "testifying falsely or evasively," are
unconstitutional for being vague and lacking clear standards.60

B. The hearings conducted by Respondents should always uphold the right to due process of the
resource persons.61

C. The hearings conducted by Respondents should respect the right against self-incrimination of the
resource persons.62

D. The Respondents' power to detain, which is corollary to the power of contempt and compulsory
processes, arises only in the conduct of inquiry in aid of legislation.63

V. Respondents encroached upon the exclusive domain of the Executive and Judiciary when they issued
the assailed Order.64

VI. Here, there is a basis to state that Ong had complied with requisites for the issuance of injunctive
reliefs.65

On June 7, 2022, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the petitions be dismissed
on the ground of mootness, by reason of the voluntary release of Ong pursuant to the Order of Release
issued by Sen. Pres. Sotto III, and the termination of the subject legislative inquiry.

Issues

Finding no procedural infirmities in the petitions, the Court narrows down the inquiry to the following
substantive issues:

(A) In the Ong Petition (G.R. No. 257401):

(1) Whether the assailed rules should be declared unconstitutional; and

(2) Whether the Contempt Order dated September 10, 2021 against Ong should be nullified; and

(B) In the Yang Petition (G.R. No. 257916):

(1) Whether the Arrest Orders dated September 7, 2021 and September 10, 2021 and the Request for
Issuance of Lookout Bulletin were issued without legal bases;

(2) Whether Yang was deprived of his rights to counsel and to be heard; and

(3) Whether Yang was compelled to answer questions and submit documents and information that are
beyond the scope of the legislative inquiry, in violation of his right to privacy.

The Court's Ruling

Both petitions are partly meritorious.

Preliminarily, it bears noting that on June 30, 2022, the 18th Congress of the Philippines conducted its
final session which in effect terminated all proceedings of the House of Representatives and the Senate,
including the Senate Committee's inquiry pertinent to the case. In their Manifestation and Motion,
respondents aver that the petitions had been rendered moot by the voluntary release of Ong pursuant
to the Order of Release issued by Sen. Pres. Sotto III and the termination of the subject legislative
inquiry.

"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be
of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner
would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition."66 "Without any legal
relief that may be granted, courts generally decline to resolve moot cases, lest the ruling result in a mere
advisory opinion."67 In Balag v. Senate of the Philippines,68 the Court explained:

The existence of an actual case or controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the court's exercise
of its power of adjudication. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or
an assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe for judicial
resolution. In the negative, a justiciable controversy must neither be conjectural nor moot and academic.
There must be a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of the parties who have
adverse legal interests. The reason is that the issue ceases to be justiciable when a controversy becomes
moot and academic; otherwise, the court would engage in rendering an advisory opinion on what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.69

However, the moot and academic principle does not automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a
case,70 under the following instances: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation
is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.71 The Court finds that the issues raised in the petitions
fall under the exceptions.

In resolving the issues raised, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the nature and incidents of the
Senate's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and its contempt power.

Power of the Legislature to Conduct Inquiries in Aid of Legislation

Time and again, the Court has affirmed the power of the Legislature to conduct investigation. The
Legislature's power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.72

In Arnault v. Nazareno73 (Arnault), which was decided when the 1935 Constitution was in effect, the
Court recognized an implied legislative power to conduct investigations with the necessary process to
enforce it; this is to the end that it may legislate wisely or effectively by being able to compel the
availability of information which will serve as basis for legislation. The Court discussed:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislations is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information—which is not infrequently true— recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to
Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication
exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.74 (Italics supplied; citations omitted.)

While the power of legislative investigation was only implicit under the 1935 Constitution, the 1973
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution are explicit as to the existence of such power.75

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of the Legislature and its committees to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation has been
upheld in The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Hon. Majaducom,76 Senate of the Philippines v. Exec.
Sec. Ermita77 (Ermita), In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v.
Senator Gordon78 (Sabio), Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks79 (Standard
Chartered Bank), Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations80 (Neri), and Romero II v. Senator Estrada.81 This means that the mechanisms available
to both the Senate and the House of Representatives, in order that they may effectively perform their
legislative functions, are also available to their respective committees.82

Senates concomitant Power of Contempt

Concomitant to the power of the Legislature to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is its power of
contempt impliedly provided under the 1987 Constitution. Unlike the Legislature's power to make
investigations in aid of legislation, there is no provision in the 1987 Constitution expressly granting either
the Senate or the House of Representatives with the authority or process to enforce this power of
inquiry. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the Legislature's power of contempt is inherent and
arises by implication.83 This coercive process is essential to the Legislature's discharge of its functions.
This power permits either House of the Legislature to perform its duties without impediment84 as it
enables the Senate or the House of Representatives to legislate wisely or effectively because they have
the power to compel the availability of information necessary in shaping legislation.85

Indeed, the exercise of the contempt power by the Legislature is anchored on the principle of self-
preservation.86 As that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, it can assert its
authority and punish contumacious acts against it independently of the Judicial Branch.87 Such power of
the Legislature is sui generis as it "attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the
character of the Legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of
government."88

Power to Arrest Concomitant to the Senates Contempt Power

Strictly speaking, the power to arrest a witness is not specified under the Senate Rules of Procedure.
Such Rules only cite the explicit power of the Senate to detain a witness. The Court, however, views that
an arrest is necessary to carry out the coercive process of compelling attendance, testimony, and
production of documents relevant and material in a legislative inquiry.

As observed in Arnault,"[e]xperience has shown that mere requests for [relevant] information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed."89 Indeed, the power of the Legislature to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is intended to be full and complete,90 according it the processes
necessary to carry out its core function of legislation. The Senate, or the Congress as a whole, may
effectively and wisely legislate for as long as it may compel the availability of information which in turn
will be basis of a proposed law emanating from the proceedings in aid of legislation. The Congress is not
precluded from causing the appearance of a resource person who is not before it. As long as the
testimony of a resource person is primordial in the Legislature's inquiry in aid of legislation, then any
House of Congress or its committees may compel, by way of an arrest, his or her appearance in the
inquiry proceedings. Necessarily, compelled testimony connotes truthful declaration by a resource
person subject of the legislative inquiry.

In Arnault, the Court stressed the power of the Senate to conduct investigations along with necessary
processes to enforce it. Being inherent and necessary for it to effectively perform its function of inquiry
in aid of legislation,91 this power to compel attendance, testimony, and production of documents
relevant and necessary in a legislative inquiry need not find textual basis in the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. As the grant of legislative power which includes the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is intended to be complete, i.e., without need to resort to
judicial process in order that the Legislature may be able to perform its function, it follows that the
Legislature likewise has the power to resort to mechanisms to obey its processes. Indeed, depriving the
Senate of this inherent and necessary power to compel a witness to appear, give a truthful testimony
and produce documents before it will amount to a serious handicap to its Constitutional function to
gather information relevant and material to its legislative inquiries.

Limitations on the Powers of Legislative Investigation and Contempt

As provided in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, however, the power of legislative
investigation is subject to three limitations: (1) the inquiry must be "in aid of legislation;" (2) the inquiry
must be conducted in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; and (3) "[t]he rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."92 Also, where there is factual
basis for the contempt, the resource person's detention should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry.93

Here, the Court finds that while satisfying the first two limitations, the Committee failed to accord
petitioners their rights relative to the conduct of its proceedings. The scope and nature of these rights, as
well as the Committee's violation thereof, is thoroughly addressed following the discussion of the first
two limitations.

First Limitation: The subject hearings were conducted in aid of legislation.

As earlier mentioned, PSR Nos. 858, 859, and 880, together with the privilege speech of Sen.
Hontiveros,94 were filed and referred to the Committee which called for the conduct of an inquiry in aid
of legislation.95 Notably, all these Senate Resolutions underscored that they are proposed precisely to
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation as regards the vaccination program and procurement of COVID-19
Vaccines (PSR No. 858), COA findings on unspent and/or misused government funds (PSR No. 859), and
payment claims issues between the Philhealth and private hospitals (PSR No. 880). The Subpoenae Ad
Testificandium96 referred not only to the COA Report but also to PSR Nos. 858, 859 and 880, together
with the privilege speech of Sen. Hontiveros.97

The Court has also held that Senate investigations of government transactions are proper exercises of
the power of inquiry. Being related to the expenditure of public funds of which the Legislature is the
guardian, such transactions involve government agencies created by the Legislature and officers, whose
positions are within the power of Legislature to regulate or even abolish.98

The Court finds proper the Senate's explanation that because the National Expenditure Program (NEP)
for 2022 had not yet been released by the DBM to the Legislature when the subject COA Report came
out in July 2021, it was fitting that the Committee hear and investigate the findings in the COA Report on
the DOH, as early as August 18, 2021. This was necessary to determine if the funds appropriated under
Republic Act Nos. (RA) 1146999 and 11494100 for the COVID-19 pandemic were properly utilized. The
inquiry of the Committee was necessary as the COA Report seemed to point out severe underutilization
of funds, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance by government officials in the use of the DOH
funds. Given this factual milieu, the hearings of the Committee, which began on August 18, 2021, were
in aid of legislation because it investigated the use of funds appropriated in RAs 11469 and 11494, not
only as part of its oversight function, but also to look into the proposed budget of the DOH for Fiscal Year
(FY) 2021 which will eventually be contained in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) that will be
enacted by the Legislature.101

Second Limitation: The assailed rules are compliant with the publication requirement of Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the
duly published rules of procedure of the Senate or the House of Representatives, necessarily implying
the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure.102

As a rule, the Legislature is given a wide latitude to enact its own rules in view of Section 16(3),103Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,104 the Court said:

This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this
power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
x x x Further, pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own
rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the
imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.105 (Italics supplied.)

The rule, however, does not divest the Court of its expanded jurisdiction, i.e., the power to intervene
whenever grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any
branch—the Legislature or any of its Houses in this case, or instrumentality of government.106 The
expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court is encapsulated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Italics supplied.)

In Neri, the Court nullified the Senate Order, which cited Romulo L. Neri in contempt and directed his
arrest and detention, after finding that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing such order. In that case, the Court noted that: (1) then Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee violated the voting requirements under Section 18 of the Senate Rules on Inquiries because
only a minority of the members were present during the deliberation; and (2) the Committee violated
the publication requirement under the 1987 Constitution which requires that the inquiry be in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure.

The Court finds that the circumstances in the instant case are different from those in the Neri case. Here,
Section 18107 of the Senate Rules on Inquiries is compliant with the requirement under Section 21,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: that the rules governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
by the Senate or the House of Representatives be duly published.

In the present case, the Senate Rules on Inquiries was unanimously adopted by the Senate as Resolution
(Reso.) No. 5 on August 9, 2010 at a session where a quorum was present.108 Section 24 of Reso. No. 5,
on Effectivity, states:

SEC 24. Effectivity. - These Rules shall take effect after seven (7) days following complete publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall remain in force until amended or repealed. A copy of
these Rules shall be posted in the official website of the Senate of the Philippines.

The Senate Rules on Inquiries was then published in the August 11, 2010 issues of Malaya and Manila
Bulletin, two (2) newspapers of general circulation.109 It was also posted in the Senate's website:
www.senate.gov.ph. The rules took effect on August 18, 2010 and remained in force until amended.110

Section 18 of the Senate Rules on Inquiries was subsequently amended by Reso. No. 145 which was
unanimously adopted by the Senate on February 6, 2013 at a session where a quorum was
present.111 Reso. No. 145, states that the amendment to the Senate Rules on Inquiries "shall take effect
immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall remain in force until
amended or repealed."112
Reso. No. 145 was published in the February 18, 2013 issues of the Manila Bulletin and Daily Tribune,
two (2) newspapers of general circulation. It was also posted in the Senate's website.113

Simply stated, the adoption and amendment of the Senate Rules on Inquiries complied with the
requirements of quorum, voting, and publication as stated in Reso. Nos. 5 and 145.

It bears emphasis that unlike the scenario in Neri, here, the Senate Rules on Inquiries and its
amendments state that the rules "shall remain in force until amended or repealed."114 Thus, the Senate
Rules on Inquiries remain effective although Reso. No. 5115 and Reso. No. 145, which amended Section
18, were adopted not by the present Senate 18th Congress but by its earlier counterparts.

Following the assailed rules, there was a quorum at the commencement of the hearings and acting
throughout. On September 10, 2021, in particular, when the assailed Contempt Order was issued, those
present at the start and throughout the proceedings were Sen. Pres. Sotto III, Senators Gordon,
Villanueva, Lacson, Marcos, Hontiveros, Revilla, Pangilinan, Zubiri, Villar, Tolentino, Pacquiao, and
Drilon.116 There were therefore more than seven Senators present. Such attendance was more than 1/3
of all the regular members plus its ex officio members as required under Section 4 of the Senate
Rules.117

II

The Committees Grave Abuse of Discretion

Third Limitation: The Committee failed to accord petitioners their Constitutional right to due process
relative to the conduct of its proceedings. The Contempt Order dated September 10, 2021 finding that
Ong and Yang testified falsely and evasively lacks factual basis.

As stated earlier, while the Committee satisfied the first and second constitutional limitations of its
power to conduct the subject inquiry in aid of legislation, it failed to accord petitioners their rights in the
conduct of its proceedings, more in the exercise of its contempt power. These rights refer to no other
than those enshrined under the Bill of Rights, more particularly to the right to due process and the right
against unreasonable seizures under Sections 1 and 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The violation and disregard of petitioners' rights were brought about by the Senate's exercise of its
power of contempt punishing the act of "testifying falsely or evasively," under the assailed rules, the
pertinent provisions of which read:

[Section 18 of Senate Rules on Inquiries]

"SEC. 18. Contempt. -

(a) The Chairman with the concurrence of at least one (1) member of the Committee, may punish or cite
in contempt any witness before the Committee who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to
be sworn or to testify or to answer a proper question by the Committee or any of its members,
or testifying, testifies falsely or evasively, or who unduly refuses to appear or bring before the Committee
certain documents and/or object evidence required by the Committee notwithstanding the issuance of
the appropriate subpoena therefor. x x x.

"A contempt of the Committee shall be deemed a contempt of the Senate. Such witness may be ordered
by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may designate under the custody of the Sergeant-at-
Arms until he/she agrees to produce the required documents, or to be sworn or to testify, or otherwise
purge himself/herself of that contempt.

"[(]b) A report of the detention of any person for contempt shall be submitted by the Sergeant-at-Arms
to the Committee and the Senate."118 (Italics supplied)

[Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee]

SECTION 6. Contempt. - (a) The Committee, by a vote of a majority of all its members, may punish for
contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee, including refusal to produce
documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer a
proper question by the Committee or any of its members, or testifying, testifies falsely or evasively.

A contempt of the Committee shall be deemed a contempt of the Senate. Such witness may be ordered
by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may designate under the custody of the Sergeant-at-
Arms until he agrees to produce the required documents, or to be sworn or to testify, or otherwise purge
himself on that contempt.

(b) A report of the detention of any person for contempt shall be submitted by the Sergeant-at-Arms to
the Committee and the Senate.119 (Italics supplied and in the original; underscoring in the original.)

First, the Committee ascribed evasiveness to Ong in answering its queries relating to the following: the
agreement between him and/or Pharmally, on the one hand, and Yang, on the other; and the payment
made to the suppliers of PPEs and the nature of the agreement with said suppliers. The Committee
referred to the excerpts of the September 10, 2021 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), as follows:

SEN. LACSON. Linconn, naririnig mo lahat iyong sinabi ni Mr. Yang? Maliwanag?

MR. ONG. Yes po. Yes po. Opo, opo.

SEN. LACSON. Ano ang masasabi mo doon sa kanyang pahayag na ang role lang niya in-introduce ka niya
doon sa apat na Chinese suppliers, wala na siyang kinalaman at all? Ikaw na lahat ang nakipagdeal. Ikaw
nakipag-transact x x x.

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman, totoo po iyon na may ipinapakilala si Mr. Michael Yang na mga suppliers at
iyong mga friends na tumulong para dito sa PPE project. Totoo po iyon.

SEN. LACSON. Iyong lang ang role niya, hindi na siya nakialam pagkatapos ka maipakilala sa mga
suppliers?
MR. ONG. I am not privy what's their discussion, pero may ipinapakilala talaga siya. Kung ano iyong
discussion nila, hindi ko alam.

SEN. LACSON. Hindi maliwanag, ano? Okay.

Ang sabi ni Mr. Yang, ang role niya tang ipinakilala sa iyo iyong mga tao sa China na kakilala niya.
Pagkatapos, wala na siyang kinalaman, ikaw na lahat ang nakipag-deal doon sa mga suppliers. Is that
true?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chair, nakikipag-usap talaga kami isa mga supplier na ipinakilala niya. Yes po.

SEN. LACSON. Hindi. Ang tinatanong ko, wala na ba siyang kinalaman? Umalis na siya, kayo na lang ang
nagtuloy-tuloy na nagusap at hindi na nakialam si Mr. Yang?

MR. ONG. Hind ko—well, paano itong hindi—

SEN. LACSON. Iyong diretsong sagot tang, Mr. Linconn.

MR. ONG. Sige po, Mr. Chairman. Ano po ulit iyong tanong ninyo para maintindihan ko nang maayos at
masagot ko nang maayos?

SEN. LACSON. Ganito ang flow. Sabi ni Mr. Yang, ang papel lang niya, ipinakilala ka sa apat na suppliers
from China ...

MR. ONG. Opo, opo.

SEN. LACSON ....at wala na siyang ginawang iba pa. Ikaw na lahat ang nagpatuloy kung papaano
makipagtransaksyon, kung papaano tumanggap ng supplies at makipag-deal doon sa mga suppliers na
sinasabi niyang pinakilala lamang sa iyo.

MR. ONG. In addition to that, Mr. Chair, he also guarantees for us. Nagga-guarantee sila para sa amin
kasi totoo po iyong analysis ni Mr. Chairman na medyo challenging talaga pagdating sa financial.

xxxx

SEN. LACSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dahil sinabi mo na wala nang kinalaman si Mr. Yang kundi maggarantiya, papaano mo binabayaran iyong
mga Chinese suppliers? LC, money transfer or cash? Papaano mo binayaran sila? Kasi malaking halaga
ito.

MR. ONG. Yes po, Mr. Chair. May mga portion na kami na nagdiretso nagbayad sa mga suppliers dahil
mayroon po naman kaming mga pondo sa amin, at siyempre, mga savings ng mga incorporators and
partners. And then there are certain items that we don't have enough funds to settle. So, Mr. Michael
Yang guarantees for us.

SEN. LACSON. So, hindi totoo na pinakilala ka lang at tapos na. Tuloy-tuloy ang kanyang participation by
way of continuously guaranteeing sa mga suppliers na babayaran sila. Parang utang. Sabihin na natin na
credit.

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman, I think medyo may na-miss si Interpreter kanina na I think Mr. Michael Yang
also mentioned that he guaranteed.for us.
SEN. LACSON. No, guarantee, meaning salita lamang, laway lang na, "Ito si Mr. Ong, kaya kayong bayaran
nito." Iyon tang. Ikaw lahat ang nagbabayad. Ang tanong ko sa iyo, how did you pay the suppliers?
Money transfer, LC?

MR. ONG. Iyong mga ibang supplier namin talaga nagtatransfer talaga kmi. Wala pa naman pong LC
noong time na iyan. Tapos may mga ibang supplier na hindi namin kayang bayaran, humihingi na po kami
ng tulong kay Mr. Michael Yang, which he guaranteed with the supplier na pag nakatanggap po kami ng
bayad from the government and then that is the time we pay na lang.

xxxx

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman, noong time na iyon, actually we are expecting the project to be very quick. So,
iyon po, humingi talaga kami ng tulong kay Mr. Michael Yang.

xxxx

SEN. LACSON. Hindi. Hindi talaga madali.

Alam mo, Linconn, hindi nga kapani-paniwala na ganoon kadali ang transaksyon involving billions of
pesos Iyon ang sinabi ko. Na garantiya lang ni Mr. Yang darating iyong supply ninyo at sigurado na kayong
makakasingil. Ngayon, paano magagarantiyahan ni Mr. Yang na makakasingil kayo kaagad para
mabayaran iyong mga sinu-supply ng mga Chinese firms, iyong apat na Chinese firms?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chair, I cannot answer for Mr. Michael Yang.

SEN. LACSON. Iyon nga, nagtuturuan na kayong dalawa ngayon. Sabi ni Mr. Yang ikaw ang diretsong
nakipagtransaksyon diyan sa mga Chinese firms at siya tang ang nagpakilala. Ngayon, hindi ka privy sa
pag-uusap ni Michael Yang doon sa mga Chinese suppliers. Ang sinasabi naman ni Mr. Yang, hindi sya
privy sa pakikipag-usap mo sa mga Chinese suppliers. Now, which is the truth?

MR. ONG. The truth is talagang, Mr. Chairman, tumulong talaga po si Mr. Michael Yang, and then I think
he is really connected with—in China. Tapos po, mayroon naman po kaming MOA noong time na iyan, so
I think it is also a good proof and boost of confidence to these suppliers.

SEN. LACSON. Yes, I know that. But this is a government transaction. Hindi ito yung bilihan, nagkita tayo
sa isang lugar, sa isang restaurant, pinakilala ko sa iyo iyong supplier at naniwala iyong supplier, sinuplyan
ka ng kung anoman iyong pinag-uusapan ninyong bilihan. This involves billions of pesos. Sabi ko nga,
hindi ganoon kasimple na isang garantiya pagbibigyan ka ng suppliers. Ang sabi ni Mr. Yang, hindi niya na
alam kung papaano kayo nag-usap noong suppliers. Ang sinasabi mo ngayon, hindi mo na alam kung
papaano nakipag-usap si Mr. Yang sa mga suppliers. Ang tanong ko, alin ang totoo sa dalawa?

MR. ONG. Totoo po iyon na pagdating sa negotiation ng mga delivery at pricing, kami na po talaga ni
supplier ang nagpa-finalize. Totoo po iyon. At inaamin ko rin po na pagdating sa mga bayaran, we also
need Mr. Michael Yang's guarantee.

SEN. LACSON. Parang... paniwalaan iyan, Linconn, ano. Kasi napakalaking halaga nito at government
transaction pa ito para isimplify ninyo ng ganoon ang inyong pakikipag-usap.

So, wala kayong LC?

MR. ONG. Ano po? LC po? Wala po.

xxxx

SEN. LACSON. Do you have documents to show your proof of payment doon sa mga suppliers?

MR. ONG. We have all those documents as long as it's--wala naman pong rights or—maba-violate sa
amin, we are more than willing to cooperate.

SEN. LACSON. Okay. How much in total did you pay the four suppliers? Doon sa mga dumating, iyong na-
procure ninyo and supplied to the PS-DBM, magkano iyong binayaran ninyo sa mga suppliers?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman, wala po kasi sa amin iyong mga -- sa akin, wala talaga sa akin ang record. I
think I have to access our accounting records.

SEN LACSON No. But ikaw ang nakikipag-usap sa mga suppliers, may idea ka kung magkano iyong
presyo na binayaran mo doon, hindi ba?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman, kasi medyo ano po iyon, trade secret na iyon. Parang hindi po kami
komportable na ibulgar na po sa publiko.

xxxx

SEN. DRILON. x x x these are public funds. These are subject to audit by the COA. And even if you do not
testify, COA has the power to inquire. x x x

xxxx

THE CHAIRPERSON. Kaya nga, di sabihin mo na. Makikipagcooperate, tinatanong ka na, hindi mo naman
sinasagot:

MR. ONG. Mr. Chair, I myself alone cannot answer that question kasi kumpanya po kami. Allow us to
have a meeting on it, tapos pag-usapan namin and we need guidance with our accountants and lawyers.
Definitely, pag kinakailangan naming makipagcooperate sa COA, gagawin po namin iyon.

SEN. LACSON. Mr. Linconn Ong x x x x

Did you have any document x x x mayroon kayong parang joint venture agreement with Mr. Yang?

MR. ONG. We do have agreement po.

SEN. LACSON. Yes. Do you have a copy of that agreement?

MR. ONG. I don't have it with me, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LACSON. What kind of agreement do you have with Mr. Yang?

MR. ONG. Hindi ko po talaga maalala noong, noong mga—specific content na iyan, Mr. Chairman, but
sana po maintindihan ninyo na kami po, sa community naming minsan—totoo po iyan. Pagkaminsan may
mga transaksiyon kami na minsan verbal-verbal talaga negosyante lang po.

SEN. LACSON. No. But in this particular case, iyong supplies ng mga PPEs, sinabi mo, mayroon kayong
pinirmahan na agreement with Mr. Yang. Ang tanong ko, anong klaseng agreement? Anong klase iyong
pinirmahan ninyong dokumento? Anong form? Is it a joint venture agreement?
xxxx

MR. ONG. Mr. Chairman. I'm not really privy or hindi ko talaga ma-recall ngayon kung ano iyong content,
but we have—we do have kasulatan po.

SEN. LACSON. A very important document, hindi mo matandaan kung anong form? Joint venture ba?
Contract ba? Hindi mo man lang maalala kung ano iyon?

MR. ONG. Mayroon po talagang ganoon.

SEN. LACSON. Anong klase nga?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chair, hindi ko po maka—hindi aka maka-ano. hindi maka-kasi baka po mali iyong masabi
ko ngayon, tapos iyong iba naman iyong nakita ko.

SEN LACSON. Can you produce that and submit it to this Committee?

MR. ONG: Hanapin ko po, sir. Yes po. yes po.120 (Italics supplied; emphases omitted.)

The Committee observed that Ong confessed that he and/or Pharmally had an agreement with Yang, but
he could not remember the terms thereof. When asked to produce a copy of the agreement, he said that
he would look for it.121

The Committee also concluded that Ong testified falsely in the course of the hearing of September 10,
2021, when he stated that Pharmally used its corporate funds to pay its suppliers before it was able to
secure a loan. Sen. Drilon pointed out that Pharmally had no capacity to pay the initial order from its
suppliers in the amount of ₱54 Million considering that Pharmally only had ₱625,000.00 as paid-up
capital at the beginning of the year 2020; thus:

SEN. LACSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Ang sunod na tanong ko, dahil sinabi nila, binabayaran nila ng money transfer or cash iyong suppliers. So
saan kayo bumibili ng foreign exchange? Kasi hindi naman ninyo pwedeng bayaran ng pesos, hindi ba?

THE CHAIRPERSON. Tama.

SEN. LACSON. So, how did you do it? Where do you buy your foreign exchange? In this case, renminbi,
how do you secure the foreign currency to pay your suppliers?

MR. ONG. Proper bank transaction po iyon, Mr. Chairman. Hindi po siya renminbi Mr. Chairman, US
dollar, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Hindi tinatanong kung renminbi. Ang tinatanong sa iyo, saan ka kumukuha ng foreign
exchange para bayaran iyong mga tao doon?

MR. ONG. Mr. Chair.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Siyempre kung magre-remit ka—magreremit ka, hindi ba? So, saan kayo kumukuha
ng pera pambayad doon?

MR. ONG. Pag dito po sa Philippines side, we transact with our bank.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Sinong bank?

SEN. DRILON. UnionBank.

MR. ONG. UnionBank.

THE CHAIRPERSON. So, kalian, kailan kayo unang nagtransact?

MR. ONG. We have to check the record pero continuous naman iyong transaction namin dito.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Sinabi nga ni Huang na ang unang transaksiyon ninyo sa Union Bank ay November,
that is a full seven months, pitong buwan magmula noong nakakuha kayo ng malalaking kontrata na
sunod-sunod na linggo... Abril. Nasa record iyan, binasa ko na kanina.

MR. ONG. Yes po.

THE CHAIRPERSON. So, it took you seven months bago kayo...

Ang hiniram ninyo doon 500 million. Sarnakatuwid, nagbabayad kayo between that time ng pera. Saka
lang kayo urnutang noong nagkaroon na kayo ng pera, kuno, kuno ha, kuho. Hindi ako naniniwala dahil
ang tingin ko nagbabayad kayo pero hindi ninyo masabi kung saan ninyo kinukuha iyong pera. Galing ba
iyan sa ibang sources na illicit.

MR. ONG. Hindi po, Mr. Chair. Mayroon po kaming mga sariling pondo rin at...

THE CHAIRPERSON: O, biglang may sariling pondo na naman. O, sige.

MR. ONG. Opo.

SEN. DRILON. Specifically, Senator Gordon, kaninong pera, bank accounts kung saan nanggaling iyong ni-
remit ninyo sa mga supplier?

MR. ONG. If ever magre-remit kami sa mga supplier, dapat po talaga manggagaling sa ano namin, sa
bank account namin.

SEN. DRILON. Kaya nga. So aling bank--sino ang may-ari nitong mga bank accounts at magkano ang ni-
remit ninyo?

MR. ONG. Corporation po namin, iyong Pharmally Pharmaceutical po.

SEN. DRILON. Iyong korporasyon ninyo, Mr. Ong, ang pera is 625,000 lang.

SEN. LACSON. Pesos.

SEN. DRILON. Ikaw naman. Oo, pesos, 625,000 pesos lang. Kaya hindi pwedeng manggagaling sa
korporasyon ninyo kung milyonmilyon ang binabayad ninyo sa Chinese suppliers. Sabi mo galing sa
bangko. Tanong ngayon, sino ba may-ari ng mga account na iyon?

MR. ONG. Corporate account po, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. DRILON. Mr. Chairman, talagang nagsisinungaling ito. How can it be a corporate account when the
account--

SEN. LACSON. Mr. Chairman.

SEN. DRILON. Yes. Sorry, Senator, Ping.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Senator Lacson, go ahead.

SEN. LACSON....establish very clearly na ang pera ninyo ₱625. Ang tanong ni Senator Drilon--

SEN. DRILON. Thousand.

SEN. LACSON. Six hundred twenty-five thousand pesos. Ang tanong ni Senator Drilon, ₱625,000, tapos
ang nire-remit ninyo, sabi mo, galing din sa corporation ninyo, sa Pharmally. Maliwanag iyan, hindi sa
ibang corporation, hindi kayo nangutang at lahat. Saan nanggaling iyong perang nire-remit ninyo sa
China. Sabihin na nating galing sa bangko rito--

MR. ONG. Opo, opo.

SEN. LACSON. Ang sagot ninyo po, galing sa corporation ninyo. Ang liit ng capital ng corporation ninyo,
625. That's the question. How do you reconcile that?

MR. ONG. Okay, Mr.Chairman, can I—pwede na po ba akong magpaliwanang?

SEN. LACSON. All right. Go ahead.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Kanina ka pa nagpapaliwanag, hindi naman kita pinipigilan.

MR. ONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chaim1an, Marami po kasing series of transaction
iyon. So, mayroon naman po kaming naiipon na pera. So, that's our pondo. And then at the same time,
sa mga series of transactions, pagka medyo malaki na po iyong project, kinakailangan din po namin
mangutang sa mga kaibigan. So, hindi ko po dine-deny na mayroon kaming mga utang sa labas.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Hindi naman iyon ang problema. Bilyonbilyon ang tina-transact ninyo, marami
kayong kaibigan. Kailangan ring ipaliwanag kung saan rin kinuha noong mga kaibigan ninyo iyang
perang iyan. Magpapaliwanag kayo sa Money Laundering Council.

MR. ONG. Definitely, we—sige po, sige po.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Sige, sagutin mo.

MR. ONG. Definitely po. Kinakailangan po naming makipagcooperate sa Anti-money Laundering Council.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Talagang magko-cooperate kayo.

SEN. DRILON. Senator Dick.

THE CHAIRPERSON. Senator Drilon, you have questions.

xxxx

SEN. DRILON. Yes. Just to go back to Mr. Lincoln Ong. Here is a resource person who is clearly lying on the
record because he says the funds were corporate funds, corporate funds of Pharmally. But the audited
financial statement indicates that beginning of 2020, they had only 625,000 which is the paid-up capital.
Clearly, the corporation had no capacity to pay the initial order of 54 million. So, it is not true at all and
there is a deliberate effort to mislead the Committee by saying these are corporate funds. We asked him,
"Who advanced this payment?" He said it was from bank accounts of Union Bank or something "Who
owns the bank accounts?" He is already evasive.
This witness, Mr. Chairman, is clearly lying—is clearly lying. And in the case of Arnault, which is a 1950
case, this Senate has the power to detain, as we have detained, people until they tell us the truth. This
witness is both evasive and refuses to answer or telling a lie. And, therefore, he has been declared in
contempt earlier. We move that the contempt order be now executed and we send our sherfffs, our
security people to arrest Mr. Ong right now.122 (Italics and underscoring supplied; emphases omitted.)

Evidently, the Committee was fixated on the fact that Pharmally had no capacity to pay the initial order
of ₱54 Million, it having a paid-up capital of ₱625,000.00 only at the beginning of the year 2020. As can
be gleaned from his testimony, however, Ong was able to subsequently aver that they had other funds
sourced from the savings of the incorporators, and that they also borrowed money from friends. He even
manifested his willingness to cooperate with the Anti-Money Laundering Council to explain where his
friends got the funds.

Further, that Ong may have shown hesitancy in giving direct answers as regards the documents
pertaining to the supplies of PPEs does not conclusively establish that he was evasive. The totality of his
responses evince that he was mindful of his right against selfincrimination. Again, he manifested his
willingness to cooperate in the investigation by committing to produce and submit documents required
by the Committee.

As regards Yang, the Committee pointed out in its Comment dated February 19, 2022, his alleged
questionable, incomplete, evasive and inconsistent answers or replies specifically as to his knowledge of
Pharmally, thus:

For example, when asked as to when, how and why he became involved with Pharmally, he answered
that he knows nothing about Pharmally and had nothing to do with it and that he came to know
Pharmally only through the news. He replied that he had nothing to do with the registration, formation
or operations of Pharrnally Pharmaceuticals. He said that he did not have business dealings with Mr.
Linconn Ong, either in his personal capacity or as incorporator of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals. But as the
questioning went on, he later admitted that Pharmally people like Mr. Ong and Mr. Garrick Hung
approached him for assistance and that he introduced them to at least four (4) suppliers and helped
them with the funding of their deal with the government. It was revealed that he acted as the financer
or creditor of Pharmally and/or guarantor to the Chinese suppliers and also as the middleman or go-
between the government and Pharmally. xx x.123

The pertinent excerpts from the September 10, 2021 TSN read:

SEN. LACSON. Twenty-two years. Okay.

My next question is, when, how and why did you become involved with Pharmally?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he doesn't know and he has no
relation to Pharmally.

SEN. LACSON. I would like to remind Mr. Yang that he is under oath, Mr. Interpreter.

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Yang is aware that he is under oath. And it
is only through the news that he found out about the existence of Pharmally Pharmaceutical.

SEN. LACSON. So, he maintains that he has nothing to do, nothing to do at all with Pharmally. Is that
correct?

xxxx

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG, [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay. Mr. Chairman, what Mr. Yang said is that, initially, he
doesn't know of the existence or the whereabouts or anything about Pharmally Pharmaceutical. Later
they did approach him for some assistance.

SEN. LACSON. So, it is not true that he has nothing to do or he had nothing to do with Pharmally?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, your question pertains to the corporation or on the
operations? We just like to clarify on that part.

SEN. LACSON. First, the corporation, Pharmally Pharmaceuticals.

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG, [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay. Mr. Chairman, we'd like to clarify in terms of the registration
or setup of Pharmally Pharmaceutical, Mr. Yang has nothing to do with it.

SEN. LACSON. That is correct. But does he have anything to do with the operations of Pharmally
Pharmaceuticals at any point?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, in terms of operations, Mr. Yang has not been
involved or he has no idea.

SEN. LACSON. Does he know Huang Tzu Yen, the chairman of Pharmally?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] During that 2017, he met Mr Huang Tzu Yen, together with his
father. And after that, they have no any communications.
SEN. LACSON. Does he know a certain Linconn Ong?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Yes. He knows Mr. Linconn Ong, Mr. Chairman.

xxxx

SEN. LACSON. Did he have any business dealings with Mr. Linconn Ong whether in his personal capacity
or in his capacity as one of the incorporators of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, no.

SEN. LACSON. No business dealings with Mr. Linconn Ong?

MR. HUNG. Mr. Chairman, can you just be more—sorry, can you just repeat the question?

SEN. LACSON. Did they have any business dealings with Linconn Ong, whether in his personal capacity or
as a stockholder incorporator of Pharmally Pharmaceuticals?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang would like to ask in terms of what
specific period you were pertaining to?

SEN. LACSON. In the supply of PPEs, medical supplies like face masks, shields, et cetera, et cetera in
relation to the transaction dealings of Pharmally with the PS-DBM, to be specific.

MR. HUNG. So, Mr. Chair. just to clarify. Your question is, if he has any dealing or anything to do with the
transactions pertaining to PS-DBM and Pharmally Pharmaceuticals?

SEN. LACSON. Yes, PPEs—supply of PPEs. supply of surgical masks, face shields, face masks.

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang would like to say that when Pharmally did
get their contracts, he has nothing to do with any of those contracts or awards.

MR. YANG. [speaking in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. Then, eventually, Mr. Linconn did approach Mr. Yang and then he helped him—them—or Mr.
Yang introduced friends to Linconn who could help them with their supplies.
SEN. LACSON. That is correct. That is the point I was trying to point out, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Michael
Yang was the one who acted as a go-between or middleman between Linconn Ong or Pharmally
Pharmaceuticals and the suppliers from China. Is that correct?

MR. HUNG. So, Mr. Chair. Your question, again, that Linconn and—

SEN. LACSON. No. Mr. Michael Yang acted as a middleman between Pharmally Pharmaceuticals through
Mr. Linconn Ong and the Chinese suppliers of the medical supplies in relation to the procurement.

MR. HUNG. [interpreting Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he only introduced and let them
discuss things on their own.

SEN. LACSON. So that was his only role? He introduced the suppliers to Mr. Linconn Ong and then he had
nothing do with the supplies anymore?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] So, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he only introduced them and
then they discussed things on their own.

SEN. LACSON. And he stopped all his participation?

MR. HUNG. I'm sorry, come again, Mr. Chairman?

SEN. LACSON. And he stopped all his participation in the dealings between the Chinese suppliers of the
medical supplies that mentioned and Mr. Linconn Ong? He just left them on their own?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay Mr. Chairman, Mr. Yang said that he only introduced as to
where or who they close their dealings. He does not know who or where did he actually purchase those
stocks.

SEN. LACSON. And he never guaranteed with his Chinese suppliers the credibility or the ability Mr.
Linconn Ong to pay them?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding in Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay. So, Mr. Yang only introduced and then they negotiated on
their own. And then probably, he first initially introduced friends, introduced some other friends for them
to negotiate all of their dealings.

SEN LACSON. How many suppliers did he introduce to Mr. Ong.

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR. YANG. [responding Chinese]

MR. HUNG, [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Around four suppliers, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LACSON. These are individuals or these are companies in China?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Okay. So, he introduced friends, individuals, and then probably
these people could have introduced some other friends or companies directly to them.

SEN. LACSON. That's it? That's his participation? Introduced, then left them alone?

MR. HUNG. [interpreting in Chinese for Mr. Yang]

MR.YANG. [responding Chinese]

MR. HUNG. [interpreting for Mr. Yang] Yes. Mr. Chairman.124 (Italics supplied; emphases omitted.)

Sen. Pangilinan observed that Yang gave inconsistent answers, thus:

SEN. PANGILINAN. The questions raised earlier by Senator Lacson, first, Mr. Yang said, he had no
connection with Pharmally and learned only about Pharmally in the news. That's on record. And then,
after which, he changed his position. He said he only met Pharmally in 2017 and never met them again.
And then, later on, Mr. Yang admits to knowing Mr. Linconn Ong of Pharmally. And then he says, he
introduced Linconn Ong to the suppliers. So, just like the virus, his answers are mutating.125 (Italics
supplied; emphases omitted.)

As keenly observed by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, even inconsistent answers were
equated by the Committee with "testifying evasively."126 As he aptly pointed out, "[w]hether a witness
genuinely did not know or did not recall the answer, or was evasive in answering a question is largely a
matter of judgment or opinion."127 He further pointed out that "falsely or evasively" should be
understood as "false" which means "not genuine, intentionally untrue, adjusted or made so as to
deceive, intended or tending to mislead, not true, based on mistaken ideas, inconsistent with the
facts."128 This determination requires "an assessment of the totality of the evidence presented to
determine whether a witness speaks truthfully or merely trying to evade answering the question
directly."129 Surely, this determination could not have been made on the basis of his testimony given in
the hearing of September 10, 2021 alone.130

Evidently, Sen. Lacson's series of repetitive questions as regards Yang's knowledge of Pharmally evoked
different answers. However, the fact that Yang made inconsistent or incomplete answers in the course of
his testimony does not conclusively establish that he was evasive within the context of contempt, that is,
there was refusal or unwillingness to testify on his part. While Yang initially tried to avoid giving any
leading information as regards his connection with Pharmally, he was able to subsequently aver in the
course of the proceedings that he introduced the suppliers of facemasks and PPEs to Ong. Again, the
Committee immediately surmised on the incredulity of his testimony, thus citing him in contempt and
ordering his arrest on the ground that he gave inconsistent or incomplete answers.
In Bro. Oca v. Custodio,131 the Court classified punishment for contempt in judicial proceedings into civil
and criminal. This is anchored on the two-fold aspect of contempt which seeks to (1) compel the party to
do an act or duty which it refuses to perform; and (2) punish the party for disrespecting the court or its
orders.132 The characterization of the proceedings is "determined by the relief sought, or the dominant
purpose."133 Under the second aspect, judicial contempt proceedings are characterized as criminal or
punitive:

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal
actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in
their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the
court and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal
proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The
proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and
criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be
conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the
strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the
accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings
are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are
preserved.134 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Following the above characterization, a legislative contempt is essentially criminal or punitive in nature.
Notably, the contumacious act of testifying falsely or evasively finds criminal definition under Article
183135 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) penalizing false testimony and perjury. In the case, the
Committee's treatment of petitioners' supposed contumacious acts as criminal in nature is even
bolstered when it ordered their arrest and, worse, the subsequent transfer of Ong to the Pasay City Jail.
Indeed, the power to punish crimes is punitive in nature as it involves a proceeding brought by the State
before the courts to punish offenders.136

It bears underscoring that the purpose of the Committee's proceedings is to conduct

an inquiry or investigation to aid the Senate in crafting relevant legislation, and not to conduct a trial or
make an adjudication. Legislative inquiries do not share the same goals as the criminal trial
process,137 and "cannot be punitive in the sense that they cannot result in legally binding deprivation of
a person's life, liberty or property."138 Thus, punishment for legislative contempt, albeit sui generis in
character, must similarly observe the minimum requirements of due process.

As succinctly pointed out by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, witnesses who are charged by
Congress with "giving false or evasive testimony" must be accorded stricter due process requirements,
such as the opportunity to explain one's side before being penalized, consistent with the due process
safeguards used in criminal proceedings. Considering the broad definition of "giving false or evasive
testimony," the witness must, at the very least, given a chance to explain why his or her testimony is not
false or evasive.139

In the case, the Committee's grave abuse of discretion lay in its precipitate act of citing petitioners Ong
and Yang in contempt and ordering their arrests without giving them the opportunity to be heard.
III

The assailed rules are not vague.

Let it be clarified that the Court's finding of grave abuse of discretion in the case—the Committee's
failure to accord petitioners their Constitutional right to due process relative to the conduct of its
proceedings—does not lead to an invalidation of the Legislature's implicit authority to make a
determination whether a person is "testifying falsely or evasively."

Ong argues that the Senate Rules of Procedure on Inquiries is vague for having no clear standards as to
what constitutes "testifying falsely or evasively."140 He insists that the phrase "testifying falsely or
evasively" is utterly vague as it does not fairly notify the witness of how it can be committed, nor does it
restrict in any manner the discretion of the Senate Committee to adjudge an act as falling within its
ambit.141

Further, Ong maintains that the determination of whether a witness testifies falsely or evasively falls
exclusively within the ambit of judicial power. For Ong, the question of falsity of an utterance is a highly
evidentiary matter and its determination requires the stringent application of the rules on evidence.

Ong's arguments fail to persuade.

Implicit in the Legislature's power to punish recalcitrant witnesses by declaring them in contempt is the
power to determine whether the witness is recalcitrant or is guilty of contumacious acts. As the grant of
legislative power which includes the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is intended to be
complete—i.e., without need to resort to judicial process in order that the Legislature may be able to
perform its function—it follows that the Legislature likewise has the power to resort to mechanisms to
obey its processes. As in the case, the Legislature has the power to determine whether a witness is
testifying falsely or evasively and, consequently, declare a witness in contempt with the end that the
witness may be compelled to purge his or her contempt by giving a truthful testimony.

It must be emphasized that the Legislature, considering the statements as well as the actuations of the
witness, is by no means helpless in determining whether a witness is testifying falsely or evasively. The
varying levels of ease or difficulty by which the Legislature may make such determination on a case-to-
case basis does not lead to the conclusion that it should solely belong to the courts. When a witness'
testimony is glaringly false or when his/her answers are evasive, the Court will not prevent the
Legislature from exercising its power just because the courts may also punish false testimony as a
violation of penal laws. If at all, the Court in certain instances can only consider the Legislature to have
ruled whimsically or arbitrarily if its finding that a witness testified falsely or evasively is evidently
without basis. It does not, however, lead to an invalidation of the Legislature's implicit authority to make
such determination.

Contrary to Ong's proposition, the phrase "testifying falsely or evasively" is not vague.

A statute or act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that persons of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.142 In such instance, it is
unconstitutional based on two grounds: "(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle."143

However, the Court has stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld, i.e., not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.144 "Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions."145

In the case, the Court finds that the phrase "testifies falsely or evasively" in Section 18 of the Senate
Rules on Inquiries is not vague.

False testimony has been defined in several provisions of the RPC.146 It is committed by any person
who, being under oath, and required to testify as to the truth of certain matter at a hearing before a
competent authority, shall deny the truth or say something contrary to it.147

A false statement is a statement that is known or believed by its maker to be incorrect or untrue and is
made especially with intent to deceive or mislead.148 It is also defined as one made knowingly false or
made recklessly without honest belief in its truth, and within the purpose to mislead or deceive.149

On the other hand, an evasive answer refers to a response that is given, which does not directly answer
the question posed.150 Evasive answers are often seen in the legal world when a party refuses to conf
rm or deny allegation(s) against him or her.151 An evasive answer is likewise defined as "one which
consists in refusing either to admit or to deny a matter in a direct, straightforward manner as to which a
person is necessarily presumed to have knowledge."152

As early as 1950, the Court, in Arnault, already pronounced that a testimony which is obviously false or
evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to
testify would be so punishable.153 Thus, in Arnault, the Court recognized the power of the Senate and
its committees to cite a witness in contempt for testifying falsely and evasively during an inquiry.

In People v. Saure,154 the Court considered a testimony of a witness as evasive when he did not
remember the facts which he ought to know because they were related to his own self-serving
allegation.

There is no doubt that the phrase "testifies falsely or evasively" can be understood by any person of
common knowledge or intelligence.

IV

No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of the Senate Committee in Requesting for the Issuance of a
Lookout Bulletin

In a Letter155 dated September 13, 2021 addressed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Committee,
through Sen. Gordon, requests that Yang be "placed on the Bureau of Immigration Hold Departure Order,
Watch List, or Lookout Bulletin, whichever is appropriate, and that the Committee be informed whenever
he is about to leave, or whenever he arrives from without the country."156

Yang ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the Committee in "causing the issuance of a lookout
order," invoking the absence of any criminal charge filed in court against him. Characterizing the letter-
request as a directive to Immigration Commissioner Jaime H. Morente, Yang contended that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation does not grant the Senate or any of its
Committees the power to request for a Hold Departure Order, Watch List, or Lookout Bulletin. Thus, Yang
questions the legality of the request.

Yang's argument is misplaced.

In its comment, the OSG confirms that Justice Secretary Menardo Guevarra acted on the request and
issued an immigration lookout bulletin order (ILBO) against Yang on or about September 14, 2021. As
correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Senate Committee only made a request. It bears underscoring that
the DOI and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) are not impleaded in this case. Indeed, the Court cannot pass
upon the propriety of the ILBO issued by Secretary Guevarra without violating the requirements of fair
play and due process.157 Suffice it to state that the questioned act of the Senate Committee pertains to
a mere request, which cannot be legally considered as the authority or basis for the issuance by the DOI
of the ILBO. Being a mere request, the same may or may not be heeded by the DOI. Contrary to Yang's
proposition, the request does not partake of a directive or order mandating the DOI to issue the ILBO,
from which grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the Senate.

In any event, the Court had the occasion of addressing a similar invocation against requests for
assistance of the BI made by the Senate in the conduct of legislative investigations. In Standard
Chartered Bank, the Court held:

[I]t is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to compel the attendance
of witnesses. Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to ensure that
said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative investigation. In the case at bench,
considering that most of the officers of SCB Philippines are not Filipino nationals who may easily evade
the compulsive character of respondent's summons by leaving the country, it was reasonable for the
respondent to request the assistance of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to prevent said
witnesses fom evading the inquiry and defeating its purpose. In any event, no HDO was issued by a court.
The BID instead included them only in the Watch List, which had the effect of merely delaying
petitioners' inten ed travel abroad for five (5) days, provided no HDO is issued against them.158 (Italics
supplied; citation omitted.)

Thus, far from acting with grave abuse of discretion, the Senate has legal and factual reasons to request
for the DOJ to place Yang under a lookout bulletin.

No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of the Senate Committee in Compelling Yang to Answer
Questions and to Submit Documents and Information Pertaining to Him, His Property and Business
Interests

Yang admits that the Senate certainly has the right to investigate the possible abuse or misuse of
government funds in relation to the enactment of RA 11469. However, he posits that the Senate
Committee is engaged in a fishing expedition by asking for documents about his properties and business
dealings.159
More pmticularly, Yang argues that the Senate Committee committed grave abuse of discretion as it
compelled him to answer questions and submit documents that are beyond the scope of the legislative
inquiry and in clear violation of his right to privacy.160 He asserts that the Senate Committee directed
him to provide information on his non-filing of income tax return, studies, and length of stay in the
Philippines.161 He also contends that questions regarding his past are outside the scope of the Senate
investigation, and that he, nonetheless, complied with the order to bring the documents to avoid being
cited in contempt under the misguided notion that he was being evasive.162

It is settled that in the absence of information pertinent to a contemplated legislation, the Congress will
not be able to fully and effectively perform its function to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

In this regard, the Congress makes use of compulsory process to gather material information for its
inquiry but such exercise must be in accordance with its rules of procedure and must take into account
the rights of those affected or appearing during inquiries in aid of legislation.

In the case of Yang, the Court is unconvinced that his right to privacy was violated when the Senate
Committee directed him to produce the subject documents.

First, in Standard Chartered Bank, the Court stressed that the right to privacy is not an absolute right.
While the Constitution guarantees the respect of persons affected by a legislative inquiry under Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution, not every assertion of one's right to privacy must be allowed to prevent
a legitimate legislative inquiry.

Too, in Sabio, the Court elucidated that the right to privacy is recognized and protected by laws. Any
intrusion to one's right to privacy is not allowed unless it is excused by law and in accordance with
established legal process. Definitely, '"no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his [or
her] privacy' and 'everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks."'163 In that case, the Court explained that in resolving whether a person's right to privacy was
violated, a court must determine two important questions: (1) did the concerned person exhibit a
reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) did the government violate such expectation?

In the case of Yang, the foregoing questions are answered in the negative as there is absence of an
arbitrary intrusion to his right to privacy.

To underscore, central to the inquiry in aid of legislation and of which Yang was invited by the Senate is
his alleged participation in the Pharmally controversy.1aшphi1 In this regard, the Senate Committee's
inquiry covers the acts of Yang related to the contemplated legislation to improve government
procurement procedure and processes in relation to RA 11494. It follows that the presentation of
documents with regard to Yang's properties and business interests is allowed as it is intimately related to
the issue of whether he acquired and/or accumulated wealth in connection with the subject government
funds.

Yang therefore had no reasonable expectations of privacy over matters relating to Pharmally and his
business interests therein as the government itself has an interest insofar as the Congress contemplates
the enactment and/or amendment of a law relating government procurement law. While there must be
ideally a balance between the interest of resource persons and the demand by the Congress for
information, the right to privacy cannot prevail where there is an overriding compelling state interest, as
in the present case.
In other words, the right to privacy of Yang cannot prevail over the compelling state interest as the
Senate Committee conducts inquiries anent a contemplated legislation relating to RA No. 11494. The
purpose of the inquiry of the Senate to resolve the misuse of government funds in connection with the
pandemic response of the government is a compelling state reason for it to proceed with its inquiry and
require Yang to produce the subject documents.

Second, pieces of information which relate to personal circumstances are not by themselves beyond the
scope of legislative inquiry especially so where, as above stated, a contemplated legislation is being
considered by the Congress. Verily, in the absence of showing that the production of the subject
documents will in any way prejudice Yang, his contention that his right to privacy was violated remains as
a bare allegation without proof supporting the claim.

Third, Yang failed to convince the Court of any recognized public interest in the confidentiality of the
information asked by the Senate Committee. In fact, he did not assail at the outset and before the
Senate the obligatory force of the subpoena duces tecum it issued against him. In contrast, Yang himself
admitted having complied with the subpoena and brought the subject documents when he appeared
before the Senate Committee. In the absence of a formal and proper invocation by Yang of his right to
privacy before the Senate, stating the specific reasons for the preservation of the confidentiality of the
information being asked from him as a resource person, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
against the Senate in directing him to produce the subject documents.164

All told, the Court finds that the Senate Committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction only insofar as it issued the assailed Contempt Order dated September 10,
2021, citing Ong and Yang in contempt for testifying falsely or evasively and ordering their arrest.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The Order dated September 10, 2021, citing
petitioners Linconn Uy Ong and Michael Yang Hong Ming in contempt of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee and directing their arrest, is NULLIFIED for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The phrase "testifies falsely or evasively" both under Section 18 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, as amended, and Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, on the basis of the challenges raised in these petitions, is NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 194469, September 18, 2019 ]

HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, PETITIONER, VS. NBI DIRECTOR MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, FORMER NBI
DIRECTOR CARLOS S. CAABAY, FORMER NBI DIRECTOR NESTOR M. MANTARING, DR. RENATO C.
BAUTISTA, DR. PROSPERO CABANAYAN, ATTY. FLORESTO P. ARIZALA, JR., ATTY. REYNALDO O.
ESMERALDA, ATTY. ARTURO FIGUERAS, ATTY. PEDRO RIVERA AND JOHN HERRA, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

While this Court's power to cite persons in contempt should be used sparingly, it should be wielded to
ensure the infallibility of justice where the defiance or disobedience is patent and contumacious that
there is an evident refusal to obey.[1]

In criminal contempt proceedings, the presumption of innocence exists. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
is but necessary; absent this, the accused cannot be cited in contempt.

This Court resolves a Petition for Indirect Contempt[2] under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The case was
filed against officers of the National Bureau of Investigation, namely: (1) Director Magtanggol B. Gatdula
(Gatdula); (2) former Director Carlos S. Caabay (Caabay); (3) former Director Nestor M. Mantaring
(Mantaring); (4) Dr. Renato C. Bautista (Dr. Bautista); (5) Dr. Prospero Cabanayan (Dr. Cabanayan); (6)
Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr. (Atty. Arizala); (7) Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda (Atty. Esmeralda); (8) Atty.
Arturo Figueras (Atty. Figueras);[3] (9) Atty. Pedro Rivera (Atty. Rivera); and (10) Agent John Herra (Herra).

This Petition is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case of Lejano v. People.[4] In that case, Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb (Webb), among others, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping
Carmela Vizconde (Carmela), then killing her, her mother, and her sister in 1991— the events of which
had been infamously called the Vizconde Massacre.[5]

While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a Motion to Direct the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis. As he claims in his Petition,
the DNA testing would establish his innocence since the results would show that the semen found in
Carmela did not belong to him.[6] When the Motion was denied, Webb filed a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the denial.[7]

In an April 20, 2010 Resolution, this Court granted Webb’s request to order a testing on the semen
specimen found in Carmela’s cadaver, in view of the Rules on DNA Evidence.[8] It ordered the National
Bureau of Investigation to assist the parties in submitting the semen specimen to the University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute.[9]

This Court ruled:

“WHEREFORE, in the higher interest of justice, the request of appellant Webb to submit for DNA analysis
the semen specimen taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde under the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation is hereby GRANTED. The NBI is ORDERED to ASSIST the parties in facilitating the
submission of said specimen to the UP-Natural Science and Research Institute, Diliman, Quezon City and
they (NBI and UP-NSRI) are further ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice hereof regarding compliance with and implementation of this Resolution.”[10]

In its Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, the National Bureau of Investigation
claimed that the semen specimen was no longer in its custody. It alleged that the specimen had been
submitted as evidence to the trial court when its Medico-Legal Chief, Dr. Cabanayan, testified on January
30, 31, and February 1, 5, 6, and 7, 1996.[11]

The trial court denied this claim.[12] The Branch Clerk of Court explained that what were marked in
evidence were photographs of the slides containing the vaginal smear, not the slides themselves. [13]
However, in a Certification dated April 23, 1997, Dr. Bautista of the National Bureau of Investigation’s
Medico-Legal Division confirmed that the slides containing the specimen were still in the Bureau’s
custody.[14]

When required by this Court to explain the discrepancies, the National Bureau of Investigation filed its
Compliance dated July 16, 2010. In its Compliance, Dr. Cabanayan explained that he submitted the
semen specimen to the trial court during his direct and cross-examinations. Dr. Bautista, denying
responsibility, clarified that he issued the certification based on the information given to him by the
medical technologist of the Bureau’s Pathology Section.[15]

Due to the missing semen specimen, Webb filed this Petition for Indirect Contempt. He prays that the
impleaded former and current National Bureau of Investigation officers be cited for indirect
contempt for “impeding, degrading, and obstructing the administration of justice and for disobeying the
April 20, 2010 Resolution of this Honorable Court[.]”[16]

Petitioner argues that the National Bureau of Investigation’s claims are belied by the records of the case.
He points out that based on the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence, the exhibits submitted to the
trial court were only photographs of the slides containing the specimen.[17]

In addition, petitioner alleges that it was not mentioned during respondent Dr. Cabanayan’s testimony
that he turned over the actual slides to the court. On February 5, 1996, when the defense
requested the production of the actual slides, the prosecution merely promised to bring them on the
next hearing.[18] When he was asked the following day, Dr. Cabanayan stated that he “forgot all
about”[19] the slides. On his last appearance on February 7, 1996, he still failed to submit the sperm
specimen.[20]

Dr. Cabanayan’s claim, petitioner submits, is also belied by the court records, among which was
respondent Dr. Bautista’s certification that the specimen was still in the Bureau’s custody.[21] He further
argues that respondent Dr. Bautista’s attempt to abandon his initial certification should be doubted as it
is not supported by competent evidence. For one, he did not identify the medical technologist who
supposedly fed him the information. Assuming that his story were true, he forwarded no evidence
that the medical technologist lied to him, petitioner points out.[22]

In essence, petitioner claims that the National Bureau of Investigation made a false report to this Court
when it stated that it had submitted the specimen to the trial court.[23] The testimony and certification
from respondents Dr. Cabanayan and Dr. Bautista, respectively, show that the Bureau, not the trial court,
had the last custody of the specimen.[24]

Petitioner further faults the National Bureau of Investigation for its apparent lack of care and concern in
preserving the vital piece of evidence. He claims that since a Motion to direct the Bureau to submit the
semen specimen for DNA analysis was pending, the Bureau should have been more diligent in handling
the specimen.[25] Yet, it has been nonchalant, as evinced by respondent Dr. Bautista’s negligence when
he admitted that he did not personally check if the slides were still in their custody. [26]
In addition, petitioner asserts that the National Bureau of Investigation devised a deliberate scheme to
falsely inculpate him and his co-accused.

First, he questions its reliance on its star witness, Jessica Alfaro (Alfaro), whom he claims to be a bogus.
[27]
Petitioner contends that Alfaro was a regular informant of the National Bureau of Investigation
who declared that she knew someone who witnessed the killings. When she failed to produce the
supposed eyewitness, Alfaro allegedly volunteered herself to be the witness despite lack of personal
knowledge of the crime.[28]

Petitioner also submits that the National Bureau of Investigation knew that Alfaro’s testimonies were
inconsistent on several material points.[29] In her first affidavit, Alfaro admitted that she did not witness
the crime’s actual commission as she was a mere lookout; yet, in her second affidavit, she suddenly
claimed being in the Vizconde residence and witnessing Carmela’s rape.[30] To cover up the
inconsistencies, Alfaro admitted to the Bureau that she shredded her first affidavit, which was only
recovered from Alfaro’s assisting lawyer, Atty. Arturo Mercader (Atty. Mercader).[31] Moreover, the
Bureau admitted that Alfaro identified the wrong person for accused Miguel Rodriguez.[32] Alfaro also
lied when she stated that she was not assisted by counsel when she executed the first affidavit, when
she was, in fact, actually assisted by Atty. Mercader.[33] Petitioner argues that Alfaro is not a reliable
witness, as supported by her being a self-confessed drug addict.[34]

Petitioner also implicates respondents Attys. Figueras and Rivera, claiming that they coached Alfaro in
the dubious execution of the second affidavit.[35] He highlights that Alfaro did not actually know him until
respondent Agent Herra and Agent Mark Anthony So (So) coached her into identifying him in court. [36]
He insists that while Alfaro presented herself as his close friend or barkada, she did not actually know
him or how he looked like prior to the case.[37]

Petitioner also alleges that National Bureau of Investigation Director Antonio Aragon (Antonio) tried to
convince his nephew, Honesto Aragon (Honesto), not to testify that he was with petitioner in the United
States at the time the crime was committed.[38] In his testimony, Honesto admitted that his uncle,
Antonio, dissuaded him from testifying because they are relatives and his testimony will not look “good
for the public.”[39]

Petitioner stresses that the National Bureau of Investigation disregarded the documentary evidence they
obtained from the United States and Philippine governments, which would have proven that he was in
the United States around the time the crime was committed. The Bureau supposedly obtained US
Immigration Naturalization Service and Philippine Bureau of Immigration Certifications showing his
departure for the United States on March 9, 1991 and his arrival back to the Philippines on October 27,
1992.[40] It also received documentary evidence confirming that petitioner was employed in California in
June 1991, and that he purchased a bicycle on June 30, 1991 from Orange Cycle in California. [41]

Moreover, petitioner points out that the National Bureau of Investigation’s Officer-in-Charge Director
Federico Opinion (Opinion) admitted that petitioner’s involvement in the murder was a “creation of
media”[42] and that the Bureau has already confirmed through immigration records that petitioner was in
the United States during the material dates.[43]

Petitioner also argues that the National Bureau of Investigation ignored the evidence showing that
the fingerprints found on the fluorescent lamp in the Vizcondes’ garage did not match his fingerprints,
but those of Engineer Danilo Aguas, another lead suspect in the case.[44]

Despite strong contrary evidence, petitioner asserts that the National Bureau of Investigation still
pursued the case and falsely implicated him in the crime. The Bureau’s actions, he states, “constitute
improper conduct which tends to directly or indirectly impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice”[45] and willful disobedience of the order of this Court, for which the officers should be held in
contempt of court.[46]

Petitioner prays that the following National Bureau of Investigation officers be cited in indirect contempt
for the following acts:

1. Current NBI Director Magtanggol B. Gatdula, Former NBI Director Carlos S. Caabay and Former
NBI Director Nestor M. Mantaring

 For failing to exercise direct supervision and due diligence in safekeeping the semen
specimen which was entrusted to the custody of the NBI since 1997 until the present
time and which was the subject matter of a pending Motion to Direct the NBI to Submit
Semen Specimen for DNA Analysis.

2. Dr. Renato C. Bautista – Medico-Legal Officer III

 For issuing his Certification that the slides were still in the custody of the NBI and later
denying that they are.

3. Dr. Prospero Cabanayan – former Chief, Medico-Legal Division

 For failing to bring the slides containing the semen specimen during the hearing held on
6 February 1996 as required by the Court, and for falsely claiming that he had already
surrendered the slides to the trial court despite all evidence to the contrary.

4. Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., M.D. – Chief, Medico-Legal Division

 For filing and signing, on behalf of the NBI, its Compliance and Manifestation dated 27
April 2010, wherein it was falsely claimed that the desired semen specimen/vaginal
smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde was no longer in its custody because
the same was already submitted as evidence to the trial court when then NBI Medico-
Legal Chief Prospero A. Cabanayan testified on January 30, 31 and February 1, 5, 6, and
7, 1996—which the trial court flatly denied.
 5. Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, Deputy Director for Technical Services

 For filing and signing, on behalf of the NBI, its Compliance and Manifestation dated 27
April 2010, wherein it was falsely claimed that the desired semen specimen/vaginal
smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde was no longer in its custody because
the same was already submitted as evidence to the trial court when then NBI Medico-
Legal Chief Prospero A. Cabanayan testified on January 30, 31, February 1, 5, 6, and 7,
1996—which the trial court flatly denied.

6. NBI’s Atty. Arturo Figueras and Atty. Pedro Rivera

 For coaching Jessica Alfaro in the execution of the Second Affidavit which converted her
into an instant eyewitness to the crime and cured the “defects” of her First Affidavit.

7. NBI Agent John Herra

 For coaching Jessica Alfaro by showing her picture of Petitioner and asking NBI Agent
Mark Anthony So to identify Petitioner and his facial marks so that she would be able to
identify him in court even if they knew that Alfaro did not know him.[47]

On December 14, 2010, about two (2) weeks after the filing of this Petition for Indirect Contempt, this
Court ruled on Lejano, the criminal case. In finding that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, petitioner and his co-accused were acquitted of the crime charged. [48]

Later, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing respondents Gatdula, Atty. Esmeralda, Dr. Bautista,
and Atty. Arizala, filed its Comment to this Petition.[49]

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the Petition is rendered moot upon the promulgation
of Lejano. Since the non-production of the specimen is merely incidental to the determination of
petitioner’s innocence, his acquittal has rendered the issue moot as no useful purpose can be served by
its resolution.[50] It emphasizes that in Lejano, this Court settled that the mere loss of the specimen did
not warrant petitioner’s acquittal.[51] It argues that there is no violation of due process because the State
is not required to preserve the semen specimen unless there was bad faith on the part of the
prosecution or the police.[52]

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise avers that this Court’s Resolution ordering the DNA analysis of
the specimen was only to afford petitioner his constitutional right to due process and was not
indispensable in determining his guilt.[53]

Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that respondents did not impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice or defy this Court’s order.[54] It points out that respondents Gatdula
and Atty. Esmeralda are not responsible for the loss of the specimen because they assumed office only
several years after the Vizconde Massacre.[55]
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Arizala stated in his Compliance that the specimen was no longer in the
National Bureau of Investigation’s custody, as respondent Dr. Cabanayan had already submitted the
evidence to the trial court.[56] He also claims that no bad faith can be attributed to respondent Dr.
Bautista when he certified the specimen’s availability, as he just relied on the medical technologist’s
information which he had no reason to doubt.[57]

Assuming that the specimen was still with the National Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Solicitor
General claims that the legal presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of their official
duties must prevail absent any showing of malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.[58] It
maintains that there was no bad faith on the part of respondents for the non-production of the
specimen.[59]

The Office of the Solicitor General further contends that in Lejano, this Court settled that at the time the
petitioner requested the DNA analysis, rules governing DNA evidence did not yet exist. There is neither
any technology available in the country nor any precedent recognizing its admissibility as evidence. [60] It
also questions petitioner’s failure to challenge the trial court’s denial of his request to have the DNA
analysis.[61]

In a separate Comment,[62] respondents Gatdula and Atty. Esmeralda clarify that they had no
participation in the alleged misconduct because they were not yet in service. Respondent Gatdula was
appointed as Director only on July 7, 2010 and assumed office on July 12, 2010, while respondent Atty.
Esmeralda was appointed Director III on October 19, 2006 and assumed office as Deputy Director for
Technical Services in July 2009.[63] They also point out that when this Court ordered the DNA analysis,
they no longer had the power to obey because the specimen was no longer in the Bureau’s custody.[64]

Respondents Gatdula and Atty. Esmeralda also stress that since this Court had already settled the issue
of the loss of DNA evidence, the non-production of the specimen is a non-issue.[65] They argue that they
never intended to disrespect or defy the order of this Court.[66]

In his Comment,[67] respondent Atty. Arizala claims innocence, alleging that he was not privy to the
specimen’s actual loss since he was assigned in a different station from 2004 to late 2008. He narrates
that after personally supervising and failing to find the specimen, he was informed by respondent Dr.
Cabanayan that the specimen had been transferred to the trial court. Thus, in the exercise of his
ministerial duty, he issued a certification in 2009 stating the absence of the specimen—but, even so, he
was not privy to its actual loss.[68]

Respondent Atty. Rivera also argued in his Comment[69] that he had no hand in the incident because he
was not a custodian of the evidence. He explains that he was only an agent-investigator who was asked
to testify before the trial court.[70]

In his Comment,[71] respondent Mantaring argues that since he was not directly part of the task force
assigned to the case, he could not have failed exercising direct supervision and due diligence in
safekeeping the semen specimen.[72] Although he was the Bureau Director from 2005 to 2010, he claims
that he cannot be held liable for contempt for the specimen’s loss. He adds that he only relied on
respondent Dr. Cabanayan’s statement[73] since he did not personally know what transpired in the trial
court when the specimen was presented in evidence.[74]

Respondent Mantaring also argues that whether the specimen was submitted to the trial court is a
factual question which must first be judicially resolved before the allegation against him is passed upon.
[75]

In his Compliance/Explanation,[76] respondent Dr. Cabanayan denies that the semen specimen was lost.
He narrates that, as the medico-legal officer, he was assigned to examine and report the findings for
submission to the trial court. He said that the glass slides containing the semen specimen, among other
pieces of evidence and findings, were collated and kept in a file folder tagged NBI Medical Jacket No. N-
91-1665. In the footnote registered in the medical jacket, he noted the date, time, and court where he
testified and submitted the file folder.[77]

In his Comment,[78] respondent Herra denies responsibility for the supposed loss of the specimen. He
states that he was assigned with the defunct Task Force JECARES as Alfaro’s lone close-in-security. As
such, he did not have a hand in the investigation, much less access to any evidence.[79] He also denies
that he coached Alfaro to identify petitioner.[80] He argues that he does not have any photo of petitioner,
and he did not show it to Alfaro.[81]

As to respondent Caabay, despite several service of the Court’s order, he failed to submit a comment.[82]

Antonio and Opinion, former National Bureau of Investigation directors, have already died and have
been excluded from the contempt charges.[83] Similarly, respondent Atty. Figueras died during the
pendency of this case.[84]

Petitioner manifested that he would be waiving his right to file a reply.[85]

The issues for this Court’s resolution are the following:

First, whether or not this action is barred by the decision of this Court in Lejano; and

Second, whether or not respondents Magtanggol B. Gatdula, Carlos S. Caabay, Nestor M. Mantaring, Dr.
Renato C. Bautista, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda,
Atty. Pedro Rivera, and John Herra are guilty of indirect contempt; particularly: (1) disobedience or
resistance to a lawful order of the court; and (2) improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.

Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged.”[86] It is an oft-repeated doctrine which bars the re-
litigation of the same claim between the parties or the same issue on a different claim between the
same parties.[87]
Res judicata is founded on the principle of estoppel, and is based on the public policy against
unnecessary multiplicity of suits.[88] In Ligtas v. People:[89]

Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a
Court’s final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled
merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable
time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.[90]

In res judicata, primacy is given to the first case. The underlying reason for this rule is the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments, which is essential for the effective and efficient administration of justice.
[91]
In Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission:[92]

[W]ell-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land.

The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final,
the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies.
[93]

The doctrine rests upon the principle that “parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once[.]”[94] It “exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical
necessity, and public [tranquility].”[95]

Precluding re-litigation of the same dispute is made in recognition that judicial resources are finite and
the number of cases that can be heard by the court is limited. Thus, the principle of res judicata seeks to
conserve scarce judicial resources and to promote efficiency. Moreover, it precludes the risk of
inconsistent results and prevents the embarrassing problem of two (2) conflicting judicial decisions when
there is re-litigation.[96] Hence, res judicata “encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars vexatious
litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes.”[97]

Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.

Res judicata by bar by prior judgment, enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b)[98] of the Rules of Court, is in
effect when, “between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.”[99]

Thus, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

The second concept, pertaining to conclusiveness of judgment, is found in Rule 39, Section 47(c)[100] of
the Rules of Court. There is conclusiveness of judgment when “there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action[.]” Moreover, “the first judgment is conclusive only as
to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein.”[101] Thus, when a court of competent jurisdiction judicially tried and settled a right or
fact, or an opportunity for a trial has been given, the court’s judgment should be conclusive upon the
parties.[102] In Nabus v. Court of Appeals:[103]

The doctrine [of conclusiveness of judgment] states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their
privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only
identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel, in contrast to the judgment as
a bar, are identity of parties and identity of issues.

It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct
issue arising in the second. In order that this rule may be applied, it must clearly and positively appear,
either from the record itself or by the aid of competent extrinsic evidence that the precise point or
question in issue in the second suit was involved and decided in the first. And in determining whether a
given question was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind the judgment to ascertain
whether the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in the second action would have authorized a
judgment for the same party in the first action.[104] (Citations omitted)

In essence, res judicata by bar by prior judgment prohibits the filing of a second case when it has the
same parties, subject, and cause of action, or when the litigant prays for the same relief as in the first
case. Meanwhile, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment precludes the re-litigation of a fact or issue
that has already been judicially settled in the first case between the same parties.[105] If, between the
first and second case, the causes of action are different and only the parties and issues are the same, res
judicata is still present by conclusiveness of judgment.[106]

To properly invoke res judicata, the following elements must concur:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.[107]

In this case, this Court’s ruling in Lejano cannot preclude petitioner’s filing of the contempt action.
The principle of res judicata, a civil law principle, is not applicable in criminal cases, as explained
in Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman.[108] As further held in People v. Escobar,[109] while certain
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Besides, even if the principle of res judicata were applied, this action is still not precluded by the finality
of the decision in the criminal case.

Between Lejano and this contempt case, only the first three (3) elements of res judicata are present: (1)
the judgment in Lejano is final; (2) it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (3) it was a
judgment on the merits. The last element is absent: there is no identity of parties, issues, and cause of
action in the two (2) cases.

Clearly, respondents in this contempt action are not parties in the criminal case. Moreover, the issue and
the cause of action here are different from the criminal case.

Here, the action seeks to cite respondents in contempt, while in the criminal case, the accused sought to
reverse his conviction. Respondents argue that this complaint is rendered “moot” because the non-
production of the semen specimen is merely incidental to the issue of petitioner’s innocence. Further,
respondents stress that the ruling in Lejano as to the loss of specimen was already settled. They, thus,
conclude that the judgment regarding the loss of the specimen bars the contempt case because the DNA
testing is no longer of practical value to petitioner.

Respondents attempt to water down the non-production of the evidence by attacking the underlying
purpose of this Court’s order. Their arguments falter.

To be clear, contempt of court simply asks whether respondents willfully defied this Court’s order. Their
reasoning only tends to weaken the authority of this Court. They present a dangerous argument; that is,
people can choose to defy this Court’s orders as long as it fits their perception.

Moreover, in Lejano, this Court answered the question of whether the loss of the specimen entitles the
accused to acquittal. In this contempt case, it only resolves if there was willful disregard or disobedience
of this Court’s order, regardless of its underlying purpose or value to this Court or to the parties.

In sum, there is a lack of identity of parties, issues, and cause of action between the criminal case and
the contempt action. As such, the judgment in the criminal case will not preclude this case’s resolution.

II

Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice,
and dignity.[110] In Lim-Lua v. Lua,[111] this Court explained that contempt of court “signifies not only a
willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the
due administration of justice.”[112]

The power to cite persons in contempt is an essential element of judicial authority.[113] All courts have
the inherent power to punish for contempt to the end that they may “enforce their authority, preserve
their integrity, maintain their dignity, and insure the effectiveness of the administration of justice.” [114]

In Roque, Jr. v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff:[115]

The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order in
court processes. In Re: Kelly provides:

The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority, is a part of the law of the land.

Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose
silence, respect, and decorum in their presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as a
corollary to this provision, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and
pollution.

The existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is essential to the observance of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the courts,
and consequently to the due administration of justice.[116] (Citations omitted)

There are two (2) types of contempt under the Rules of Court, namely: (1) direct contempt; and (2)
indirect contempt.

There is direct contempt when there is a “misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before [it.]”[117] It includes disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, refusal to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition.[118] It may be meted out “summarily without a hearing.”[119]

Under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, there is indirect contempt when any of the following acts
are committed:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his [or her] official duties or in his [or her]
official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the
act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or
upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order or process of a court held by him [or her].

Contempt proceedings are sui generis. They “may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and
independently of any action.”[120]

The power of contempt has a two-fold aspect, namely: “(1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for
his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of some act or duty required
of him by the court which he refuses to perform.”[121] Due to this two-fold aspect, contempt may be
classified as civil or criminal.[122]

Criminal contempt is a “conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.”[123] On the other hand, civil contempt is one’s failure to fulfill a court order in a
civil action that would benefit the opposing party. It is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order was made.[124]

In People v. Godoy,[125] this Court held that the primary consideration in determining whether a contempt
is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the power of contempt is exercised.[126]

A proceeding is criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment. Criminal contempt is directed
against the power and dignity of the court with no element of personal injury involved. The private
parties’ interest in the criminal contempt proceedings is tangential, if any.[127]

In contrast, a proceeding is civil when the purpose is compensatory or remedial.[128] In such case,
contempt “consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the
benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before the court[.]”[129] Thus, in civil contempt, the
party in whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real party-in-interest in the proceedings. [130]

Furthermore, in Godoy:

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal
actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in
their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the
court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal
proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The
proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and
criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be
conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the
strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the
accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings
are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are
preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are
proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the
thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and
enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree
intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its form,
if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of
the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the punishment is to
aid in an enforcement of obedience.[131] (Citation omitted)

A difference between criminal and civil contempt also lies in the determination of the burden of proof. In
criminal contempt proceedings, the contemnor is “presumed innocent and the burden is on the
prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.”[132]In civil contempt proceedings, no
presumption exists, “although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not
be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence.”[133]

The disobedience that the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. [134] To be held
liable for contempt, a person’s act must be done willfully or for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
Thus, the good faith, or lack thereof, of the person being cited in contempt should be considered. [135]
In Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines:[136]

There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good
faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the act complained of is
ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting
in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances,
held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he
contends for what he believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose,
however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done
willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.[137] (Citations omitted)

However, this Court has clarified that intent is a necessary element only in criminal contempt cases.
Because the purpose of civil contempt proceeding is remedial and not punitive, intent is immaterial.
Hence, good faith or lack of intent to violate the court’s order is not a defense in civil contempt.[138]
Here, respondents were charged with indirect contempt on two (2) grounds under the Rules of Court: (1)
“disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court”; and (2)
“improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice[.]”

III

On the first ground, petitioner contends that respondents Gatdula, Caabay, Mantaring, Dr. Bautista, Dr.
Cabanayan, Atty. Arizala, and Atty. Esmeralda all disobeyed this Court’s order in failing to produce the
specimen for DNA analysis.

Since the order to have the DNA test was made for petitioner’s benefit, disobedience of or resistance to
the order is in the nature of civil contempt.

In allowing the test, this Court declared that the DNA technology would afford petitioner the fullest
extent of his constitutional right to due process. In its Resolution, this Court stated:

“It is well to remind the parties that a flawed procedure in the conduct of DNA analysis of the semen
specimen on the slides used during the trial for microscopic examination of human spermatozoa may
yield an inconclusive result and thus will not entitle the accused to an acquittal. More important,
allowing Webb to utilize the latest available DNA technology does not automatically guarantee an
exculpatory DNA evidence, but simply to afford appellant Webb the fullest extent of his constitutional
right to due process.”[139] (Citation omitted)

Furthermore, when this contempt petition was filed, petitioner’s purpose was to seek the enforcement
of this Court’s order for his benefit and advantage.

Petitioner has shown that respondents acted with gross negligence in safekeeping the specimen in their
custody. The records show that respondents, when repeatedly asked to produce the specimen,
convinced the trial court that they have the specimen in their custody.

During the February 5, 1996 hearing, the defense lawyers requested the production of the slides
containing the semen specimen. The prosecution stated that the slides were not available that day, but
promised to bring them the following day:

COURT:

Is this slide available now?

FISCAL ZUNO:

It is not available, Your Honor with these questions propounded by the counsel, we can produce
the slide itself, Your Honor, and can be produced by the laboratory technician who examined the
 slide, Your Honor. So that the doctor will not make any estimate of the slide. Because further
questions on the slide, on the size of the slide, Your Honor, we will object to it on the ground that it
is not the best evidence. We will be presenting the slide, Your Honor.

....

COURT:

Is the slide not available today?

FISCAL ZUNO:

It is not available, Your Honor because we did not expect that questions will be asked on the slide.
We will bring the slide on the next hearing, Your Honor.[140]

The following day, when respondent Dr. Cabanayan was asked to produce the slides, he testified that he
forgot all about it:

ATTY. AGUIRRE:

Q:
Yesterday Doctor you were drawing the size of the slides you used in taking the sample of the
seminal fluid, but the prosecution objected to and instead they said it would be better they
will produce in court the slides which you used for the examination of the seminal fluid or the
fluid taken from the genitalia of Carmela Vizconde. Did you bring with you now those three (3)
slides?

WITNESS DR. CABANAYAN:

A: I am sorry to inform the Honorable Court that I forgot all about it before I came here.[141]

On February 7, 1996, respondent Dr. Cabanayan still failed to produce the slides. This time, he even
testified that he last saw the slides in 1995.[142]

These exchanges before the trial court belie respondents’ claim that they submitted the sperm specimen
to the court. Moreover, the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence shows that the exhibits submitted
were merely the photographs of the slides containing the vaginal smear. The actual slides were never
submitted in court.

Subsequently, the National Bureau of Investigation also issued a certification on April 23, 1997 that the
sperm specimen was still in its custody. In their attempt to evade responsibility, respondents later
claimed that it was the medical technologist who confirmed that the specimen was still in the Bureau’s
care, and they relied on this information in good faith. As discussed, good faith is not a defense in civil
contempt proceedings.

Moreover, respondents failed to convince this Court that they have acted in the regular performance of
their duty. They did not controvert petitioner’s allegations and evidence; particularly, they offered no
explanation as to the contradicting claims of respondent Dr. Cabanayan and the facts behind the
certification issued by the National Bureau of Investigation. Aside from their bare assertion that the
medical technologist gave them the wrong information, no other evidence showed that they transferred
the specimen to the trial court or to other agency’s custody.

Finally, respondents’ argument that they were not in service yet when the incident happened is
untenable since the National Bureau of Investigation submitted its Compliance on April 27, 2010 and July
16, 2010, when all of them were already in service.

While this Court has ruled that the power to cite persons in contempt should be used sparingly, it should
be wielded to ensure the infallibility of justice, where the defiance or disobedience is patent and
contumacious that there is an evident refusal to obey.[143]

The facts here sufficiently prove that, indeed, there was willful disobedience. Respondents Gatdula,
Caabay, Mantaring, Dr. Bautista, Dr. Cabanayan, Atty. Arizala, and Atty. Esmeralda should, therefore, be
cited in contempt for disobedience of a lawful order of this Court.

Corollary to its power of contempt, courts have the inherent power to impose a penalty that is
reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense.[144] This penalty must be exercised on the
preservative and corrective principle, not for vindicatory or retaliatory purpose.[145]

Under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, if a respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a regional trial court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he or she may be
punished by a fine not exceeding P30,000.00, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months.

Thus, this Court finds it proper to mete out the penalty of P20,000.00 on respondents Gatdula, Caabay,
Mantaring, Dr. Bautista, Dr. Cabanayan, Atty. Arizala, and Atty. Esmeralda.

IV

On the second ground, petitioner prays that respondents Atty. Rivera and Herra be held in contempt for
coaching Alfaro in executing her dubious affidavit and in the coached identification of petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that these acts amount to improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice.
A contempt case on this ground is in the nature of a criminal contempt. Being a criminal
contempt, it must be shown that respondents acted willfully or for an illegitimate purpose. This implies
willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.[146] In criminal contempt, the contemnor is
presumed innocent and the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the contemnor is guilty of
contempt lies with the petitioner.[147]

Here, respondents were not shown to have planned a deliberate scheme to inculpate petitioner.
Petitioner’s sole evidence against respondent Atty. Rivera is Atty. Artemio Sacaguing’s testimony stating
that Alfaro supposedly told him that Atty. Rivera asked her to execute a second affidavit. There was no
other evidence presented supporting this. This does not satisfy the quantum of evidence required of
petitioner.

It was also not shown that respondent Herra coached Alfaro to identify petitioner. Allegedly, So, another
Bureau agent, witnessed how respondent Herra coached Alfaro. However, in his testimony, So merely
mentioned that respondent Herra asked him if petitioner was the person in the photo while Alfaro was
around:

ATTY. BAUTISTA:

Q: Now, when you went to the room of Jessica Alfaro on the second floor where John Herra was
likewise there together with the pictures of Hubert Webb, upon your arrival in the place, what
happened?

WITNESS SO:

A: Agent John Herra showed me the pictures of Mr. Hubert Webb.

ATTY. BAUTISTA:

Q: Yes. And why were the pictures shown to you, were you told why those pictures were being
shown to you?

WITNESS SO:

A: Agent John Herra asked me, “Is this Hubert?”, “Ito ba si Hubert?”

....

ATTY BAUTISTA:
 Q: Now, when that question “Ito ba si Hubert?” was asked of you by John Herra, was Jessica
Alfaro present?

WITNESS SO:

A: Yes, Your Honor.

....

ATTY. BAUTISTA:

Q: Who asked "Saan 'yung nunal ni Huber Webb", who asked that?

WITNESS SO:

A: Agent John Herra, Your Honor.

....

ATTY. BAUTISTA:

Q: When Agent John Herra asked you kung nasaan ‘yung nunal [ni] Hubert, was Jessica Alfaro
present?

WITNESS SO:

A: Yes, Your Honor.[148]

Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt. This Court cannot cite a person for criminal
contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he or she intended to commit it.[149] The evidence
here does not clearly show that respondent Herra coached Alfaro to identify petitioner. This is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the contempt complaint against respondents Atty. Rivera
and Herra must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Respondents Magtanggol B. Gatdula, Carlos S. Caabay,
Nestor M. Mantaring, Dr. Renato C. Bautista, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Atty. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., and
Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda are found GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. They are sentenced to pay a
fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) each. However, the Petition against respondents Atty.
Pedro Rivera and John Herra is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 240984, September 27, 2021 ]

HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP. AND
PHILIPPINE FOREMOST MILLING CORP., RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 241120]

MICHAEL L. ROMERO, PETITIONER, VS. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP, AND PHILIPPINE FOREMOST
MILLING CORP., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

These petitions for review on certiorari[1] assail the July 13, 2017 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 38210 which reversed and set aside the February 2, 2015 Decision [3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 09-121953, finding Harbour Centre Port Terminal.,
Inc. (HCPTI), Michael L. Romero (Romero), Edwin L. Jeremillo (Jeremillo), and Henry Rophen V. Virola
(Virola), guilty of Indirect Contempt for violating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) [4] issued by
Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila (RTC Branch 24) on September 25, 2008. The assailed July 24, 2018
Resolution[5] of the appellate court denied herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents:

On November 19, 2004, HCPTI, the operator of the Manila Harbour Centre, on one hand, and La Filipina
Uygongco Corp. (LFUC), an enterprise engaged in the importation and trading of fertilizers, milk and
dairy products, soybean meal and sugar, together with its sister company Philippine Foremost Milling
Corp. (PFMC), an entity primarily organized to import and mill wheat, flour and animal foods, on the
other hand, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[6] which provided, among others, priority
berthing rights to the domestic and foreign vessel's of respondents LFUC and PFMC.

In 2008, the parties' relationship turned fetid. On August 29, 2008, HCPTI sent a letter to respondents
LFUC and PFMC informing them of their accountabilities amounting to P362,670,820.42 representing
rental, overhauling, and additional wharfage fees, short payments, and other receivables.[7]

By way of response, respondents LFUC and PFMC alleged that HCPTI failed to provide priority berthing to
their vessels and to conduct dredging to maintain the depth of the navigational access channel and
berthing area. Consequently, respondents LFUC and PFMC filed a Complaint for Compliance with
Maritime Law, Regulation and Contract, Breach of Contract, Specific Performance and Damages docketed
as Civil Case No. 08-119957 against petitioner HCPTI before the RTC.[8]

On even date, respondents' application for a 72-hour restraining order was granted.[9] On September 11,
2008, the trial court granted respondents' application for a 20-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
[10]
Eventually, a WPI[11] was issued by Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila on September 25, 2008, which
enjoined HCPTI from preventing respondents LFUC and PFMC access to its rail lines and unloaders, and
from using the port facilities of HCPTI, among others.

However, from March 9, 2009 to June 28, 2009, around twenty-four (24) barges and tugboats classified
as domestic vessels chartered by respondents LFUC and PFMC were either not allowed access to their
unloaders and rail lines, or were delayed, in using the berthing area, fronting their facilities, in violation
of the November 19, 2004 MOA and the WPI issued by RTC Branch 24.

During the said periods, respondents' barges were not permitted to berth in their assigned berthing area
despite the fact that they were ready for berthing and notwithstanding that the proper documentations
were already submitted by respondents to HCPTI such as the PPA Application for Berth/Anchorage, an
HCPTI Commitment Sheet and Request for Berth Application.

There were even instances when respondents' barges were allowed to berth at the berthing area, only to
be ordered to vacate the same before the cargoes were fully discharged or unloaded. As a consequence,
respondents were constrained to rent the said barges for an extended period of time thereby causing
them to incur additional expenses. Respondents were also forced to unload some of their cargoes at the
property owned by the Philippine National Bank adjacent to the berthing area, which resultantly caused
them, to pay unnecessary charges.

This prompted respondents LFUC and PFMC to file a Petition for Indirect Contempt[12] on August 13, 2009
against HCPTI and individual respondents therein Virola, Romero, and Jeremillo, in their capacities as
Vice President for Operations, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Operating Officer for
Administration, respectively, before the RTC of Manila. Respondents averred that HCPTI and its officers
willfully violated the WPI issued by RTC Branch 24 as well as the provisions of the November 19, 2004
MOA when they denied respondents access to and use of its rail lines, unloaders and port facilities.

In its Answer,[13] HCPTI denied the accusations of respondents. It claimed that respondents either failed
to apply for berthing for any or all of the vessels allegedly denied priority berthing, or some of the said
vessels were never serviced at all by HCPTI during the period from March 19, 2010 to June 28, 2010.
HCPTI further argued that a charge for Indirect Contempt is criminal in nature and thus, the rules of
evidence in contempt proceedings should be applied as far as practicable.

Ruling of the Regional Trial

Court:

The RTC Branch 42, in its February 2, 2015 Decision,[14] dismissed the Petition for Indirect Contempt. It
ratiocinated that pursuant to Sections 3 and 4 of the MOA, priority berthing for respondents' domestic
vessels can be availed of only when the two requirements set forth are met: first, the Locators,
respondents herein, serve a Final Advice of Arrival (FAA) upon HCPTI; and second, the Berthing Area is
vacant.

The RTC Branch 42 found that no written FAA was submitted by respondents to HCPTI in contravention
of the MOA. Moreover, the delay in the berthing of the subject vessels was due to the failure of the
respondents to indicate their vessels' Expected Time of Arrival (ETA) in some of their Berth Applications.

Respondents moved for reconsideration which the RTC Branch 42 denied in an Order[15] dated October 8,
2015.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. They averred that their failure to furnish HCPTI with
the written advice of their vessels' arrival was not a valid reason to deny them of berthing rights. They
argued that for the last three years prior to 2008 before the present dispute arose and even after the
petition for indirect contempt was filed, they have been allowed priority berthing rights even without
their submission of the FAA and other documents. They also claimed that they need not inform HCPTI of
the ETA of their barges since HCPTI was aware of their vessels' arrival because they were merely 200
meters away from the berthing area.

In their brief,[16] petitioners insisted that the appeal tiled by respondents should be dismissed even
without necessarily delving into the merits because the February 2, 2015 Decision of the RTC dismissing
the petition for Indirect Contempt bars a second prosecution. They maintained that the dismissal is akin
to an acquittal of an accused in a criminal case, hence, could not be the subject of an appeal.[17]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In its July 13, 2017 Decision,[18] the appellate court did not sustain the finding of the trial court and
instead found petitioners liable for Indirect Contempt for willfully violating the WPI issued by the RTC
Branch 24 and failing to comply with the November 19, 2004 MOA. It further held that contrary to the
contention of the petitioners, the petition for indirect contempt filed by respondents is not criminal but
civil in nature since the primordial objective of the petition was to compel obedience to the injunctive
writ for the benefit of respondents.

The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners HCPTI and Romero were denied by the appellate
court in a Resolution[19] dated July 24, 2018.

Undaunted, petitioner HCPTI appealed the July 13, 2017 Decision and July 24, 2018 Resolution via the
instant petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 240984. Petitioner Romero's, appeal was docketed as
G.R. No. 241120.

In a Resolution dated April 8, 2019,[20] the two cases were ordered consolidated as they involve the same
parties and issues and assail the same CA Decision.

Issues
1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioners liable for indirect contempt; and

2) Whether or not the CA erred in finding the present petition for indirect contempt civil in nature.

Petitioners insist that they could not be held guilty of indirect contempt since respondents themselves
violated the terms of the November 19, 2004 MOA when they failed to serve HCPTI with a written FAA of
their barges as well as their ETA. This failure on the part of respondents prevented HCPTI from
determining the exact time of arrival of respondents' vessels such that they had to allocate the vacant
berthing area to another available vessel that is ready for berthing. Further, petitioners reiterate that the
petition for indirect contempt is criminal in nature, Ergo, the RTC Decision dismissing the petition
amounted to an acquittal, hence, an appeal does not lie.

Our Ruling

Petitioners' contentions are partly meritorious.

In Oca v. Custodio,[21] the Court distinguished criminal contempt from civil contempt, as follows:

The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal contempt.

Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the
benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's
authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.

This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to punish the party for disrespecting
the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform.

In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:

Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil
or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for
the benefit of the opposing party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or
dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the punishment imposed, whether
against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power
of the court, either by fine payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a
judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature
of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the
performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or decree rendered
in his behalf the contempt judgment will, if made before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an
interlocutory order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on
appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate to the review of judgments in civil
cases. x x x The question of whether the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the
jurisdiction or the power of a Court to punish the same.

The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further elaborated in People v. Godoy:

It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought, or
the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose, is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.

Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal, or quasi-criminal
actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in
their prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the
court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they axe not criminal
proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The
proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and
criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be
conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
procedure is consistent, with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the
strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the
accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings
are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are
preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are
proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the
thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and
enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree
intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil contempt, regardless of its
form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in
behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the
punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal
contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.

In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or has successor, or
someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings,
it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor.

Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent
and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for
civil contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while
the proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere
between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden.
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order, judgment, or decree
which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the
preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The
purpose of the contemner's punishment is to compel obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not
treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to prove it.
[22]
(Emphasis supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)

In the case at bar, respondents prayed for the following reliefs in their petition for indirect contempt, as
follows:

a) DECLARE [petitioners] guilty of indirect contempt, under Section (b) of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure;

b) ORDER HCPTI and each of the individual [petitioners] to pay the fine of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) each;

c) ORDER that each of the individual [petitioners] be imprisoned for six (6) months; and

d) ORDER each of the [petitioner] jointly and severally liable to pay [respondents] in the amount of
SIXTEEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE and 27/100
(P16,712,789.27), and other demurrage and unloading costs that may be incurred should [petitioners]
continue to violate the writ of preliminary injunction after the filing of the instant petition. [23]

While the reliefs prayed for by respondents is a combination of both criminal and civil, punishment, the
nature of the contempt proceeding in. this case is more civil than criminal. To recall, respondents alleged
that during the period. March 9, 2009 to June 28, 2009, thirty-nine (39) of its vessels and barges were
denied access to HCPTI's rail lines and unloaders and the use of its port facilities in violation of the WPI
and the November 19, 2004 MOA.

Clearly, the purpose of the contempt petition was for the enforcement of the September 25, 2008 WPI.
It is a remedy resorted to preserve and enforce the rights of respondents and to compel obedience to
the injunctive writ which was issued for their benefit. Hence, the petition for contempt is civil in nature.
Accordingly, an appeal from the decision dismissing the same is not barred by double jeopardy. The
appellate court was therefore correct in holding that the petition, for indirect contempt instituted by the
respondents herein is civil in nature.

Be that as it may, We find that petitioners are not guilty of indirect contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's order, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or,
in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or
dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation.[24]

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order
injudicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.[25] "However, such power should be exercised on the
preservative, not on the vindictive, principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect[,] without which the administration of justice will falter or
fail."[26] Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. Such
power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice.[27]

In this case, HCPTI's failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents' vessels during the period
material to the case was not intended to undermine the authority of the court or an act of disobedience
to the September 25, 2008 WPI of the RTC Branch 24.

To recall, the WPI enjoined HCPTI and any of its agents from "preventing plaintiffs access to its rail lines
and unloaders and from using the port facilities of HCPTI." It likewise directed the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) to "ensure that HCPTI is enjoined from the acts complained of, particularly any act that
would prevent plaintiffs from utilizing the port facilities of defendant HCPTI in accordance with the MOA
dated November 19, 2004."

The injunction order, therefore, recognized the applicability of the MOA in the enforcement of the WPI.

Under the MOA, respondents were given priority berthing rights over the berth fronting their facility,
subject to the conditions set forth in Sections 3 and 4 of the said MOA, viz.:

Section 3. Domestic (Coastwise) Vessels' Port and Handling Charges. - HCPTI shall allow the berthing of
the Locator's domestic (coastwise) vessels at the Berthing Area, provided that the Locators serve a
written final advice of arrival upon HCPTI. It is understood that should, the Locators' domestic
(coastwise) vessel be unable to berth at the Berthing Area due to congestion caused by the volume of
other vessels being accommodated by HCPTI, or for any other reasonable causes, HCPTI shall allow the
Locators' domestic (coastwise) vessels to discharge in the nearest vacant berth other than the Berthing
Area. However, should the berthing area be vacated, the Locators' domestic (coastwise) vessels shall be
allowed to immediately transfer to the Berthing Area at the expense of the Locators. x x x

Section 4. - Priority Berthing. The Locators shall continue to have the right to priority berthing at the
Harbour Centre Port Terminal as defined in Section 1(a) of this Agreement and shall be strictly
implemented, as follows:

a. Foreign bulk carrier vessels chartered by Locators.

1. Foreign bulk carrier vessels chartered by the Locators shall have priority berthing in the Berthing Area
over any other vessels being served by HCPTI upon submission of the Locators' final advice of arrival. xxx

b. Domestic (Coastwise) Vessels of Locators.

Domestic (coastwise) vessels owned or chartered by the locators shall likewise enjoy priority berthing
when the berthing Area is vacant. But should the Berthing Area be occupied, by a Third party vessel
whose operation is already in progress upon arrival of the Locators' vessel, the Third Party vessel shall be
allowed to complete its operation at the Berthing Area or shall be shifted to another available berth to
give way to the Locators' vessel, at the option of HCPTI.[28]

In short, respondents' priority berthing rights is not absolute. The same is conditioned on: 1) the
submission of the required documents such as a written FAA of its vessels to HCPTI; and 2) the
availability of the designated berthing area. In this case, the RTC Branch 24 found, that respondents did
not submit a written FAA to HCPTI in violation of the November 19, 2004 MOA. This was admitted no less
by respondents' own witness, Love Lee, Logistics Manager of PFMC.[29] Moreover, the MOA provides that
if the berthing area is occupied by another vessel, respondents' vessels will have to wait until it is
vacated by the third party vessel either after the completion of its discharge or upon its transfer to
another berthing area.[30]

Petitioners' witness, Bryan D. Gayagoy, Senior Manager for Planning of HCPTI, testified that some of
respondents' berth applications did not contain the ETA of their vessels to allow HCPTI to schedule their
berthing. Without foreknowledge of when these barges would arrive, HCPTI would, thus, be justified to
allocate the vacant berthing area to the other vessels which are at that time ready for berthing, to
maximize its utilization. He explained that without the ETA, there is no way for them to know when
respondents' vessel would arrive.

Arguing against it, respondents contend that HCPTI could not deny awareness of the arrival of
respondents' barges because they were located merely 200 meters away from the berthing area.

This contention is specious.

To reiterate, respondents' priority berthing right is subject to the condition that the berthing area is
vacant. Thus, even if respondents' vessels are already near the vicinity of petitioners' terminals, if the
berthing area is occupied by a third party vessel, respondents' barges could not be immediately
accommodated. It must wait until after the unloading of the third party vessel has been completed or it
has transferred to another berthing area. It is only when no other vessel is available for berthing at the
time the berth application is filed that the vessel with no ETA would be provisionally scheduled for
berthing.[31]

In fine, considering that petitioners' failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents' vessels
during the time material to the instant case was due to respondents' own failure to comply with the
requirements mandated in the November 19, 2004 MOA, We find that petitioners did not commit any
act amounting to indirect contempt.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 13, 2017 Decision and July 24,
2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38210 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the February 2, 2015 Decision and October 8, 2015 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 4-2 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.