December 4, 2024

AFTER ACTION REVIEW OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC:

The Lessons Learned and a Path Forward

Final Report of the

Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

Committee on Oversight and Accountability

U.S. House of Representatives

 5) Former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo participated in medical malpractice and
publicly covered up the total number of nursing home fatalities in New York.

In addition to these notable bipartisan successes, the Select Subcommittee developed

extensive findings, some of which include:

1) The U.S. National Institutes of Health funded gain-of-function research at the Wuhan
Institute of Virology.

2) The Chinese government, agencies within the U.S. Government, and some members of
the international scientific community sought to cover-up facts concerning the origins of
the pandemic.

3) Operation Warp Speed was a tremendous success and a model to build upon in the future.
The vaccines, which are now probably better characterized as therapeutics, undoubtedly
saved millions of lives by diminishing likelihood of severe disease and death.

4) Rampant fraud, waste, and abuse plagued the COVID-19 pandemic response.

5) Pandemic-era school closures will have enduring impact on generations of America’s

children and these closures were enabled by groups meant to serve those children.

6) The Constitution cannot be suspended in times of crisis and restrictions on freedoms sow
distrust in public health.

7) The prescription cannot be worse than the disease, such as strict and overly broad
lockdowns that led to predictable anguish and avoidable consequences.

Chairing the Select Subcommittee for the 118th Congress has been my honor. I said from
the beginning, this work is the single most impactful responsibility I have undertaken in 12 years
in Congress, and it has been. This work will help the United States, and the world, predict the
next pandemic, prepare for the next pandemic, protect ourselves from the next pandemic, and
hopefully prevent the next pandemic. Members of the 119th Congress should continue and build
off this work, there is more information to find and honest actions to be taken.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted a distrust in leadership. Trust is earned.

Accountability, transparency, honesty, and integrity will regain this trust. A future pandemic
requires a whole of America response managed by those without personal benefit or bias. We can
always do better, and for the sake of future generations of Americans, we must. It can be done!

Sincerely,

Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M.

Chairman
Table of Contents

Preface

I. List of Key Names and Institutions ..................................................................................... i

II. List of Hearings and Meetings ........................................................................................... xi

III. List of Transcribed Interviews and Depositions .............................................................. xix

IV. On-the-Ground Oversight .............................................................................................. xxiii

The Origins of the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including but Not Limited to the Federal
Government’s Funding of Gain-of-Function Research

I. The Unknown Origins of COVID-19 ..................................................................................1

A. SARS-CoV-2, the Virus that Causes COVID-19, Likely Emerged Because of a

Laboratory or Research Related Accident .....................................................................1

B. “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” Was “Prompted” by Dr. Anthony Fauci to

“Disprove” the Lab Leak Theory ...................................................................................5

II. The Failures of EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. ...........................................................................58

A. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Facilitated Gain-of-Function Research at the Wuhan

Institute of Virology .....................................................................................................58

B. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Submitted its Year 5 Annual Progress Report Nearly Two
Years Late ....................................................................................................................68

C. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Failed to Timely Report a Dangerous Experiment to the U.S.
National Institutes of Health ........................................................................................78

D. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Failed to Provide the U.S. National Institutes of Health with
Research the U.S. Taxpayer Funded ............................................................................84

E. To Get a Grant Reinstated, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Misled the U.S. National
Institutes of Health Regarding the Physical Locations of U.S. Funded Samples ......102

F. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Rejected EcoHealth Alliance,

Inc.’s DEFUSE Proposal Because of a Lack of Gain-of-Function or Dual Use
Research of Concern Plan ..........................................................................................108

G. The Department of Justice Empaneled a Criminal Grand Jury to Investigate the

Origins of COVID-19 ................................................................................................ 119
III. The Failures of the National Institutes of Health and National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases...........................................................................................................123

A. The U.S. National Institutes of Health and National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases Failed to Oversee EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. ................................................123

B. Dr. Anthony Fauci Played Semantics with the Definition of Gain-of-Function

Research .....................................................................................................................133

C. The U.S. National Institutes of Health and National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases Granted U.S. Taxpayer Funds to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army ...139

D. Senior National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Leadership Fostered an

Environment That Promoted Evading the Freedom of Information Act ...................140

E. A National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Freedom of Information Act

Official Apparently Aided Others in Efforts to Evade the Freedom of Information Act
....................................................................................................................................143

The Efficacy, Effectiveness, and Transparency of the Use of Taxpayer Funds and Relief
Programs to Address the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including Any Reports of Waste, Fraud,
or Abuse

I. The Paycheck Protection Program ...................................................................................146

F. The Paycheck Protection Program Was Rife with Fraudulent Claims Resulting in at
Least $64 Billion of Taxpayers’ Dollars Lost to Fraudsters and Criminals ...............148

G. The U.S. Small Business Administration Did Not Properly Define Critical Internal
Roles and Responsibilities and Failed to Provide Actionable Guidance to External
Stakeholders to Manage Fraud Risk and Combat Paycheck Protection Program
Abuse. ........................................................................................................................149

II. Enhanced Unemployment Insurance ...............................................................................152

A. Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments Total More Than $191 Billion ..... 153

B. States Failed to Improve Their Preparedness and Implement Data-Driven Oversight,

Leading to Increased Fraud Across All Pandemic-Related Unemployment Insurance
Programs ....................................................................................................................156

III. Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program ........................................................................159

 A. The U.S. Small Business Administration Disaster Programs, Including COVID-19
Economic Injury Disaster Loans, Suffered Increased Vulnerability to Fraud and
Unnecessary Losses of at Least $200 Million. ..........................................................159

B. U.S. Small Business Administration Did Not Implement Proper Oversight Controls to
Prevent Fraudulent Economic Injury Disaster Loans ................................................161

IV. Transnational Fraud .........................................................................................................163

A. Lackluster Oversight Resulted in Transnational Criminal Organizations and

Fraudsters Stealing U.S. Taxpayer Money from Pandemic Relief Funds .................164

B. Domestic and International Fraudsters that Stole from Pandemic Relief Programs
were also Connected to Other Organized Crimes ......................................................165

V. Flaws in Pandemic Program Oversight............................................................................166

A. Federal Agencies Overseeing Pandemic Relief Funds were Needlessly “Siloed Off”
from Each Other, Which Prevented Wholistic Tracking and Disbursing of Funds to
Prevent Fraud .............................................................................................................166

B. Federal Agencies Did Not Require and Failed to Validate Information Provided by
Applicants to Properly Verify Eligibility ...................................................................168

C. Federal and State Agencies Lacked Up-to-Date Financial Management Systems,

Failing to Meet Federally Mandated Modernization Requirements, Leading to
Billions of Dollars of American Taxpayer Money Improperly Paid or Stolen ..........169

The Implementation or Effectiveness of Any Federal Law or Regulation Applied, Enacted,

or Under Consideration to Address the Coronavirus Pandemic and Prepare for Future
Pandemics

I. Overreliance on the World Health Organization ..............................................................171

A. The World Health Organization Failed to Uphold Its Mission and Caved to Chinese
Communist Party Pressure .........................................................................................173

B. The Chinese Communist Party Violated Articles Six and Seven of the International
Health Regulations with No Repercussions...............................................................180

C. The World Health Organization’s Report Regarding the Origins of COVID-19 Was
Incomplete, Misleading, and Parroted Chinese Communist Party Propaganda ........182

D. The World Health Organization’s Draft “Pandemic Treaty” Does Not Solve the
Organization’s Underlying Problems and May Affirmatively Harm the United States
....................................................................................................................................187
II. The Strategic National Stockpile Was Not Prepared to Address a Nationwide Viral
Pandemic ..........................................................................................................................189

A. Dating Back to the Obama Administration, the Strategic National Stockpile Was Not
Prepared for a National Public Health Emergency ....................................................190

B. States Must Mainatain Their Own Stockpile of Emergency Medical Supplies .........192

III. The United States’ Unsecure Supply Chain Risks a Future Failed Pandemic Response.......
..........................................................................................................................................194

A. The United States Must Reduce Its Reliance on Other Countries, Particularly China,
for Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies ................................................................195

IV. The Six-Foot Social Distancing Requirement Was Not Supported by Science ...............198

A. There Was No Quantitative Scientific Support for Six Feet of Social Distancing ....198

V. Masks and Mask Mandates Were Ineffective at Controlling the Spread of COVID-19 ........
..........................................................................................................................................203

A. Public Health Officials Flip Flopping on the Efficacy and Use of Face Masks Without
Full Scientific Transparency Caused Mistrust in Public Health Establishments .......204

B. The Biden Administration Exceeded its Authority by Mandating Masks .................206

C. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Relied on Flawed Studies to
Support the Issuance of Mask Mandates ...................................................................207

D. Forcibly Masking Young Children, Ages Two and Older, Caused More Harm than
Good ...........................................................................................................................212

VI. Unscientific COVID-19 Lockdowns Caused More Harm Than Good ............................214

A. Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Unnecessarily Harmed the U.S. Economy ..........215

B. Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Unnecessarily Damaged American’s Mental Health

....................................................................................................................................215

C. Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Disrupted the Development of American Children

and Young Adults .......................................................................................................216

D. Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Unnecessarily had Severe Consequences for

Americans’ Physical Health .......................................................................................217
 E. Despite Lacking Scientific Basis, Vaccine Passports Became a De Facto Lockdown
for Unvaccinated Americans ......................................................................................218

VII. Former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s March 25 Order Was Medical
Malpractice, and the New York Executive Chamber Attempted to Cover it Up .............221

A. The Cuomo Administration’s March 25 Directive Was Antithetical to Known Science

....................................................................................................................................221

B. Contrary to Denials, Mr. Andrew Cuomo and the New York Executive Chamber Were
Directly Involved in the Decision that Led to the March 25 Directive .....................222

C. The New York Executive Chamber Reviewed and Approved the March 25 Directive
....................................................................................................................................225

D. The March 25 Directive Was Inconsistent with Applicable Federal Guidance

Regarding Hospital to Nursing Home Transfers and COVID-19 Related Infection
Control .......................................................................................................................230

E. The Cuomo Administration Terminated the March 25 Directive in Response to Public

Pressure, not a Change in Applicable Science ...........................................................234

F. Cuomo Administration Officials Believed Mr. Cuomo Directed the Issuance of the
“July 6 Report” to Combat Criticism of the March 25 Directive ..............................237

G. The July 6 Report Was Not Independently Drafted by the New York State Department
of Health nor Peer Reviewed .....................................................................................238

H. Mr. Andrew Cuomo Reviewed and Edited the July 6 Report, and His Edits Were to
Make the Report’s Findings More Causal .................................................................243

I. Mr. Andrew Cuomo Was Involved in the “Peer Review” Process and Directed
Individuals Outside of the New York State Government to Review the July 6 Report
....................................................................................................................................252

J. The Executive Chamber Decided to Remove Out-of-Facility Death Data from the
July 6 Report ..............................................................................................................253

K. The New York Executive Chamber Made the Decision to Not Publicly Report Out-of-
Facility Deaths ...........................................................................................................259

L. Mr. Andrew Cuomo Acted in a Manner Consistent with an Attempt to Inappropriately

Influence the Testimony of a Witness and Obstruct the Select Subcommittee’s
Investigation ...............................................................................................................265
 M. Mr. Andrew Cuomo Likely Gave False Statements to the Select Subcommittee in
Violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001.......................................................................................274

VIII. While Testing for COVID-19 Was Flawed, Utilizing Public-Private Partnerships Resulted
in Readily Available and Accurate Tests ..........................................................................276

A. Career Scientists at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Undermined
Trust in Public Health by Overpromising and Underdelivering Early Testing Kits,
Including Knowingly Putting Tests with a High Failure Rate on the Market Without
Appropriate Disclosures.............................................................................................277

B. Public-Private Partnerships Were More Effective in Increasing Testing Production,

Distribution, and Capacity than Career Government Bureaucrats.............................280

IX. Rapidly Implemented Travel Restrictions Can Save Lives .............................................283

A. International Travel Restrictions Delayed the Spread of COVID-19 Early in the

Pandemic ....................................................................................................................283

B. But for the Chinese Communist Party Blatantly Downplaying and Lying Concerning
the Serious Threat Posed by COVID-19, Travel Restrictions Would Have Been
Imposed Earlier and Been More Effective.................................................................288

X. Government Perpetrated COVID-19 Misinformation .....................................................290

A. Public Health Officials Incorrectly Characterized the Lab-Leak Theory as a

“Conspiracy Theory” .................................................................................................290

B. The Biden Administration Employed Undemocratic and Likely Unconstitutional

Methods to Fight What It Deemed to Be Misinformation .........................................292

C. The Biden Administration and Many Public Health Officials Exaggerated the Power
of COVID-19 Vaccines ..............................................................................................296

D. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Other Public Health Officials Falsely
Implied that Ivermectin Was Only for Horses and Cows ..........................................300

The Development of Vaccines and Treatments, and the Development and Implementation
of Vaccination Policies for Federal Employees and Members of the Armed Forces

I. The Success of Operation Warp Speed ............................................................................301

A. Operation Warp Speed Was a Great Success and Helped Save Millions of Lives ....301
 B. Then Presidential Candidate Joe Biden and Vice-Presidential Candidate Kamala
Harris May Have Contributed to Early Distrust of Operation Warp Speed and
COVID-19 Vaccines ..................................................................................................303

II. The Decision to Override the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices.............305

A. The Biden Administration Arbitrarily and Without Scientific Support Announced

COVID-19 Vaccine Boosters Would be Available to All Americans.........................305

B. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director Rochelle Walensky
Overruled Expert Advisors in an Apparent Attempt to Satisfy President Joe Biden’s
Arbitrary Vaccine Approval Goals .............................................................................309

III. The Review of Pfizer’s Biologics License Application .................................................. 311

A. The Biden Administration Sidelined Senior Scientists After They Expressed Concern
Regarding the Rapid Pace of Review of Pfizer’s Biologics Approval Application ...312

B. The Biden Administration Accelerated the Approval of Pfizer’s Biologics Approval

Application to Impose Vaccine Mandates..................................................................322

C. U.S. Food and Drug Administration Officials Refused to Rebut Allegations the Biden
White House Was Involved in the Pfizer Biologics Approval Application ...............326

IV. Public Health Officials Disregarded Natural Immunity, Despite Its Proven Effectiveness
and Durability ..................................................................................................................331

A. Those Who Recovered From COVID-19 Were Conferred Infection Acquired

Immunity ....................................................................................................................331

B. Herd Immunity is a Real Concept and Occurrence supported by public health leaders
such as Dr. Fauci. There Was a Coordinated Effort from Public Health Officials to
Ignore Natural Immunity and Suppress Dissenting Opinions ...................................332

V. Vaccine Mandates Were Not Supported by Science and Caused More Harm than Good
..........................................................................................................................................336

A. COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Caused Massive Collateral Damage and Were Very
Likely Counterproductive ..........................................................................................340

B. COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Were Not Supported by Science ...............................346

C. COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Hampered U.S. Military Readiness ..........................347

VI. The COVID-19 Vaccine, While Largely Safe and Effective, Had Adverse Events That
Must be Thoroughly Investigated ....................................................................................349
 A. The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System is Insufficient and Not Transparent .......
....................................................................................................................................349

B. Existing Vaccine Safety Systems May Be Missing Important Safety Signals,

Especially Related to Neurological Conditions .........................................................353

C. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Created a new Surveillance
System Specifically for COVID-19 Vaccines but Has Not Been Fully Transparent in
Sharing the Data Collected in it .................................................................................355

VII. The U.S. Government’s Insufficient Systems for Compensating COVID-19 Vaccine
Injuries .............................................................................................................................357

A. The U.S. Government Is Failing to Efficiently, Fairly, and Transparently Adjudicate

Claims for COVID-19 Vaccine Injuries .....................................................................359

B. The Countermeasure Injury Compensation Program Failed to Handle a Mass-

Vaccination Program ..................................................................................................361

C. A Robust and Transparent Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Is Necessary for

Promoting Trust in Vaccines ......................................................................................363

D. Debating or Discussing Vaccine Injury Compensation is Not “Anti-Vax,” and

Implications Otherwise Are Counterproductive to Protecting Public Health ............364

VIII. The Erosion of the Doctor-Patient Relationship During the COVID-19 Pandemic ........366

A. Pandemic-Era Policy Often Disregarded or Outright Violated the Sanctity of the

Doctor-Patient Relationship .......................................................................................367

B. The Use of Off-Label Prescriptions Was Unjustly Demonized and Further Eroded the
Doctor-Patient Relationship .......................................................................................371

The Economic Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Associated Government Response
on Individuals, Communities, Small Businesses, Health Care Providers, States, and Local
Government Entities

I. The COVID-19 Pandemic’s Impact on American Business ............................................376

C. Government Imposed Mandatory Lockdowns Were the Primary Cause of Temporary

and Permanent Business Closures, but Other Factors Contributed as Well...............377

D. Business Closures Disproportionately Impacted Rural and Low-Income Areas and

Have Led to Long-Term Changes in These Areas .....................................................379
 E. The Lack of Supply Chain Diversity Exacerbated Economic and Business Recovery
....................................................................................................................................383

II. The COVID-19 Pandemic’s Impact on American Workers .............................................387

E. Public Health Officials’ Arbitrary and Overly Broad Mitigation Measures and
Aggressive Efforts to Squash Legitimate Scientific Debate Unnecessarily
Exacerbated Unemployment ......................................................................................389

F. Pandemic Unemployment Disproportionately Impacted Sectors with Lower Wage

Earners Compared to Higher Wage Earners, Such as Those in Professional Services,
and Lower Wage Earners Continue to Remain Unemployed at Higher Rates and Will
Likely Remain So Over the Next Decade ..................................................................393

III. The Federal Reserve’s Efforts to Mitigate the Economic Impacts of the COVID-19
Pandemic ..........................................................................................................................397

A. The Federal Reserve’s Aggressive, Early Actions Blunted Economic Damage of the
Pandemic but Contributed to Staggering Inflation in Late 2021 Through 2022 .......405

B. After Immediate Actions to Stabilize the Economy and Financial Markets, the Federal
Reserve Should Have Placed More Emphasis on Monitoring and Addressing Long-
Term Risks Associated with Prolonged Low Interest Rates and Increased Government
Debt and Ensuring that Policies Did Not Lead to Future Financial Instability .........407

C. The Federal Reserve Likely Exceeded Its Role and Responsibilities to Provide
Market Liquidity and Acting as a “Lender of Last Resort” by Assuming the Role and
Responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury by Acting as a Spender to Prevent
Market Insolvency .....................................................................................................408

The Societal Impact of Decisions to Close Schools, How the Decisions Were Made and
Whether There is Evidence of Widespread Learning Loss or Other Negative Effects as a
Result of These Decisions

I. COVID-19 Pandemic-Era School Closures ..................................................................... 411

A. Long Term School Closures Were Not Supported by Available Science and Evidence
....................................................................................................................................412

II. The American Federation of Teachers’ Influence ............................................................415

A. The American Federation of Teachers Is Not a Scientific or Medical Organization .......

....................................................................................................................................415

B. The American Federation of Teachers Did Not Support Reopening Schools and
Predicated Its Support for Reopening Schools on Non-Scientific Policies ...............416
 C. The Biden Administration’s U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Broke
Precedent and Shared a Draft Guidance with the American Federation of Teachers ......
....................................................................................................................................420

D. The American Federation of Teachers Advocated for Mitigation Measures that Were
Overly Broad and Not Scientific, including Closure Triggers, Delaying the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Issuance of the Operational Strategy ......
....................................................................................................................................422

E. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Accepted American Federation
of Teachers Edits to the Operational Strategy ............................................................428

III. The Harmful Impacts from School Closures ...................................................................438

A. Pandemic-era School Closures Adversely Impacted Academic Performance that Will

Continue for Years .....................................................................................................438

B. School Closures Significantly Contributed to Increased Instances of Mental and

Behavioral Health Issues............................................................................................440

C. School Closures Made an Already Alarming Trend in Declining Physical Health

Worse .........................................................................................................................441

Cooperation By the Executive Branch and Others with Congress, the Inspectors General,
the Government Accountability Office, and Others in Connection with Oversight of the
Preparedness for and Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic

I. The Biden Administration’s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Obstructed
the Select Subcommittee’s Investigation .........................................................................443

A. The Biden Administration’s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Deliberately Obfuscated Evidence that Could Incriminate or Embarrass Senior Public
Health Officials ..........................................................................................................444

B. The Biden Administration’s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Unreasonably and Possibly Illegally Limited Access to Key Witnesses ...................449

II. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. and Dr. Peter Daszak Obstructed the Select Subcommittee’s
Investigation and Misled the Public .................................................................................456

A. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Obstructed a Congressional Investigation .........................456

B. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Doctored Documents It Released to the Public .................462

 C. Dr. Peter Daszak Made False Statements to Congress in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001
and 18 U.SC. 1621 .....................................................................................................466

III. Dr. David Morens Likely Destroyed Evidence, Used Personal Email to Hide from
Accountability, and Acted Unbecoming of a Federal Employee .....................................467

A. Dr. David Morens Used Personal E-Mail Accounts to Avoid the Freedom of
Information Act and Accountability...........................................................................467

B. Dr. David Morens Deleted Federal Records in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 2071 ............474

C. Dr. David Morens Shared Internal U.S. National Institutes of Health Information with
Dr. Peter Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance, Inc ..........................................................481

D. Dr. David Morens Used His Position as a Federal Employee and Assisted Dr. Peter
Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance, Inc Avoid Oversight ..............................................491

E. Dr. David Morens’ Actions Violated U.S. National Institutes of Health Policy ........497

F. Dr. David Morens Acted in a Manner Unbecoming of a Federal Public Health Official
....................................................................................................................................501

G. Dr. David Morens Likely Provided False Statements to Congress in Violation of 18

U.S.C. 1001 and 18 U.S.C. 1621 ...............................................................................508

IV. New York Governor Kathy Hochul’s Administration Withheld Key Documents from the
Select Subcommittee Based on Claimed Privilege ..........................................................512

A. The Executive Chamber’s Production Is Incomplete, Overly Redacted, and Withheld

Thousands of Responsive Records Without Apparent Legal Basis ...........................513
Preface

I. List of Key Names and Institutions (by order of appearance)

U.S. Department of State [hereinafter “State Department”]

Wuhan Institute of Virology [hereinafter “WIV”]

Office of Director of National Intelligence [hereinafter “ODNI”]

U.S. Department of Energy [hereinafter “DOE”]

Federal Bureau of Investigation [hereinafter “FBI”]

Dr. Robert Redfield [hereinafter “Dr. Redfield”]

Director
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

The Honorable John Ratcliffe [hereinafter “Mr. Ratcliffe”]

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Nicholas Wade [hereinafter “Mr. Wade”]

Former Science Editor
The New York Times

EcoHealth Alliance, Inc [hereinafter “EcoHealth”]

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [hereinafter “DARPA”]

Biosafety Level [hereinafter “BSL”]

Dr. Alina Chan [hereinafter “Dr. Chan”]

Molecular Biologist
The Broad Institute

Dr. Zhengli Shi [hereinafter “Dr. Shi”]

Senior Virologist
Wuhan Institute of Virology

Dr. Peter Daszak [hereinafter “Dr. Daszak”]

President
EcoHealth Alliance Inc.

Dr. W. Ian Lipkin [hereinafter “Dr. Lipkin”]

John Snow Professor of Epidemiology

i
Columbia University

Dr. Ralph Baric [hereinafter “Dr. Baric”]

Professor, Department of Epidemiology
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Dr. Andrew Rambaut [hereinafter “Dr. Rambaut”]

Professor
University of Edinburgh

Dr. Kristian Andersen [hereinafter “Dr. Andersen”]

Professor
Scripps Research

Dr. Edward Holmes [hereinafter “Dr. Holmes”]

Professor of Biology
University of Sydney

Dr. Robert Garry [hereinafter “Dr. Garry”]

Professor
Tulane University School of Medicine

Dr. Jeremy Farrar [hereinafter “Dr. Farrar”]

Chief Scientist
World Health Organization
Former Director
Wellcome Trust

Dr. Francis Collins [hereinafter “Dr. Collins”]

Former Director
National Institutes of Health

Dr. Anthony Fauci [hereinafter “Dr. Fauci”]

Former Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

Receptor Binding Domain [hereinafter “RBD”]

Mr. Greg Folkers [hereinafter “Mr. Folkers”]

Former Chief of Staff, Office of the Director
National Institute of Allery and Infectious Diseases

Dr. Lawrence Tabak [hereinafter Dr. Tabak”]

Principal Deputy Director
National Institutes of Health

ii
Defense Intelligence Agency [hereinafter “DIA”]

CDR Jean-Paul Chretien [hereinafter “CDR Chretien”]

Program Manager, Biological Technologies Office
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

U.S. National Institutes of Health [hereinafter “NIH”]

National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases [hereinafter “NIAID”]

The Honorable James Comer [hereinafter “Mr. Comer”]

Chairman
House Oversight & Accountability Committee

Dr. Erik Stemmy [hereinafter “Dr. Stemmy”]

Team Lead, Influenza Research and Response
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease

President Donald J. Trump [hereinafter “President Trump”]

Dr. Michael Lauer [hereinafter “Dr. Lauer”]

Deputy Director for Extramural Research
National Institutes of Health

U.S. Department of Justice [hereinafter “DOJ”]

Mr. F. Gray Handley [hereinafter “Mr. Handley”]

Associate Director
National Institute of Allery and Infectious Diseases

Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter “FOIA”]

Dr. David Morens [hereinafter “Dr. Morens”]

Senior Scientific Advisor to the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

Ms. Maragret Moore [hereinafter “Ms. Moore”]

Former Freedom of Information Act Public Liaison
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act [hereinafter CARES Act”]

Paycheck Protection Program [hereinafter “PPP”]

Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program [hereinafter “EIDL”]

iii
Unemployment Insurance [hereinafter “UI”]

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee [hereinafter “PRAC”]

Inspector General [hereinafter “IG”]

American Rescue Plan Act [hereinafter “ARPA”]

President Joseph R. Biden [hereinafter “President Biden”]

U.S. Small Business Administration [hereinafter “SBA”]

Government Accountability Office [hereinafter “GAO”]

Personally Identifiable Information [hereinafter “PII”]

Social Security Number [hereinafter “SSN”]

U.S. Department of Homeland Security [hereinafter “DHA”]

Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter IRS”]

U.S. Department of Labor [hereinafter “DOL”]

Families First Coronavirus Response Act [hereinafter “FFCA”]

Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation [hereinafter “FPUC”]

Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation [hereinafter “PEUC”]

Pandemic Unemployment Assistance [hereinafter “PUA”]

Employment and Training Administration [hereinafter “ETA”]

Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act [hereinafter “CVPR”]

Employer Identification Numbers [hereinafter “EIN”]

U.S. Secret Service [hereinafter “USSS”]

U.S. Department of Treasury [hereinafter “Treasury”]

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [hereinafter “HHS”]

Treasury Do Not Pay List [hereinafter “DNP list”]

iv
Social Security Administration [hereinafter “SSA”]

Death Master File [hereinafter “DMF”]

Information Technology [hereinafter “IT”]

World Health Organization [hereinafter “WHO”]

United Nations [hereinafter “UN”]

Chinese Communist Party [hereinafter “CCP”]

Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus [hereinafter “Dr. Tedros”]

Director-General
World Health Organization

International Health Regulations [hereinafter “IHR”]

Strategic National Stockpile [hereinafter “SNS”]

Personal Protective Equipment [hereinafter “PPE”]

Department of Defense [hereinafter “DOD”]

Dr. Hillary Marston [hereinafter “Dr. Marston”]

Chief Medical Officer
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

The Honorable John Nkengasong [hereinafter “Ambassador Nkengasong”]

Ambassador-at-Large
U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
Senior Bureau Official for Global Health Security and Diplomacy
U.S. Department of State

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [hereinafter “CDC”]

Dr. Rochelle Walensky [hereinafter “Dr. Walensky”]

Director
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Randomized Control Trial [hereinafter “RCT”]

Dr. Deborah Birx [hereinafter “Dr. Birx”]

Coordinator
White House Coronavirus Response

v
U.S. Food and Drug Administration [hereinafter “FDA”]

Emergency Use Authorization [hereinafter “EUA”]

Mr. Mark Zuckerberg [hereinafter “Mr. Zuckerburg”]

CEO
Meta

The Honorable Andrew Bailey [hereinafter “Mr. Bailey”]

Attorney General
State of Missouri

Operation Warp Speed [hereinafter “OWS”]

Dr. Janet Woodcock [hereinafter “Dr. Woodcock”]

Former Principal Deputy Commissioner
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Vice President Kamala Harris [hereinafter “Vice President Harris”]

Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee [hereinafter “VRBPAC”]

Mr. Andrew Cuomo [hereinafter “Mr. Cuomo”]

Former Governor
New York

Dr. Howard Zucker [hereinafter “Dr. Zucker”]

Former Commissioner
New York State Department of Health

Greater New York Hospital Association [hereinafter “GNYHA”]

Ms. Melissa DeRosa [hereinafter “Ms. DeRosa”]

Former Secretary to the Governor
State of New York

New York State Department of Health [hereinafter “NYSDOH”]

Mr. Brad Hutton [hereinafter “Mr. Hutton”]

Former Deputy Commissioner
New York State Department of Health

Ms. Beth Garvey [hereinafter “Ms. Garvey”]

Former Counsel to the Governor
State of New York

vi
Ms. Linda Lacewell [hereinafter “Ms. Lacewell”]
Former Superintendent
New York State Department of Financial Services

Mr. Larry Schwartz [hereinafter “Mr. Schwartz”]

Former Senior Advisor to the Governor
State of New York

The Honorable Seema Verma [hereinafter “Ms. Verma”]

Former Administrator
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention

U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [hereinafter “CMS”]

Ms. Stephanie Benton [hereinafter “Ms. Benton”]

Former Executive Assistant to the Governor
State of New York

Dr. James Malatras [hereinafter “Dr. Malatras”]

Former Advisor to Governor Andrew Cuomo
State of New York

Mr. Garreth Rhodes [hereinafter “Mr. Rhodes”]

Former Deputy Superintendent
New York State Department of Financial Services

Dr. Eleanor Adams [hereinafter “Adams”]

Deputy Assistant Secretary
Center for the Strategic National Stockpile
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Mr. Kenneth Raske [hereinafter “Mr. Raske”]

President & Chief Executive Officer
Greater New York Hospital Association

Mr. Michael Dowling [hereinafter “Mr. Dowling”]

President & Chief Executive Officer
Norwell Health

Ms. Farrah Kennedy [hereinafter “Ms. Kennedy”]

Former Executive Assistant to the Governor
New York State

The Honorable Brad Wenstrup [hereinafter “Chairman Wenstrup”]

Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic

vii
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [hereinafter “ACIP”]

Dr. Marion Gruber [hereinafter “Dr. Gruber”]

Former Director
Office of Vaccines Research and Review
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Dr. Philip Krause [hereinafter “Dr. Krause”]

Former Director
Office of Vaccines Research and Review
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Biologics License Application [hereinafter “BLA”]

Action Due Date [hereinafter “ADD”]

Dr. Peter Marks [hereinafter “Dr. Marks”]

Director
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Office of Vaccine Research and Review [hereinafter “OVRR”]

The Honorable Lloyd Austin [hereinafter “Secretary Austin”]

Secretary
U.S. Department of Defense

Dr. Cliff Lane [hereinafter “Dr. Lane”]

Deputy Director, Clinical Research
National Institutes of Health

Occupational Health and Safety Administration [hereinafter “OSHA”]

Dr. Kevin Bardosh [hereinafter “Dr. Bardosh”]

Affiliate Assistant Professor
University of Washington

Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System [hereinafter “VAERS”]

Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research [hereinafter “CBER”]

Biologics Effectiveness and Safety [hereinafter “BEST”]

Vaccine Safety Datalink [hereinafter “VSD”]

viii
Dr. Patrick Whelan [hereinafter “Dr. Whelan”]
Associate Clinical Professor of Pediatrics
Division of Rheumatology
University of California – Los Angeles

Informed Consent Action Network [hereinafter “ICAN”]

Vaccine Injury Compensation Program [hereinafter “VICP”]

Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness [hereinafter “PREP”]

Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program [hereinafter “CICP”]

Health Resources and Services Administration [hereinafter “HRSA”]

Commander George Reed Grimes [hereinafter “CDR Grimes”]

Director
Division of Injury Compensation Programs
U.S. Health Resource & Services Administration

Small and Medium Enterprise [hereinafter “SME”]

Federal Reserve Board of Governors [hereinafter “Board of Governors”]

Federal Reserve Banks [hereinafter “Reserve Banks’]

Federal Reserve Open Market Committee [hereinafter “FOMC”]

American Federation of Teachers [hereinafter “AFT”]

Ms. Randi Weingarten [hereinafter “Ms. Weingarten”]

President
American Federation of Teachers

Ms. Marla Ucelli-Kashyap [hereinafter “Ms. Ucelli-Kashyap”]

Director, Educational Issues
American Federation of Teachers

Dr. Greta Massetti [hereinafter “Dr. Massetti”]

Principal Deputy Director, Injury Center
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Ms. Kelly Nedrow (Trautner) [hereinafter “Ms. Nedrow (Trautner)”]

Director, Health Issues
American Federation of Teachers

ix
Ms. Carole Johnson [hereinafter “Ms. Johnson”]
Administrator
Health Resources and Services Administration

National Education Association [hereinafter “NEA”]

The Honorable Melanie Egorin [hereinafter “Ms. Egorin”]

Assistant Secretary for Legislation
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Dr. Gerald Keusch [hereinafter “Dr. Keusch”]

Professor of Medicine and International Health
Boston University

Dr. Robert Kessler [hereinafter “Dr. Kessler”]

Communications Manager
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

x
II. List of Hearings and Meetings

February 28, 2023

“Preparing for the Future by Learning From the Past: Examining COVID Policy Decisions”

Witnesses: 2) Dr. Jay Bhattacharya M.D., Ph.D.

Professor of Medicine
Stanford University

3) Dr. Martin Kulldorff Ph.D.

Professor of Medicine
Harvard University

4) Dr. Martin Makary M.D., M.P.H.

Chief, Islet Transplant Surgery / Professor of Surgery
Johns Hopkins University

5) Dr. Georges Benjamin M.D. (Minority Witness)

Executive Director
American Public Health Association

March 8, 2023
“Investigating the Origins of COVID-19”
Witnesses: 1) Dr. Jamie Metzl
Senior Fellow
Atlantic Council

2) Dr. Robert Redfield

Former Director
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

3) Mr. Nicholas Wade

Former Editor for Nature and Science
Former Science Editor for The New York Times

4) Dr. Paul Atwater (Minority Witness)

Clinical Director, Division of Infectious Diseases
Sherrilyn and Ken Fisher Professor of Medicine
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine

March 28, 2023

“The Consequences of School Closures: Intended and Unintended”
Witnesses: 1) Mr. David Zweig
Author and Investigative Journalist
The Atlantic, New York Magazine, and The Free Press

xi
 2) Dr. Tracy Høeg
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Specialist
Epidemiologist
Private Practice Physician

3) Ms. Virginia Gentles

Director, Education Freedom Center
Inpednant Women’s Forum

4) Ms. Donna Mazyck (Minority Witness)

Executive Director
National Association of School Nurses

April 18, 2023

“Investigating the Origins of COVID-19, Part 2: China and the Available Intelligence”
Witnesses: 1) The Honorable John Ratcliffe
Former Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

2) Mr. David Feith

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

3) Dr. Mark Lowenthal (Minority Witness)

Former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence of Analysis and
Production
Former Vice Chairman for Evaluation for the National Intelligence
Council
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

April 26, 2023

“The Consequences of School Closures, Part 2: The President of the American Federation of
Teachers Ms. Randi Weingarten”
Witness: 1) Ms. Randi Weingarten
President
American Federation of Teachers

May 11, 2023

“Investigating Pandemic Immunity: Acquired, Therapeutic, or both”
Witnesses: 1) Dr. Marty Makary
Chief, Islet Transplant Surgery
Professor of Surgery
Johns Hopkins University

2) Dr. Margery Smelkinson

xii
 3) Dr. Tina Tan (Minority Witness)
Professor of Pediatric Infectious Diseases
Feinberg School of Medicine
Northwestern University

May 17, 2023

“‘Like Fire Through Dry Grass’: Nursing Home Mortality & COVID-19 Policies”
Witnesses: 1) Ms. Janice Dean

2) Mr. Bill Hammond

Senior Fellow for Health Policy
Empire Center

3) Ms. Vivian Zayas

Voices for Seniors

4) Dr. David Grabowski (Minority Witness)

Professor of Health Care Policy
Harvard Medical School

June 13, 2023

“Oversight of CDC Policies and Decisions During the COVID-19 Pandemic”
Witness: 1) Dr. Rochelle Walensky
Director
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

June 21, 2023

“Churches vs. Casinos: The Constitution is Not Suspended in Times of Crisis”
Witnesses: 1) The Honorable Andrew Bailey
Attorney General
Missouri

2) The Honorable Elizabeth Murrill

Solicitor General
Louisiana

3) Mr. Misha Tseytlin

Partner
Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP

4) Mr. Micah Schwartzman (Minority Witness)

Hardly Cross Dillard Professor of Law
Director, Karsh Center for Law and Democracy
University of Virginia School of Law

xiii
July 11, 2023
“Investigating the Proximal Origin of a Cover Up”
Witnesses: 1) Dr. Kristian Andersen
Professor
Scripps Research

2) Dr. Robert Garry

Professor
Tulane University School of Medicine

3) Dr. W. Ian Lipkin (Attendance Excused)

John Snow Professor of Epidemiology
Columbia University

4) Dr. Andrew Rambaut (Declined to Attend)

Professor
University of Edinburgh

5) Dr. Edward Holmes (Declined to Attend)

Professor of Virology
University of Sydney

July 27, 2023

“Because I Said So: Examining the Science and Impact of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates”
Witnesses: 1) Dr. Kevin Bardosh
Affiliate Assistant Professor
University of Washington

2) Ms. Allison Williams

Reporter
Fox Sports

3) Ms. Danielle Runyan

Senior Counsel
First Liberty

4) Dr. John Lynch (Minority Witness)

Associate Professor of Medicine and Allergy and Infectious Diseases
University of Washington School of Medicine

September 14, 2023

“Oh Doctor, Where Art Thou? Pandemic Erosion of the Doctor-Patient Relationship”
Witnesses: 1) Dr. Azedeh Khatibi
Physician
Medical Ethics and Freedom Advocate

xiv
 2) Dr. Jeffrey Singer
Surgeon
Senior Fellow
CATO Institute, Department of Health Policy Studies

3) Dr. Jerry Williams

Founder
Urgent Care 24/7

4) Dr. Andrea Shane (Minority Witness)

Professor of Pediatrics
Division of Infectious Disease
Emory University School of Medicine

September 19, 2023

“The Strategic National Stockpile” **Classified**
Witnesses: 1) The Honorable Dawn O’Connell
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

2) Mr. Steven Adams

Deputy Assistant Secretary
Center for the Strategic National Stockpile
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

3) Ms. Julia Limage

Director
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Requirements
Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

December 13, 2023

“Reforming the WHO: Ensuring Global Health Security and Accountability”
Witnesses: 1) The Honorable Atul Gawande
Assistant Administrator for Global Health
U.S. Agency for International Development

2) The Honorable John Nkengasong

Ambassador-at-Large
U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
Senior Bureau Official for Global Health Security and Diplomacy
U.S. Department of State

3) Ms. Loyce Pace

Assistant Secretary for Global Affairs
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

xv
January 31, 2024
“Overseeing the Department of Health and Human Services’ Compliance with Congress”
Witness: 1) The Honorbale Melanie Egorin
Assistant Secretary for Legislation
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

February 15, 2024

“Assessing America’s Vaccine Safety Systems, Part 1”
Witnesses: 1) Dr. Daniel Jernigan
Director
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

2) CDR George Reed Grimes

Director
Division of Injury Compensation Programs
U.S. Health Resource & Services Administration

3) Dr. Peter Marks

Director
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

March 6, 2024
“Examining the White House’s Role in Pandemic Preparedness and Response”
Witness: 1) Maj. Gen. (ret.) Paul Friedrichs
Director
Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy
The White House

March 21, 2024

“Assessing America’s Vaccine Safety Systems, Part 2”
Witnesses: 1) Ms. Renee Gentry
Director, Vaccine Injury Litigation Clinic
George Washington University

2) Dr. David Gortler

Senior Research Fellow
Public Health Policy and Regulation
The Heritage Foundation

3) Dr. Patrick Whelan

Associate Clinical Professor of Pediatrics
Division of Rheumatology
University of California – Los Angeles

xvi
 4) Dr. Yvonne Maldonado (Minority Witness)
Chief of the Division of Infectious Diseases
Department of Pediatrics
Stanford University School of Medicine

April 16, 2024

“Academic Malpractice: Examining the Relationship Between Scientific Journals, the
Government, and Peer Review”
Witnesses: 1) Dr. Holden Thorp
Editor-in-Chief
Science Journals
American Association for the Advancement of Science

2) Mr. Richard Horton (Declined to Attend)

Editor-in-Chief
The Lancet

3) Dr. Magdalena Skipper (Declined to Attend)

Editor-in-Chief
Nature

May 1, 2024
“A Hearing with the President of EcoHealth Alliance, Dr. Peter Daszak”
Witness: 1) Dr. Peter Daszak
President
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

May 16, 2024

“Overseeing the Overseers: A Hearing with NIH Deputy Director, Dr. Lawrence Tabak”
Witness: 1) Dr. Lawrence Tabak
Principal Deputy Director
National Institutes of Health

May 22, 2024

“A Hearing with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Senior Scientific
Advisor, Dr. David Morens”
Witness: 1) Dr. David Morens
Senior Scientific Advisor to the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

June 3, 2024
“A Hearing with Dr. Anthony Fauci”
Witness: 1) Dr. Anthony Fauci
Former Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

xvii
September 10, 2024
“A Hearing with former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo”
Witness: 1) The Honorable Andrew Cuomo
Former Governor
New York

November 14, 2024

“Preparing for the Next Pandemic: Lessons Learned and the Path Forward”
Witness: 1) Dr. Lawrence Tabak
Principal Deputy Director
National Institutes of Health

2) Dr. Henry Walke

Director
Office of Readiness and Response
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

3) Dr. Hillary Marston

Chief Medical Officer
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

xviii
III. List of Transcribed Interviews and Depositions

April 6, 2023: Dr. Ian Lipkin

John Snow Professor of Epidemiology
Columbia University

April 21, 2023: Dr. Michael Farzan

Professor of Pediatrics
Harvard Medical School

June 9, 2023: Dr. Robert Garry

Professor
Tulane University School of Medicine

June 16, 2023: Dr. Kristian Andersen

Professor
Scripps Research

June 20, 2023: Ms. Marla Ucelli-Kashyap

Director, Educational Issues
American Federation of Teachers

June 23, 2023: Ms. Kelly Nedrow

Director, Health Issues
American Federation of Teachers

June 29, 2023: CDR Jean-Paul Chretien

Program Manager, Biological Technologies Office
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

October 31, 2023: Ms. Gretta Massetti

Principal Deputy Director, Injury Center
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

November 2, 2023: Dr. Michael Lauer

Deputy Director for Extramural Research
National Institutes of Health

November 13, 2023: Dr. Erik Stemmy

Team Lead, Influenza Research and Response
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease

November 14, 2023: Dr. Peter Daszak

President
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

xix
November 28, 2023: Dr. Emily Erbelding
Director, Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
National Institute of Allery and Infectious Diseases

December 8, 2023: Mr. F. Gray Handley

Associate Director
National Institute of Allery and Infectious Diseases

December 12, 2023: Mr. Greg Folkers

Former Chief of Staff, Office of the Director
National Institute of Allery and Infectious Diseases

December 15, 2023: Dr. Clifford Lane

Deputy Director, Clinical Research
National Institutes of Health

December 18, 2023: Dr. Howard Zucker

Former Commissioner
New York State Department of Health

December 20, 2023: Dr. Hugh Auchincloss

Former Acting Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

December 29, 2023: Dr. David Morens

Senior Scientific Advisor to the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

January 5, 2024: Dr. Lawrence Tabak

Principal Deputy Director
National Institutes of Health

January 8 & 9, 2024: Dr. Anthony Fauci

Former Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

January 12, 2024: Dr. Francis Collins

Former Director
National Institutes of Health

January 18, 2024: Dr. David Morens

Senior Scientific Advisor to the Director
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

January 22, 2024: Dr. Ralph Baric

xx
 Professor, Department of Epidemiology
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

April 8, 2024: Dr. Eleanor Adams

Special Advisor
New York State Department of Health

May 3, 2024: Mr. Garreth Rhodes

Former Deputy Superintendent
New York State Department of Financial Services

May 9, 2024: Dr. James Gimlett

Program Manager
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

May 13, 2024: Dr. Janet Woodcock

Former Principal Deputy Commissioner
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

May 20, 2024: Dr. James Malatras

Former Advisor to Governor Andrew Cuomo
State of New York

May 30, 2024: Ms. Beth Garvey

Former Counsel to the Governor
State of New York

May 31, 2024: Ms. Linda Lacewell

Former Superintendent
New York State Department of Financial Services

June 11, 2024: The Honorable Andrew Cuomo

Former Governor
State of New York

June 24, 2024: Ms. Melissa DeRosa

Former Secretary to the Governor
State of New York

June 24, 2024: Mr. Lawrence Schwartz

Former Senior Advisor to the Governor
State of New York

August 13, 2024: Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio

In his capacity as Consultant
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

xxi
August 27, 2024: Mr. Bradley Hutton
Former Deputy Commissioner
New York State Department of Health

October 4, 2024: Ms. Margaret Moore

Former Freedom of Information Act Public Liaison
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases

October 8, 2024: Ms. Farrah Kennedy

Former Executive Assistant to the Governor
New York State

October 10, 2024: Dr. Peter Hotez

Professor
Baylor College of Medicine

xxii
IV. On-the-Ground Oversight

November 6, 2023 – November 8, 2023

STAFFDEL

• Los Alamos, New Mexico

o Los Alamos National Laboratory

• Livermore, California
o Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

February 19, 2024 – February 24, 2024

CODEL Wenstrup Europe

• Geneva, Switzerland
o World Health Organization Headquarters

• Paris, France
o French National Academy of Medicine
o World Organization of Animal Health

• Brussels, Belgium
o North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters
o European External Action Service
o European Commission’s Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety

August 18, 2024 – August 25, 2024

CODEL Wenstrup S.E. Asia

• Taipei, Taiwan
o Office of the President
o Office of the Vice President
o Ministry of Foreign Affairs
o Ministry of Health and Welfare
o Academica Sineca

• Phnom Penh, Cambodia

o Ministry of Health
o Institut Pasteur du Cambodge
o Live Bird Market Surveillance

• Vientiane, Laos
o Ministry of Health
o National Animal Health Laboratory
o National Center for Laboratory and Epidemiology
o Live Bird Market Surveillance

xxiii
The Origins of the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including but Not Limited to the
Federal Government’s Funding of Gain-of-Function Research

I. The Unknown Origins of COVID-19

FINDING: SARS-CoV-2, the Virus that Causes COVID-19, Likely Emerged Because of a
Laboratory or Research Related Accident.

Four years after the onset of the worst pandemic in 100 years, the weight of the evidence
increasingly supports the lab leak hypothesis. Since the Select Subcommittee commenced its
work in February 2023, more and more senior intelligence officials, politicians, science editors,
and scientists increasingly have endorsed the hypothesis that COVID-19 1 emerged as the result
of a laboratory or research related accident.

In January 2021, the State Department published an unclassified Fact Sheet entitled,
“Fact Sheet: activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,” [hereinafter “Fact Sheet”] that stated
the following.

1) “The U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV
became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with
symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illness.” 2 The June
2023 ODNI Assessment entitled, “Potential Links Between the Wuhan Institute of
Virology and the Origin of the COVID-19 Pandemic,” [hereinafter “June 2023 ODNI
Assessment”] supported this conclusion. 3

2) “The WIV has a published record of conducting “gain-of-function” research to engineer

chimeric viruses.” 4 The June 2023 ODNI Assessment supported this conclusion and went
further, stating, “[s]cientists at the WIV have created chimeras, or combinations of
SARS-like coronaviruses through genetic engineering, attempted to clone other unrelated
viruses, and used reverse genetic cloning techniques on SARS-like coronaviruses.” 5 The
June 2023 ODNI Assessment continued, “[s]ome of the WIV’s genetic engineering
projects on coronaviruses involved techniques that could make it difficult to detect
intentional changes.” 6

3) “Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States had
determined that the WIV collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s
military…since at least 2017.” 7 Again, the June 2023 ODNI Assessment supported this

1
Throught this Report, “COVID-19” is used to describe SARS-CoV-2.
2
FACT SHEET: ACTIVITY AT THE WUHAN INSTITUTE OF VIROLOGY, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter
“Fact Sheet”].
3
POTENTIAL LINKS BETWEEN THE WUHAN INSTITUTE OF VIROLOGY AND THE ORIGIN OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC,
OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (June 2023) [hereinafter “June 2023 ODNI Assessment”].
4
Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
5
June 2023 ODNI Assessment, supra note 3.
6
Id.
7
Fact Sheet, supra note 2.

Page 1 of 520
 conclusion, stating, “…WIV personnel have worked with scientists associated with the
PLA on public health-related projects and collaborated on biosafety and biosecurity
projects.” 8

Further, the June 2023 ODNI Assessment stated, “[s]ome WIV researchers probably did
not use adequate biosafety precautions at least some of the time prior to the pandemic in
handling SARS-like coronaviruses, increasing the risk of accidental exposure to viruses.” 9

In February and March of 2023, DOE and FBI publicly acknowledged their respective
assessments that COVID-19 was the likely result of a lab incident—FBI with moderate
confidence and DOE with low confidence. 10 Other intelligence elements assess COVID-19’s
emergence was likely zoonotic, albeit all with low confidence. 11

On March 8, 2023, Dr. Redfield testified:

Dr. Robert Redfield (March 8, 2023)

From the earliest days of the pandemic, my view was that both theories
about the origin of COVID-19 needed to be aggressively and thoroughly
examined. Based on my initial analysis of the data, I came to believe—and
still believe today—that it indicates COVID-19 infections more likely were
the result of an accidental lab leak than the result of a natural spillover event.
This conclusion is based primarily on the biology of the virus itself,
including its rapid high infectivity for human-to-human transmission which
would then predict rapid evolution of new variants, as well as a number of
other important factors to include the unusual actions in and around Wuhan
in the fall of 2019… 12

One month later in April 2023, Mr. Ratcliffe testified:

The Honorable John Ratcliffe (April 18, 2023)

First, let me state the bottom-line up front. My informed assessment as a

person with as much access as anyone to our government’s intelligence
during the initial year of the pandemic has been and continues to be that a
lab leak is the only explanation credibly supported by our intelligence, by
science, and by commonsense. From a view inside the IC, if our
intelligence and evidence supporting a lab leak theory was placed side-by-

8
June 2023 ODNI Assessment, supra note 3.
9
Id.
10
Hannah Rabinowitz, FBI Director Wray acknowledges bureau assessment that Covid-19 likely resulted from lab
incident, CNN (updated Mar. 1, 2023); Jeremy Herb & Natasha Bertrand, US Energy Department assesses Covid-19
likely resulted from lab leak, furthering US intel divide over virus origin, CNN (Feb. 27, 2023).
11
June 2023 ODNI Assessment, supra note 3.
12
Investigating the Origins of COVID: Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th
Cong, 1, (Mar. 8, 2023) [hereinafter “Investigating the Origins of COVID-19”].

Page 2 of 520
 side with our intelligence and evidence pointing to a natural origins or
spillover theory, the lab leak side of the ledger would be long, convincing,
even overwhelming, while the spillover side would be nearly empty and
tenuous. 13

In January 2024, Mr. Wade voiced his increasing support for a lab incident origin. 14 Mr.
Wade astutely noted that “SARS2 possesses a furin cleavage site, found in none of the other 871
known members of its viral family, so it cannot have gained such a site through the ordinary
evolutionary swaps of genetic material within a family.” 15 With the natural evolution of a furin
cleavage site being nonexistent, Mr. Wade further noted that EcoHealth and the WIV’s DEFUSE
proposal, which was rejected by DARPA, sought to do what nature had not been ever known to
do—insert a furin cleavage site into a SARS2 virus. 16 It is, therefore, more than just a
coincidence that COVID-19 emerged from the city with a lab preparing to conduct this research
under cost-effective yet risky BSL-2 protocols. 17

In June 2024, Dr. Chan explained five key points that support the lab leak scenario as
more plausible than a zoonotic spillover. 18

First, COVID-19 emerged in Wuhan, the city that happens to be the location of the
China’s foremost research lab for SARS-like viruses. 19 Dr. Shi, has been researching SARS-like
viruses for over a decade and even initially wondered if the outbreak came from the WIV. 20

Next, in 2018, a year before the outbreak, EcoHealth, in partnership with the WIV, in a
grant application to DARPA proposed to create a virus with SARS-CoV-2’s defining features. In
their application to DARPA, EcoHealth and its WIV partners stated their intent to create a
SARS-like virus with a furin cleavage site, which is the exact same feature that made humans
susceptible to COVID-19 infection. 21

Third, the WIV has a track record of engaging in this type of airborne viral research
under low biosafety conditions. 22 At the WIV, it was known that Chinese researchers conducted
this type of research under BSL-2 protocols, which do not require masking at all times and
involves less protective equipment. 23 In the U.S., this type of research would be conducted under
BSL-3 protocols, which require stricter personal respirator use at all times and more protective

13
Investigating the Origins of COVID Part 2: China and the Available Intelligence: Hearing Before the Select
Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong, 1, (Apr. 18, 2023) [hereinafter “Investigating the Origins of
COVID Part 2: China and the Available Intelligence”].
14
Nicholas Wade, The Story of the Decade, CITY JOURNAL (Jan. 25, 2024).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Alina Chan, Why the Pandemic Probably Started in a Lab, in 5 Key Points, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2024)
[hereinafter “Chan”].
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.

Page 3 of 520
equipment. 24 In fact, in a draft proposal for the grant to DARPA, Dr. Daszak acknowledged that
some of the SARS-CoV-2 research would be conducted at BSL-2 at the WIV. 25

Fourth, the evidence supporting that COVID-19 came from an animal at the Huanan
Seafood Market in Wuhan is tenuous. 26 Dr. Chan points of that “the existing genetic and early
case data show that all known COVID-19 cases probably stem from a single introduction of
SARS-CoV-2 into people, and the outbreak at the Wuhan market probably happened after the
virus had already been circulating in humans.” 27 Furthermore, no infected animal has been
verified at the Wuhan market or its supply chain. 28

Finally, key evidence that would be expected if the virus had emerged from the wildlife
trade is still missing. 29 In previous outbreaks, such as SARS in 2002 and MERS in 2012,
infected animals were found, the earliest cases occurred in people exposed to live animals, and
ancestral variants of the virus found in animals were discovered, but none of this evidence has
been discovered for COVID-19. 30

In September 2024, Mr. Boris Johnson, former British Prime Minister, stated his belief
that the COVID-19 pandemic originated via a laboratory or research related accident in Wuhan. 31

24
Id.
25
Emily Kopp, American scientists misled Pentagon on research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, U.S. RIGHT TO
KNOW (Dec. 18, 2023).
26
Chan, supra note 18.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Jane Dalton, Boris Johnson claims Covid originated in lab, in sudden U-turn in his views, INDEPENDENT (Sept.
29, 2024).

Page 4 of 520
Mr. Johnson noted that the pandemic “now looks overwhelmingly likely that the mutation was
the result of some botched experiment in a Chinese lab.” 32

In November 2024, Biden-Harris Administration COVID-19 Response Coordinator, Dr.

Ashish K. Jha, wrote that Chinese “senior military officers have been writing for years about the
potential benefits of offensive biological warfare.” 33 He also acknowledged that the COVID-19
virus might have accidentally leaked from a lab. 34

On November 21, 2024, Dr. Tim Spector, Professor at King’s College London, who
played a significant role in the pandemic response in the United Kingdom, recently doubled
down on his belief that the lab leak is the most likely source of the pandemic. 35 Dr. Spector noted
that “[i]t’s looking increasingly like that was a bit of a cover-up and the most likely source of this
was a lab leak from Wuhan.” 36

Over the course of the pandemic, there have also been studies suggesting COVID-19’s
emergence was zoonotic and transferred from an animal to a human. 37 Dr. Lipkin described two
of these studies as “armchair epidemiology,” 38 Dr. Baric described one as having a “major
problem,” 39 and Dr. Holden Thorp, the Editor-in-Chief of Science (the publisher of two of these
studies) testified these studies “do not conclusively prove [ ] the theory of natural origin.” 40

As Mr. Ratcliffe testified, the ledger on the side of lab leak is full of convincing evidence
while the spillover side is nearly empty. Since January 2020, the body of evidence has only
grown stronger in support of a lab leak theory.

FINDING: “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” Was “Prompted” by Dr. Anthony Fauci to
“Disprove” the Lab Leak Theory.

On February 16, 2020, Dr. Rambaut, on behalf of himself and his co-authors, Dr.
Andersen, Dr. Lipkin, Dr. Holmes, and Dr. Garry posted “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2”

32
Id.
33
Ashish K. Jha, et al., The U.S. could soon face a threat ‘more powerful’ than nuclear weapons, THE WASH. POST
(Nov. 11, 2024).
34
Id.
35
Sarah Knapton, Lab leak most likely source of Covid, says Prof Tim Spector, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 21, 2024).
36
Id.
37
Alexander Crits-Christoph, et. al., Genetic tracing of market wildlife and viruses at the epicenter of the COVID-19
pandemic, CELL 187: 5468-5482; Edward Holmes, et. al., The origins of SARS-CoV-2: A critical review, CELL 184:
4848-4856; Jonthan Pekar, et. al., The molecular epidemiology of multiple zoonotic origins of SARS-CoV-2, SCIENCE
377:960-966; Michael Worobey, et. al., The Hunan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan was the early epicenter of
the COVID1-9 pandemic, SCIENCE 377: 951-959; Edward Holmes, et. al., The emergence and evolution of SARS-
CoV-2, ANN. REV. VIROL. (Sept. 11, 2024).
38
Transcribed Interview of Ian Lipkin, M.D., John Snow Professor of Epidemiology, Columbia Univ. (Apr. 6, 2023)
[hereinafter “Lipkin TI”].
39
Transcribed Interview of Ralph Baric, Ph.D., Professor, University of N. Carolina, at 102 (Jan. 22, 2024)
[hereinafter “Baric TI”].
40
Academic Malpractice: Examining the Relationship Between Scientific Journals, the Government, and Peer
Review: Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong, (Apr. 11, 202) (Statement
of Dr. Holden Thorp, Editor-in-Chief, Science Journals).

Page 5 of 520
on the website Virological. 41 One month later, on March 17, 2020, “The proximal origin of
SARS-CoV-2” [hereinafter “Proximal Origin”] was published in Nature Medicine. 42

The authors of Proximal Origin stated two primary conclusions: (1) “…[COVID-19] is
not a laboratory construct or a purposefully manipulated virus,” and (2) “we do not believe that
any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible.” 43

January 2020

According to Dr. Farrar, the initial discussions regarding the sequence of COVID-19 and
any unusual aspects began on January 8 or 9. 44 At that point it is unclear what the concerns were
or who exactly was involved, however e-mails suggest that Dr. Farrar called both Chinese
officials and Dr. Collins. 45

According to Dr. Farrar he became aware of “chatter” suggesting the virus looked almost
engineered to infect human cells in the last week of January. 46 In Dr. Farrar’s own words, “[t]hat
got my mind racing. This was a brand-new virus that seemingly sprang from nowhere. Except

41
Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al., The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2, VIROLOGICAL (Feb. 16, 2020),
https://virological.org/t/the-proximal-origin-of-sars-cov-2/398.
42
Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al., The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2, NATURE MEDICINE (Mar. 17, 2020)
[hereinafter “Proximal Origin”].
43
Id.
44
E-Mail from Jeremy Farrar, Dir., Wellcome Trust, to Eddie Holmes, Ph.D., et. al., Professor, University of Sydney
(July 28, 2020, 12:36 AM).
45
Id. (Dr. Collins did not recall being on any calls with Chinese officials or Dr. Farrar, separately or together, during
this time period.)
46
Jeremy Farrar, Spike: The Virus vs. The People – The Inside Story (Profile Books 2021) [hereinafter “Spike: The
Virus vs. The People – The Inside Story”].

Page 6 of 520
that this pathogen had surfaced in Wuhan, a city with a BSL-4 virology lab which is home to an
almost unrivalled collection of bat viruses.” 47 Dr. Farrar’s first concern was, “[c]ould the novel-
coronavirus be anything to do with ‘gain-of-function’ (GOF) studies?” 48 This is a type of
research that Dr. Farrar, much like Dr. Fauci, believed to be “ultimately useful.” 49

Around this same time, Dr. Andersen shared his concerns regarding the possibility the
COVID-19 pandemic was the result of a lab leak and that it had properties that may have been
genetically modified or engineered—specifically the furin cleavage site—with Dr. Holmes. 50
According to Dr. Holmes, Dr. Andersen texted, “Eddie, can we talk? I need to be pulled off a
ledge here.” 51

Dr. Andersen went on to express concerns regarding two distinct aspects of the virus—the
RBD and the furin cleavage site. Dr. Andersen also found a paper written by Dr. Baric and Dr.
Shi [hereinafter “Baric/Shi Paper”] that purported to have inserted furin cleavage sites into
SARS. As recounted by Dr. Farrar, this paper was a “how-to-manual for building the Wuhan
coronavirus in a laboratory.” 52 Dr. Holmes responded, “fuck, this is bad” and “oh my god what
worse words than that.” 53

On January 30, 2020, Dr. Holmes relayed Dr. Andersen’s concerns to Dr. Farrar via his
burner phone. 54 Dr. Andersen recalled Dr. Holmes saying that Dr. Farrar acted as Dr. Holmes’
“handler.” 55 Then, as Dr. Holmes characterized it, the conversations went from “zero to 100.” 56

January 31, 2020

In a transcribed interview, Dr. Andersen testified that after discussing his concerns with
Dr. Farrar, they began to organize a conference call [hereinafter “February 1 Conference Call”]. 57
The February 1 Conference Call was a forum for Dr. Andersen to “walk through my concerns
and then…discuss it.” 58

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

And Jeremy [Farrar] gets all of this set up. He, I’m sure, has been in touch
with Tony Fauci at the time, reaches out to Dr. Fauci, asks him to call me. 59

47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Vincent Racaniello, This Week in Virology 940 (Sept. 28, 2022) [hereinafter “Racaniello”].
51
Id.
52
Spike: The Virus vs. the People, supra note 46.
53
Id; Racaniello, supra note 50.
54
Id.
55
Transcribed Interview of Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, at 16 (June 16, 2023) (hereinafter
“Andersen TI”).
56
Racaniello, supra note 50.
57
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 16.
58
Id.
59
Id.

Page 7 of 520
 Dr. Andersen testified that January 31 was the first time he spoke to Dr. Fauci personally,
outside of potential interactions at conferences. 66 Accordingly, it was also on the January 31
phone call between Dr. Fauci and Dr. Andersen when the first discussion of a paper regarding a
possible lab leak took place. 67

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. Was this the first time that you had ever spoken to Dr. Fauci, like
personally?

A. Probably. Yeah…

Q. Outside of conferences or - -?

A. Sure. Yes. Yes. Yes. Absolutely, yes.

***

66
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 16.
67
Id.

Page 10 of 520
 Dr. Andersen clarified what “unusual features” he was referencing.

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. Which features, at that time, were you talking about?

A. Yeah, I’m talking about, like, the furin cleavage site, the receptor
binding domain, and a few things associated with that, the BamH1
restriction site that I mentioned, as well as some features associated
with that - - basically, what I ended up presenting the next day at
that conference call. 73

Dr. Andersen subsequently confirmed that when he said the “genome inconsistent with
expectations from evolutionary theory” he meant he thought COVID-19 could have been
engineered.

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. …[W]as it the furin cleavage site and the RBD that looked
inconsistent from evolutionary theory?

***

A. And when I’m saying the genome is inconsistent with expectations

from evolutionary theory, it’s a bit of a fancy way of basically
saying, like, look, guys, I think this could be engineered. 74

The next day, February 1, 2020, a group of scientists, including Dr. Fauci, gathered via
conference call for Dr. Andersen to present these findings and discuss a path forward.

February 1, 2020

On February 1, 2020, Dr. Farrar emailed a large group to set up the February 1
Conference Call to discuss Dr. Andersen’s concerns about the origins of COVID-19. The original
attendee list included:

Kristian Andersen
Bob Garry
Christian Drosten
Tony Fauci
Mike Ferguson
Ron Fouchier
Eddie Holmes

73
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 16.
74
Id.

Page 12 of 520
Marion Koopmans
Stefan Pohlmann
Andrew Rambaut
Paul Schreier
Patrick Vallance. 75

Despite Dr. Farrar sending the invitation on February 1, Dr. Andersen testified he was
aware of the potential of a call prior to February 1.

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. When did you first learn of this call? Was it when the roster was sent
out, February 1st?

A. No. I knew that the call was going to happen, because Eddie, myself
had talked about it, and I talked to Jeremy Farrar…This is where I
became aware of all the details surrounding the conference call. 76

In a transcribed interview, Dr. Garry testified he was also aware of the potential
conference call prior to February 1.

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. How were you invited to this call?

A. I believe I received an email from Jeremy Farrar.

Q. …[T]o the best of you recollection, what day was that?

A. Probably the day before or - - at most 2 days before, but I think it

was the day before. 77

In addition to Dr. Fauci, at least two other federal government officials were on the call
despite not being on the official roster—Dr. Collins and Dr. Tabak.

E-mails suggest that Dr. Fauci personally invited Dr. Collins. 78

75
E-Mail from Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir., Wellcome Trust, to Anthony Fauci, M.D., et. al., Dir., Nat’l Inst. of
Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Feb. 1, 2020).
76
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 16.
77
Transcribed Interview of Robert Garry, Ph.D., Professor, Tulane University School of Medicine, at 16 (June 9,
2023) [hereinafter “Garry TI”].
78
E-Mail from Anthony Fauci, M.D., Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to
Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir., Wellcome Trust, & Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health (Feb. 1,
2020, 15:48); E-Mail from Anthony Fauci, M.D., Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Robert Garry, Ph.D., Professor, Tulane School of Medicine, et. al. (Feb. 1, 2020, 15:50).

Page 13 of 520
 On March 24, 2023, the Select Subcommittee requested Dr. Fauci clarify whether he
personally invited Dr. Collins to the conference call. 79 On March 27, 2023, Dr. Fauci responded,
via Counsel, “[a]s one would reasonably expect, Dr. Fauci advised his immediate supervisor, Dr.
Francis Collins, that the call was taking place. Dr. Collins expressed an interest in joining the
call.” 80 In a transcribed interview, Dr. Fauci further clarified this sequence of events.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (January 9, 2024)

Q. So I want to talk about the first forward of yours to Dr. Collins. Did
Dr. Collins request to be on the call? Like, how did the process --
you obviously forwarded the call-in details to Dr. Collins. How did
that process play out?

A. Well, Dr. Collins is my boss. So this seemed like a pretty important

call for NIH, so I thought it would be a good idea to let my boss
know.

79
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Anthony Fauci,
M.D. Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Mar. 24, 2023).
80
Letter from David Schertler & Danny Ornato, Counsel for Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, to Hon. Brad Wenstrup,
Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Mar. 27, 2023).

Page 14 of 520
Q. So you got invited -- or you had the January 31st call, got invited to
the conference call after Farrar set it all up, and then went and was
like, "Dr. Collins, there's this call happening. Would you like to take
part?" Is that fair?

A. I believe that's the way it went, because -- yeah, I believe that's the
way it went.

Q. Okay. It's been in the news for a while and Dr. Redfield has talked
about this a lot and testified in front of us in March that he was not
included in the call. He was very clear to say he was not -- he's not
testifying that he was intentionally excluded, just that he was not
included. At any point, did –

A. Actually, he said that I kept him out of the call because he had a
different viewpoint.

Q. He did say that –

A. He said that clearly.

Q. Do you recall having any conversations with –

A. Sorry.

Q. No. No problem. Do you recall having any conversations with Dr.

Redfield about the call?

A. No. No.

Q. Why not?

A. Because why would I do that? This was a call that was organized by
Jeremy Farrar, who was the organizer of the call, and it wasn't my
call who was in and on. But it was perfectly appropriate for me to
notify my boss.

Q. This is the beginning of a pandemic, discussing how to respond to

the pandemic.

A. Yeah. Yeah.

Q. Dr. Redfield is the head of the CDC –

A. No, I'm sorry, I disagree with you.

Page 15 of 520
 Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. And what, to the best of your recollection, and briefly, what did you
present on the call?

A. I presented the main findings I had, which was some of the features
that I found to be unusual in the viral genome, including the receptor
binding domain, the furin cleavage site, the damage, one site which
is a restriction site, and also just outlining some of the research that
have been ongoing at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. And I had a
presentation, which you have as part of your exhibits too.

Q. Regarding the Wuhan Institute of Virology, what did you present?

A. Just in broad terms, the fact that they were culturing viruses from
bats, or attempting to culture viruses from bats, isolate viruses from
bat samples, which is not easy, in BSL-2; and, also, some of their
chimeric work using WIV-1, for example, which is a common
backbone that they are using; as well as just the general strategies
around creating chimeric viruses, much of which I believe was done
in BSL-2 and, as I mentioned, animal work in BSL-3. But those
were my, sort of, concerns around the research and the reason, of
course, for why we need to consider a potential lab leak as a
scientific hypothesis, yes. 84

Dr. Andersen further testified that the primary participants on the call were himself, Dr.
Rambaut, Dr. Holmes, Dr. Christian Drosten, 85 Dr. Ron Fouchier, 86 and Dr. Marion
Koopmans. 87, 88 Both Dr. Garry and Dr. Andersen testified about any comments made by Dr.
Fauci or Dr. Collins on the February 1 Conference Call.

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. Did [Dr. Fauci] say anything?

A. He didn’t say a whole a lot.

Q. To your recollection - - what did he say?

84
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 89-90.
85
Dr. Christian Drosten: Professor, Deputy Coordinator Emerging Infections, German Center for Infection Research,
DE.
86
Dr. Ron Fouchier: Deputy Head of the Erasmus MC Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, NL.
87
Dr. Marion Koopmans: Head of the Erasmus MC Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, NL.
88
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 98.

Page 17 of 520
 A. He just acknowledged that he was there, but the details are not really
clear. He really didn't say much of substance. It was, you know -- I
mean, Jeremy Farrar was clearly sort of introducing and ending the
meeting. It was his call to make. Neither Fauci or Collins really
had much to say, other than just, you know, maybe a point of
clarification here or there.

***

Q. …Was Dr. Collins on the call?

A. He was on the call. What I remember was is that he was basically

on and off the call, because I think he was having some kind of a
social event at the time. So, he did come on and off. But he, you
know, he made his presence, you know, just I'm here, basically,
known a couple of times.

Q. Was that - - to your recollection, was that the substance of his

speaking role?

A. He really didn’t offer anything scientifically. 89

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. On the conference call -- we talked a little bit about it -- what do you

recall Dr. Fauci saying, if he said anything?

A. I honestly don't remember Dr. Fauci, Collins -- I believe there

might've been other NIH contingents on the call too. They probably
had some questions, but I don't recollect that they -- they certainly
didn't add anything of substance to the scientific discussion. Again,
the discussions were: Jeremy said a few things to sort of set up the
call and "here's what we're going to do," but, otherwise, the
conversation was just between myself, Eddie Holmes, Andy
Rambaut, Christian Drosten, Ron Fouchier in particular, so among
the experts present on the call.

Q. Do you recall Dr. Collins saying anything on the conference call?

A. I do not, no. 90

89
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 132.
90
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 96.

Page 18 of 520
 In a transcribed interview, Dr. Tabak testified he joined the call to discuss the presence of
O-linked glycans and that the presence of these glycans does not indicate whether COVID-19
emerged as a natural spillover or via a laboratory related incident.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (January 5, 2024)

Q. …So kind of just the invitation just kind of fell into your inbox, and
you went from there?

A. I had a specific reason for wanting to join the call.

Q. What was that?

A. Because I had one observation that I wanted to share with the group,
and I did.

Q. Was it the O-linked glycans?

A. Correct.

***

Q. I appreciate it. I'm not a scientist at all, so, like, anything that I've
learned is because I've just been listening to people like you. But the
presence of the O-linked glycans themselves does not lean one way
or another?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Okay.

A. I think you could argue it either way. I really do. 91

The February 1 conference call was subsequently summarized in a memo. 92

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 134- 136.

91

E-Mail from Lawrence Kerr, Ph.D., Dir., Off. Of Pandemic and Emerging Threats, Off. Of Global Affairs, U.S.
92

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to REDACTED (Feb. 5, 2020 1:54 AM).

Page 19 of 520
Page 20 of 520
 Both Dr. Andersen and Dr. Garry testified regarding if Dr. Fauci ever directed them to
write a paper regarding the origins of COVID-19. Dr. Garry testified, “he never directed that to
me.” 93 However, Dr. Garry clarified, “I’m not privy to all the communications that Dr. Fauci had
with the other authors.” 94 Dr. Andersen testified that in addition to Dr. Fauci “suggesting” a
paper about a potential lab leak on January 31, 2020, on the February 1 Conference Call, Dr.
Fauci “encouraged to, you know, follow the scientific process on this which ultimately ends up
in peer-reviewed publications.” 95 Dr. Andersen clarified that Dr. Fauci specifically mentioned
drafting a peer-reviewed paper on January 31, stating, “he specifically mentioned that if I
believed this was a lab leak, I should consider writing a peer-reviewed paper on it.” 96

When Dr. Andersen presented a draft of Proximal Origin to Nature, he stated it was
“prompted” by Dr. Fauci and later stated the goal of Proximal Origin was to “disprove the lab
leak theory.” 97

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

93
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 133-134.
94
Id.
95
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 145.
96
Id.
97
E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, to Clare Thomas, Editor, Nature (Feb. 12,
2020, 23:09); E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, to Christian Drosten, Ph.D.,
Deputy Coordinator for Emerging Infections, German Center for Infection Research, et. al. (Feb. 8, 2020).

Page 21 of 520
 way. Maybe he was, you know -- I don't know. I really shouldn't
speculate on that. You probably need to ask him. 98

When asked about this email, Dr. Andersen confirmed that he was referencing the
January 31 phone call with Dr. Fauci.

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. What did you mean by “prompted by Jeremy Farrar, Tony Fauci,

and Francis Collins”?

A. I mean specifically that -- again, as I've already explained, is that

they prompted us to the idea of seriously considering the origin of
the virus and to consider producing a paper on that…And, again,
remember my first conversation with Tony Fauci, where he
specifically suggests that if I think this came from the lab, I should
consider writing a scientific paper on it.

Q. So that’s what the - - the prompt he was referencing - - that first

conversation?

A. Correct. 99

The first draft of a report that would become Proximal Origin was completed by 7:40
p.m. on February 1—only hours after the conference call. While it may not have been the goal of
the February 1 Conference Call, a written product of some sort was certainly discussed and
contemplated on the February 1 Conference Call.

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Well, you know, of course, we had the teleconference on February the 1st,
2020. And we had already, you know, had many discussions amongst
ourselves, I mean. And by ourselves, I mean Kristian and Eddie and
Andrew and I, with other people. So, you know, there were sort of notions
and ideas circulating around.

And, you know, the possibility of the paper, we're scientists. We write
papers. We communicate. We do, you know, we do science
communication. That's the sort of the final stamp on a lot of work that you
might do is to write up a paper. So, of course, I think that was in everyone's
mind…

98
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 166.
99
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 170.

Page 23 of 520
 And so, I think by, you know, by that February 1 teleconference, if you want
to mark it there, I mean, it didn't take too many days after that. 100

The Stated Goals of Proximal Origin

First, on February 8, 2020, Dr. Andersen wrote, “[o]ur main work over the past couple of
weeks has been focused on trying to disprove any type of lab theory, but we are a crossroad
where the scientific evidence isn’t conclusive enough to say that we have high confidence in any
of the three main theories considered.” 101

Second, on February 20, 2020, Dr. Andersen—in trying to defend the viability of
Proximal Origin—wrote, “[u]nfortunately none of this helps refute a lab origin and the
possibility must be considered as a serious scientific theory (which is what we do) and not
dismissed out of hand as another ‘conspiracy’ theory. We all really, really wish that we could do
that (that’s how this got started), but unfortunately it’s just not possible given the data.” 102

100
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 130-131.
101
E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, to Christian Drosten, Ph.D., Deputy
Coordinator for Emerging Infections, German Center for Infection Research, et. al. (Feb. 8, 2020, 22:15).
102
E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, to Claire Thomas, Ph.D., Senior Editor,
Nature (Feb. 20, 2020, 17:48).

Page 24 of 520
The Possible Motives of Proximal Origin

The first possible motive to downplay the lab leak theory was an interest by those
involved to defend China. This motive was expressed by numerous individuals including Dr.
Farrar, Dr. Rambaut, Dr. Andersen, Dr. Fouchier. Similarly, Dr. Collins expressed concerns
regarding “international harmony.” 105

1. Dr. Andrew Rambaut

On February 2, 2020, Dr. Rambaut, communicating over a private Slack channel with Dr.
Andersen, Dr. Holmes, and Dr. Garry, wrote, “given the shit show that would happen if anyone
serious accused the Chinese of even accidental release, my feeling is we should say that given
there is no evidence of a specifically engineered virus, we cannot possibly distinguish between
natural evolution and escape so we are content with ascribing it to natural process.” 106

2. Dr. Kristian Andersen

In response to Dr. Rambaut’s message above, Dr. Andersen replied, “[y]up, I totally agree
that that’s a very reasonable conclusion. Although I hate when politics is injected into science –
but its impossible not to, especially given the circumstances.” 107

3. Dr. Ron Fouchier

Dr. Fouchier, in emails following the February 1 Conference Call, stated, “…further
debate about such accusations would unnecessarily distract top researchers from their active
duties and do unnecessary harm to science in general and science in China in particular.” 108

4. Dr. Francis Collins

Dr. Collins, in emails following the February 1 Conference Call, stated, “…the voices of
conspiracy will quickly dominate, doing great potential harm to science and international
harmony.” 109

The second possible motive to downplay the lab leak theory was to lessen the likelihood
of increased biosafety and laboratory regulations. Dr. Fouchier stated, “[t]his manuscript would
be much stronger if it focused on the likelihood of the first 2 scenarios as compared to intentional
or accidental release. That would also limit the chance of new biosafety discussion that would

105
E-Mail from Francis Collins, M.D., Dir. Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Jeremy Farrar, M.D., et. al., Dir. Wellcome
Trust (Feb. 2, 2020).
106
Message from Andrew Rambaut, Ph.D., Slack (Feb. 2, 2020, 11:53 a.m.).
107
Message from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Slack (Feb. 2, 2020, 11:56 a.m.).
108
E-Mail from Ron Fouchier, Ph.D., Deputy Head of the Erasmus MC Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, to
Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir. Wellcome Trust, et. al. (Feb. 2, 2020, 8:30 AM).
109
E-Mail from Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Dir. Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir. Wellcome
Trust, et al. (Feb. 2, 2020, 10: 27).

Page 26 of 520
unnecessarily obstruct future attempts of virus culturing for research and diagnostic purposes for
any (emerging/zoonotic virus).” 110

The Involvement of Dr. Fauci, Dr. Collins, and Dr. Farrar

Throughout the drafting process, the authors of Proximal Origin were keenly aware of the
influence of Dr. Fauci, Dr. Collins, and Dr. Farrar.

It appears a draft of Proximal Origin did not leave the authorship group until on or around
February 4 or 5. Dr. Andersen wrote to Dr. Holmes, Dr. Garry, and Dr. Rambaut, “[u]nless others
have further comments, I’d say this is ready to go up the chain.” 111 Dr. Holmes responded,
“[w]orks for me. Should I quickly check with Jeremy to see if he is happy for it to be circulated
to the higher group?” 112 A few hours later, Dr. Holmes sent the first summary to Dr. Farrar. 113

110
E-Mail from Ron Fouchier, Ph.D., Deputy Head of the Erasmus MC Department of Viroscience, Erasmus MC, to
Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir. Wellcome Trust, et. al. (Feb. 8, 2020, 11:36 AM).
111
E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor Scripps Research, to Robert Garry, Ph.D., Professor, Tulane
School of Medicine, et. al. (Feb. 5, 2020).
112
E-Mail from Dr. Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al.,
Professor Scripps Research (Feb. 4, 2020).
113
E-Mail from Dr. Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Robert Garry, Ph.D., et. al.,
Professor, Tulane School of Medicine (Feb. 4, 2020, 12:36 PM).

Page 27 of 520
 Q. Is it your same presumption that he's referencing NIH?

A. That's my assumption, yes. 119

On February 7, 2020, Dr. Farrar said, “will share with TC [teleconference] group over the
weekend…” 120 On February 8, Dr. Farrar forwarded a draft of Proximal Origin to the same
participants of the February 1 Conference Call—further linking that call to the conception of
Proximal Origin. 121

Within hours of receiving the draft, Dr. Fauci, worried about the possibility of serial
passage in animals in a lab, asked the whole group, “[w]ould serial passage in an animal in the
laboratory give the same result as prolonged adaption in animals in the wild? Or is there
something that is fundamentally different in what happens when you serial passage versus
natural animal adaption?” 122 Dr. Garry responded, “[i]t’s possible to fairly rapidly select for more
pathogenic variants in the laboratory.” 123

In addition to Dr. Fauci’s and Dr. Collin’s involvement, Dr. Farrar led the drafting process
and made at least one direct edit to Proximal Origin. Dr. Farrar, however, is not credited as
having any involvement in the drafting and publication of Proximal Origin, when in fact he led
the drafting process and made direct substantive edits to the publication.

On February 17, 2020, right before publication, Dr. Lipkin emailed Dr. Farrar to thank
him for leading the drafting process of Proximal Origin, to which Dr. Farrar responded that he
will “push” the publisher. 124

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

119
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 176.
120
E-Mail from Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir. Wellcome Trust, to Edward Holmes, Ph.D., et. al. Professor, University of
Sydney (Feb. 7, 2020).
121
E-Mail from Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir. Wellcome Trust, to Edward Holmes, Ph.D., et. al. Professor, University of
Sydney (Feb. 8, 2020).
122
E-Mail from Anthony Fauci, M.D., Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to
Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., et. al., Dir., Wellcome Trust (Feb. 8, 2020).
123
E-Mail from Robert Garry, Ph.D., Professor, Tulane College of Medicine, to Anthony Fauci, M.D., et. al., Dir.,
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Feb. 8, 2020).
124
E-Mail from Lipkin to Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir. Wellcome Trust (Feb. 17, 2020).

Page 30 of 520
 Further, Dr. Andersen testified that Dr. Farrar was the “father figure” of Proximal
Origin. 125 In addition to leading the drafting and publication process, Dr. Farrar made at least one
direct edit to Proximal Origin. 126

This evidence suggests that Dr. Farrar was involved in the drafting and publication of
Proximal Origin and probably should have been credited or acknowledged for this involvement.
Both Dr. Fauci and Dr. Collins testified they did not provide edits to Proximal Origin.

Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 180.

125

E-Mail from Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir., Wellcome Trust, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al., Professor, Scripps
126

Research (Feb. 17, 2020, 10: 42 AM).

Page 31 of 520
The Involvement of Dr. Lipkin

Dr Lipkin was the only author of Proximal Origin that was not on the February 1
Conference Call. 127 Dr. Lipkin confirmed he was not even invited to the February 1 Conference
Call, and he had no prior knowledge of the call taking place. 128

Dr. Ian Lipkin (April 6, 2023)

Q. When did you eventually learn of the call?

A. Actually, I learned of it far more recently than you might expect - -

I can’t tell you precisely when, but I did not know about it in
February of 2020.

Q. The existence of the call or what was communicated on the call was
not communicated to you during the drafting or Proximal Origin?

A. That is correct. 129

Despite the authors completing the first draft of Proximal Origin by February 1, Dr.
Lipkin was not invited to join and was not sent a draft until February 10. 130 In that email, Dr.
Holmes stated, “I’ll have to chat with Jeremy in a little while to see if I can get you more directly
involved.” 131 It is unclear, why Dr. Farrar had approval over Dr. Lipkin’s involvement.

Prior to being added as an author, Dr. Lipkin spoke to Dr. Holmes a few times. On at least
one occasion, Dr. Lipkin raised concerns regarding the furin cleavage site. As Dr. Holmes
recounted on February 10, “Ian Lipkin just called – very worried about the furin cleavage site
and says that high ups are as well, inc. intel.” 132 Dr. Holmes later said, “I think Ian thinks it’s
from a lab.” 133

After reading the draft shared with him, Dr. Lipkin responded: 134

127
Lipkin TI, supra note 38, at 92.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
E-Mail from Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Ian Lipkin, M.D., Professor, Columbia
University (Feb. 10, 2023).
131
Id.
132
E-Mail from Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Andrew Rambaut, Ph.D., et. al.,
Professor, University of Edinburgh (Feb. 10, 2020).
133
E-Mail from Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al.,
Professor Scripps Research (Feb. 11, 2020).
134
E-Mail from Ian Lipkin, M.D., Professor, Columbia University, to Eddie Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of
Sydney (Feb. 11, 2020, 9:01 AM).

Page 32 of 520
 Dr. Garry testified that Dr. Lipkin “…made a nice authorship contribution” and that “he
read the paper many times and made some good comments back and forth…” 135 Dr. Lipkin
testified that he believed he was added to Proximal Origin because of his prior authorship of
related papers.

Dr. Ian Lipkin (April 6, 2023)

Q. Why do you think Dr. Holmes invited you to join as an author?

A. I had written an article on why the risk of wild animal markets. I

sent it to him, asked him to be a coauthor with me. He agreed. And
my guess is that it was in that context that he invited me to join this
paper. 136

However, this is not what the other authors discussed when considering whether to add
him to the authorship group. According to Dr. Holmes, the authors added Dr. Lipkin as an author
not necessarily for his expertise but for “safety in numbers” and “gravitas.” 137

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

135
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 160.
136
Lipkin TI, supra note 38, at 93.
137
E-Mail from Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al.,
Professor, Scripps Research (Feb. 12, 2020, 1:15 AM).

Page 33 of 520
 to arise. This is strong evidence that SARS-CoV-2 is not the product of purposeful
manipulation.” 141

As discussed in a May 26, 2020 Working Paper authored independently by DIA scientists
entitled, “Critical analysis of Andersen et al. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2” [hereinafter
“Working Paper”], this argument rested on assumptions rather than facts. 142 Instead of relying on
scientific data or evidence, Proximal Origin assumes a methodology and intent of a fictional
scientist. 143 In essence, Proximal Origin argues that this fictional scientist would want to design
the most optimal RBD possible, which COVID-19 does not possess.

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

We knew, based on, you know, much of the great research that Dr. Baric did
with SARS-1 is that based on that were predictions of here's the optimal
way in which a sarbecovirus will bind into the human ACE2 receptor. That
is described in the literature, right? So, if you were to design a new receptor
binding domain, presumably you would choose that, right? That would be
the logical way to do it.

And SARS-2 doesn't have that at all. It has a completely different solution,
right, which we had never seen before. Yet it still appeared to bind well to
the human ACE2 receptor -- which we now know, yes, it does bind well to
the human ACE2 receptor, but it binds well to a lot of other ACE2 receptors,
right, not just human.

So, yeah, that's the idea behind, like, if you were to build this from scratch,
you would take the solution that you already know works well. Because
that's how science is done, molecular biology is being done. 144

The Working Paper outlined that a more common approach is to simulate nature in the
lab by taking novel coronaviruses and simulating recombination events—even by inserting furin
cleavage sites—instead of optimizing the virus. 145 This was explained further during a
transcribed interview with an author of the Working Paper, CDR Chretien.

CDR Jean-Paul Chretien (June 29, 2023)

A. Well, they had pointed out that the receptor-binding domain would
not have been predicted to be very good or optimal for infecting
human cells. And for me that implied an assumption that if

141
Proximal Origin, supra note 41.
142
CDR Jean-Paul Chretien & Dr. Greg Cutlip, Working Paper 26 May 2020: Critical Analysis of Andersen et. al.
The proximal origin of SARS-Cov-2, DEF. INTEL. AGENCY (May 26, 2020) [hereinafter “Chretien & Cutlip Working
Paper”].
143
Id.
144
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 122.
145
Chretien & Cutlip Working Paper, supra note 144.

Page 35 of 520
 SARS-CoV-2, whatever was in lab, that it probably would have
come about in that way where one might have a priori designed a
sequence to infect human cells. And that certainly is possible, but
we showed examples of the literature of novel coronaviruses being
developed in different ways, and what we -- what we found was
more of an empirical approach where one might take a backbone
virus, a coronavirus from one species and insert part of a coronavirus
from another species to observe the effects, and all serving stated
purposes of developing medical countermeasures or improving
public health. But what we saw in scientific practice was much more
of an empirical approach and not -- not an approach by design to
achieve a specific function.

Q. So, the reality was scientists more taking an approach to try to mimic
natural recombination to see what those viruses would do in a
human population?

A. Yes.

Q. Not with a stated goal of making the most effective coronavirus

possible?

A. That's right. 146

When asked if the arguments in Proximal Origin regarding the RBD rested on
assumptions, Dr. Garry testified:

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. Is that still resting on an assumption that that’s not done, that they
weren’t testing suboptimal RBDs at some point?

A. I suppose, but why would you do that, you know? I mean, especially
if you’re thinking that this virus was somehow engineered to be a
weapon or, you know, at least be a good pathogen, you wouldn’t
make a binding domain that was, you know, as poor as your
computer predicted it would be for either one of those scenarios. 147

“The finding of SARS-CoV-like coronaviruses from pangolins with nearly identical RBDs,
however, provides a much stronger and more parsimonious explanation of how SARS-CoV-2
acquired these via recombination or mutation.” 148

146
Transcribed Interview of CDR Jean-Paul Chretien, Program Manager, Biological Technologies Office, Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, at 35 (June 29, 2023) [hereinafter “Chretien TI”].
147
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 151.
148
Proximal Origin, supra note 41.

Page 36 of 520
 Again, according to CDR Chretien, the discovery of a very similar RBD in a naturally
occurring pangolin virus is largely irrelevant.

CDR Jean-Paul Chretien (June 29, 2023)

So one of the -- the scenarios we laid out as plausible, and I think would
still be plausible, is to begin with a bat origin coronavirus, something along
the lines of RaTG13 but more similar to the -- or very, very closely similar
to SARS-CoV-2, and then -- and then evaluate the effects of inserting a
receptor-binding domain from another species, such as a pangolin. And
that's consistent with work that we've seen published from various
coronavirus research labs and would be consistent with the observed
SARS-CoV-2 as well. 149

Dr. Garry agreed that this scenario was an entirely plausible outcome.

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. If I in theory were to take that particular pangolin spike protein and

attach it to a backbone of some other virus, that product that I would
have created, though, theoretically in a lab, would itself have had
the six key amino acid mutations being discussed here, right? I
know that's a - - hypothetical question.

A. The way you said it, hypothetically, sure. 150

Further, Dr. Garry testified that the pangolin sequences “are interesting, but they, you
know, by themselves, don’t tell you that, the virus was natural or from a lab.” 151

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. What does this mean?

A. Okay. It means that, you know, the pangolin sequences are

interesting, but they, you know, by themselves, don’t tell you that,
the virus was natural or from a lab…You know, the pangolin viruses,
by themselves you know, they have the similarity in the receptor
binding domain, but, you know, there are other viruses out there like
RaTG13 that is still, you know, a closer virus overall. None of the
viruses that were known have a furin cleavage site, at least in these,
you know, these close -- the ones that we're talking about here. 152

149
Chretien TI, supra note 148, at 36.
150
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 112.
151
Id.
152
Id.

Page 37 of 520
 When asked if Proximal Origin’s arguments regarding the RBD ruled out a lab origin,
CDR Chretien testified, “[n]ot in my assessment.” 153 It is clear, the science and facts did not
support Proximal Origin’s conclusion that COVID-19’s RBD “is strong evidence that SARS-
CoV-2 is not the product of purposeful manipulation.” 154

2. The Furin Cleavage Site

“Polybasic cleavage sites have not been observed in related ‘lineage B’ betacoronaviruses,
although other human betacoronaviruses, including HKU1 (lineage A), have those sites and
predicted O-linked glycans. Given the level of genetic variation in the spike, it is likely that
SARS-CoV-2-like viruses with partial or full polybasic cleavage sites will be discovered in other
species.” 155

The central pillar of Proximal Origin’s argument is that science would eventually find a
furin cleavage site in a related coronavirus. This is a clear assumption with no proof nor
evidence. Further, as of December 4, 2024, there still has not been a furin cleavage site
discovered in sarbecoviruses—the subgenus COVID-19 belongs to—despite years of searching.

Dr. Andersen confirmed the rarity of furin cleavage sites in sarbecoviruses, stating,
“…the furin cleavage site itself, which we had not seen in sarbecoviruses before.” 156 Dr. Garry
confirmed this, stating, “…SARS-Cov-2 so far is the only sarbecovirus that has a furin cleavage
site.” 157 Further, Dr. Lipkin stated, “[s]o, amongst the SARS-like viruses, and there are many
coronaviruses, that was the first time that we’d seen that furin cleavage type.” 158 When asked,
“[h]ave there been any other SARS-related viruses…that has had a furin cleavage site?,” Dr.
Farzan testified, “[n]o.” 159 Finally, when asked, “…has there been a furin site observed in any
viruses in the sarbecovirus family other than COVID-19?,” CDR Chretien stated, “…not to my
knowledge.” 160

“The acquisition of both the polybasic cleavage site and predicted O-linked glycans also argues
against culture-based scenarios. New polybasic cleavage sites have been observed only after
prolonged passage of low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus in vitro or in vivo. Furthermore, a
hypothetical generation of SARS-CoV-2 by cell culture or animal passage would have required
prior isolation of a progenitor virus with very high genetic similarity, which has not been
described. Subsequent generation of a polybasic cleavage site would have then required repeated
passage in cell culture or animals with ACE2 receptors similar to those of humans, but such
work has also not previously been described. Finally, the generation of the predicted O-linked

153
Chretien TI, supra note 148, at 36.
154
Proximal Origin, supra note 41.
155
Id.
156
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 95.
157
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 119.
158
Lipkin TI, supra note 38, at 70.
159
Transcribed Interview of Michael Farzan, Ph.D., Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School (Apr. 21, 2023)
[hereinafter “Farzan TI”].
160
Chretien TI, supra note 148, at 37.

Page 38 of 520
glycans is also unlikely to have occurred due to cell-culture passage, as such features suggest the
involvement of an immune system.”

Again, according to the Working Paper, this argument rested on a false assumption that
all research is published. Dr. Garry testified:

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. Is it possible - - maybe not probable, but possible - - that scientists

do experiments they don’t publish?

A. Sure. 161

Dr. Lipkin testified:

Dr. Ian Lipkin (April 6, 2023)

Q. Do you know of any researchers that don’t publish everything they

sequence?

A. Yes. 162

Dr. Farzan testified:

Dr. Michael Farzan (April 21, 2023)

Q. …have you ever conducted or known someone to conduct an

experiment that they did not publish or make public?

A. Sure. 163

Further, many involved in Proximal Origin, or the February 1 Conference Call believe
that it is possible to manipulate a novel coronavirus in a lab to force the selection of a furin
cleavage site. In an email, Dr. Garry wrote, “[b]ottom line – I think that if you put selection
pressure on a Cov without a furin cleavage site in cell culture you could well generate a furin
cleavage site after a number of passages…” 164

161
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 153.
162
Lipkin TI, supra note 38, at 70.
163
Farzan TI, supra note 161, at 26.
164
E-Mail from Robert Garry, Ph.D., Professor, Tulane School of Medicine, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al.,
Professor, Scripps Research (Feb. 4, 2020, 2:50 PM).

Page 39 of 520
 Further, Dr. Garry testified that it would be possible to generate a furin cleavage site in a
lab.

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. But a novel coronavirus, if I just bring in a novel coronavirus, its

still possible that I could create a furin cleavage site?

A. I mean, its possible. I - - you know, its possible. 167

Additionally, Dr. Garry testified that a scientist could conduct serial passaging of a virus
in animals to generate a furin cleavage site and that this virus would be indistinguishable from a
natural one.

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. Would past evolutionary passage in an animal in a laboratory look

the same as evolutionary passage in an animal in the wild?

A. In principle, yes. It's a very difficult experiment you are describing

though.

Q. Are people capable of conducting that experiment?

A. They're capable of doing it. There would have to be a reason why

they would want to do that. And just doing it on some random bat
viruses is probably not something that most scientists would
consider.

Q. Could you put enough laboratory selection pressure on a novel

coronavirus to generate a furin cleavage site?

A. I mean, is it possible? It's in the realm of -- it's something -- I mean

most everything is possible, right? Is it probable? Probably not, I
would have to say. I mean, in principle, you know, lots of things can
happen; you know, unexpected things can happen. But designing an
experiment to actually make that happen, I'm not sure that there's
any scientist that's really capable of doing that. 168

Dr. Andersen agreed when asked, “you could put enough pressure on a coronavirus to
generate a furin cleavage site?” He responded, “I think as a hypothesis, I think it’s a good
hypothesis.” 169

167
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 34.
168
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 32-33.
169
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 159.

Page 41 of 520
 No known SARS-related coronavirus or sarbecovirus—the subgenus that COVID-19
belongs to—has a furin cleavage site and none have been found since the beginning of the
pandemic. Further, those involved with Proximal Origin believed it is possible to artificially
create a furin cleavage site in the lab. When asked if the arguments regarding the furin cleavage
site put forth in Proximal Origin ruled out a lab origin, CDR Chretien testified, “no, not in my
mind.” 170

3. The Novel Backbone

“Furthermore, if genetic manipulation had been performed, one of the several reverse-genetic
systems available for betacoronaviruses would probably have been used. However, the genetic
data irrefutably show that SARS-CoV-2 is not derived from any previously used virus backbone.”

The Proximal Origin authors are correct that COVID-19 does not derive from any
published backbone, but they once again assume that all data has been previously published, a
faulty assumption. As noted in the Working Paper, “[r]ecent technological innovations make it
easier than ever for scientists to develop new reverse genetics systems.” 171 When asked for more
detail, CDR Chretien testified:

CDR Jean-Paul Chretien (June 29, 2023)

Q. So, it would be possible that there are novel backbones or novel

reverse genetics systems that are out there but not published?

A. Yes.

Q. And even simpler than that, not necessarily a novel backbone, but is
it possible that researchers just used an unsequenced or unpublished
coronavirus as the backbone?

A. Yes. 172

Via Slack, the Proximal Origin authors rebuted their own argument. Dr. Andersen wrote,
“[j]ust in case people think it is difficult to make a CoV reverse genetics clone from scratch –
these guys did it in a week…” 173

Further, Dr. Andersen wrote, “[o]ne important thing I came across though – for the SARS
GoF studies they created a reverse genetics system for their bat virus on a whim. So, Ron’s and
Christian’s argument (which I found to be the strongest) about that not being feasible is not true
– they were already creating those.” 174

170
Chretien TI, supra note 148, at 39.
171
Chretien & Cutlip Working Paper, supra note 144.
172
Chretien TI, supra note 148, at 39.
173
Message from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Slack (Feb. 21, 2020 9:05 p.m.)
174
Message from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Slack (Feb. 2, 2020 6:48 p.m.)

Page 42 of 520
 Four hours later, according to Dr. Holmes, “[a]ll came together very quickly in the end.
Jeremy Farrar and Francis Collins are very happy. Works for me.” 179

Proximal Origin Gets Rejected from Nature

On February 12, 2020, Dr. Andersen pitched Proximal Origin to Nature. 180 In his first
pitch, as described above, he wrote, “[p]rompted by Jeremy Farrah [sic], Tony Fauci, and Francis
Collins, Eddie Holmes, Andrew Rambaut, Bob Garry, Ian Lipkin, and myself have been working
through much of the (primarily) genetic data to provide agnostic and scientifically informed
hypothesis around the origins of the virus. We are not write finished with the writeup and we still
have some loose ends, but I wanted to reach out to you to see if this might be potentially of
interest? We see this more as a commentary/hypothesis, as opposed to a more long-form Letter
or Article.” 181

Senior Editor at Nature Clare Thomas responded, “Yes please!” 182

On February 17, 2020, Dr. Holmes, on behalf of Dr. Andersen, submitted a manuscript
titled, “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” to Nature for review. 183 Later that day, Dr.
Andersen followed up writing, “[s]orry for contracting you again. The manuscript was put on
Virological this morning, which has created some urgency from Wellcome, WHO, and

179
E-Mail from Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al.,
Professor, Scripps Research (Feb. 16, 2020, 6:59 PM).
180
E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, to Clare Thomas, Editor, Nature (Feb. 12,
2020).
181
Id.
182
E-Mail from Clare Thomas, Editor, Nature, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research (Feb. 13,
2020).
183
E-Mail from Clare Thomas, Editor, Nature, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research (Feb. 17,
2020).

Page 45 of 520
 On February 20, 2020, Nature officially rejected Proximal Origin for publication. Ms.
Thomas stated, “[w]e’ve now obtained two ref reports on the paper (appended below), and I’ve
had the opportunity to discuss them with our chief editor Magdalena Skipper. In the light of the
advice received I am afraid we have decided that we cannot offer to publish in Nature.” 188 The
primary reason for denial, as stated by Ms. Thomas, was, “…one of our referees raised concerns
(also emphasized to the editors) about whether such a piece would feed or quash the conspiracy
theories.” 189

Regarding the denial, Dr. Andersen testified:

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. Did you ever get told why Nature originally rejected Proximal
Origin?

A. They -- I think they rejected the paper because I think the reviewers
felt that probably -- I mean, reviewer two was pretty critical about
our conclusions of the paper and felt that they should have been
stronger, and I think he had relayed those concerns to the editor, and
I think that that would have been the reason.

Q. The conclusions that -- what do you mean?

A. Basically, that we -- because, again, we kept the possibilities

of -- remember the submitted version to that was open-ended,
agnostic as to whether it could have been a lab passage of the two
versions of the natural origin that we discuss. And I think the editor
probably felt that that was too open-ended. That was clearly
what -- especially reviewer two pointed that out in their review,
which we disagreed with. 190

Dr. Garry testified:

Dr. Robert Garry (June 9, 2023)

Q. What were the reasons for the rejection?

A. They -- well, I mean, you can read all the reviews of the paper. They
thought that we came down too strongly on the side that the virus
had been of possible lab origin. And some of the reviewers wanted
us to take that out, and we didn't think that was appropriate. 191

188
E-Mail from Clare Thomas, Editor, Nature, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research (Feb. 20,
2020).
189
Id.
190
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 186.
191
Garry TI, supra note 77, at 176,

Page 47 of 520
 After the denial, Ms. Thomas suggested submitting Proximal Origin to Nature
Medicine. 192

Proximal Origin Gets Accepted at Nature Medicine

On February 27, 2020, Dr. Andersen submitted Proximal Origin to Nature Medicine. 193 In
his submission, Dr. Andersen wrote:

I believe Clare over at Nature might have mentioned our commentary on

the proximal origins of the hCoV-19 virus last week. We have been
incorporating some critical changes to the reviewer's comments, so I just
wanted to reach out to you to see if you're still interested in having a look
at this manuscript? We're still incorporating a few changes but will have all
of this wrapped up shortly as we're on a tight deadline - the media interest
in this has been enormous and hasn't slowed down (we have refrained from
commenting until formal publication). The public interest has also been
very high, with more than 65,000 reads of the blog post version over the last
week. 194

After having been denied by Nature for not downplaying the possibility of a lab leak
strongly enough, the authors decided to make this submission stronger.

Dr. Kristian Andersen (June 16, 2023)

Q. You, and correct me if I'm wrong, said something along the lines
earlier that the line: We do not believe that any type of
laboratory-based scenario is plausible was added at some point?

A. Correct. That was added to the final version of -- this was added
after it went over to Nature Medicine, yes.

Q. Did Nature Medicine add the line?

A. No.

Q. How did that process play out? How did that line get added?

A. That's based on our edits to the paper. Again, as the editor at Nature
Medicine states, is that he thought that the paper had grown
significantly since the one he had seen from Nature. We had to
shorten it. You need to trim this back down, more or less, to the size

192
E-Mail from Clare Thomas, Editor, Nature, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research (Feb. 20,
2020).
193
E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor Scripps Research, to Joao Monterio, Editor, Nature Medicine
(Feb. 27, 2020).
194
Id.

Page 48 of 520
 of the Nature version while retaining the major changes in response
to the reviewers. And some of the responses to the reviewers was
that the reviewer felt that we could be more specific on, for example,
that lab origins were less likely than we initially entertained, and I
agreed with that. I think we all agree with that, and those were
changes that we incorporated. So that includes that we don't believe
that any type of lab origin is plausible. It's something that was added
in response to the reviewers, our own thinking of the topic, and then
getting it published in Nature Medicine, as opposed to Nature. 195

On March 5, 2020, Nature Medicine accepted Proximal Origin for publication. 196

The Anonymous Whistleblower to Jon Cohen

On July 25, 2020, an anonymous whistleblower emailed Mr. Jon Cohen, a reporter for
Science magazine, and alleged that Proximal Origin plagiarized the arguments of others from the
February 1 conference call. 197 The whistleblower also alleged that this was one of the reasons
that Nature rejected the paper. 198 Mr. Cohen forwarded these claims to Dr. Andersen and Dr.
Holmes and said, “[h]ere’s what one person who claims to have inside knowledge is saying
behind your backs…” 199

Dr. Andersen and Dr. Holmes then drafted a response to Mr. Cohen and forwarded their
draft to Dr. Fauci and Dr. Farrar for approval. 200 In this email, Dr. Andersen expressed concerns
about confirming that the February 1 Conference Call took place, stating, “[w]e need to reply
back to Jon, which would include confirming that this meeting took did indeed take place with
you and Jeremy present. Please let me know if you have any comments or concerns in this
regard.” 201

In response to Dr. Andersen, Dr. Farrar replied, “[c]an we get the sequence of events right
and agreed before a substantive reply goes back to Jon?” 202 Dr. Holmes, responded with a
revised draft and wrote, “[f]or Tony’s benefit a revised draft of the email to Jon is pasted
below.” 203

While the identity of the anonymous whistleblower is still unknown, the Proximal Origin
authors had their own suspicions. Dr. Holmes opined, “…I’m 100% sure it was Ron who leaked
195
Andersen TI, supra note 55, at 186-187.
196
E-Mail from Nature Medicine, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research (Mar. 5, 2020).
197
E-Mail from Jon Cohen, Reporter, Science, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, & Edward
Holmes, Ph.D., Professor University of Sydney (July 25, 2020).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
E-Mail from Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., Professor, Scripps Research, to Anthony Fauci, M.D., et. al., Dir., Nat’l
Inst. Of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (July 28, 2020).
201
Id.
202
E-Mail from Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., Dir., Wellcome Trust, to Kristian Andersen, Ph.D., et. al., Professor Scripps
Research (July 28, 2020).
203
E-Mail from Edward Holmes, Ph.D., Professor, University of Sydney, to Jeremy Farrar, Ph.D., et. al., Dir.
Wellcome Trust (July 28, 2020).

Page 49 of 520
 Q. Were you the –

A. No, I was not. I was not. I was building suspense.

Q. So Dr. –

A. And it worked.

Q. It did. Part of it is because Dr. Holmes thinks you were the one that
contacted John Cohen.

A. Well, that's why he may say it. He and -- I'm forgetting his name,
sorry -- Andersen. If that's what they thought, he may have been
really irritated with me if he felt that it was me, but it was not.

Q. What did Mr. Cohen contact you about?

A. He was asking me the same question you asked me, was I the author
of that statement? And I said, no, I was not.

Q. Do you know who is?

A. No, I don't. 206

The Critical Reception of Proximal Origin

On February 19, 2020, Proximal Origin was cited in the letter in The Lancet titled,
“Statement in support of the scientists, public health professionals, and medical professionals of
China combatting COVID-19.” 207 Proximal Origin was cited as proof “this coronavirus
originated in wildlife.” 208

On March 17, 2020, Dr. Andersen’s employer, Scripps Research, put out a press release
regarding Proximal Origin entitled, “The COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic has a natural origin,
scientists say.” 209 Dr. Andersen is quoted in this release saying, “…we can firmly determine that
SARS-COV-2 originated through natural process.” 210 Dr. Farrar’s organization, The Wellcome
Trust, is also quoted in the release, stating, “they conclude that the virus is the product of natural
evolution.” 211

NIH and NIAID were keenly anticipating the release of Proximal Origin. On February
19, 2020, the NIAID Office of Communications spoke internally regarding the paper and stated,
206
Baric TI, supra note 39, at 124-125.
207
Charles Calisher, Ph.D., et. al., Statement in support of the scientists, public health professionals, and medical
professionals of China combatting COVID-19, THE LANCET (Feb. 19, 2020).
208
Id.
209
The COVID-19 coronavirus epidemic has a natural origin, scientists say, SCRIPPS RESEARCH (Mar. 17, 2020).
210
Id.
211
Id.

Page 51 of 520
 On March 26, 2020, Dr. Collins wrote a blog post for the NIH regarding Proximal
214
Origin. Dr. Collins wrote, “[a] new study debunks such claims by providing scientific
evidence that this novel coronavirus arose naturally.” 215 Dr. Collins concluded, “[e]ither way, this
study leaves little room to refute a natural origin for COVID-19.” 216

On April 16, 2020, more than two months after the original February 1 Conference Call
and a month after Proximal Origin was published, Dr. Collins emailed Dr. Fauci and expressed
dismay that Proximal Origin did not successfully squash the lab leak theory. He stated, “I hoped
the Nature Medicine article on the genomic sequence of SARS-CoV-2 would settle this…” 217
Then Dr. Collins asked Dr. Fauci, “[w]ondering if there is something NIH can do to help put
down this very destructive conspiracy…Anything more we can do?” 218

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

214
Francis Collins, Genomic Study Points to Natural Origin of COVID-19, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar. 26,
2020).
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
E-Mail from Francis Collins, Dir., Nat’l Insts. Of Health, to Anthony Fauci M.D., Dir. Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy &
Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. Of Health (Apr. 16, 2020, 10:45 PM).
218
Id.

Page 53 of 520
 Dr. Collins testified that “Nature Medicine article” was in reference to Proximal
219
Origin. The next day, on April 17, 2020, Dr. Fauci cited Proximal Origin from the White
House podium.

White House Press Conference (April 17, 2023)

Q. Mr. President, I wanted to ask Dr. Fauci: Could you address

these suggestions or concerns that this virus was somehow
manmade, possibly came out of a laboratory in China?

Dr. Fauci. There was a study recently that we can make available to
you, where a group of highly qualified evolutionary

219
Transcribed Interview of Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D., former Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health (Jan. 12, 2024)
[hereinafter “Collins TI”].

Page 54 of 520
 virologists looked at the sequences there and the sequences
in bats as they evolve. And the mutations that it took to get
to the point where it is now is totally consistent with a jump
of a species from an animal to a human. So, I mean, the paper
will be available — I don’t have the authors right now, but
we can make that available to you. 220

After the briefing, a reporter directly asked which paper Dr. Fauci cited and was then sent
Proximal Origin. The reporter wrote, “Dr. Fauci on Friday said he would share a scientific paper
with the press on the origin of the coronavirus. Can you please help me get a copy of that
paper?” 221

Dr. Fauci responded, “[h]ere are the links to the scientific papers and a commentary about
the scientific basis of the origins of SARS-Cov-2” and lists Proximal Origin. 222

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

220
Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press
Briefing, The White House (Apr. 17, 2020) [hereinafter “Remarks by President Trump April 17, 2020”].
221
E-Mail from Bill Gertz, Correspondent, The Wash. Times, to Anthony Fauci, M.D., Dir. Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy &
Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. Of Health (Apr. 19, 2020, 2:21 PM).
222
E-Mail from Anthony Fauci, M.D., Dir. Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. Of Health, to
Bill Gertz, Correspondent, The Wash. Times (Apr. 19, 2020, 9:25 PM).

Page 55 of 520
 Dr. Fauci later stated he may not have ever actually read Proximal Origin. 223 This raises
questions of why he would cite a paper, he did not even read, from the White House podium as
proof COVID-19 was not the result of a lab leak.

Dr. Collins testified that despite his e-mail suggesting he desired more action to “put
down” the lab leak hypothesis, he did not instruct Dr. Fauci to cite Proximal Origin from the
White House. 224 Dr. Fauci also testified that his statement at the White House was not in
response to Dr. Collins’ e-mail. 225

On January 9, 2024, Mr. Don McNeil, former science and health reporter for the New
York Times, published “The Wisdom of Plagues: Lessons from 25 Years of Covering
Pandemics.” In Wisdom of Plagues, Mr. McNeil recounted:

223
Megan Stack, Dr. Fauci Could Have Said a Lot More, THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020).
224
See Collins TI, supra note 221.
225
See, Transcribed Interview of Anthony Fauci, M.D., former Dir., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases,
Nat’l Insts. of Health (Jan. 8, 2024) [hereinafter “Fauci TI 1”].

Page 56 of 520
 Far more serious errors occur when sources deliberately deceive reporters.
In late July 2023, this book was almost in print when I learned, from emails
and Slack chats [released] by the Congressional Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Pandemic and posted on Public, a Substack magazine, that I
was the victim of deception in the pandemic’s earliest days. In February
2020, four eminent scientists whom I respected had discussed with each
other various ways to throw me off track when I asked whether it was
possible that the virus had been manipulated in a lab or might have leaked
from one. Their efforts affected how I viewed the controversy over Covid’s
origins and how the Times covered it. My publisher allowed me to quickly
rewrite this chapter. 226

Mr. McNeil also confirmed that the Proximal Origin authors’ deception altered how the
New York Times reported on COVID-19 origins.

Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The Wisdom of Plagues: Lessons from 25 Years of Covering Pandemics (Simon &
226

Schuster, 2024).

Page 57 of 520
II. The Failures of EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

EcoHealth is a non-profit scientific research organization that is primarily funded by U.S.

taxpayer dollars. Its President is Dr. Daszak, and both EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak are long time
collaborators with the WIV and Dr. Shi. Beginning in April 2020, NIH investigated both
EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak for numerous grant policy violations and accusations of facilitating
dangerous research at the WIV.

Starting in February 2023, the Select Subcommittee began its own investigation into
EcoHealth. 227 In July 2023, HHS debarred the WIV for a period of 10 years for non-
compliance. 228 Further, in May 2024, as a direct result of the Select Subcommittee’s
investigation, HHS immediately suspended and proposed for debarment both EcoHealth, as an
institution, and Dr. Daszak, as an individual. 229 As of December 4, 2024, neither EcoHealth’s nor
Dr. Daszak’s debarment is finalized. Both NIH and Dr. Fauci support the debarment of
EcoHealth.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (November 14, 2024)

Q. And does NIH still support the debarment of EcoHealth and Dr.
Daszak?

A. We do. And we have provided all necessary documents to the

Department. 230

Dr. Anthony Fauci (June 3, 2024)

Q. During previous TIs and hearings, when asked if they supported

every one of these actions…, both Dr. Collins and Dr. Tabak said
yes. Sitting here today, do you support the suspension and
debarment of EcoHealth?

A. Yes. 231

FINDING: EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Facilitated Gain-of-Function Research at the Wuhan

Institute of Virology.

227
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Feb. 13, 2023).
228
Letter from Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Acquisitions, Suspension and Debarment Official, to Yanyi Wang, Dir.,
Wuhan Institute of Virology (July 18, 2023).
229
Letter from Henrietta Katrina Brisbon, Suspension and Debarment Official and Deputy Assistant Sec’y for
Acquisitions, HHS, to Peter Daszak, President, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (May 2024).
230
Preparing for the Next Pandemic: Lessons Learned and the Path Forward: Hearing Before Select Subcomm. on
Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. 2, at 19 (Nov. 14, 2024) (testimony of Dr. Tabak) [hereinafter “Preparing for the
Next Pandemic”].
231
A Hearing with Dr. Anthony Fauci: Hearing Before Select Subcomm. on Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. 2,
at 122 (June 3, 2024) [hereinafter “Fauci Hearing”]. (The actions referenced in this question refer to NIH’s
enforcement and oversight actions preceding the 2024 suspension and debarment.)

Page 58 of 520
What Is Gain-Of-Function Research?

The term gain-of-function research encompasses a wide swath of life sciences research, a
subset of which involves creating potential pandemic pathogens. The meaning to the public
versus the scientific community is different and ever shifting, especially as federal government
oversight policies and procedures have shifted. However, the term gain-of-function is not tied to
any specific policy or oversight framework and, instead, has a long-established lay definition.

Throughout this investigation, the Select Subcommittee found the term “gain-of-
function” could mean something completely different to one person in the field than to another
person simply using the term. In fact, different experts also have different understandings of the
term. Consequently, a nuanced understanding of the term is essential to facilitate effective
oversight and understanding of this type of research.
As of October 19, 2020, according to the NIH website, gain-of-function meant “a type of
research that modifies a biological agent so that it confers a new or enhanced activity to that
agent.” 232

This definition was confirmed by multiple witnesses interviewed by the Select

Subcommittee.

Dr. Hugh Auchincloss (Dec. 20, 2023)

Q. So, this is the NIH website for gain-of-function research involving

potential pandemic pathogens, and this version was last updated July
12, 2021. There has since been a new version, and under the header
"Gain-of-Function Research" is that definition that I just read to you.
It does have the qualifier, not all research described as gain-of-
function entails the same level of risk, and I guess one of the kind of
semantics here is that what a layperson thinks of as gain-of-function,
I think falls under this definition: Any research that attributes a new
attribute to a biological agent, whether it's taking avian influenza
virus that can't infect humans or making it able to infect humans or

232
Gain-of-Function Research Involving Potential Pandemic Pathogens, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (last updated July
12, 2021) (last accessed Oct. 19, 2021) (archived version on file with Select Subcomm. Staff).

Page 59 of 520
 taking a bat Coronavirus that can't infect mice and making it infect
mice, either of which would qualify as gain-of-function under that
definition.

Do you agree?

A. I do, and I think that this is making the same points that I've been
making earlier. There's gain-of-function which is common in
virology and that's not the same as the gain-of-function research of
concern. 233

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

Q. …My, kind of, understanding is that there's -- it's a complicated

definition. There's a lot of different pieces to it. There are pieces that
NIH regulates; there's pieces that HHS regulates. There are pieces
that have dual-use problems. So, I'm going to run through each
definition, and you just tell me if I'm kind of on the right page. The
high-level gain-of-function, as was defined by NIH: a type of
research that modifies a biological agent so that it confers new or
enhanced activity to that agent.

Is that right?

A. It -- as an agent, yes. 234

In addition to the above definition, the federal government requires that certain types of
gain-of-function research receive further oversight and review. In 2014 OSTP determined that a
subset of gain-of-function research needed further regulation and paused all new federal funding
for that type of research [hereinafter “2014 OSTP Pause”].

New USG funding will not be released for gain-of-function research

projects that may be reasonably anticipated to confer attributes to influenza,
MERS, or SARS viruses such that the virus would have enhanced
pathogenicity and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route.
The research funding pause would not apply to characterization or testing
of naturally occurring influenza, MERS, and SARS viruses, unless the tests
are reasonably anticipated to increase transmissibility and/or
pathogenicity. 235

233
Transcribed Interview of Hugh Auchincloss, M.D., Dep. Dir., Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l
Insts. of Health, at 100-101 (Dec. 20, 2023) [hereinafter “Auchincloss TI”].
234
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 27.
235
U.S. GOVERNMENT GAIN-OF-FUNCTION DELIBERATIVE PROCESS AND RESEARCH FUNDING PAUSE ON SELECTED
GAIN-OF-FUNCTION RESEARCH INVOLVING INFLUENZA, MERS, AND SARS VIRUSES, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECH.
POLICY, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 17, 2014).

Page 60 of 520
 This definition is clear—it is not a pause on all gain-of-function research, but on a
specific subset. Therefore, it is possible for research to qualify as gain-of-function without
qualifying for the 2014 OSTP Pause.

In 2017, as a result of and replacing the 2014 OSTP Pause, HHS released the
“Framework for Guiding Funding Decisions About Proposed Research involving Enhanced
Potential Pandemic Pathogens (P3CO)” [hereinafter “P3CO Framework”]. 236 Similar to the 2014
OSTP Pause, the P3CO Framework did not apply to all gain-of-function research but only a
specific subset.

The P3CO Framework applies to “[p]roposed intramural and extramural life sciences
research that is being considered for funding and that has been determined by the funding agency
as reasonably anticipated to create, transfer, or used enhanced PPPs [potential pandemic
pathogens]…” 237 A PPP is defined as a pathogen that:

(1) “is likely highly transmissible and likely capable of wide and
uncontrollable spread in human populations” and

(2) “is likely highly virulent and likely to cause significant morbidity and/or
mortality in humans.” 238

An enhanced PPP—the type of pathogen the P3CO Framework is designed to oversee—

is defined as a potential pandemic pathogen “resulting from the enhancement of the
transmissibility and/or virulence of a pathogen.” 239 This applies to only a very narrow subset of
research. In fact, out of all the grants issued since the P3CO Framework went into effect, HHS
has only reviewed three potential studies that fall under this definition. 240 Again, the P3CO
Framework is clear—it only applies to a small subset of gain-of-function research. Therefore, it
is possible for research to qualify as gain-of-function without qualifying for the P3CO
Framework.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

Q. Can there be a subset of research that would qualify under that

definition of modifying -- of providing a new function to a
biological agent --

A. Uh-huh.

236
FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING FUNDING DECISIONS ABOUT PROPOSED RESEARCH INVOLVING ENHANCED POTENTIAL
PANDEMIC PATHOGENS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2017).
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Research Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogens, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS. (last updated June 5, 2023) (last accessed Apr. 23, 2024).

Page 61 of 520
 Q. -- without falling under the categories of being regulated by the
P3CO?

A. Absolutely. 241

Applying the Definition of Gain-Of-Function to EcoHealth’s Reported Experiments.

The Select Subcommittee endeavored to determine if research facilitated by EcoHealth—

paid for with U.S. taxpayer dollars—and conducted in Wuhan by the WIV qualified as gain-of-
function research. The research in question was published by EcoHealth in its Year 5 Research
Performance Progress Reports (RPPR) [hereinafter “Year 5 Report”]. 242

The Year 5 Report describes an experiment in which the WIV infected transgenic mice
with four different coronaviruses, three of which were chimera or recombinant viruses with
different spike proteins. The WIV then measured the pathogenicity of the novel laboratory
created viruses as compared to the control, which was a full-length backbone of WIV1. The
pathogenicity of the three chimeras was then compared to the control—the full-length backbone
of WIV1.

In the experiment, the survival rate of mice infected with WIV1 was 71.4 percent while
the survival rate of the mice infected with one of the chimeric viruses (WIV1-SHC014) was just
25 percent. Therefore, the laboratory generated chimera was more pathogenic than the control
virus and the mice infected with that chimera became sicker.

241
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 29.
242
Interim Research Performance Progress Report, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., at 15 (Aug. 3, 2021).

Page 62 of 520
 In the October 20, 2021 letter to Mr. Comer, Dr. Tabak described this experiment and its
result as “unexpected.” 243 Regardless of whether the results were expected or not, it appears this
experiment would constitute gain-of-function research.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

Q. NIH has said a lot that the experiment in the EcoHealth grant was
not gain-of-function research, that it didn't qualify. Did NIH mean it
wasn't ePPP research?

A. It is certainly an example of generic gain-of-function, if that’s what

you mean.

Q. Yes. So, I'm trying to get at, like, words matter. And using a term
that has an established definition, "gain-of-function" -- it's on the
NIH's website –

A. Right.

Q. -- has an established definition, that when people say that what

EcoHealth did was not gain-of-function research, that's not true. It's
not gain-of-function research of concern or that HHS would
regulate. Is that fair?

A. That is fair. And I have always, when asked, tried to make that
distinction.

Q. All right.

A. Because, as you point out, there's lots of gain-of-function research,

and, as is written here, however, not all such research entails the
same level of risk.

Q. And I agree with that. I'm just –

A. Yeah.

Q. When there's such a -- like, I don't remember the infection count or

the death toll in 2021. And origins has been such a hot-button issue.
But, like, when I write things for my bosses that are going to go out
and speak or if I was prepping someone for congressional testimony,
I'd want to make sure that they're using the right phrases. And
whenever we've talked to NIH -- I think I was briefed by you once;
it might've been on this letter -- maybe outside of that, we've heard

Letter from Lawrence Tabak, D.D.S., Ph.D., Principal Dep. Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health to Hon. James Comer,
243

Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (October 20, 2021).

Page 63 of 520
 "NIH did not fund gain-of-function research in Wuhan," period.
That's, at best, misleading.

A. I have always tried to make sure that whoever is asking the question
is speaking about gain-of-function research of concern. I can only
speak for how I'm trying to answer questions of this type. Because
you're right, words matter.

Q. And I won't harp too long, but just -- you would agree, what's
described in this letter, what's described in the EcoHealth year
progress report, would fit the definition -- the broad definition of
gain-of-function research?

A. The generic, broad description of what gain-of-function is, yes. 244

Dr. Ralph Baric (Jan. 22, 2024)

Q. Dr. Baric, you've read the year 5 paragraph now, the in vivo
infection where five of the seven mice infected with just the WIV1
backbone survived, but only two of the eight mice infected with the
WIV1 SHC014 [survivied].

A. You should be able to do the statistics on that, and it should show

that there's a statistical difference, which means there was an
increase in virulence and the entire review process would have been
triggered.

***

Q. So, my question is, and we've gotten different answers on

everything, and it depends on if you're using the P3 definition or
whatever definition. This reads like gain-of-function to me.

A. Okay. So what year was this? I just want to make sure I'm in the
right gain-of-function regulation.

Q. 2019.

A. So, it's the NSABB regulation…So based on those regulations, yes,

this is -- as my interpretation, is that, yes, these would be exempt.
But is it a gain-of-function phenotype? Absolutely. You can't argue
with that. 245

244
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 95-97.
245
Baric TI, supra note 39, at 181-184.

Page 64 of 520
 Dr. Lawrence Tabak (May 16, 2024)

Q. …Dr. Tabak, did the NIH fund the gain-of-function research at the
Wuhan Institute of Virology through EcoHealth?

A. It depends on your definition of gain-of-function research. If you are

speaking about the generic term, yes, we did… 246

Dr. Baric previously stated and testified that the WIV should not have been conducting
this type of research at BSL-2. This is a divergence from the beliefs of Dr. Daszak. This
divergence was exemplified by the following email exchange. 247

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

246
Overseeing the Overseers: A Hearing with NIH Deputy Director, Dr. Lawrence Tabak: Hearing Before Select
Subcomm. On the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong., 2, at 95-97 (May 16, 2024) [hereinafter “Tabak Hearing”].
247
Baric TI, supra note 39, at 181-184.

Page 65 of 520
[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 66 of 520
Page 67 of 520
FINDING: EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Submitted its Year 5 Annual Progress Report Nearly Two
Years Late.

During the life cycle of a grant, the principal investigator must provide annual reports,
known as RPPR, to its funding agency. 248 These reports provide the funding agency with updates
on the progress of the work funded by the grant and any anticipated changes in the research
approach or direction going into the next funding year. In the case of EcoHealth, these reports,
especially its Year Five Report, have come under scrutiny from the NIH Office of Extramural
Research and the Select Subcommittee’s investigation.

EcoHealth’s Year 5 Report was due September 28, 2019. However, the report was not
submitted until August 3, 2021—nearly two years late. 249 This failure was first reported to
Congress via an October 20, 2021 letter from Dr. Tabak to Mr. Comer. 250

Each year, regardless of whether a grant is being evaluated for a competitive renewal, the
principal investigator must submit an annual progress report. As stated above, EcoHealth’s Year
5 Report—the report that included the results of research and experiments for June 2018 through
May 2019, the time period immediately preceding the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic—
was due September 28, 2019. However, EcoHealth submitted this report nearly two years later
on August 3, 2021.

For project years one through four, Dr. Daszak, in addition to submitting the annual
report via the NIH online reporting system, would routinely also send it via e-mail to his
program officer, Dr. Stemmy. The Select Subcommittee are in possession of these e-mails for
reporting years one, two, and four:

1) On May 1, 2015, Dr. Daszak emailed Dr. Stemmy the Year 1 RPPR stating, “[w]e just
uploaded our Y1 Report for our Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence
award (1R01AI110964-01). I wanted to send you a copy of the report as well.” 251

2) On May 13, 2016, Dr. Daszak emailed Dr. Stemmy the Year 2 RPPR stating, “I just
wanted to let you know that we submitted our Year 2 Report yesterday (attached as
pdf).” 252

248
Research Performance Progress Report (RPPR), NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (last updated Nov. 2, 2022) (last
accessed Apr. 24, 2024).
249
Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence, RPPR (Aug. 3, 2021).
250
Letter from Lawrence Tabak, D.D.S., Ph.D., Principal Dep. Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Hon. James Comer,
Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (Oct. 20, 2021).
251
E-Mail from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Erik Stemmy, Ph.D., Program Officer,
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, et al. (May 1, 2015) (On file with Select
Subcomm. Staff).
252
E-Mail from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Erik Stemmy, Ph.D., Program Officer,
Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, et al. (May 13, 2016) (On file with Select
Subcomm. Staff).

Page 68 of 520
 3) On April 25, 2018, Dr. Daszak emailed Dr. Stemmy the Year 4 RPPR stating, “I just
wanted to send you a pdf of our Year 4 Report which I submitted last week.” 253

When asked why he did not continue this pattern for the Year 5 Report, Dr. Daszak testified
that he “wish[ed]” he did email the Year 5 Report to the NIH grants office but did not.

Dr. Peter Daszak (Nov. 13, 2023)

Q. Okay. And I think we had seen in, I think at least 1 year prior, maybe
year 4, a practice of submitting the annual report through the
Commons system –

A. Yeah.

Q. -- of course the way that it's submitted?

A. Yeah.

Q. And then separately from that, emailing it over to your grants office?

A. Yeah. I remember doing that a couple of times, yeah.

Q. Did that happen here?

A. No, unfortunately. I wish I'd done that. I didn't do it. You know, it's
unfortunate. 254

Dr. Stemmy was the NIAID official responsible for tracking and ensuring EcoHealth’s
progress reports were submitted on time. According to Dr. Stemmy, Dr. Daszak did not send an
e-mail with the Year 5 Report until Dr. Daszak officially submitted it August 3, 2021.

Dr. Erik Stemmy (Nov. 13, 2023)

Q. So this is minority exhibit G. It is the year 4 progress report along

with the sort of cover email from Dr. Daszak to you in April 25th,
2018. So we have this email attaching the year 4 report where he's
going outside of the eRA Commons system to sort of personally
hand you a copy of what he's up to. They had the big success with
SADS and some other notable events.

Did he do this for year 5?

253
E-Mail from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Erik Stemmy, et. al., Ph.D., Program
Officer, Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Apr. 25, 2018) (On file with Select
Subcomm. Staff).
254
Transcribed Interview of Peter Daszak, Ph.D., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance Inc. (Nov. 14, 2023) (hereinafter
“Daszak TI”).

Page 69 of 520
 A. I believe he sent me an email in -- contemporaneous with when he
submitted the progress report in 2021, I believe that August, right?
Is that when that one came in? So I believe he copied me on a
message then, but not around the time that it would have been
due. 255

Dr. Daszak also testified that “the information from the Year 5 Report was in the
resubmitted - - [year 6 competitive] renewal submission, in the first part of that renewal
submission.” 256

Dr. Peter Daszak (Nov. 14, 2023)

Q. Could I ask –

A. But -- yeah, go ahead, go ahead.

Q. Could I ask why not, in other words, it seems as if there was a

knowledge that you can always just attach the PDF to the email and
send it over to Erik Stemmy.

A. Yeah.

Q. We're struggling, I think, a little bit to understand why that would

not have occurred here.

A. Well, you know, one, it's me second-guessing my decisions 4 years

ago, but one reason why there's less concern is, the information from
the year 5 report was in the resubmitted -- the renewal submission,
in the first part of that renewal submission. We had information of
relevance to the work we were doing in China in that submission.
So Erik Stemmy, the program officer, had seen that, without a doubt.
That was part of his job to read that proposal. 257

This sentiment was reiterated by multiple witnesses throughout the inquiry. However,
after a review of the Year 6 competitive renewal, the Select Subcommittee does not believe the
experiment in question in the Year 5 Report was in the renewal application. Regardless, simply
because there is a renewal application, does not exempt EcoHealth from following the terms of
its grant and submitting its Year 5 Report on time. As multiple NIH witnesses testified, the Year 5
Report is still due on time regardless of the competitive renewal application.

Dr. Erik Stemmy (Nov. 13, 2023)

255
Stemmy TI, supra note 260, at 142.
256
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 52.
257
Id.

Page 70 of 520
 Q. If a grant is suspended or terminated, does the prime awardee
still have to complete the requirements under the grant --
administrative requirements?

HHS Counsel. If you know.

A. So my understanding is that this was a unique

situation. I do recall that, when they came up for their
first annual progress report, I believe the, they
reached out to grants management to ask what they
should submit. So I believe they still have to submit
something, but, in essence, it was a paper that said,
"This grant is terminated," and no action has been
undertaken.

Q. No. I'm saying -- so the grant that was suspended was

the renewal, the type 2, right? But they hadn't
completed all the requirements on the type 1 prior to
having the funding for the type 2.

A. Correct.

Q. If the type 2 is suspended, does it just waive their

requirements to complete the type 1?

A. No. 258

As an excuse for why EcoHealth’s Year 5 Report was late, Dr. Daszak testified that he
attempted to submit it but was “locked out” by the NIH system.

Dr. Peter Daszak (May 1, 2024)

Q. Right. I’m sorry. September 28, 2019?

A. Yes.

Q. Perfect. Thank you. But it is also true that you did not submit this
report until August 2021, nearly 2 years later, as my colleague just
represented.

A. Well—

Q. You did not submit the report at the end of September 2019?

Transcribed Interview of Erik Stemmy, Ph.D., Program Officer, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases,
258

Nat’l Insts. of Health, at 140-141 (Nov. 13, 2023) [hereinafter “Stemmy TI”].

Page 71 of 520
 A. We uploaded the report into the system. The system locked us
259
out…

This testimony does not stand up to further scrutiny. Dr. Lauer and NIH conducted a
forensic audit across their systems to attempt to confirm Dr. Daszak’s claim, however, NIH could
not verify the claim.

Dr. Michael Lauer (Nov. 2, 2023)

Q. Okay. Oh, I meant to -- I had one other question on this late year-
five report. You said earlier to somebody's questioning today that
you were not convinced that EcoHealth -- EcoHealth sent a product.
They had a submission. They were trying to submit it in July 2019,
and they experienced a lockout. They were locked out of the eRA
Commons system, and they weren't able to do it. Now, you said you
were not convinced. So could you explain why you were of that
view?

A. Yeah. So our office did an electronic forensic investigation of

EcoHealth's encounters with our grant system, and that included
both looking at activity logs. Every time that anyone interacts with
our system, there is an activity log that describes when they came
in, who came in, what actually happened. And it also involved our
help desk ticket. So we have a help desk. And so whenever
somebody calls in and says, "I am having problems with the
system," that encounter that they have with our staff is recorded. We
never found any evidence that they had been locked out of our
system. We did see that on one day somebody from EcoHealth had
attempted to log in through one -- you can log into our system in
multiple different ways. And they had attempted to log in in one way
and had entered the wrong password, I think, three times. And so
that particular channel did get blocked. But then, on the very same
day, later they were interacting with our system having logged in
through a different route. And then we looked at the help desk
tickets, we also looked at emails with NIAID staff, and we never
saw any evidence that they claimed that they were unable to submit
their progress report because the eRA system had locked them out.

Q. Okay. And if it had locked them out, weren't there other ways they
could have gotten the report into NIH if they had called somebody?

A. If they were unable to submit any document because they had been
locked out of the system, then what they would do is they could call

A Hearing with the President of EcoHealth Alliance, Dr. Peter Daszak: Hearing Before Select Subcomm. On the
259

Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. 2, at 23 (May 1, 2024) [hereinafter “Daszak Hearing”].

Page 72 of 520
 up our help desk, and then our help desk would work with them to
figure out what was going on. 260

In response to Dr. Lauer’s testimony, Dr. Daszak deflected by stating that both the fact
that Dr. Lauer’s forensic investigation failed to find evidence supporting Dr. Daszak’s claim, and
his underlying claim can both be true.

Dr. Peter Daszak (Nov. 14, 2023)

Q. So I'm going to show you what's going to be majority exhibit No. 5.

This is an excerpt of a transcribed interview with Dr. Lauer that the
committees took earlier this month. So we asked Dr. Lauer what, as
part of his compliance review of the grant, what steps he did to look
into this lockout issue…So we plan to ask for that, the results of that
forensic audit. But, again, wanted to get your impression as to how
correct that is.

A. It's absolutely possible. What Dr. Lauer says there is true and what
I'm saying to you is true. It can be true that there is, as he states,
there's no evidence of us contacting the help desk and getting a help
desk ticket because we maybe didn't do that. We contacted the grants
officer. It can also be true that Dr. Lauer doesn't have any evidence
that we'd been locked out of the system and that we were locked out
of the system. Just because he can't find evidence of that doesn't
mean it's not true. We were locked out of the system. Not only were
we locked out of the system then, when Dr. Lauer wrote to us
demanding that we immediately send the year 5 report and upload it
into the system, NIH couldn't get the system to work for 11 days.
We have it on record. And that's how we did keep email. So look,
Dr. Lauer is a very senior manager at NIH. I'm sure that it's logical
to him that someone would go to the help desk. But we had a direct
point of contact in charge of grants management who never
responded to us by phone. All we can do is try. And if NIH was
unable to, even when they demanded the report 2 years later, they
were unable to unlock the system for a number of days, it was clearly
locked.

Q. Sure. I'm just giving you the opportunity to comment on his [sic].
And we don't have the forensic audit so we don't have a firm idea of
the scope.

A. Well, if the forensic audit tests whether we got a help desk ticket or
assesses whether we tried to log into a system or assesses whether
we sent an email, then maybe the forensic audit won't find that. But

Transcribed Interview of Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir., Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, at 102-103
260

(Nov. 2, 2023) [hereinafter “Lauer TI”].

Page 73 of 520
 we tried to upload that report. We even tried when NIH told us 2
years later immediately send it and we weren't able to. The system
locked us out. It's a fact.

Q. You said that you had emailed your point of contact at NIAID or
NIH to try to rectify the situation, right?

A. My admin staff called the point of contact.

Q. Called?

A. I believe so, yeah. I think they emailed her, received no response,

called.

Q. Because Dr. Lauer also testified that during the course of this audit
they looked at emails with NIAID staff and still never saw any
evidence that EcoHealth claimed you were unable to submit a
progress report because the eRA system had locked them out?

A. Well, again, like I said, they may find no email evidence, but we did
try to submit the report. It did lock us out. I mean, you can't get much
more clearer than when NIH specifically instructed us to upload it
immediately, 2-1/2 years later, in a matter of urgency, where they
knew all about it and were waiting for it, they still couldn't get the
system to unlock. Clearly that system needs to be fixed. 261

The forensic analysis of the NIH reporting system concluded “[t]he user was never
locked out of the system.” 262 Further, the analysis determined that EcoHealth accessed the
reporting system at least once a day for 72 days between July 24, 2019 and July 27, 2021. 263 The
analysis stated, “[e]ach of those times accessing Commons was an opportunity to route the RPPR
so it could be submitted to NIH.” 264 In summary, EcoHealth could have chosen to submit its Year
5 RPPR and chose not to. 265

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

261
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 139-141.
262
RPPR Related Activities for R01AI110964-05 and Other Actions Performed, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (on
file with Select Subcomm. Staff).
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.

Page 74 of 520
Page 75 of 520
 Dr. Daszak, himself, publicly and via e-mail appeared to contradict his own claims that
he was “locked out” from submitting the Year 5 Report on time. On October 1, 2021, Dr. Daszak
wrote in an email regarding the late Year 5 Report, “[f]or your interest, here’s the truth behind the
mystery: We got our report ready to file for yr5 of the grant, but when it was re-funded we
assumed we didn’t need to…eventually NIH wrote to us and told us to file, so we did.” 266

Furthermore, on September 24, 2024, EcoHealth published a document [hereinafter

“EcoHealth’s document] that included more information regarding the Year 5 Report
submission. 267 This document did not support Dr. Daszak’s testimony that he was “locked out”
of the NIH reporting system. In fact, this document directly contradicts Dr. Daszak’s sworn
testimony.

266
E-Mail from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor,
Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy & Infectios Diseases, et al., (Oct. 1, 2021, 3:02 PM).
267
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., EcoHealth Alliance Corrects the Record (Sept. 24, 2024).

Page 76 of 520
 1) On page one, EcoHealth’s document stated, “[e]vidence shows that EcoHealth Alliance
made substantial efforts to upload its Year 5 Report, but was stymied by confusing
instructions, and an NIH reporting system that had a history of substantial glitches and
errors.” 268

2) On page two, EcoHealth’s document stated, “[w]e provide public records of other
organizations and scientists that have been locked out from submission to eRA
Commons, or had difficulties uploading reports.” 269

3) On page nine, EcoHealth’s document stated, “…a lack of clarification and the subsequent
renewal grant award without any further request for the Year 5 report led EcoHealth to its
mistaken impression that the Year 5 report was not required by NIH for its work to be in
compliance.” 270

4) On page 19, EcoHealth’s document included an email from NIH that informs EcoHealth,
“[a]s reflected in the terms and conditions in the Notice of Award, NIH grant closeout
policy requires the submission of three final reports no later than 120 calendar days after
the termination of the grant. The following documents must be submitted no later than
09/28/2019.” 271

In fact, nowhere in the 139-page document does it state EcoHealth, itself, was locked out
from submitting its Year 5 Report on time. None of the above statements support Dr. Daszak’s
testimony that EcoHealth was locked out or otherwise prevented from submitting its Year 5
Report.

Dr. Daszak also testified that, once NIH formally requested the late Year 5 Report, NIH
could not open the system for 11 days.

Dr. Peter Daszak (November 14, 2023)

A. We were locked out of the system. Not only were we locked out of
the system then, when Dr. Lauer wrote to us demanding that we
immediately send the year 5 report and upload it into the system,
NIH couldn’t get the system to work for 11 days. We have it on
record… 272

A. Again we went online, and it was locked out. And we contacted

NIH, and then it took something like 11 days to open up that system
to allow us to submit… 273

268
Id. at 1.
269
Id. at 2.
270
Id. at 9.
271
Id. at 19.
272
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 140.
273
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 197.

Page 77 of 520
 Dr. Peter Daszak (May 1, 2024)

A. But let me explain, please I if I can. NIH told us 2 years later to

submit that report. It took NIH 11 days to unlock the system—so
any assertion that the system was not locked are demonstrably
false—11 days… 274

Dr. Daszak’s testimony is directly contradicted by NIH.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (May 16, 2024)

Q. Thank you. When EcoHealth eventually submitted its year-5 report,

Dr. Daszak testified it took 11 days to unlock the NIH system. Is this
true?

A. We have no evidence of that. 275

The fact is that Dr. Daszak was able to submit the Year 5 Report on time and he simply
chose not to. This is supported by both the NIH’s internal forensic analysis and Dr. Daszak’s own
statements.

FINDING: EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Failed to Timely Report a Dangerous Experiment to the
U.S. National Institutes of Health.

EcoHealth was required to “monitor the activities of the subrecipient as necessary to

ensure that the subaward is used for authorized purposes, in compliance with Federal statutes,
regulations, and the terms and conditions of the subaward . . .” 276 As stated in the Notice of
Award, “[a]cceptance of this award including the ‘Terms and Conditions’ is acknowledged by the
grantee when funds are drawn down or otherwise obtained from the grant payment system.” 277
Even grantees that function as pass-through entities must monitor the activities of subrecipients,
including foreign subrecipients, to ensure that subawards are used for authorized purposes in
compliance with relevant laws and the terms and conditions of the subaward. 278

This was particularly true when NIAID identified possible gain-of-function research
concerns in an experiment proposed by EcoHealth and to be conducted by the WIV. In a July 7,
2016 letter to EcoHealth, as a grantee undertaking potentially dangerous gain-of-function
experiments, NIAID officials advised:

NIAID acknowledges that if any of the MERS-like or SARS-like chimeras

generated under this grant show evidence of enhanced virus growth greater
274
Daszak Hearing, supra note 261, at 25.
275
Tabak Hearing, supra note 248, at 8.
276
45 C.F.R. § 75.352(d).
277
NIAID, Notice of Award, EcoHealth Alliance, Grant Number 1R01A1110964-01, Understanding the Risk of Bat
Coronavirus Emergence (May 27, 2014).
278
45 CFR § 75.352.

Page 78 of 520
 than 1 log over the parental backbone strain, Dr. Daszak will immediately
stop all experiments with these viruses and provide the NIAID Program
Officer and Grant Management Specialist, and Wuhan Institute of Virology
Institutional Biosafety Committee, with the relevant data and information
related to these unanticipated outcomes. 279

This advisement was memorialized in EcoHealth’s Notice of Award.

In Dr. Tabak’s October 20, 2021 letter to Mr. Comer, he noted that an experiment
published in EcoHealth’s Year 5 Report exhibited greater than one log growth and should have
been reported to NIAID but was not.

However, out of an abundance of caution and as an additional layer of

oversight, language was included in the terms and conditions of the grant
award to EcoHealth that outlined criteria for a secondary review, such as a
requirement that the grantee report immediately a one log increase in
growth. These measures would prompt a secondary review to determine
whether the research aims should be re-evaluated or new biosafety
measures should be enacted. EcoHealth failed to report this finding right
away, as was required by the terms of the grant. 280

NIH concluded that EcoHealth facilitated an experiment that was published in its Year 5
Report that violated this grant term and was not reported. EcoHealth argued that if an experiment
did violate the one log notification requirement, it was previously reported in its Year 4 Report.

279
Letter from Erik J. Stemmy, Ph.D., Program Officer, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health to Mr. Aleksei Chmura, Chief of Staff, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (July 7, 2016).
280
Letter from Lawrence A. Tabak, D.D.S., Ph.D., Principal Dep. Dir., Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Hon. James Comer,
Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (Oct. 20, 2021).

Page 79 of 520
This argument is contested by NIH. Regardless, the grant term required “immediate
notification”, and witness testimony confirms that notification should occur within one or two
business days and that simply adding the experiment to an annual report does not satisfy that
requirement. 281

As stated, whether the experiment in question occurred during Year 4 or Year 5 is a

matter of dispute between EcoHealth and NIH. After reviewing the experiment, NIH determined
it believed there are two separate experiments.

Dr. Erik Stemmy (Nov. 13, 2023)

Q. …That all seems, I think, consistent with what you're describing,

which is, at this point, which is after the submission of the year 4
report, neither the NIAID side of things nor it sounds like Dr. Daszak
understood the one log rule to have been previously implicated. In
other words, you all sort of were on the same page that year 4 report
did not show growth greater than one log. Is that right?

A. Yes. That's my best recollection, yes. 282

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

Q. It says in the fourth paragraph, the first sentence, "The limited

experiment described in the final progress report provided by
EcoHealth Alliance...." Is it your understanding or recollection that
the experiment in year 5 was different from the experiment in year
4?

A. That was our conclusion.

Q. Okay.

A. That was our conclusion. Yes. 283

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (May 16, 2024)

Q. OK. I appreciate that clarification. So, going back to that, whether it

was conducted in Year 4 or 5 of that grant, what is NIH’s
determination? Did it occur in Year 4 or 5?

281
Stemmy TI, supra note 260, at 73-743; Transcribed Interview of Emily Erbelding, M.D., M.P.H., Dir., Division
of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, at 102-103 (Nov. 28, 2023)
[hereinafter “Erbelding TI”].
282
Stemmy TI, supra note 260, at 106.
283
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 81.

Page 80 of 520
 A. It was our evaluation that it occurred in Year 5, but because of the
uncertainty, we asked for the original metadata, that is the electronic
records, and the actual lab notebooks, that would have memorialized
the actual events. And as you know, we never received those.

Further, Dr. Baric testified that he believed this to be two separate experiments and
should have been reported to NIAID.

Dr. Ralph Baric (Jan. 22, 2024)

Q. Dr. Baric, you've read the year 5 paragraph now, the in vivo
infection where five of the seven mice infected with just the WIV1
backbone survived, but only two of the eight mice infected with
the WIV1 SHC014.

A. You should be able to do the statistics on that, and it should show

that there's a statistical difference, which means there was an
increase in virulence and the entire review process would have
been triggered.

Q. So that's --

A. I think, if you did the statistics on those numbers.

Q. That's my question, is that this wouldn't have triggered P3 because

it's not a human virus.

A. It doesn't matter whether it triggered P3 or not. It triggered the

regulation that they agreed to in the document to follow. 284

To support Dr. Daszak’s claim that the Year 4 and 5 experiments were the same, he called
Dr. Shi who assured him.

Dr. Peter Daszak (Nov. 14, 2023)

Q. This is 2021. We've had a year of all this controversy. We've had
the grant canceled. We've had President Trump making his
statements, Senator Cotton making his statements. And you just
have this -- you have like a standing -- maybe not a standing call,
but a call with the WIV, and you ask them, "One experiment or
two?" "One." "I thought so. It seems like that was the case." And
there was no further follow-up?

284
Baric TI, supra note 39, at 181-182.

Page 81 of 520
 A. Correct. 285

Dr. Daszak also confirmed that the experiment in question, regardless of when it
occurred, did result in a chimeric virus that grew more than one log faster. 286

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 146.

285

E-Mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., to David Morens, M.D., Senior
286

Advisor, Nat’l Inst. Of Allergy & Infectious Diseases (Oct. 20, 2021, 8:14 PM).

Page 82 of 520
Page 83 of 520
 Dr. Tabak testified that simply calling Dr. Shi to “verify” when the experiment occurred
is not sufficient and that production of the underlying data and lab notebooks was necessary and
required.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (May 16, 2024)

Q. Thank you. Dr. Daszak wrote in an email that he “verified” this

experiment by calling Dr. Shi at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and
asking her. Is that alone sufficient to meet his requirement to oversee
subgrantees?

A. It is not, sir, which is why we asked to see the metadata, electronic

records, and the laboratory notebook.

Q. [Would] the lab notebooks that Dr. Daszak failed to produce,

provide information that may potentially validate this experiment?

A. I certainly hoped they would, yes. 287

Without verifiable evidence—such as what may be in the NIH requested laboratory

notebooks that Dr. Daszak has failed to provide—Dr. Daszak’s claim lacks credibility.

FINDING: EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Failed to Provide National Institutes of Health with
Research the U.S. Taxpayer Funded.

On November 5, 2021, Dr. Lauer requested Dr. Daszak produce “original laboratory
notebook entries” to verify certain experiments and determine if those experiments violated
EcoHealth’s grant terms and conditions—specifically the condition requiring notification to NIH
of any experiment that exhibits excessive growth. 288

Dr. Daszak testified that he was not required to have access to or produce the underlying
original lab notebooks.

Dr. Peter Daszak (November 14, 2023)

Q. …Pursuant to these regulations did EcoHealth get the lab notebooks

and the lab electronic files at the time the human mice experiment
were conducted in 2017 to 2018, and reported it in the year 4
progress report?

A. No, we did not. Had we got those reports, we would have submitted
them to NIH when requested[.]

287
Tabak Hearing, supra note 248, at 8-9.
288
Letter from Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Nov. 5, 2021).

Page 84 of 520
 Q. So I guess my question then is, why didn’t you send off the alarm
bells that something wasn’t right, that we weren’t getting the data
that we were contractually obligated to get?

A. No, no, no. We definitely got the data we were contractually

obligated to get, which is the results of the experiments. There is no
contractual obligation at that time that a grantee should get the lab
notebooks. That’s a very different thing[.]

Q. It’s in the regulations as part of what you’re operating under.

A. No. I understand your interpretation of regulations, but my

interpretation, our administrative team, at the time, the regulations
were not considered by any organization that you should get all the
lab notebooks. And I want to point out that NIH has now made it a
new rule to get hold lab notebooks to clarify what is clearly not
obvious in the codes and regulations. 289

However, according to witnesses, EcoHealth should have had and was required to have
access to these notebooks.

Dr. Emily Erbelding (Nov 28, 2023)

Q. Thank you. Yes. That's what I was asking. When Dr. Lauer -- he's
asked for the notebooks a couple times. We've already discussed
EcoHealth hasn't produced them. And it is EcoHealth's
responsibility to produce them when requested. Is that correct?

A. [Nonverbal response.]

Q. You have to give an audible answer.

A. Yes. Oh, I'm sorry. Yes. 290

Dr. Michael Lauer (Nov. 2, 2023)

Q. And, in your opinion, NIH had the authority to ask for those
notebooks and files?

A. Yes.

289
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 77-78.
290
Erbelding TI, supra note 281, at 101.

Page 85 of 520
 Q. And, in your opinion, EcoHealth should've had access to those
notebooks and files?

A. Yes. 291

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

Q. So, at the time of the EcoHealth enforcement actions, it would have

been a requirement, if NIH requested lab notebooks, for EcoHealth
to provide them?

A. Yes, it would've been. 292

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (May 16, 2024)

Q. Dr. Tabak, when the National Institute[s] of Health requested the

notebooks from EcoHealth, was EcoHealth required to produce
them under its grant’s terms?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. OK. Thank you. When NIH requested notebooks from EcoHealth,

should EcoHealth have been able to access them or already have
access them?

A. That is correct.

Q. OK. Thank you. Did EcoHealth ever produce the requested

notebooks?

A. They have not.

Q. Never did. Thank you. Dr. Daszak testified 2 weeks ago that he was
not required to produce the lab notebooks. Would NIH disagree with
that testimony?

A. Yes, we disagree with that testimony.

On November 18, 2021, Dr. Daszak said that, despite the requirement to do so, he does
not have access to the requested laboratory notebooks. Specifically, Dr. Daszak stated, “[w]e do
not have copies of these, which were created by and retained by the WIV. Nonetheless, I have
forwarded your letter to the WIV, and will let you know their response soon as the WIV replies

291
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 74.
292
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 100.

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to our request.” 293 It appears Dr. Daszak never explicitly requested the notebooks from the WIV,
but instead simply informed it of the request from NIH.

On April 26, 2024, NIH followed-up and asked EcoHealth for more information
regarding its efforts to recover the laboratory notebooks. 294

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

293
Letter from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir.
Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Nov. 18, 2021).
294
Letter from Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance Inc. (Apr. 26, 2024).

Page 87 of 520
 Dr. Daszak’s responses to NIH indicate that the WIV did receive the request for lab
notebooks—but ignored it, EcoHealth did not follow up and re-request the lab notebooks, and
that communications between EcoHealth and the WIV were allegedly “strained.” 295

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Letter from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., President, EcoHealth Alliance Inc., to Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of
295

Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Apr. 26, 2024).

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 EcoHealth’s document contended that “[a]t the time of NIH’s request for WIV lab
notebooks from EcoHealth Alliance, there was no specific requirement for NIH grantees to
require foreign subrecipients to provide laboratory notebooks and other raw data.” 296 This
statement is disputed by NIH.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (November 14, 2024)

Q. Okay. Thank you. One final question for you. Dr. Daszak has
routinely said that the regulations did not require that he provide
NIH with lab notebooks from the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Last
year, NIH put out a new rule regarding this issue. So, just to clarify,
when NIH asked for these lab notebooks, was Dr. Daszak required
to produce them?

A. He was indeed. 297

According to Dr. Daszak’s consultant, Dr. Sturchio, they agreed that pursuant to
regulations “NIH has the right to review original lab notebooks and data, and that EHA would in
the normal course of events be able to obtain these data from the WIV.” 298

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

296
Executive Summary: EcoHealth Alliance responses to recent allegations from the SSCP, ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE,
INC., available at https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/EcoHealth-Alliance-Responses-to-
Questions-from-SSCP.pdf.
297
Preparing for the Next Pandemic, supra note 232, at 20.
298
E-Mail from Jeffrey Sturchio, Ph.D. Consultant, Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance Inc., et al. (Jan. 17,
2022, 10:40).

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 In addition to Dr. Daszak arguing that he was not required to provide the laboratory
notebooks to NIH, he also stated “[t]he geopolitical tensions with China regarding COVID-19
made NIH’s requests effectively impossible for EcoHealth Alliance to fulfill.” 299 Despite this

299
Executive Summary: EcoHealth Alliance responses to recent allegations from the SSCP, ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE,
INC., available at https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/EcoHealth-Alliance-Responses-to-
Questions-from-SSCP.pdf.

Page 95 of 520
claim, Dr. Daszak and Dr. Shi maintained a friendly relationship, even discussing the Select
Subcommittee’s hearings via email. 300

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

300
E-Mail from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Shi Zhengli, Ph.D., Wuhan Institute of Virology
(Apr. 29, 2024, 7:44 AM); E-Mail from Shi Zhengli, Ph.D., Wuhan Institute of Virology, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D.,
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Apr 28, 2024, 11:50 PM); E-Mail from Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to
Shi Zhengli, Ph.D., Wuhan Institute of Virology (Apr. 15, 2024, 5:48 AM); E-Mail from Shi Zhengli, Ph.D., Wuhan
Institute of Virology, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Apr 11, 2024, 10:39 PM);

Page 96 of 520
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FINDING: To Get a Grant Reinstated, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc Misled the U.S. National
Institutes of Health Regarding the Physical Location of U.S. Funded Samples.

It is NIH policy to make every possible attempt to return grantees to compliant status.
However, in the case of EcoHealth, NIH turned a blind eye to potential issues with the
reinstatement of this grant. Evidence gathered by the Select Subcommittee suggests that Dr.
Daszak omitted a material fact during the grant reinstatement process—a fact that may have
changed whether EcoHealth’s grant was reinstated or not.

On April 26, 2023, NIAID reinstated EcoHealth’s grant. 301 On May 8, 2023, EcoHealth
publicly announced this reinstatement. 302 In NIH’s notification to Congress, it stated that
EcoHealth had been organizing and implementing a corrective action plan to satisfy NIH’s
compliance efforts. 303 NIH’s goal during compliance investigations is to bring the grantee back
into compliance and to design a corrective action plan to support that outcome.

Dr. Michael Lauer (Nov. 2, 2023)

So, again, our philosophy -- and it's not just a philosophy; it's what's
grounded in the uniform guidance regulations -- is that, when a recipient is
out of compliance, the goal is to bring them back into compliance. And we
can do that, as I said, through a variety of means -- through revising terms
and conditions of award, through specific award conditions, through a
corrective action plan. Because, ultimately, what we want is we want the
recipient to be successful and we want them to be compliant with terms and
conditions. 304

However, in the case of EcoHealth, one of the required conditions could not be remedied.
NIH requested EcoHealth provide laboratory notebooks to establish what gain-of-function
experiments involving coronaviruses were conducted with U.S. taxpayer dollars at the WIV.
EcoHealth failed to provide these notebooks. 305

301
See, Grant Summary, R01AI110964, USASpending (last accessed Apr. 24, 2024).
302
EcoHealth Alliance Receives NIH Renewal Grant for Collaborative Research to Understand the Risk of Bat
Coronavirus Spillover Emergence, ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE, INC. (May 8, 2023).
303
Letter from Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Hon. Brad
Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability
(Apr. 26, 2023).
304
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 80.
305
Lauer Letter, supra note 303.

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 In a notification to EcoHealth sent on the same day, NIH wrote, “[t]he award
R01AI110964 beginning on April 19, 2020, remains suspended pending the renegotiation of
specific aims for the award without the involvement of the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” 306 The
Select Subcommittee proceeded to gather evidence regarding the rationale for the renewal. One
of the primary reasons for reinstating the grant to EcoHealth was its alleged access to sequences
and samples previously paid for by the federal government and not yet analyzed.

Dr. Emily Erbelding (Nov. 28, 2023)

Q. And then I want to somewhat briefly parse out a little bit more on
the samples. So you referenced earlier you and Dr. Lauer provided
a briefing to a number of committees over the summer on the
EcoHealth Alliance reinstatement. And one of the reasons given for
reinstating the grant were that there were these bat samples collected
from China and Southeast Asia with funding that still needed to be
tested or sequenced, or I forget the exact language that was used.

Is that correct?

A. Is it correct that I said that to the committee –

Q. Yes.

A. -- or --

Q. Is that your understanding of the grant, the reason for the grant
reinstatement?

A. That was part of the reason, yes, that we wanted to get the most out
of existing sequences from prior work. We wanted to get the most
out of prior work.

Q. What were the other rationales?

A. Well, that they could address a scientific priority of NIAID in

understanding how pandemics occur. I think that it would be -- that
they had been scientifically productive in the past. That was another
part of the rationale for reinstatement.

Q. If you know, at the time of reinstatement, how many samples did

EcoHealth have access to that remained untested?

A. I don't know the number.

Letter from Michelle Bulls, Dir., Office of Policy for Extramural Research Administration, Office of Extramural
306

Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Apr. 26, 2023).

Page 103 of 520

 Q. Did EcoHealth -- was it EcoHealth that told you that they had
samples?

A. They did -- they did give an approximate number. I don't recall what
it was.

Q. Did they tell you that the samples were in their possession?

A. I believe I asked, You have access to these samples? Do you have

access to these samples? I think that, to my -- to the best of my
recollection, that's how I phrased the question. And I got an
affirmative answer. That was, I think, the conversation.

Q. You asked, do you have access, and they responded yes?

A. This was Peter Daszak. Yes.

Q. There wasn't an elaboration on the yes?

A. I did not ask further questions. I took his representation as

truthful. 307

Dr. Erbelding testified that, at the time of the reinstatement, NIAID believed that
EcoHealth had access to sequences and samples the federal government had previously paid to
have collected but that had yet to be analyzed. For reasons that are not clear to the Select
Subcommittee, NIAID apparently never asked EcoHealth where the samples were located.
Instead, NIAID relied solely on the representations of Dr. Daszak that the samples existed and
that he had access to them. In reality, EcoHealth was relying on the WIV, an institute debarred
for failing to produce laboratory notebooks, to provide them with the virus samples and
sequences that were the justification for reinstatement.

Dr. Peter Daszak (Nov. 14, 2023)

Q. I have got a few quick questions on the reinstatement. And then one
circle back on the intelligence community issue. So the reason you
should know this, but Drs. Lauer and Erbelding gave us a
congressional briefing a few months ago on the reinstatement and
some of the decisions and, you know, additional terms put in place.
One of the reasons -- one of scientific rationales for reinstating the
grant is that there remains thousands of bat samples collected from
China with funding basically paid for by the grant before it was
suspended, but still need to be tested for the presence of the virus. Is
that still the case?

307
Erbelding TI, supra note 281, at 55-56.

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A. Well, we have new data from China on some of those -- on the
results from some of those samples. We are currently analyzing it.
Very important critical data. And yeah, I think it's -- we're getting
there. It's good to have new information, but there are still many
samples that we don't have direct control over.

Q. Sure. Who is the custodian for those samples presently?

A. Right now, they are in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. And

theoretically, a sample collected in a foreign government belongs to
the foreign government so yeah.

Q. But the WIV has been debarred. They can't participate in this grant?

A. Yeah. And they are not participating in this grant.

Q. But they have custody of all the samples?

A. But we have got information, data from the samples that has not yet
been analyzed. We have that information here in the U.S.

Q. But the Latinne paper, you said that was all your information?

A. Since the Latinne paper, since the pandemic began, Wuhan Institute
of Virology's staff has continued to sequence out some of those
initial small fragments to get whole genome sequences, critical
information. I agree with what Dr. Erbelding and Stemmy or
whoever it was has said that that was paid for by U.S. taxpayers. It
is our right to get that information. We've got it and we're now
working on it to publish that information.

Q. Is there information derived from the samples that you don't have?

A. From what I hear, no. Not -- until they do more work on them. And
then we have an understanding that we'll be able to get some access
to those data too.

Q. I'm trying to understand how this works. With the WIV debarred,
and not talking to you anymore, which –

A. Well, they do talk to us. I can talk to them. It's not illegal to talk to
them.

Q. No, no, no. But you said, like, we've asked them for the progress
reports, they never answered an email.

Page 105 of 520

A. I asked them for the lab notes.

Q. For the lab notes.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. But your -- I'm trying to understand how we have debarred them,

but we're still paying them to process samples.

A. No, no. There's no money going to Wuhan Institute of Virology at

all. No money going to China.

Q. So there's a bolus of data that left the WIV before they were suspend
-- between -- before they were suspended that has yet to be analyzed,
that has to be analyzed or that need - -

A. My understanding is that the debarment is they are not able to take

Federal funds, now for 10 years. I think at least that is, what I
understand, from what the phrase means. They have other samples.
If they are going to do further work on those samples and they are
willing to give us that information, that's a positive win for the U.S.
taxpayer.

Q. Sure.

A. I'm going to take the opportunity and publish it, and I think that's a
good thing.

Q. So why do you think the difference? Why do you think the

difference in the WIV is willing to give you access to the samples,
the results of tests on these samples but not the laboratory
notebooks?

A. Well, you would have to ask WIV about that. I'm very delighted that
we've been able to get that. Information out of WIV and out of
China. It's a good thing.

Q. And they are, functionally, doing it for free? We may have some
prior claim on it because the initial sampling was done with our
money.

A. Yeah, unfortunately, the legalities of ownership are not good and not
clear in this sort of issue. However, if we can get the data, we're
going to get it and we're going to work it and we are going to make

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 it public and we are going to try and get at much good information
as we can out of it. 308

According to Dr. Erbelding, Dr. Daszak failed to inform NIH that a substantial number of
samples or sequences—the same samples or sequences that were a primary purpose for
reinstating EcoHealth’s previously suspended grant—were in the custody and control of the
WIV, a now debarred organization. It remains unclear how many samples or sequences that the
federal government paid for still reside at the WIV.

Since access to sequences and samples was a substantial reason for reinstating
EcoHealth’s grant, it raises the question of whether NIH would have still reinstated the grant if it
had knowledge of this issue. According to Dr. Erbelding, if she had that knowledge, it would
have at least caused her to ask more questions regarding the reinstatement.

Dr. Emily Erbelding

Q. I have one quick follow-up question, and then I'm going to ask some
more about EcoHealth and their various efforts. If Dr. Daszak had
told you that samples were still in the custody and control of the
Wuhan Institute of Virology, would that have changed your calculus
in reinstating the grant?

A. I think it depends on -- we would have said those samples, we can't

assume that they're going to be used. It would have depended upon
what other samples he did have access to or he did have in other
locations that were accessible.

Q. So it would have at least prompted some follow-up questions or

more information?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Thank you.

A. I think so. 309

Dr. Daszak later testified that Dr. Erbelding mistook samples for sequences and that he
clearly stated EcoHealth had access to sequences and then samples from elsewhere in S.E. Asia.

Dr. Peter Daszak (May 1, 2024)

308
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 263-265.
309
Erbelding TI, supra note 281, at 90.

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 Q. You testified a couple of minutes ago that you were very forthright
with NIH and NIAID that you actually didn’t have access to the
samples.

A. Correct.

Q. Is Dr. Erbelding lying?

A. …Clearly, Dr. Erbelding either wasn’t in the conversation where I

clearly stipulated we do not have access to those samples; we do
have access to the sequences, or perhaps she has mistaken sequences
for samples…what matters is the record, which is the emails sent to
NIH proposing the work to be done and the revised specific [aims],
which clearly state no further samples will be brought out of China
and that sequences are already in EcoHealth’s possession. 310

Dr. Tabak was asked about Dr. Erbelding’ s testimony.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (May 16, 2024)

Q. …Dr. Tabak, do you think it is likely that the director of NIAID’s

Division of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases does not
understand the difference between sequences and samples?

A. I am sure she does. 311

Dr. Daszak omitted the material fact that the sequences and samples the federal
government were paying for were, at least in part, under the custody and control of the WIV.
Further, testimony suggests that if NIH had known this, it would have resulted in more questions
regarding whether to reinstate the grant or not.

FINDING: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Rejected EcoHealth Alliance,
Inc.’s DEFUSE Proposal Because of a Lack of Gain-of-Function or Dual Use
Research of Concern Plan.

In 2018, DARPA began accepting applications for federal funded research pursuant to a
new program entitled PREventing Emerging Pathogenic Threats [hereinafter “PREEMPT”]. This
program was designed to “target viral biothreats within animal reservoir to preempt their entry
into human populations before an outbreak occurs.” 312 Dr. Gimlett was the Program Officer at
DARPA in charge of the PREEMPT program. Dr. Gimlett described his responsibilities as:

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

310
Daszak Hearing, supra note 261, at 52.
311
Tabak Hearing, supra note 248, at 23.
312
PREEMPT Proposers Day, DARPA, available at https://events.sa-meetings.com/ehome/299628/648416/.

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 Q. Those were your responsibilities generally. What were your
responsibilities specific to PREEMPT?

A. So basically formulate the concept, which was my concept; canvas

the community to sort of understand where the state of the art was,
potential performers, trying to get the word out that we were
interested in this, solicit feedback; and eventually create a definition
for what the program looks like, get buy-in from the level of
management at DARPA, which meant office directorship and then
DARPA directorship. And basically that means going through a few
hurdles, like acceptance from your colleagues, who are also aiming
to shoot you down if you don't have it thought through. So it's
basically kind of get the details right on how the program gets then
communicate it to the community in a broad area announcement.
Subsequent to that, go through the source selection process, which
means reviewing the proposals. My job as a reviewer would be on
the technical side of the proposal review, and then there's additional
review after that that would come from the office leadership or from
legal or other -- contracts office, for example -- and then manage the
program. 313

PREEMPT would be divided into two technical areas. According to Dr. Gimlett,
Technical Area 1 was:

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. And what were kind of the goals or strategy of the PREEMPT

program?

A. So it started from sort of a hypothesis that we've had a lot of close

calls in zoonotic spillover and had gotten fairly lucky that most of
them were semi-contained. But I wasn't happy with the overall
approach, which is, okay, let's hope we don't -- let's hope we get
lucky again, wait until another spillover happens and then try to rush
and contain it through all kinds of draconian measures sometimes.
So the idea was can we do a better job of sort of sampling the hotspot
areas of the globe where this is happening frequently, especially both
in the wild animal reservoir, as well as in livestock reservoirs and
humans associating with those two; get a better gauge of sort of a
probabilistic likelihood and try to come up with some models for
how easy -- how likely a spillover could happen; try to get a little bit
in front of the curve and even possibly think about ways of sort of

Transcribed Interview of James Gimlett, M.D., Dir., Program Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects
313

Agency, at 9 (May 9, 2024) [hereinafter “Gimlett TI”].

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 stopping it in its tracks before it hits the human population. So that
was the overall goal. 314

Dr. Gimlett described Technical Area 2:

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. No, no, no. I appreciate it. Would it be more of a surveillance

program? You said, like, kind of the end goal is stopping it before
the human -- before human spillover. And we'll get into DEFUSE
with, like, kind of the aerosolized bat vaccine that they proposed.
But was it more heavily focused on surveillance or more heavily
focused on kind of stopping the spillover?

A. It was more -- in my mind, it was more heavily focused on the

surveillance and analytics at the front end and trying to do a better
job of assessing likelihood of spillover. So the program was divided
into two technical areas. That was technical area one. Technical area
two was sort of -- it was basically pinging the community to see if
there were any ideas on how to preempt, literally, a spillover either
at the vector if it was mosquito borne, at the sort of livestock if it
was passing through livestock before entering the human
population, or directly in the wild animal reservoirs. And it was
more assess what's possible, sort of the art of the possible, and if you
had some solution to validate it in some kind of closed, confined,
safely controlled area. So that was the idea. It wasn't actually go out
and do it. It was to see what is possible to be done in a controlled
experimental environment. 315

***

Q. And the goal kind of on part two, like you said, would have been to
do it in a controlled research environment, not necessarily go to the
source and release?

A. Correct. That would have been beyond that program's scope. 316

After DARPA received proposals, DARPA conducted a three-person peer review. 317
These reviewers judged each proposal on (1) the “technical approach, competence, plausibility,
innovation, whether [DARPA] thought it was outlined in a way that you could kind of get to the
ultimate goal of the program in a reasonable timeframe”; (2) “[t]he sort of relevance to the

314
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 10.
315
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 11.
316
Id.
317
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 13.

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DOD”; and (3) “cost realism, so was it actually budgeted to do the job.” 318After the peer review
concluded, each proposal was graded as (1) selectable, (2) selectable, but not recommended for
funding, or (3) not selectable. 319

In the end, it was Dr. Gimlett who would make the recommendation to DARPA
leadership and then the DARPA Director or Deputy Director would make the final funding
decision. 320

On March 24, 2018, a consortium of researchers led by Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth
submitted a proposal to DARPA named “Project DEFUSE: Defusing the threat of Bat-borne
Coronaviruses” [hereinafter “DEFUSE”]. 321 In Technical Area 1, the stated goal of DEFUSE
was:

In TA1 we will intensively sample bats at our field sites where we have
identified high spillover risk SARSr-CoVs. We will sequence their spike
proteins, reverse engineer them to conduct binding assays, and insert them
into bat SARSr-CoV (WIV1, SHC014) backbones (these use bat-SARSr-
CoV backbones, not SARS-CoV, and are exempt from dual-use and gain of
function concerns) to infect humanized mice and assess capacity to cause
SARS-like disease. 322

In Technical Area 2, the stated goal of DEFUSE was:

In TA2, we will evaluate two approaches to reduce SARSr-CoV shedding

in bat caves: (1) Broadscale immune boosting, in which we will inoculate
bats with immune modulators to upregulate their innate immune response
and downregulate viral replication; (2) Targeted immune boosting, in which
we will inoculate bats with novel chimeric polyvalent recombinant spike
proteins plus the immune modulator to enhance innate immunity against
specific, high-risk viruses…The most effective biologicals will be trialed
in our test cave sites in Yunnan Province, with reduction in viral shedding
as proof-of-concept. 323

On its face, this type of research is dangerous and, specifically regarding Technical Area
2, EcoHealth’s proposed experiments—conducting trials in uncontrolled cave environments—
violated the scope of PREEMPT. Furthermore, some scientists have even pointed to DEFUSE as
a type of research that can create a virus like COVID-19. 324

318
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 15.
319
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 16.
320
See generally, Gimlett TI.
321
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., Proposal - Project DEFUSE: Defusing the threat of Bat-borne Coronaviruses,
HR001118S0017-PREEMPT-PA-001 (Mar. 27, 2018).
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Chan, supra note 18.

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 Prior to submission of EcoHealth’s full proposal, EcoHealth had the opportunity to attend
a “Proposers Day” and, subsequent to that, submit an abstract for preliminary review by DARPA.
According to Dr. Gimlett, Dr. Daszak was present for “Proposers Day” and submitted an abstract
for preliminary review. 325 After DARPA and Dr. Gimlett reviewed EcoHealth’s abstract, Dr.
Gimlett and Dr. Daszak discussed it.

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. And then the conversation that you had with Dr. Daszak afterwards,
were there tweaks you wanted him to make? How was that, the
encouragement of a proposal, communicated?

A. So it's generally: Here's some really strong pieces that we think have
merit. In their case, it was they have their feet on the ground in a
very hotspot for zoonotic spillover, with access to bats and bat caves
and even a whole repertoire of prior samples that they've collected
and only partially analyzed. So that was attractive. I don't recall the
exact feedback he would have given me on that, other than be sure
to read the BAA. We're particularly interested in quantitative
models, so connect your sampling with some kind of approach to
get a risk map and a likelihood model of spillover. There's a bunch
of safety concerns as well, and please read the BAA about things
that might be of ELSI, which is ethical, legal, societal impact, as
well as safety concerns. So that would have been the feedback to
everybody. 326

It was also at this stage that Dr. Daszak asked DARPA about the inclusion of a Chinese
partner, specifically the WIV. 327 According to Dr. Gimlett, DARPA approved the use of a
Chinese collaborator.

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. And it sounds like they had -- at this point had they informed
DARPA that they were planning on using the Wuhan Institute?

A. Yes. So he would have talked about that and probably would have
asked us: Is it okay to have a Chinese partner? And I wouldn't have
been able to give him the answer. So this PREEMPT is a 6.1 research
proposal. There's no official restriction on who can perform. And
often DARPA does rely on researchers outside of the country.
They're often teamed with U.S. researchers as well. But DARPA
goes where the expertise is, or in this case where the samples exist.
So there wouldn't have been any official restriction. I basically asked

325
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 20.
326
Id.
327
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 21.

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 up the chain: Is it okay? Because I don't have any awareness of
China being a performer on a DARPA program, certainly didn't have
any on mine. So it would have been a little bit unusual, but probably
not strictly prohibited. So I went up the chain, and the answer came
back: No, we're not going to restrict. Yeah. So that was
communicated back, that, yes, it's okay to have a Chinese partner.

Q. We've heard from NIH and EcoHealth on a different grant that

foreign labs, foreign collaborators are vetted through the State
Department. How does DARPA vet foreign labs or collaborators?

A. That I don't know.

Q. Would there be vetting beyond just the review process? If you know.

A. There would probably be vetting at the contractual process, which

generally does not involve the program manager, more on the
technical side, but probably there'd be vetting at that level.

Q. Again, to the extent you know, when particularly work with China,
beyond going up the chain in DARPA, do you know if there was any
question to the intelligence community at large on the use of a
Chinese lab?

A. No, I don't know. I mean, there certainly would have been concerns
about whether the information flow would allow access to the data,
and that would have been part of that vetting process as well, I'm
guessing, because China had just come out with some new policies
on data export controls. So that would have been something to be
discussed, but not at my level. 328

In addition to EcoHealth’s summaries of Technical Areas 1 and 2, EcoHealth—via

DEFUSE—also proposed:

After receptor binding, a variety of cell surface or endosomal proteases

cleave the SARS-CoV S glycoprotein causing massive changes in S
structure and activating fusion-mediated entry. We will analyze all SARSr-
CoV gene sequences for appropriately conserved proteolytic cleavage sites
in S2 and for the presence of potential furin cleavage sites. SARSr-CoV S
with mismatches in proteolytic cleavage sites can be activated by exogenous
trypsin or cathepsin L. Where clear mismatches occur, we will introduce
appropriate human-specific cleavage sites and evaluate growth potential in
Vero cells and HAE cultures. 329

Gimlett TI, supra note 313 at 21-22.

328

EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., Proposal - Project DEFUSE: Defusing the threat of Bat-borne Coronaviruses,
329

HR001118S0017-PREEMPT-PA-001 (Mar. 27, 2018).

Page 113 of 520

 Scientists believe COVID-19’s furin cleavage site located at the S1/S2 juncture of the
spike protein of the virus to be a primary driver in infectability in humans. 330 Furthermore, no
sarbecoviruses—the subgenus of coronaviruses COVID-19 belongs to—are known to have a
furin cleavage site. EcoHealth’s proposed research could have resulted in a unique virus such as
COVID-19.

However, Dr. Daszak did not discuss this specific research during the abstract phase of
the DEFUSE proposal. 331 Dr. Gimlett was surprised by this lack of discussion and this specific
research’s inclusion in EcoHealth’s final DEFUSE proposal. 332

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. So that opens up new questions. So the kind of -- and I'm going to

butcher the science a little bit -- but the proposal of taking 20
percentage divergent SARS-related coronaviruses, dropping in a
furin 1 cleavage site at S1/S2, and testing pathogenicity was not in
the original Proposers Day or abstract?

A. It wasn't at the abstract or Proposers Day that I would remember,

no. That's why I kind of hedged a little bit, surprising.

Q. That part of the proposal was surprising?

A. Yes. 333

In addition to being surprised at this new proposal, Dr. Gimlett also expressed concerns
regarding the safety of EcoHealth conducting this kind of research.

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. Why? I mean, beyond that he hadn't mentioned it before, did it pose

particular risks?

A. Well, so to answer that, we kind of have to back up, if it's okay with
you, just to --
Q. Yes.

A. So before the BAA even went out, we did a lot of research on all the
government regulations involving gain-of-function research, dual-
use research of concern. There was some language about basically

330
Chan, supra note 18.
331
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., Proposal - Project DEFUSE: Defusing the threat of Bat-borne Coronaviruses,
HR001118S0017-PREEMPT-PA-001 (Mar. 27, 2018).
332
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 23-24.
333
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 23-24.

Page 114 of 520

 this P3CO, so potential pandemic pathogen documentation that had
come out. All of which were very -- they all had their own viruses
of interest. Like gain-of-function, the original moratorium was
specifically about avian influenza and SARS and MERS. The P3CO
had a broader set of pathogens, not all viral, and it specifically talked
about gain of transmissibility or virulence, but it said it was not --
that did not apply to wild type viruses not in humans. So when we
put together the BAA, I was concerned that regardless of what the
official language is, since this is going out to the academic
community and others who will basically not -- they will not want
to be constrained in terms of how they publish information, being in
a 6.1 research, and DARPA had no formal mechanism to restrict that.
But I'm still concerned that if this ever gets into the area where there
could be dual-use research of concern, you've somehow created
something that you didn't intend and it's more virulent and
transmissive. And I don't want to see that sequence published the
next day in some journal. So we insisted on sort of a safety and
communication plan in the BAA: Tell us what is your mechanisms
to put a halt or a slowdown on anything in case you encounter this
situation. So this is sort of preamble to why this sort of struck us in
an odd way, because the intent of PREEMPT really was to look at
natural spillover processes. So we weren't even expecting that it
would encounter dual-use issues but wanted that protection
mechanism anyway just in case. And I did not want to see sort of,
well, a narrow interpretation, since it's not these specific viruses, it
doesn't apply. And reading the proposal is the first time that they did
talk about engineering chimeric viruses, albeit still just taking
components of wild virus found in bat caves, but mixing and
matching to potentially gain -- probably to gain ability to even
culture in, like, human cell cultures. So I understood the rationale,
but it didn't quite map to what I was looking for, and I wasn't sure
how that would help necessarily in producing probabilistic risk map,
and they didn't go through clearly that motivation and how they were
going to use that data. So all of these were concerns, particularly
the claim that since this is a wild bat virus, gain-of-function, dual
use, none of it is relevant, and we don't have to go any further. That
was not what the BAA specified. So now I don't remember the
original question, whether I got to it in some way, 1 but this is a
complicated story. I just want to get it clear.

Q. No. Absolutely. I think you did a little bit. I think the original
question in this case was does that proposed work strike particular
risks that were not envisioned.

A. So, I mean, any time you put a virus in some other animal, in a petri
dish, in a cell culture, there are some risks. And any time anyone

Page 115 of 520

 gets infected by a virus, the virus will be looking to gain function in
some respect. So there's always risks. And I wanted to be sure that
this program had clear safety guidelines, where it would be done, in
the BSL-3, if it was a coronavirus with pandemic potential. And
even if it's a bat virus, it could still have risks. I mean, there are
always -- it is spilling over, and there's probably some component in
that viral quasi species that's capable of entering other mammalian
cell types. So this does encounter -- and it's hitting a gray area that
was a concern, and we just wanted to make sure that we never got -
- crossed that line. 334

After review, DARPA marked the DEFUSE proposal as “selectable, but not
recommended.” 335 A letter was leaked that purported to be the denial letter from Dr. Gimlett to
Dr. Daszak. 336 Dr. Gimlett confirmed the accuracy of this letter.

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. Okay. I'll introduce majority exhibit 3 and have some preliminary

questions about this before getting into the specifics. At least on its
face, it appears to be the denial letter to EcoHealth under PREEMPT.
It has your signature block that is not signed. So, just an initial
question of, is this a letter that you would have typed out?

A. Yep. That -- that looks like the letter I wrote.

Q. Was it formally sent to EcoHealth, or was it more communicated

verbally?

A. No, it would have been formally sent. 337

DEFUSE was not selected for funding by DARPA for numerous reasons. According to
DARPA’s rejection letter, DARPA was concerned that EcoHealth’s research proposed in
DEFUSE would meet the definition of gain-of-function research or dual use research of concern
[hereinafter “DURC”]. 338

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

334
Gimlett TI, supra note 313, at 24-26.
335
Letter from James Gimlett, M.D., Program Manager, DARPA, to Peter Daszak, Ph.d., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance,
Inc. (On File with Select Subcomm. Staff).
336
Id.
337
Gimlet TI, supra note 313, at 41-42.
338
Gimlett Letter, supra note 335.

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 In a transcribed interview, Dr. Daszak refuted this, and testified that DEFUSE was not
funded because DARPA did not have sufficient funds.

Dr. Peter Daszak (November 14, 2024)

Q. And as you said, DARPA denied it. Did you ever submit this
proposal to any other funding agencies?

A. Well, there was a little bit said about DARPA declining to fund this,
including people who have said that they declined it because of
biosecurity concerns. Absolutely not true. We had an interview with
DARPA specifically so they could inform us why it was rejected. I
have got the contemporaneous notes right here, never once did
biosafety come up. It was too much money. They didn't have enough
money. It was too 1 ambitious, which is standard grant -- agency
language for too ambitious. So just a little miff around that. I forgot
the question, though. 339

However, Dr. Gimlett testified that biosecurity concerns were one of the three reasons
that EcoHealth’s DEFUSE proposal was denied.

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

Q. Dr. Daszak testified that the reason that this was not funded was
strictly because there was not enough money. This seems to go
further than just it's an expensive proposal. I guess -- and the letter
is in your own words, but sitting here today, what do you recall as
the primary drivers to deny funding?

339
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 260-261 (As of publication of this Report, although Dr. Daszak testified he had
contemporaneous notes between himself and DARPA, Dr. Daszak never produced those notes to the Select
Subcommittee despite being requested.).

Page 117 of 520

 A. I would say three major things, which we've kind of talked about all
of them. One, no regulatory or ELSI discussion. Two, no, sort of,
justification for collect -- of basically, acquiring a whole set of data
based on, sort of, genetic manipulation of the virus, how that data
would then inform a model, for example. So the model development
which we've talked about in the letter. And then, three, didn't address
-- or basically just denied that they had to address gain-of-function
because it didn't fall under any of the regulatory requirements. So
those three were key reasons in my mind. 340

***

Q. Yeah. So was kind of the lack of safety proposal both in

communications of the results and in the actual research a reason for
denial?

A. It was. I mean, so safety kind of hits on two different levels. One is

safety in terms of how the samples are acquired or how and where
the research is done, and that seemed to be addressed in the proposal.
But it also requires what happens if, during these kinds of assaying
and manipulation tests, you all of a sudden stumble on something
that's highly infectious, how are we going to, sort of, reanalyze
whether we proceed with this research or not. And that was the
safety piece that was missing.

Q. So the actual, like, "Oh, no, we found something that was more
transmissible or more lethal, what do we do next," was the safety --
was the biosafety –

A. Yeah. So, in my mind, regardless of whether that falls strictly under

gain-of-function, the virus has potentially gained some function that
could be hazardous, and we needed -- we need to reassess whether
to proceed with research or put it in a 1 different safety level or
something. 341

Dr. Gimlett directly contradicted Dr. Daszak’s testimony regarding the rejection of
DEFUSE. Dr. Gimlett testified unequivocally that EcoHealth’s lack of a gain-of-function or
DURC plan was part of the rationale to reject the DEFUSE proposal.

Dr. James Gimlett (May 9, 2024)

340
Gimlet TI, supra note 313, at 43-44.
341
Gimlet TI, supra note 313, at 44-45.

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 Q. And we've kind of touched on this, but I'm going to ask it a little bit
more bluntly. Did the lack of a gain-of-function or DURC plan affect
the decision to reject the proposal?

A. Yes, it did. 342

EcoHealth and Dr. Daszak proposed research in DEFUSE that was inherently dangerous
and could have created and released a virus like COVID-19. Dr. Daszak initially hid the most
dangerous aspect of this research from DARPA. Dr. Daszak declined to provide a required gain-
of-function or DURC plan, even though his research may have resulted in a virus gaining
function. Finally, DARPA denied to fund DEFUSE in part because of this lack of gain-of-
function or DURC plan—contrary to Dr. Daszak’s testimony.

FINDING: The Department of Justice Empaneled a Criminal Grandy Jury to Investigate the
Origins of COVID-19.

EcoHealth was subject to numerous federal investigations regarding both its potential
role in the COVID-19 pandemic, but also multiple accusations surrounding violated federal grant
policies. The outcomes of most of these investigations are public.

However, the Select Subcommittee discovered that DOJ was also investigating the
origins of COVID-19. The specific details of the investigation are unknown but, based on
documents, it appears the DOJ’s investigation involves EcoHealth’s role in the COVID-19
pandemic. 343 As of December 4, 2024, the outcome(s) of DOJ’s investigation are not public.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Gimlet TI, supra note 313, at 46.

342

E-Mail from Counsel for EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Peter Daszak, Ph.D, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Feb. 6,
343

2023 12:01 PM). (The Select Subcommittee obtained communications between EcoHealth and its counsel that
EcoHealth was with withholding pursuant to attorney-client privilege because Dr. Daszak and his counsel included
non-clients on the e-mails, thus piercing the privilege.)

Page 119 of 520

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 120 of 520

 On November 1, 2024, the Select Subcommittee requested EcoHealth confirm the
existence of a DOJ Grand Jury investigation. 344 EcoHealth’s counsel responded:

Regarding your inquiry about the DOJ, we decline generally to provide any
information about the existence or nonexistence of any investigation other
than the SSCP’s own. For the avoidance of doubt this response should not
be read to confirm or deny the existence of any investigation. 345

344
E-Mail from Select Subcommittee Staff to Counsel for EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Nov. 1, 2024 9:54 AM).
345
E-mail from Counsel to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. to Select Subcommittee Staff (Nov. 1, 2024 6:25 PM)

Page 121 of 520

 On November 15, 2024, the Select Subcommittee again requested information regarding
the existence of a DOJ Grand Jury investigation. During this call, EcoHealth’s counsel assured
the Select Subcommittee the investigation was not into EcoHealth nor Dr. Daszak.

According to documents, DOJ subpoenaed EcoHealth’s communications with, at least,

Dr. Shi. This subpoena included both Dr. Shi’s official WIV e-mail address and her personal
hotmail address. 346

346
E-Mail from Counsel to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. to Aleksei Chmura, Ph.D., Chief of Staff, EcoHealth Alliance,
Inc. (Dec. 23, 2022 1:25 PM)

Page 122 of 520

III. The Failures of the National Institutes of Health and National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases

FINDING: The U.S. National Institutes of Health and National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases Failed to Oversee EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. .

In response to allegations regarding EcoHealth’s actions—including concerns that the

research conducted at the WIV funded by NIAID and may have started the COVID-19
pandemic—the NIH began compliance actions regarding the grant. These actions centered
around EcoHealth’s administrative and scientific failures.

There is very little accountability regarding the approval of grants. Technically, the
Director of NIAID approves grants for funding. In reality, the peer review process limits
exposure and restricts Congress’ ability to oversee federal funding. Dr. Fauci testified, that as
Director of NIAID, he simply signs off on grants without reviewing them.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (January 8, 2024)

Q. Who gives the final approval?

A. You know, technically, I sign off on each council, but I don’t see the
grants and what they are. I never look at what grants are there. It’s
just somebody at the end of the council where they’re all finished
and they go, “Here,” and you sign it. 347

The Trump Administration Identified EcoHealth’s Actions and Instructed NIH To Remedy
It

On April 17, 2020, during a press conference, President Trump identified EcoHealth’s
grant, and any other grants going to China, as potentially problematic.

Coronavirus Task Force Briefing (Apr. 17, 2020)

Q. Thank you, Mr. President. U.S. intelligence is saying

this week that the coronavirus likely came from a
level 4 lab in Wuhan. There’s also another report that
the NIH, under the Obama administration, in 2015
gave that lab $3.7 million in a grant. Why would the
U.S. give a grant like that to China?

THE PRESIDENT: The Obama administration gave them a grant of $3.7

million? I’ve been hearing about that. And we’ve
instructed that if any grants are going to that area —
we’re looking at it, literally, about an hour ago, and

347
Fauci TI 1, supra note 227, at 83.

Page 123 of 520

 also early in the morning. We will end that grant very
quickly. 348

On April 18, 2020, Dr. Tabak directed Dr. Lauer to send a letter to EcoHealth and instruct
them to terminate all funding to the WIV. 349 On April 19, 2020, Dr. Lauer sent this letter. 350 On
April 24, 2020, Dr. Tabak directed Dr. Lauer to send a letter to EcoHealth terminating its entire
grant. 351 Dr. Lauer was not involved in the discussions or drafting of ether letter and did not have
knowledge of how the decision originated. Importantly, however, Dr. Lauer agreed with the
letters’ contents and justifications.

Dr. Michael Lauer (Nov. 2, 2023)

Q. Did you review the letter before it was sent?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you agree with its contents and the justifications provided
in it?

A. Yes. 352

Through the Select Subcommittee’s investigation, evidence discovered suggests that the
decision to terminate the EcoHealth grant originated from Mr. Mark Meadows, Chief of Staff to
President Trump.

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

Q. So like I said, this is Majority Exhibit 7. It's an April 19th, 2020

letter from Dr. Lauer to EcoHealth and Columbia -- I believe
Columbia was on there by mistake -- but primarily to EcoHealth,
notifying EcoHealth that they're not to provide funds to the Wuhan
Institute of Virology anymore pursuant to a couple regulations and
OMB provisions. Were you aware of this letter at the time it was
sent?

A. I was.

Q. Did you have any discussions with anyone about this letter prior to
it being sent?

348
Remarks by President Trump April 17, 2020, supra note 222.
349
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 40.
350
Letter from Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., et. al., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Apr. 19, 2020).
351
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 48.
352
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 49.

Page 124 of 520

A. Yes.

Q. Who?

A. I discussed this letter with Dr. Lauer and I discussed this letter with
Dr. Collins. I don't know if I discussed it with anyone else.

Q. Do you remember how this -- the drafting process of this letter, how
it came to be?

***

A. Okay. So this was done with the help of a senior administrative

official. That's really all I could say.

Q. Can you give me a little bit more generality about that? A grants
officer? A program officer? Who was the –

A. A senior administrative official.

Q. Who is that?

A. That's –

Q. The who isn't deliberative.

***

A. Mr. Charrow.

Q. The Office of General Counsel at HHS?

A. Correct.

Q. All right. Is this the first time or the days preceding this that you
became aware of efforts to suspend or terminate or otherwise alter
the EcoHealth grant?

A. I don't remember the dates. I remember the -- but I remember the

event that was time-sensitive. Former President Trump was to give
a news conference of some sort, and apparently he wanted to
articulate that this had been suspended, and so that was the time
sensitivity.

Q. And who communicated that sensitivity to you?

Page 125 of 520

 ***

A. Mr. Charrow.

Q. Okay. And do you know who had communicated with Mr. Charrow?

***

A. I was told who it was, but I don't have any evidence of who it was.

Q. Who were you told who it was?

***

A. Okay. My secondhand knowledge is that it was the White House

chief of staff.

Q. Mark Meadows?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. I want to then -- well, I'm going to summarize the

timeline then leading up to April 19th without getting into any of the
discussions of how April 19th happened. Your understanding -- and,
granted, some of this is secondhand -- is a conversation took place
between Chief of Staff Meadows and Mr. Charrow, who then had a
conversation with you, and then you had a conversation with Dr.
Lauer that resulted in this letter?

***

A. That is correct. 353

This sequence of events was confirmed by Dr. Fauci.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (Jan. 8, 2024)

Q. This is a letter sent from Dr. Lauer to Drs. Chmura and Daszak from
April 24th, 2020 -- so 5 days after this one was sent -- that terminates
the entire grant "Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus
Emergence." Were you previously aware of this letter?

A. Let me read it. Hold on. I was aware that the grant was terminated.
I'm not -- I don't recall this particular letter that I saw at the time. I

353
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 53-58.

Page 126 of 520

 think I was shown -- I don't think I was shown this, but I don't recall
seeing this letter at the time it was sent.

Q. You testified in June of 2020 before the House Committee on Energy

and Commerce. You were asked about this grant and the cancellation
and said, "Why was it canceled? It was canceled because the NIH
was told to cancel it. I don't know the reason, but we were told to
cancel it." Do you have any recollection of who told you to cancel
it?

***

Q. All right. I'll relay to you what Dr. Tabak told us was the chain of
events, and you can just tell me if that's accurate to the best of your
recollection. Dr. Tabak testified that Chief of Staff Mark Meadows
called the Office of General Counsel at HHS, who then called Dr.
Tabak, who then called Dr. Lauer, who was instructed to cancel the
grant. Is that consistent with your memory?

A. Yes. 354

By April 17, 2020, the White House was reviewing both the EcoHealth grant and other
grants that involved China to ensure they were in compliance with all applicable grant terms and
conditions. After this review, Mr. Meadows identified EcoHealth and its subgrant to the WIV as
being problematic and instructed HHS to first terminate the subaward and then the entirety of the
grant. Dr. Lauer, the NIH official in charge of grant compliance, testified that he was unaware of
EcoHealth or that it was out of compliance prior to April 19, 2020. 355 If not for the actions of the
Trump Administration, this grantee and grant may have been allowed to continue without proper
oversight.

Between April 19, 2020 and April 26, 2023, NIH conducted an investigation into
EcoHealth’s compliance with its grant terms. This investigation primarily focused on (1)
EcoHealth’s late Year 5 Report, (2) an experiment that showed excessive viral growth, and (3)
EcoHealth’s relationship with the WIV.

1) April 19, 2020: Letter from Dr. Lauer to EcoHealth 356

2) April 24, 2020: Letter from Dr. Lauer to EcoHealth 357

354
Fauci TI 1, supra note 227, at 211-212.
355
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 22.
356
Letter from Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al (Apr. 19, 2020).
357
Letter from Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al (Apr. 24, 2020).

Page 127 of 520

 3) July 8, 2020: Letter from Dr. Lauer to EcoHealth 358

In this letter, Dr. Lauer, because of legal issues surrounding NIH’s decision to terminate
the full grant on April 24, reinstated and then immediately suspended EcoHealth’s grant. The
suspension was pending EcoHealth’s answers to a number of questions regarding activities in
and around Wuhan at the time of the outbreak. NIH witnesses testified they agreed with sending
this letter.

Dr. Michael Lauer (Nov. 2, 2023)

Q. And did you believe at the time that NIH had the authority to ask
these questions -- make these -- let me rephrase. Did you believe at
the time that NIH had the authority to make these requests of a
grantee?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And is that still your opinion, NIH had the authority to make
these requests of a grantee?

A. I'm comfortable that, you know, with what was happening at the
time, the information I had available at the time, that we followed
appropriate processes. 359

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

Q. Did you agree with sending this letter?

A. I did agree with sending it. 360

4) July 23, 2021: Letter from Dr. Lauer to Dr. Daszak 361

In this letter, Dr. Lauer first identified that EcoHealth’s Year 5 Report was later. Dr. Lauer
writes, “[w]e are also writing to notify you that a review of our records for R01AI110964
indicates that EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. is out of compliance with requirements…” 362 Witness
testimony indicates that neither NIH nor NIAID identified this late report until this letter was
sent.

Dr. Erik Stemmy (Nov. 13, 2023)

358
Letter from Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Of Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., et. al., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (July 8, 2020).
359
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 53-54.
360
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 62.
361
Letter from Dr. Michael Lauer, M.D., Dep. Dir. Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. Of Health, to Peter Daszak,
Ph.D., et. al., President, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (July 23, 2021).
362
Id.

Page 128 of 520

 Q. So this is a July 23rd, 2021, letter from Dr. Lauer to EcoHealth. I
don't know if you're -- you are cc'd. Do you recall this letter going -
- being sent?

A. Just give me 1 minute to flip through. Yes, I think so.

Q. Were you involved in drafting this letter at all?

A. I don't recall being involved in drafting this letter, no.

Q. Primarily in this letter, in addition to a couple other requests, but Dr.

Lauer informs EcoHealth that at this point they were 22 months late
on their year 5 progress report. When did you first learn that the year
5 report was late?

A. I don't remember the exact date when I learned this. It may have
been with this letter. But because the award was terminated, I wasn't
doing the normal sort of oversight work that a program officer would
have done, right. Or notifications weren't coming out as well, so --
363

Dr. Emily Erbelding (Nov. 28, 2023)

Q. While you're flipping through it, this is a letter from Dr. Lauer to
EcoHealth from July 23rd, 2021. And in it there's a lot, and it
continues to request in order to review the WIV's records validating
certain expenditures and monitoring safety and financial specifics.
But then also on the second page indicates that EcoHealth has not
submitted their year 5 annual report yet.

***

Q. "We are also writing to notify you that a review of our records for
R01 indicates that EcoHealth Alliance is out of compliance with
requirements to submit the following reports," a financial report and
then the Interim Research Performance Progress report.

A. Okay. I see the paragraph you're referring to.

Q. Were you involved at all in the drafting of this letter?

A. No.

363
Stemmy TI, supra note 260, at 127-128.

Page 129 of 520

 Q. When did you first learn that the year 5 report was late?

A. I believe I learned of it when it came in, which was about a month

after the date on this letter. 364

Dr. Michael Lauer (Nov. 2, 2023)

Q. In this letter, it's also the first time you notify EcoHealth that they're
now 22 months late on their year-five progress report. Is that
correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Would that have been consistent with the timing that you testified to
earlier, that the interim progress report would've come up with the
year-seven funding?

A. So –

Q. Or was it later than what you would normally see?

A. It's later than what we would normally see, but -- okay. Well, I'll
answer your question. It's later than what we would normally see.

Q. Okay. When did you learn that the year-five report was late?

A. Shortly before we sent this letter. 365

On numerous occasions Dr. Daszak held President Trump responsible for the cancellation
of the grant.

Dr. Peter Daszak (Nov. 14, 2023)

Q. Did you ever learn any information, either from government

officials or nongovernment officials, that connected the statement of
intent by then-President Trump to terminate the grant to the decision
that was ostensibly made by NIH to terminate the grant?

A. What I heard was that -- look, when President Trump says

something, he usually does it. Let's face it. I mean, that's one
attribute of President Trump, that when he makes a statement like
that he normally follows through.

364
Erbelding TI, supra note 281, at 96-97.
365
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 66.

Page 130 of 520

 ***

Q. And from what you heard and what you understand, do you believe
that it was the HHS Secretary making the decision himself at that
point, or through instructions from the President?
A. Well, I think President Trump very clearly stated in that press
conference, "We will end it very quickly." And within a week it was
ended.

Q. And is this, is your understanding of that formed through public

reporting and your sort of connecting the dots, or have people
directly told you that?

A. So all of the above. 366

Notwithstanding Dr. Daszak’s testimony, additional testimony regarding the grant

cancellation is clear—NIH career public health officials supported and did not doubt the actions
undertaken by NIH and Dr. Lauer.

Dr. Michael Lauer (Nov. 2, 2023)

Q. All right. Thank you. I'm going to go back and ask some
questions -- a blanket one I think you touched on, but maybe not
directly: Would you sign and send a letter if you did not agree with
the contents of the letter?

A. No. 367

Dr. Hugh Auchincloss (Dec. 20, 2023)

Q. I want to first start by, as you know, NIH Office of Extramural

Affairs started compliance efforts with regard to EcoHealth in April
of 2020. Every letter sent by them was sent by Mike Lauer, who
heads that office. When he testified in front of us, he said that he
would not sign and send a letter that he disagreed with. Do you have
any reason to doubt that assertion?

A. None. 368

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (Jan. 5, 2024)

366
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 203-204.
367
Lauer TI, supra note 262, at 55.
368
Auchincloss TI, supra note 253, at 147-148.

Page 131 of 520

 Q. So understanding there wasn't, if any, involvement prior to 2020, I'm
going to shift ahead to the 2020 to present timeframe as it pertains
to EcoHealth and start with one question. We had a similar interview
with Dr. Lauer, and he testified at that interview that he would not
sign or send a letter that he disagreed with. Do you have any reason
to doubt that assertion?

A. I have no doubt at all about that. 369

Dr. Francis Collins (Jan. 12, 2024)

Q. Moving into 2020. Before we start with individual letters, we asked

Dr. Lauer and he testified that he would not sign or send a letter that
he disagreed with. Do you have any reason to doubt that assertion?

A. No.

Q. Do you agree with every enforcement action the NIH took against
EcoHealth?

A. Yes. 370

Dr. Fauci was the only official at the Director or Deputy Director level the Select
Subcommittee interviewed who was evasive regarding Dr. Lauer’s integrity.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (Jan. 8, 2024)

Q. Okay. I want to shift to a time period a little closer -- it's still 2020,
but it's at least closer than 2016 -- and ask a blanket question first.
Dr. Lauer testified that he would not sign or send a letter that he
disagreed with. Do you have any reason to doubt that assertion?

A. He would not sign –

Q. Or send a letter that he disagreed with.

A. I can't speak for him. 371

As discussed above, Mr. Meadows instructed HHS and NIH to terminate or suspend the
grant to EcoHealth because of concerns that arose regarding the WIV and compliance. This
instruction resulted in a multi-year effort to investigate and oversee EcoHealth’s actions,
including an investigation led by Dr. Lauer with the support of NIH leadership—notably Dr.

369
Tabak TI, supra note 83, at 51.
370
Collins TI, supra note 221, at 145.
371
Fauci TI 1, supra note 227, at 210.

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Collins and Dr. Tabak. Contrary to Dr. Daszak’s testimony and public reporting, the actions
levied against EcoHealth were not political, but instead supported by facts and evidence and
executed by career public health officials.

FINDING: Dr. Anthony Fauci Played Semantics with the Definition of Gain-of-Function
Research.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, many scientists and government officials

categorically denied that taxpayer funds were used for gain-of-function research in Wuhan at the
WIV. These assertions rested on semantics and the misapplication of understood definitions.

On May 11, 2021, Dr. Fauci testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions [hereinafter “HELP”]. 372 At this hearing, Senator Rand Paul (R–
Ky.) asked Dr. Fauci if gain-of-function research was occurring with NIH funding at the WIV.
Dr. Fauci categorically denied it three times.

May 11, 2021 Hearing Before Senate HELP

Senator Paul. Dr. Fauci, do you still support funding of the – NIH funding
of the lab in Wuhan?

Dr. Fauci. Senator Paul, with all due respect, you are entirely and
completely incorrect that the NIH has not ever and does not
now fund gain-of-function research in the Wuhan Institute of
Virology.

***

Senator Paul. Will you, in front of this group, categorically say that the
COVID-19 could not have occurred through serial passage
in the laboratory?

Dr. Fauci. I do not have an accounting of what the Chinese may have
done, and I am fully in favor of any further investigation of
what went on in China. However, I will repeat again, the
NIH and NIAID categorically has not funded gain-of-
function research to be conducted in the Wuhan Institute of
Virology.

***

The Chair. I will allow you to respond to that, and then we will move
on.

An Update From Federal Officials on Efforts to Combat COVID-19: Hearing Before Sen. Comm. on Health,
372

Education, Labor, and Pensions, 117th Cong. (May 11, 2021).

Page 133 of 520

 Dr. Fauci. Yes. I mean, I just wanted to say, we – I do not know how
many times I can say it, Madam Chair. We did not fund
gain-of function research to be conducted in the Wuhan
Institute of Virology. 373

Dr. Fauci’s testimony was, at a minimum, misleading. As established above, at the time
of Dr. Fauci’s testimony senior NIH officials and the NIH website defined gain-of-function
research as “a type of research that modifies a biological agent so that it confers a new or
enhanced activity to that agent.” Further, witness testimony and a plain reading of EcoHealth’s
research conducted at the WIV using U.S. taxpayer dollars confirm it facilitated an experiment
that conveyed new or enhanced activity to a pathogen—thus, satisfying the definition of gain-of-
function research.

Dr. Fauci, during his transcribed interview before the Select Subcommittee, stood by his
Senate HELP testimony.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (Jan. 8, 2024)

Q. When you talk about this issue, this broader issue of gain-of-
function and Wuhan Institute of Virology, publicly -- for example,
the high-profile exchange with Senator Rand Paul --

A. Right.

Q. -- and if you say that NIH, quote, "has not ever and does not now
fund gain-of-function research in the Wuhan Institute of Virology,"
is this layman's definition the definition that you are talking about
in those occasions?

A. No.

Q. Great. What would you be talking about in those situations?

A. What I was referring to when Senator Paul asked me and I repeated

multiple times that we were not doing gain-of-function research, no
-- I said that the NIH sub-award to the Wuhan Institute was not to
do gain-of-function research. I was referring specifically to the
operative definition of "gain-of-function" at the time, which is the
P3CO framework. And the P3CO framework is a policy and a
framework that came out of a policy guidance from 3 years of
discussions led by OSTP, the National Academies of Sciences, and
multiple scientific working groups that came out with a very precise
definition. And the precise definition was: any experiment that is

373
Id.

Page 134 of 520

 reasonably anticipated to result in the enhancement of a -- and by
"enhancement," it is meant an increase in the transmissibility and/or
the pathogenesis of a PPP. And what a PPP is is a potential pandemic
pathogen. So if you enhance it, it's referred to as "ePPP." So then
you ask the question, what is a PPP? And by the regulatory
definition, it is the following: It is a pathogen that is likely to be
highly transmissible and spread widely in a population and a
pathogen that likely will cause a high degree of morbidity and
mortality in humans. So, when I was asked the question, did the
grant that was a sub-award to Wuhan fund experiments that were
enhanced PPP, that is what I was referring to when I said we do not
fund gain-of-function -- gain-of-function according to the strict
definition, which I refer to as the operative definition of "gain-of-
function." So, when someone asks me, as a scientist, are you doing
gain-of-function, is that gain-of-function, I always apply it to the
operative definition of "gain-of-function."

Q. That is very helpful. Thank you for drawing that distinction. And at
the time of that exchange, it was the P3CO framework. There was
also a time, I think from 2014 to 2017, when the gain-of-function
moratorium was the operative policy.

A. Right.

Q. So a similar analysis, I assume, would've been the case for that –

A. Right.

Q. -- period of time.

A. Yes. 374

Dr. Anthony Fauci (Jan. 8, 2024)

Q. I want to introduce the year 5 progress report as majority exhibit 18.

And in the nature of time, it's a long report, so I'd ask you not to read
the whole report, but I'm going to draw your attention to a discrete
paragraph. It's on page 15 under aim 3.1.

***

Q. And I believe, and Dr. Tabak has confirmed that in his letter he is
referring to the experiment outlined in this paragraph. And I'm going
to -- you have it in front of you, but I'm going to read it in kind of

374
Fauci TI 1, supra note 227, at 47-48.

Page 135 of 520

 layman's terms so it's comprehendible. But, in essence, it says that
mice were infected with four strains of SARS-related coronaviruses
with different spike proteins, including full-length recombinant
virus of 4 SARS-related WIV 1 and 3 chimeric viruses, with the
backbone of WIV 1 and the spike proteins from three other bat
coronaviruses. So that's what we were just discussing. All four of
the viruses caused lethal infection in human ACE2 transgenic mice,
but the mortality rate varied among the four groups. Fourteen days
post-infection, five out of the seven mice infected with just the WIV
1 backbone remained alive, while only two out of eight mice
infected with the SHC014 chimera survived. And the paragraph ends
with, "These results suggest that the pathogenicity of SHC014 is
higher than other tested bat SARS-related coronaviruses in
transgenic mice that express human ACE2." I'll give you a minute
to read the full version in the progress report. I know I kind of
summarized it.

A. [Reviewing.] Yeah.

Q. So to me, it sounds like seven mice infected with the full-length

WIV 1; five survived. Eight mice infected with a chimera of WIV 1
and SHC014 and two survived. Is that your understanding as well?

A. That's what it says, yeah.

Q. This to me sounds like the experiment that EcoHealth conducted by

creating a chimera increased the pathogenicity of the underlying
virus. Is that fair?

A. The underlying virus is WIV.

Q. Correct.

A. And the spike that they put on indicated that the virus was more
pathogenic than the WIV.

Q. Correct. Is that right? So by replacing the WIV 1 spike with the SHC
spike –

A. Yes, yes. But, again, you got to put it into context because, again,
these viruses, when you -- if you -- are you hearkening back to the
definition of whether –

Q. I'm getting there.

Page 136 of 520

A. Yeah, but then let's go there, okay? The fact is that what was built
into the scope of the conditions was that if you do get an increase in
viral load or pathogenesis, you've got to report it or reevaluate it, but
it still doesn't change the underlying premise that this is not a PPP.
That's the point. That's the conclusion -- that's the confusion people
get. By the operative definition of gain-of-function of concern, even
with this, this is merely an added going the extra mile that if
something like this happens you stop and you look at it and discuss
whether or not to go forward, et cetera. And, to my understanding,
that even if you do that, this still doesn't change that you're not
dealing with a virus that's very likely to lead to widespread
transmission, et cetera, et cetera. So it doesn't change the definition
or the operative guideline for this experiment, but it tells you, you
should report this, because that was part of the fail-safe.

Q. And I don't disagree with you that it's not an ePPP –

A. Yeah, right.

Q. -- and it doesn't fall under the P3CO framework. What I think we're
trying to understand is this was submitted, I mean, well, late, but the
work was conducted during 2018 for the fiscal year 2018 to 2019
and the year 5 progress report. At that time, this definition of gain-
of-function was still live on the website of enhancing a biological
agent. And I guess what I'm trying to understand, and the minority
talked about it too, is you said what your intent was with Senator
Paul, that when you said NIH does not now and has not ever funded
gain-of-function research in Wuhan was that you meant to say or
you intended ePPP research.

A. I said that before and I'll repeat it again. When I talk about gain-of-
function, I talk about -- a gain-of-function of concern -- I am talking
about the operative definition of gain-of-function of concern, which
for me is the P3CO that we've discussed multiple times.

Q. And I agree, again, agree that this experiment did not meet the P3
definition. Would you agree that it meets that broad definition of
gain-of-function that was on NIH's website when this research was
conducted?

A. Again, I don't use the terminology "gain-of-function" because it can

be very confusing, which was the reason why we went through 3
years of discussion to avoid the kind of confusion that we're going
to get into now if we start going back and forth about this. That was
the whole reason for 3 years of deliberation to establish a regulatory
guideline based on a guiding policy that led to a framework. So,

Page 137 of 520

 regardless of how you slice it, when I spoke to -- when I responded
to Doctor -- to Senator Paul, I was referring to the gain-of-function
research of concern as defined by the P3CO framework.

Q. My last question. That hearing was May 11th, 2021. When you
testified, like -- again, I apologize, but if I was a general C-SPAN
watcher or watching the news afterwards it obviously became a big
deal, and I went and I googled NIH gain-of-function research, this
is what would come up. Do you think you could have -- like, you
knew that you meant ePPP.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think you could have been more specific in your answer?

A. Well –

***

A. I think -- I think in terms of 3PCO, and that's embedded in my mind,

he didn't appreciate what gain-of-function according to the
regulatory guidelines are. I was speaking in that term. So he was
thinking of a different thing. When I spoke to him, I'll stand by my
statement that when I said we do not do gain-of-function I was
referring to gain-of-function of concern according to the 3PCO
guideline, done, full stop.

***

Q. The last thing I'll say is we interviewed Dr. Tabak on Friday -- it's
been a long weekend -- and we asked him a similar question.
"What's described in the EcoHealth year 5 progress report would fit
the definition -- the broad definition of gain-of-function research?"
And he answered, "The generic, broad description of what gain-of-
function is, yes." Would you agree with Dr. Tabak?

A. You know, again, we're going in circles, because it's going to get the
same confusion that the chairman was just talking about.

Q. I'm –

A. Because then, if I say yes, then, "Ah, yes, he says it was gain-of-
function." It is not gain-of-function of concern that is associated
with the regulatory operative definition of gain-of-function.

Page 138 of 520

 Q. No. And I'm entirely willing to stipulate that and stipulate that it
didn't need to go through the P3CO and it didn't meet the definition
of ePPP. And I'll end on this, and if it's the same answer it's the same
answer. But we've asked Dr. Auchincloss this question. We've asked
Dr. Tabak this question. Both have said that it meets the definition,
the broad definition of gain-of-function research. I'm not trying to
catch you in a trap. I'm not trying to catch you –

A. But the thing is I have been living a life over the last few years of
getting total distortion of things that I've said and done, and you
know that. So if you want me to –

***

Q. You don't need to answer again. I'll take that what you meant is what
–

A. Right.

Q. And I agree that that is what you meant. I'm not trying to go against
that. I'm just -- when people read things in black and white and
words are said, it's hard to distinguish sometimes.

A. Yes.

Q. Our hour is up, and we can go off the record. Our day is up too. 375

[Whereupon, at 6:57 p.m., the interview was recessed, to reconvene at 10:00

a.m., Tuesday, January 9, 2024.]

Dr. Fauci testified that when he testified before the Senate, he was using the “operative”
definition of gain of function. However, that was not the definition of that term used by the NIH
at that time. Unfortunately, the website containing that definition was unceremoniously removed
and that definition deleted the same day the EcoHealth experiment was reported to Congress. Dr.
Fauci’s testimony to Senator Paul misled the public regarding NIH funding of gain-of-function
research at the WIV.

FINDING: The U.S. National Institutes of Health and National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases Granted U.S. Taxpayer Funds to the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army.

375
Fauci TI 1, supra note 227, at 219-226.

Page 139 of 520

 On April 13 2020, Mr. Handley prepared a background document outlining NIAID’s
interaction with China and its current relationship with various grantees. 376 This document was
presented to Dr. Fauci. 377 As an illustrative example of the lack of vetting of both foreign
laboratories and collaborators, this document lists at least three grants that include Dr. Yusen
Zhou—a known CCP member and PLA officer—as a collaborator. 378

FINDING: Senior National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Leadership Fostered
an Environment That Promoted Evading the Freedom of Information Act.

FOIA establishes a statutory right of public access to Executive Branch information in the
federal government. 379 FOIA provides that any person has a right, enforceable in court, to obtain
access to federal agency records subject to the Act, except to the extent that any portions of such
records are protected from public disclosure by one of nine exemptions. 380

In the process of seeking official COVID-19 related documents, the Select Subcommittee
discovered documents suggesting senior officials in Dr. Fauci’s office flagrantly used deceptive
tactics to prevent their e-mails and correspondences from being discovered as responsive to
FOIA requests.

On June 4, 2021, Mr. Folkers intentionally misspelled “EcoHealth” as “Ec~Health.” 381

376
Memorandum by F. Gray Handley, Associate Dir. For International Affairs, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious
Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Apr. 13, 2020).
377
Id.
378
Id.
379
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); see also, John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 150 (1989) ("This Court
repeatedly has stressed the fundamental principle of public access to Government documents that animates the
FOIA.").
380
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(3), (a)(4)(B), (b), (c).
381
E-Mail from Gregory Folkers, Chief of Staff, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, to Courtney Billet, et
al., Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (June 4, 2021, 9:36 PM).

Page 140 of 520

 Again, in an original email from June 7, 2021, Mr. Folkers intentionally misspelled
“Andersen” as “anders$n”—an email Dr. Morens eventually forwarded to his Gmail. 382

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

E-Mail from Gregory Folkers, Chief of Staff, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, to David Morens,
382

M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (June 16, 2021, 1:03 PM).

Page 141 of 520

 Again, on June 25, 2021, Mr. Folkers intentionally misspelled “gain-of-function” to be
“g#in-of-function.” 383

E-Mail from Greg Folkers, Chief of Staff, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to
383

David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (June 25,
2021, 11:25 AM).

Page 142 of 520

 The intentional misspelling of these key words makes the e-mail more difficult to identify
via a keyword search to fulfill a FOIA request. The terms “Andersen,” “EcoHealth,” and “gain-
of-function” were frequently key words searched in many FOIA requests from the media and
others during the pandemic response.

Further, the apparent intentional misspellings of “Anders$n,” “Ec~Health,” and “g#in-of-

function” cannot be reasonably explained as typographical errors. The added symbols could not
be a slip or minor keyboard mistake. None of the “$,” “~”, and “#” are directly adjacent to either
letter they are intended to replace, and to place the symbols in a document, the additional “shift”
key must be pressed. These actions are indicative of a culture of avoiding accountability and
transparency by the unelected public health bureaucracy.

FINDING: A National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Freedom of Information

Act Official Apparently Aided Others in Efforts to Evade the Freedom of
Information Act.

According to documents, Ms. Moore assisted other employees regarding how to avoid
producing responsive documents or ensuring documents are not recoverable.

On February 25, 2021, Dr. Morens stated that he learned tricks to evade the FOIA from
Ms. Moore “who heads our FOIA office,” and she “also hates FOIAs.” 384

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
384

Health, to Gregory Keusch, M.D. (Feb. 25, 2021, 11:25 AM).

Page 143 of 520

 On February 24, 2021, Dr. Morens again discussed how he learned specific tactics from
“our foia lady” on how to work around FOIA regulations, avoid transparency and accountability,
and “make emails disappear after i am foia’d but before the search starts.” 385 Dr. Morens
concluded “I think we are all safe.” 386

385
E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Gerald Keusch. M.D., et al., (Feb. 24, 2021, 9:21 AM).
386
Id.

Page 144 of 520

 During a public hearing, Dr. Morens testified that these conversations were a “joke” and
stated that Ms. Moore “didn’t give me advice about how to avoid FOIA.” 387

Considering the conflict between Dr. Morens’ emails and his testimony, the Select
Subcommittee sought to question Ms. Moore regarding knowledge of these issues.

On May 31, 2024, the Select Subcommittee attempted to arrange a voluntary transcribed
interview to obtain Ms. Moore’s testimony. The Select Subcommittee only began the process of
scheduling a transcribed interview after she did not reply to several attempts by Select
Subcommittee staff to schedule an informal briefing by phone. 388 Ms. Moore eventually retained
personal counsel. 389

Select Subcommittee staff and Ms. Moore’s personal counsel engaged in negotiations to
facilitate a voluntary interview. 390 The Select Subcommittee offered numerous accommodations,
including limiting the scope of the interview. 391 On August 5, 2024, Ms. Moore, via her counsel,
formally refused to testify. 392

Subsequently, the Select Subcommittee issued a subpoena for Ms. Moore for a deposition
in Washington, D.C. on October 4, 2024. 393 The Select Subcommittee asked Ms. Moore if she
had “any conversations with Dr. David Morens regarding his obligations pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act or document retention laws and policies?” 394 In response, Ms.
Moore invoked her right against self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. 395

387
A Hearing with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Senior Scientific Advisor, Dr. David
Morens: Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong, 25, (May 22, 2024).
388
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Margaret Moore
(Sept. 30, 2024).
389
Id.
390
Id.
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
Wenstrup Letter, supra note 388.
394
See Deposition of Maragret Moore (Oct. 4, 2024)
395
Id.

Page 145 of 520

The Efficacy, Effectiveness, and Transparency of the Use of Taxpayer Funds
and Relief Programs to Address the Coronavirus Pandemic, Including Any
Reports of Waste, Fraud, or Abuse

The COVID-19 pandemic left a detrimental impact on small businesses across the U.S.,
resulting in business closures, product shortages, and widespread job losses. Americans faced
instability in their daily lives prompting action by Congress to stabilize the economy and
providing critical resources to affected individuals, businesses and communities.

Congress passed the CARES Act, a $2.2 trillion dollar relief package designed to address
the economic impacts on small business and individuals. This legislation created and extended
programs such as PPP, EIDL, and enhanced UI benefits. The CARES Act also established the
PRAC to provide independent oversight of pandemic relief spending by coordinating IGs whose
agencies administer pandemic relief programs.

The unprecedented scale and lack of transparency in COVID-19 pandemic relief

programs exposed vulnerabilities for waste, fraud, and abuse. Reports of improper payments,
fraudulent claims, and misuse of funds have raised alarming concerns about where these funds
are going and who they are going to.

Federal agencies must do better to prepare for future public health crises to ensure
accountability and transparency in agencies to prevent waste fraud and abuse in emergency relief
programs.

I. The Paycheck Protection Program

On March 27, 2020, President Trump signed the CARES Act, which created PPP under
section 1102 7(a) of the Small Business Act. 396 PPP provided essential relief for small
businesses, individuals, and nonprofit organizations by offering loans that could be forgiven if
the funds were used in accordance with criteria enumerated in the legislation.

Rollout of the Payment Protection Program

From the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was unprecedented public demand
for relief loans, especially for small businesses. A month after PPP was established, individual
and business applicants were granted $349 billion in taxpayer funded loans. 397 On April 24,
2020, Congress allocated another $310 billion to PPP—in addition to the original $659 billion—
through the Health Care Enhancement Act. 398

396
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Securities (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020)
[hereinafter “CARES Act”].
397
Stolen Taxpayer Funds: Reviewing the SBA and OIG Reports of Fraud in Pandemic Lending Programs: Hearing
Before H. Comm. On Small Businesses, 118th Cong. 1, (July 13, 2023) (Testimony of Hannibal “Mike” Ware,
Inspector General).
398
Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 620 (2020).

Page 146 of 520

 On June 5, 2020, the PPP Flexibility Act modified the program by extending time under
which recipients had to spend funds from eight weeks to twenty-four weeks. 399 While this
granted new flexibilities to loan recipients, it also resulted in greater potential for error and
increased opportunities for fraud and improper payments.

On December 27, 2020, Congress extended PPP through the Economic Aid to Hard-Hit
Small Business, Nonprofits and Venues Act in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. 400
Small businesses financially affected by the COVID-19 pandemic received continued assistance
through March 31, 2021, equaling an additional $147.5 billion in program funding, increasing
total funding to $806.5 billion. 401

ARPA provided an additional $7.2 billion in PPP funding, increased the total funding to
$813.7 billion. 402 President Biden signed the legislation, which extended the deadline to apply
for PPP loans to May 31, 2021. 403

The rapid rollout of pandemic relief funds and lack of adequate systems to determine
eligibility and distribute assistance paved the way for large amounts of improper payments and
fraud. The SBA IG estimated the U.S. taxpayers lost $64 billion in fraud attributable to PPP
alone. 404

Structure of the Payment Protection Program

PPP loans were rapidly disbursed by SBA following the program’s establishment. To
qualify for a PPP loan, of which applicants had to self-certify their eligibility, applicants needed
to have less than 500 employees, been operational as of February 15, 2020, and certify the funds
would be used for specific purposes, such as payroll expenses, interest payments, rent, or
utilities. 405 Under the CARES Act, 60 percent of funds received had to be allocated for payroll
costs and other eligible employee expenses to qualify for loan forgiveness. 406

Initial Oversight of PPP Loans

In June 2020, GAO released its first bimonthly report which revealed that—because the
loan application process was essentially based on merit and self-reporting—the program was

399
Robert J. Dingler & Sean Lowry, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R46397, SBA Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
Loan Forgiveness: In Brief (last updated Sept. 3, 2020).
400
Id.
401
Id. (last updated Apr. 23, 2021).
402
American Rescue Plan Expands PPP Eligibility, PYA (Mar. 31, 2021).
403
Grace Segers, Biden signs PPP extension into law, moving application deadline to May 31, CBS NEWS (Mar. 30,
2021).
404
Dan Nanz, How the FBI is Combating COVID-19 Related Fraud, FBI SPRINGFIELD PRESS OFFICE (Jan. 12,
2024).
405
PPP Borrower Information Fact Sheet, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T.
406
Press Release, U.S. Small Business Admin., Joint Statement by SBA Administrator Jovita Carranza and U.S.
Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin Regarding Enactment of the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act
(June 8, 2020).

Page 147 of 520

susceptible to fraudulent claims. 407 Eligibility for receiving a PPP loan was based on the claimant
self-asserting their PII without verification by the SBA. This lenient approach to distributing
federal relief funds opened the door for exploitation, with some applicants fraudulently inflating
payroll costs to secure larger loans, misrepresenting their number of employees to falsely appear
eligible, and certifying that the funds would be used for allowable expenses while diverting them
for personal use. 408

FINDING: The Paycheck Protection Program Was Rife with Fraudulent Claims Resulting in
at Least $64 Billion of Taxpayers’ Dollars Lost to Fraudsters and Criminals.

PPP was susceptible to many forms of waste, fraud, and abuse due to its rapid
implementation and reliance on self-verification by applicants. The most common ways this
program was exploited was through inflated payroll costs, misrepresenting employee numbers,
misuse of loan proceeds, submitting multiple applications, creating false certifications,
committing identify theft, loan stacking, and fake documentation. 409

Fraudulent Loan Applications

PPP fraud became one of the most accessible avenues for exploiting pandemic relief
funds. One of the largest PPP fraud cases prosecuted by DOJ involved six individuals who
conspired and submitted 75 fraudulent loan applications. 410 Using fake bank records and
fabricated federal tax forms, these defendants managed to secure $20 million in federal PPP
funds by inflating employee numbers and falsifying payroll amounts of their loan applications. 411
Like many other cases, these individuals engaged in additional illegal activities, including
cashing more than 1,100 fake PPP paychecks amounting to more than $3 million that was
supposed to go towards employee payroll. 412

In another case prosecuted by DOJ, a California man was convicted for submitting
fraudulent applications to obtain PPP loans. 413 By simply providing false information, he secured
$27 million in forgivable loans. 414 He claimed his company had more than 100 employees with
an average monthly payroll of $400,00. 415 After receiving $3 million in taxpayer money, he used
the funds for personal expenses, including cash withdrawals, payments on personal credit cards,
and transfers to other personal and business accounts under his control. 416 The individual now

407
GAO, GAO-20-625, COVID-19 OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE FEDERAL RESPONSE AND RECOVERY EFFORTS (June
2020).
408
Ken Dilanian & Laura Strickler, 'Biggest fraud in a generation': The looting of the Covid relief plan known as
PPP, NBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2022).
409
GAO, GAO-23-105331, COVID RELIEF FRAUD SCHEMES AND INDICATORS IN SBA PANDEMIC PROGRAMS (May
2023).
410
Press Release, DOJ, Leader of $20M COVID-19 Relief Fraud Ring Sentenced to 15 Years (Oct. 3, 2023).
411
Id.
412
Id.
413
Press Release, DOJ, Man Convicted for $27 Million PPP Fraud Scheme (Mar. 29, 2022).
414
Id.
415
Id.
416
Id.

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faces up to 30 years in prison for charges of bank fraud, making false statements, and money
laundering. 417

Fraudsters Using Unverified Social Security Numbers

Since opening investigations, PRAC identified 69,323 questionable SSNs used to obtain
$5.4 billion from PPP and EIDL programs. 418 Fraudsters used SSNs that were either stolen from
real or dead individuals or completely fabricated to create fake identities, impersonate legitimate
businesses, and submit multiple loan applications under multiple identities. 419 Using fake SSNs
allowed individuals to bypass background checks, receive funds illicitly, and launder money
through transfers, cash withdrawals, or high-value purchases. 420

One specific investigation from DHS resulted in the conviction and five-year prison
sentence of a Florida man for fraudulently obtaining two Florida identification cards to apply for
three PPP loans using the identities of two separate victims. 421 He received approximately
$150,000 in PPP loans. 422 Further investigation by the IRS indicated that the same Florida man
also submitted eight fraudulent tax returns using the stolen identities of six victims unrelated to
COVID-19 relief funds. 423

U.S. Agencies IGs continue to investigate PPP fraud and other pandemic relief funds.
Many investigations have led officials to more serious organized criminals. As of August 2023,
the federal government charged 3,195 defendants for offenses related to PPP fraud and seized
more than $1.4 billion in relief funds, many of them from PPP fraud. 424 U.S. Attorney Offices
and dozens of federal, state, and local law enforcements agencies have also opened their own
investigations. 425

FINDING: The U.S. Small Business Administration Did Not Properly Define Critical Internal
Roles and Responsibilities and Failed to Provide Actionable Guidance to External
Stakeholders to Manage Fraud Risk and Combat Paycheck Protection Program
Abuse.

417
Id.
418
Federal Pandemic Spending: A Prescription for Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: Hearing Before H. Comm. On
Oversight and Accountability, 118th Cong. 1, (Feb. 1, 2023) (Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic
Response Accountability Comm. Inspector General, DOJ).
419
PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE, PRAC-2023-02, FRAUD ALERT: PRAC IDENTIFIES $5.4
BILLION IN POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT PANDEMIC LOANS OBTAINED USING OVER 69,000 QUESTIONABLE SOCIAL
SECURITY NUMBERS (Jan. 30, 2023).
420
Id.
421
New Release, Homeland Security Investigations, Florida Man Sentenced for ‘PPP’ Fraud, Identity Theft (Mar.
19, 2024).
422
Id.
423
Id.
424
Madeleine Ngo, Over 3,100 Charged With Pandemic Relief Fraud, Justice Dept. Says, THE N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23,
2023).
425
Examining Federal Efforts to Prevent, Detect, and Prosecute Pandemic Relief Fraud to Safeguard Funds for All
Eligible Americans: Hearing Before Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, 117th Cong., (June 14, 2022)
(Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, Inspector General, DOJ).

Page 149 of 520

 SBA lacked a well-structured organizational framework with clearly defined roles,
responsibilities, and processes to manage and handle potentially fraudulent PPP loans across the
program. 426 SBA did not establish a sufficient fraud risk framework, and therefore lenders had
little to no information on how to handle PPP fraud or recover funds that were already disbursed
that were suspected fraud. 427 Even though lenders continually stressed the necessity of specific
guidance from SBA to ensure they were meeting the agency’s requirements, none was
provided. 428 SBA was one of many federal agencies that did not implement internal controls,
fraud prevention measures, or adequate financial and risk management capabilities even though
they were required by law. 429

SBA Did Not Properly Define and Assign Roles and Responsibilities in Combating PPP
Fraud

The SBA did not clearly designate points of contact for handling various aspects of fraud
in the program and never defined their roles and responsibilities. 430 During a SBA IG
investigation, the IG found the SBA’s Office of Capitol Access and Office of General Counsel
were in supportive roles and involved in only a portion of fraud risk effort instead of being fully
integrated into that effort. 431 They also found that SBA pointed to their publicly available
“Frequently Asked Questions” site and interim final rules for many questions that were asked.
These documents only contained general statements on SBA preventing fraud waste and abuse
within the PPP. 432

During SBA IG’s investigation, they interviewed employees of offices within SBA
including the Office of Financial Assistance. An official from that office said they did not have a
formal internal process for handling potentially fraudulent PPP loans and referred them to the
Office of Financial Program Operations, an office not associated with the SBA. 433 When IG
officials met with the Office of Financial Program Operations, an official told them the PPP
guidance did not address fraud and referred them back to the Office of Financial Assistance for
formal processes. 434

SBA Lacked Specific Guidance to Lenders Regarding PPP Fraud Schemes

Lenders that distributed PPP loans to “qualifying” applicants lacked clear guidance from
the SBA on how to handle PPP fraud or recover funds obtained fraudulently from scammers. 435
Instead, the SBA assumed lenders already established and implemented industry regulations

426
See generally, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN., REPORT 22-13, SBA’S HANDLING OF POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT
PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM LOANS (May 26, 2022).
427
Id.
428
Id.
429
Id.
430
Id.
431
Id.
432
Id.
433
Id.
434
Id.
435
Id. (Lenders that distributed PPP loans to “qualifying” applicants lacked a clear guidance from the SBA on how
to handle PPP fraud or recover funds obtained fraudulently from criminals).

Page 150 of 520

regarding fraud. As a result, the SBA blamed financial institutions and lenders rather than taking
responsibility for not developing and communicating actionable guidance to manage PPP fraud
risk. 436

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, lenders had little to no communication with OIG
investigative agencies. 437 However, SBA OIG received a significant volume of requests from
lenders and financial institutions on how to handle potentially fraudulent PPP loans, with PPP
fraud hotline complaints exceeding 54,000. 438 Providing lenders with sufficient information and
guidance on how to address PPP fraud would have established a foundation for addressing fraud
and would have prevented billions of taxpayer’s dollars from going to criminals.

436
Id.
437
Id.
438
Id.

Page 151 of 520

II. Enhanced Unemployment Insurance

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress and the Executive Branch fast-
tracked emergency relief packages aimed at stabilizing the economy and providing crucial
support to individuals and businesses. States quickly issued stay-at-home orders because of
overcrowded hospitals and a rising mortality rate, leading to widespread economic shutdowns
and a surge in unemployment claims. 439 In April 2020, the unemployment rate reached 15
percent—the highest unemployment rate since data collection began in 1948. 440 Within just a
few months, unemployment benefit claims soared to more than 58 million as businesses closed
and workers lost their jobs, with more than 7 million UI applications filed in a 23-week span. 441

The DOL establishes federal guidelines that require each state to manage and fund its
own unemployment benefits program with the federal government allowing extensions and
expansions of benefits during emergencies, including public heath crises. 442 In response to
massive unemployment, Congress enacted several pandemic relief packages to provide financial
support to employers, employees, and the newly unemployed:

• FFCRA: The first relief program that required certain employers to provide emergency
paid sick leave and expanded family and medical leave for individuals with reasons
related to COVID-19. 443

• CARES Act: The largest relief package that created three new temporary federal
unemployment benefit programs. These fully federally funded programs expanded
existing UI benefits, created additional weeks of temporary benefits, and increased UI
benefits to groups that were traditionally not eligible to apply: 444

o FPUC: Established weekly $600 payments in addition to regular UI and extended

benefits. 445

o PEUC: Extended the length of time individuals could receive UI benefits,

allowing the claimant to claim benefits for up to 79 weeks. 446

439
31 CFR Part 35.
440
Fraud in Federal Unemployment Insurance Programs: Hearing Before Committee on Ways & Means, 118th Cong.
1, (Feb. 8, 2023) (Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic Response Accountability Comm., Inspector
General, DOJ).
441
Nigel Chiwaya & Jiachuan Wu, The coronavirus has destroyed the job market in every state, NBC NEWS (Apr.
14, 2020).
442
Fraud in Federal Unemployment Insurance Programs: Hearing Before Committee on Ways & Means, 118th
Cong. 1, (Feb. 8, 2023) (Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic Response Accountability Comm.,
Inspector General, DOJ).
443
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 177 (2020).
444
CARES Act, supra note 396.
445
Id.
446
Id.

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 o PUA: Expanded eligibility of UI to self-employed workers, freelancers,
independent contractors, and part-time workers impacted by COVID-19,
providing up to 79 weeks of unemployment benefits. 447

In total, an estimated $872 billion was allocated to COVID-19 UI benefit programs. 448
These programs were implemented rapidly as Congress, governors, and state legislatures pushed
for state workforce agencies to distribute funds efficiently. However, the unprecedented volume
of claims placed enormous strain on states’ unemployment systems contributing to delays,
confusion, improper payments, and fraud. 449 The DOL ETA was tasked with overseeing
traditional UI benefit claims, ensuring states distributed effectively while maintaining
accountability. 450 ETA officials reported that the COVID-19 pandemic led to a tenfold increase in
pandemic-related UI claims for federal and state programs, overwhelming the capacity of state
systems. 451

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021implemented refined integrity measures which

required documentation for claimants filing benefits after January 31, 2021. States had to verify
PUA applicants and include a statutory requirement for weekly self-certification. States were
required to have a process which addressed work refusals including a method for employers to
properly report these refusals. 452

ARPA extended pandemic UI benefits for an additional six months, including continued
weekly FPUC payments and a 29-week extension of PEUC benefits. 453 By March 2021, nearly
all businesses had reopened, and a mass vaccination program was well under way with one-third
of Americans having already reported to at least one dose of the vaccine. 454 Extending these
programs, with insufficient oversight, allowed fraudsters, international criminals, and foreign
adversaries to steal billions in taxpayer dollars through UI fraud. 455

FINDING: Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments Total More Than $191 Billion.

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, unemployment claims skyrocketed to

unprecedented levels. GAO estimated that 11 to 15 percent of UI claims were fraudulent,

447
Id.
448
MITRE, Best Practices and Lessons Learned From the Administration of Pandemic Related Unemployment
Benefits Program (Feb. 2022).
449
Where Do We Go From Here? Examining a Path Forward to Assess Agencies’ Efforts to Prevent Improper
Payments and Fraud: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations and the Federal Workforce, H. Comm. on
Oversight and Accountability, 118th Cong, 2 (Sept. 10, 2024).
450
OIG Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last updated Dec. 15, 2023)
available at https://www.oig.dol.gov/doloiguioversightwork.htm.
451
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 19-24-002-03-315, A REVIEW OF PANDEMIC UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE RELIEF AND ITS
IMPACT ON SIX DIFFERENT U.S. COMMUNITIES (Mar. 28, 2024).
452
Consolidated Appropriates Act, Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136 Stat. 4459 (2022).
453
Julie M. Whittaker & Katelin P. Isaacs, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R46687, Current Status of Unemployment
Insurance (UI) Benefits: Permanent-Law Programs and COVID-19 Pandemic Response (last updated Aug. 22,
2021).
454
Liz Hamel, et al., KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor: March 2021, KFF (Mar. 30, 2021).
455
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OIG Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program (last updated Dec. 15, 2023)
available at https://www.oig.dol.gov/doloiguioversightwork.htm.

Page 153 of 520

resulting in between $100 billion and $135 billion of improper payments potentially linked to
fraud. 456 After further investigation by DOL IG, it found that at least $191 billion was wrongfully
paid out to bad actors who exploited individuals’ PII. 457

In December 2021, ETA reported an improper payment rate of 18.71 percent for two of
the three pandemic UI programs—PEUC and EPUC—excluding monetary losses from the PUA
program. 458 A year later, ETA reported the percentage of improper payments rose almost three
precent for the same two programs. 459 As of September 13, 2023, DOJ announced more than 700
enforcement actions, including criminal charges, against 371 defendants for more than $836
million in alleged UI fraud. 460 Most of these losses could have been prevented if Congress and
Federal agencies provided up-to-date technologies along with proper verification methods for
oversight, something GAO has been specifically recommending for more than ten years. 461

Agencies are actively working to recover funds lost to fraudsters but are having
difficulties tracking down some of the money, as some was converted into tangible assets. 462
Fraudsters bought cars, property, and even hired hitmen with the money stolen from taxpayers. 463
The figure below shows the total estimated fraudulent and nonfraudulent overpayments that
occurred between March 2020 and March 2023 versus how many fraudulent or erroneous
payments have been recovered during this time period. 464

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

456
GAO, GAO-23-106696, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF FRAUD DURING PANDEMIC
LIKELY BETWEEN $100 BILLION AND $135 BILLION (Sept. 12, 2023).
457
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 455.
458
Matt Weidinger, Official Estimate of Unemployment Misspending Rises to $191 billion—and That Is Still the
“Low End”, AEI (Feb. 9, 2023).
459
GAO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, supra note 456.
460
Id.
461
Id.
462
Id.
463
COVID money to hire hitmen?, OLEAN TIMES HERALD (Nov. 11, 2023).
464
GAO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, supra note 456.

Page 154 of 520

 States have continuously reported fraudulent UI overpayments in both traditional and
pandemic UI programs. The data from March 2020 and March 2023 compares the stark
differences in how much money was lost during the pandemic compared to traditional UI
programs. 465 States have only identified $1.2 billion in payment recoveries out of $5.3 billion
lost across FPUC, PEUC, and UI programs. 466 The figure below shows the amount of money lost
to fraudulent overpayments and subsequent recoveries by states for both the traditional and
pandemic UI programs. 467 The prior lapses in the traditional UI benefit claim system opened the
door for fraud, waste, and abuse of pandemic-era UI benefits.

Organized Crime Networks, Domestic Fraudsters, Identity Thieves, and Prison Imamates
Exploited Stolen Identities to Fraudulently File for Pandemic UI Benefits

Fraudsters exploited the federal government’s pandemic relief programs by using the
SSNs of deceased people and federal prisoners to receive unemployment benefits during the
pandemic. 468 The U.S. Attorney Office for the Western Division of Virginia charged a woman
with leading a conspiracy to commit pandemic-related UI fraud in connection with a scheme
involving the filing of fraudulent claims. 469 This defendant conspired with more than 35
individuals to file fraudulent claims of UI benefits. The co-conspirators included 15 prison
inmates, totaling fraudulent claims for at least 37 individuals resulting in $499,000 lost. 470

In another case, Homeland Security Investigations Baltimore, alongside other federal

agencies, investigated a Maryland man who plead guilty to fraudulently obtaining at least $1.3
million in COVID-19 UI benefits. 471 The defendant conspired with others to impersonate victims
by submitting fraudulent claims for UI benefits in Maryland, Georgia, Illinois, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Washington, D.C. The criminal group obtained PII, without the victims’ knowledge

465
GAO, supra note 456.
466
Id.
467
Id.
468
Richard Lardner, et al., The Great Grift: How billions in COVID-19 relief aid was stolen or wasted, AP NEWS
(June 12, 2023).
469
Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office, Western Distr. of Virg., Russell Co. Woman Pleads Guilty to $499,000
Unemployment Fraud Scheme (Mar. 18, 2021).
470
Id.
471
Id.

Page 155 of 520

or consent, and shared them between themselves and others to facilitate the fraud. They applied
for at least $1.3 million in UI benefits using the names and information of more than 183
victims. 472

The Structure of the PUA Program Enabled Widespread Fraud at an Unprecedented Level

In August 2023, DOL reported an improper payment rate of 35.9 percent for the PUA
program. 473 During the first nine months of the program, claimants were not required to provide
any documentation or evidence of earnings, despite states certifying individuals’ eligibility for
benefits. 474 State workforce agencies, responsible for distributing funds to claimants, lacked the
necessary information to verify the credibility of the claims. 475 These agencies were unable to
confirm prior employment or self-employment, nor verify wage amounts beyond what was self-
reported by claimants. 476 Additionally, states failed to cross-check claims against critical
databases to ensure applicants were not filing in multiple states, incarcerated, or flagged as high-
risk for fraud. Since the PUA provided UI benefits to a new population of workers, states
struggled with identity verification because claimants were outside of the federal-state taxation
system. 477 This absence of robust verification measures allowed criminals to exploit the system
by receiving multiple payment cards, with some sent to the same address, and by fraudulently
obtaining benefits in the names of incarcerated individuals.

Many of these vulnerabilities stemmed from delays in implementing proper cross-

matching of applicant data with available databases during the early stages of the program. As a
result, some legitimate claimants later discovered they had been victimized by fraud when they
received IRS1099-G forms for unemployment benefits that were paid out in their name. 478

FINDING: States Failed to Improve Their Preparedness and Implement Data-Driven

Oversight, Leading to Increased Fraud Across All Pandemic-Related
Unemployment Insurance Programs.

The DOL IG identified significant weaknesses in states’ abilities to measure, report, and
reduce improper payments in the traditional UI program. 479 For more than 20 years, DOL IG
consistently reported that the UI program has some of the highest improper payments in the
federal government. 480 In 15 of the past 19 years, improper payments in the regular UI program
exceeded ten percent. 481 States are required to issue weekly benefit payments while ensuring

472
News Release, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, Maryland man admits to $1.3 million COVID-19
relief fraud scheme (Feb. 9, 2023).
473
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 455.
474
Id.
475
GAO, GAO-23-106696, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF FRAUD DURING PANDEMIC
LIKELY BETWEEN $100 BILLION AND $135 BILLION (Sept. 12, 2023).
476
Id.
477
Katelin P. Isaacs & Julie M. Whittaker, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R47079, Unemployment Insurance: Program
Integrity and Fraud Concerns Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic Response (Apr. 24, 2022).
478
Id.
479
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 455.
480
Id.
481
Id.

Page 156 of 520

claimants eligibility, but improper payments persisted. Common causes include claimants failing
to meet job search requirements, continuing to claim benefits after returning to work, or
misreporting earnings. 482 Additionally, employers often fail to provide timely information about
employee separations, which further contributes to improper payments. 483

Fraud significantly contributed to improper payments within pandemic UI programs.

Despite prior recommendations for systematic improvements, the improper payment rate in
pandemic UI programs surged to 21.52 percent in 2022, resulting in an estimated $191 billion in
improperly distributed UI benefits. 484 These outcomes underscore several deficiencies in states’
preparedness and highlight long-standing systematic issues withing state UI systems.

Several states encountered considerable challenges in mitigating unemployment

insurance fraud, demonstrating a lack of coordination and missed opportunities for
accountability. 485 Although the federal government moved quickly to provide emergency funds
for those in need, the system’s vulnerabilities allowed ineligible individuals and fraudsters to
take advantage of the program. 486

The DOL established deadlines for states to report on their UI program performance, but
certain states failed to comply. This non-compliance coupled with inaccurate reporting,
hampered the federal government’s ability to ensure proper oversight and accountability.
Frequently, flagged transactions that had “suspicious email accounts” were not all fraudulent
transactions and not all fraudulent transactions may be flagged. 487 This systematic failure
requires a more thorough investigation with more staff. 488

States such as California, New York, and Pennsylvania demonstrated a lack of urgency in
distributing benefits and repeatedly missed reporting deadlines related to performance of their UI
programs. California’s Employment Development Department [hereinafter “EDD”] struggled
with an overwhelming backlog of claims. The EDD consistently missed critical deadlines and
submitted incomplete reports. 489 In one instance, California submitted its required reports for the
FPUC and PEUC programs just before the deadline but filed them with zeros—falsely indicating
no activity. 490 This reporting was clearly inaccurate given the state’s immense population, and
such failures impeded oversight efforts and exposed taxpayer funds to greater risk of fraud. 491

482
Id.
483
Id.
484
PRAC, supra note 419.
485
Hearing on The Greatest Theft of Taxpayer Dollars: Unchecked Unemployment Fraud: Hearing Before H.
Comm. On Ways & Means, 118th Cong. 1, (Feb. 8, 2023) (Statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the
U.S.).
486
Id.
487
Id.
488
Id.
489
Auditor of the State of California, Report Number: 2020-128/628.1, EDD's Poor Planning and Ineffective
Management Left It Unprepared to Assist Californians Unemployed by COVID-19 Shutdowns (Jan. 26, 2021).
490
Id.
491
PRAC, supra note 419.

Page 157 of 520

 Pennsylvania also faced significant challenges, as it was unprepared for the surge in
fraudulent claims, many of which originated from outside the U.S. 492 The state failed to
implement modern digital identification services to manage the spike in claims during the
pandemic. 493 New York similarly neglected to use databases or systems to cross-reference claims
for potential fraud. As a result, checks were sent to the same address multiple times, issued to
individuals incarcerated, in prison, and sent to the claimants using fraudulently obtained social
security numbers and government identification. 494

492
Id.
493
Id.
494
Id.

Page 158 of 520

III. Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program

The SBA Disaster Assistance Program is the federal government’s primary program for
providing disaster relief to businesses. 495 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, CVPR
deemed COVID-19 a disaster which authorized SBA to provide EIDLs to businesses and
nonprofits affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. 496 EIDLs are low-interest, fixed-rate, long-term
COVID- loans to provide covered businesses with working capital to meet ordinary and
necessary operating expenses. 497

In addition to CVPR, the CARES Act expanded EIDL by providing $10 billion more to
provide emergency loans. 498 The money allocated to SBA for the COVID-19 pandemic was a
significant increase compared to other natural disasters including Hurricanes Sandy, Irma and
Maria. 499 EIDL loans are long-term loans with a 30-year term and a 3.75 percent fixed interest
rate for business and 2.75 percent fixed interest rate for non-profit organizations. 500 Through
third-party lending firms, SBA disbursed over $400 billion in COVID-19 EIDL funds. 501

The SBA IG and other oversight bodies found the COVID-19 EIDL program had
repayment failures and an abundance of fraudulent payments. 502 The SBA IG stated this was
nothing short of surprising based on SBA’s disaster loan program suffering increased
vulnerability to fraud and unnecessary losses when loan transactions are expedited to provide
quick relief. 503

FINDING: The U.S. Small Business Administration Disaster Programs, Including COVID-19
Economic Injury Disaster Loans, Suffered Increased Vulnerability to Fraud and
Unnecessary Losses of at Least $200 Million.

At least 17 percent of all COVID-19 EIDL and PPP funds were disbursed to potentially
fraudulent actors. This amounted to approximately $200 million in fraudulent payments out of
the $1.2 trillion SBA disbursed through EIDL and PPP programs. Like other COVID-19 relief
programs, fraudsters falsified documents, used personally identifiable information, inflated
business revenues, submitted multiple applications, and misused loan funds. 504 Oftentimes,
individuals who defrauded the EIDL program also defrauded PPP using the same methods for
each of the programs.

495
Press Release, U.S. Small Businesses Admin., SBA Tops $200 Million in Disaster Assistance Loans for
Hurricane Beryl (Aug. 28, 2024).
496
Id.
497
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN., REPORT 23-09, WHITE PAPER: COVID-19
PANDEMIC EIDL AND PPP LOAN FRAUD LANDSCAPE (June 27, 2023).
498
CARES ACT, supra note 396
499
Id.
500
Bruce R. Lindsay, et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., R47509, SBA COVID-19 EIDL Financial Relief: Policy
Options and Considerations (Apr. 18, 2023).
501
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 479.
502
Id.
503
Id.
504
Id.

Page 159 of 520

Fraudsters Used False Employee Identification Numbers to Apply for EIDL Loans That
Were Not Vetted by the SBA

Sole proprietors and independent contractors applying for the EIDL program were not
required to provide EINs. At that time, SBA limited applicants to receive $1,000 per employee,
with a legislated cap on EIDL advance amount of $10,000 per employee. 505 These EIDL
advances were structured as grants, which did not require repayment. 506 Applicants self-certified
the number of employees they had, and SBA did not verify this information. 507

This lack of verification created an opportunity for fraudulent activity. Some individuals
fraudulently applied for and obtained grants exceeding $1,000 by falsely claiming to have
multiple employees despite not possessing an EIN. 508 The SBA IG conducted analysis of all
COVID-19 EIDL advances to identify applications from sole proprietors or independent
contractors who claimed more than one employee with the required EIN. 509

One example of EIDL fraud was two brothers who used fictitious aliases, stolen
identities, defunct corporate entities, and new business entities with no actual business
operations. 510 They claimed to be sole proprietors or independent contractors who claimed more
than one employee while not possessing the required EIN and tried to obtain more than $1
million dollars in COVID-19 relief loans including EIDL. 511

EIDL Advances Aided Millions of Illegitimate Entrepreneurs During the Early Stages of
the Pandemic

In another SBA IG investigation, SBA provided the IG with a list of EIDL advances and
grants suspected or confirmed to be linked to fraudulent activity. 512 Two individuals were
convicted for orchestrating an elaborate telemarketing scheme in which they submitted more
than 400 fraudulent COVID-19 EIDL applications, securing more than $1.5 million in EIDL
advances for ineligible applicants. 513 In exchange for a fee, the defendants obtained PII from
victims to submit fraudulent COVID-19 EIDL applications to SBA. 514 This case was initiated
based on information provided by a financial institution in response to a joint fraud alert issued
by the SBA IG and USSS. 515

The scope of fraud related to EIDL loans resulted in significant financial losses. In March
2021, GAO conducted an analysis of DOJ fraud cases. The analysis highlighted a substantial

505
Id.
506
Id.
507
Id.
508
Id.
509
Id.
510
Id.
511
Id.
512
Id.
513
Id.
514
Id.
515
Id.

Page 160 of 520

increase in EIDL-related fraud, particularly wire fraud, which was the most prevalent type of
fraud in 2021 and continued to rise through 2021. 516

FINDING: U.S. Small Business Administration Did Not Implement Proper Oversight
Controls to Prevent Fraudulent Economic Injury Disaster Loans.

The GAO, SBA IG, and SBA’s financial auditors identified significant weaknesses in
SBA’s internal controls, which allowed potentially ineligible or fraudulent entities to receive
EIDL relief payments. 517 Despite these findings, SBA has not fully implemented many of the
recommendations provided by GAO and OIG. 518 For instance, in January 2021, GAO advised
SBA implement data analytics to detect fraudulent applications. However, SBA did not
immediately act to refine its fraud detection measures nor adopted the recommended data
analytics program. 519

In March 2021, GAO further reported that SBA lacked a comprehensive plan to assess
and mitigate fraud risks within the EIDL program. 520 While SBA agreed to address these
concerns, it did not immediately take the necessary steps to fully implement the GAO’s
recommended fraud risk assessment and oversight strategy. 521

In an October 2020 report, SBA IG highlighted deficiencies such as inadequate responses

to fraud alerts and the issuance of duplicate loans. 522 The IG issued ten recommendations,
including the review of suspicious loans and the strengthening of verification controls. 523 While

516
Id.
517
GAO COVID RELIEF FRAUD SCHEMES, supra note 409.
518
Id.
519
Id.
520
Id.
521
Id.
522
Id.
523
Id.

Page 161 of 520

SBA partially agreed with these recommendations and took some corrective actions, many of the
concerns raised by both OIG and GAO were not immediately resolved. 524

In December 2020, SBA’s independent financial auditor identified two material

weaknesses in SBA’s internal controls: (1) approval of EIDL loans and advances and (2)
oversight of the contractor managing the EIDL application system. 525 These weaknesses were
linked to issues like duplicate payments and loans provided to ineligible borrowers. The audit
revealed that SBA failed to implement proper controls to monitor the contractor’s processes,
such as checks for duplicate applications, bank account verification, and identity validation. 526

The auditors largely attributed these deficiencies to SBA’s prioritization of the rapid
implementation of CARES Act provisions over the establishment of effective internal
controls. 527 Seven recommendations were made to address these shortcomings, including a
review of the EIDL portfolio for ineligible transactions, improving loan approval controls, staff
training, and enhanced contractor oversight. 528

Additionally, the audit identified a material weakness in SBA’s entity-level controls,

indicating that SBA management did not design or implement adequate controls to support the
expanded programs under the CARES Act. 529 The audit issued five recommendations to improve
these controls, including holding individuals accountable for internal control oversight and
ensuring proper documentation of processes. 530

While SBA disagreed with some of the material weaknesses and did not take a clear
stance on the recommendations, by May 2021, SBA began working with a contractor to address
oversight issues and assess the adequacy of controls in processing EIDL loans and advances, but
millions of dollars were already lost to ineligible claimants. 531

524
Id.
525
Id.
526
Id.
527
Id.
528
Id.
529
Id.
530
Id.
531
Id.

Page 162 of 520

IV. Transnational Fraud

The unprecedented amount of emergency relief distributed throughout the COVID-19

pandemic created a target for transnational criminal organizations. Despite prior congressional
initiatives aimed at addressing waste, fraud, and abuse, federal agencies have not sufficiently
implemented fraud prevention measures to deter, detect, and defeat international organized crime
syndicates. 532

Transitional criminal networks engaged in large-scale operations that submitted

fraudulent claims, laundered illicit funds through financial systems, and transferred proceeds
across borders. 533 It is estimated that at least half of the federal funds lost through the PPP and UI
relief programs were stolen by international fraudsters. 534 This exploitation of pandemic relief
programs has not only undermined domestic recovery efforts but has also fortified organized
crime syndicates, underscoring the urgent need for enhanced global cooperation and enforcement
to safeguard public funds.

Oversight of Transnational Crime

Many federal government agencies played a central role in the oversight of relief fund
fraud committed by transnational organizations. The DOJ, FBI, DHS, SBA, IRS, and USSS all
had separate investigations into foreign criminal activity related to relief funds. 535

Methods of Exploitation

International criminal organizations mirrored the tactics of domestic fraudsters, utilizing

similar methods to obtain sensitive information from vulnerable Americans. 536 Many fraudulent
relief claims were filed using illegally acquired personal data—including PII, much of which
stemmed from pre-existing data breaches. 537 Cybercriminals also employed phishing attacks to
further exploit individuals’ information, targeting the most vulnerable populations. 538

Among the various COVID-19 relief programs, UI fraud emerged as one of the most
prevalent areas of exploitation. 539 The rapid need for an expedited distribution of funds led to the
removal of several verification requirements, creating a prime target for transnational criminals.
These fraudsters successfully impersonated jobless Americans by leveraging stolen identity
information available for purchase in the dark web. 540 This comprised data often included critical
personal details such as birthdates, SSNs, and addresses.

532
Id.
533
Id.
534
Id.
535
Ken Dilanian & Laura Stickler, 'Biggest fraud in a generation': The looting of the Covid relief plan known as
PPP, NBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2022).
536
COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, COVID-19 FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK
FORCE 2024 REPORT (Apr. 2024).
537
Id.
538
Id.
539
Id.
540
Id.

Page 163 of 520

FINDING: Lackluster Oversight Resulted in Transnational Criminal Organizations and
Fraudsters Stealing U.S. Taxpayer Money from Pandemic Relief Funds.

International criminal organizations and foreign government-affiliated actors exploited

the urgency of relief programs and orchestrated sophisticated fraud schemes that span multiple
countries. 541

Some notable cases are:

1. Chinese government-linked hackers stole at least $20 million in U.S. Government

COVID-19 relief funds. 542

An USSS investigation revealed that hackers affiliated with the Chinese government,
specifically identified as APT41, were implicated in theft of $20 million of U.S. Government
COVID-19 relief funds. 543 APT 41 has been linked to fraudulent activity in the past, specifically
traditional unemployment insurance fraud against SBA across dozens of states. 544 APT41 also
has a history of espionage activities on behalf of the Chinese government, including attacks on
pro-democracy politicians in Hong Kong and data breaches affecting more than 100
organizations. 545 Investigations of foreign pandemic-related fraud also seem to point back to
foreign state-affiliated hackers, such as this one.

2. A Nigerian fraud ring stole $10 million in pandemic relief funds. 546

Mr. Abemdemi Rufai, a Nigerian government official, organized a large-scale cyberfraud

scheme—named Scattered Canary—targeting COVID-19 relief funds. Scattered Canary, a
business email compromise operation, filed at least 174 fraudulent unemployment claims in
Washington state and 17 in Massachusetts that were all accepted, all with an expected payout of
$5.4 million. 547

3. An Indian national stole $8 million in a COVID-19 relief fraud scheme. 548

A federal grand jury in Newark, New Jersey indicted an Indian national for submitting
fraudulent PPP loan applications totaling more than $8.2 million. 549 The defendant submitted at
least 17 applications on behalf non-existent companies, using false information about employees

541
Id.
542
Sarah Fitzpatrick & Kit Ramgopal, Hackers linked to Chinese government stole millions in Covid benefits, Secret
Service says, NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2022).
543
Id.
544
Id.
545
Id.
546
Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office Dist. of Mass., Nigerian Man Arrested in Alleged $10 Million Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance Fraud Scheme (Aug. 19, 2024).
547
Id.
548
Press Release, DOJ, Indian National Charged in $8 Million COVID-19 Relief Fraud Scheme (Nov. 9, 2022).
549
Id.

Page 164 of 520

and payroll. 550 He also fabricated tax filings on behalf of a non-existent business to receive more
relief payments. He reportedly received $3.3 million in loan proceeds which he then laundered.
The defendant faces multiple charges including wire fraud, money laundering, and aggravated
identity theft. 551

FINDING: Domestic and International Fraudsters that Stole from Pandemic Relief Programs
were also Connected to Other Organized Crimes.

Fraudsters involved with stealing millions of dollars were also involved in other federal
crimes including wire fraud and drug smuggling. In a DOL IG investigation, a defendant was
sentenced to 92 months of federal incarceration for his role in a scheme involving the possession
of 15 or more access devices and a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 552 DOL IG has
continued to connect abuse of UI relief funds to organized criminal groups. The National UI
Fraud Task Force was created to combat fraud of UI perpetrated by domestic and international
criminal organizations. 553 Many of these include street-level criminal organizations with ties to
illegal guns and drugs. 554

The U.S. Attorney’s Office charged six individuals, including two Maryland State
Department of Labor subcontractors with participating in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain
$3.5 million in UI benefits. 555 The lead defendant now faces separate narcotics and firearms
charges, including allegations that he unlawfully possessed a machine gun in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime. 556 Another convicted felon charged with CARES Act fraud also
committed firearm offenses and possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl. 557

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland targeted cases with connections
between COVID-19 fraud and individuals involved with violent crime, organized criminal
networks, business email compromise schemes, and narcotics distribution. 558 Using probable
cause from the commission of COVD-19 fraud, agents conducted searches and seized illegal
firearms, narcotics, and stolen PII. Many cases of COVID-19 fraud have led agents to defendants
with ghost guns, machines guns, and illicit drugs.

550
Id.
551
Id.
552
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Go Viral: Inspectors General on Curing the Disease: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Gov’t Operations and the Fed. Workforce H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability, 118th Cong, 1. (Mar. 9, 2023)
(Testimony of Larry D. Turner, Inspector General, Office of Inspector General U.S. Dep’t of Labor).
553
Id.
554
Id.
555
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office District of Maryland, Six Individuals, Including Two Maryland State
Department of Labor Subcontractors, Facing Federal Indictment for a Scheme to Fraudulently Obtain COVID-19
CARES Act Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Dec. 15, 2023).
556
Id.
557
Id.
558
Id.

Page 165 of 520

V. Flaws in Pandemic Program Oversight

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted critical weaknesses in oversight measures to

prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in federally funded emergency relief programs. While these
relief programs were aimed at providing critical assistance, the urgency of combating a public
health crisis exposes significant weaknesses in oversight. The PRAC was included in the CARES
Act to support and coordinate independent oversight of pandemic relief spending. 559 The PRAC
facilitated coordination across IGs to ensure wrongdoers are held accountable for misusing
taxpayer dollars. 560 Since April 2020, PRAC has worked with state and federal oversight
agencies to oversee more than $5 trillion in federal pandemic relief emergency spending. 561

Federal agencies, such as the SBA, USSS, Treasury, DOL, GAO, and HHS, are some of
the 20 agencies that led pandemic relief oversight efforts to bring money back to the taxpayer. 562
These agencies with their respective IGs were responsible for detecting and preventing fraud,
waste, and abuse in pandemic relief efforts, though many of them faced challenged in carrying
out this oversight effectively. 563

During the 118th Congress, the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability held
hearings to expose the massive fraud in pandemic relief programs and how federal agencies were
simply unprepared for the influx of domestic and international fraud. 564 Federal agencies failed
to utilize tools to prevent fraud from occurring in the first place, resulting in billions of dollars
lost due to improper payments. Simple measures and up-to-date technology could have
prevented millions of dollars being lost within days of rollout. According to testimony, the
Treasury do-not-pay list was not included within the internal control environment, allowing
billions of dollars in likely improper payments. 565

Federal and state agencies had significant lapses in coordination, insufficient resources
for oversight, weak data sharing and reporting mechanisms, and delays in enforcement and
accountability for pandemic relief programs. 566 Federal and state agencies must be held
accountable for the billions of dollars lost due to their flaws in oversight.

FINDING: Federal Agencies Overseeing Pandemic Relief Funds were Needlessly “Siloed
Off” from Each Other, Which Prevented Wholistic Tracking and Disbursing of
Funds to Prevent Fraud.

559
Fact Sheet – Two-Year Mark of the CARES Act and the Creation of the Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee, PANDEMIC OVERSIGHT, available at https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/media/file/prac-two-year-fact-
sheet.
560
Id.
561
Id.
562
Federal Pandemic Spending: A Prescription for Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Oversight
and Accountability, 118th Cong. 1, (Feb. 1, 2023).
563
Id.
564
Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability, Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations and the Federal
Workforce, Hearing Wrap Up: Existing Flaws, Structural Weaknesses, and Unprecedented Levels of Spending Led
to Rampant Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs (Mar. 10, 2023).
565
Id.
566
Id.

Page 166 of 520

 Many domestic and foreign fraudsters used the SSNs of deceased individuals and federal
prisoners to get unemployment checks. 567 These fraudsters were able to collect these checks in
multiple states because federal loan applications were not cross-checked against a Treasury
database that would have raised red flags about sketchy borrowers. 568

Pursuant to the Payment Integrity Information Act, federal agencies are required to
develop and implement internal controls that prevent and detect fraud and other improper
payments. 569 One requirement is agencies must verify the identities and eligibility of individuals
and organizations seeking pandemic funding prior to issuing payments, specifically by accessing
the DNP list. 570 Although, at the beginning of the pandemic, agencies did not have access to the
full DNP list because SSA was not legally able to share the full DNP list.

The DNP Was Not 100 Percent Accurate and Lacked Sufficient Information to Cross-
Check

The DNP list includes individuals who are deceased and excluded from doing business
with the government. 571 According to Treasury’s website, the DNP list exists to prevent improper
payments from federal programs but does not have access the SSA’s full DMF. 572 Instead, it
currently receives a limited version of the DMF, provided by the National Technical Information
Service, along with state provided death related data. 573 The full DMF contains death
information SSA collects, including state-owned data, which is cross-referenced with SSA’s
records on individuals with SSNs. 574

This lack of access prevented PRAC from conducting a full investigation into fraudulent
loan applications, leaving 5,097 fraudulent loan applications unable to be accounted for because
of the lack of information sharing between the SSA and Treasury. 575 The SBA IG office
identified the DNP system as a critical control that could have been implemented at the onset of
these relief programs to prevent billions of dollars from being improperly disbursed.

The Social Security Act currently does not allow full death data sharing between the SSA
and Treasury. 576 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 allowed the SSA to share, to the
extent feasible, its full death data with DNP list only for a 3-year period. 577 When combating
domestic and transnational fraud, this does not allow enough time for agencies to conduct full
oversight and recover improperly paid funds.

567
Id.
568
Id.
569
Id.
570
Id.
571
Id.
572
Id.
573
Id.
574
Id.
575
PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE, PRAC-2023-02, FRAUD ALERT FOLLOW-UP:
IMPROVED SHARING OF DEATH RECORDS AND USE OF THE DO NOT PAY SYSTEM WOULD STRENGTHEN PROGRAM
INTEGRITY AND BETTER PROTECT THE PUBLIC (May 11, 2023).
576
Federal Pandemic Spending, supra note 562.
577
Id.

Page 167 of 520

FINDING: Federal Agencies Did Not Require and Failed to Validate Information Provided by
Applicants to Properly Verify Eligibility.

The Payment Integrity Information Act mandated agencies use effective pre-payment
controls like the DNP list to prevent improper payments. 578 However, during the pandemic,
many agencies allowed applicants to self-certify their eligibility for programs, which led to
significant fraud and improper payments. 579

For instance, under the Emergency Rental Assistance program, Treasury awarded funds
without verifying applicants’ rental agreements or financial need. Similarity SBA allowed self-
certification for both PPP and EIDL loans. This lack of verification contributed to an estimated
$200 billion in fraud between both programs. 580 The SBA failed to implement front-end controls
when verifying applicants. SBA OIG identified that the Treasury Offset Program Debt Database,
which contains information regarding individuals who are delinquent on child support
obligations, was not implemented to cross-check any claimants applying for PPP or EIDL
loans. 581 The SBA also did not manually check the DNP list prior to approving a loan or grant.
The SBA IG identified more than $120 million in loans and $24 million in grants to borrowers
listed on the DNP list.

The Department of Labor Allowed for Self-Certification of the Unemployment Insurance

PUA programs, Straining the States

The expanded coverage in the CARES Act for the PUA program posed significant
challenges to states as they implemented processes to determine initial and continued program

578
Id.
579
Id.
580
Garrett Hatch & Natalie R. Ortiz, Cong. Research Servs., R47902, Improper Payments in Pandemic Assistance
Programs (Jan. 19, 2024).
581
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT 24-18, EVALUATION OF COVID-19
ECONOMIC INJURY DISASTER LOAN APPLICANTS ON THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY’S DO NOT PAY LIST
(June 4, 2024).

Page 168 of 520

eligibility for participants. 582 During the PUA’s first nine months of extended eligibility,
claimants were able to self-certify their prior employment or self-employment without any
documentation to receive funds. 583 Department of Labor Inspector General Larry D. Turner,
testified that states were not prepared for the volume of UI claims and struggled to implement the
new programs. 584 Specifically, the PUA program had control weaknesses that may have
facilitated more improper payments. 585

The ETA, tasked with providing guidance to states regarding improper payments, notified
multiple states regarding control issues with the PUA form. One state did not include the
required questions confirming that claimants are able and available to work while another state
did not have a procedure in place for re-determining the claimant’s weekly benefits if the
claimants did not provide proof of earnings or insufficient proof. 586 These states responded to the
issue raised by the ETA, but more than $25 billion in PUA benefits were already paid out to
claimants that provided insufficient information on their application. 587

FINDING: Federal and State Agencies Lacked Up-to-Date Financial Management Systems,
Failing to Meet Federally Mandated Modernization Requirements, Leading to
Billions of Dollars of American Taxpayer Money Improperly Paid or Stolen.

The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency CIGIE identified major
problems in agencies IT security including that it lacked the ability to prevent cyberthreats and
phishing attempts. 588 Integrated, functional, and secure data systems are essential for effective
fraud and risk management. 589 Agencies’ IT systems were unable to facilitate fraud detection and
recovery. 590

According to the Fraud Risk Framework, a leading practice in fraud data analytics is to
conduct data mining and matching, including cross-checking of data using external data sources
to validate information. 591 This includes the DNP list, which had its own flaws and lacked
sufficient information to conduct oversight.

Most federal agencies at the time of the pandemic still had legacy IT systems in place to
catch and control improper payments. 592 In May 2021, DOL IG identified various legacy IT
systems still in place which was one of the main causes of the DOL’s inability to detect waste,
582
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 455.
583
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 455.
584
Id.
585
Id.
586
Id.
587
Id.
588
PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE, TOP CHALLENGES FACING FEDERAL AGENCIES:
COVID-19 EMERGENCY RELIEF AND RESPONSE EFFORTS AS REPORTED BY OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACROSS
GOVERNMENT (June 2020).
589
Examining Federal COVID-era Spending and Preventing Future Fraud: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Emerging
Threats and Spending Oversight, Senate Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs Comm., 118th Cong. 1, (Nov. 1, 2023)
(Testimony of Rebecca Shea, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service).
590
Id.
591
Id.
592
Id.

Page 169 of 520

fraud, and abuse int UI programs, including PUA. 593 These legacy systems did not have the
ability to perform cross-matches for such a large volume of claims, posing a risk to claimants as
their PII could become more easily accessible to criminals targeting UI.

Legacy IT systems also made it difficult for many states to prevent cybersecurity attacks
or the use of fraudulently obtained information. DOL IG officials stated that some state IT
systems were not equipped to handle the volume of claims, and some may not have been
compatible with the National Association of State Workforce Agencies UI Integrity Center’s
Integrity Data Hub resources. 594 Even though a participation agreement between states was
established, there was no way to verify that that participants were using the resources.

Stolen PII also played a role in large-scale identity fraud during the pandemic, providing
a source for fraudsters. A Nigerian fraud ring took advantage of this lapse to commit large-scale
fraud in Washington, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and
Florida. 595 These states were subject to vulnerabilities based off their outdated IT systems
allowing for transnational crimes against traditional and pandemic-related UI programs. 596

593
Id.
594
Id.
595
Id.
596
Id.

Page 170 of 520

The Implementation or Effectiveness of Any Federal Law or Regulation
Applied, Enacted, or Under Consideration to Address the Coronavirus
Pandemic and Prepare for Future Pandemics

I. Overreliance on the World Health Organization

The WHO is the most recognized global public health institution. As a specialized agency
within the UN, the WHO’s mandate is to “act as the directing and coordinating authority on
international health work” within the UN system. 597 The overarching mission of the WHO is
“attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health,” 598 and is achieved via (1)
providing technical assistance to member states, (2) setting international health standards and
providing guidance, and (3) coordinating and supporting international responses to health
emergencies. 599

Yet, while the WHO is supposed to support the entire world, during the COVID-19
pandemic, it appeared to protect its relationship with the CCP. The WHO was misinformed,
denied access to China, and was used as cover for CCP’s reckless actions. At a time when the
globe was turning to the WHO for leadership and advice, the WHO’s actions showed that it did
not support all its members equally. What was seen was an organization that, rather than serving
all of humankind, became beholden to and entrapped in politics.

The Director-General of the WHO can make a formal declaration of a “public health
emergency of international concern,” [hereinafter “PHEIC”] which can immediately implement
action to attempt to stop or slow the spread of the PHEIC. 600 A PHEIC is defined as “an
extraordinary event which is determined to constitute a public health risk to other States through
the international spread of disease and to potentially require a coordinated international
response.” 601 These are situations that are serious, sudden, unusual or unexpected; carry
implications for public health beyond the affected State’s border; and may require immediate
international action. 602

When a PHEIC is declared, the WHO issues guidance as to how Member-States should
respond to the emergency, which can include restrictions on travel and trade. 603 Declaring a

597
Constitution of the World Health Organization (Nov. 1, 1946) (The WHO has 194 Member-States, all Members
of the UN, except for Liechtenstein).
598
United Nations Academic Impact, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at https://www.un.org/en/academic-
impact/who#:~:text=The%20objective%20of%20WHO%20is,absence%20of%20disease%20or%20infirmity.
599
Lawrence O. Gostin, COVID-19 Reveals Urgent Need to Strengthen the World Health Organization, JAMA
HEALTH FORUM (Apr. 30, 2020).
600
Emergencies: International health regulations and emergency committees, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210815072835/https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/emergencies-international-
health-regulations-and-emergency-committees.
601
Id.
602
Id. (The WHO has declared six PHIECs: 2009 swine flu (H1N1) epidemic; 2014 in reaction to reversal of
progress in polio; 2014 Ebola outbreak; 2016 Zika virus; 2019 Ebola; and 2020 COVID-19.)
603
CRF.org Editors, What Does the World Health Organization Do?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (last updated
June 2, 2022).

Page 171 of 520

PHEIC is intended to speed up the rate of international action and even encourages research on
the disease in question. 604 It is a formal declaration of a “red alert” to the world. 605

The WHO has two primary sources of revenue, assessed contributions (set amounts
expected to be paid by Member-State governments) and voluntary contributions (other funds
provided by Member-States and private organizations). 606 Most assessed contributions are
considered core funding, which are flexible funds used to cover general expenses and program
activities. 607 Voluntary contributions are specialized funds which can be earmarked by donors for
certain activities. 608

The U.S. is historically the single largest contributor to the WHO. 609 The assessed
contributions of the U.S. remained fairly stable between fiscal year (FY) 2014-2023, fluctuating
between $110 million and $123 million. 610 U.S. voluntary contributions for specific projects or
activities varied to reflect changing policies and/or support during international crisis. Voluntary
contributions ranged from a low of $102 million in FY 2014 to a high of $402 million in FY
2017. 611

604
Mara Pilinger, WHO declared a public health emergency about Zika’s effects. Here are three takeaways., THE
WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2016).
605
Id.
606
Financing of 2022-2023 Biennium, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at http://open.who.int/2022-23/budget-and-
financing/summary.
607
Id.
608
Id.
609
Id.
610
The U.S. Government and the World Health Organization, KFF (Jun. 13, 2024) (With the exception of 2020
when the Trump administration suspended financial support, and in 2021 when the Biden administration
reestablished relations.).
611
Id.

Page 172 of 520

 Apart from the assessed contributions from Member-States, the WHO is funded through
private organizations through voluntary contributions. 612 These voluntary contributions are
specialized funds that can be earmarked by the individual donors for specific activities. In the
current 2022-2023 budget, the total assessed contributions were 12.1 percent of the total
revenue 613 (or approximately $956.9 million) and the total voluntary contributions were 87.5
percent (or approximately $6.92 billion). 614 For the 2020-2021 budget, the top five specified
voluntary contributions were: Germany – $952 million; Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation - $592
million; U.S. – $447 million; GAVI Alliance – $413 million; and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland – $367 million. 615

The WHO exists for the protection of all. Yet in the time of the greatest global crisis, it
did not deliver on its promises.

FINDING: The World Health Organization Failed to Uphold Its Mission and Caved to
Chinese Communist Party Pressure.

The WHO claims to “work worldwide to promote health, keep the world safe, and serve
the vulnerable.” 616 More specifically, regarding health emergencies, the WHO claims to:

• “Prepare for emergencies by identifying, mitigating and managing risks.

• Prevent emergencies and support development of tools necessary during outbreaks.

• Detect and respond to acute health emergencies.

• Support delivery of essential health services in fragile settings.” 617

The WHO’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was an abject failure. The Organization failed
to satisfy all of the above stated goals.

Throughout the pandemic, the WHO shied away from placing any blame on the CCP. Dr.
Tedros even went so far as to praise the CCP’s “transparency” during the crisis, when, in fact, the
regime consistently lied to the world by underreporting China’s actual infection and death
statistics. 618 During the pandemic, the WHO repeatedly relied on false information from the
CCP.

The WHO Ignored Taiwan Despite It Warning of COVID-19 in December 2019

612
Id.
613
Id. (updated Jun. 13, 2024).
614
Id.
615
Voluntary contributors – Specified, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at https://open.who.int/2020-
21/contributors/overview/vcs.
616
What we do, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2024).
617
Id.
618
THE EDITORIAL BOARD, World Health Coronavirus Disinformation, THE WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2020); Nick
Wadhams & Jennifer Jacobs, China Concealed Extent of Virus Outbreak, U.S. Intelligence Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
1, 2020).

Page 173 of 520

 The WHO disregarded warnings from Taiwan of a burgeoning virus because of pressure
from China. From 2009 to 2016, Taiwan was an observer in the WHO under the name “Chinese
Taipei.” 619 Yet, the CCP has consistently blocked any form of engagement, ensuring the WHO
does not formally recognize Taiwan as a Member-State. This lack of recognition led to these
warnings from Taiwan being substantially ignored.

Taiwan notified the WHO as early as December 31, 2019, asking for more information
about atypical pneumonia cases reported in Wuhan. 620 The WHO never followed up with
information.

619
Jonahtan Herington & Kelley Lee, The limits of global health diplomacy: Taiwan’s observer status at the world
health assembly, GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH (Oct. 1, 2014).
620
E-mail from IHR Secretariat, to Dr. Liu (Dec. 31, 2019, 02:21).

Page 174 of 520

 Then Taiwanese Vice President Chen Chien-Jen, a renowned scientist with a doctorate in
epidemiology from Johns Hopkins University who oversaw the SARS outbreak in Taiwan in
2003, stated in an interview that had Taiwan been a member of the WHO, it would have been
even better prepared for countermeasures against COVID-19. 621

The initial mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic not only potentially caused the
further spread of the virus, but it created a situation where people lost trust in the global public
health organization. The IHR requires mutual communication, yet when it was time to test the
strength of this trust, the WHO did not care to use their own policy, rather playing politics and
ensuring their relationship with the CCP remained intact.

The WHO Denied Human-to-Human Spread of COVID-19 Based Solely on CCP

Propaganda

On January 14, 2020, the WHO tweeted that “[p]reliminary investigations conducted by
Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the novel
coronavirus.” 622

These “preliminary investigations” in actuality included the CCP jailing any doctor that
disseminated any information about COVID-19 that was not first cleared through state-run
media. 623 U.S. intelligence sources have since discovered that the CCP covered-up and lied about
the extent of the outbreak. 624 On January 23, 2020, the WHO finally recognized that human-to-
human spread was occurring, a month later than the first warnings. 625

The WHO Prolonged Naming COVID-19 a PHEIC and Pandemic Because the CCP
Insisted the Spread was Under Control

621
Javier C. Hernandez & Chris Horton, Taiwan’s Weapon Against Coronavirus: An Epidemiologist as Vice
President, THE N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2020).
622
World Health Organization (@WHO), Twitter (Jan. 14, 2020) available at
https://twitter.com/WHO/status/1217043229427761152?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed&ref_ur
l=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.foxnews.com%2Fworld%2Fworld-health-organization-january-tweet-china-human-
transmission-coronavirus.
623
Jim Geraghty, Whom Does WHO Trust?, NATIONAL REVIEW (Mar. 20, 2020).
624
Wadhams supra note 618.
625
Francois Godement, Fighting the Coronavirus Pandemic: China’s Influence at the World Health Organization,
INSTITUT MONTAIGNE (Mar. 23, 2020).

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 By the time the WHO declared COVID-19 a PHEIC on January 30, 2020, the disease had
infected almost 10,000 and killed almost 1,000 people in 19 different countries. 626 It was
reported that the delay in PHEIC declaration was a result of intense pressure from the CCP. 627
According to both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the German
Bundesnachrichtendienst [hereinafter “BND’], on January 21, 2020 the CCP threatened to cease
participation in all international COVID-19 efforts if the WHO declared a PHEIC. 628 While
making the PHEIC declaration, Dr. Tedros stated, “China is to be congratulated for the
extraordinary measures it has taken to contain the outbreak.” 629 The BND concluded that the
WHO’s delay in declaring the PHEIC wasted approximately four to six weeks of the potential
global response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 630

The WHO Delayed and Denigrated Serious Countermeasures, Like Travel Restrictions,
Because of CCP Pressure

Despite declaring COVID-19 a PHEIC and extensive evidence of transmission through

travel, the WHO insisted other countries not restrict travel or trade to or from China. 631 On
January 31, 2020, President Trump came under intense criticism when he barred travel from
China; an order called “xenophobi[c]” by then Presidential candidate Biden. 632 As Dr. Fauci
testified on July 31, 2020, in comparison to the WHO’s inaction, President Trump’s decision to
restrict travel from China saved lives.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (July 31, 2020)

Q. Dr. Fauci, let me ask you about some of the decisions that you
worked with President Trump on and the whole team did. I know
when you go back to the beginning of this, the China ban was very
heavily discussed. Were you involved in working with President
Trump on deciding to ban flights from China?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

Q. Do you agree with that decision?

A. I do.

Q. Do you think that decision saved lives, Dr. Fauci?

626
Deaths surpass 200, and State Department Urges Against Travel to China, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2020).
627
Sarah Boseley, China’s handling of coronavirus is a diplomatic challenge for WHO, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18,
2020).
628
Naveed Jmali & Tom O’Connor, Exclusive: As China Hoarded Medical Supplies, the CIA Believes it Tried to
Stop the WHO from Sounding the Alarm on the Pandemic, NEWSWEEK (May 12, 2020).
629
Sarah Boseley, WHO declares coronavirus a global health emergency, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2020).
630
Matthew Strong, China asked WHO to cover up coronavirus outbreak: German intelligence service, TAIWAN
NEWS (May 05, 2020).
631
Yasufumi Saito, Andrew James, & Rosa de Acosta, High-Speed Trains, International Flights: How the
Coronavirus Spread, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 5, 2020); Boseley, supra note 72.
632
Dan McLaughlin, Trump Could Have Restricted Travel Further, NATIONAL REVIEW (Apr. 7, 2020).

Page 176 of 520

 A. Yes, I do. 633

Dr Fauci, however, could have quelled the unwarranted criticism that the travel
restrictions were xenophobic if he had forcefully and publicly supported President Trump’s
decision.

Between December 31—when cases were first reported—and January 31, more than
430,000 people were on direct flights from China to the U.S. 634 If the CCP had been more
transparent and the WHO acted with integrity, fewer COVID-19 cases would have entered the
U.S.

The WHO Continued to Praise CCP Failed Efforts to Combat the Pandemic, Despite a
Globally Recognized the Cover-Up

The WHO routinely praised the CCP’s efforts to combat the spread of COVID-19 despite
multiple reports that the CCP engaged in a massive disinformation campaign. 635 According to a
U.S. intelligence community report, the CCP severely underreported both its total number of
cases and deaths caused by COVID-19. 636 The CCP continually altered their reporting
methodology which, at different points, left out individuals who tested positive but were
asymptomatic—despite their ability to remain contagious. 637 The CCP also gagged doctors and
journalists that attempted to speak the truth about the severity of COVID-19. 638 Dr. Tedros said
the CCP should be “praised” for these manipulative tactics; tactics frowned upon worldwide. 639

The WHO Failed to Condemn the CCP’s Aggressive Tactics Against Whistleblowers,
Journalists, and Americans

The CCP is a known human rights offender, including by silencing or “disappearing”

dissenters, journalists, and researchers that go against the CCP’s narrative.

Dr. Ai Fen was the first Chinese doctor to receive a laboratory test of a possible SARS-
CoV type virus in Wuhan. Dr. Ai then sent the laboratory test results to a group of eight other
Chinese scientists, including Dr. Li Wenliang. These scientists expressed grave concern over the
test results and began warning others of the novel virus—later to be named COVID-19. As a
result, they were all harassed by CCP officials for “spreading rumors” regarding the novel
COVID-19 outbreak. 640

633
The Urgent Need for a National Plan to Contain the Coronavirus: Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the
Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong (July 31, 2020).
634
Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020).
635
WHO chief praises China’s virus fight, urges more from world, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 15, 2020).
636
Wadhams supra note 618.
637
Id.
638
Whom Does WHO Trust?, supra note 623.
639
Boseley supra note 627.
640
Li Wenliang: Coronavirus kills Chinese Whistleblower doctor, BBC (Feb. 7, 2020).

Page 177 of 520

 On January 1, 2020, Dr. Ai ordered her staff to wear masks to combat the spread and was
immediately called in front of her hospital’s disciplinary board. 641 She was then accused of
“spreading rumors” and “damag[ing] the stability of Wuhan.” 642 The disciplinary board went
further and banned Dr. Ai and her staff from publicly discussing the virus. 643 Unfortunately,
because of the CCP’s efforts to silence Dr. Ai, multiple members of her medical team became
sick and later died.

On January 3, 2020—four days after Dr. Li warned of a novel virus—he was forced to
sign a letter accusing him of “making false statements” that “severely disturbed the social order”
by the Wuhan Public Security Bureau. 644 This punishment and the harassment of the seven other
doctors was publicly broadcast on CCP state media to deter any other whistle-blowers from
coming forward. 645 Dr. Li was allowed to return to work but consequently contracted COVID-19
five days later, on February 7, died of complications from COVID-19. 646

On January 3, 2020, the CCP arrested eight people for “publishing or forwarding false
information without verification.” 647 The CCP then “issued a warning that anyone caught using
social media to share coronavirus information obtained from anywhere, but state-run media or
organizations would face between three and seven years in jail.” 648

Additionally, the CCP took the unprecedented step of expelling U.S. journalists reporting
on the beginnings of the COVID-19 pandemic from China. 649 The CCP expelled at least 13
journalists, including correspondents from The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and
Washington Post. 650

Further, according to the FBI and the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, the CCP instituted a cyber espionage campaign in an attempt to steal sensitive U.S.
research related to COVID-19 vaccines and treatments. 651 These attacks were a direct assault on
U.S. public health.

And finally, according to the CCP aligned Global Times, the CCP was considering
“punitive measures” against multiple state and federal U.S. lawmakers. 652 In an unprecedented

641
Jeremy Page, et al., How the WHO’s Hunt for Covid’s Origins Stumbled in China, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Mar. 17,
2021).
642
Id.
643
Id.
644
Id.
645
China didn’t warn public of likely pandemic for 6 key days, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 15, 2020).
646
Li Wenliang: Coronavirus kills Chinese Whistleblower doctor, BBC (Feb. 7, 2020).
647
Jim Geraghty, Whom Does WHO Trust?, NATIONAL REVIEW (Mar. 20, 2020).
648
Id.
649
Tony Munroe, et al., China expels American journalists as spat with U.S. escalates, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020).
650
Id.
651
Public Service Announcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation & Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency People’s Republic of China (PRC) Targeting of COVID-19 Research Organizations (May 13, 2020);
Gordon Lubhold & Dustin Volz, U.S. Says Chinese, Iranian Hackers Seek to Steal Coronavirus Research, THE
WALL ST. JOURNAL (May 14, 2020).
652
Chen Qingqing & Li Sikun, China targets GOP hawks, US forms, states over lawsuits, GLOBAL TIMES (May 14,
2020).

Page 178 of 520

and abhorrent step, the CCP said it will “strike back” at attempts from the U.S. government to
ascertain the origins of COVID-19 and go beyond sanctions to make U.S. lawmakers “feel
painful.” 653 For example, the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. expressed its “grave concern”
regarding the Select Subcommittee’s investigation. 654 This is just another example of China and
the CCP obfuscating their wrongdoing during the beginnings of this pandemic.

Shockingly, the WHO has not acknowledged or supported the brave actions by these
scientists and reporters who blew the whistle against the oppressive CCP regime and warned the
world about this deadly pandemic. Instead of praising their efforts to save lives, the WHO
routinely promoted the CCP regime’s disinformation.

The WHO Posted False Information Regarding the Origins and Notification of COVID-
19’s Emergence

On April 9, 2020, Committee on Oversight and Reform Republicans wrote to Dr. Tedros
regarding the WHO’s failed response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 655 On June 15, 2020, more
than two months after receipt of the letter, Dr. Tedros provided a formal response. 656 This
response was wholly incomplete and contained at least one false statement. 657

From as early as April 27, 2020, the WHO included a COVID-19 response timeline on its
public website. 658 This timeline originally stated that on December 31, 2019 the “Wuhan
Municipal Health Commission, China, reported a cluster of cases of pneumonia in Wuhan, Hubei
Province” to the WHO. 659 This is also what Dr. Tedros told the Committee in his June 15, 2020
letter and maintained on the WHO’s website until June 29, 2020. 660 On April 20, 2020, during a
virtual press conference, Dr. Tedros even said: “[t]he first report came from Wuhan, from China
itself.” 661

However, the WHO chose to quietly contradict these claims by posting an “updated”
timeline to its official website. 662 Then, on June 30, 2020, the above reference was quietly
scrubbed from the website timeline. The timeline now states that the “WHO’s Country Office in
653
Paul D. Shinkman, China Threatens to Sanction U.S. Politicians for Coronavirus Criticism, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (May 14, 2020).
654
Adam Sabes, Chinese Embassy emails House Republican staff expressing 'grave concern' with COVID-19 origins
hearing, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 2023).
655
Letter from Jim D. Jordan, et. al., Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to Dr. Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org. (Apr. 9, 2020).
656
Letter from Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org., to Jim D. Jordan, Ranking
Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (June 15, 2020).
657
Id.
658
Statement, World Health Org., Archived: WHO Timeline – COVID-19 (last updated June 29, 2020), available at
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19.
659
Id.
660
Letter from Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health Org., to Jim D. Jordan, Ranking
Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (June 15, 2020).
661
World Health Org., Virtual Press Conference (Apr. 20, 2020) transcript available at
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-
conference-20apr2020.pdf.
662
Adam Kredo, China Never Reported Existence of Coronavirus to World Health Organization, THE WASH. FREE
BEACON (July 2, 2020).

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the People’s Republic of China (PRC) picked up a media report…on cases of ‘viral pneumonia’
in Wuhan, PRC.” 663 In actuality, the “media report” was information posted to a U.S. website
from doctors working at the epicenter of the pandemic. 664 This revelation confirms that the CCP
failed to notify the WHO of the outbreak. This failure is a violation of the IHR for which the
CCP must be held accountable. 665 By refusing to disclose the truth, the WHO made an
affirmative decision to shield the CCP from accountability.

FINDING: The Chinese Communist Party Violated Articles Six and Seven of the
International Health Regulations with No Repercussions.

The CCP violated IHR Articles Six and Seven and needs to be held accountable.

Article 6 of the IHR says that “[e]ach State Party shall notify WHO…within 24
hours…of all events which may constitute a public health emergency of international
concern.” 666 In order for an outbreak to require notification it must: (1) have serious public
health consequences, (2) be unusual or unexpected, (3) have risk of international spread, and (4)
pose significant risk to international trade. 667 COVID-19 met all these criteria well before the
WHO was formally notified of the outbreak by China. Further, Article 7 of the IHR states that if
a “State Party has evidence of an unexpected or unusual public health event…it shall provide to
WHO all relevant public health information.” 668 The CCP failed to notify the WHO in a timely
manner and subsequently concealed valuable information—harming the global response and
leading to unnecessary illness and death.

According to reports from Hong Kong, the CCP identified cases of COVID-19 going all
the way back to November 17, 2019—more than a month before the WHO was publicly
notified. 669 On December 27, 2019, Dr. Zhang Jixian, a doctor with the Hubei Provincial
Hospital Integrated Chinese and Western Medicine, told CCP health authorities that the disease
was caused by a novel coronavirus—three days before the WHO was publicly notified. 670
Doctors were ordered not to disclose any information about the unidentified virus to the
public. 671 This delay in public notification is in violation of Article 6 of the IHR and led to a
delay in global response.

663
Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (last updated June 29, 2021), available at
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline.
664
Id; Adam Kredo, China Never Reported Existence of Coronavirus to World Health Organization, THE WASH.
FREE BEACON (July 2, 2020).
665
WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS, 2nd, at 12 (2005);
Matthew Lee, Trump US notifies UN of withdrawal from World Health Organization, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (July
7, 2020).
666
IHR, supra note 665.
667
Id. at 44-46.
668
Id. at 12.
669
Josephine Ma, Coronavirus: China’s first confirmed COVID-19 case traced back to November 17, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (Mar. 13, 2020); Statement, World Health Organization, WHO Timeline-COVID-19 (last updated
Apr. 27, 2020).
670
Id.
671
Id.

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 Additionally, Dr. John MacKenzie, WHO’s emergency committee adviser, admitted that
the WHO was “misled” about the outbreak. 672 He stated by the time the CCP notified the WHO
on December 31, the CCP had already sequenced the virus genome—the first step to creating an
accurate test and developing medical countermeasures—but did not share the sequencing with
the WHO until January 12, in violation of Article 7 of the IHR. 673

This was confirmed by Dr. Farrar, in his book Spike: The Virus vs The People The Inside
Story, and Dr. Daszak in a transcribed interview before the Select Subcommittee.

Dr. Peter Daszak (November 14, 2023)

Q. Do you recall when China first officially reported what would

become COVID-19?

A. It was in early January, from my recollection. I mean, we heard

about it 18 earlier than that through unofficial channels.

Q. When did you first hear about it?

A. I think December the 30th or the 31st. It's a matter of record. I put
out a tweet, I think very late on the 31st, New Year's Eve. But I think
I heard about it the day before. And, you know, you hear about these
rumors all the time. "Oh, there's an outbreak here, there's an
outbreak there." Your first response is, well, verify, to quote Ronald
Reagan. So we managed to get hold of folks in China and ask what
they knew, what are these rumors. And we were told on the day
before New Year's Eve, to my recollection, that there was a new
coronavirus percent different to SARS, which was strangely
accurate information.
…

Q. Okay. Do you recall when the genome was publicly released?

A. I think it was the 9th or the 12th of January. 674

For potentially more than two weeks, the CCP held the key to the global response but
refused to share it.

The CCP intentionally delayed notification of COVID-19 and concealed important health
information in violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the IHR. These actions demonstrate the CCP’s
complete lack of respect for the global public health community.

672
Stephen Buranyi, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2020).
673
Id.
674
Daszak TI, supra note 256, at 169-170, 173.

Page 181 of 520

FINDING: The World Health Organization’s Report Regarding the Origins of COVID-19
Was Incomplete, Misleading, and Parroted Chinese Communist Party Propaganda.

Apart from the initial mismanagement of the virus, the WHO produced a report on the
origins of COVID-19 that did nothing but continue the CCP’s propaganda. 675 The WHO
attempted to organize an investigation into the origins of the virus, yet from the very beginning it
was evident the CCP was completely in control.

The “Terms of Reference for the China Part” [hereinafter “Terms of Reference”] was a
document that laid the ground rules for the WHO’s investigation. These terms were inherently
flawed, provided significant discretion to the CCP, and continued to parrot CCP propaganda. 676
Some examples included:

• Supporting CCP propaganda by stating the investigation would also evaluate the
“possibility the virus may have silently” started outside of Wuhan.

• Dodging responsibility by “build[ing] on existing information and augment, rather than

duplicate, ongoing [CCP]…efforts.”

• Phony scientific independence by giving the CCP final right of refusal on the
“composition of the international team.” 677

With these restrictions baked into the Terms of Reference, it was near impossible for any review
of the origins of COVID-19 conducted by the WHO to bear fruit.

In January 2021, an international team traveled to Wuhan, China to review evidence of

when and how the virus might have emerged. 678 In March 2021, the WHO team released a
report, entitled “WHO-Convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part,”
[hereinafter “WHO Report”] outlining four possible origin scenarios:

1) “direct zoonotic spillover is considered to be a possible-to-likely pathway;

2) introduction through an intermediate host is considered to be a likely to very likely

pathway;

3) introduction through cold/food chain products is considered a possible pathway; [and]

675
WHO-convened Global Study of the Origins of SARS-CoV-2, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 5, 2020).
676
WHO-convened Global Study of the Origins of SARS-CoV-2: Terms of Reference for the China Part (July 31,
2020), available at https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/who-convened-global-study-of-the-origins-of-sars-cov-
2.
677
Id.
678
Smriti Mallapaty, WHO abandons plans for crucial second phase of COVID-origins investigation, NATURE (Mar.
3, 2020).

Page 182 of 520

 4) introduction through a laboratory incident was considered to be an extremely unlikely
pathway.” 679

Yet, many, including the U.S., U.K., Australia and Canada, sharply criticized the WHO
Report. 680 Experts stated the scientists weren’t provided with access to complete, original data
and samples; full access to interviews; and access to any and all laboratories they wished to
tour. 681 Even members of the WHO team stated the report was not adequate. Dr. Ben Embarek, a
WHO expert who led the WHO mission to Wuhan, reiterated there were areas his team had
difficulty getting down to the raw data in China, adding that the data would need to be
reexamined in the next phase of the study. 682 He also stated the report “only scratched the
surface,” of their understandings of the origins of COVID-19. 683

Prominent U.S. public health officials, such as Dr. Fauci, publicly denounced the report.
In March 2021, on Face The Nation, Dr. Fauci stated, “[t]here was a lot of restrictions on the
ability of the people who went there to really take a look…[I] have some considerable concerns
about that.” 684 Further senior officials, including President Biden’s Secretary of State Mr. Antony
Blinken, similarly criticized it stating, “[w]e’ve got real concerns about the methodology and the
process that went into that report, including the fact that the government in Beijing apparently
helped to write it.” 685

It is no surprise the WHO Report did not receive a glowing reception from the global
stage. To begin with, one of the conditions the CCP demanded in allowing the investigation to
take place at all, was that they had full veto power over the inclusion of American scientists. 686
HHS submitted three expert candidates: a virologist who works on viruses that require study in
high-security laboratories; a senior veterinarian; and a medical epidemiologist leading a program
in global health studies. 687 All three were denied.

The only American on the WHO’s team was Dr. Daszak, who prominent scientists
acknowledged has significant conflicts of interest, due in part to his work with the WIV—the
very laboratory the WHO group was supposed to be investigating.

Dr. Ian Lipkin (Apr. 6, 2023)

Q. The team was comprised of 17 international scientists and 17

Chinese scientists. There is only one American. It was Dr. Daszak
679
World Health Organization, WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part (Jan. 14-Feb.
10 2021).
680
Peter Beaumont, UK and U.S. criticize WHO’s Covid report and accuse China of withholding data, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2021).
681
Id.
682
Id.
683
Id.
684
Transcript, Anthony Fauci, Face the Nation (Mar. 28, 2021).
685
Javier C. Hernandez, The U.S. is concerned about China’s influence over a report on the pandemic’s origins, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2021).
686
Jeremy Page, Betsy McKay & Drew Hinshaw, How the WHO’s Hunt for Covid’s Origins Stumbled in China,
WALL ST. JOURNAL (Mar. 17, 2021).
687
Id.

Page 183 of 520

 of EcoHealth Alliance. Do you think Dr. Daszak has conflicts of
interest regarding the search for origins of COVID 19?

A. I do.

Q. Why?

A. Because he was – because he had ran an active research program at

WIV. 688

Dr. Anthony Fauci (Jan. 9, 2024)

Q. I'm going to ask your opinion now. He has obviously been

intertwined with the Wuhan Institute for a long time, has made
numerous public statements, has now -- over the past 3 years, we've
seen numerous compliance issues with his grants. Do you think that
he has a conflict of interest in investigating the origins question?

A. I believe that he could've saved himself a lot of trouble if he did.

Q. If he did disclose a conflict of interest?

A. Yeah, yeah, because he's obviously received a lot of flak about that
and had doubts about his credibility on that. I think, retrospectively,
thinking about it, he probably would've said it would have been a
better idea to do. 689

A significant restriction, was the CCP’s complete control over every single aspect of the
investigation team’s itinerary and access to information. Upon arriving in Wuhan, the WHO team
quarantined for two weeks in hotel rooms and were further restricted to certain areas of the hotel
after quarantining. 690 The investigators were restricted from dining with their Chinese
counterparts, a seemingly insignificant detail, yet denied the WHO team the opportunity to
engage in informal, human-to-human, conversation that can provide invaluable information. 691

In Wuhan, Chinese scientists stated they had reviewed the medical records of
approximately 76,000 patients from more than 200 medical institutions. 692 When the WHO team
requested raw numbers and data, Chinese scientists only presented analysis. 693 Of the 76,000
medical records examined, 92 patients from October, November, and early December 2019
curiously showed symptoms suggesting COVID-19, yet none tested positive for antibodies

688
Lipkin TI, supra note 38, at 73-74.
689
Fauci TI 2, supra note 81, at 2.
690
Jeremy Page, Betsy McKay & Drew Hinshaw, How the WHO’s Hunt for Covid’s Origins Stumbled in China,
WALL ST. JOURNAL (Mar. 17, 2021).
691
Id.
692
Id.
693
Id.

Page 184 of 520

according to medical records. 694 The WHO team was not allowed to review any raw data or
conduct their own analysis. 695

The WHO Report’s conclusion included four hypotheses: that the virus jumped directly
from animal to human; it spread via some (one not identified) intermediate animal; it was
transmitted via the food chain, especially frozen products; or it came from a laboratory. 696 These
were concluded via a show of hands, in a room with Chinese counterparts—many of whom
report directly to the CCP—that had already ruled out a lab accident and suggested the pandemic
started somewhere outside of China. 697 The theory that the virus came from a lab was voted as
“extremely unlikely” and wasn’t recommended for further research. 698

This was very clearly not a thorough, complete, or impartial investigation. The CCP
Ministry of Foreign Affairs even admitted, “China firmly opposes certain countries’ attempts
to…hold China accountable.” 699 Yet, even though the rest of the world understands this report is
a sham, the CCP presents it as the definitive assessment concerning the origins of COVID-19. So
much so, the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. sent the Select Subcommittee a letter attempting to
obstruct the Select Subcommittee’s investigation into the origins of COVID-19, citing to the
WHO origins report. 700

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

694
Id.
695
Id.
696
Id.
697
Id.
698
Id.
699
Ken Moritsugu, China outlines COVID-origin findings ahead of WHO Report, ABC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2021).
700
E-Mail from Li Xiang, Counselor, Embassy of China in the United States of America, to Staff, Select Subcomm.
on the Coronavirus Pandemic (May 3, 2023, 2:15 AM).

Page 185 of 520

Page 186 of 520
FINDING: The World Health Organization’s Draft “Pandemic Treaty” Does Not Solve the
Organization’s Underlying Problems and May Affirmatively Harm the United
States.

Unlike the World Trade Organization, the WHO has no real authority to sanction or
otherwise pressure its Member-States. As Lancet editor Dr. Richard Horton said, “[t]he WHO
has been drained of its power and resources. Its coordinating authority and capacity are weak. Its
ability to direct an international response to a life-threatening epidemic is non-existent.” 701 The
only authority WHO leadership must enforce compliance is via public pressure. Illustrative of
this point, when asked to name the countries who had “alarming levels of inaction,” Dr. Mike
Ryan, WHO’s head of COVID-19 response, stated, “[y]ou know who you are, we don’t criticize
our member states in public.” 702

The COVID-19 pandemic was the worst global public health emergency since the
inception of the WHO in 1948 and it further exposed the severe limitations of the IHR and the
institutional limits of the WHO. The IHR is designed to achieve a higher level of global health
security, but in the face of COVID-19, the IHR did not properly perform its management or
supervision. 703

Responding to the many calls of Member-States to strengthen the framework for future
pandemics, a rare special session of the WHA convened in November 2021. 704 There, Member-
States agreed “to establish…an intergovernmental negotiating body open to all Member States
and Associate Members to draft and negotiate a WHO convention, agreement or other
international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response.” 705

As of September 20, 2024, there was not a completed, presentable draft of a Pandemic
Treaty. 706 As of the draft dated March 13, 2024, the overall goal of the Pandemic Treaty is to
help “prevent, prepare for and respond to pandemics.” 707 The provisions (still being negotiated)
included definitions and principles, aspirational goals for improving pandemic preparedness and
response capacities, and supply chain and logistics. 708 Some of the more contested and debated
provisions include financing for pandemic preparedness and response, pathogen access and
benefit sharing, intellectual property rights, technology transfer, and research and development
for pandemic-related products. 709

701
Stephen Buryani, The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2020).
702
Id.
703
Myungsei Sohn, The problem of International Health Regulations (IHR) in the process of responding to COVID-
19 and improvements measures to improve its effectiveness, JOURNAL OF GLOBAL HEALTH SCIENCE (Dec.13, 2021).
704
Nick Cumming-Bruce, W.H.O. members agree to begin talks on a global pandemic treaty, THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
1, 2021).
705
World Health Assembly, Second Special Session (Dec. 1, 2021).
706
News Release, World Health Organization, Governments progress on negotiations for a pandemic agreement to
boost global preparedness for future emergencies (Sept. 20, 2024).
707
Revised Draft of the negotiating text of the WHO Pandemic Agreement, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 13, 2024)
available at https://apps.who.int/gb/inb/pdf_files/inb9/A_inb9_3-en.pdf.
708
Id.
709
Id

Page 187 of 520

 The Pandemic Treaty does not address the weaknesses of the IHR. The WHO’s refusal to
hold the CCP accountable for violating the IHR is a major issue in protecting global public
health.

Furthermore, there are specific U.S. concerns regarding enactment of any potential
Pandemic Treaty. Throughout the ongoing negotiations, there have been questions about the
transparency of the negotiations. There have been multiple closed-door negotiations resulting in
large edits that are then presented to all Member-States. Further, it is not clear if this treaty will
be ratified through the U.S. Senate or not. If the U.S. determines to enact a Pandemic Treaty, it
must go through the required Senate approval process.

While a new pandemic, prevention, preparedness, and response treaty seems like a good
idea in theory, on paper it falls short. The draft does little to address any of the shortfalls revealed
in COVID-19. The WHO needs to be an organization that represents and protects the entire
world. That requires a system of trust from both the Member-States to report and the WHO to
protect, which proved not to be the case during the pandemic. Accordingly, Ambassador
Nkengasong testified:

The Honorable John Nkengasong (December 13, 2023)

We fully agree with your opening remarks about the trust capital that is
required to [deal] with global disease threats, and that comes with the ability
to be fully transparent, to be accountable, to report in a timely fashion, and
also to cooperate, and all of these elements were lacking in China’s ability
to cooperate with WHO and the world. And when you have a fast-moving
respiratory disease like COVID, all of these elements are very important for
the global health security.

I think the burden is still on China, that for the past 3 years China has not
been forthcoming the way it should be in working with WHO, working with
us directly so that we just understand what the origin is of the virus is so
that it can better prepare us for the future. As we have all said, it is a matter
of time before we are faced with another threat, yes, so I think I fully agree
with you that we need to build a trusting relationship that will enable us to
be able to respond in a very timely fashion. 710

710
Reforming the WHO: Ensuring Global Health Security and Accountability: Hearing Before Select Subcomm. on
the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, 118th Cong., 11 (Dec. 13, 2023).

Page 188 of 520

II. The Strategic National Stockpile Was Not Prepared to Address a Nationwide Viral
Pandemic

The SNS is the U.S. stockpile of pharmaceutical drugs, medical products, and ancillary
supplies. 711 Deployed at the discretion of the Secretary of HHS, these supplies supplement
medical countermeasures needed by states, tribal nations, territories, and the largest metropolitan
areas during public health emergencies. 712 Congress mandated the SNS in 1999, and since then it
has provided resources during hurricanes, floods, bioterror events, and infectious disease
outbreaks, including of course the COVID-19 pandemic. 713

The SNS is a network of strategically placed, not publicly known, storehouses designed
to supplement and resupply resources in a timely response to state and local public health
agencies in the event of an emergency at anywhere and anytime within the U.S. 714 The SNS’
purpose and task is to deliver medical supplies to communities within 12 hours of the decision to
deploy the stockpile. 715

In its current form, the mission of the SNS is to “provide for the emergency health
security of the United States…in the event of a bioterrorist attack or other public health
emergencies.” 716 Between Fiscal Years (FY) 2015 and 2021, three-quarters of the non-COVID-
19 supplies and budget were allocated to fighting just two threats: smallpox and anthrax. 717

HHS provides a 24/7, 365 emergency contact for senior government officials to call when
an emergency arises. Within approximately 15 minutes, SNS leadership, subject matter experts,
and other federal agencies either gather for a conference call or direct the requestor to the
appropriate technical experts. 718 The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response [hereinafter “ASPR”] evaluates the request to see if it can be completely, partially, or
not fulfilled. 719 SNS may be deployed in incidents of varying scope and size, at the request of
state, local, tribal, and territorial [hereinafter “SLTT”] health jurisdictions, or may be
prepositioned for events of national security significance at the discretion of the HHS Secretary.

711
42 U.S.C. §247d-6b.
712
Strategic National Stockpile, ADMINI. FOR STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, available at
https://aspr.hhs.gov/SNS/Pages/default.aspx.
713
Id. (The SNS was originally named the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) and under the direction of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)).
714
Todd Kuiken & Frant Gottron, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R47400, The Strategic National Stockpile: Overview and
Issues for Congress (updated Sept. 26, 2023).
715
Stockpile Response, ADMIN. FOR STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, available at
https://aspr.hhs.gov/SNS/Pages/Stockpile-Responses.aspx.
716
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, P.L. 107-188 (In response to
the September 11, 2011 terrorist and anthrax attacks, Congress enacted the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness Response Act of 2002 which formally changed the name to the SNS and expanded the role to its
current capabilities.).
717
Todd Kuiken & Frant Gottron, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R47400, The Strategic National Stockpile: Overview
and Issues for Congress (Updated Sept. 26, 2023).
718
Strategic National Stockpile, ADMINISTRATION FOR STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, available at
https://aspr.hhs.gov/SNS/Pages/default.aspx.
719
Todd Kuiken & Frant Gottron, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R47400, The Strategic National Stockpile: Overview
and Issues for Congress (updated Sept. 26, 2023).

Page 189 of 520

 However, the SNS was not created nor designed to respond to a national, or truly global
emergency, like the COVID-19 pandemic. It was designed to be a stopgap for local medical
countermeasures and biohazard events. The SNS generally maintains a broad range of
medications such as antibiotics, antidotes, and antitoxins, as well as equipment and ancillary
supplies such as PPE and surgical equipment. 720 There are also CHEMPACKs, Federal Medical
Stations, and push packages. 721

The Secretary of the HHS is required to:

[M]aintain a stockpile or stockpiles of drugs, vaccines and other biological

products, medical devices, and other supplies (including personal protective
equipment, ancillary medical supplies, and other applicable supplies
required for the administration of drugs, vaccines and other biological
products, medical devices, and diagnostic tests in the stockpile) in such
numbers, types, and amounts as are determined ... to be appropriate and
practicable, taking into account other available sources, to provide for and
optimize the emergency health security of the United States, including the
emergency health security of children and other vulnerable populations, in
the event of a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency and ...
make necessary additions or modifications to the contents of such stockpile
or stockpiles. 722

Determining what supplies are “appropriate and practicable” is tenuous because the SNS
needs to be prepared for any number of emergencies that could arise at any moment across the
entire U.S. The Secretary defines “appropriate and practicable” within the context of the finite
resources SNS is realistically able to provide. It would be impossible for the SNS to predict
which supplies and how many would be needed for an emergency that hasn’t occurred. Yet, as
discussed above, there is generally a large range of items at each site.

Again, the SNS was not created to be the only source of emergency medical
countermeasures in the time of a crisis. However, it is the nation’s foremost supply of emergency
medical countermeasures. The COVID-19 pandemic showed there were areas of weakness,
particularly surrounding the states’ lack of individual stockpiles.

FINDING: Dating Back to the Obama Administration, the Strategic National Stockpile Was
Not Prepared for a National Public Health Emergency.

720
Id.
721
Id. (CHEMPACKs are containers of nerve agent antidotes that can be used to treat exposure to a chemical
incident, even with an unknown agent. More than 90 percent of the U.S. population is within one hour of a
CHEMPACK location; FMS are quickly deployable caches with medical and pharmaceutical resources that can turn
a pre-identified building into a temporary medical shelter during a national emergency; Push packages are
prepackaged, transport-ready containers that can be delivered to an area anywhere in the U.S. within twelve hours of
the decision to deploy.).
722
42 U.S.C. §247d-6b.

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 The COVID-19 pandemic placed the SNS in the eye of the storm and shook it to its core.
While the SNS delivered on some aspects, the pandemic highlighted weaknesses and areas
needed for improvement.

One such area is the content review process for the SNS. The HHS Secretary is required
to annually review the contents of the stockpile to confirm it is relevant to current threats in
public health security. 723 To aid in this review, the Secretary works “in consultation with the
Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise [hereinafter “PHEMCE”].” 724 The
PHEMCE is an interagency group that identifies public health security needs and makes
recommendations to the Secretary regarding “research, advanced research, development,
procurement, stockpiling, deployment, distribution, and utilization” of medical countermeasures,
including the contents and use of the SNS.” 725

The SNS is in the unique and precarious position of maintaining a large national stockpile
for multiple low-probability, but high-consequence, threats while also managing the ability to
rapidly respond to novel threats and other emergencies. The stockpile is equipped with enough
smallpox vaccines for a national emergency, but going into the COVID-19 pandemic, the SNS
was not adequately stocked with some essential assets. 726

In 2009 the SNS responded to the H1N1 influenza outbreak and depleted its resources of
PPE. 727 Even knowing a resource such as PPE will always be relevant and valuable to any type
of emergency, the Obama Administration repeatedly prioritized replenishing the stockpile with
other resources. During the COVID-19 crisis, ASPR and DOD awarded contracts in 2020 and
2021 to allow the SNS to significantly increase the amount of PPE and ventilators inventory. 728

723
42 U.S.C. §247d-6b(a)(2).
724
Id.
725
42 U.S.C. §300hh-10a.
726
Todd Kuiken & Frant Gottron, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R47400, The Strategic National Stockpile: Overview
and Issues for Congress (updated Sept. 26, 2023).
727
Id.
728
GAO, GAO-23-106210, PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS: HHS SHOULD ADDRESS STRATEGIC NATIONAL
STOCKPILE REQUIREMENTS AND INVENTORY RISKS (Oct. 2022).

Page 191 of 520

 The SNS is the nation’s largest repository of emergency medical supplies, including PPE,
yet there was a national shortage of masks, PPE, and ventilators in the early days of the COVID-
19 pandemic. 729 In April 2020, the stores at the SNS were nearly depleted. 730 While it is vital to
note the SNS is not designed to supply the entire country with supplies, starting the pandemic in
the negative hindered the nation’s response.

FINDING: States Must Mainatain Their Own Stockpile of Emergency Medical Supplies.

The SNS was established to ensure SLTTs had the adequate number of supplies in the
face of a fast-moving emergency as a “short-term, stopgap buffer when the immediate supply of
these materials may not be available or sufficient.” 731 It was not established to, or even capable
of, responding to a national crisis. During the COVID-19 pandemic, states overwhelmingly
requested assets from the SNS at a rate the SNS could not provide.

Currently, states are not required to maintain their own stockpile of medical and ancillary
equipment. 732 As every state learned during the pandemic, stockpiling ensures resources are
available for a swift and efficient response without relying on the federal government. Strategic
localized stockpiling can be the difference between a well-coordinated response, and a chaotic
one with a potential lack of resources due to national shortages.

State-maintained stockpiles would ensure states could deploy resources at a faster

timeline and have guaranteed access to assets. The SNS was not able to evenly distribute
supplies across all 50 states. 733 Having the capability to be a stop-gap for multiple emergencies,
does not mean the SNS was ever prepared to equip, ever jurisdiction, in every single state, at the
same time. 734 A statewide stockpile would protect individuals at a much higher rate, because
local leadership would be able to provide individuals with the necessary equipment
immediately. 735

Localized stockpiles would also allow states to further prepare for emergencies by
tailoring the stockpiles to unique needs. The SNS is a “catch-all” program that help prepare for a
broad range of problems. 736 For example, the SNS has measures against smallpox and anthrax,

729
Strategic National Stockpile, ADMINISTRATION FOR STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, available at
https://aspr.hhs.gov/SNS/Pages/default.aspx.
730
Nick Miroff, Protective gear in national stockpile is nearly depleted, DHS officials say, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 1,
2020).
731
Center for the Strategic National Stockpile, Admin. for Strategic Preparedness & Response, available at
https://aspr.hhs.gov/SNS/Pages/default.aspx.
732
Todd Kuiken & Frant Gottron, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R47400, The Strategic National Stockpile: Overview
and Issues for Congress (updated Sept. 26, 2023).
733
See generally, Amy Goldstein, et al., Desperate for medical equipment, states encounter a beleaguered national
stockpile, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2020).
734
Id.
735
See generally, Amy Goldstein, et al., Desperate for medical equipment, states encounter a beleaguered national
stockpile, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2020).
736
Todd Kuiken & Frant Gottron, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R47400, The Strategic National Stockpile: Overview
and Issues for Congress (updated Sept. 26, 2023).

Page 192 of 520

but not necessarily equipment to help a jurisdiction with a local disaster, such as a hurricane or
earthquake, or forest fire. 737

The state stockpile is beneficial and necessary because it would help alleviate the burden
of the SNS to provide for the states, allowing the SNS to fulfill its mission statement and work to
prepare and respond to emergencies to protect the health of Americans. 738

The long-term sustainability of the SNS requires a balance of the scope and purpose of
the stockpile with the provided resources. The SNS must evaluate its needs and goals with future
needs and goals. The burden of this would be lifted if states established and maintained their own
stockpiles to respond to emergencies.

737
Id.
738
Center for the Strategic National Stockpile, Admin. for Strategic Preparedness & Response, available at
https://aspr.hhs.gov/SNS/Pages/default.aspx.

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III. The United States’ Unsecure Supply Chain Risks A Future Failed Pandemic
Response

The COVID-19 pandemic profoundly impacted the global and national supply chains,
particularly exposing vulnerabilities in the critical areas of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals.
As the virus spread, unprecedented disruptions in the manufacturing, transportation, and
distribution of supplies greatly affected how people were cared for during the pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic dramatically increased demand for many common consumer
items and most Americans were stuck at home and turned to e-commerce for all their shopping
needs. 739 This surge in demand for goods, when supplies were limited due to pandemic-related
shortages and shutdowns, caused a ripple effect throughout the supply chain. 740 Ports across the
world, but particularly in Southern California, grew congested to the point of inoperability. 741

While no country was prepared for the pandemic, or its second-order effects, the
vulnerability of the U.S. medical and pharmaceutical industry was unacceptable due to its
significant reliance on imported finished products or resources needed to manufacture products
here. COVID-19 revealed that the U.S. must make its medical and pharmaceutical supply chains
more resilient, increase domestic production to curtail crippling regulations and other production
roadblocks and avoid being in a position of being “cut off” by a catastrophic event, such as the
COVID-19 pandemic, or geopolitical instability. This is attainable and can be fixed by ensuring
U.S. companies communicate with the FDA more efficiently and establishing a system where
companies are able to quickly adjust their manufacture goods.

However, there were some bright spots that, while not a dramatic change in the supply
chain distribution, exhibited the American “can do” spirit and adaptability of U.S. companies in
times of crisis. General Motors partnered with Ventec Life Systems and retooled its plant in
Kokomo, Indiana to build ventilators for hospitals in short supply. 742 The Bacardi plant in Puerto
Rico, one of the largest rum distilleries in the world, tweaked its production line to pump ethanol
needed for hand sanitizer rather than distilled spirits. 743 Olein Refinery used Bacardi alcohol to
make more than 1.7 million, 10-ounce bottles of hand sanitizer. 744 Burton Snowboards, a
Burlington, Vermont based snowboard maker, shifted production to disposable face shields and
reusable brims for health care workers. 745

That small sample of business that were able to quickly shift gears and assist the overall
U.S. supply chain are examples of what can be done to help bolster a disrupted global supply

739
Alicia Wallace, Covid broke supply chains. Now on the mend, can they withstand another shock?, CNN (Jan. 16,
2023).
740
Id.
741
Matt Egan, $24 billion in goods is floating outside California’s biggest ports, CNN (Oct. 25, 2021).
742
Vanessa Yurkevich & Peter Valdes-Dapena, GM prepares to ship first round of ventilators, CCN (Apr. 14, 2020).
743
Jim Wyss, Rum to the rescue? How Bacardi is tweaking production to fight the coronavirus, MIAMI HERALD
(Mar. 24, 2020).
744
Bacardi Helps Produce Hand Sanitizers With Change in Production, BACARDI LIMITED (Mar. 19, 2020).
745
Megan Cerullo, How companies pivoted from making dresses, snowboards and whisky to face masks, gloves and
sanitizer, CBS NEWS (Mar. 10, 2021).

Page 194 of 520

chain. The logistics for these companies went well, especially for how fast the turnaround was.
However, a defined and ready plan of action would allow for a flawless execution of change.

FINDING: The United States Must Reduce Its Reliance on Other Countries, Particularly
China, for Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies.

The shortage of pharmaceutical and medical supplies during the pandemic fully exposed
the U.S.’ dependences on China.

The medical and pharmaceutical industries are ones of particular concern for the U.S.
supply chain. Many of the medications taken by Americans are manufactured overseas. But
further, the active ingredients in these medications, the chemical compounds used to make them,
are overwhelmingly made in China. 746 So much so that the supply has been described as China
having “a global choke hold” on the chemical components of medicines distributed
worldwide. 747

The complex nature of the drug supply chain keeps consumers, hospitals, and even the
FDA completely unaware of the variety of types and volumes of pharmaceutical ingredients that
come from China or other foreign countries. In October 2019, before the Subcommittee on
Health of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Dr. Woodcock testified that the FDA:

Dr. Janet Woodcock (October 29, 2019)

[C]annot determine with any precision the volume of [active

pharmaceutical ingredients] that China is actually producing, or the volume
of APIs manufactured in China that is entering the U.S. market, either
directly or indirectly by incorporation into finished dosages manufactured
in China or other parts of the world. 748

In 2018, China accounted for 95 percent of U.S. imports of ibuprofen, 91 percent imports
of hydrocortisone, approximately 40 percent of penicillin, and 70 percent of acetaminophen. 749

This issue was only exasperated by the COVID-19 pandemic. During the early days of
the virus, there were certain pharmacies in New York City that could not stock any brand of any
simple over-the-counter painkiller, for weeks. 750

746
Laurie McGinley & Carolyn Y. Johnson, Coronavirus raises fears of U.S. drug supply disruptions, THE WASH.
POST (Feb. 26, 2020).
747
Rosemary Gibson & Janardan Prasad Singh, China Rx: Exposing the Risks of America's Dependence on China
for Medicine (Prometheus, 2018)
748
Safeguarding Pharmaceutical Supply Chains in a Global Economy: Hearing Before Subcomm on Health, House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 116th Cong. (Oct. 29, 2019) (statement by Dr. Janet Woodcock, Director, Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research).
749
Doug Palmer & Finbarr Bermingham, U.S. policymakers worry about China ‘weaponizing’ drug exports,
POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2019, updated Apr. 10, 2020).
750
Chuin-Wei Yap, Pandemic Lays Bare U.S. Reliance on China for Drugs, THE WALL ST. JOURNAL (Aug. 5, 2020).

Page 195 of 520

 Another issue with the modern supply chain is that many manufacturers have suppliers
and subcontractors that utilize specialized technology that can limit where products are made, or
the alternative that all supplies are made in one place. One example of this is a group of
chemicals known as nucleoside phosphonamidites and the additional associate reagents used to
create DNA and RNA sequences. 751 All companies that develop DNA or mRNA based COVID-
19 vaccines and DNA-based drug therapies rely on these reagents. 752 However, many of the key
precursor materials for the vaccines and drugs are solely produced in South Korea and China. 753

On the medical supply side, the Hubei Province in China is the global hub for producing
protective-medical gear. 754 Hubei Province is where the virus first emerged in the city of Wuhan.
Wuhan was almost completely locked down for many months during the early parts of the
pandemic, leaving the U.S. in the tenuous position of relying on current inventories of medical
supplies knowing that the primary manufacturer of those supplies may be out of commission for
some time.

While undoubtedly, the dependence on China and other foreign nations in the supply
chain must be addressed, there are several actions U.S. companies should adopt to help address
market issues.

Dr. Marston articulated how the COVID-19 pandemic underscored how fragile and vital
the supply chain is and discussed steps the FDA can take to improve the ability to provide
supplies and mitigate shortages. 755 One major change that must be addressed is the lack of
reporting requirement from companies to the FDA when they experience a rise in demand that
they are not able to keep up with. 756 An example of this is in 2022 when a surge of influenza and
respiratory viruses in children created an abnormally high demand for mainstay medicines. 757
Many parents had to go to multiple stores to find any form of pain or fever reducer. 758

Another change, that will not only strengthen the U.S. supply chain but protect the safety
and health of Americans, will be requiring drug companies to supply more detailed labels for
their products. Currently, drug labels from U.S. companies are not required to identify the
original manufacturer or specify reliance on different manufactures for APIs for the produced
drugs. 759 Additionally, drug labels do not include the original manufacturer of limited high-risk

751
Willy C. Shih, Global Supply Chains in a Post-Pandemic World, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Sept.-Oct. 2020).
752
Id.
753
Id.
754
Melanie Evans & Drew Hinshaw, Masks Run Short as Coronavirus Spreads, THE WALL ST. JOURNAL (Feb. 27,
2020).
755
Preparing for the Next Pandemic, supra note 232. (Statement or Dr. Marston, Chief Medical Dir., U.S. Food and
Drug Admin.).
756
Id.
757
Brenda Goodman & Raenu Charles, Meds for kids with pain and fever are in high demand. Here’s what to do if
you can’t find them, CNN (Dec. 9, 2022).
758
Id.
759
Preparing for the Next Pandemic, supra note 232. (Statement or Dr. Marston, Chief Medical Dir., U.S. Food and
Drug Admin.).

Page 196 of 520

excipients, along with API and finished drug product. Providing this information could help
mitigate supply impacts, enhance national security, and improve public health preparedness. 760

Finally, Dr. Marston, testified that medical-device manufacturers are not required to alert
the FDA about a supply chain disruption outside of a public-health emergency. 761 She used the
painful, real-life example of a tornado taking out a factory. 762 She stated that the FDA might
know about it and see it on the news and call the manufacturers itself, but the manufacturer does
not have to alert the FDA that there may be a disruption in the supply chain because of an event
outside of a public health emergency. 763

The U.S.’s current dependence on China for medicine and medical supplies is a serious
national security risk. This over-reliance could easily be weaponized against us. The supply
chain vulnerability was not a new problem, but one that was laid bare during the COVID-19
pandemic.

760
Mary Van Beusekom, Report details where top 100 brand-name Rx drugs are made, CIDRAP NEWS (Jan. 26,
2022).
761 761
Preparing for the Next Pandemic, supra note 232. (Statement or Dr. Marston, Chief Medical Dir., U.S. Food
and Drug Admin.).
762
Id.
763
Id.

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IV. The Six-Foot Social Distancing Requirement Was Not Supported by Science

Social distancing was one of the most consequential policies of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Social distancing is the practice of intentionally maintaining a physical space between yourself
and other people. On March 22, 2020, the CDC issued guidance specifically designating six feet,
or two arm’s length, as the distance that would best reduce the spread of the coronavirus. 764

Governments at every level and private entities implemented social distancing nationwide
in manner that adversely impacted nearly every person in the country. Small businesses limited
the capacity of patrons allowed in the shop at one time, grocery stores placed stickers on the
floor alerting people where to stand, and schools struggled to reopen because the rule limited the
number of desks that could be in a classroom at one time.

FINDING: There Was No Quantitative Scientific Support for Six Feet of Social Distancing.

Six feet of social distancing was a phrase and rule known by every single American
during the pandemic. Amazingly, social distancing guidance was not revised until August
2022. 765 Even though it was CDC guidance and not a mandate, it was forcefully implemented by
state and local governments and caused lots of strife amongst Americans. 766 Social distancing
764
Social distancing: keep a safe distance to slow the spread, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention (July 6, 2020).
765
Dan Diamond, In the pandemic, we were told to keep 6 feet apart. There’s no science to support that, THE WASH.
POST (June 2, 2024).
766
Kevin Sikali, The dangers of social distancing: How COVID‐19 can reshape our social experience, JOURNAL OF
COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY (Aug. 16, 2020).

Page 198 of 520

requirements were largely responsible for closing businesses, heightening a sense in loss of
community, and were part of the reasoning schools could not reopen for so long. 767

While six feet of social distancing was a cornerstone policy associated with the COVID-
19 pandemic, like many others that were implemented, public health leadership did not articulate
or explain the science behind the decision.

Dr. Fauci testified regarding what studies he, and the CDC, reviewed before imposing
such a harsh policy on the American people, for such a length of time.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (January 9, 2023)

Q. Do you recall when discussions regarding, kind of, the at least a 6

foot threshold began?

A. The 6 foot in the school?

Q. Six foot overall. I mean, 6 foot was applied at businesses…it was

applied in schools, it was applied here. At least how the messaging
was applied was that 6-foot distancing was the distance that needed
to be --

A. You know, I don't recall. It sort of just appeared. I don't recall, like,
a discussion of whether it should be 5 or 6 or whatever. It was just
that 6 foot is

Q. Did you see any studies that supported 6 feet?

A. I was not aware of studies that, in fact, that would be a very difficult
study to do.

Q. I know. I'm just trying to figure out why 6 versus 3 or 4 or 5.

A. Yeah. Yeah…I think it would fall under the category of empiric.

Just an empiric decision that wasn't based on data or even data that
could be accomplished. But I'm thinking hard as I'm talking to you.

Q. Uh huh.

A. I don't recall, like, a discussion of, "Now it's going to be" it sort of
just appeared, that 6 feet is going to be the distance. 768

Dr. Collins testified:

767
Id.
768
Fauci TI 2, supra note 81, at 183-184.

Page 199 of 520

 Dr. Francis Collins (January 11, 2023)

Q. …We asked Dr. Fauci where the six feet came from and he said it
kind of just appeared, is the quote. Do you recall science or evidence
that supported the six-foot distance?

A. I do not.

Q. Is that I do not recall or I do not see any evidence supporting six

feet?

A. I did not see evidence, but I'm not sure I would have been shown
evidence at that point.

Q. Okay.

A. I was not involved in that conversation.

Q. Since then, it has been an awfully large topic. Have you seen any
evidence since then supporting six feet?

A. No. 769

In June 2024, at a public hearing, Dr. Fauci continued to articulate that the six-foot rule
for social distancing was not supported by quality scientific standards. He additionally attempted
to further distance himself from the issue by stating the decision making of this policy
implementation was the responsibility of the CDC.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (June 3, 2024)

You know, one I’m sure is going to come up later is the issue of the six foot
distance, and I made the statement that it ‘‘just appeared.’’ And that got
taken like, ‘‘I don’t know what’s going on. It just appeared.’’ It actually
came from the CDC. The CDC was responsible for those kinds of guidelines
to schools, not me. So, when I said that it just appeared, it appeared. Was
there any science behind it? What I meant by ‘‘no science behind it’’ is that
there wasn’t a controlled trial that said, compare 6-foot with 3 feet with 10
feet. So there wasn’t that scientific evaluation of it. 770

At the hearing, Dr. Fauci discussed that he did not want to appear to push back against
another scientific institution. He again placed the blame on the CDC, even though he noted the
CDC was part of the COVID-19 response team.

769
Collins TI, supra note 221, at 225-226.
770
Fauci Hearing, supra note 233, at 24.

Page 200 of 520

Dr. Anthony Fauci (June 3, 2024)

Q. Dr. Fauci, one of the controversial regulations of the pandemic was

the six-foot distancing rule. This rule became an important policy
consideration in subsequent regulations. However, you testified
recently, and I’m quoting, this six-foot rule ‘‘sort of just appeared.’’
Do you think that a rule that ‘‘sort of just appeared’’ is substantial
justification for the regulations that we saw based on that six-foot
rule?

A …When saying it ‘‘just appeared,’’ it came from the CDC——

Q. …What was your relationship with the CDC when you saw a
regulation which was not based in the current science?

A. Well, when I say it was not based in science, I meant a prospective

clinical trial to determine whether 6-foot was better than 3, was
better than 10. What——

Q. But once we realized that the virus was not spread by droplets and
was aerosolized, did you feel an indication to go back to the CDC
and say, let’s base this on science, let’s get rid of this six-foot rule?
This six-foot rule crippled businesses… It allowed students to stay
at home and not learn. Americans suffered. And that suffering
continues, because the fracture of trust in American scientists
continues to this day. Did you not feel an obligation, for something
that just sort of appeared, not to go back to the CDC and say, let’s
base this on what we know?

A. It was a CDC decision, and it was clear——

Q. Were you in communication with the CDC?

A. CDC was part of the coronavirus response team, yes.

Q. And you didn’t feel an obligation to go to them and say, look,

Americans aren’t going to trust——

A. Yes.

Q. [continuing]. Us, we’re providing them with misinformation?

A. We had discussions at the White House about that. We did. But the
CDC’s decision—and it was their decision to make, and they made
it. at the NIH, to challenge that? I’ve challenged the CDC multiple
times——

Page 201 of 520

 …

Q. Publicly you challenged them on this six-foot distancing rule?

A. It is not appropriate to be publicly challenging a sister

organization. 771

Even though Dr. Fauci was arguably one of the most notable, recognizable faces and
names of the COVID-19 response team, and a strong advocate for the six-foot of separation rule,
he continuously stated the policy was blindly accepted, without any further discussion as to
possible consequences or alternative routes.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (June 3, 2024)

Q. Do you recall if it was ever suggested to be 10 feet?

A. You know, I don’t recall if it was ever suggested it was 10 feet. But
when I made my explanation of what it 6 versus 3 versus not even
worrying about it at all.

Q And you said today that there were discussions at the White House
about the six-foot rule. You don’t recall if it was discussions about
whether or not it should be 3 or should be 10 or should be 6?

A. You know, I don’t recall what the exact discussion was. But as I’ve
said in response to multiple questions, what we had was it came to
CDC was said that on the basis of their evaluation, which was based
on the droplet approach, that six-foot would be the go. And since
there was no clinical trials going one way or the other, that’s why it
was accepted by the group. 772

The justification for one of the most impactful COVID-19 policies, that arguable affected
the most Americans in their day-to-day lives, was “it sort of just appeared.” There were no
scientific trials or studies conducted before this policy was implemented, there appeared to be no
pushback or internal discussion amongst the highest level of leadership, and more importantly
there appears to be no acceptance of responsibility. That is an unacceptable answer from public
health leadership. Decisions of this magnitude must have scientific backing that can be explained
to the American public.

771
Fauci Hearing, supra note 233, at 36-37.
772
Fauci Hearing, supra note 233, at 58-59.

Page 202 of 520

V. Masks and Mask Mandates Were Ineffective at Controlling the Spread of COVID-
19.

Much of the conversations around the earliest days of the COVID-19 pandemic
surrounded inconsistent messaging and a lack of understanding around the virus in general. One
area of policy that was riddled with contradictions was the use of face masks. Throughout the
pandemic federal, state, and local governments had conflicting policies and rhetoric regarding
wearing face masks.

In the very early days, public health officials urged the general public not to wear
773
masks. That messaging was then replaced saying individuals should wear a mask, and then the
American people were told they must wear a mask. 774 The first recommendation for the public to
wear face masks by the CDC was April 3, 2020. 775 But before this, the WHO and CDC reported
healthy members of the public at large should not wear masks, reserving them for those who
were sick or most susceptible to the virus. 776 On February 29, 2020, the U.S. Surgeon General
tweeted, urging people not to buy masks and stated proper hygiene and a flu vaccine would be an
adequate solution to the virus. 777

During a 60 Minutes interview on March 8, 2020, Dr. Fauci similarly stated "when you're
in the middle of an outbreak, wearing a mask might make people feel a little bit better and it
might even block a droplet, but it's not providing the perfect protection that people think that it
is." 778 This was consistent with the CDC and WHO’s guidance, which in late March 2020
recommended using masks if one was sick or caring for a sick individual. 779

But these sentiments were reversed just about a month later. On April 3, 2020, the CDC
issued guidance recommending non-medical face coverings be worn in areas with high amounts
of potential community transmission. 780 The guidance stated to wear "cloth face coverings
fashioned from household items or made at home from common materials ... as an additional,
voluntary public health measure." 781 The CDC went as far as posting a video teaching the public
how to make masks with a T-shirt and rubber bands.

773
Holly Yan, Want to prevent another shutdown, save 33,000 lives and protect yourself? Wear a face mask, doctors
say, CNN (June 29, 2020).
774
Id.
775
Chris Megerian, et al., CDC recommends wearing face masks during coronavirus pandemic, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020); Colin Dwyer & Allison Aubrey, CDC Now Recommends Americans Consider Wearing Cloth
Face Coverings In Public, NPR (Apr. 3, 2020).
776
Holly Yan, Want to prevent another shutdown, save 33,000 lives and protect yourself? Wear a face mask, doctors
say, CNN (June 29, 2020).
777
This tweet has since been deleted.
778
60 Minutes, CBS (Mar. 8, 2020).
779
See generally, Holly Yan, Want to prevent another shutdown, save 33,000 lives and protect yourself? Wear a face
mask, doctors say, CNN (June 29, 2020).
780
Chris Megerian, et al., CDC recommends wearing face masks during coronavirus pandemic, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020); Colin Dwyer & Allison Aubrey, CDC Now Recommends Americans Consider Wearing Cloth
Face Coverings In Public, NPR (Apr. 3, 2020).
781
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF CLOTH FACE COVERINGS, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF SIGNIFICANT
COMMUNITY-BASED TRANSMISSION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Apr. 3, 2020) available at
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/86440.

Page 203 of 520

 These initial changes in statements and reversals of policy are understandable, as they
were said in the panicked early days of the novel coronavirus, and public health officials were
working with the limited information they had on hand. However, public health officials
eventually acquired more information about COVID-19 at a rapid pace.

Ultimately, a systematic review carried out by Cochrane Collaboration—one of the most

highly regarded methodologies in evidence-based healthcare—found that the pooled randomized
control trials they analyzed “did not show a clear reduction in respiratory viral infection with the
use of medical/surgical masks” and that “[t]here were no clear differences between the use of
medical/surgical masks compared with N95/P2 respirators in healthcare workers when used in
routine care to reduce respiratory viral infection.” 782 These results appear to directly contradict
public health agencies’ and local governments’ support for broadly requiring masking throughout
much of the pandemic.

FINDING: Public Health Officials Flip Flopping on the Efficacy and Use of Face Masks
Without Full Scientific Transparency Caused Mistrust in Public Health
Establishments.

On January 20, 2021, in one of his very first actions as President, President Biden signed
Executive Order (EO) 13991. Part of the order reads:

The heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall

immediately take action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law,
to require compliance with CDC guidelines with respect to wearing masks,
maintaining physical distance, and other public health measures by: on-duty
or on-site Federal employees; on-site Federal contractors; and all persons in
Federal buildings or on Federal lands. 783

President Biden signed another EO, the very next day, compelling the Transportation
Security Administration and other federal agencies to also require face masks on all forms of
domestic and international travel. 784 This language in essence made CDC guidances actionable.
Before, these guidances were non-binding recommendations provided by the public health
officials as a best practice; however, President Biden’s EO called for these actions to be
mandatory.

Approximately four months later, the Biden Administration and the CDC amended the
guidelines on mask wearing. On April 27, 2021, it was announced that fully vaccinated

782
Tom Jefferson, et al., Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses, COCHRANE
(Jan. 30, 2023).
783
Exec. Order No. 13991, 86 FR 7045 (Jan. 25, 2021).
784
Exec. Order No. 13998. 86 FR 7205 (Jan. 21, 2021).

Page 204 of 520

individuals did not need masks during small outdoor gatherings, but that they should still be
worn at large outdoor gatherings as well as indoor events. 785

On May 13, 2021, the CDC announced that the mask mandate was effectively lifted and
individuals who were fully vaccinated did not need to wear masks at all (except as otherwise
required, such as the mandate on public transportation which was still in effect). 786

This abrupt announcement and change caused mass confusion amongst state and local
officials, as well as the public at large. People did not know which way to turn or which policy to
follow. 787 Senior government officials did not alleviate the confusion. Merely two days before
the CDC dropped the guidance on required face masks, Dr. Walensky appeared before Senate
HELP and adamantly defended the guidance at the time. At the hearing, Dr. Walensky stated the
measures that are known to prevent the spread of the virus must remain the policy, despite calls
from lawmakers that suggested the CDC was too harsh in requesting masks for outdoors. 788 This
abrupt announcement stunned medical and public health experts. At the Senate hearing, Dr.
Walensky doggedly argued the CDC policy was the most appropriate at the time, yet two days
later it was changed without providing people proper notice to prepare for the lifting of the
restriction.

Due to the change in Biden Administration policy and CDC guidance, many states began
lifting their mask mandates. 789 On May 20, 2021, in yet another whiplash moment, Dr. Fauci
stated he believed Americans were “misinterpreting” the guidance. 790 In an interview, he stated
"[the CDC] said: If you are vaccinated, you can feel safe — that you will not get infected either
outdoors or indoors. It did not explicitly say that unvaccinated people should abandon their
masks." 791 This is one of many statements that were provided by public health leadership without
the backing of a scientific study. It was a declaration by Dr. Fauci, verified by Dr. Fauci.

On July 26, 2021, the CDC issued yet another change in guidance, stating even
vaccinated individuals should wear masks when indoors, if in a region with a substantial and
high transmission. 792 The guidance also recommended masks be mandated at schools for all
students and faculty, regardless of vaccination status. The Biden Administration and CDC
provided no scientific justification or information for the change, apart from citing the new Delta
variant. 793

785
Jason Hoffman & Maegan Vazquez, Biden pushes new CDC mask guidance as a reason why all Americans
should get vaccinated, CNN (Apr. 27, 2021); Elizabeth Cohen, et al., CDC issues new outdoor mask guidance for
fully vaccinated people, CNN (Apr. 27, 2021).
786
Paul LeBlanc & Kaitlan Collins, Biden touts new CDC mask guidance as ‘a great day for America’, CNN (May
13, 2021).
787
Id.
788
An Update from Federal Officials on Efforts to Combat COVID-19: Hearing before Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, 117th Cong., (May 11, 2021).
789
Chas Banner, Mask Mandates Are Back – Even for the Vaccinated. Here’s What to Know, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Aug.
7, 2021).
790
See Wilson Wong, Fauci says public is 'misinterpreting' latest CDC mask guidance, NBC (May 20, 2021).
791
Id.
792
HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF & OTHERS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (updated July 26, 2021)
(archived copy with Select Subcomm. Staff).
793
Id.

Page 205 of 520

 Citing the availability of vaccines, treatments, and improved testing options, on February
25, 2022, the CDC stated residents in areas of substantial and high transmissions (of which 70
percent of the country was no longer considered due to a change in the CDC metrics when
determining COVID-19 risk by county) did not need to wear a mask, regardless of vaccination
status. 794 By April 2022, mask mandates were lifted in all U.S. states, except Hawaii that still had
a mask mandate in schools. 795

In times of national public health crisis, Americans should be able to turn to the CDC to
guide us through turmoil. Yet, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the worst public health crisis in
our modern era, the CDC constantly redirected their opinions and provided conflicting answers.
These actions undermined the American people’s belief in the CDC, public health leadership,
and science as a whole. At the start of the pandemic, 69 percent of Americans believed what the
CDC said, yet by March 2022 that number was only 44 percent. 796 This must change before a
future pandemic.

FINDING: The Biden Administration Exceeded its Authority by Mandating Masks.

In February 2021, the CDC, under President Biden’s EO, required the use of masks on
public transportation under section 264(a) of the Public Health Service Act of 1944 [hereinafter
“PHSA”]. 797 On April 13, 2022, the CDC announced it extended the requirement for face masks
on public transportation by an additional 15 days. 798 However, a lawsuit filed by 21 state
Attorneys General called to block the federal mandate extension, particularly after the CDC
suggested in a guidance in late February 2022 that almost 70 percent of Americans could stop
wearing masks. 799

On April 18, 2022, a federal judge of the District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
found the mandate unlawful, stating the CDC exceeded its legal authority. 800 The PHSA allows
the CDC to prevent the interstate spread of communicable disease. 801 The CDC argued the mask
requirement, which was issued as an emergency action, was “reasonable and necessary measure
to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of COVID-19” and that it was acting within
the scope of power granted by Congress under the PHSA. 802

794
Berkeley Lovelace Jr. & Erika Edwards, Indoor mask use no longer necessary across most of the U.S., CDC says,
NBC (Feb. 25, 2022).
795
Katie Teague, et al., Where Are COVID-19 Mask Mandates Still in Effect?, CNET (Apr. 13, 2022).
796
James Hamblin, Can Public Health Be Saved?, THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2022).
797
Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Joseph R. Biden, No. 8:21-cv-01693-KKM-AEP, 2022 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18,
2022).
798
Will Stone & Pien Huang, CDC extends transportation mask mandate until May 3, NPR (Apr. 13, 2022).
799
Apoorva Mandavilli, New C.D.C. Guidelines Suggest 70 Percent of Americans Can Stop Wearing Masks, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2022).
800
Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Joseph R. Biden, No. 8:21-cv-01693-KKM-AEP, 2022 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18,
2022).
801
Id.
802
Id.

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 The court held the CDC’s interpretation of its powers granted by Congress was overly
broad and struck down the mandate as unlawful. 803 The court noted that while section 264(a) of
the PHSA does allow for regulations to curb the spread of communicable diseases, the power to
do so must be done within the enumerated actions of the regulation, namely “inspection,
fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, and destruction of contaminated animals
and articles, and other measures.” 804

The CDC argued that “sanitation” measures were intended for the general promotion of
hygiene and prevention of disease, and as such the mask mandate was appropriate under that
definition, even though “sanitation” is not defined by the PHSA. 805 The court ruled masking was
distinct from sanitation. 806 The court also discussed that since its enaction, the PHSA has rarely
been invoked, and “generally limited to quarantining infected individuals and prohibiting the
import or sale of animals known to transmit disease.” 807 The decision further noted the CDC’s
use of section 264(a) (notably, shutting down the cruise ship industry and stopping landlords
from evicting tenants who had not paid their rent) were ruled as acts that also exceeded the
CDC’s statutory authority. 808

The court’s decision also discussed how the CDC did not adequately follow the rules of
the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter “APA”] by not providing the public with an
adequate review and comment period and further not properly explaining its reasoning. 809
Ultimately, the court ruled the mask mandate exceeded the CDC’s, and by extension the Biden
Administration’s, statutory authority and violated the procedures for agency rulemaking under
the APA. 810 This decision almost immediately ended the mask mandate for public transportation.
The judge presiding over the case wrote in her opinion, “[i]f Congress intended this definition,
the power bestowed on the C.D.C. would be breathtaking…And it certainly would not be limited
to modest measures of ‘sanitation’ like masks.” 811

FINDING: The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Relied on Flawed Studies to
Support the Issuance of Mask Mandates.

In issuing guidances that mandated the use of masks across the country, the CDC publicly
relied on several different studies to justify the actions. The CDC provided a list of
approximately 15 studies that demonstrated wearing masks reduced new infections. 812 Yet, all 15
of the provided studies are observational studies that were conducted after COVID-19 began and,

803
Id.
804
Id.
805
Id.
806
Id.
807
Id.
808
Id.
809
Id.
810
Id.
811
Id.
812
Science Brief: Community Use of Masks to Control the Spread of SARS-CoV-2, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION (last updated Dec. 6, 2021).

Page 207 of 520

importantly, none of them were RCTs. 813 RCTs are considered the gold standard in medical
research.

One study the CDC utilized to mandate masks was the “Missouri hairstylists.” 814 There,
an observational cohort study, focused on two hairstylists that were positive for COVID-19 while
providing hair styling services to customers. 815 The stylists worked on 139 customers over
several days, and both stylists were masked the whole time. Many of the customers were as well,
but not all of them were. Out of 139 people, 67 customers chose to test for COVID-19 after
receiving their service, and all of whom tested negative. The other 72 either did not test for
COVID-19 or did not report any symptoms of the virus.

While these numbers appear significant, this study is far from perfect. For example, the
72 clients who reported no COVID-19 symptoms could absolutely have been positive but
asymptomatic, or purposely chose not to report to the Green County Health Department. 816 There
was also no control group for this study. There was no way to know, how many people, if anyone
at all, could have been infected had neither stylist worn a mask during the appointments. Further,
the study does not discuss any alternatives as to why no one became sick. There was no
discussion of the ventilation of the salon, the hand hygiene of the stylists, or the fact that a client
and stylists generally do not come face to face.

The CDC also utilized a study of 1,000 public school children in Arizona that concluded
students without mask mandates were 3.5 times as likely to experience COVID-19 outbreaks as
the ones that did have mask mandates. 817 The study published in September 2021 reviewed
school-associated COVID-19 outbreaks and compared rates across schools with and without
mandates. 818

However, this study also posed serious flaws. The very first lines of the paper note the
authors studied school mask policies and COVID-19 outbreaks between “July 15-August 31,
2021.” 819 This time frame is important, because the schools that were reviewed for the study
were not all open at the same time. For example, some of these schools were not open during the
month of July at all; some of the other schools did not have a start date until August 10; and
some of the schools only had a few weeks of student activity during the summer. 820 There was
also not a control for the vaccination status of staff and students and the definition of an outbreak
of COVID-19 was two or more cases among staff or students within a 14-day period versus cases
per week per student. 821 Further, the list of Maricopa County schools used for the study included:
at least three schools from Pima County (two hours away), one preschool, at least one virtual

813
Id.
814
M. Joshua Hendrix, et al., Absence of Apparent Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from Two Stylists After Exposure at
a Hair Salon with a Universal Face Covering Policy — Springfield, Missouri, May 2020, MMWR (July 17, 2020).
815
Id.
816
Jeffrey H. Anderson, Do Masks Work?, CITY JOURNAL (Aug. 11, 2021).
817
Megan Jegn, P.hD, et al., Association Between K–12 School Mask Policies and School-Associated COVID-19
Outbreaks — Maricopa and Pima Counties, Arizona, July–August 2021, MMWR (Sep. 24, 2021).
818
Id.
819
Id.
820
Id.
821
Id.

Page 208 of 520

academy, and more than 80 vocational programs. 822 When asked about these discrepancies, the
journal replied “MMWR is committed to quickly correcting errors when they are identified. We
reviewed the specific items that you describe below and found no errors.” 823

A similar study out of Georgia was published in May 2021. 824 In this study, authors
reviewed case rates of 90,000 students, comparing schools with and without mandates. 825 It
showed 37 percent lower instances of COVID-19 in schools where staff were required to wear a
mask and 21 percent lower for children. 826 However, the authors noted the difference was not
statistically significant, and thus the data could not be used to infer causal relationships. 827

Yet, in an interview with Face the Nation, at a White House briefing, and a public tweet,
the CDC cited the Arizona study and claimed in a blanket statement that lack of school mask
mandates more than tripled the risk of outbreaks. 828

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

822
Id.
823
David Zweig, The CDC’s Flawed Case for Wearing Masks in School, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 6, 2021).
824
Jenna Gettings, et al., Mask Use and Ventilation Improvements to Reduce COVID-19 Incidence in Elementary
Schools — Georgia, November 16–December 11, 2020, MMWR (May 28, 2021).
825
Id.
826
Id.
827
Id.
828
David Zweig, The CDC’s Flawed Case for Wearing Masks in School, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 6, 2021).

Page 209 of 520

 Additional, peer-reviewed, literature on masking began to emerge as the pandemic
progressed. In May 2020, a study published in Emerging Infectious Diseases found “[i]n pooled
analysis, we found no significant reduction in influenza transmission with the use of face
masks.” 829 There, researchers conducted a professional literature review of several RCTs
surrounding different nonpharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza studies, including
ten on face masks. 830 Also in May 2020, the New England Journal of Medicine published an
article on masking in hospitals. 831 Those researches observed, “[w]e know that wearing a mask
outside health care facilities offers little, if any, protection from infection.” 832 A November 2022
British Medical Journal study found that masking of Spanish school-aged children with cloth
masks did not lower SARS-CoV-2 transmission, “suggesting that this intervention was not
effective.” 833

During a deposition related to the lawsuit filed by the Attorneys General of Louisiana and
Missouri, which alleges collusion by the Biden Administration to censor COVID-19 speech on
social media, counsel for the plaintiff asked Dr. Fauci which studies the CDC relied upon to
justify the mask mandates. 834 They asked Dr. Fauci how many studies, and if any placebo-based

829
Jingyi Xiao, et al., Nonpharmaceutical Measures for Pandemic Influenza in Nonhealthcare Settings—Personal
Protective and Environmental Measures, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (May 26, 2020).
830
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (May 26, 2020).
831
Michael Klompas, M.D., M.P.H., et al., Universal Masking in Hospitals in the Covid-19 Era, THE NEW ENGLAND
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (Apr. 1, 2020).
832
Id.
833
Ermengol Coma, et al., Unravelling the role of the mandatory use of face covering masks for the control of
SARS-CoV-2 in schools: a quasi-experimental study nested in a population-based cohort in Catalonia (Spain),
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (Nov. 3, 2022).
834
Missouri v. Biden, 3:22-cv-01213, (W.D. La. Jan. 11, 2023) (Deposition of Dr. Anthony Fauci (Nov. 23, 2022)).

Page 210 of 520

randomized, double-blind studies were conducted between February 2020 and April 2020. 835 Dr.
Fauci answered that he could not recall. 836 It is absolutely essential that these decisions—
decisions that had real life consequences—can be verified after the fact. 837

Dr. Fauci admitted that at the population level, masks do not provide effective coverage,
stating, “[f]rom a broad public-health standpoint, at the population level, masks work at the
margins — maybe 10 percent.” 838 He does go on to say that for an individual, who religiously
wears a mask, the highest standard of a well-fitted KN95 or N95 is effective. 839 However, the
reality of that perfect storm of factors coming together for one person, let alone the entire
country, is impossible.

In late January 2023, the most rigorous and comprehensive review of the scientific
literature on masks during the COVID-19 pandemic was published by Cochrane. 840 Cochrane is
considered the worlds most respected organization for evaluating health interventions, is known
for being the single best resource for methodologic research, 841 and is recognized as having the
highest standard of evidence-based healthcare. 842

The January 2023 publication found that wearing any kind of face covering “probably
makes little or no difference” in reducing the spread of respiratory illness. 843 The study reviewed
15 trials comparing outcomes of wearing surgical masks versus no mask and also versus N95
masks, in hospital and community settings during the pandemic. The conclusion was that the
value of wearing masks was approximately zero. 844 “There is just no evidence that they make
any difference. Full stop.” 845

The trajectories of the rate of COVID-19 infections for states with mask mandates and
states without is virtually identical. Eleven states never mandated masks, while the rest had some
form of enforcement. 846 Mandates generally began in early 2020 and stayed until summer of
2021, some into 2022. 847

835
Id.
836
Id.
837
Id.
838
David Wallace-Wells, Dr. Fauci Looks Back: ‘Something Clearly Went Wrong’, THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2023).
839
Id.
840
Tom Jefferson, et al., Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses, COCHRANE
(Jan. 30, 2023).
841
Jeremy Grimshaw, So what has the Cochrane Collaboration ever done for us? A report card on the first 10 years,
CMAJ (Sep. 28, 2004).
842
A. Cipriani, et al., What is a Cochrane review?, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRIC SCIENCES (Sep. 20, 2011).
843
Tom Jefferson, et al., Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses, COCHRANE
(Jan. 30, 2023).
844
John Tierney, Approximately Zero, CITY JOURNAL (Feb. 17, 2023).
845
A. Cipriani, et al., What is a Cochrane review?, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRIC SCIENCES (Sep. 20, 2011).
846
Ian Miller, Unmasked (Post Hill Press, 2022).
847
Id.

Page 211 of 520

 It is apparent that the CDC and the Biden Administration cherry-picked observational
data to fit their narrative that masks are fully effective. Yet, that is not the role of the CDC. The
CDC is an agency meant to protect the American people, and part of that responsibility includes
conducting, sponsoring, or at the very least examining clinical trials to actually have the best
available research before formulating its guidance.

FINDING: Forcibly Masking Young Children, Ages Two and Older, Caused More Harm than
Good.

One area where the mask mandate may have caused quantifiable harm is the masking of
children. The April 3, 2020-February 25, 2022 (with a brief lift between May 13,2021-July 27,
2021) CDC guidance masking in schools was unbelievably far reaching. It called for “universal
indoor masking by all students (age two and older), staff, teachers, and visitors to K-12 schools,
regardless of vaccinations status.” 848

Many countries, including the U.K., Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, followed the
guidelines of the WHO. The WHO specifically did not recommend masking children aged five
or younger because they are at low risk of illness, masks are “not in the overall interest of the
child,” and also because most children that age are not capable of wearing a mask properly or
efficiently. 849 The WHO also recommended children aged six through 11 not routinely wear
masks because of potential adverse impact to psychosocial and learning development. 850 The
WHO further explicitly advised against children wearing masks during physical activities, such
as outside playground time, so as not to impede their breathing. 851

But beyond those logical reasons as to not require young children to wear a mask all day,
every day, are additional, still unknown consequences. These can be issues such as delayed
848
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR K-12 SCHOOLS AND EARLY CARE AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT SAFE IN-
PERSON LEARNING, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last updated Oct. 4, 2023).
849
Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Children and masks, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 7, 2022).
850
Id.
851
Id.

Page 212 of 520

speech and language disorders in young children. Many children that wore masks were more
hesitant to talk with a mask on, further substantiating insecurities in communication. 852

COVID-19 did not affect children at the same rate as adults. A May 2020 Journal of the
American Medical Association [hereinafter “JAMA”] review of North American pediatric
hospitals article published, “[o]ur data indicates that children are at far greater risk of critical
illness from influenza than from COVID-19.” 853 COVID-19 was far less serious for children
than it was for adults.

Yet even with the early knowledge children were not as suspectable to the virus, many
students were subjected to wearing masks for much longer than necessary. Further, in 2022, the
CDC did not list speech or language impairments as an adequate reason for a mask exemption
for schools. 854 The consequences of this are already being felt. The American Speech-Language-
Hearing Association published a 2023 survey that concluded two-thirds of participating speech-
language pathologists reported in increase in client referrals since 2020. 855

Ignoring the science and facts of COVID-19 and the harms of masking young children
was profoundly immoral on behalf of the leadership of the country’s public health officials. The
future consequences of these types of draconian policies are not yet known, but public health
leaders in the future should remember that all policy must be decided in a balanced manner.

852
Stephanie H. Murray, Speech Therapy Shows the Difficult Trade-Offs of Wearing Masks, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2,
2022).
853
Lara S. Shekerdemian, et al., Characteristics and Outcomes of Children With Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) Infection Admitted to US and Canadian Pediatric Intensive Care Units, JAMA (May 2020).
854
Stephanie H. Murray, Speech Therapy Shows the Difficult Trade-Offs of Wearing Masks, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2,
2022).
855
Liza Stahnke, Elusive Words: Confronting the Post-Pandemic Skills Gap, ASHAWIRE (May 17, 2024).

Page 213 of 520

VI. Unscientific COVID-19 Lockdowns Caused More Harm Than Good

The COVID-19 pandemic proved to be one of the most consequential events in modern
American history. Yet, the virus itself may not have the same lasting effects to health, culture,
and the economy as the government’s policy response. From the local to the federal level,
policies aimed at fighting COVID-19 had tremendous unintended consequences and side-effects
that we will likely be dealing with for generations to come. One of the most controversial and
consequential of these pandemic-era policies were the stay-at-home orders and other social
distancing policies generally referred to as “lockdowns.” Later in the pandemic a new de facto
lockdown emerged for unvaccinated Americans in many parts of the country with mandatory
vaccination policies often referred to as “vaccine passports.” Most federal lockdown policies
were nonbinding guidelines for states to use to inform their own policy, though they directly led
to stringent lockdowns which were executed with the force of law in many states.

On March 16, 2020, the Trump Administration announced “15 days to slow the spread”
guidelines. Subsequent to these guidelines, states and localities took it a step further and began to
issue strict lockdown orders. 856 At this point, there appeared to be general agreement that
potentially unnecessary activities should be put on hold temporarily to “flatten the curve” and
mitigate the risk of the healthcare system being overwhelmed by serious cases of COVID-19.
Yet, behind the scenes public health officials were quietly preparing for a much longer period of
disruption. Dr. Birx later wrote in her book “Silent Invasion” that 15 days was simply a starting
point and that she had already planned for a longer lockdown when pitching the plan.

No sooner had we convinced the Trump administration to implement our

version of a two-week shutdown than I was trying to figure out how to
extend it. Fifteen Days to Slow the Spread was a start, but I knew it would
be just that. I didn’t have the numbers in front of me yet to make the case
for extending it longer, but I had two weeks to get them. 857

Ultimately, the promised 15 days evolved into years, which caused incredibly damaging
consequences for the American people. Rather than prioritizing the protection of the most
vulnerable, federal and state government policies encouraged or forced millions of Americans to
forego critical elements of a healthy, happy, productive, and fulfilling life. This appears to be a
fundamental problem with the public health approach favored by American institutions during
the pandemic. In an apparent mea culpa from Dr. Collins on a panel for Braver Angels, he
admitted that the approach inherently disregarded possible collateral damage and blindly sought
to fight COVID itself.

You attach infinite value to stopping the disease and saving a life. You attach
zero value to whether this actually totally disrupts people’s lives, ruins the
economy, and has many kids kept out of school in a way that they never
quite recovered. 858

856
Press Release, White House, 15 Days to Slow the Spread (Mar. 16, 2020).
857
David R. Henderson, Book Review: Silent Invasion, CATO INSTITUTE (Spring 2023).
858
Braver Angels, A Deplorable and an Elitist Walk into a Bar: Francis Collins and Wilk Wilkinson (July 10, 2023).

Page 214 of 520

 As more data comes out about the elements to which the public health establishment
attached “zero value,” it appears the American people could have been better served by policies
which focused on protecting the most vulnerable while prioritizing productivity and normalcy for
the less vulnerable.

FINDING: Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Unnecessarily Harmed the U.S. Economy.

Potentially the most severe consequence of COVID-19 lockdowns was the damage they
caused to the economy. In the wake of COVID-19 lockdowns, businesses closed, workers were
laid off, and inflation soared. The lockdowns also disproportionately disrupted service industry
jobs, thereby doubly punishing lower wage earners across the country while professional and
business sectors shifted to remote work. Meanwhile, shifting consumer habits and disrupted
supply chains helped to pump up the stock market and drive-up profits for large corporations and
wealthy individuals. As a result of lockdowns, millions of Americans experienced new and
painful economic hardship. This Report contains more more detail about the economic
destruction during the pandemic.

FINDING: Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Unnecessarily Damaged American’s Mental

Health.

Enduring COVID-19 lockdowns had drastic consequences on the mental health of many
Americans, including elevated substance abuse, overdoses, and suicide. The full picture of these
consequences is not yet knowable as it will take years to collect and analyze the data, however
currently available data already indicates incredibly troubling trends. For example, a March 2024
Nature study found a 22 percent increase in mental health disorders between 2019 and 2020. 859
The study also found a causal relationship between lockdowns and mental health disorders.

Results show that lockdown has significantly and causally increased the
usage of mental health facilities in regions with lockdowns in comparison
to regions without such lockdowns. Particularly, resource usage increased
by 18% in regions with a lockdown compared to 1% decline in regions
without a lockdown. 860

Data showing this troubling trend was available early in the pandemic. An August 2020 CDC
study on mental health during the pandemic found that 40 percent of U.S. adults reported
struggling with mental health or substance use. 861

Other forms of addiction also rose dramatically during the era of lockdowns. A chapter in
the textbook “Behavioral Addiction: A Comprehensive Perspective” highlighted data illustrating

859
Ibtihal Ferwana & Lav. R Varshney, The impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on mental health patient populations in
the United States, NATURE (Mar. 7, 2024).
860
Id.
861
Mark É. Czeisler, et al., Mental Health, Substance Use, and Suicidal Ideation During the COVID-19 Pandemic
— United States, June 24–30, 2020, MMWR (Aug. 14, 2020).

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a troubling rise in gambling, internet gaming, pornography, social media, online dating,
shopping, and food addictions. 862

The COVID-19 pandemic has cast a spotlight on the intricate relationship

between public health crises and behavior addiction. It has underscored the
need for a nuanced understanding of how stressors, isolation, and the digital
age intersect to foster addiction in various forms, from smartphone and
social media addiction to pornography and food addiction. 863

Unfortunately, it also appears that many of the individuals who were the least at risk of
serious illness or death from COVID-19 were at disproportionately higher risk of suffering
serious mental distress as a result of lockdowns. For example, a February 2023 study, published
by the American Academy of Pediatrics, found that suicide deaths among U.S. youth increased
significantly during the pandemic, with an estimated 212 excess youth suicides occurring in 2020
alone. 864 This trend appeared even stronger with substance abuse. A December 2022 CDC study
found that median monthly adolescent overdose deaths increased 109% between July-December
2019 to July-December 2021. 865

FINDING: Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Disrupted the Development of American

Children and Young Adults.

Reports indicate that speech delays in children are more common in the wake of the
pandemic. In 2023, the American Speech and Hearing Association conducted a national poll of
audiologists and speech-language pathologists who work with children under the age of five, the
majority of whom reported an increase in referrals for concerns about hearing, speech, and
language delays or disorders since the pandemic began. 866 Of the polled speech-language
pathologists, 84 percent reported seeing more children with emotional or behavioral difficulties,
79 percent reported seeing more children with delayed language or diagnosed language
disorders, and 78 percent reported seeing more children with social communication
difficulties. 867

This increase in speech and language disorders is also supported by studies conducted in
the U.S. and abroad in the wake of the pandemic. Research done by Rhode Island Hospital’s
Advanced Baby Imaging Lab and the nonprofit LENA Foundation indicates that children under
16 months old showed a significant reduction in verbal skills between 2020 and 2021, and
neuroimaging data showed that babies born during the pandemic had slower growth in the

862
Kevin Gallagher, Pandemic Lockdowns Led to Spike in Behavioral Addictions, MAD IN AMERICA (Nov. 22,
2023).
863
Id.
864
Jeffrey A. Bridge, et al., Youth Suicide During the First Year of the COVID-19 Pandemic, PEDIATRICS (Feb. 15,
2023).
865
Lauren J. Tanz, et al., Drug Overdose Deaths Among Persons Aged 10–19 Years — United States, July 2019–
December 2021, MMWR (Dec. 16, 2022).
866
Poll Shows Increase in Hearing, Speech, and Language Referrals, More Communication Challenges in Young
Children, ASHA (Apr. 30, 2023).
867
Id.

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communications channels of the brain. 868 A related preprint study co-authored by the Advanced
Baby Imaging Lab’s Principal Director, Dr. Sean Deoni, found that children born during the
pandemic had average cognitive scores of 78, down from 100 in children born before the
pandemic. 869 Analysis by LENA used devices worn by children to measure the number of words
spoken near the child and the child’s own vocalizations in order to count child-adult
interactions—a critical component of language acquisition according to researchers. 870 LENA
researchers found that “children born nine months into the COVID-19 pandemic produced
significantly fewer vocalizations and experienced fewer serve-and-return interactions in the first
months of life than those born before the pandemic.” 871

Harmful developmental delays were not limited just to infants born during the pandemic.
Due to lockdowns as well as financial hardship, more young adults became dependent on their
parents during the pandemic. According to Pew Research, the share of 18–29-year-olds living at
home with their parents reached 52 percent during the first year of the pandemic—surpassing the
previous peak during the Great Depression. 872 Scientific studies on teenagers and young adults
have also found other troubling trends associated with lockdowns. For example, a September
2024 study from the University of Washington found that COVID-19 lockdowns prematurely
aged the brains of teenagers, with the trend appearing stronger in females than males. 873 The
researchers said of their findings “our research introduces a new set of questions about what it
means to speed up the aging process in the brain. All the best research raises profound new
questions, and I think that’s what we’ve done here.” 874

These harmful effects associated with COVID-19 lockdowns in American youth are also
inexorably linked to extended school closures. This Report contains more details on the impacts
of school closures.

FINDING: Enduring COVID-19 Lockdowns Unnecessarily had Severe Consequences for

Americans’ Physical Health.

While COVID-19 itself was clearly a massive threat to American’s health, so too were
the lockdowns. One analysis done using CDC data found that non-COVID-19 excess deaths
totaled nearly 100,000 per year in 2020 and 2021. 875 The findings indicate that hypertension,
heart disease, and diabetes dominated the excess deaths for senior citizens, while accidents,
868
Sarah D. Sparks, Babies Are Saying Less Since the Pandemic: Why That’s Concerning, EDUCATION WEEK (Apr.
7, 2022).
869
CrisAnna Mink, Is COVID causing developmental delays in kids?, USC CENTER FOR HEALTH JOURNALISM (Dec.
21, 2021).
870
Jo Napolitano, New Research: Babies Born During COVID Talk Less with Caregivers, Slower to Develop
Critical Language Skills, THE 74 (Apr. 18, 2022).
871
LENA Team, COVID-era infants vocalize less and experience fewer conversational turns, says LENA research
team, LENA (Mar. 7, 2022).
872
Richard Fry, et al., A majority of young adults in the U.S. live with their parents for the first time since the Great
Depression, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 4, 2020).
873
Lauren Kirschman, COVID-19 lockdowns prematurely aged teenage brains, UW study shows, UW NEWS (Sept.
9, 2024).
874
Id.
875
Casey B. Mulligan & Robert D. Arnott, The Young were not Spared: What Death Certificates Reveal about Non-
Covid Excess Deaths, SAGE JOURNALS (Dec. 15, 2022).

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overdoses, alcoholism, and homicide skewed younger. 876 Because of this, Americans under the
age of 45 had more excess deaths without the virus in 2020 and 2021 than they had from it.

If the pandemic response had to involve wholesale disruption of ordinary

life, the public-health community should have been actively monitoring its
effects on the millions of Americans we knew suffered from drug addiction,
diabetes and many other potentially lethal health conditions. No time is too
soon to acknowledge and begin to alleviate the collateral damage from
Covid policies. 877

Relatedly, COVID-19 lockdowns led to many procedures and doctor visits being delayed
for millions of Americans. One study published in JAMA found that 41 percent of Americans
had forgone medical care during the early months of the pandemic, from March to July 2020. 878
Some studies have even found that early detection of diseases such as cancer was hindered. For
instance, a report published in JAMA Oncology in January 2021 found a “significant decrease in
the number of patients undergoing screening tests for cancer and in the number of ensuing
diagnoses of cancerous and precancerous lesions during the COVID-19 pandemic…” 879

Disease prevention was also hindered significantly by our COVID response. Looking at
cardiovascular health trends alone, it is clear how significant the damage is. One survey found
that 42 percent of Americans gained more weight than they intended, with an average weight
gain of 29 pounds. 880 The millions of missed appointments not only have serious implications for
disease prevention and detection, but they also led to increased wait times, 881 shortened
appointments, and patient burnout once things returned to normal. 882

FINDING: Despite Lacking Scientific Basis, Vaccine Passports Became a De Facto

Lockdown for Unvaccinated Americans.

In 2021 and 2022, with the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines, some policies were eased,
and normalcy began slowly returning in many areas of American life. However, a new de facto
lockdown began to emerge across many jurisdictions for anyone who elected not to receive a
COVID-19 vaccine. The Report addresses broader issue of COVID-19 vaccine mandates, but so-
called “vaccine passport” policies were in some ways their own distinct policy. “Vaccine
passports” refer to policies put in place which required vaccination to attend social functions—
like sporting events and concerts, travel, patronize restaurants and bars, or other activities. 883
While there were a variety of methods used to verify vaccination status, among the most
common was to require individuals to present their CDC issued COVID-19 vaccine cards.
876
Id.
877
Id.
878
15 Days to Slow the Spread, supra note 856.
879
David R. Henderson, Book Review: Silent Invasion, CATO INSTITUTE (Spring 2023).
880
Sophie Bethune, One year on: Unhealth weight gains, increased drinking reported by Americans coping with
pandemic stress, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Mar. 11, 2021).
881
Oliver Kharraz, Long waits to see a doctor are a public health crisis, STAT (May 2, 2023).
882
Jamie Ducharme, Long Waits, Short Appointments, Huge Bills: U.S. Health Care is Causing Patient Burnout,
TIME (Feb. 27, 2023).
883
Anna Rouw, et al., Key Questions about COVID-19 Vaccine Passports and the U.S., KFF (Apr. 15, 2021).

Page 218 of 520

According to reports, the CDC issued nearly 1 billion of these cards between 2020 and May of
2023. 884

In August 2021, New York City became the first major city to impose a vaccine passport
requirement when Mayor Bill de Blasio announced that the city would require proof of
vaccination for customers and employees of gyms, movie theaters, and indoor dining
establishments. 885 During Mayor de Blasio’s briefing announcing the policy, New York State
Senator James Sanders Jr. spoke in support of the effort, saying, “you have the right to your
body, of course, but you do not have the right to kill other people” and that “a strong stance
needs to be taken.” 886 This type of divisive rhetoric became a hallmark of the era of vaccine
passport policies. Many leaders and politicians sought to characterize unvaccinated individuals
as being the source of the continued pain and suffering that COVID-19 was imparting, and
vaccine passports were presented as a solution. On July 16, 2021, just a month before the New
York City vaccine passport policy, Dr. Walensky notoriously warned that “this is becoming a
pandemic of the unvaccinated.” 887

However, COVID-19 vaccines were never intended to stop the spread of the virus, and any
marginal benefit they provided in this particular realm had essentially disappeared with the
outbreak of the Delta variant—which was already widely spreading among vaccinated
individuals in August 2021. 888 Dr. Walensky herself acknowledged on August 5, 2021, that
COVID-19 vaccines “continue to work well for Delta, with regard to severe illness and death –
they prevent it. But what they can’t do anymore is prevent transmission.” 889 Unfortunately, even
with this knowledge that the vaccines did little to prevent the spread of the disease, numerous
other jurisdictions followed New York City’s lead and imposed similar requirements for vaccine
passports, including New Orleans, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Washington
D.C., and others. 890

In the paper, “The unintended consequences of COVID-19 vaccine policy: why mandates,
passports and restrictions may cause more harm than good,” the authors argued that these sorts of
“differential restrictions” were often viewed as punitive and discriminatory and had damaging
effects on public trust, vaccine confidence, and political polarization.

While vaccine mandates for other diseases exist in some settings (e.g.,
schools, travel (e.g., yellow fever) and, in some instances, for healthcare
workers, population-wide adult mandates, passports, and segregated

884
Ayana Archie, The CDC will no longer issue COVID-19 vaccination cards, NPR (Oct. 5, 2023
885
Emma G. Fitzsimmons, New York City to Require Proof of Vaccination for Indoor Dining and Gyms, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2021).
886
Id.
887
Emily Anthes & Alexander E. Petri, C.D.C. Director Warns of a ‘Pandemic of the Unvaccinated’, THE N.Y.
TIMES (July 16, 2021, updated July 22, 2021).
888
Reuters Fact Check, Fact Check: Preventing transmission never required for COVID vaccines’ initial approval;
Pfizer vax did reduce transmission of early variants, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2024).
889
Madeline Holcombe & Christina Maxouris, Fully vaccinated people who get a Covid-19 breakthrough infection
can transmit the virus, CDC chief says, CNN HEALTH (Aug. 6, 2021).
890
Carlie Porterfield, Here Are The U.S. Cities Where You Need A Covid Vaccine To Dine In A Restaurant, FORBES
(Dec. 22, 2021).

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 restrictions are unprecedented and have never before been implemented on
this scale. These vaccine policies have largely been framed as offering
‘benefits’ (freedoms) for those with a full COVID-19 vaccination series, but
a sizeable proportion of people view conditioning access to health, work,
travel and social activities on COVID-19 vaccination status as inherently
punitive, discriminatory and coercive. 891

These policies which imparted “segregated restrictions” essentially created a new type of
lockdown wherein unvaccinated individuals were denied the ability to return to normalcy under
the incorrect assumption that they were a danger to society. This de facto lockdown also had
some staying power, with some jurisdictions continuing their vaccine passport policies into
2022. 892 Even once local governments lifted the requirements, many businesses chose to
continue them independently, therefore illustrating how pervasive these false assumptions about
COVID-19 vaccines protective abilities had become. 893 The COVID-19 vaccines are arguably
more akin to treatments than the traditional vaccines the American public is used to receiving in
early childhood. The mRNA vaccines for COVID-19 did not prevent human-to-human
transmission nor prevent COVID-19 infection in the way that traditional vaccines have been able
to do. Not fully and honestly explaining this dynamic was a critical public health messaging
failure. It is likely that COVID-19 vaccine passport policies and related divisive political rhetoric
will have continued impact on Americans’ perception of public health and may be a hurdle for
future pandemic preparedness.

891
Kevin Bardosh, et al., The unintended consequences of COVID-19 vaccine policy: why mandates, passports and
restrictions may cause more harm than good, BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH (May 2023).
892
New Orleans COVID Safety Plan, (last updated Apr. 19, 2022) available at
https://www.neworleans.com/blog/post/new-orleans-covid-safety/.
893
Kayla Benjamin, DC’s Vaccine Mandate Is Over—but Many Restaurants, Gyms, and Entertainment Venues Still
Require Vax Proof, WASHINGTONIAN (Feb. 16, 2022).

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VII. Former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s March 25 Order Was Medical
Malpractice, and the New York Executive Chamber Attempted to Cover it Up

Beginning in March 2020, federal, state, and local governments rushed to respond to the
COVID-19, implementing strict social distancing and stay-at-home orders aiming to limit
transmission. It quickly became clear that COVID-19 was especially dangerous for elderly
people and people with comorbidities. Accordingly, it was critically important that public health
policy prioritize and implement targeted mitigation measures to protect high-risk populations.

Many states issued guidance intended to reduce exposure to COVID-19 for vulnerable
populations in nursing homes and long-term care facilities. Namely, this included restricting
individuals diagnosed with COVID-19 from accessing these facilities.

However, a handful states—including New York—failed to institute similar guidance.

Instead, New York issued an order that effectively required nursing homes and long-term care
facilities to admit COVID-19 positive individuals.

On March 25, 2020, the Cuomo Administration issued a directive entitled “Hospital
Discharges and Admissions to Nursing Homes” [hereinafter the “March 25 Directive”]. 894 The
March 25 Directive ordered that “[n]o resident shall be denied re-admission or admission to the
[nursing home] solely based on a confirmed or suspected diagnosis of COVID-19” and “[nursing
homes] are prohibited from requiring a hospitalized resident who is determined medically stable
to be tested from COVID-19 prior to admission or re-admission.” 895 While other states with
similar orders quickly reversed course, Mr. Cuomo failed to terminate his directive for six
weeks.

As a result of the March 25 Directive, more than 9,000 COVID-19 patients were
readmitted or admitted to nursing homes between March 25, 2020 and May 8, 2020. 896 This
unjustifiably exposed vulnerable nursing home populations to COVID-19, causing predictable
but disastrous consequences—including excess deaths. 897

FINDING: The Cuomo Administration’s March 25 Directive Was Antithetical to Known

Science.

It was well understood early in the pandemic that COVID-19 did not harm all people
equally. Age and comorbidities were the most important risk factors for predicting
hospitalization and death from COVID-19.

894
Memorandum from the New York State Department of Health to Nursing Home Administrators, et. al. (Mar. 25,
2020) (on file with Select Subcomm. Staff) [hereinafter “March 25 Directive.”]
895
Id.
896
Bernard Condon & Jennifer Peltz, Over 9,000 virus patients sent into NY nursing homes, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Feb. 11, 2021).
897
Id.

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 The risks to elderly populations, especially those in nursing homes, were known to Mr.
Cuomo. 898 Mr. Cuomo was aware of the deaths occurring in the State of Washington—the early
epicenter of COVID-19—as a result of COVID-19 in nursing homes. 899 On March 10, 2020, in
response to a question regarding the threat COVID-19 posed to nursing homes, he stated that
coronavirus in nursing homes was a “nightmare” scenario. 900

[T]hat’s my nightmare and that’s where you’re going to see the pain and
the damage from this virus. Senior citizen homes, nursing homes,
congregant senior facilities… 901

Days later, Mr. Cuomo allegedly told Mr. Jared Kusher—who helped lead the early White
House response to COVID-19—that “[f]or nursing homes, this could be like fire through dry
grass.” 902

The Cuomo Administration initially took actions to safeguard vulnerable populations,

including suspending visitation to nursing homes 903 and ordering vulnerable populations to stay
home while restricting visitors. 904 Nonetheless, the Cuomo Administration still issued the March
25 Directive. These other actions demonstrate that Mr. Cuomo and his Administration knew the
dangers of COVID-19 to nursing homes but proceeded with the March 25 Directive regardless.

Finding: Contrary to Denials, Mr. Andrew Cuomo and the New York Executive Chamber
Were Directly Involved in the Decision that Led to the March 25 Directive.

In a transcribed interview, Dr. Zucker testified that the March 25 Directive was prompted
by a phone call Mr. Cuomo received from GNYHA. 905

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

Q. When you did ask questions did you ever ask what prompted the
directive to be drafted?

898
Marisa Kwiatkowski, ‘A national disgrace’: 40,600 deaths tied to US nursing homes, USA TODAY (June 1,
2020).
899
Andrew Cuomo, American Crisis: Leadership Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic (Crown Publishing Group,
Oct. 13, 2020).
900
The Lead with Jake Tapper, CNN (Mar. 10, 2020).
901
Id.
902
Steven Nelson & Bernadette Hogan, Cuomo feared COVID ‘fire’ in nursing homes before notorious order:
Kushner, N.Y. POST (Aug. 2, 2022) (emphasis added).
903
Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to Nursing Homes and Adult Care Facilities (Mar. 13, 2020).
904
Governor Cuomo Signs the 'New York State on PAUSE' Executive Order, Gov. Kathy Hochul (Mar. 20, 2020).
905
Transcribed Interview of Dr. Howard Zucker, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff, at 88-
89 (Dec. 18, 2023) [hereinafter “Zucker TI”]; See also, Jimmy Vielkind, et. al., In Worst-Hit COVID State, New
York’s Cuomo Called All the Shots, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 11, 2020) (Reported that “Mr. Raske, president
of the Greater New York Hospital Association, said he contacted Mr. Cuomo’s team for help with nursing homes.
Hospitals couldn’t afford to house recovered nursing-home residents long-term, with models showing they soon
could be swamped.”).

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 A. I know why this was drafted. I know why this was drafted.

Q. Can you just briefly summarize?

A. Sure. Sure. So it goes to what was transpiring at the time. So we

have to put this in context. And now we’re in March, the middle of
March, and the numbers are going up. The third week of March the
cases were escalating at a rapid pace, and I would wake up in the
morning with 1,000 more positive cases, and unbelievable numbers
of people being admitted to the hospital. But a few days before this
was drafted, or sent out I should say, the modelers came back with
what is going to happen. So the governor asked for the public
health expert modeling teams that were consultants to provide us
with where this was going, and they predicted up to 136,000
people would be in the hospital at peak, which was X number of
weeks away. I don’t remember, 4, 6 weeks away from where we
were at that point. And when I looked at the rate at which people
were going to the hospital it made sense that we could end up
there. And at that point, we also had, around this same time, a
crisis at Elmhurst Hospital, where they had about 234 positive
people in the hospital with COVID out of their 400-or-so beds, and
13 had died in one 24-hour period. And the hospitals were getting
overwhelmed. Greater New York Hospital Association called the
governor and the team – we were all there in a conversation; a lot
of us were there – and said that we have individuals who are better,
they have recovered, and they are just sitting in a hospital bed but
they need to go “home,” quote “home” for those who are in long-
term care facilities or the other ones would just go home. And the
long-term care facilities were not going to take them and that we
needed to do something, which generated this document…

Dr. Zucker testified that he was not involved with the drafting, review, or issuance of the
March 25 Directive, but said that issuing an advisory, that would become the March 25
Directive, was decided following the GNYHA’s phone call with Mr. Cuomo. 906

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

Q. …When did you first see a copy [of the directive]?

A. So I actually do not remember seeing this advisory. I was there,

along with others, from the Governor’s Office when the decision
was made to issue an advisory, and then it was put into motion…

906
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 93.

Page 223 of 520

 In a transcribed interview, Mr. Cuomo testified that he played no role in the issuance of
the March 25 Directive and was not aware of it until he was asked about it at a press conference
on April 20, 2020. 907 Mr. Cuomo testified that he did not recall receiving a phone call from the
GNYHA related to discharging hospitalized individuals to nursing homes. 908 However, Mr.
Cuomo testified that his discussions with GNYHA were “always” related to hospital capacity—
the issue the March 25 Directive was purportedly drafted to correct. 909

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Do you recall such a phone call taking place?

A. No.

Q. Regardless of the phone call, do you recall the Greater New York
Hospital Association asking you to do something related to that
issue?

A. No. The discussion with the Greater New York Hospital Association
was always about the hospital capacity and they were tracking the
capacity, which never actually happened.

Q. As far as hospital capacity is concerned, would it be possible that

they would have proposed something similar to the March 25 order
in order to increase hospital capacity?

A. No. I’ll use the analogy I used before. Fire capacity is 41 in this
room. It’s not a problem until the 42nd person shows up. Then it will
be a discussion, but we never – that never happened.

At a transcribed interview, Ms. DeRosa testified that she played no role in the
development of the March 25 Directive and only learned about it at the press conference on April
20, 2020. 910 Ms. DeRosa speculated that it was drafted by a “midlevel person” within
NYSDOH. 911

At a transcribed interview, Mr. Hutton testified that the March 25 Directive was
developed by NYSDOH staff. 912 Similar to Dr. Zucker, Mr. Hutton testified that the March 25

907
Transcribed Interview of Andrew Cuomo, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, at 38-41 (June
11, 2024) [hereinafter “Cuomo TI”].
908
Cuomo TI, supra note 918, at 202-203.
909
Id.
910
Transcribed Interview of Ms. Melissa DeRosa, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff, at 20
(June 21, 2024) [hereinafter “DeRosa TI”].
911
Id. at 114-115.
912
Transcribed Interview of Bradley Hutton, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff, at 26-28
(Aug. 27, 2024) (hereinafter “Hutton TI”].

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Directive was prompted by “an urgent phone call from the [Chief Executive Officer] of a
hospital in the Hudson Valley” that was concerned about hospital capacity. 913

FINDING: The New York Executive Chamber Reviewed and Approved the March 25
Directive.

Mr. Hutton testified that the March 25 Directive “absolutely” received approval from the
Executive Chamber prior to issuance. 914

Mr. Brad Hutton (August 27, 2024)

Q. … [T]he Executive Chamber signs off on all Health Department

guidance that was issued. Is that right?

A. In the pandemic, yes.

Q. So, for the record, the March 25th order did receive sign-off from the
Executive Chamber?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Similarly, Dr. Zucker testified all NYSDOH guidance needed to be approved by the
Executive Chamber. 915

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

Q. …[D]o you agree with Ms. DeRosa’s characterization of the

Department’s practices in issuing guidance?

A. I would say that during this pandemic everything ended up on the

second floor.

Q. Can you elaborate on that?

A. Yeah, well, the second floor being the Executive Chamber, the
governor’s floor.

Q. So it’s –

A. And there were times when we, the Department of Health, would
say, “Where is that guidance?” and it still hasn’t been cleared from
over on the second floor.

913
Id.
914
Hutton TI, supra note 912, at 51.
915
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 43-44.

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 Q. And when you say “second floor” –

A. That is the Governor’s Office. Sorry.

Q. Okay. Would you presume that would include the governor himself
being privy to—

A. I can’t answer how that process went. We knew that things needed
to be cleared, and sometimes they were legal issues, which Beth
Garvey was involved, and other issues, obviously, the secretary to
the Governor, Melissa DeRosa, was the one who signed off on it.

Furthermore, according to Dr. Zucker, “most things” had to be approved by Ms. DeRosa,
herself. 916 However, Dr. Zucker did not testify that Ms. DeRosa approved the March 25
Directive.

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

Q. During the pandemic did anyone in the Governor’s Chamber, Ms.

DeRosa included, act as a clearinghouse of information?

A. Well, everything ended up having to go through the Governor’s

Office. And when I use the phrase “governor’s office” I refer to the
entire, you know, the executive team, the second floor, however one
wants to refer to it. But that’s what I mean when I say “governor’s
office.”

Q. What did that look like? Did you like a stamp of approval? Who
gave the final stamp of approval on issuing something?

A. Well, most things went through the secretary to the governor,

Melissa DeRosa. That was, I guess, in a lot of ways, the voice of
what the governor wants, right? And we moved forward on
addressing whatever the challenges were.

According to documents, Ms. DeRosa did serve as “final sign off” on at least one
guidance relating to nursing homes and visitation. 917

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

916
Id. at 22-23.
917
E-Mail from Executive Chamber Staff to Executive Chamber Staff (July 7, 2020, 3:01 PM).

Page 226 of 520

 At a transcribed interview, Ms. Garvey testified that she had a role in the approval of the
March 25 Directive. 918

Ms. Beth Garvey (May 30, 2024)

Q. Did you play any role in the development of this guidance?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain your role?

A. Um, so I have no specific memory of this, but as I stated earlier,

guidance was coming to the Executive Chamber and it was being
reviewed by a number of different staff people and ultimately
coming to me for approval to go out. It did typically run through Joe
Popcun, who sent this e-mail. He was deployed, you know, from
Department of State to help our office. And so I would have looked
at this guidance to make sure that it was consistent with executive
orders, policies, every, you know, communication that the Governor
was making and then approved it for distribution by whatever
department had asked for the guidance.

Indeed, the approved March 25 Directive was attached in an email from Mr. Joseph
Popcun to several Executive Chamber officials, including Ms. Garvey, Ms. Rebecca Wood, Mr.
Peter Kiernan, and Ms. Megan Baldwin. 919

At a transcribed interview, Ms. Lacewell testified that Mr. Cuomo and Ms. DeRosa were
“surprised” by the March 25 Directive and cited the March 25 Directive as a rare example of an

918
Transcribed Interview of Beth Garvey, by Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, at 81-82 (May 30,
2024) [hereinafter “Garvey TI”].
919
E-Mail from Joseph Popcun, N.Y. Dep’t of State, to Beth Garvey, Special Counsel to the Governor, et. al. (Mar.
25, 2020).

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instance when something was issued without sign-off from Ms. DeRosa. 920 Ms. Lacewell
testified that this was not “supposed to happen.” 921

Ms. Linda Lacewell (May 31, 2024)

Q. Do you think it would be fair to say nothing got approved without

Ms. DeRosa’s approval?

A. Well, actually things did get approved without Melissa DeRosa, but
that wasn’t supposed to happen.

Q. Do you have an example of that?

A. I do.

Q. Can you share?

A. I can.

Q. Please go ahead.

A. Um, the March guidance. The governor and Ms. DeRosa were not –
let me rephrase that. They were surprised by the guidance. So to the
best of my understanding, they were not consulted, and she was not
consulted more specifically beforehand because she was surprised.
And from time to time, that did happen.

For her part, Ms. Lacewell testified that she had a “privileged” discussion regarding the
March 25 Directive prior to its issuance with Mr. Schwartz, who formerly served as the
Secretary to the Governor and volunteered to assist with the Cuomo Administration’s response to
the pandemic. 922

Ms. Linda Lacewell (May 31, 2024)

Q. What were the nature of the conversations of COVID-19 and the

nursing homes with Mr. Schwartz?

A. Well, he was part of the group assembled in the Executive Chamber

to manage COVID. So we regularly had conversations with each
other in the day-to-day management of the pandemic during that
period of time.

920
Transcribed Interview of Linda Lacewell, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff, at 42-43
(May. 31, 2024) [hereinafter “Lacewell TI”].
921
Id.
922
Id. at 20-21.

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 Q. Anything specific to the directive or nursing homes?

A. Other than privileged conversations, I don’t have anything for you.

Q. What was the topic of the privileged conversations?

A. Nursing homes.

Q. I think we can get a little bit more specific with that without touching
a privileged conversation right now. So—

A. I had privileged conversation [sic] with Mr. Schwartz about the

subject matter of the March directive before it was issued.

In a transcribed interview, Mr. Schwartz testified that he did not recall having any
conversations, privileged or otherwise, with Ms. Lacewell related to the March 25 Directive. 923
He also testified that he did not know the origins of the March 25 Directive. 924

FINDING: The March 25 Directive Was Inconsistent with Applicable Federal Guidance
Regarding Hospital to Nursing Home Transfers and COVID-19 Related Infection
Control.

Mr. Cuomo and the Executive Chamber repeatedly argued that the March 25 Directive
followed federal guidance, from both CMS and CDC, regarding protecting residents in nursing
homes and other long-term care facilities. 925 Mr. Cuomo argued that it was “written from CMS
and CDC.” 926 This testimony is contradicted by federal health officials—including and Dr. Birx.

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. I’m talking about this directive right now and the wording of the
directive.

A. It was written from CMS and CDC. And it refers to – it is referring

to the guidance they received two days before, which says, “When
should a nursing home accept a resident who is diagnosed with

923
Transcribed Interview of Larry Schwartz, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff, at 12-13
(June 24, 2020) [hereinafter “Schwartz TI”].
924
Id. at 13.
925
See generally Cuomo TI, supra note 907.
926
Id. at 129.

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 COVID-19 from a hospital? A nursing home can accept a resident
diagnosed with COVID-19 and still under transmission-based
protocol.” So still infections, as long as the facility can follow CDC
guidance for transmission-based precautions. If they can’t, they
can’t take the person.

Similarly, Dr. Zucker testified that the March 25 Directive was consistent with CMS and
CDC guidance. 927

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

A. …But the fact is we followed the CDC guidance that was out at the
time, and CMS guidance, and the guidance, the CDC guidance about
transmissible disease at that point, said that those individuals were
not infectious, based on the criteria…

None of the witnesses interviewed by the Select Subcommittee consulted—nor knew of

anyone within the Cuomo Administration that consulted—CMS or CDC prior to the issuance of
the March 25 Directive.

In response to the Cuomo Administration’s insistence that the March 25 Directive

followed federal guidance, Administrator Verma disagreed, saying, “[u]nder no circumstances
should a hospital discharge a patient to a nursing home that is not prepared to take care of those
patient’s needs.” 928

Indeed, CMS guidance entitled, “For Infection Control and Prevention of Coronavirus
Disease 20219 (COVID-19) in Nursing Homes” [hereinafter “CMS Guidance”] did not mandate
COVID-19 positive patients back to nursing homes but, instead, stated that a COVID-19 case at
a hospital does not preclude the nursing home from accepting a COVID-19 negative patient. 929
This is contrary to the March 25 Directive—which states that nursing homes shall not deny
COVID-positive patients because of their COVID-19 diagnosis. 930

In a transcribed interview, Dr. Birx, when asked about the March 25 Directive, testified
that it “violated” CMS guidance. 931

Dr. Deborah Birx (October 13, 2021)

927
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 90-91.
928
Charles Creitz, Medicare chief Verma blasts Cuomo for trying to deflect blame onto White House for NY nursing
home deaths, FOX NEWS (May 28, 2020).
929
Memorandum from David R. Wright, Director, Quality, Safety & Oversight Group, U.S. Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, to State Survey Agency Directors (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with Comm. Staff).
930
March 25 Directive, supra 894.
931
Transcribed Interview of Dr. Deborah Birx, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis Staff, at 119-121
(Oct. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Birx TI].

Page 231 of 520

 Q. On the bottom of page 4 of this CMS guidance it gives guidance on
how to return a resident diagnosed with COVID-19 back to their
nursing home; and it says it should be done if a facility can follow
CDC guidance for transmission-based precautions. First, what
would those transmission-based precautions have been?

A. So that would require isolation and gowning, masking, and ensuring

no contact with any other residents.

Q. [CMS] Administrator [Seema] Verma said about this guidance,

‘under no circumstances should a hospital discharge a patient to a
nursing home that is not prepared to take care of those patient’s
needs.’

A. Correct.

Q. If we turn now to the New York Guidance…Does that have the same
qualifier of able to take CDC precautions as the CMS guidance
required?

A. No.

Q. So, would [the March 25 Directive] have violated CMS guidance?

A. Yes.

Dr. Birx further testified to the negative effects of readmitting potentially positive
COVID-19 nursing home residents.

Dr. Deborah Birx (October 13, 2021)

Q. Do you think admitting potentially positive COVID-19 nursing

home residents back into the nursing home without the ability to
quarantine or isolate them is dangerous and could lead to
unnecessary deaths?

A. Yeah, I think that’s why the CDC guidance was very clear about
precautions needed to protect them. And I think that’s why [CMS
Administrator] Seema [Verma] was proactively working on this
infection control guidance. 932

CMS Guidance was understood as non-binding and used non-prescriptive language such
as “can” and “should.” 933

932
Id. at 123.
933
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 90-91.

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 Conversely, the March 25 Directive referred to itself as a “directive” and used
prescriptive language such as “must,” “shall,” and “prohibit.” 934 In fact, it underlined the
operative language. 935

Mr. Hutton testified that it was an established “norm” to include prescriptive language, as
the Executive Chamber did not like to be “perceived as being too soft or suggestive as opposed
to directive.” 936

Mr. Brad Hutton (August 27, 2024)

Q. …When you look at the last two paragraphs that we reviewed that
uses permissive language such as “should” or “can,” whereas the
March 25th Order uses restrictive language such as “shall” or
“must,” is that – was the language that was used in the March 25th
order ever discussed during your review?

A. I don’t recall.

Q. Did you have any concerns with the language that was used in the
order?

A. I didn’t, but I guess I would qualify it by saying that it had been

established as the norm, that this Executive Chamber preferred the
orders be much more directive in their language and that we would

934
March 25 Directive, supra note 894; See also ‘Like Fire Through Dry Grass: Nursing Home Mortality and
COVID-19 Policies,’ Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. (May 17,
2023) (Written Testimony of Bill Hammond, Senior Fellow for Health Policy, Empire Center for Public Policy).
935
Id.
936
Hutton TI, supra note 912, at 60.

Page 233 of 520

 commonly receive things sent back if they were perceived as being
too soft or suggestive as opposed to directive.

Q. And you said that was an executive order – or Executive Chamber

suggestion?

A. I would say a norm, yeah, a norm that this Executive Chamber did
not react favorably to soft or what they perceived as weak or
suggestive language but instead, whether it was local health
departments or nursing homes or any other entity, that we be much
more directive in our language when we issue guidance.

FINDING: The Cuomo Administration Terminated the March 25 Directive in Response to

Public Pressure, not a Change in Applicable Science.

Despite testifying that he was not involved with the issuance, Dr. Zucker stood by the
March 25 Directive. 937

Dr. Howard Zucker (Dec. 18, 2023)

Q. …On February 19, 2021, you defended the state’s decision to issue
the March 25th directive, stating, “We would make the same decision
again.” For the record, do you stand by that, still?

A. I do.

Mr. Cuomo testified that, prior to being briefed by Dr. Zucker, he did not initially
understand the March 25 Directive. 938

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Going back to when you were first made aware and debriefed and
Dr. Zucker you said answered questions. What questions did you
ask? Did you have –

A. Well, all the questions you’re asking.

Q. So you did have concerns about the directive?

A. I didn’t understand it.

937
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 169-170.
938
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 152.

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 However, Mr. Cuomo testified that he had no concerns with the March 25 Directive once
Dr. Zucker explained it to him. 939

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Were you concerned about the language of the [March 25] directive
when it was first brought to your attention?

A. When [Dr. Zucker] explained it to me, no. Because he explained it

to me in the context of the CMS/CDC…

The March 25 Directive remained in effect until it was superseded by an Executive Order
on May 10, 2020. 940 Ms. DeRosa testified that the Cuomo Administration did not have any
discussions related to rescinding the March 25 Directive until the days leading up to the
Executive Order on May 10. 941

Ms. Melissa DeRosa (June 21, 2024)

Q. When did you have discussion related to rescinding the order?

A. You’re using the word rescinding. I would use the word superseding.

Q. When did those discussions begin?

A. I believe we did the superseding order on May 10th. So in the days

leading up to May 10th.

According to emails, NYSDOH was instructed to remove the March 25 Directive from its
website on April 29, 2020, despite the March 25 Directive still being operable. 942

939
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 153.
940
N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.30 (May 10, 2020).
941
DeRosa TI, supra note 910, at 115-116.
942
E-Mail from Kristen Navarette, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to Jill Montag, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, et. al.
(May 12, 2020).

Page 235 of 520

 In a subsequent email, another NYSDOH official said they were instructed by the
Executive Chamber to remove it because it was “inconsistent.” 943

Mr. Cuomo testified that the March 25 Directive was terminated because of “public
relations.” 944

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. But yet you rescinded the order on May 10. Talking about the
decision-making process—

A. Because the public relations after April 20 had made the public so
nervous and so concerned, anyone who had family in a nursing
home was agitated and frightened.

Q. Did you discuss those public relations in these articles with your
team?

A. I spoke to Dr. Zucker about it.

Q. Who else?

A. Basically Dr. Zucker. And I said, “Look, it may be false, but we have
a lot of concerned people out there now.” And it was coincident with
we have ramped up our testing capacity. So we could now actually
test nursing home staff, which was what he believed and I believed
it was really all about.

Similarly, Dr. Zucker testified that the Cuomo Administration reversed the policy in
response to criticism surrounding the March 25 Directive and maintained that it was not changed
because of issues with the March 25 Directive, itself. 945

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

943
E-Mail from Adrianne Mazeau, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to Kristen Navarette, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, et.
al. (May 27, 2020).
944
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 158
945
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 159.

Page 236 of 520

 Q. …[I]f the March 25th guidance wasn’t wrong, then why change it?

A. It was not changed because of this guidance. It was changed more

because there was such criticism about something which we felt
there shouldn’t be criticism on, as I was just saying. But it’s not
going to hurt anyone, and we’re not sort of, you know, jeopardizing
someone else’s care by running a test on this person.

FINDING: Cuomo Administration Officials Believed Mr. Cuomo Directed the Issuance of
the “July 6 Report” to Combat Criticism of the March 25 Directive.

The Select Subcommittee investigated allegations that the Cuomo Administration

improperly withheld and misrepresented nursing home fatality data from the public and federal
government throughout the pandemic. This investigation included the drafting and publication of
the NYSDOH report entitled, “Factors Associated with Nursing Home Infections and Fatalities
in New York State During the COVID-19 Global Health Crisis” [hereinafter “July 6 Report”]. 946

The July 6 Report alleged that it was the nursing home staff—not the March 25
Directive—that was the source of transmission that resulted in deaths of nursing home
residents. 947 However, this report was heavily edited by the Executive Chamber—including Mr.
Cuomo—to show more causality and was not a scientific nor peer-reviewed publication. The
Executive Chamber also made the decision to remove deaths occurring to nursing home residents
out-of-facility—i.e., deaths occurring to residents that died following a transfer to the hospital—
thereby releasing a report that was not fully transparent regarding deaths occurring to nursing
home residents.

The origin of the July 6 Report was likely an e-mail on June 7, 2020. In that e-mail, Ms.
Benton told Dr. Malatras, Mr. Rhodes, Dr. Zucker, and Ms. DeRosa that the criticism
surrounding the March 25 Directive would be “the great debacle in the history books.” 948 The
email directed them to “[g]et a report on the facts because this legacy will overwhelm any
positive accomplishment.” 949

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

946
New York State Department of Health, Factors Associated with Nursing Home Infections and Fatalities in New
York State During the COVID-19 Global Health Crisis, (July 6, 2020).
947
New York State Department of Health, Factors Associated with Nursing Home Infections and Fatalities in New
York State During the COVID-19 Global Health Crisis, (July 6, 2020).
948
E-Mail from Stephanie Benton, Executive Assistant to the Governor, to Dr. Jim Malatras, Advisor to the
Governor, et. al. (June 7, 2020) (emphasis added).
949
Id.

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 The recipients of this email understood—or suspected—that this was a message from Mr.
Cuomo himself. 950 In a transcribed interview, Dr. Malatras testified that the demand to “[g]et a
report on the facts” was referring to the July 6 Report. 951 Dr. Malatras testified that this email
prompted the July 6 Report to be drafted. 952

Dr. Zucker testified that Ms. DeRosa asked for a “medical journal” publication to be
released, but the decision was made to make it a report given the pressure to release it quickly. 953
Dr. Adams testified that she viewed the NYSDOH’s work on a scientific article as separate from
what would eventually become the July 6 Report. 954 Dr. Adams testified that she provided
“talking points” to the Executive Chamber that would be used to draft the July 6 Report. 955
According to emails, Dr. Adams sent Dr. Zucker these “talking points” within hours of the “great
debacle” email. 956

Dr. Adams also provided charts similar, but seemingly less favorable, to those that would
eventually be used in the July 6 Report. 957 For example, one chart examining the average
mortality rate by level of admissions and readmissions statewide showed a mortality rate of 8.1
percent for nursing homes with “[s]ome admissions or readmissions” versus a 4.1 percent
mortality rate for nursing homes with “[n]o admissions or readmissions.” 958

FINDING: The July 6 Report Was Not Independently Drafted by the New York State
Department of Health nor Peer Reviewed.

950
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 160-161; Transcribed Interview of Gareth Rhodes, by Select Subcomm. on the
Coronavirus Pandemic Staff, at 104-105 (May 3, 2024) [hereinafter Rhodes TI]; Transcribed Interview of Dr. Jim
Malatras, by Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff, at 130 (May 20, 2024) [hereinafter Malatras TI];
DeRosa TI, supra note 910, at 198-199.
951
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 130.
952
Id. at 198.
953
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 167-168.
954
Transcribed Interview of Eleanor Adams, M.D., Advisor, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 118-119 (Apr. 8, 2024)
[hereinafter “Adams TI”].
955
Id. at 80.
956
E-Mail from Dr. Eleanor Adams, Special Advisor to the Commissioner, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to Dr.
Howard Zucker, Commissioner, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, (June 7, 2020).
957
Id. (on file with Comm. Staff).
958
Id.

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 Dr. Adams testified that the July 6 Report was not authored by her nor the NYSDOH, and
that it was not in fact a “peer reviewed” publication as claimed by Mr. Cuomo and his staff. 959
Like Dr. Adams, Dr. Malatras testified that the July 6 Report was not peer-reviewed. 960

According to witness testimony, numerous Executive Chamber officials were involved

with the July 6 Report, including Ms. DeRosa, Ms. Lacewell, Dr. Malatras, Ms. Garvey, Ms.
Baldwin, and Mr. Robert Mujica—the former New York State Budget Director. 961 In response to
questions related to the Executive Chamber’s involvement with the July 6 Report, Ms. Lacewell
testified that the report would not have existed without her. 962

Linda Lacewell (May 31, 2024)

Q. It reads, “The aides who were involved in change the report included
Melissa DeRosa, the governor’s top aide, Linda Lacewell, the head
of the state’s Department of Financial Services, and Jim Malatras, a
former top advisor to Mr. Cuomo brought back to work on the
pandemic. None had public health expertise.” You mentioned all of
you being involved in the report, so I believe you would agree with
the listing of your three names as being involved in the report?

A. That’s not what the paragraph says. It says the aides were involved
in changing the report, right? That’s what it actually says.

Q. And --

A. I was involved in helping draft the report.

Q. Okay.

A. Right? The whole premise of the article is mistaken. It was not a

DOH report that landed in the executive chamber and was then
changed.

Q. If you were responsible for the report, why was it issued as a DOH
report?

A. I didn’t say I was responsible for a report.

Q. Okay. What word would you use?

959
Adams TI, supra note 954, at 128-131.
960
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 196.
961
See generally Dr. Zucker TI, supra note 905; Dr. Malatras TI, supra note 950; Garvey TI, supra note 918;
Lacewell TI, supra note 920; DeRosa TI, supra note 910.
962
Lacewell TI, supra note 920, at 63-64; See J. David Goodman & Danny Hakim, Cuomo Aides Rewrote Nursing
Home Report to Hide Higher Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2021).

Page 239 of 520

 A. That’s really your question. I described what I did with respect to
the report.

Q. You mentioned –

A. But I’m not McKinsey doing the data and I’m not DOH weighing in
and I’m not Dr. Zucker weighing in and I’m not a statistician.

Q. But you said the report wouldn’t have happened but for you?

A. Correct, and it wouldn’t have happened but for McKinsey, but my

point there was, I’m executive chamber. I’m executive chamber. The
DOH report wouldn’t exist without me…

Dr. Malatras testified that Ms. DeRosa was “very active” with the July 6 Report and
directed what points she wanted the report to make. 963

Dr. Jim Malatras (May 20, 2024)

Q. Was that the extent of [Melissa DeRosa’s] involvement in the

report?

A. No, she was very active, sending information; things like that. She
actually at one point sent an e-mail. This was prior to that meeting,
but indicative of the process. She laid out the points that she wanted
to have touched upon in the report.

Additionally, witnesses testified that individuals and organizations outside the

government played a role in the report. including Mr. Raske, Mr. Dowling, and Dr. David
Grabowski, a professor of Health Care Policy at Harvard Medical School. 964 This testimony is
supported by documents.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

963
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 161.
964
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 29, 162-163, 197; DeRosa TI, supra note 910, at 235.

Page 240 of 520

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 241 of 520

 In response to an article by The New York Times reporting the Executive Chamber’s
involvement in the July 6 Report, 965 Dr. Malatras issued a statement saying that he was not
involved in altering the nursing home numbers. 966 Thereafter, Dr. Malatras testified that he
received a call from Executive Chamber Officials, including Ms. DeRosa, Ms. Lacewell, Ms.
Garvey, and others, asking him to “put out a statement suggesting otherwise” because they

Goodman, supra note 962.

965

See Bernadette Hogan & Bruce Golding, Cuomo official Malatras appears to throw cohorts under bus in nursing
966

home denial, N.Y. POST (Mar. 5, 2021).

Page 242 of 520

believed The New York Times reporting and his statement to be misleading. 967 Dr. Malatras
refused. 968

FINDING: Mr. Andrew Cuomo Reviewed and Edited the July 6 Report, and His Edits Were
to Make the Report’s Findings More Causal.

Mr. Cuomo testified that he did not have any involvement with the drafting of the July 6
Report. He further stated that he did not recall reviewing or editing the July 6 Report. 969

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Were you involved in the drafting of this report in any capacity?

A. No.

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. In the minority hour, did you testify that you had no role in the July
6 Report?

A. I do not recall seeing the July 6 report prior its issuance. It was
Howard Zucker’s report. He then presented it numerous times. I then
spoke to it numerous times, because it came up at every press
briefing afterwards.

Q. And to clarify your testimony, you did not recall reviewing the
report?

A. I do not recall reviewing.

Q. Did you edit the report?

A. I don’t recall seeing it.

However, Mr. Cuomo’s testimony is directly contradicted by documents and other

witness testimony. It is also contradicted by the report entitled, “Impeachment Investigation
Report to Judiciary Committee Chair Charles Levine and the New York State Assembly Judiciary
Committee” [hereinafter “Impeachment Report”]. 970 Dr. Malatras testified that Mr. Cuomo

967
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 212-214; Lacewell TI, supra note 920, at 63-64.
968
Id.
969
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 173 & 285-286.
970
Impeachment Investigation Report to Judiciary Committee Chair Charles Levine and the New York State
Assembly Judiciary Committee, 40, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (Nov. 22, 2021) [hereinafter “Impeachment
Report”] (“[T]he evidence obtained in our investigation demonstrates that former Governor Cuomo directed officials
from the Executive Chamber, Task Force and DOH to prepare a report from DOH in order to combat criticism of the
March 25 Directive. The report was initiated by the then-Governor and influenced by members of the Executive

Page 243 of 520

reviewed and edited the July 6 Report. 971 Dr. Malatras also testified that the former Governor
would have had final approval on the report. 972

When Select Subcommittee counsel informed Mr. Cuomo that Dr. Malatras had testified
that the former governor was involved in reviewing the July 6 Report, he again denied
involvement.

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Dr. Malatras also told us in his testimony that you did review a draft
of this report prior to its release. Is that true?

A. I did not. Maybe it was in the inbox, but I did not. 973

Documents and testimony, however, show that Mr. Cuomo was intimately involved in the
review and drafting of the report.

Chamber and Task Force, then released under the auspices of DOH. Throughout the drafting process, the former
Governor reviewed and edited the draft DOH Report on multiple occasions and made edits to strengthen the defense
of the March 25 Directive.”).
971
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 207-208.
972
Id. at 165.
973
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 177.

Page 244 of 520

Page 245 of 520
 Dr. Malatras further testified that Mr. Cuomo would edit the July 6 Report via
handwritten notes or via Mr. Cuomo’s assistants and that Mr. Cuomo edited the language of the
July 6 Report to be more causal. 974 Dr. Malatras’ testimony is confirmed by documents.

On June 23, 2020, Ms. Kennedy emailed Executive Chamber staff an attachment with the
“Governor’s edits.” 975

In a transcribed interview, Ms. Kennedy testified that she was communicating edits from
Mr. Cuomo. 976 Furthermore, Ms. Kennedy testified that she understood Mr. Cuomo’s edits to be
identified in larger text that consisted of more than 10 pages. 977 A text message contemporaneous
to Mr. Cuomo’s edits, suggests that NYSDOH staff were concerned that Mr. Cuomo’s edits to the
July 6 Report “may not be scientifically accurate.”

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

974
Malatras TI, supra note 950, 208-209
975
E-Mail from Farrah Kennedy, Executive Assistant, Executive Chamber, N.Y., to Executive Chamber Staff (June
23, 2020, 2:42 p.m.).
976
Transcribed Interview of Farrah Kennedy, Executive Assistant, N.Y. Executive Chamber, 20-21 (Oct. 8, 2024)
[hereinafter “Kennedy TI”].
977
Id.

Page 246 of 520

 On June 24, 2020, a scanned version of the July 6 Report was sent to Executive Chamber
staff. 978 The scanned version of the July 6 Report included handwritten edits and comments. 979

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

978
E-Mail from Executive Chamber Staff to Executive Chamber Staff (June 24, 2020, 10:55 a.m.).
979
Id.

Page 247 of 520

 Ms. Kennedy testified that part of her responsibilities as Executive Assistant to the
Governor were to transcribe Mr. Cuomo’s handwritten notes. 980 When asked to review the
handwritten notes of the draft from June 24, 2020, Ms. Kennedy testified that it appeared to be
Mr. Cuomo’s handwriting. 981 Below is an example of Mr. Cuomo’s handwritten edits to the June
24, 2020 draft of the July 6 Report.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTETIONALLY BLANK]

980
Kennedy TI, supra note 976, at 24-25.
981
Id. at 25.

Page 248 of 520

 On June 28, 2020, Executive Chamber staff communicated about more of Mr. Cuomo’s
edits to the July 6 Report. 982

982
E-Mail from Executive Chamber Staff to Executive Chamber Staff (June 28, 2020, 3:20 p.m.).

Page 249 of 520

 The version of the July 6 Report attached to this e-mail also included handwritten edits
and comments. When asked about source of the handwriting, Ms. Kennedy testified that it
appeared to be Mr. Cuomo’s handwriting. 983 Below is an example of Mr. Cuomo’s handwritten
edits to the June 24, 2020 draft of the July 6 Report.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

983
Kennedy TI, supra note 976, at 26.

Page 250 of 520

Page 251 of 520
 Accordingly, Ms. Kennedy testified that Mr. Cuomo was involved in the drafting of the
July 6 Report. 984

FINDING: Mr. Andrew Cuomo Was Involved in the “Peer Review” Process and Directed
Individuals Outside of New York State Government to Review the July 6 Report.

Documents and testimony establish that Mr. Cuomo was involved in directing an external
“peer review” process of the July 6 Report. Mr. Cuomo denied having any involvement in peer-
review process. 985

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Did you have any discussions regarding the report being peer
reviewed?

A. No.

Mr. Cuomo testified that he did not know whether any individual outside of NYSDOH
was involved in the drafting or editing of the July 6 Report. 986

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Do you know if people outside of DOH were involved with

drafting or editing this report?

A. No.

Dr. Malatras testified to the Select Subcommittee that individuals outside the NYSDOH,
including Mr. Dowling and Mr. Raske, President were involved. 987

Documents show that Mr. Cuomo directed the July 6 Report be peer reviewed by Mr.
Dowling and Mr. Raske. On June 30, 2020, Ms. Benton emailed Executive Chamber staff. A
former Executive Chamber staffer told the Select Subcommittee this e-mail was likely from Mr.
Cuomo, consistent with his practice of dictating emails Ms. Benton sent. The email directed,
“[g]et that Harvard guy[,] dowling[,] and ken Davis [sic] to be the ‘peer review’ experts of the
report. Get them the draft now to study.” 988

984
Kennedy TI, supra note 976, at 26.
985
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 287.
986
Id. at 173.
987
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 29.
988
E-Mail from Stephanie Benton to Executive Chamber Staff (June 30, 2020 10:59 AM).

Page 252 of 520

 The e-mail does not specify who “dowling” and “ken” are, but subsequent e-mails
establish that Mr. Cuomo meant Mr. Dowling and Mr. Raske. Later that same day, Mr. Dowling
sent back edits and suggestions to an Executive Chamber staff. 989 Mr. Dowling even stated, “Ken
Raske’s staff and mine can do a complete rewrite [of the Executive Summary] if you wish.” 990
That evening, Mr. Raske sent his edits to Mr. Dowling, who then forwarded them to the
Executive Chamber. 991

Accordingly, these documents and testimony establish that Mr. Cuomo had conversations
regarding the “peer review” of the July 6 Report and directed and knew that people outside of the
NYSDOH were involved in the July 6 Report.

FINDING: The Executive Chamber Decided to Remove Out-of-Facility Death Data from the
July 6 Report.

Dr. Adams testified that the original NYSDOH analysis—that was going to be a scientific
paper—included both in-facility and out-of-facility nursing home fatalities. 992

Dr. Eleanor Adams (April 8, 2024)

Q. …[W]ould that number [of out-of-facility deaths] have been in the

scientific report you working on?

A. Yes. In our draft – well, I should rephrase. I’m not sure if this
answers your questions but in our draft paper, we included the
numbers of in and out of nursing home, deaths of nursing home
residents…

989
Email from Michael Dowling, Chief Exec. Office, Northwell Health, to Executive Chamber Staff (June 30,
2020), 4:31 p.m.).
990
Id.
991
E-Mail from Kenneth Raske, Pres. & Chief Exec. Officer, Greater N.Y. Hospital Ass’n, to Michael Dowling,
Chief Exec. Officer, Northwell Health (June 30, 2020, 6:00 p.m.).
992
Adams TI, supra note 954, at 98.

Page 253 of 520

 According to witness testimony, the initial drafts of the report analyzed in-facility and
out-of-facility nursing home deaths. 993 Accordingly, the initial drafts of the report cited the total
nursing home deaths as approximately 10,000.

Dr. Malatras testified that the decision to not include out-of-facility deaths occurred on a
phone call on June 27, 2020. 994

Dr. Jim Malatras (May 20, 2024)

Q. Who was on that call?

A. It was – I believe it was me, Beth Garvey, Linda Lacewell, Howard

Zucker, Melissa DeRosa, and there could have been some others. I
don’t know. . .

Q. Why was that call called?

A. It was about the nursing home report.

Further, Dr. Malatras testified that the decision was made after Ms. DeRosa
“aggressively” questioned Dr. Zucker on out-of-facility death data. 995

Dr. Jim Malatras (May 20, 2024)

Q. You mentioned earlier a call on June 27th, I believe, with Ms.

DeRosa and a variety of other people about the numbers going into
the report. And you said Ms. DeRosa made some demands related
to those numbers. If we could just reiterate what she said on that
call?

A. The call in question was the data that we were provided from
McKinsey, that she forwarded to us after that initial e-mail from
Stephanie Benton, or Governor Cuomo through Stephanie Benton.
It had a whole bunch of data in it, and including the curves and
everything like that in the charts; that included the full in-the-
facilities health care – in the hospitals and in the nursing home
facilities with fatalities. That continued to be the report through all
of those charts, through the June 27th call. I don’t know what
precipitated the change in Ms. DeRosa – something happened. She
talked to somebody. Something triggered a response, which she then
called a meeting, and was very aggressive about questioning the
numbers, why those numbers. Mostly aimed at Dr. Zucker, but we
were – none of us were immune from the – I would say – passionate

993
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 160-161; Lacewell TI, supra note 920, at 115; Garvey TI, supra note 918, at 163.
994
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 106-107.
995
Id.

Page 254 of 520

 interaction. And then, thereafter, she said she does not trust the
numbers. She wants it to be continually be – the numbers that were
publicly reported until, you know, they could do a review on the
numbers.

Dr. Malatras testified it was Ms. DeRosa’s decision to not include out-of-facility nursing
home fatalities. 996 He testified that he believed out-of-facility death data should have been
included in the report. 997

Dr. Jim Malatras (May 20, 2024)

Q. Do you believe those numbers should have been included in the

report?

A. I would have – if I had the authority to do so, I would have included

them, again, so that we wouldn’t be sitting together right now.

Q. Was that discussed among the people who were working on editing
the report?

A. Most people thought the numbers should be out, and that was –
should be the end of it. That’s why they were in the report until the
June – they were in the – all the charts had these numbers until June
27th.

Q. You talked about being directed by Ms. DeRosa to make that

change. Did anyone else agree with her –

A. No.

Q. --or was it just she’s the top of the chain, I’m going to listen?

A. Well, Mr. Zucker – if I remember the call correctly – was trying to

push back a little bit. I think at one point, Ms. Garvey did. There was
some ire turned my way about it, but there – sometimes, as you know
with the principal, there’s not – there’s certain discussions – certain
decisions made of which you don’t – they have ultimate authority
and that was that.

Q. Sure.

A. I followed up with an e-mail afterwards because I was frustrated.

Q. An e-mail saying that you thought –

996
Id. at 106, 206.
997
Id. at 168-169.

Page 255 of 520

 A. No, let me share this. I was the one in the impeachment report that
said no one should have been shocked or surprised by the 10,000
number. You guys gave me – the report with those numbers came
from you. We synthesized the information in the report. We gave
you the report, and now you are criticizing us for things that you
gave us. So I was frustrated at that moment very much so. And I was
frustrated by the tone on the call very much so. We were all pretty
exhausted by that point…

However, Ms. DeRosa testified that it was Dr Zucker’s decision to remove out-of-facility
nursing home deaths. 998 Dr. Zucker testified that he stood by the findings of the July 6 Report. 999

Ms. Melissa DeRosa (June 23, 2024)

Q. Is the penultimate conversation the June 27th phone call?

A. I don’t know the actual date, but there was that conversation which
was like the big group conversation which has been reported and
discussed previously. But the questions to DOH not just from me,
but from others including Linda. Including Beth, including other
people, that were looking at this report, because it, was data that had
never been previously published was, has this been vetted or
verified? No. In looking at the cursory numbers, we’ve all agreed
previously that this information has to be audited because it’s
incorrect. Has anything changed? No. Have you done anything to
figure out which information is incorrect? No. How certain are you
of the numbers that are reported from outside facilities that they are
correct? Silence. Are you seriously proposing using numbers in a
report to back a conclusion that the March 25th guidance didn’t
influence bringing COVID into nursing homes, knowing that the
numbers are wrong? Not thinking that they could be wrong but
knowing that they’re wrong? Silence. What do we want to do here,
guys? What do you want to do here? And Zucker said, it doesn’t
alter the conclusion, the ultimate conclusion is the same, so let’s use
the vetted verified numbers, be clear that’s what we’re doing and we
will audit them later. And so it was Zucker’s call. Zucker had to
defend it, Zucker had to put his name on it. As Zucker told the
Assembly, if he disagreed with it, he would not say it out loud. His
name was one it. It was his call…

Prior to the phone call, Ms. Lacewell emailed Executive Chamber staff that the out-of-
facility fatality data was not public. 1000 Ms. Lacewell also highlighted other concerns related to

998
DeRosa TI, supra note 910, at 245.
999
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 200.
1000
E-Mail from Executive Chamber Staff to Executive Chamber Staff (June 27, 2020 10:13 AM).

Page 256 of 520

other sections of the report—including that New York was not prioritizing nursing homes for
PPE. 1001

Dr. Malatras responded, a response previously reported in part in the Impeachment

Report, to Ms. Lacewell’s email to express his concerns with not including out-of-facility
fatalities in the July 6 Report. 1002

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1001
Id.
1002
E-Mail from Executive Chamber Staff to Executive Chamber Staff, N.Y. State (June 27, 2020 10:58 AM).

Page 257 of 520

 A subsequent response from Ms. Lacewell confirmed that the June 27 phone call, where
the decision was made to remove out-of-facility deaths, was in response to a question posed by
Ms. DeRosa. While Ms. Lacewell stated that “a [questions] from MDR” and “reason for” the
June 27 phone call, it is unclear Ms. DeRosa asked because the Executive Chamber invoked
attorney client privilege.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 258 of 520

 Furthermore, the Select Subcommittee is aware of additional communications regarding
the June 27 call. However, as of December 4, 2024, the Executive Chamber has yet to produce
them.

In response to questions related to the Executive Chamber’s decision to remove out-of-

facility deaths from the July 6 Report, Mr. Cuomo remarked “[w]ho cares.”

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. Do you – and Ms. Lacewell confirmed this as well, that drafts of the
report before the phone call had the 9,844 number in it, and drafts
of the report after the phone call had 6,432. Do you recall any
conversations about that?

A. No, but I don’t know how to express – let’s say there’s a 3,000
differential, 2,500. Who cares? What difference does it make in any
dimension to anyone about anything? Do you know what I’m
saying? 1003

FINDING: The New York Executive Chamber Made the Decision to Not Publicly Report
Out-of-Facility Deaths.

Dr. Malatras testified that Ms. DeRosa made the decision to change the methodologies in
which nursing home fatalities were publicly accounted for and reported. 1004

Dr. Jim Malatras (May 20, 2024)

Q. But to be clear, what you’re testifying is that Melissa DeRosa was

involved in the decision to change the methodology that was used
throughout the pandemic?

1003
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 289.
1004
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 143-144.

Page 259 of 520

 A. It was her decision.

Dr. Malatras testified that Ms. DeRosa did not “trust the numbers” related to reporting
out-of-facility fatalities and made the decision to exclude them. 1005 Similarly, Ms. DeRosa
testified that the out-of-facility “numbers were wrong.” 1006

Dr. Jim Malatras (May 20, 2024)

Q. … Do you know what necessitated the administration making this

change?

A. This is a question of location?

Q. Yes.

A. Yeah, this is – this is the same issue. My understanding was even

after the audit – I don’t know. You have to ask them about why they
didn’t do it after the audit. But prior to the audit conducted by Gareth
Rhodes, Ms. DeRosa said she didn’t trust the numbers.

Q. …This decision to change the methodology to exclude nursing

home deaths would have been approved by Ms. DeRosa?

A. Correct.

According to witness testimony, the Executive Chamber was advised by numerous

officials to release the full accounting of nursing home fatalities. Mr. Rhodes testified that he was
ordered by Ms. DeRosa to conduct an audit of NYSDOH data following a hearing in August
2020. 1007 Mr. Rhodes testified that Ms. DeRosa was concerned with double counting. 1008

Mr. Gareth Rhodes (May 3, 2024)

Q. But isn’t it true . . . that after this hearing you were ordered to
conduct an audit of the Department of Health’s data?

A. I recall it like a common sense review of a data set that I was asked
to, you know, go over and sit down with their staff and go through
it line by line and make sure there were no discrepancies or any
inconsistencies.

Q. …[W]ho ordered you to conduct this audit?

1005
Id. at 147.
1006
DeRosa TI, supra note 910, at 55.
1007
Rhodes TI, supra note 950, at 116-117.
1008
Id.

Page 260 of 520

 A. Melissa asked me to go over there and do this review.

Q. Did she explain why?

A. I don’t recall really the conversation, just, you know, can you – what
– you know, do you mind going there and taking a look at this. I
think there was – I think she – I remember she mentioning like
double-counting or like she wanted me to make sure that the
numbers didn’t have inaccuracies or inconsistencies.

Mr. Rhodes testified that it took no longer than a week to complete his audit of the
nursing home fatality data and that he flagged “maybe 600” entries as “inconsistent.” 1009

Mr. Gareth Rhodes (May 3, 2024)

Q. ... [C]an you just provide a general summary of what you found?

A. To the best of my recollection, this was some time ago, there was
like an Excel spreadsheet on a DOH computer. For every fatality
there was like a line that had like the initials, it had the facility, it
had date of admission, date of death, like the comorbidities. I had
like – like ran some like Excel formulas. Was really looking to see
is there anything here like – I am not a data scientist. I was more
looking at this like a commonsense kind of approach. And I was
looking for things like – you know, anything that looked
inconsistent. And I think I flagged maybe 600 or so entries that had
some sort of thing that could be considered inconsistent. Like
someone had been marked as having passed away like before they
had been admitted. There were like some cases of people who were
confirmed to have died of COVID before COVID had been reported
in New York.

Mr. Rhodes identified himself as the Task Force member in the Impeachment Report that
advised the Executive Chamber to release the full data set. 1010 Mr. Rhodes testified that he
believed his audit to be sufficient and believed that the full data set should have been released
with a disclaimer related to the inconsistencies. 1011

Mr. Gareth Rhodes (May 3, 2024)

Q. But for the record, you are testifying today that you did support
releasing the numbers in August of 2020?

A. Yes.
1009
Id. at 118-119.
1010
Id. at 121.
1011
Id. at 122-123.

Page 261 of 520

 Q. And do you recall why you supported releasing the numbers?

A. In my view – as part of my kind of review of these numbers, I

thought maybe my review, you know, was – you know, I thought I
had done my job. I found kind of any discrepancies, I identified
them. We could – Department of Health could maybe follow up on
the discrepancies and that would be – you know, if there were any
concerns, you know, about the inconsistencies like maybe my
review had helped resolve those, I was not sure, but like at least
maybe provided some – some input or helpfulness on that side. And
that – you know, there’s mention here about the legislature had
written a letter requesting the numbers and, you know, I thought that
it made sense to put those – put the numbers in that letter and then
maybe add an asterisk that said, you know, review had found maybe
there were 600 that were continued to be follow up on. Those – just
as a note that those were being validated. That’s what I thought just
made sense based on what my review was.

Similarly, Dr. Zucker testified that he was the Senior NYSDOH Official in the
Impeachment Report that prepared a letter in August 2020 that reported the full number of
nursing home fatalities to the legislature. 1012 He testified that he also prepared a second letter in
October 2020 that was never approved. 1013

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

Q. So based on the Impeachment Report, does it follow that there were

nursing home numbers that included residents that were transferred
to the hospital that the Executive chose not to release in August of
2020?

A. But the numbers – I’m unclear. I’m unclear what the question is.
What I’m reading here says that the letter that we put together, which
had all the numbers, and it did not go back to the legislature. That’s
how I determine it. I’m not sure about what you asked me about
August 20, 2020. Right, that was the letter. Right, there were letters
that were sent over there. There were, I think, two letters. Well, there
was one official letter, and I think that was information that went
over there as well, saying these are the number of deaths, and that
came from the Department, you know, from the Department
probably prior to – put together prior to my August testimony.

Q. At this point were you comfortable when you sent the letter over,
were you comfortable with the numbers?
1012
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 179-180.
1013
Id. at 180-181.

Page 262 of 520

 A. The letter that I sent over in October, I was totally comfortable with.
That was the number of deaths at that time.

Dr. Zucker believed that the numbers did not need to be audited further, and by not
releasing the data the Cuomo Administration was simply “delaying.” 1014

Dr. Howard Zucker (December 18, 2023)

Q. Do you believe that [the number of deaths] needed to be audited

further?

A. No. No. I felt that this letter should go.

Q. And again, this is your personal opinion. At this point any delay in
releasing the numbers was just a delay?

A. Yeah, I felt it was a delay. I felt it should go out, and I will be the
first to say that I raised it multiple times about getting them out, and
had some days that I thought if they were so worried about
something then they should put it out on X day or Y day. So like
Thanksgiving.

Mr. Cuomo testified that he neither recalled Mr. Rhodes nor Dr. Zucker advising him to
release the full data set. 1015 In response to Mr. Rhodes’ audit, Mr. Cuomo noted that Mr. Rhodes
“wasn’t an auditor.” 1016 Mr. Cuomo testified that Mr. Rhodes would not have advised releasing
the numbers. 1017

In response to the letters that Dr. Zucker drafted releasing the full data set, Mr. Cuomo
denied ever reviewing them, saying that those letters would have been reviewed by the attorneys
responding to the DOJ inquiry. 1018 Mr. Cuomo testified that the Executive Chamber had notified
the New York state Legislature that they would release out-of-facility death totals in January
2021. 1019

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. It’s been widely reported that on a phone call with the legislature,
Ms. DeRosa said the state froze in response to the DOJ’s request. Is
that the situation you’re referencing?

1014
Zucker TI, supra note 905, at 181.
1015
Cuomo TI, supra note 907, at 275.
1016
Id.
1017
Id. at 276.
1018
Id. at 279.
1019
Id. at 282.

Page 263 of 520

 A. Froze meaning we had to make sure everything was careful. We had
to be careful and make sure everything was right. That’s what she
was referring to. They both made requests at about the same time.
The legislature made a request about August, the DOJ letter comes
in about August. We called the legislative leaders and say, Can we
do it in January because we have to be very careful because we have
this purely political witch hunt going on at the Department of Justice
run by two really bad guys. And that’s what she’s referring to.

Q. You mention that you asked the legislature if you could pause
responding…[W]ho specifically spoke to the legislature from your
office?

A. It would have been the governmental person, it could have been

Beth or if it was the counsel or it could have been Melissa.

Q. You’re saying that in August of 2020, you asked to wait until

January 2021?

A. Somewhere around there, yeah.

Ms. DeRosa similarly testified that because of the ongoing DOJ investigation there was
an agreement with the legislature to delay releasing the numbers until January 2021. 1020

Ms. Melissa DeRosa (June 23, 2024)

Q. What happened to [Dr. Zucker’s] letter? Did it make its way to the
legislature?

A. No, the plan stayed the same. We were going to get back to [the
legislature] in January with the hearing with the agreement that we
had reached with the leaders.

Q. Why?

A. Well, I can give the reason I believe. I don’t remember, like – I don’t
remember having any thought towards this in realtime. But after the
Jeff Clark letter came in on October 28th, it was sort of like back to
square zero, if that makes any sense. We were now in a situation
where we were dealing with the Department of Justice, they had a
fresh inquiry, and we needed to be responding to them. And while
we did that, we were waiting on the legislature. We had every

1020
DeRosa TI, supra note 910, at 83.

Page 264 of 520

 intention of keeping our word to the legislature, which was to get
back to them by their first hearing when they came back and
resumed session in January. But that was not our priority. Our
priority was getting back to DOJ.

FINDING: Mr. Andrew Cuomo Acted in a Manner Consistent with an Attempt to

Inappropriately Influence the Testimony of a Witness and Obstruct the Select
Subcommittee’s Investigation.

Dr. Malatras was the only Executive Chamber official to testify to the Mr. Cuomo’s
involvement in the July 6 Report prior to Ms. Kennedy testifying similarly on October 8,
2024. 1021 Senior Executive Chamber officials involved with the July 6 Report, including Ms.
DeRosa, Ms. Lacewell, and Ms. Garvey, testified that they had no knowledge or recollection of
Mr. Cuomo being involved in the July 6 Report. 1022

Dr. Malatras testified about his most recent communications with former Governor
Cuomo. 1023

Dr. James Malatras (May 20, 2024)

Q. Since January 2023, have you had any conversations with the former
governor… about our investigation?

A. I have had no conversations with the governor since sometime in

early 2021. He did text me several times to check in. The latest time
he texted me was February 18th of this year, I believe, just to say I
hope you’re doing well, things like that. I did not respond…

It is the Select Subcommittee’s understanding that, at the time of his transcribed

interview, Dr. Malatras did not respond to any of the text messages he received from Mr. Cuomo
and, consistent with his testimony, the Select Subcommittee stated Dr. Malatras had not “spoken”
to former Governor Cuomo since 2021.

Subsequent to Dr. Malatras’ transcribed interview, the Select Subcommittee requested the
referenced text message from Mr. Cuomo to Dr. Malatras from February 18, 2024. 1024

1021
Ms. Kennedy testified to the involvement of Mr. Cuomo after reviewing documents obtained by the Select
Subcommittee.
1022
Garvey TI, supra note 918, at 163; Lacewell TI, supra note 920, at 58; DeRosa TI, supra note 910, at 238.
1023
Malatras TI, supra note 950, at 30.
1024
Text from Andrew Cuomo, former Governor of New York, to Dr. Jim Malatras, former Advisor to the Governor
(Feb. 18, 2024).

Page 265 of 520

 Considering the timing of this text message—within 48 hours of the Select Subcommittee
publicly announcing its request for Dr. Malatras’ testimony—and the fact that he had not spoken
with former Governor Cuomo since 2021, the Select Subcommittee determined:

…this text message raises concerns that Mr. Cuomo may have been trying
to influence Dr. Malatras’ testimony and obstruct the Select Subcommittee’s
investigation.

Mr. Cuomo testified the text message was “it’s just a nice note” and that he was not aware
of the Select Subcommittee’s letter to Dr. Malatras. 1025

Mr. Andrew Cuomo (June 11, 2024)

Q. [The text was sent] 48 hours after Dr. Malatras received an invitation
to testify before us.

A. I hadn’t spoken to Jim. I don’t think I spoke to him since this period
of time period. I think this was just saying – he went through a very
tough time and was forced to resign from the state university system,
and I think I’m saying to him – I think that’s what this is in reference
to… There was also ongoing conversations with Jim and litigation
with him and I’ve known him a long time. He’s a great fellow and
he was getting beaten up, and I think I was just saying to him, you
know, you’re a good man.

Q. To the best of your recollection, when was the last time you
contacted Dr. Malatras before this text?

1025
Cuomo TI, supra note 907.

Page 266 of 520

 A. I don’t think I’ve spoken to Jim since I left as governor.

Q. I guess it’s just a coincidence that Dr. Malatras got this text message
within two days of getting an invitation to testify on nursing homes.

A. I didn’t know that Jim – I haven’t had – I haven’t had conversations

with Jim. Jim never told me he was coming here to testify.

Q. Were you aware that he received a letter, though?

A. No.

Q. So this text wasn’t – you weren’t trying to influence his testimony

in any way by sending this text message?

A. No.

Q. Have you attempted to influence the testimony of any witness

providing information concerning your administration’s response to
this Select Subcommittee?

A. No. By the way, this is just a nice note to a person.

A. I don’t ask to speak with him. I don’t suggest anything. It’s just a
nice note.

On September 9, 2024, Counsel for Mr. Cuomo e-mailed Select Subcommittee staff to
express her objections regarding the Select Subcommittee’s determination regarding this text
message. 1026

I explained that there was nothing nefarious about this text from which you
could suggest Governor Cuomo may have been trying to influence Dr.
Malatras’s testimony or obstruct the Subcommittee’s investigation…

I told you that if Dr. Malatras did not understand this innocuous text in that
way, you could not suggest something nefarious by Governor Cuomo and
you should note that Dr. Malatras did not testify he understood or thought
there may have been a nefarious purpose…

The RSM [Republican Staff Memo] deliberately misleads the public by

omitting…the fact that [Dr. Malatras] never told you that he understood the
text message to be an effort to improperly influence him or obstruct this

E-Mail from Ms. Rita Glavin, Counsel for Mr. Andrew Cuomo, to Select Subcommittee Staff (Sept. 9, 2024 2:30
1026

PM).

Page 267 of 520

 investigation. Your suggestions that Governor Cuomo may have been
attempting violate [sic] the law are entirely unsupported.

To address Counsel for Mr. Cuomo’s concerns, Select Subcommittee staff replied and
stated:

Since Dr. Malatras was not asked explicitly how he [interpreted] the text, it
is likely we send an interrogatory to Dr. Malatras to ask him what his
interpretations or feelings were. Once we receive his response, we will make
sure the memo is updated top [sic] include both his testimony and Mr.
Cuomo’s. 1027

Counsel for Mr. Cuomo went further than simply expressing her objections and
“reminded” Select Subcommittee staff of their ethical obligations. 1028 Counsel for Mr. Cuomo
did this by referencing two staffers’ applicable state bar rules—meaning she researched their
state bar numbers—and cited the disbarment case against former New York City Mayor Rudolph
Guiliani. 1029 A reasonable person may perceive this “reminder” as a threat to file disbarment
complaints against those staffers. This is not the first time that Counsel for Mr. Cuomo has
resorted to such intimidation tactics on Select Subcommittee staff. 1030

On September 26, 2024, to address Counsel for Mr. Cuomo’s objections, the Select
Subcommittee sent interrogatories to Dr. Malatras. 1031 These interrogatories were targeted to
address Counsel for Mr. Cuomo’s concerns, including whether there were more communications
between Mr. Cuomo and Dr. Malatras, and how Dr. Malatras interpreted the communications. On
September 19, 2024, the Select Subcommittee received Dr. Malatras’ supplemental testimony. 1032

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1027
E-Mail from Select Subcommittee Staff to Ms. Rita Glavin, Counsel for Andrew Cuomo (Sept. 10, 2024 10:58
AM).
1028
E-Mail from Ms. Rita Glavin, Counsel for Mr. Andrew Cuomo, Supra note 26; See also Dan Diamond, Andrew
Cuomo, once a pandemic star, grilled by Congress over pandemic missteps, WASH. POST. (Sept. 10, 2024) (“Rich
Azzopardi, a Cuomo spokesman, said his colleagues were ‘reminding’ House lawyers that there were consequences
for making “false and misleading” statements in the report that Republicans issued Monday. ‘I do think lawyers
have an ethical obligation to tell the truth, and I don’t think there’s a lot of that in this report,’ Azzopardi said”).
1029
Id.
1030
E-Mail from Ms. Rita Glavin, Counsel for Mr. Andrew Cuomo, to Select Subcommittee Staff (Mar. 8, 2024 5:07
PM).
1031
Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability, to James Malatras, Former Advisor, Governor of the States of New York, (Sept. 16,
2024).
1032
Letter from James Malatras, Former Advisor, Governor of the States of New York, to Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M.,
Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability (Sept. 19,
2024) [hereinafter “Malatras Letter”].

Page 268 of 520

 early 2021, Mr. Cuomo contacted Dr. Malatras. Mr. Cuomo sent the
following text message to Dr. Malatras. Dr. Malatras did not respond.

February 16, 2024: The Select Subcommittee requested Dr. Malatras’ testimony at a voluntary
transcribed interview. 1036 The New York Post publicly reported the Select
Subcommittee’s request to Dr. Malatras. 1037

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1036
Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability, to James Malatras, Former Advisor, Governor of the States of New York (Feb. 16,
2024).
1037
Victor Nava, House COVID-19 panel requests testimony from 4 former Cuomo admin officials, N.Y. POST (Feb.
16, 2024) (While the former Governor testified that he was not aware that the Select Subcommittee had requested
Mr. Malatras’ testimony, his spokesman, Rich Azzopardi was able to provide a statement on his behalf to this article
in response to the Select Subcomittee’s requests for transcribed interviews with Mr. Malatras’ and others).

Page 270 of 520

February 18, 2024: Within 48 hours of the Select Subcommittee’s letter, and for the second
time since 2021, Mr. Cuomo contacted Dr. Malatras again.

In response to interrogatories from the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Malatras

stated that he believed this text to be in response to the Select
Subcommittee’s letter. 1038 Further, Dr. Malatras stated that this text
message was a “flare—or signal—alerting [him] that [former Governor
Cuomo] was aware” of Dr. Malatras’ upcoming testimony. 1039

Dr. James Malatras (September 19, 2024)

1038
Malatras Letter, Supra note 1032.
1039
Id.

Page 271 of 520

 Q. Dr. Malatras, to you, was the February 18, 2024 text message from
Mr. Cuomo to you in response to the Select Subcommittee’s
invitation for your testimony?

A. Yes.

Q. Dr. Malatras, how did you interpret the content of the February 18,
2024 text message from Mr. Cuomo to you?

A. I took it as a type of flare—or signal— alerting me that he was aware

that the House Select Subcommittee had requested that I testify on
issues related to the administration’s handling of the Covid-19
response.

July 15, 2024: After negotiating for a week, the Select Subcommittee, Mr. Cuomo, and
Counsel for Mr. Cuomo agreed to a public hearing on September 10, 2024
with Mr. Cuomo as the sole witness. To secure Mr. Cuomo’s voluntary
cooperation, the Select Subcommittee agreed to not publicly announce the
date until required pursuant to the rules of the Committee on Oversight
and Accountability—seven days prior to the hearing date. 1040

July 15, 2024: The same day the hearing was confirmed and for the first time in more
than three years, Mr. Cuomo called Dr. Malatras. 1041 Dr. Malatras did not
answer. 1042 Mr. Cuomo followed up by text. 1043

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1040
E-Mail from Ms. Rita Glavin, Counsel for Andrew Cuomo, to Select Subcommittee Staff (July 15, 2024 6:38
PM).
1041
Malatras Letter, Supra note 1032.
1042
Id.
1043
Id.

Page 272 of 520

 Dr. Malatras stated that he and Mr. Cuomo spoke later that day around
5:00 p.m. for about half an hour and Mr. Cuomo discussed his upcoming
testimony before the Select Subcommittee and the nursing home
investigation specifically. 1044 Dr. Malatras stated that he did not engage in
that conversation because he was “uncomfortable.” 1045

As far as the Select Subcommittee is aware, at the time of this call, Mr.
Cuomo and his Counsel were the only ones, outside of the Select
Subcommittee, with knowledge of the upcoming hearing.

Dr. James Malatras (September 17, 2024)

Q. Dr. Malatras, have you been contacted by Mr. Cuomo since your
May 20, 2024 interview before the Select Subcommittee?

A. Yes.

Q. …[D]id Mr. Cuomo discuss issues related to the Select

Subcommittee?

A. Yes.

Q. …[W]hat topics?

1044
Id.
1045
Id.

Page 273 of 520

 A. Governor Cuomo started the call by mentioning he would be
testifying publicly in front of the House Select Subcommittee. As
part of the conversation he spoke about nursing homes, specifically
describing how the story in New York was much better than I even
knew it to be and mentioned several facts and datapoints to
demonstrate his point. I don’t recall the exact details of the facts or
datapoints but recall generally that he mentioned that New York’s
nursing home numbers in comparison to other states were even
better than first thought.

Q. …[H]ow did you interpret the phone call?

A. For the portion of the call regarding the Select Subcommittee, I

interpreted the call as an effort to make me aware of the positive
information about which he intended to testify. I only listened and
did not respond to his discussion on nursing homes, because I was
uncomfortable having to potentially contradict or disagree with
Governor Cuomo on the call, or somehow prejudicing the upcoming
Select Subcommittee hearing by discussing it at all.

FINDING: Andrew Cuomo Likely Gave False Statements to the Select Subcommittee in
Violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001.

The Select Subcommittee believes that Mr. Cuomo made false statements about his
involvement in and knowledge of the drafting of the July 6 Report. On October 30, 2024, The
Select Subcommittee referred Mr. Cuomo to DOJ pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 1046

That same day, Mr. Cuomo, via Counsel, transmitted a referral of the Select
Subcommittee to DOJ for no articulated violation of law, but instead, a vague reference to
“misuse of government resources and the invasion of state prerogatives.” 1047 As a preliminary
matter, this referral has no basis in fact. Additionally, Mr. Cuomo’s Counsel intentionally
truncated the Select Subcommittee’s jurisdiction in an apparent attempt to give the appearance of
a lack of jurisdiction. 1048 Further, it appears that Mr. Cuomo’s position is that a citizen of the U.S.
no longer retains their First Amendment Right and is disallowed from petitioning their
government, if they are simultaneously availing themselves of the justice system. This position is
in clear divergence with the rights afforded to Americans and runs afoul of the founding
principles of the U.S.

1046
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability, to Hon. Merrick Garland, Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 30, 2024); Referral
of Andrew M. Cuomo, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Oct. 30, 2024).
1047
Letter from Sarah Sulkowski, Counsel for Andrew Cuomo, to Hon. Merrick Garland, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice (Oct. 30, 2024).
1048
Id.

Page 274 of 520

 Subsequent to the referral, Mr. Cuomo, again via Counsel, transmitted a letter to DOJ in
his defense of the Select Subcommittee’s referral. 1049 In this letter, Counsel for Mr. Cuomo
stated, “[t]he grotesque political nature of the Wenstrup Referral is also revealed by its inclusion
of a footnote that cites to the discredited, biased, and hopelessly flawed investigation of sexual
harassment allegations against Governor Cuomo by the New York Attorney General
(“OAG”).” 1050

Mr. Cuomo’s aversion to the New York Attorney General in this case is contradictory to
Mr. Cuomo’s praise for the Attorney General at his public hearing before the Select
Subcommittee.

The Attorney General of New York, who governs the New York law and
interprets the New York law, found exactly contrary to what you are
saying, and said it repeatedly, and you know she said it repeatedly.

***

The March 25 guidance was consistent with the CMS guidance. The March
25 guidance was consistent with the CMS guidance if nursing homes have
the ability to adhere to infection prevention and control recommendations.
It was also consistent with CDC-published transmission-based precautions.
That’s the attorney general’s position and opinion, and that’s the law
of the state of New York. 1051

1049
Letter from Ms. Rita Glavin, Counsel for Andrew Cuomo, to Hon. Merrick Garland, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice (Oct. 31, 2024).
1050
Id.
1051
A Hearing with former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo: Before Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, 118th Cong. (Sept. 10, 2024)

Page 275 of 520

VIII. While Testing for COVID-19 Was Flawed, Utilizing Public-Private Partnerships
Resulted in Readily Available and Accurate Tests

Historically, the CDC has taken the lead on developing tests for new diseases and
distributing the tests through the public health laboratory network. 1052 Once the genetic sequence
of COVID-19 was identified, the CDC assumed initial responsibility for developing COVID-19
test kits. 1053 The agency produced a diagnostic test, which was distributed to public health
laboratories in early February 2020. 1054 However, issues with the test's accuracy led to delays in
widespread testing. The FDA began issuing EUAs 1055 in February 2020 to allow labs and
manufacturers to develop, validate, and distribute COVID-19 tests. 1056 EUAs allowed for quicker
deployment of tests without going through the typical, lengthier approval process.

As the CDC’s tests were limited and, therefore, hindered testing capacity, the federal
government encouraged private companies and laboratories to develop their own tests. In March
2020, commercial laboratories, such as Quest Diagnostics and LabCorp, were approved to
develop and distribute tests, which significantly expanded testing capacity. 1057 Additionally, the
federal government partnered with private industry to increase testing capabilities, including the
launch of drive-through testing sites in collaboration with companies like Walmart, Walgreens,
CVS, and others. 1058 The COVID-19 Testing Supply Chain Stabilization Task Force was also
created to address shortages of testing materials. 1059

In addition to developing and distributing tests, the federal government also issued testing
guidance. Early on in March 2020, the CDC’s testing guidelines prioritized people who were
symptomatic, had traveled to affected areas, or were exposed to confirmed cases. 1060 Healthcare
workers and those in critical roles were also prioritized due to limited testing capacity. 1061 As
testing availability expanded by June of 2020, the CDC updated its guidelines to include
asymptomatic individuals, especially those in high-risk settings like long-term care facilities or
prisons. 1062 The guidance gradually shifted to encourage broader testing.

1052
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, A-04-20-02027, CDC’s Internal Control
Weaknesses led to its initial COVID-19 Test Kit Failure, but CDC Ultimately Created a Working Test Kit, at 4-5
(Oct. 2023).
1053
Id. at 6.
1054
Id.
1055
For a comprehensive discussion and understanding of EUAs see xxx section infra/supra at page #.
1056
HHS IG report at 6, figure 2.
1057
Noah Weiland & Katie Thomas, Trump Administration Moves to Speed Coronavirus Testing, THE N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2020).
1058
Amy Goldstein, et al., Trump says he will partner with private sector to expand coronavirus testing but details
are sketchy, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2020).
1059
FEMA COVID-19 Supply Chain Task Force: Supply Chain Stabilization, FEMA available at
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200725/nhom-cong-tac-chuoi-cung-ung-trong-dai-dich-covid-19-cua-fema-
dinh-chuoi-cung.
1060
Roni Caryn Rabib & Katie Thomas, Coronavirus Testing Offered With Just a Doctor’s Approval, C.D.C. Says,
THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020).
1061
Carolyn Y. Johnson, et al., In hard-hit areas, testing restricted to health care workers, hospital patients, THE
WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2020).
1062
COVID-19 timeline, CDC (June 13, 2020) (CDC releases consolidated guidelines for COVID-19 testing—
including for nursing homes, long-term care facilities, and high-density critical infrastructure workplaces, like food
production facilities.)

Page 276 of 520

 The federal government also provided funding to facilitate testing. There was significant
financial support for testing through the CARES Act, which allocated billions of dollars for
testing and disease surveillance. 1063 This funding helped expand testing sites, purchase testing
supplies, and support state and local public health efforts. The Health Care Enhancement Act
allocated an additional $25 billion for testing, including funds for states, territories, and tribes to
develop testing plans and increase capacity. 1064

FINDING: Career Scientists at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Undermined Trust in Public Health by Overpromising and Underdelivering Early
Testing Kits, Including Knowingly Putting Tests with a High Failure Rate on the
Market Without Appropriate Disclosures.

In the early stages of the pandemic, states sent samples to the CDC, which then tested
those samples in its labs. 1065 Although the CDC has limited capacity to conduct these tests, Dr.
Redfield testified that samples from states were not refused by the CDC, albeit it may have taken
several days to test those samples. 1066 States wanted their own test kits so that they could test
their own samples, and the CDC sought to facilitate that request.

Dr. Redfield was not involved in the CDC’s development of these test kits. 1067 In fact,
Dr. Redfield testified that the CDC is “not a manufacturing company [and] had [he] been
involved in those decisions at the time, [he] would have recommended a contract manufacturing
company manufacture [the test kits].” 1068

While the CDC’s career scientists’ desire to quickly develop these test kits was laudable,
the execution was disastrous. These career scientists assured the public that reliable, widespread
testing would soon be accessible, helping to contain outbreaks and protect public health. 1069
These officials opted to develop their own test kits rather than use tests already approved and
distributed internationally 1070 or seek assistance from industry. This slowed the process
significantly and prevented wider access to testing.

The CDC’s first batch of COVID-19 test kits, distributed in February 2020, were found to
be faulty due to contamination issues. 1071 These tests that were rushed to market without

1063
See CARES act
1064
Cite HCEA section
1065
Redfield TI, at 43.
1066
Id.
1067
Redfield TI, at 75 (“There were people at the states, obviously a number of them said it would be easier for them
if they could do the tests themselves. And people at CDC had decided that they would try to facilitate that. And this
is not something I was engaged in the decisionmaking at the time. But the lab group and the incident command
group decided that the lab team would develop reagents that then they would distribute to the public health labs.”)
1068
Id.
1069
Arman Azad, WHO and CDC never discussed providing international test kits to the US, global health agency
says, CNN (Mar. 18, 2020).
1070
Id.
1071
Dina Temple-Raston, CDC Report: Officials Knew Coronavirus Test Was Flawed But Released It Anyway, NPR
(Nov. 6, 2020).

Page 277 of 520

sufficient validation had high failure rates. These included both false positives and false
negatives, which undermined the reliability of testing as a public health tool. 1072

However, within weeks of distribution, it was discovered that the tests were producing
inconclusive results due to a flaw in one of the components used in the chemical analysis
(referred to as a “reagent”) of the collected sample. 1073 This flaw led to a significant delay in the
ability of public health labs to conduct tests, leaving the U.S. blind to the early spread of the
virus. These issues led to delays in testing at a critical time when the virus was beginning to
spread widely in the U.S. Despite the promises of widespread testing, many areas of the country
faced severe shortages of tests, leading to long wait times for results and a lack of timely data to
inform public health decisions. There were instances where CDC scientists did not fully disclose
the limitations and failure rates of certain tests. 1074 For example, some tests that were approved
by the FDA under EUAs were later found to be less accurate than initially reported. 1075

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1072
Summary of the Findings of the Immediate Office of the General Counsel’s Investigation Regarding CDC’s
Production of COVID-19 Test Kits, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (June 19, 2020) available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6953861-6-19-20-Summary-of-the-Findings-of-the-Immediate.html.
1073
Id.
1074
Dan Vergano, The Government Asked Us Not To Release Records From The CDC’s First Failed COVID Test.
Here They Are, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 8, 2021).
1075
Id.

Page 278 of 520

 The combination of overpromising, delays, and the release of unreliable tests created
confusion and frustration among the public. This confusion was compounded by mixed messages
from federal officials, which further eroded trust. The initial missteps in testing not only
hampered efforts to control the pandemic but also had long-lasting effects on public trust in
government and public health institutions. The perception that CDC scientists had misled the
public about the availability and effectiveness of testing contributed to skepticism about other
public health measures, including vaccination.

Although CDC scientists eventually acknowledged the problem with the test kits, the
delay in addressing the issue and the lack of initial transparency contributed to a growing

Page 279 of 520

mistrust in the public health officials’ handling of the pandemic. The failure of the CDC’s early
test kits highlighted the need for more rigorous testing and validation procedures before rolling
out diagnostic tools in a public health emergency.

CDC scientists overpromising widespread and reliable testing, followed by the

underdelivering of faulty and unreliable tests, created a significant gap between public
expectations and reality. This gap, exacerbated by a lack of transparency about the limitations of
early tests, contributed to a broader erosion of confidence in public health measures. Moving
forward, it is essential that lessons from these early failures are used to improve the
development, validation, and communication of public health interventions.

FINDING: Public-Private Partnerships Were More Effective in Increasing Testing

Production, Distribution, and Capacity than Career Government Bureaucrats.

In the early stages of the pandemic, the CDC was tasked with developing and distributing
diagnostic tests for COVID-19. However, as previously discussed the initial rollout was slow,
and the tests produced by the CDC were plagued by inaccuracies and supply shortages. These
early setbacks hindered the U.S.'s ability to rapidly scale up testing capacity and track the virus’s
spread. Furthermore, the CDC’s focus on centralized control over test production and distribution
created bottlenecks that delayed broader testing efforts.

By mid-March 2020, it became clear that public health authorities could not handle the
growing demand for testing alone. The involvement of private industry, particularly diagnostic
companies, biotechnology firms, and commercial laboratories, became essential to improve
testing at scale. The shift to include the private sector catalyzed a rapid expansion in testing
availability and quality.

Private industry played a pivotal role in increasing the production capacity for COVID-19
testing kits. Commercial diagnostic laboratories such as LabCorp, Quest Diagnostics, Abbott
Laboratories, and Roche Diagnostics leveraged their established infrastructure and experience to
ramp up production of both molecular [hereinafter “PCR”] and antigen-based testing kits. 1076 By
mid-2020, these companies had significantly increased the daily output of tests, contributing to
an exponential rise in the U.S.’s overall testing capacity.

For example, Abbott Laboratories [hereinafter “Abbot”]developed the BinaxNOW rapid

antigen test, which became widely used due to its affordability, ease of use, and fast turnaround
time. 1077 With FDA approval pursuant to an EUA, Abbott was able to produce millions of tests,
vastly increasing access to COVID-19 diagnostics. 1078 Similarly, Roche Diagnostics produced
1076
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, COVID-19 STRATEGIC TESTING
PLAN, at 11 (May 24, 2020).
1077
Jessica Prince-Guerra, et al., Evaluation of Abbott BinaxNOW Rapid Antigen Test for SARS-CoV-2 Infection at
Two Community-Based Testing Sites — Pima County, Arizona, November 3–17, 2020, MMWR (Jan. 22, 2021).
1078
BINAXNOW COVID-19 Antigen Self Tests, Abbott, available at
https://www.globalpointofcare.abbott/us/en/product-details/binaxnow-covid-19-antigen-self-test-
us.html?utp=UTID&utid=SEM_G_BR_BinaxNOW_Tests&utm_term=abbott%20binaxnow%20home%20test&utm
_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&gclid=Cj0KCQiAgJa6BhCOARIsAMiL7V90XdpTKJfKIxSfigZEpW9T_s8w
GfO8emzrBSLWVwWWCRKDivXcP9UaAsCREALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds#find-test.

Page 280 of 520

PCR test kits that were widely regarded as the gold standard for accuracy and sensitivity. 1079
These efforts addressed the early shortages that had hampered public health official’s initial
testing strategy and helped ensure that supply could meet rising demand.

Private firms also utilized advanced manufacturing techniques to streamline production.

This included innovations in automation, robotics, and supply chain optimization, which allowed
testing kit production to scale up without sacrificing quality. The capacity to produce millions of
tests weekly became a reality by mid-2020, largely due to private sector engagement.

Private industry’s involvement not only increased testing capacity but also improved the
quality and accuracy of COVID-19 tests. The CDC’s initial test kits faced issues related to faulty
reagents, which led to inconclusive results and hindered public health efforts. In contrast, many
of the diagnostic tests developed by private companies demonstrated higher sensitivity and
specificity, making them more reliable for detecting SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-
19. 1080

Commercial laboratories invested heavily in research and development to improve test

performance. Companies like Thermo Fisher Scientific and Hologic developed PCR tests that
provided accurate results within 24 hours, while also reducing the likelihood of false
negatives. 1081 Additionally, private companies played a critical role in developing rapid antigen
tests, such as the Quidel Sofia test, which allowed for mass testing in settings like schools,
workplaces, and nursing homes. 1082 These tests, although less sensitive than PCR tests, were
crucial for identifying infectious individuals quickly and preventing outbreaks. 1083 Moreover,
private industry ensured that testing quality remained consistent as production scaled up. Many
companies adhered to stringent quality control measures, regularly validating their tests against
CDC and FDA standards. This commitment to high-quality testing helped restore public
confidence in the diagnostic tools available during the pandemic.

The ability of private industry to create efficient distribution networks was another key
factor in the success of COVID-19 testing efforts. Early in the pandemic, testing was largely
confined to hospitals and specialized laboratories, which were overwhelmed by demand.
However, private companies, with their established logistics networks, were able to rapidly
expand the distribution of test kits across the country. Retailers such as Walmart, Walgreens, and
CVS partnered with diagnostic companies to open drive-through testing sites, providing easily
accessible testing in parking lots and clinics nationwide. This decentralized approach allowed for

1079
Olena Filchakova, et al., Review of COVID-19 testing and diagnostic methods, SCIENCE DIRECT (July 1, 2022).
1080
Id.
1081
ThermoFisher Scientific available at https://www.thermofisher.com/us/en/home/life-science/pcr/digital-
pcr.html?ef_id=EAIaIQobChMI-
qzawqe7iAMVtkxHAR3s7R5CEAAYASAAEgIUvvD_BwE:G:s&s_kwcid=AL!3652!3!606132910994!p!!g!!therm
ofisher%20dpcr!17574808538!139287683938&cid=gsd_pcr_sbu_r02_co_cp1491_pjt9601_gsd00000_0se_gaw_rs_
lgn_&gad_source=1&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI-qzawqe7iAMVtkxHAR3s7R5CEAAYASAAEgIUvvD_BwE.
1082
Avalon, Coronavirus Testing in the Outpatient Setting, CARE SOURCE (effective date Nov. 1, 2022) available at
https://avalonhcs.com/wp-
content/uploads/CareSource/KYDSNP/G2174%20v3%20Coronavirus%20Testing%20in%20the%20Outpatient%20
Setting%20efd;%2011-01-2022.pdf.
1083
Greg Slabodkin, COVID-19 antigen testing on par with PCR when used often: NIH-funded study,
MEDTECHDIVE (July 1, 2021).

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more people to be tested in both urban and rural areas, reducing geographic disparities in testing
availability. Furthermore, the private sector facilitated the distribution of test kits directly to state
and local health departments, ensuring a more equitable allocation of resources.

Private industry also pioneered the development of at-home test kits, such as those
created by Ellume and Everlywell. 1084 These tests enabled individuals to collect samples at home
and receive rapid results within minutes. The introduction of at-home testing revolutionized
accessibility, particularly for people who could not easily visit testing centers due to mobility
issues or concerns about exposure to the virus in public settings.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of private industry to the COVID-19 response
was the dramatic increase in testing capacity. As private laboratories and manufacturers entered
the testing market, daily testing capacity rose from just a few thousand tests per day in early
2020 to more than one million tests per day by mid-2021. 1085 This increase was critical for
controlling the spread of the virus, especially during periods of high transmission and the
emergence of new variants.

The private sector’s investment in high-throughput laboratory technology allowed for the
processing of large volumes of tests in a short time. Laboratories like Quest Diagnostics and
LabCorp implemented automation in their testing processes, reducing turnaround times and
minimizing the backlog of unprocessed samples. 1086 Additionally, the introduction of rapid
antigen tests provided a complementary approach to molecular testing, enabling quicker results
for those in need of immediate diagnosis.

The success of private sector contributions underscores the importance of public-private

partnerships in responding to large-scale health crises. As the world prepares for future
pandemics, leveraging the expertise, resources, and agility of private industry will be essential
for developing effective testing strategies and ensuring swift responses to emerging threats.

1084
William Wan, FDA authorizes first rapid, over-the-counter home coronavirus test, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 15,
2020).
1085
Laura Strickler & Adiel Kaplan, Private labs do 85 percent of U.S. COVID-19 tests but still struggle with
backlogs, shortages, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020).
1086
Will Feuer, Quest says FDA cleared new ‘lab method’ that will cut coronavirus testing delays, CNBC (July 29,
2020).

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IX. Rapidly Implemented Travel Restrictions Can Save Lives

The COVID-19 pandemic led to an unprecedented series of global public health

measures, with international travel-related control measures playing an early role in the U.S.’
response. The effectiveness of these measures has been a subject of debate since the time they
were imposed. The phrase “travel-related control measures ” could include the following actions:
“(1) border closure, (2) travel bans, (3) travel restrictions [e.g., a ban of persons who had been in
certain countries with enumerated exceptions], (4) entry/exit screening, (5) travel-related
quarantine and (6) . . . [a combination of different] travel-related control measures.” 1087 For
purposes of this report and as described below, the Trump Administration’s actions early in the
pandemic are best categorized as travel restrictions.

On January 31, 2020, as China reluctantly acknowledged that COVID-19 cases and
deaths were rising in their country, the Trump Administration promulgated travel restrictions
focused on China. 1088 Specifically, the U.S. suspended entry of all aliens, with a list of 11
enumerated exceptions, who were physically present in China 14 days prior to their entry or
attempted entry into the U.S. 1089

On March 12, 2020, the Trump Administration announced travel restrictions for an initial
period of 30 days covering 26 European countries within the Schengen Area, which excludes the
United Kingdom and Ireland. 1090 Two days later, the European travel restrictions were extended
to travelers from the United Kingdom and Ireland and contained similar criteria (e.g., persons
who were a covered country with 14 days from attempted entry in the U.S.) and exceptions to
those in the order pertaining to China (e.g., lawful permanent residents, and their immediate
family members could enter). 1091

At the time of the European travel restrictions, COVID-19 had reached American shores.
On March 12, 2020, there were more than 1,000 known cases in the U.S., but more than 125,000
known cases globally. 1092

FINDING: International Travel Restrictions Delayed the Spread of COVID-19 Early in the
Pandemic.

1087
Ani Movsisyan, et al., Travel-related control measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic: an evidence map,
BMJ OPEN (Apr. 2021).
1088
Proclamation, White House, Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons
who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020).
1089
Id. The order excluded the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
1090
Saim Saeed, Trump’s Europe travel ban explained, POLITICO (Mar. 12, 2020) (noting “[t]he 26 European
countries in the Schengen zone — Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland).
1091
Proclamation, White House, Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons
who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020).
1092
Contagion Live News Network: Coronavirus Updates for March 12, 2020, Contagion Live (Mar. 12, 2020).

Page 283 of 520

 The effectiveness of international travel restrictions in curbing the spread of COVID-19
remains a subject of contention among public health experts. While these bans were seen as
crucial in the early stages of the pandemic, their long-term efficacy has been questioned.
By the end of January 2020, there were only seven known cases of COVID-19 in the
U.S. 1093 At that point in time, the travel restrictions pertaining to China, the origin of the virus,
were reasonably grounded in the belief that limiting international movement could prevent the
introduction and spread of the virus in the U.S., particularly in the early stages of the pandemic
before community transmission became widespread. Even as Europe became a hotspot for the
virus by March of 2020, the known cases within the U.S. were at a manageable level—just more
than 1,000.

With four years of hindsight, it is clear the international travel restrictions early in the
pandemic delayed spread of the virus but did not prevent COVID-19 from entering the U.S. By
the time the European travel ban was enacted in March 2020, it is now known that the virus had
already spread significantly within the U.S. due to earlier untracked travel from Europe. 1094
However, the restrictions likely helped reduce the number of new cases entering the U.S. from
Europe, where the virus was spreading rapidly at the time.

One study estimated that the U.S. travel bans helped to prevent approximately 77,000
cases of COVID-19 in the first month of their implementation. 1095 This study concluded that,
while the travel restrictions did not entirely stop the virus from entering the U.S., they were
effective in slowing the rate of transmission, giving the U.S. healthcare system more time to
prepare and respond to the pandemic. 1096 A different study estimated that without the
implementation of travel restrictions of persons coming from China, U.S. cases would have been
83 percent higher at the end of February 2020. 1097

Contrary to baseless claims that the travel restrictions were pointless or worse the result
of untoward motivations, on July 31, 2020, Dr. Fauci testified he supported the travel restrictions
when questioned by then-Minority Whip Steve Scalise.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (July 31, 2020)

Q. Dr. Fauci, let me ask you about some of the decisions that you
worked with President Trump on and the whole team did. I know
when you go back to the beginning of this, the China ban was very

1093
https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html (“January 30, 2020: CDC confirms that the SARS-CoV-2
virus has now spread between two people in Illinois with no history of recent travel. This is the first recorded
instance of person-to-person spread of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the U.S and brings the total number of cases
up to seven.”).
1094
Bingyi Yang, et al, Effectiveness of International Travel Controls for Delaying Local Outbreaks of COVID-19,
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Jan. 28, 2022).
1095
Nicole A. Errett et al., An integrative review of the limited evidence on international travel bans as an emerging
infectious disease disaster control measure, JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (Jan. 1, 2020).
1096
Id.
1097
Nahae Kang & Beomsoo Kim, The Effects of Border Shutdowns on the Spread of COVID-19, JOURNAL OF
PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 30, 2020).

Page 284 of 520

 heavily discussed. Were you involved in working with President
Trump on deciding to ban flights from China?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

Q. Do you agree with that decision?

A. I do.

Q. Do you think that decision saved lives, Dr. Fauci?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you agree with the decision, when ultimately we saw spread in

Europe and then the President recommended that we extend that to
Europe, did you participate in that discussion?

A. I was actively involved in that discussion, sir.

Q. Do you agree with that decision?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you think that decision saved lives?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Eventually, then, we saw the United Kingdom have an outbreak,

and there had to be a tough decision made, do we extend that to the
United Kingdom? Were you part of that decision?

A. I was.

Q. And do you agree with that decision as well?

A. I do.

Q. Did that decision save lives?

A. Yes, it did. 1098

The Urgent Need for a National Plan to Contain the Coronavirus: Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the
1098

Coronavirus Pandemic of the Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. 2, (July 31, 2020).

Page 285 of 520

 In 2024, Dr. Fauci repeated his support for the travel restrictions believing that they
afforded the country time to prepare for the full impact of the virus.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (January 9, 2024)

Q. Dr. Fauci, in your opinion, are travel restrictions a good public

health tool?

A. It's context and circumstance dependence, and it depends on

what's -- in general. I'm talking generically. I'm not talking about
your question. It depends on at what stage of the outbreak you do
it. It depends on the level of the particular infection in question that
is already in your country. It depends on the efficiency of the
transmissibility of a particular infection, because if you have people
in your country that are already infected and it's highly
transmissible, it doesn't make a lot of sense to restrict. But in a very,
very precise period of time when you have virtually nothing in there,
you may want to have a temporary restriction to give you time to
prepare. That's one of the things that we did.

Q. Did you agree with the President's decision to restrict travel from
China?

A. I did, and I said there were caveats to restrictions. I agreed with it,
but I said that we've got to be careful because sometimes when you
do restrictions they have negative consequences in that you don't
have open access to help or even information. But fundamentally I
agreed at that time, since we had almost no infections that we knew
of in our country, that at least a temporary restriction would be
important.

Q. Did you also agree with the EU travel restriction?

A. I agreed with the suggestion that that be done, yes.

Q. Did you agree with the U.K. travel restriction?

A. Yes, I did. 1099

Contrary to Dr. Fauci’s support, then Presidential Candidate Biden criticized these early
travel restrictions as xenophobic. 1100 1101

1099
Fauci TI 2, supra note 81, at 125-126.
1100
Joe Biden (@JoeBiden), Twitter (Feb. 1, 2020) available at
https://x.com/JoeBiden/status/1223727977361338370.
1101
Joe Biden (@JoeBiden), Twitter (Mar. 12, 2020) available at
https://x.com/JoeBiden/status/1238254697695326209.

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 While Dr. Fauci voiced his support of the travel restrictions to Congress in 2020 and
2024, he did not publicly voice his support for them with then Presidential candidate Biden, then
Speaker Pelosi, and others characterized the travel restrictions as xenophobic. Furthermore, once
in office, President Biden enacted similar travel restrictions on travel from several African

Page 287 of 520

countries in late 2021 in response to the Omicron variant of the virus. 1102 At that time, President
Biden was not accused of xenophobia or racism for this action, nor should he have been.
Similarly, President Trump should not have been criticized for actions supported by public health
officials.

In the early days of the pandemic, before widespread community transmission, most
COVID-19 cases in the U.S. were associated with international travel. By restricting travel from
high-risk areas such as China and Europe, the Trump Administration was able to reduce the
influx of infected individuals and save lives.

FINDING: But for the Chinese Communist Party Blatantly Downplaying and Lying
Concerning the Serious Threat Posed by COVID-19, Travel Restrictions Would
Have Been Imposed Earlier and Been More Effective.

Undoubtedly, the timing of travel restrictions played a primary role in their effectiveness.
Logically, the earlier the travel restrictions are implemented the chance of them being more
effective increases. The China travel restrictions were implemented on January 31, 2020, when
the virus was still primarily concentrated in China. While some critics argued that these
restrictions were ineffective because they should have been implemented earlier, it is important
to note that the U.S. was one of the first countries to take such a step. 1103 In contrast, many other
countries waited until the virus had already spread internationally before imposing similar
restrictions.

Critics of the Trump Administration’s travel restrictions argue that they were reactive
rather than proactive and that domestic measures such as improved testing and contact tracing
would have been more effective in controlling the spread of COVID-19. However, these
criticisms fail to acknowledge the absence of widespread testing and domestic preparedness in
the early days of the pandemic, leaving travel restrictions as one of the few tools available to
slow COVID-19’s spread.

It is important to acknowledge that the U.S. was facing an unprecedented public health
crisis with limited information about the virus at the time the travel bans were enacted. The goal
of these measures was not to stop COVID-19 entirely, but to delay its spread and allow for a
more coordinated domestic response.

The travel restrictions could have been more effective had they been enacted earlier, but
the responsibility that they were not implemented in early January 2020 or perhaps even in
December 2019 lies squarely on the CCP’s shoulders. Rather than notifying the WHO and the
international community of the alarming viral outbreak, CCP authorities censored and concealed

1102
Andrew Mark Miller, Flashback: Biden suggested Trump's coronavirus travel ban was 'xenophobic', FOX NEWS
(Nov. 26, 2021).
1103
Nahae Kahg & Beomsoo Kim, The Effects of Border Shutdowns on the Spread of COVID-19, JOURNAL OF
PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 30, 2020) (The U.S. travel restrictions for persons from China
was announced on January 31, 2020, but implemented and enforced on February 2, 2020. Only Kuwait (January 31,
2020) and Australia (February 1, 2020) implemented their restrictions earlier).

Page 288 of 520

information and silenced doctors who tried to warn others in the scientific community. 1104 A
charitable review of the known timeline of events that unfolded in China indicates that CCP
officials should have signaled the international community of an outbreak of concern before
Christmas in 2019. 1105 The CCP’s desire to hide details and outright lie to the U.S. and other
world leaders, immeasurably and unnecessarily cost additional American lives and resources. At
the time, the U.S. and WHO had no ability to know the CCP lied about having the virus under
control.

The Trump Administration’s travel restrictions targeting Asia and Europe during the
early days of the COVID-19 pandemic were effective in delaying the spread of the virus into the
U.S. While these measures did not and were not designed to completely prevent the introduction
of COVID-19, they significantly slowed its transmission and provided critical time for U.S.
public health officials to respond. Data supports the argument that these travel restrictions
reduced the number of imported cases and helped mitigate the initial impact of the pandemic,
buying the U.S. critical time. While no single measure can fully contain a pandemic, the
evidence suggests that travel restrictions, when implemented early and in conjunction with other
public health strategies, can play an important role in controlling the spread of infectious
diseases.

1104
Annie Sparrow, The Chinese Government’s Cover-Up Killed Health Care Workers Worldwide: Bad advice based
on false information led to fatal mistakes, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 18, 2021).
1105
Jim Geraghty, The Comprehensive Timeline of China’s COVID-19 Lies, NATIONAL REVIEW (Mar. 23, 2020)./
(“December 21: Wuhan doctors begin to notice a ‘cluster of pneumonia cases with an unknown cause’ and
December 25: Chinese medical staff in two hospitals in Wuhan are suspected of contracting viral pneumonia and are
quarantined. This is additional strong evidence of human-to-human transmission.”).

Page 289 of 520

X. Government Perpetrated COVID-19 Misinformation

It has been widely discussed that the COVID-19 pandemic brought with it a new and
pervasive wave of misinformation throughout the U.S. and the world. Social media provided
fertile ground for accidental falsehoods and deliberate lies to burgeon into the public
consciousness. 1106

Unfortunately, kneejerk reactions by the federal government did little to fix the problem
and instead may have sowed deeper distrust of government institutions while trampling on the
First Amendment of the Constitution. At times, the government’s attempts to quell
misinformation contradictorily resulted in new misinformation being spread.

FINDING: Public Health Officials Incorrectly Characterized the Lab-Leak Theory as a

“Conspiracy Theory.”

During the early months of the pandemic, Dr. Fauci played a critical role in disparaging
the lab-leak theory. Dr. Fauci appeared alongside Dr. Daszak on an episode of former Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich’s podcast, Newt’s World. 1107 During the podcast, Speaker Gingrich
asked if Dr. Fauci had heard about the “urban legend” that COVID-19 escaped from a
“biological warfare center in Wuhan.” 1108 Dr. Fauci told him that these were “conspiracy theories
without any scientific basis for it.” 1109

Dr. Anthony Fauci (February 9, 2020)

Q. I don't know if you have had access to enough information from the
Chinese, but as you know, there's a sort of urban legend that there's
a biological warfare center in Wuhan and that the coronavirus
escaped from that. Did you have any sense of where it probably
came from.

A. Well, I think ultimately we know that these things come from an

animal reservoir. I've heard these conspiracy theories, and like all
conspiracy theories, Newt, they’re just conspiracy theories. Is it
impossible that that could have happened? I don't think I can say that
it's not impossible. But I think if you examine all of the isolates and
look at the very detailed pattern or map of their molecular structure,
you may get more insight as to whether it was a natural direct jump,
whether it percolated in another species from the bat to whatever, a
civic cat or some other animal, and then jumped species into
humans. I think the more you examine isolates and the more we get
information, we’ll be able to clarify the evolutionary origin of the

1106
Tiffany Hsu, As Covid-19 Continues to Spread, So Does Misinformation About It, THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
2022).
1107
Newt’s World: China’s Coronavirus, Gingrich 360 (Feb. 9, 2020).
1108
Id.
1109
Id.

Page 290 of 520

 virus. But right now, I think the things you're hearing are still in the
realm of conspiracy theories without any scientific basis for it. 1110

Dr. Fauci was also directly involved in the drafting and promotion of Proximal Origin, in
which the authors concluded “we do not believe that any type of laboratory-based scenario is
plausible.” 1111 Evidence suggests that Dr. Fauci “prompted” the drafting of the Proximal Origin
paper to “disprove” the lab-leak theory. 1112 Since its publication on March 18, 2020, Proximal
Origin has been accessed nearly 6 million times and has been cited countless times to discredit
the possibility of a lab leak. 1113 This paper was perhaps the most consequential tool used to paint
the lab-leak theory as a conspiracy theory.

Over the course of the Select Subcommittee’s investigation, Dr. Fauci repeatedly tried to
walk back his assertion that the lab-leak theory was a conspiracy. When asked during a
transcribed interview, he acknowledged that the lab leak “isn’t inherently a conspiracy theory”
but also claimed that instead some people have “made conspiracy aspects from it.” 1114

Dr. Anthony Fauci (January 9, 2024)

Q. Just you sitting here today, do you think the possibility or the
hypothesis that the coronavirus emerged from a laboratory accident
is a conspiracy theory?

A. Well, it's a possibility. I think people have made conspiracy aspects

from it. And I think you have to separate the two when you keep an
open mind, that it could be a lab leak or it could be a natural
occurrence. I've mentioned in this committee that I believe the
evidence that I've seen weighs my opinion towards one, which is a
natural occurrence, but I still leave an open mind. So I think that in
and of itself isn't inherently a conspiracy theory, but some people
spin off things from that that are kind of crazy. 1115

Similarly, during a public hearing before the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Fauci testified that
he did not believe the “concept of there being a lab leak is inherently a conspiracy theory” but
that some “distortions on that particular subject” are. 1116

Dr. Anthony Fauci (June 3, 2024)

1110
Id.
1111
Proximal Origin, supra note 41.
1112
Memorandum from Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Majority Staff to Select Subcomm. on the
Coronavirus Pandemic Majority Staff, New Evidence Resulting from the Select Subcommittee’s Investigation into the
Origins of COVID-19 (Mar. 5, 2023).
1113
Proximal Origin, supra note 41.
1114
Fauci TI 2, supra note 81, at 116
1115
Id.
1116
Fauci Hearing, supra note 233, at 52.

Page 291 of 520

 Q. I just want to clarify for the record, because today you testified that
you did not suppress the lab leak theory, yet in the past you have
said, quote, "It is a distortion of reality," unquote. You've said, quote,
"I've heard these conspiracy theories, and, like all conspiracy
theories, they're just conspiracy theories." That's what you told the
American people. And so would you like to clarify, what science
were you following then versus now?

A. Yeah. No, I -- actually, I've also been very, very clear and said
multiple times that I don't think the concept of there being a lab leak
is inherently a conspiracy theory. What is conspiracy is the kind of
distortions of that particular subject. Like, it was a lab leak, and I
was parachuted into the CIA like Jason Bourne and told the CIA that
they should really not --

Q. Okay.

A. -- be talking about a lab leak. 1117

Yet, in Dr. Fauci’s Memoir—which was published just weeks after the hearing—Dr.
Fauci argued that allegations that EcoHealth’s subgrant at the WIV could have caused the
COVID-19 pandemic are conspiracy theories.

The smear campaign soon boiled over into conspiracy theories. One of the
most appalling examples of this was the allegation, without a shred of
evidence, that a NIAID grant to EcoHealth Alliance (EHA) with a sub-grant
to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China funded research that
caused the COVID pandemic. 1118

Later in his memoir, Dr. Fauci wrote:

We cannot account for all the research that takes place in Wuhan or in the
rest of China. That is why, as I have often stated publicly, we must keep an
open mind to the origin of COVID, as I do. 1119

Although Dr. Fauci believed the lab-leak theory to be a conspiracy theory at the start of
the pandemic, it now appears that his position is that he does have an open mind about the origin
of the virus—so long as it does not implicate EcoHealth Alliance, and by extension himself and
NIAID. Understandably, as he signed off on the EcoHealth Alliance grant.

FINDING: The Biden Administration Employed Undemocratic and Likely Unconstitutional

Methods to Fight What It Deemed to Be Misinformation.

1117
Id.
1118
Anthony Fauci, On Call: A Doctor’s Journey in Public Service, at 418 (Penguin Random House 2024).
1119
Id. at 423.

Page 292 of 520

 On May 1, 2024, the House Committee on the Judiciary’s Select Subcommittee on the
Weaponization of the Federal Government released an Interim Staff Report [hereinafter
“Judiciary Report”], which highlighted some of the most egregious examples of the Biden White
House’s censorship campaign. 1120 The Judiciary Report found that major technology companies
Meta, Alphabet, and Amazon changed their content moderation policies in response to pressure
from the Biden White House. 1121 For example, the report highlighted emails sent by Mr.
Zuckerberg which indicated that pressure from the White House led Facebook to take down
posts which claimed that COVID-19 was “man-made, manufactured, bioengineered, a
bioweapon, or created by an individual government or country, which includes claims that the
virus was modified through gain of function research and leaked from a lab.” 1122

In an August 26, 2024 letter to House Committee on the Judiciary Chairman Mr. Jim
Jordan, Mr. Zuckerberg wrote that the Biden Administration “repeatedly pressured our teams for
months to censor certain COVID-19 content, including humor and satire, and expressed a lot of
frustration when our teams didn’t agree.” 1123

1120
SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FED. GOV’T, H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INTERIM STAFF
REPORT, THE CENSORSHIP-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW TOP BIDEN WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS COERCED BIG TECH TO
CENSOR AMERICANS, TRUE INFORMATION, AND CRITICS OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION (May 1, 2024). [Hereinafter
“Weaponization Report”]
1121
Id.
1122
Id., at 12
1123
Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman & CEO, Meta Platforms, Inc., to Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. of
Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Aug. 26, 2024).

Page 293 of 520

g
 Available evidence suggests that a lab leak may be the most likely scenario, but
regardless, any assertion that the lab leak is “misinformation” is plainly false—a sentiment which
has been shared by numerous federal officials interviewed by the Select Subcommittee, including
Dr. Fauci. 1124

Other emails highlighted in the Judiciary Report illustrate that Mr. Zuckerberg regretted
“compromising [Facebook’s] standards due to pressure from an administration.” 1125

The Judiciary Report also highlighted emails indicating that Biden White House officials
pressured social media companies to take down or otherwise suppress posts related to other
elements of the COVID-19 pandemic, including COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics. For
example, the report includes an email sent by President Biden’s Director of Digital Strategy, Mr.
Robert Flaherty, pressuring Facebook to reduce posts made by Mr. Tucker Carlson and Ms. Tomi
Lahren regarding vaccines. 1126

The Judiciary Report also contains numerous other examples of the Biden White House’s
efforts to suppress content on social media, many of which were originally obtained through
litigation brought by state Attorneys General, including Mr. Bailey. 1127 During the Select
Subcommittee’s June 21, 2023 hearing titled “Churches vs. Casinos: The Constitution is not

1124
See generally, Fauci TI, supra note 81.
1125
Judiciary Report, at 13
1126
Judiciary Report, at 25
1127
See generally, Judiciary Report.

Page 295 of 520

Suspended in Times of Crisis,” Mr. Bailey characterized his efforts to stop the government’s
suppression of content on social media as “a pitched battle for the very character of our nation.”

This is why Missouri v. Biden is so important. The question of our time is

whether Americans will enjoy the legacy of free speech handed down to us
by the founding generation and protected by subsequent generations, or
whether federal officials will control what we say, what we hear, and how
we debate the veracity of claims and arguments. We are locked in a pitched
battle for the very character of our nation. If we do not prevail over
government officials who seek to control the speech of millions of
Americans, we will be left with, in the words of Justice Gorsuch, ‘a shell of
a democracy and civil liberties just as hollow.’ 1128

FINDING: The Biden Administration and Many Public Health Officials Exaggerated the
Power of COVID-19 Vaccines.

COVID-19 vaccines were tremendously important in reducing the severity of COVID-19

symptoms and were extremely effective in doing so. 1129 However, the Biden Administration
oversold the power of these vaccines. On more than one occasion, President Biden himself
overstated the vaccine’s ability to prevent infection and transmission. These false statements
likely contributed to Americans’ confusion about COVID-19 vaccines and reduced overall
vaccine confidence.

President Biden earned a fact check from the Associated Press [hereinafter “AP] for a
statement which the AP described as “an absolute guarantee…that people who get COVID-19
vaccines are completely protected from infection, sickness, and death from the coronavirus.” 1130
Specifically, President Biden said during a July 21, 2021 CNN Town Hall that “[i]f you’re
vaccinated, you’re not going to be hospitalized, you’re not going to be in the IC unit, and you’re
not going to die.” 1131 According to the AP’s fact checkers, by the time of this statement nearly
5,500 vaccinated people had been hospitalized or died with COVID-19. 1132 As a result, the AP
asserted that Biden “[went] too far in assurances on vaccines.” 1133

Similarly, during his announcement of the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for federal
workers and contractors on September 9, 2021, President Biden implied that COVID-19 vaccines

1128
Churches vs. Casinos: The Constitution is not Suspended in Times of Crisis: Hearing Before Select Subcomm.
on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight and Accountability, 118th Cong. 1, (June 21, 2023).
1129
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(22)00320-6/fulltext
1130
Calvin Woodward & Hope Yen, AP FACT CHECK: Biden goes too far in assurances on vaccines, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (July 22, 2021).
1131
Alexandra Jaffe & Aamer Madhani, Biden says getting vaccinated ‘gigantically important’, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(July 21, 2021).
1132
Calvin Woodward & Hope Yen, AP FACT CHECK: Biden goes too far in assurances on vaccines, AP NEWS
(July 22, 2021).
1133
Id.

Page 296 of 520

were effective at preventing the spread of the virus when he said, “The bottom line – we’re going
to protect vaccinated workers from unvaccinated coworkers.” 1134

Other officials also made false or misleading statements about COVID-19 vaccines. On
March 29, 2021, during an appearance on the Rachel Maddow Show, Dr. Walensky claimed that
CDC data indicated that “vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick, and that it’s
not just in the clinical trials but it’s also in the real-world data.” 1135 On April 1, 2021, a CDC
spokesperson walked back Dr. Walensky’s assertions in a comment to The New York Times.

Dr. Walensky spoke broadly during this interview…It’s possible that some
people who are fully vaccinated could get Covid-19. The evidence isn’t
clear whether they can spread the virus to others. We are continuing to
evaluate the evidence. 1136

On May 16, 2021, during an appearance on CBS’ Face the Nation, Dr. Fauci claimed that
vaccinated individuals can go without masks even if they have an asymptomatic case of COVID-
19 because “it is very unlikely that a vaccinated person, even if there's a breakthrough infection,
would transmit it to someone else.” 1137 Dr. Fauci also took it a step further and indicated that
vaccinated people become “dead ends” for the virus.

[T]hat's the reason why we say when you get vaccinated, you not only
protect your own health, that of the family, but also you contribute to the
community health by preventing the spread of the virus throughout the
community. And in other words, you become a dead end to the virus. And
when there are a lot of dead ends around, the virus is not going to go
anywhere. 1138

During each of their appearances before the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Walensky and Dr.
Fauci half-heartedly defended their earlier statements. Dr. Walensky testified that she was
“speaking in generalities.”

Dr. Rochelle Walensky (June 13, 2023)

Q. Dr. Walensky, simply yes or no. Does a spokesperson from the CDC
going on record and correcting the statements that you made
undermine and fracture the confidence in CDC leadership?

A. Dr. Joyce, I know you know that I was speaking in generalities, that
we saw data and evidence that was over 90 percent that the vaccines

1134
Kathryn Watson, et al., Biden announces COVID-19 vaccine mandates that will affect 100 million Americans,
CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2021).
1135
The Rachel Maddow Show, MSNBC (Mar. 29, 2021).
1136
Apoorva Mandavilli, Can Vaccinated People Spread the Virus? We Don’t Know, Scientists Say, THE N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2021).
1137
Transcript, Anthony Fauci, Face the Nation (May 16, 2021).
1138
Id.

Page 297 of 520

 were effective in preventing severe disease and death and in fact, in
preventing symptomatic disease. And that once people had been
vaccinated, even if they were to get infected, they were not getting
sick and they were not able to transmit to others, so that was the
information. 1139

Dr. Fauci argued that it “is a complicated issue” and that the vaccines did prevent
infection and transmission “in the beginning.”

Dr. Anthony Fauci (June 3, 2024)

Q. Did the COVID vaccine stop transmission of the virus?

A. That is a complicated issue, because, in the beginning, the first

iteration of the vaccines did have an effect—not 100 percent, not a
high effect—they did prevent infection and, subsequently,
obviously, transmission. However, it’s important to point out,
something that we did not know early on that became evident as the
months went by is that the durability of protection against infection,
and hence, transmission was relatively limited, whereas the duration
of protection against severe disease, hospitalization, and deaths was
more prolonged. We did not know that in the beginning. In the
beginning, it was felt that, in fact, it did prevent infection and, thus,
transmission, but that was proven, as time went by, to not be a
durable effect. 1140

Dr. Fauci said that it was “not a durable effect,” therefore acknowledging that the
vaccines did not effectively prevent the spread of the virus’ later variants. 1141 However, even
with the most charitable read of the contemporary data supporting these statements, it appears
these were gross overstatements of the COVID-19 vaccines’ protective abilities, even against the
earlier variants. 1142 Perhaps conveniently, the CDC stopped tracking all breakthrough infections
beginning May 1, 2021, and instead only tracked breakthrough cases that led to hospitalization or
death. 1143 The CDC argued that this decision would help “maximize the quality of the data
collected on cases of greatest clinical and public health importance.” 1144 The CDC’s final report

1139
Oversight of CDC Policies and Decisions During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Hearing Before the Select
Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H Comm. on Oversight and Accountability, 118th Cong. 1, at 23 (June 13,
2023).
1140
Fauci Hearing, supra note 233, at 15
1141
Id.
1142
Apoorva Mandavilli, Can Vaccinated People Spread the Virus? We Don’t Know, Scientists Say., THE N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2021).
1143
CDC COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Case Investigations Team, COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Infections
Reported to CDC — United States, January 1–April 30, 2021, MMWR (May 28, 2021).
1144
Rachel Roubein & David Lim, CDC under fire for decision to limit tracking of Covid-19 cases in vaccinated
people, POLITICO (July 30, 2021).

Page 298 of 520

showing breakthrough infections indicated that 10,262 infections had occurred across 46 U.S.
states. 1145

With the outbreak of the Delta variant beginning around July 2021, it became obvious
that any mild protection the vaccine may have provided against infection and transmission was
significantly diminished. This first emerged with data reported from Barnstable County,
Massachusetts after a COVID-19 outbreak following Independence Day celebrations. 1146 A CDC
study found that three-quarters of the 469 cases were in fully vaccinated individuals. 1147 The
CDC then decided to reverse course and returned to recommending masking regardless of an
individual’s vaccination status in many areas. 1148 According to CNN, a source involved with the
decision process indicated that:

New unpublished data showing that vaccinated people infected with the
Delta coronavirus variant can have as much virus as those who are
unvaccinated is the primary driver for the CDC’s latest mask guidance
change. 1149

As the Delta variant continued to spread throughout the U.S., this became clear to most
Americans as breakthrough infections became commonplace. Ironically, President Biden, Dr.
Walensky, and Dr. Fauci, along with numerous other fully vaccinated public figures, reported
testing positive for COVID-19 during variant outbreaks, despite being fully vaccinated and
boosted. 1150

The Biden Administration’s exaggeration of the COVID-19 vaccine’s ability to prevent

infection and transmission of COVID-19 may have contributed to Americans’ waning trust in
vaccines overall. 1151 It is likely that many Americans, especially those who were young and
healthy, elected to be vaccinated under the pretense that it would ensure they would not get their
loved ones sick. When these pretenses turned out to be false, Americans were understandably
upset. This may have also contributed to the lackluster numbers of individuals who elected to
receive subsequent booster doses. An October 2023 study, published in the journal Vaccine,
studied the reasons for why less than 20 percent of eligible Americans had obtained a bivalent
booster dose. 1152 According to the study’s findings, 23.1 percent of respondents indicated their

1145
CDC COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Case Investigations Team, COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough Infections
Reported to CDC — United States, January 1–April 30, 2021, MMWR (May 28, 2021).
1146
Katie Brace, et al., New Provincetown COVID Cases ‘Overwhelmingly' in Vaccinated: Town Manager, NBC
BOSTON (July 12, 2021).
1147
Catherine M. Brown, et al., Outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 Infections, Including COVID-19 Vaccine Breakthrough
Infections, Associated with Large Public Gatherings — Barnstable County, Massachusetts, July 2021, MMWR
(Aug. 6, 2021).
1148
Jacqueline Howard, CDC updates guidance, recommends vaccinated people wear masks indoors in certain areas,
CNN (July 27, 2021).
1149
Id.
1150
Jamie Gumbrecht & Jen Christensen, Fauci tests positive for Covid-19, CNN (June 15, 2022); Media Statement,
CDC, CDC Director Tests Positive For COVID-19 (Oct. 22, 2022); Maegan Vazquez, et al., Biden tests positive for
Covid-19 and is experiencing mild symptoms, CNN (July 21, 2022).
1151
Public trust in vaccines shows a dip, NATURE INDIA (May 8, 2024).
1152
Elizabeth T. Jacobs, et al., Understanding low COVID-19 booster uptake among US adults, VACCINE (Oct. 6,
2023).

Page 299 of 520

reason for not getting the booster included that they believed it wouldn’t protect them from being
infected. 1153

FINDING: The U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Other Public Health Officials Falsely
Implied that Ivermectin Was Only for Horses and Cows.

Throughout the pandemic, in the face of a deadly disease for which there were minimal
treatments available, many doctors explored the use of drugs which were already approved for
other indications. 1154 This practice is called “off-label use” and is commonplace in the medical
profession. This situation yielded one of the most egregious examples of the Biden
Administration’s purveyance of misinformation—the FDA’s infamous statement which implied
that Ivermectin was a veterinary drug for horses and cows and not for humans. 1155 Specifically,
the FDA tweeted on August 21, 2021, from its official Twitter (now X) account, “You are not a
horse. You are not a cow. Seriously, y’all. Stop it.” 1156 Which seemingly conflated the off-label
prescription of Ivermectin as being the same as humans intentionally taking the veterinary
version of the drug without a doctor.

Ivermectin is FDA approved to treat certain parasites in human and any implication that it
is only for “horses” or “cows” is plainly false. 1157

1153
Id.
1154
Off-label use of medicines for COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG., available at https://www.who.int/news-
room/commentaries/detail/off-label-use-of-medicines-for-covid-19.
1155
U.S. FDA (@US_FDA), Twitter (Aug. 21, 2021) Tweet has since been deleted.
1156
Id.
1157
Ivermectin and COVID-19, F.D.A. (last updated Apr. 5, 2024) available at
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/ivermectin-and-covid-19.

Page 300 of 520

The Development of Vaccines and Treatments, and the Development and
Implementation of Vaccination Policies for Federal Employees and Members
of the Armed Forces

I. The Success of Operation Warp Speed

OWS was a $10 billion dollar strategy developed and initiated by the Trump
Administration during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic which aimed to expedite the
development of a safe and effective vaccine and have substantial quantities available by January
2021. 1158 OWS consisted of a partnership between HHS, DOD, and the private sector and
employed several time-saving strategies, while mitigating financial risk through the backing of
the federal government. Ultimately, the first COVID-19 vaccine was authorized on December 11,
2020, just less than 7 months after OWS was announced. 1159

The primary mechanisms OWS leveraged to accelerate the development of COVID-19

vaccines was allowing vaccine companies to start large-scale manufacturing during clinical trials
and combining clinical trial phases or running them concurrently, while limiting liability. 1160 This
differs significantly from the traditional timeline for vaccine development which tends to be
more rigidly sequential. 1161

OWS’ also provided a range of potential options by supporting vaccines with varying
characteristics rather than putting all eggs in one basket. Specifically, OWS initially planned to
include mRNA, replication-defective live-vector, recombinant-subunit-adjuvanted protein, and
attenuated replicating live vector platforms and ultimately supported six vaccine candidates
which used three platforms. 1162 Once the vaccine was developed, OWS utilized existing logistics
and shipping providers through a strong public-private partnership to ensure rapid
distribution. 1163

FINDING: Operation Warp Speed Was a Great Success and Helped Save Millions of Lives.

Before 2020 the fastest vaccine development took four years. 1164 OWS yielded a vaccine
that was available to millions of Americans in less than one year. 1165 By nearly all accounts, this
was an incredible feat of science which was made possible by the unique structure of OWS. Dr.
Fauci, though reluctant to give credit to the Trump Administration, characterized the effort as

1158
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Trump Administration Announces Framework and Leadership for 'Operation
Warp Speed' (May 15, 2020).
1159
News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 By
Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for First COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 11, 2020).
1160
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Operation Warp Speed: Accelerated COVID-19 Vaccine Development Status
and Efforts to Address Manufacturing Challenges (Feb. 2021) (GAO-21-319).
1161
Id.
1162
Id.
1163
From the Factory to the Frontlines The Operation Warp Speed Strategy for Distributing a COVID-19 Vaccine,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Sept. 16, 2020).
1164
Sandy Cohen, The fastest vaccine in history, UCLA HEALTH (Dec. 10, 2020).
1165
GAO, Operation Warp Speed, supra note 3.

Page 301 of 520

“the best decision [he’s] ever made with regard to an intervention as director of the institute.” 1166
Dr. Fauci also testified that OWS was a “great success.”

Dr. Anthony Fauci (January 9, 2024)

Q. Do you think that kind of thought process could be scaled to other

pharmaceuticals?

A. I think it can. I mean, I don’t think anybody would argue that

Operation Warp Speed was a great success. No doubt about that. I
think an Operation Warp Speed-like approach could be applied –
and, I guess, when you talk about lessons learned for other diseases,
it could be applied to other diseases. 1167

In January 2021, critics argued that the failure to meet the goal of vaccinating 20 million
people by the end of 2021 was an indication that OWS was broadly faltering. 1168 However, there
is little doubt that the rapid development and authorization of COVID-19 vaccines saved
millions of lives. 1169 The NIH estimates that as many as 140,000 American lives were saved by
May 2021—within 5 months of the first authorization. 1170

During a transcribed interview, Dr. Woodcock, definitively agreed that OWS was a
success and should be emulated again.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. In your opinion, do you believe Operation Warp Speed was a

success?

A. Yes. 1171

Dr. Woodcock also suggested that during a future pandemic an OWS-like strategy could
potentially be even more powerful if the U.S. had better clinical trial infrastructure in order to
yield more actionable data for vaccines and therapeutics.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

1166
Jackie Salo, Fauci claims credit for COVID vaccines: ‘Best decision I’ve ever made’, N.Y. POST (Mar. 29,
2021).
1167
Fauci TI, Day 2, at 192.
1168
Dan Diamond, The crash landing of ‘Operation Warp Speed’, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2021).
1169
Meagan C. Fitzpatrick, et al., Two Years of U.S. COVID-19 Vaccines Have Prevented Millions of
Hospitalizations and Deaths, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 13, 2022).
1170
Erin Bryant, Vaccines prevented up to 140,000 COVID-19 deaths in U.S., NIH RESEARCH MATTERS (Aug. 24,
2021).
1171
Woodcock TI, at 35.

Page 302 of 520

 Q. Do you think anything should be done differently in a future
pandemic, with regard to Operation Warp Speed?

A. I am certainly on record saying that it has more to do with the

clinical trial infrastructure. In fact, that we really don’t have a sort
of – more base for clinical trials in the United States. This was very
evident for therapeutics. And there were hundreds and hundreds of
trials that went on, I published on this, none of which were able to –
would yield any actionable data. On the vaccine side, the companies
ended up running the trials because they had the infrastructure to get
that done, you know, with the help of the government and the
participation of government sites as well.

Q. So you’re saying we need a little bit more infrastructure on the

therapeutic side to generate good data?

A. On both sides. And I have certainly, as I said, published on this and

been very vocal about it. 1172

FINDING: Then Presidential candidate Joe Biden and Vice-Presidential candidate Kamala
Harris May Have Contributed to Early Distrust of Operation Warp Speed and
COVID-19 Vaccines.

During the leadup to the 2020 Presidential election, then Vice Presidential candidate,
Harris, became one of the first officials to publicly politicize OWS when she suggested that
President Trump would “suppress,” “muzzle,” and “sideline” public health experts because
President Trump was “looking at an election coming up in less than 60 days, and um, and he’s
grasping for whatever he can get to pretend he has been a leader on this issue when he has
not.” 1173 Harris also refused to definitively say whether she would get a vaccine if they were
authorized or approved prior to election day, saying, “[w]ell, I think that’s going to be an issue
for all of us.” 1174 Meanwhile, then Presidential candidate Biden argued that the American people
had lost confidence in the Trump Administration, saying, “why do we think the public is gonna
line up to be willing to take the injection?” 1175

It should be obvious to anyone who lived through these events that this was a thinly
veiled attempt to politicize the development of COVID-19 vaccines to hurt President Trump’s
chances in the 2020 election. It was grossly irresponsible to, without any evidence, question the
safety and efficacy of COVID-19 vaccinations at that critical juncture in OWS and in the
pandemic. These irresponsible statements eventually proved to be outright hypocrisy less than a

1172
Woodcock TI, at 35.
1173
Evan Semones, Harris says she wouldn’t trust Trump on any vaccine released before election, POLITICO (Sept. 5,
2020).
1174
Evan Semones, Harris says she wouldn’t trust Trump on any vaccine released before election, POLITICO (Sept. 5,
2020).
1175
Id.

Page 303 of 520

year later when the Biden-Harris Administration began to boldly decry all individuals who
decided to forgo COVID-19 vaccinations for personal, religious, or medical reasons. 1176

1176
Id.

Page 304 of 520

II. The Decision to Override the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices

America’s bureaucratic arrangement for studying, regulating and recommending vaccines

involves several agencies including NIH, FDA, and CDC. Each agency has advisory committees
which consist of experts who evaluate available data, and vote on recommendations. The FDA’s
VRBPAC is an independent advisory body consisting of 15 voting members who provide
recommendations to the FDA Commissioner. 1177 These recommendations are nonbinding but are
used by the Commissioner to inform regulatory decisions about biological products such as
vaccines.

Similarly, the CDC’s ACIP is an independent advisory body that consists of 15 voting
members who “develop recommendations on the use of vaccines in the civilian population of the
United States.” 1178 According to its charter, ACIP provides “advice and guidance to the Director
of the CDC regarding use of vaccines and related agents for effective control of vaccine-
preventable diseases.” 1179 The decisions made by ACIP are not legally binding, yet, prior to
September 2021, it appears that the CDC Director had only ever rejected a recommendation
made by ACIP once.

FINDING: The Biden Administration Arbitrarily and Without Scientific Support Announced
COVID-19 Vaccine Boosters Would be Available to All Americans.

Before any official recommendations had been made by the FDA, CDC, or their advisory
panels, President Biden began promising that boosters for all Americans were coming soon. On
August 18, 2021, President Biden, along with the CDC and FDA, announced a plan to offer
booster shots for all Americans beginning the week of September 20. 1180 They noted that the
plan was dependent on final evaluation from the FDA and recommendations from the CDC’s
ACIP. However, they also noted that boosters would be available to “many health care providers,
nursing home residents, and other seniors.” 1181 These statements are interesting given the fact
that Dr. Walensky ultimately ignored her own ACIP to make the boosters available to more
workers, including in healthcare. It is also concerning that the Biden Administration chose to
announce a specific timeline for this plan when the FDA had not yet made a regulatory decision.

Dr. Woodcock testified to the Select Subcommittee that future FDA regulatory actions
are generally considered to be market moving information that should not be made public. 1182
1177
Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (last updated Apr.
26, 2019) available at https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/blood-vaccines-and-other-biologics/vaccines-and-
related-biological-products-advisory-committee.
1178
General Committee-Related Information, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES (last updated
Sept. 10, 2024) available at
https://www.cdc.gov/acip/about/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/index.html.
1179
Charter of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
(Filing date Apr. 1, 2024).
1180
New Release, Joint Statement from HHS Public Health and Medical Experts on COVID-19 Booster Shots, U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (Aug. 18, 2021); Release, FACT SHEET: President Biden to Announce New Actions
to Protect Americans from COVID-19 and Help State and Local Leaders Fight the Virus, The White House (Aug.
18, 2021).
1181
Id.
1182
See generally, Woodcock TI.

Page 305 of 520

When Select Subcommittee staff raised the concern with the announcement of the booster plan,
Dr. Woodcock testified that sharing this sort of information was unusual for the FDA, but that it
was explainable because of the public health emergency, because the announcement caveated
that it was dependent on FDA and CDC review, and because it was not a decision on the
approval of a new molecular entity.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. …[W]ithin our earlier conversation about sharing these expected

deadlines outside of the FDA, would you say that this announcement
falls within the general guidelines of what kinds of information can
be shared outside the FDA?

A. Well, again, as I said, it's caveated about the week of September

20th. It's not about an approval, it's about potentially an approval
but not of a new molecular entity. It's about yet another dose, more
of the same, so to speak. So it's a little less vague than what usually
FDA would do, but yet this is within the public health
emergency. 1183

It is important context to consider that these events were during the same period that the
FDA was in the final review of the BLA for the primary series of Pfizer’s COVID-19 vaccine –
wherein senior FDA scientists raised significant concerns about the hasty timelines that were
being imposed by their superiors. In this Report, the Select Subcommittee illustrated how this
process may have been tainted with political pressure. Some of these very same FDA scientists
expressed concern again with the booster authorization process.

On August 31, 2021, The New York Times published an article announcing that Dr.
Gruber and Dr. Krause were departing the FDA at the end of the following month. 1184 Dr.
Gruber and Dr. Krause were “upset about the Biden administration’s recent announcement that
adults should get a coronavirus booster vaccination eight months after they received their second
shot,” that “neither believed there was enough data to justify offering booster shots yet,” and that
they “viewed the announcement, amplified by President Biden, as pressure on the F.D.A. to
quickly authorize them.” 1185

On September 13, 2021, Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause, along with 16 other scientists, wrote
an article which in the in The Lancet titled, “Considerations in boosting COVID-19 vaccine
immune responses.” 1186 The article raised concerns about introducing boosters for the general
population too soon, especially given the potential risks of immune-mediated side-effects like

1183
Woodcock TI, at 103.
1184
Noah Weiland & Sharon LaFraniere, Two Top F.D.A. Vaccine Regulators Are Set to Depart During a Crucial
Period, THE N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2021).
1185
Id.
1186
Philip R. Krause, et al., Considerations in boosting COVID-19 vaccine immune responses, THE LANCET (Sept.
13, 2021).

Page 306 of 520

myocarditis. 1187 The authors argued, “[i]f unnecessary boosting causes significant adverse
reactions, there could be implications for vaccine acceptance that go beyond COVID-19
vaccines. Thus, widespread boosting should be undertaken only if there is clear evidence that it is
appropriate.” 1188 They also argued that the available evidence does not seem to suggest a need
for boosting the general population since the efficacy of the primary series remained high against
severe disease.

Current evidence does not, therefore, appear to show a need for boosting in
the general population, in which efficacy against severe disease remains
high. Even if humoral immunity appears to wane, reductions in neutralising
antibody titre do not necessarily predict reductions in vaccine efficacy over
time, and reductions in vaccine efficacy against mild disease do not
necessarily predict reductions in the (typically higher) efficacy against
severe disease. 1189

The Select Subcommittee’s investigation confirmed that senior FDA officials were aware
of Dr. Gruber’s and Dr. Krause’s concerns with COVID-19 boosters, but it appears they were not
taken very seriously. During a transcribed interview, Dr. Woodcock testified that she knew about
the existence of Dr. Gruber’s and Dr. Krause’s article, but that she had never read it because she
“did not feel the need to read their argument.”

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Do you recall [the Lancet article]?

A. I knew it was published. I never read it.

***

Q. You mentioned you had not read this article. Was there a particular
reason you had not read it, or was it just you didn’t – you had a lot
to do?

A. At the time, I was very well aware of all the data, and including data
from other countries about the use of boosters and the impact, and
so forth. So I did not feel – I know these folks, and I did not feel the
need to read their argument. 1190

Dr. Woodcock also attempted to excuse herself for having ignored the article by claiming
that, based on her cursory first-glance while sitting for her transcribed interview, the paper was
discussing the “general population” and that the booster “was not indicated in the general
population” at the time of the first authorization in September 2021.

1187
Id.
1188
Id.
1189
Id.
1190
Woodcock TI, at 105.

Page 307 of 520

 Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Had you heard this sort of concern raised from within FDA prior to
September 13, 2021, when this article was published? Similar,
meaning concerns that the evidence may not or does not show the
need for widespread use of booster vaccination in populations that
have received an effective primary regimen?

A. Well, first of all, if I may.

Q. Certainly.

A. They are talking about general population. This wasn't indicated --

the booster at the time of approval was not indicated in the general
population. So you might say they were arguing against something
that didn't happen. 1191

Dr. Woodcock’s excuse is not supported by the facts. While Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause
argued against the need for boosting the “general population” at that time, it is incorrect to assert
that their arguments are therefore irrelevant. The core of their argument is that due to insufficient
evidence supporting the necessity of boosters, they should be limited to the most vulnerable first,
and remaining doses—since they are identical to the primary series doses—should be used to
vaccinate those who had remained unvaccinated entirely.

Yet, Dr. Woodcock, herself, endorsed President Biden’s plan to begin boosting all adults
by September 20. 1192 An NBC article from September discussing VRBPAC’s September 17
votes pointed out how President Biden’s plan could be imparting pressure on the FDA to make
the boosters available to all adults.

Still, the decision could put the FDA at odds with Biden administration
officials who have been pushing to begin giving out booster shots to the
general population starting the week of Sept. 20, essentially starting the
countdown for the FDA and the CDC to act. 1193

On the same day that the FDA authorized the booster for a limited population, President
Biden doubled down on his premature promises by publicly stating that they would soon be
made available to all adults. 1194 Additionally, the FDA’s and Dr. Walensky’s decisions to
recommend boosters for workers in supposedly high risk occupations necessarily included

1191
Woodcock TI, at 105-106.
1192
New Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Joint Statement from HHS Public Health and Medical Experts on
COVID-19 Booster Shots (Aug. 18, 2021).
1193
Sara G. Miller, et al., FDA advisory group rejects Covid boosters for most, limits to high-risk groups, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2021).
1194
Jonathan Wolfe, Coronavirus Briefing: What Happened Today, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2021).

Page 308 of 520

millions of young, healthy workers for whom the marginal benefit of a booster was, according to
the arguments made by Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause, likely very low. 1195

FINDING: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Director Rochelle Walensky
Overruled Expert Advisors in an Apparent Attempt to Satisfy President Joe
Biden’s Arbitrary Vaccine Approval Goals.

On September 17, 2021, VRBPAC convened a public meeting to evaluate the use of
Pfizer’s primary series COVID-19 vaccine as booster doses for those who had already received
the primary series. The panel voted against making a recommendation for the broad population,
but recommended FDA authorize boosters for Americans aged 65 and up, those aged 18 to 64
who were at high risk for severe illness, as well as those in certain high-risk occupations. 1196 On
September 22, 2021, FDA announced an amended EUA for booster doses in the same
populations recommended by VRBPAC. 1197

On September 23, 2021, ACIP convened its public meeting on the same topic. 1198 The
ACIP concurred with FDA’s recommendation for a COVID-19 vaccine booster for Americans
65 and older and aged 18 to 64 who were at high risk for serious illness. 1199 However, departing
from the FDA in a 6-9 vote, ACIP specifically ruled against a broad recommendation for
workers in higher risk professions including health care workers and teachers. 1200

On September 24, 2021, in a decision deemed “highly unusual,” Dr. Walensky overruled
ACIP’s recommendation and issued updated CDC guidance that fully concurred with FDA. 1201
Dr. Walensky characterized her announcement of new CDC guidance simply as an endorsement
of ACIP’s recommendations. However, she completely skipped over the fact that she had
overruled her own agency’s advisory committee on the key aspect of boosting workers in high-
risk professions.

Today, CDC Director Rochelle P. Walensky, M.D., M.P.H., endorsed the

CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’ (ACIP)
recommendation for a booster shot of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19
vaccine in certain populations and also recommended a booster dose for
those in high risk occupational and institutional settings. 1202

1195
Id.
1196
Food and Drug Admin. Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Summary Minutes (Sept. 17, 2021)
available at https://www.fda.gov/media/152597/download.
1197
News Release, FDA Authorizes Booster Dose of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine for Certain Populations,
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (Sept. 22, 2021).
1198
Melissa Mahtani & Meg Wagner, The latest on Covid-19 and vaccine boosters, CNN (Sept. 23, 2021).
1199
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), Summary Minutes (Sept. 22-23, 2021,
Publish date: Nov. 4, 2021) available at https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/114944.
1200
Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), Summary Minutes (Sept. 22-23, 2021,
Publish date: Nov. 4, 2021) available at https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/114944.
1201
Apoorva Mandavilli & Benjamin Mueller, C.D.C. Chief Overrules Agency Panel and Recommends Pfizer-
BioNTech Boosters for Workers at Risk, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2021).
1202
Press Release, CDC Statement on ACIP Booster Recommendations, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(Sept. 24, 2021).

Page 309 of 520

 During ACIP’s meeting, experts who voted against the measure argued that there was not
sufficient data to support the recommendation, that it was too narrow and premature, and that
there was little marginal benefit in acting then rather than waiting for better data. 1203 They also
said that they felt they were being pulled into an “emotional decision” and that this decision
could undermine confidence in the primary vaccine series.

Ms. Bahta said she felt like they were being pulled into an emotional
decision. The science shows that this is a very effective vaccine. This
decision was made for the vaccinated, not the unvaccinated. She did not
believe they had the data in the younger age groups to make a decision for
a booster dose. To her, it would suggest that the vaccine does not work.
While they know this is not true, that is likely how that message will be
conveyed to the broader public. That was why she voted “not” for the third
and fourth interim recommendations. 1204

Dr. Bell agreed with everything Dr. Bahta said in explaining why she voted
“no” and also to emphasize that this represented the beginning of a lot of
activity around booster doses and other vaccination efforts that are
forthcoming. In this situation, at this moment, and given the lack of
evidence about the marginal benefits of booster doses for people in certain
groups who received a Pfizer primary series, it was too narrow and too soon.
In terms of the potential risks for adverse outcomes of waiting until more is
known, there was little marginal benefit to making this booster dose
available at this time in her opinion given all of the unknowns. 1205

Reportedly, Dr. Walensky’s decision to break with the recommendations of the ACIP
came as a surprise to some of her own staff. 1206 According to reports, it was understood that
“[h]ours before [Walensky’s] statement, agency insiders predicted she would stick with the usual
protocol because doing otherwise would undermine the process and upset the advisers as well as
her own staff.” 1207

During ACIP’s meeting, prior to the votes, Dr. Walensky spoke directly to ACIP
members, saying, “[k]now that I am grateful for your efforts and that I so appreciate your
expertise, your counsel, and your partnership.” 1208 Unfortunately, it appears that Dr. Walensky
may not have meant what she said given that she flagrantly ignored ACIP’s expertise and
counsel on this key decision.

1203
Id.
1204
ACIP Summary Minutes, supra note 8, at 92. Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP), Summary Minutes (Sept. 22-23, 2021, Publish date: Nov. 4, 2021) available at
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/114944.
1205
Id.
1206
Apoorva Mandavilli & Benjamin Mueller, C.D.C. Chief Overrules Agency Panel and Recommends Pfizer-
BioNTech Boosters for Workers at Risk, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2021).
1207
Id.
1208
Id.

Page 310 of 520

II. The Review of Pfizer’s Biologics License Application

COVID-19 vaccines were novel in many ways, including that they were widely
distributed under EUA before they received full approval from the FDA. Specifically, the first
COVID-19 vaccine was administered under EUA on December 11, 2020, and the first vaccine
received full approval on August 23, 2021. 1209 During the course of this 255-day period, more
than 360 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines were distributed throughout the U.S. 1210 Since the
FDA first established its EUA program in 2004, the anthrax vaccine was the only other vaccine
to receive an EUA and this vaccine was only administered to an extremely limited cohort of
people. 1211

Throughout the early rollout of COVID-19 vaccinations in the winter and spring of 2021,
there was an aggressive and widespread campaign—often with the support of government public
health institutions—to convince the American people to get vaccinated. However, the nuances of
the vaccines’ regulatory status were unclear to most regular people. Instead, these novel mRNA
vaccines were dubbed simply as “safe and effective,” with very little opportunity for patients to
discuss these vaccines with their doctor and assess their individual risks and benefits.

In actuality, the FDA’s standards for EUA differ from their standards for approving a
BLA. Most importantly, for a BLA to be approved a product must demonstrate that it is safe and
effective, whereas for an EUA to be authorized the product must only demonstrate that it may be
safe and effective. 1212 The decision to widely distribute COVID-19 vaccines under an EUA likely
had significant negative effects on the public’s perceptions of the vaccines. It appears that some
FDA officials shared this concern as it was later used as a justification for why the review of the
BLA was aggressively accelerated.

On May 18, 2021, Pfizer became the first company to submit a BLA to the FDA for
review. 1213 Under normal circumstances, this review would have taken around 12 months and
have been completed around May 2022. However, this BLA was given priority review status,
which stipulates that the process should be completed in around 8 months, therefore setting an
ADD of mid-January 2022. Details provided by Dr. Gruber, and her deputy, Dr. Krause,
indicated that high-level FDA officials imparted significant pressure on them to continually
accelerate the timeline despite their concerns that safety and efficacy of the vaccines would
suffer.

The FDA ultimately accelerated the process substantially, with Pfizer receiving its official
approval letter for its COVID-19 vaccine under the brand name COMIRNATY on August 23,
2021 – nearly 5 months faster than the typical priority review timeline. 1214 In September 2021, it

1209
New Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine (Aug. 23, 2021).
1210
Kanishka Singh, U.S. administers 361.7 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines -CDC, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2021).
1211
70 Fed. Reg. 5452 (Feb. 2, 2005).
1212
Guidance Document, Emergency Use Authorization of Medical Products and Related Authorities, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2017).
1213
Cite FDA BLA approval letter from August 2021?
1214
Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Director, Office of Compliance and Biologics Quality & Marion F. Gruber,
Director, Offices to Vaccines Research and Review, to Amit Pate, Pfizer Inc., (Aug. 23, 2021) available at
https://www.fda.gov/media/151710/download.

Page 311 of 520

became public that Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause were retiring from the FDA. 1215 Shortly
afterwards it was reported that Dr. Gruber’s and Dr. Krause’s departure was related to their
internal disagreement about whether available data supported booster shots for the general
public. 1216

Since then, evidence further indicates that the FDA may have allowed politics to interfere
with what should have been dispassionate and scientifically driven regulatory process. Dr.
Gruber and Dr. Krause expressed legitimate concerns about the hyper-acceleration of the review
of COVID-19 vaccines and booster shots and were ignored. When they detailed these concerns
to Dr. Marks he pressured them further. 1217 When the issue was brought to Dr. Woodcock, she
placed Dr. Marks in charge and sidelined Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause. 1218 Unfortunately, the
FDA’s acceleration of the process may have contributed to the public’s waning confidence in
vaccines, public health, and government institutions, and possibly to facilitate harmful COVID-
19 vaccine mandates. 1219

FINDING: The Biden Administration Sidelined Senior Scientists After They Expressed
Concern Regarding the Rapid Pace of Review of Pfizer’s Biologics Approval
Application.

As Director of OVRR, Dr. Gruber was the most senior expert in charge of reviewing
BLA’s for vaccines, and the ultimate decisionmaker. According to their own testimony, Dr.
Gruber, Dr. Krause, and Dr. Marks initially agreed to set the ADD for mid-October 2021. 1220
According to Dr. Krause, Dr. Marks came back soon afterwards and requested it be accelerated
to September 15, 2021. 1221 Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause discussed with their team and told Dr.
Marks that it would be possible to compress the review and meet the September 15 deadline. 1222
Not long after that, Dr. Marks approached them yet again and demanded that the timeline be
pushed up even earlier than September 15—a target date which was already eight months earlier
than the standard review timeline, and four months earlier than the priority review timeline. 1223

1215
Dan Diamond, Two FDA officials who oversee coronavirus vaccine reviews to depart, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 1,
2021).
1216
Noah Weiland & Apoorva Mandavilli, In Review, Top F.D.A. Scientists Question Imminent Need for Booster
Shots, THE N.Y. TIMES (Sept, 13, 2021, Updated Oct. 1, 2021).
1217
E-Mail from Marion Gruber, Ph.D., Dir., Office of Vaccines Research & Review, U.S. Food & Drug Admin, to
Peter Marks, FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), et al., (July 19, 2021, 11:59 AM).
1218
Woodcock TI, at 79-91
1219
Elizabeth Williams & Robin Rudowitz, Headed Back to School in 2024: An Update on Children’s Routine
Vaccination Trends, KFF (July 18, 2024).
1220
SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, REGULATORY REFORM, AND ANTITRUST OF THE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, INTERIM STAFF REPORT, POLITICS, PRIVATE INTERESTS, AND THE BIDEN ADMIN.’S DEVIATION FROM
AGENCY REGS. IN THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, at 85-86 (June 24, 2024) [hereinafter “Judiciary Report”].
1221
Id.
1222
Id.
1223
Id. at 248.

Page 312 of 520

 In a July 15, 2021 email from Dr. Gruber to Dr. Marks, she explained that after discussing
with her team, she and Dr. Krause believed it would be impossible to accelerate the review any
further without “cutting corners.” 1224

Attached to this email was a memo explaining their logic in more detail. 1225

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1224
E-Mail from Marion Gruber, Ph.D., Dir., Office of Vaccines Research & Review, U.S. Food & Drug Admin, to
Peter Marks, FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) (July 15, 2021, 8:00 AM).
1225
Internal memo, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 15, 2021).

Page 313 of 520

Page 314 of 520
Page 315 of 520
The paragraph headers for this memo provide a succinct summary of their arguments:

• The Pfizer BLA is a complex BLA

• The BLA merits a complete and thorough review
• As compared with other BLAs, the proposed completion date of Sept
15 would be unprecedented
• This is possible only with reprioritization of other reviews, including
some related to COVID, and reassignment of work to other
experienced medical officers
• Additional support from outside OVRR will not speed up review

Page 316 of 520

 • Additional support from outside of OVRR, if effectively used, might
reduce the need to deprioritize certain submissions 1226

Dr. Marks forwarded this email and the attached memo to Dr. Woodcock and suggested
that they set up a phone call to discuss the situation.

Dr. Woodcock replied and indicated her intention to have Dr. Marks take over the review
of the Pfizer BLA and replace Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause. 1227 During her transcribed interview,
Dr. Woodcock testified that this decision to replace them was made on her own.

1226
Id.
1227
E-Mail from Janet Woodcock, Acting FDA Director to Peter Marks, CBER Director (July 16, 2021, 11:10 AM).

Page 317 of 520

 Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. And you said, "Peter, you can find out more when you take over."
Are you referring to Dr. Marks taking over the review from Dr.
Gruber?

A. Yes, I believe I was.

Q. So is it fair to say that …[b]y July 16th, you had decided that Dr.
Marks would be taking over?

A. That's fair.

***

Q. Did you make that decision on your own?

A. Yes.

Q. And did Dr. Marks request that, or was it your idea?

A. It was my idea. 1228

On July 19, 2021, Dr. Gruber, Dr. Krause, Dr. Marks, Dr. Woodcock, and her Chief of
Staff, Ms. Julia Tierney, convened a meeting to discuss this further. On July 21, 2021, Dr. Gruber
sent an email to the group memorializing her perspective of what had been discussed during the
meeting. 1229

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1228
Woodcock TI, at 80.
1229
E-Mail from Marion Gruber, Ph.D., Dir., Office of Vaccines Research & Review, U.S. Food & Drug Admin, to
Peter Marks, FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) (July 19, 2021, 11:59 AM).

Page 318 of 520

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 319 of 520

Dr. Gruber wrote that she and Dr. Krause remained concerned that:

[A] review that is hyper-accelerated beyond the already very rapid

September 15 target date and as a consequence, may be less thorough than

Page 320 of 520

 our typical review seems more likely to undermine confidence in the
vaccine (and, indeed, in FDA’s credibility) than to increase it. 1230

Dr. Gruber also memorialized Dr. Woodcock’s decision to have Dr. Marks take over the
review from her and Dr. Krause.

You informed us of your decision that OVRR management and oversight of

the BLA review will be delegated to Dr. Marks who will provide you with
weekly updates on the review process and ensure that due diligence is
exercised while I am away [REDACTED]. You also informed me that Dr.
Krause will not be involved in the BLA oversight as he will be overseeing
other regulatory and programmatic programs in OVRR. I note that Dr.
Krause is a recognized expert in vaccine regulation, development and very
familiar with the scientific and clinical issues presented by this specific
vaccine product and that the review team relies on his expertise and
guidance. 1231

Dr. Woodcock testified that the rationale she gave during the meeting for sidelining Dr.
Gruber and Dr. Krause with Dr. Marks centered around the fact that Dr. Gruber was going to be
on vacation out of the country and that Dr. Krause was an expert but not a clinician.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Do you generally agree with [Dr. Gruber’s] summary of the

meeting?

A. She's focusing on the timelines. I did not focus on that in my part

of the meeting. I focused on the fact that she would be on vacation,
which is perfectly reasonable, some family time, out of the country,
not in a position to oversee this very complicated, as she said,
review. Dr. Krause is an expert, he's not a clinician, and I asked that
Peter take over the review. 1232

During a Select Subcommittee hearing on February 15, 2024, Dr. Marks dismissively
testified that, in his view, Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause’s concerns were simply related to “the
workload.”

Dr. Peter Marks (February 15, 2024)

Q. Do you recall why Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause expressed concern
about accelerating the approval of the vaccine?

1230
E-Mail from Marion Gruber, Ph.D., Dir., Office of Vaccines Research & Review, U.S. Food & Drug Admin, to
Janet Woodcock, et al., (July 21, 2021, 11:59 AM).
1231
Id.
1232
Woodcock TI at 92.

Page 321 of 520

 A. They were concerned about the workload. 1233

Yet, these explanations seem to leave out the fact that Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause had
become “intransigent” on moving up the ADD any further than September 15, which they
explained their expert rationale for in detail, and that neither Dr. Gruber nor Dr. Krause stated
they were unable to fulfill their duties.

FINDING: The Biden Administration Accelerated the Approval of Pfizer’s Biologics

Approval Application to Impose Vaccine Mandates

Dr. Gruber’s summary of the July 19 meeting also explicitly highlighted the fact that Dr.
Marks and Dr. Woodcock indicated that they wanted to move up the target date in part because it
was a prerequisite for vaccine mandates to take effect.

You expressed concern about the rising COVID-cases in the US and

globally, largely caused by the Delta variant and stated [their] opinion that,
absent a license, states cannot require mandatory vaccination and that
people hesitant to get an EUA authorized vaccine would be more inclined
to do so when the product is licensed. 1234

When confronted with Dr. Gruber’s meeting summary, Dr. Woodcock testified that she
was unable to recall whether vaccine mandates came up at all during their July 19 meeting.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Did the topic of vaccine mandates or mandatory vaccination policies

come up at all during this meeting?

A. Not by me.

Q. But do you recall that someone else may have brought them up?

A. I do not recall. 1235

However, she was able to recall that at some undetermined time, Dr. Marks had indeed
discussed COVID-19 vaccine mandates, as well as the fact that the regulatory status of COVID-
19 vaccines could have an impact on the ability for mandates to be levied.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

1233
Vaccines part 1
1234
E-Mail from Marion Gruber, Ph.D., Dir., Office of Vaccines Research & Review, U.S. Food & Drug Admin, to
Janet Woodcock, et al., (July 21, 2021, 11:59 AM).
1235
Woodcock TI, at 90.

Page 322 of 520

 Q. Did any conversations [with Dr. Marks] ever touch on vaccine
mandates or mandatory vaccination policies, broadly?

A. I believe Dr. Marks brought it up a couple times.

Q. A couple of times?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember specific times?

A. No.

***

Q. Did Dr. Marks ever speak to you about the need for full biologics
approval in order for groups to institute vaccine mandates?

A. Dr. Marks commented on the fact that mandates for some

populations would be tied to their FDA status. 1236

During his transcribed interview with the House Committee on the Judiciary, Dr. Marks
said that he recalled having some discussions about the link between full BLA approval and
vaccine mandates, but that he did not recall bringing up vaccine mandates during the July 19
meeting, or who else may have done so.

Dr. Peter Marks (April 15, 2024)

Q. Was it Janet Woodcock or was it you who told Dr. Gruber that
[absent a license, states cannot require mandatory vaccination]?

A. I can’t speak to – I don’t know. And I don’t recall that I would have
ever said this, but I can’t recall, and I can’t speak to who said it.

Q. Were you present when this was said?

A. Again, I can’t recall it being said. I was something that had – look,
the potential for vaccine mandates is something that may have been
discussed over the course of time even from early on in – during the
pandemic. But I can’t recall who would have introduced this to the
conversation. 1237

1236
Woodcock TI, at 29.
1237
Judiciary report, supra note 1220, at 89.

Page 323 of 520

 During the Select Subcommittee’s February 15, 2024 hearing, Dr. Marks testified
indecisively that he didn’t recall the specific conversation about vaccine mandates, but that it was
probably just a “statement of fact.”

Dr. Peter Marks (February 15, 2024)

Q. Do you recall any conversations regarding the need to approve the

vaccines in order for it to then be mandated?

A. There was an acknowledgment that an approval could allow vaccine

mandates to occur, but they were not conversations over that, that it
were –

Q. So Dr. Gruber wrote that you and Dr. Woodcock expressed your
opinion that absent a license States cannot require mandatory
vaccination. Do you recall this conversation?

A. I don't know what you're referring to, but I -- there is probably -- it's
just a statement of fact that that once you have a licensed vaccine, a
mandate could be placed. 1238

Contradictorily to Dr. Marks and Dr. Woodcock, during transcribed interviews with the
House Committee on the Judiciary, Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause both testified unambiguously that
it was both Dr. Marks and Dr. Woodcock that expressed their opinion that a license was a
prerequisite to vaccine mandates.

Dr. Gruber testified:

Dr. Marion Gruber (July 18, 2023)

Q. Your email is addressed to both Marks and Woodcock, and here you
say “you.” Was it Woodcock or was it Marks or was it both of them
that expressed their opinion that a license would be needed for
vaccine mandates?

A. It was both of them. Yeah. 1239

Dr. Krause testified:

Dr. Philip Krause (September 7, 2023)

Q. Did Dr. Woodcock or Dr. Marks state that the goal was to require
mandatory vaccination?

1238
Vaccine Hearing Part 1.
1239
Judiciary Report, supra note 1220, at 60

Page 324 of 520

 A. Well, the, as stated in the email, the discussion was about State
mandates, and of course there already had been some mandates
announced by the Biden administration. There was a so-called
vaccinate-or-test rule that they had put in place at some point earlier
in August, as I recall. And so there was no doubt, in my recollection,
that Dr. Marks and Dr. Woodcock saw the licensure of the vaccine
as a prerequisite to mandates. 1240

Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause each also testified that making way for vaccine mandates
appeared to have played a key role in Dr. Marks’ and Dr. Woodcock’s persistence in hyper-
accelerating the review of the Pfizer BLA:

Dr. Gruber testified:

Dr. Marion Gruber (July 18, 2023)

Q. Were there other reasons they gave, or could you determine why
they had such a sense of urgency to get this?

A. The reason given to me was the vaccine mandate. And the second
reason that I also mentioned in my email was that people hesitant to
take a vaccine that is authorized but not approved may be inclined
to take the vaccine if it’s licensed. These were the two reasons
provided to me. 1241

Dr. Krause testified:

Dr. Philip Krause (September 7, 2023)

Q. Now you just said the need to support mandates. In your view, was
that need part of why you all were being pressured to meet this
deadline, as this assumed date?

A. Given that they brought it up, it’s hard to imagine that that was not
a component of this pressure. 1242

It is highly concerning that paving the way for mandatory vaccination policies played any
role at all in the FDA’s process for approving COVID-19 vaccines, and even worse that it
appears to have played a primary role in their rationale for casting aside top vaccine experts and
hyper-accelerating the target date. Vaccine mandates are fundamentally highly political matters

1240
Judiciary Report, supra note 1220, TI of Philip Krause, page 288.
1241
Judiciary Report, supra note 1220, TI of Marion Gruber, page 131.
1242
Judiciary Report, supra note 1220, TI of Philip Krause, page 295.

Page 325 of 520

that the FDA should be completely insulated from. Dr. Woodcock readily admitted this fact
during her transcribed interview.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Does the FDA have any role in shaping policies like vaccine
mandates?

A. No. 1243

FINDING: U.S. Food and Drug Administration Officials Refused to Rebut Allegations the
Biden White House Was Involved in the Pfizer Biologics Approval Application.

On August 9, 2021, after Dr. Marks had taken over the review of the Pfizer BLA but prior
to it being completed, Secretary Austin issued a memo which announced his intention to seek
President Biden’s approval to mandate COVID-19 vaccines for U.S. servicemembers “no later
than mid-September, or immediately upon the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
licensure, whichever comes first.” 1244 As indicated by the memo, Secretary Austin was unable to
issue a mandate for COVID-19 vaccines without a waiver from President Biden so long as the
vaccines remained under EUA status. 1245 The memo implies that Secretary Austin was aware that
the FDA had been working with an ADD of September 15, 2021. Additionally, the DOD’s press
release announcing this memo denotes that “the Food and Drug Administration is expected to
give full approval to the vaccines, possibly by the end of the month.” 1246

Ultimately, the FDA issued its approval for Pfizer’s BLA on August 23, 2021, and the
very next day, on August 24, 2021, Secretary Austin issued a memo announcing the DOD’s
vaccine mandate. 1247 The dubious timing raises concerns about whether Secretary Austin, or any
other executive branch official, may have been involved in the hyper-acceleration of the ADD.
Dr. Krause testified that he thought it appeared that some decisions that OVRR would normally
make were being made elsewhere:

Dr. Philip Krause (September 7, 2023)

1243
Woodcock TI, at 96-97
1244
Memorandum from Lloyd Austin, Sec’y of Defense, to All Dept’s of Defense Employees, Message to the Force
(Aug. 9, 2021).
1245
Wen. W. Shen, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., R46745, State and Federal Authority to Mandate COVID-19
Vaccination (May 17, 2022) (in the military context, for instance, additional waiver requirements under 10 U.S.C. §
1107a may apply to the administration of medical products subject to EUAs to servicemembers.)
1246
Jim Garamone, Biden to Approve Austin's Request to Make COVID-19 Vaccine Mandatory for Service Members,
DOD NEWS (Aug. 9, 2021).
1247
Memorandum from Lloyd Austin, Sec’y of Defense, to Senior Pentagon Leadership, Commanders of the
Combatant Commanders, Defense Agency and DOD Field Activity Directors, Rescission of August 24, 2021 and
November 30, 2021 Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination Requirements for Members of the Armed Forces (Jan.
10, 2023) available at https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/10/2003143118/-1/-1/1/SECRETARY-OF-DEFENSE-
MEMO-ON-RESCISSION-OF-CORONAVIRUS-DISEASE-2019-VACCINATION-REQUIREMENTS-FOR-
MEMBERS-OF-THE-ARMED-FORCES.PDF.

Page 326 of 520

 I admit that the events in July and August surrounding the BLA and the
booster vaccines made me concerned, without direct knowledge of any
specific outside interference, because I didn't know of any communications
from the outside, but it appeared as though major decisions that normally
would have been within the purview of the office were now being made
outside of the office, whether at the center director's level or even
elsewhere. 1248

During the Select Subcommittee’s February 15, 2024 hearing, Dr. Marks testified that he
had made the decision to pressure Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause to move up the ADD earlier than
September 15th all on his own.

Dr. Peter Marks (February 15, 2024)

Q. Did anyone instruct you, or is this just a decision you made on your
own?

A. This was a decision I had made on my own. 1249

Dr. Woodcock denied that she had any foreknowledge of Secretary Austin’s plans to issue
a vaccine mandate.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Were you aware that Secretary Austin was planning to mandate

COVID 19 vaccination before August 24th, 2021?

A. No. 1250

Dr. Woodcock also denied communicating with anyone at DOD about the Pfizer BLA
prior to it being approved.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Did you communicate with anyone at the Department of Defense

prior to the BLA being issued regarding the BLA?

A. No. 1251

However, Dr. Woodcock admitted that she did communicate with the White House about
the Pfizer BLA.

1248
Judiciary Report, supra note 1220, Krause TI, Page 303
1249
Vaccine Hearing Part 1.
1250
Woodcock TI, at 99
1251
Woodcock TI, at 68,

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 Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Did you communicate with anybody at the White House regarding

the Pfizer BLA prior to being issued?

A. Yes. 1252

When pressed for details, Counsel for the Biden Administration instructed Dr. Woodcock
not answer questions about her conversations with the White House regarding the ADD for the
Pfizer BLA review as it evolved over time.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Majority Staff. Did you discuss with the White House the expected
ADD as it evolved over time for the Pfizer BLA?

HHS Counsel. Now we’re getting more into the substance, and at
that point, we’re not going to be able to answer.

Majority Staff. You’re instructing the witness not to answer?

HHS Counsel. Yes. 1253

Dr. Woodcock also testified that updates about the timing of an ADD for a vaccine
approval are typically shared with the CDC, because they have related actions to take, but not
other agencies. She explained that this information is considered to be private.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. So as the ADD gets moved around, are you providing updates to

CDC about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you typically provide -- or does FDA typically provide updates

about the ADD to other agencies besides CDC?

A. FDA typically does not do that, because that's market moving

information, right? And we ask anybody that we generally
wouldn't tell people that, right? But this relationship with CDC is
very special, because they have an action to take as well.

1252
Woodcock TI, at 68
1253
Id.

Page 328 of 520

 Q. So outside of CDC, it's generally private information?

A. Absolutely. 1254

Dr. Woodcock acknowledged that despite this information being considered private, it
would sometimes be reported publicly in the papers.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. [D]uring the COVID vaccine approval process, was the ADD shared
with any other agencies?

A. Not to my -- not by me.

Q. To your knowledge, did somebody else?

A. Well, it often would appear in the papers. But that might have been
from the companies, because we tell the company, so they can
prepare. They have to -- the company has to do a lot of work. It's a
very frenetic activity toward the end of that, as you approach that
final date. And so the companies would be told. So it's hard to
know who would -- but the dates might start floating around out
there. You know, companies are talking about that. 1255

It seems unlikely that neither Dr. Marks nor Dr. Woodcock recall who brought up vaccine
mandates during the July 19 meeting, despite recalling many other details about the call and the
time around it. It also seems unlikely that Dr. Gruber was mistaken in her very detailed summary
—which was sent only two days after the meeting had taken place—and that she and Dr. Krause
were both mistaken during their transcribed interviews.

Instead, it appears that Dr. Marks and Dr. Woodcock may have chosen to feign amnesia,
or intentionally not answer questions, because they would otherwise be implicated in a pressure
campaign to hyper-accelerate the approval of COVID-19 vaccines to facilitate the state and
federal vaccine mandates which were predicated on the vaccines’ regulatory status. Nonetheless,
their testimony directly contradicts that of Dr. Gruber and Dr. Krause and has left unanswered
questions about what information the White House or other executive branch agencies were
given ahead of the BLA approval.

Ultimately, Dr. Gruber did sign off on the approval of Pfizer’s BLA and testified that she
believed the vaccine to be safe and effective. 1256 However, this does not excuse the fact that the
process that was undertaken was reckless, nor does it undo the public’s perception that these
vaccines were approved in a hurry to satisfy a political agenda—one that culminated with
harmful vaccine mandates which trampled on individual liberty, informed consent, and the

1254
Woodcock TI, at 25-26
1255
See generally, Woodcock TI.
1256
Judiciary report page 120

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doctor-patient relationship. Federal health agencies should have done more to ensure the integrity
of the process and preserve the American people’s trust in public health and vaccines. In failing
to do so, they have likely done irreparable damage to public trust and our pandemic
preparedness.

Page 330 of 520

IV. Public Health Officials Disregarded Natural Immunity, Despite Its Proven
Effectiveness and Durability

Natural immunity, and infection acquired immunity, is the body’s ability to create internal
protection against an invading infectious agent. 1257 In the simplest of terms, a protein called an
antibody enters the blood stream and helps the body detect and fight the infectious agent if it
returns. It is science known and studied since the 1800s. 1258 A common example of this, is
varicella, commonly referred to as chickenpox. At least 90 percent of U.S. adults are immune to
chickenpox because of having the disease as a child. 1259 In addition to the high rate of infection
acquired immunity to the disease, upon license of the vaccine in 1995, the number of cases of
chickenpox fell by more than 95 percent. 1260

FINDING: Those Who Recovered From COVID-19 Were Conferred Infection Acquired
Immunity.

While the novelty and lack of initial knowledge of COVID-19 cannot be understated,
there was established science that infection from coronaviruses, including SARs-CoV-1,
produced infection acquired immunity. 1261 However, it was not long before global research was
presented establishing that COVID-19 did produce a natural immunity after infection.

A study, published in October 2021, examined the rate of COVID-19 reinfection amongst
people in Lombardy, Italy during the first wave of infections. 1262 The study suggested reinfection
of COVID-19 were rare and those who’d recovered from the virus were at a lower risk of
reinfection. 1263 The results further suggested natural immunity provided a protective effect for
approximately a year, similar to the reported vaccine studies. 1264 An additional Italian study from
March 2020, followed 36 patients with documented cases of the virus. 1265 These patients were
followed until September 2021 and the 17 who remained unvaccinated continued to present IgG
antibodies through at least 18 months. 1266 Another February 2020 study out of Qatar, and
published in the New England Journal of Medicine, concluded previous infection of COVID-19
prevented reinfection of the virus. 1267 A January 2021 study, out of La Jolla Institute for
Immunology, found 95 percent of the 200 participants presented durable immune responses for

1257
Natural Immunity, CLEVELAND CLINIC (last reviewed Aug. 15, 2024).
1258
Jonathan D. Kaunitz, The Development of Monoclonal Antibodies, PUBMED CENTRAL (Apr. 2017).
1259
Varicella (Chickenpox): Questions and Answers, IMMUNIZE.ORG available at https://www.immunize.org/wp-
content/uploads/catg.d/p4202.pdf
1260
Id.
1261
Jonathan D. Kaunitz, The Development of Monoclonal Antibodies, PUBMED CENTRAL (Apr. 2017).
1262
Jose Vitale, et al. Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Reinfection 1 Year After Primary Infection in a Population in
Lombardy, Italy, PUBMED CENTRAL (May 2021).
1263
Id.
1264
Id.
1265
Sheena Meredith, COVID-19: Why Are We Ignoring Infection-Acquired Immunity?, MEDSCAPE (Feb. 28, 2022).
1266
Puya Dehgani-Mobaraki, et al., Long-term persistence of IgG antibodies in recovered COVID-19 individuals at
18 months post-infection and the impact of two-dose BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech) mRNA vaccination on the
antibody response: Analysis using fixed-effects linear regression model, PUBMED (Dec. 6, 2022).
1267
Heba N. Altarawneh, et al., Protection against the Omicron Variant from Previous SARS- CoV-2 Infection, THE
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (Feb. 9, 2022).

Page 331 of 520

up to eight months after infection of COVID-19. 1268 Additional studies out of England and Israel
in 2021 found infection rates at equally low levels amongst those who were fully vaccinated and
those who previously were infected COVID-19. 1269

On February 16, 2023, more than three years into the pandemic, The Lancet published a
report confirming the benefits associated with naturally acquired immunity. 1270 The study found that
a previous COVID-19 infection offers at least the same level of protection as two doses of a high-
quality mRNA vaccine, such as Moderna or Pfizer-BioNTech. 1271 Protection from reinfection of the
virus may be as high as 40 weeks or longer. 1272 The likelihood of not getting infected again is the
strongest with the original (ancestral) strain of the virus, and the alpha, beta, and delta variants, all of
which remain at more than 78 percent after 40 weeks. 1273 The omicron variant is lower, at 36.1
percent. 1274 Protection was high across all variants for sever disease (hospitalization or death). 1275

This study was the first to “comprehensively assess natural immunity protection against
COVID-19 reinfection by variant (primary infection and reinfection) and to evaluate waning
immunity with time since primary infection." 1276 The researchers considered the severity of
symptoms, the variant of the virus, and how long since the subjects last positive COVID-19 test. The
Lancet article included 65 studies from 19 countries.

Even with all the global scientific data that those who contracted COVID-19 had some
extended time of immunity, the Biden Administration and the CDC began pushing a vaccine-only
strategy to population immunity. When the vaccines rolled out, approximately 91 million Americans
were previously infected with COVID-19. 1277 Yet any status of recently recovered from the virus, and
thus provided with a short time of immunity, was completely ignored.

FINDING: Herd Immunity is a Real Concept and Occurrence Supported by Public Health
Leaders, Such as Dr. Fauci, and There Was a Coordinated Effort from Public
Health Officials to Ignore Natural Immunity and Suppress Dissenting Opinions.

The very initial phases of the COVID-19 pandemic were understandably riddled with
unknowns. Yet, while research and information were gathered, the science supported infection
from coronaviruses, including SARS-CoV-1, provided individuals with infection acquired

1268
Sharon Reynolds, Lasting Immunity Found After Recovery From COVID-19, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
(Jan. 26, 2021).
1269
See, Victoria Hall, et al., SARS-CoV-2 Infection Rates of Antibody-Positive Compared With Antibody-Negative
Health-care Workers in England: a Large, Multicenter, Prospective Cohort Study, THE LANCET (2021); Yair
Goldberg, et al. Protection of Previous SARS-CoV-2 Infection is Similar to that of BNT162b2 Vaccine Protection: A
Three Month Nationwide Experience from Israel, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (Apr. 24, 2021).
1270
Caroline Stein, Past SARS-CoV-2 infection protection against re-infection: a systematic review and meta-
analysis, THE LANCET (Feb. 16, 2023; updated: Mar. 11, 2023).
1271
Id.
1272
Id.
1273
Id.
1274
Id.
1275
Id.
1276
Id.
1277
Id.

Page 332 of 520

immunity. 1278 Many researchers recognized the existing science and called for policy makers and
government officials to use infection acquired immunity from COVID-19 to help control the
spread of virus. Many countries around the world allowed a previous COVID-19 infection to
satisfy the individuals “vaccination status.” 1279 Yet U.S. public health officials resisted including
infection acquired immunity when developing guidance and policy during the pandemic. Despite
this resistance, in a transcribed interview, Dr. Fauci testified that natural immunity is a “real
thing.”

Dr. Anthony Fauci (January 9, 2024)

Q. I want to talk about natural immunity for a minute. In general, is

natural immunity a real thing?

***

A. It’s a real thing. 1280

The lack of policy conversations was evident when other ideas were proposed, but never
discussed. For example, the Great Barrington Declaration was an open letter published in
October 2020 in response to mass lockdowns. 1281 Originally signed by scientists from the
University of Oxford, Stanford University, and Harvard University, the document presented the
idea that lockdowns had adverse effects on both the mental and physical health of
populations. 1282 It called for a “focused protection” pandemic strategy. 1283 The authors proposed
reducing the harms of lockdown by ending the mandatory restrictions for most people, yet still
protecting those most vulnerable. 1284

Critics of this idea immediately disqualified the proposal, to an unsettling degree never
seen before in the scientific community. Anyone associated with the paper was immediately
categorized as a “fringe” theorist. 1285 Rather than being allowed to engage in scientific and
political debate, the alternative proposal was dubbed dangerous and referred to as a “let it rip,”
meaning the vast spread of the virus, approach. The Great Barrington Declaration categorically
did not advocate for individuals to intentionally get infected with COVID-19 or a “let it rip”
approach. It was evident from the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic that public health
leadership had little interest in engaging in any form of alternative debate.

1278
Li-Ping Wu, et al., Duration of Antibody Responses After Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, PUBMED
CENTRAL (Oct. 2007).
1279
Id.
1280
Fauci TI 2, supra note 81, at 209.
1281
Great Barrington Declaration and Petition (Oct. 4, 2020).
1282
Id.
1283
Id.
1284
Id.
1285
The Editorial Board, How Fauci and Collins Shut Down Covid Debate, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 21, 2021).

Page 333 of 520

 In an October 8, 2020, email from Dr. Collins to Dr. Fauci, Dr. Lane, and Dr. Tabak, Dr.
Collins wrote that the proposal of a policy other than national lockdowns needed “a quick and
devastating published take down of its premise.” 1286

One week after this e-mail, Dr. Collins called The Great Barrington Declaration “a fringe
component of epidemiology…that is not mainstream science.” 1287 He also called it outright
dangerous. 1288 Following the sharp rebuke from NIH officials, reputable and international media
outlets, such as Wired, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, Independent, and Telegraph,
amongst almost all others, began dismissing the idea that the Great Barrington Declaration was
something to be taken seriously or even discussed. 1289

The Biden Administration was also complicit in attempting to manage the flow of
information on COVID-19 in public spaces. In an August 2024 letter to the House Committee on
the Judiciary, Mr. Zuckerberg wrote that the White House pressured the company to censor
certain posts about COVID-19. 1290

This kind of rhetoric and behavior created a scientific environment that fostered hostility
and outright contempt for differing opinions. Scientists and doctors were demonized by
colleagues and peers within their own community. 1291 Even though it was evident this virus was
novel, there was absolutely no room for any kind of high level, scientific debate.

The authors of the Great Barrington Declaration, and any other scientists with a different
idea than what was dictated by public health officials, were not demanding their policy ideas
become law. They were simply asking that they be allowed to participate in the conversation. Yet
infection acquired immunity was never part of the national public health policy during the
coronavirus pandemic.

The job of public health officials is to offer the best scientific advice to protect the nation
as a whole. Yet during the COVID-19 pandemic, many public health leaders narrowly focused on
one mission, to the detriment of others, including the trust of the public. In July 2023 at a panel
for Broken Angels, Dr. Collins reflected on his time as a leader during the pandemic.

If you’re a public-health person and you’re trying to make a decision, you

have this very narrow view of what the right decision is, and that is
something that will save a life…so you attach infinite value to stopping the
disease and saving a life. You attach a zero value to whether this actually
totally disrupts people’s lives, ruins the economy, and has many kids kept

1286
E-Mail from Francis Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health, to Anthony Fauci, et al., Director, National
Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (Oct. 8, 2020, 2:31 PM).
1287
Joel Achenbach, Proposal to hasten herd immunity to the coronavirus grabs White House attention but appalls
top scientists, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2020).
1288
Id.
1289
See generally, Matt Reynolds, There is no ‘scientific divide’ over herd immunity, WIRED (Oct. 7, 2020).
1290
Letter from Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman & CEO, Meta Platforms, Inc., to Jim Jordan, Chairman, H. of
Representatives Judiciary Comm. (Aug. 26, 2024).
1291
Vinay Prasad & Jeffrey S. Flier, Scientists who express different views on Covid-19 should be heard, not
demonized, STAT (Apr. 27, 2020).

Page 334 of 520

 out of school in a way that they never quite recovered is a public-health
mindset…another mistake we made. 1292

At a March 8, 2023 Select Subcommittee hearing, Congressman Ronny Jackson (R-T.X.)

asked Dr. Redfield what can be done to gain back to trust of public health officials.

Dr. Robert Redfield (March 8, 2023)

…The second thing, you have to have the courage when you’re a public
health official to say, I don’t know, when you don’t know. And I think the
really fundamental—that’s how we begin to lose it when people say that
we’re going to be OK once we get 30 percent immunity, and then later they
say 50 percent, and then later they say 70 percent. And then the press says,
well, why did you say 50 percent before, and now you’re saying 70 percent?
And the [public health officials] says, well, I didn’t think the public was
ready to hear that. 1293

Public health leaders’ aggressive exclusion of natural immunity even being considered to
be a part of fighting the COVID-19 virus created an environment of hostility in the scientific
community that will produce lasting adverse effects. Public health leadership appeared to only
push a single agenda and not foster an atmosphere of mutual respect and robust discussion.

Braver Angels available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1eAvh1sWiw.

1292

Investigating the Origins of COVID-19: Hearing Before Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th
1293

Cong. 1, at 44 (Mar. 8, 2023).

Page 335 of 520

V. Vaccine Mandates Were Not Supported by Science and Caused More Harm than
Good

The FDA issued EUAs for the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines in
December 2020. 1294 The EUA for the Janssen (Johnson and Johnson) COVID-19 vaccine was
issued in February 2021. 1295 By early February, the U.S. had administered approximately 26.5
million vaccinations, one of the fastest rollouts in the world. 1296 By the late February, the doses
administered had nearly doubled to 50 million doses administered. 1297

On March 19, 2021, the U.S. administered its 100-millionth vaccine. 1298 By April 18,
half of all U.S. adults had received at least one COVID-19 dose, 1299 and on April 19 all U.S.
adults became eligible for a vaccine. 1300 In early August 2021, 70 percent of the U.S. population
had been vaccinated, including 90 percent of Americans aged 65 and older. 1301

In December 2020, President-Elect Biden stated he would not make vaccines mandatory.
President Biden and other officials within the administration repeated this promise throughout
much of early and mid-2021 as the vaccines were rolled out. 1302 However, the promise was soon
broken when, on August 24, 2021, Secretary Austin announced the first federal COVID-19
vaccine mandate—one day after the FDA’s full approval of the Pfizer vaccine. This first
COVID-19 vaccine mandate required the secretaries of each Military Department to
“immediately begin full vaccination of all members of the Armed Forces under DoD authority.”
Secretary Austin also noted that this decision was made “with the support of the President.” 1303
DOD did not, however, mention or reference specific scientific studies supporting its mandate.
Further, Secretary Austin has repeatedly ignored letters from members of Congress regarding
making data-driven decisions concerning the health of the military. 1304

After DOD issued its mandate, the floodgates of federal mandates opened. On September
9, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14043, which required federal employees to be
vaccinated against COVID-19 by November 8, 2021, or risk removal or termination from their
federal employment. 1305 On November 4, 2021, OSHA issued a rule which required all
1294
COVID-19 Vaccines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, available at
https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/covid-19-vaccines/index.html.
1295
Id.
1296
AJMC Staff, A Timeline of COVID-19 Vaccine Developments in 2021, AJMC (Jun. 3, 2021).
1297
Biden marks 50M vaccine doses in first 5 weeks in office, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2021).
1298
Zeke Miller, Biden eyes new goal after US clears 100M shots since Jan. 20, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 19, 2021).
1299
Jeannette Muhammad, Global COVID-19 Deaths Top 3 Million, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, (Apr. 17, 2021).
1300
Biden marks 50M vaccine doses in first 5 weeks in office, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2021).
1301
AJMC Staff, What We’re Reading: 70% of US Vaccinated; CMS Payment Rules Released; Alcohol Consumption
and Cancer, AJMC (Aug. 3, 2021).
1302
Tommy Pigott, Biden Promised No Mandate. He Lied, RAPID RESPONSE (Sept. 10, 2021).
1303
Memorandum for Senior Pentagon Leadership Commanders of the Combatant Commands Defense Agency and
DOD Field Activity Directors, Mandatory Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination of Department of Defense Service
Member (Aug. 24, 2021).
1304
Press Release, Congressman Brad Wenstrup, Wenstrup Demands Substantive Response from DOD After
Receiving Four-Sentence Reply (Feb. 27, 2023).
1305
Guidance on Enforcement of Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination Requirements for Federal Employees –
Executive Order 14043, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; See Exec. Order No. 14043, 86 Fed. Reg. 50985
(Sept. 14, 2021).

Page 336 of 520

employers with 100 or more employees to impose COVID-19 vaccine mandates, and CMS
announced a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for all healthcare workers who worked at facilities
participating in Medicare and Medicaid. 1306 Finally, on November 30, 2021, HHS announced a
rule which required COVID-19 vaccination for all Head Start staff, contractors and volunteers.

Although all five of the major federal COVID-19 vaccine mandates are now rescinded,
overturned, or otherwise ended, their consequences will live on for years to come. The COVID-
19 vaccine mandates caused people to lose their livelihoods, hollowed out our healthcare and
education workforces, reduced our military readiness and recruitment, caused vaccine hesitancy,
reduced trust in public health, trampled individual freedoms, deepened political divisions, and
interfered in the patient-physician relationship.

Aside from these severe consequences, the scientific basis of the COVID-19 vaccine
mandates was highly questionable. COVID-19 mandates ignored natural immunity, stratification
of risk from the virus, risk of adverse events from the vaccine, as well as the fact that the
vaccines don’t prevent the spread of COVID-19. Meanwhile, as the Select Subcommittee has
established in previous hearings, federal health officials consistently overstated the power of the
vaccines and deepening political divides with statements like “the pandemic of the
unvaccinated.” 1307 This is yet another example of the Biden Administration’s guidance and
policies straying far outside boundaries of the available evidence while proudly proclaiming they
were “following the science.” 1308 For them, “because I told you so” was good enough.

DOD Mandate

Secretary Austin issued the DOD COVID-19 vaccine mandate on August 24, 2021 1309,
and it remained in effect until he rescinded it on January 10, 2023 1310, as required by the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2023. 1311 Over the course of the 16 months
that the COVID-19 vaccine mandate was in effect, approximately 8,000 service members were
separated due to their COVID-19 vaccination status. 1312 However, more than 17,500 troops’
religious exemptions were still being adjudicated just prior to the rescission of the COVID-19
vaccine mandate. 1313 Some have also argued that the NDAA language did not go far enough to
ameliorate the harms done by the COVID-19 vaccine mandate since separated servicemembers

1306
Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Announces Details of Two Major Vaccination Policies,
(Nov. 4, 2021).
1307
President Joe Biden, Remarks by President Biden on Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic (Sept. 9, 2021).
1308
President Joe Biden, Statement by President Joe Biden on CDC Guidance, (July 27, 2021).
1309
Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Announces Details of Two Major Vaccination Policies,
(Nov. 4, 2021).
1310
DOD Rescinds COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Jan. 10, 2023).
1311
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, Stat. 2395
(2022).
1312
Oren Liebermann, Only 43 of more than 8,000 discharged from US military for refusing Covid vaccine have
rejoined, CNN (Oct. 2, 2023).
1313
Steve Beynon, Thousands of Troops with COVID Vaccine Exemption Requests No Longer Facing Separation
With Mandate Gone, MILITARY TIMES (Jan. 4, 2023).

Page 337 of 520

would not be automatically reinstated or paid back-pay. 1314 The Select Subcommittee agrees that
members should be reinstated with back-pay.

Federal Workforce Mandate

On September 9, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14043 which mandated
all 3.5 million Federal employees get a COVID-19 vaccine by November 22, 2021. 1315 In the
press release issued by the White House, President Biden stated that “[t]he health and safety of
the Federal workforce, and the health and safety of members of the public with whom they
interact, are foundational to the efficiency of the civil service” and that “[the COVID-19
vaccines] protect people from getting infected and severely ill, and they significantly reduce the
likelihood of hospitalization and death.” The Biden Administration formally ended this mandate
(along with the CMS mandate) at the end of the public health emergency on May 11, 2023. 1316

OSHA Mandate

On November 4, 2021, the Biden Administration announced that it would be using

OSHA to require all businesses with more than 100 employees to impose COVID-19 vaccine
mandates. 1317 Under this Emergency Temporary Standard [hereinafter “ETS”], employees would
be required to be vaccinated or face weekly testing. Companies would also have to give workers
paid time off to receive vaccines and to recover from any adverse effects. Companies that did not
comply would face up to $14,000 in fines per violation. 1318

This was met with immediate questions about whether OSHA had the authority to impose
such a requirement. On November 9, 2021, the National Federation of Independent Businesses
[hereinafter “NFIB”] filed a lawsuit against OSHA regarding this ETS. 1319 Shortly thereafter, on
November 12, 2021, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a stay. 1320 On December 17, 2021,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Fifth Circuit Court’s stay, which allowed the ETS
to be implemented. On January 13, 2022, the Supreme Court sided with NFIB and blocked
OSHA from enforcing the ETS only three days after it took effect. However, many employers
had already implemented COVID-19 vaccine mandates by this point.

1314
Press Release, Ted Cruz, U.S. Senator for Texas, Sen. Cruz Introduces Updated Legislation Building on Vaccine
Mandate Ban to Reinstate Service Members Fired Over COVID Vaccine (Jan. 24, 2023).
1315
President Joe Biden, Remarks by President Biden on Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic (Sept. 9, 2021).
1316
Release, White House, The Biden-Harris Administration Will End COVID-19 Vaccination Requirements for
Federal Employees, Contractors, International Travelers, Head Start Educators, and CMS-Certified Facilities (May
1, 2023).
1317
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, DOD Rescinds COVID-19 Vaccination Mandate (Jan. 10, 2023).
1318
Press Briefing by Mr. Munoz, Background Press Call on OSHA and CMS Rules for Vaccination in the
Workplace, White House Briefing Room (Nov. 4, 2021).
1319
NFIB Files Lawsuit Against OSHA’s Vaccine Mandate on America’s Businesses (Nov. 9, 2021).
1320
BST Holdings LLC, et al. v. OSHA, et al. No. 21-60845 (5th Cir. 2021).

Page 338 of 520

CMS Mandate

In the same November 4, 2021 announcement of the OSHA COVID-19 vaccine mandate,
the Biden Administration simultaneously announced that it would be proceeding with a COVID-
19 vaccine mandate for all health care workers who worked at facilities that participate in
Medicare and Medicaid. Due to the incredibly large scale of these two federal programs, this
mandate covered approximately 10 million people and around 76,000 healthcare providers. 1321
This was among the most consequential COVID-19 vaccine mandates due to the significant
number of individuals within its scope, the fact that it remained in effect until May 2023, and
because of the damage it did to the health care workforce in the middle of a pandemic. Many
healthcare workers voluntarily quit or were fired for not complying with the mandate. 1322

Head Start Mandate

On November 30, 2021, the Office of Head Start—the early education federal program
within HHS—announced an interim final rule [hereinafter “IFR”] imposing both vaccination and
masking requirements for grant recipients of the program. 1323 Specifically, the IFR mandated the
COVID-19 vaccine for all staff, volunteers, and contractors, and universal masking for all
individuals two years of age or older. 1324 Prior to May 11, 2023—the formal end of the COVID-
19 public health emergency—the Biden Administration had been prohibited from enforcing the
Head Start mandate by a federal district court judge on September 21, 2022. 1325

Other Jurisdictions:

The Biden Administration’s federal COVID-19 vaccine mandates directly imposed

vaccination requirements on more than 12 million Americans, but even individuals not within the
scope of these mandates were likely to come across another entity imposing one. 1326 Many of
these entities may have even been encouraged to do so because of the federal COVID-19 vaccine
mandates, even if not compelled to do so. States, counties, municipalities, schools, employers,
restaurants, airlines, gyms, entertainment venues and many others across the country, imposed
COVID-19 vaccine mandates.

In response to the OSHA mandate, many private companies pushed to implement their
own vaccine policies. After the FDA hurriedly granted full approval for the Pfizer vaccine on
August 23, 2021, these companies, amongst others, announced some form of vaccination plan:
American Express, Amtrak, Cisco, Citigroup, CVS Health, Deloitte, Delta Airlines, DoorDash,
Equinox, Facebook, Ford, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Google, Lyft, McDonalds, MGM
Resorts International, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, NBCUniversal, Netflix, The New York Times,
Saks, Southwest Airlines, Twitter, Uber, United Airlines, Walgreens, The Walt Disney

1321
Tom Hals, Judge blocks U.S. COVID-19 vaccine rule for health workers in 10 states, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2021).
1322
Dave Muoio, How many employees have hospitals lost to vaccine mandates? Here are the numbers so far,
FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Feb. 22, 2022).
1323
86 Fed. Reg. 68,052 (Nov. 30. 2021).
1324
Id.
1325
Louisiana v. Becerra, 3:21-CV-04370 (W.D. La. Sep. 21, 2022).
1326
See Where 12 Million U.S. Employees Are Affected by Government Vaccine Mandates, THE N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18,
2021).

Page 339 of 520

Company, Walmart, and The Washington Post. 1327 Individuals who refused to comply with these
COVID-19 vaccine mandates were fired from their jobs and many more people opted to quit
instead. 1328

College campuses across the country were another area significantly impacted by
COVID-19 vaccine mandates. Prior to the COVID-19 vaccine rollout, college students had
already been robbed of the traditional college experience and doors were opened in piecemeal
and inconsistent ways. However, the implementation of COVID-19 vaccine mandates across
campuses brought new disruptions. There were still many campuses in 2023 that required
students to receive a COVID-19 vaccine and boosters, even though booster shots have been
shown to be unnecessary for younger people 1329 and that the risk for myocarditis is higher in
young men. 1330

The negative effects brought by COVID-19 lockdowns has been widely reported, and for
some, the so-called “vaccine passport” requirements became a new de-facto lockdown. For
example, in Washington DC, bars, gyms, concert venues and other businesses were forced to
require proof of COVID-19 vaccination for their patrons. 1331 Even after the COVID-19 vaccine
mandate was dropped, 1332 many businesses elected to keep their vaccination requirement in
effect. 1333 A similar story played out in other jurisdictions across the country.

FINDING: COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Caused Massive Collateral Damage and Were Very
Likely Counterproductive.

Vaccines alone, and therefore COVID-19 vaccine mandates, could not and did not bring
us to “herd immunity.” 1334 Yet, they caused collateral damage that has been felt by millions of
Americans.

A May 2022 British Medical Journal [hereinafter “BMJ”] Global Health paper written
by Dr. Bardosh and several other public health and bioethics experts from around the world
found that COVID-19 vaccine mandates caused significant collateral damage. The paper’s
summary stated:

1327
Haley Messenger, From McDonald’s to Goldman Sachs, here are the companies mandating vaccines for all or
some employees, NBCNEWS (Aug. 3, 2021).
1328
Andrea Hsu, Thousands of Workers are Opting to Get Fired, Rather than take the Vaccine, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO (Oct. 24, 2021).
1329
Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Younger, health people don’t need another COVID booster, vaccine expert says,
NBCNEWS (Jan. 11, 2023).
1330
Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., Small study points to possible cause of myocarditis following mRNA vaccination in
young men, NBCNEWS (May 5, 2023).
1331
Karina Elwood & Fritz Hahn, Ready your vaccination cards: DC businesses prepare to enforce new mandate,
THE WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2022).
1332
Tori Bergel, DC Is Ending Its Vaccination and Mask Mandates, WASHINGTONIAN, (Feb. 14, 2022).
1333
Tierney Plumb, Some D.C. Restaurants and Bars Refuse to Stop Asking for Customers’ Vax Status, EATER (Feb.
16, 2022).
1334
Christie Aschwanden, Five reasons why COVID herd immunity is probably impossible, NATURE (Mar. 18, 2021).

Page 340 of 520

 Our analysis strongly suggests that mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policies
have had damaging effects on public trust, vaccine confidence, political
polarization, human rights, inequities and social wellbeing. We question the
effectiveness and consequences of coercive vaccination policy in pandemic
response and urge the public health community and policymakers to return
to non-discriminatory, trust-based public health approaches. 1335

The BMJ paper also found that COVID-19 vaccine mandates primarily served to
encourage vaccination in younger people who were the least at-risk for serious COVID-19
illness, and that this further entrenched distrust and provoked reactance:

Although studies suggest that current policies are likely to increase

population-level vaccination rates to some degree, gains were largest in
those under 30 years old (a very low-risk group) and in countries with below
average uptake. Moreover, insights from behavioral psychology suggest
that these policies are likely to entrench distrust and provoke reactance—a
motivation to counter an unreasonable threat to one’s freedom. 1336

Dr. Bardosh testified before the Select Subcommittee during a July 27, 2023 hearing
titled “Because I Said So: Examining the Science and Impact of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates.”
Dr. Bardosh was able to further expand on these findings on COVID-19 vaccine mandates.

Dr. Kevin Bardosh (July 27, 2023)

Q. Dr. Bardosh, let’s amplify some of the points from your

publications. There was a collaborative effort that you published
with researchers and physicians from Johns Hopkins, Harvard, and
Oxford, yes or no?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the COVID vaccine mandates from your research, from your
publication with others, erode civil liberties?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. Did the COVID vaccine mandates fracture trust in public health

officials?

A. Yes, it did.

1335
Kevin Bardosh, et al., The unintended consequences of COVID-19 vaccine policy: why mandates, passports and
restrictions may cause more harm than good, BMJ GLOB HEALTH, (May 25, 2022).
1336
Id.

Page 341 of 520

 Q. Did the COVID vaccine mandates create financial stress to
individuals and families who lost their jobs to the COVID
mandates?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And Dr. Bardosh, do you feel that the decrease in individuals

receiving routine pediatric immunizations for their children, do you
feel that is due to the mandates of the COVID vaccine?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And, finally, and I thank you for your brevity. Dr. Bardosh, do you
feel that the COVID–19 vaccine mandates have harmed America?

A. Yes, I do. 1337

This collateral damage may have hampered our preparedness for a future pandemic. Dr.
Bardosh testified that COVID-19 vaccine mandates decreased public confidence in vaccines and
would likely be responsible for resistance to vaccines during a future pandemic.

Dr. Kevin Bardosh (July 27, 2023)

Q. Dr. Bardosh, your paper in the British Medical Journal of Global

Health discusses the unintended consequences of the COVID-19
vaccine mandates. The Biden administration imposed several,
including the DOD mandate for military service members, the
executive order mandate for federal employees and contractors, the
OSHA mandate for employers with 100 or more employees, the
CMS mandate for health care workers at facilities that participate in
Medicare and Medicaid, and the HHS Head Start Program COVID-
19 vaccine mandate for which we know young children are at the
least risk. Can you highlight the ramifications of these mandates,
such as no jab, no jab policies, vaccine passports and social
lockdowns for the unvaccinated?

A. There is no doubt in my mind that these mandate policies are going

to be responsible for the increase in distrust the next time there’s a
pandemic and the mobilization of resistance to a future vaccine in a
future pandemic. And I think it’s really shocking, and kind of a little
bit sad, that my colleagues in the public health community, who are
pro-mandate, don’t understand this. 1338

1337
Bardosh testimony (July 27, 2023).
1338
Id.

Page 342 of 520

 As Dr. Bardosh highlighted in the BMJ paper, vaccine mandates appear to have also
deepened political divisions. Rhetoric from some politicians and public health officials painted
the vaccine mandates as a necessary policy to combat the selfish, ignorant, or malevolent
“unvaccinated” who were perpetuating the pandemic. Americans wanted to be honestly educated
about both the virus and the vaccines, not indoctrinated. During the Select Subcommittee’s July
27, 2021 hearing, Dr. Bardosh testified that this rhetoric was a “scapegoating response,” which
evidence indicates may be counterproductive as a public health strategy.

Dr. Kevin Bardosh (July 27, 2023)

Q. Dr. Bardosh, in your paper, you mentioned that political leaders

singled out the unvaccinated and blamed them for the continuation
of the pandemic. In fact, in July 2021, during the onset of the Delta
variant wave, CDC Director Rochelle Walensky said that it was
‘‘becoming a pandemic of the unvaccinated.’’ Is this the sort of
blame, Dr. Bardosh, that you were referring to in your paper?

A. Yes, it is a scapegoating response.

A. Dr. Bardosh, I am going to make this simpler. Do you believe that

this sort of language is harmful when we look for public officials in
charge to scapegoat?

A. I think, you know, the HIV/AIDS community has done a lot of

research on stigma and scapegoating, right? And, you know,
decades of research has shown that stigma as a public health strategy
is counterproductive. I will leave it at that. 1339

In a December 2022 interview with Fox 5 New York, Dr. Anthony Fauci appeared to
admit this fact, saying “[I] would like people to use good judgment to protect themselves and
their family in that community without necessarily having to mandate anything, because, you
know, there is a fatigue about being mandated. People don't like to be told what to do.” 1340 Yet,
this was too-little too-late. Dr. Fauci himself had already made extremely inflammatory remarks
about the unvaccinated, including during an interview for an audiobook by journalist Michael
Specter, where he patronizingly deemed concerns about not getting vaccinated as simply
“ideological bullshit,” and implied that institutions should make life difficult for the
unvaccinated using vaccine mandates:

Once people feel empowered and protected legally, you were going to have
schools, universities, and colleges are going to say; “you want to come to
this college, buddy? You're going to get vaccinated. Lady, you're going to
get vaccinated.” Big corporations like Amazon and Facebook and all of
those others are going to say; “you want to work for us, you get vaccinated.”

Vaccine mandates hearing transcript page 30

1339

Julia Musto, Fauci acknowledges Americans have mandate 'fatigue': 'People don't like to be told what to do',
1340

FOX NEWS (Dec. 10, 2022).

Page 343 of 520

 And it's been proven that when you make it difficult for people in their lives,
they lose their ideological bullshit, and they get vaccinated. 1341

During the Select Subcommittee’s June 3, 2024 hearing, Dr. Fauci did acknowledge in
hindsight that not all objections to COVID-19 vaccines were ideological bullshit.

Dr. Anthony Fauci (June 3, 2024)

Q. Are all objections to COVID vaccinations ideological bullshit, Dr.

Fauci?

A. No, they're not. 1342

Some also argued that COVID-19 vaccine mandates would be self-defeating to their
stated goal of ending the pandemic. In June 2021, Psychologist Katrin Schmelz and Economist
Samuel Bowles co-wrote a Washington Post article titled; “Imposing vaccine mandates may be
counterproductive, our research suggests.” 1343 Schmelz and Bowles wrote that their research
suggested it could “hurt voluntary compliance, prolonging the pandemic and raising its social
costs.” 1344 Specifically, their representative panel survey in Germany showed that:

[M]aking vaccination a legal requirement might have retarded the rate of

vaccinations, as it would have substantially reduced willingness to be
vaccinated, consistent with self-determination and reactance theory in
psychology and what economists’ term “control aversion. 1345

Vaccine mandates appear to have also contributed to a surge in vaccine hesitancy and
overall distrust of public health authorities. For example, a recent CDC study showed that
immunization rates for kindergarteners fell each year since the start of the pandemic. 1346 This
trend could prove to be problematic for vaccination efforts during a future pandemic.

COVID-19 vaccine mandates also forced millions of people to choose between their
livelihoods and being vaccinated—even if they had closely held personal or religious beliefs or a
medical reason. This is not only unjust, but it also caused thousands of people to lose their jobs
in the middle of a pandemic and unstable economic environment. 1347

During the Select Subcommittee’s July 27, 2023 hearing, Ms. Allison Williams testified
about losing her job as an ESPN sports reporter after she sought an exemption to Disney’s

1341
Michael Specter, Fauci (Puskin 2020) (audio).
1342
Fauci Hearing, supra note 233, at 97
1343
Katrin Schmelz & Samuel Bowles, Imposing vaccine mandates may be counterproductive, our research
suggests, THE WASH. POST (June 7, 2021).
1344
Id.
1345
Id.
1346
Ranee Seither, et al., Coverage with Selected Vaccines and Exemption Rates Among Children in Kindergarten —
United States, 2023–24 School Year, MMWR (Oct. 17, 2024).
1347
Id.

Page 344 of 520

COVID-19 vaccine mandates. Ms. Williams told the Select Subcommittee that at the time of the
mandate she was actively working with fertility specialists while she and her husband were
trying for their second child. 1348 Her doctor supported her decision to forgo the vaccine due to
her young age, good health, and ongoing efforts to conceive a child. 1349 Nonetheless, Ms.
Williams employment was terminated. 1350

Ms. Allison Williams (July 27, 2023)

Just like that, newly pregnant, I was stripped of my job, my health insurance
and having my personal and medical decisions the topic of national news.
It is hard to explain what it is like to have so much taken from you for doing
what you know in your heart and mind to be the right thing for you and your
family. The financial toll it took on my family and so many others like us
was significant, and still enduring. The lost wages and sacrifices made by
families like mine who stood up to the overreaching, unjustified mandates
to preserve their autonomy and health can never be fully recovered. 1351

Worse still, one of the most impacted sectors, due to the CMS COVID-19 vaccine
mandate, was our healthcare work force. The very same people heralded as “heroes” in 2020
were soon being fired for noncompliance in 2021. 1352 This notion is absurd on its face, but it is
taken to another level given the fact that the healthcare workforce, particularly in the nursing
field, was at crisis-level shortages across the country during this time.

In a December 2022 article, the AP highlighted this absurd hypocrisy and noted that
“foundations are pouring millions of dollars into efforts to ensure that more stay in the [nursing]
profession.” 1353 The AP also cited an April 2022 study published by Health Affairs which
showed that more than 100,000 nurses, or 1.8 percent of the nationwide work force, left in
2021. 1354 Many of these potential consequences were known prior to the federal COVID-19
vaccine mandates and were being widely discussed throughout the media, yet the Biden
Administration continued anyway. 1355 Sadly, many of the individuals who were fired or left their
jobs likely acquired natural immunity from previous infection and this immunity may have been
greater than immunity acquired through vaccination.

1348
Because I Said So: Examining the Science and Impact of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates: Hearing Before the
Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. 1, (July 27, 2023) [hereinafter “Because I Said So”].
1349
Id.
1350
Id. at 30.
1351
Id.
1352
Dave Muoio, How many employees have hospitals lost to vaccine mandates? Here are the numbers so far,
FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Feb. 22, 2022); Honoring Our Public Heroes Who Protect Us All, CDC Foundation, available
at
https://www.cdcfoundation.org/hero#:~:text=A%20hero%20is%20every%20public,essential%20health%20and%20
wellbeing%20services.
1353
Alex Daniels, Foundations, major donors tackle nation’s nursing shortage, ASSOCIATE PRESS (Dec. 5, 2022).
1354
David I. Auerbach, et al., A Worrisome Drop In The Numbers Of Young Nurses, HEALTH AFFAIRS FOREFRONT
(Apr. 13, 2022).
1355
Taylor Dotson & Nicholas Tampio, Vaccine mandates will backfire. People will resist even more, THE WASH.
POST (July 31, 2021).

Page 345 of 520

FINDING: COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Were Not Supported by Science.

Not only did COVID-19 vaccine mandates cause many unintended consequences, but
they were also not based in science. In President Biden’s September 9, 2021, announcement of
the federal workforce mandate, he cited the notion that the vaccines protect against infection as
the first example for why the mandate was necessary. 1356

However, it was already evident then and is now commonly known that the vaccines do
not prevent you from getting infected or transmitting the virus. 1357 This seems to invalidate the
most basic logic of a vaccine mandate. As noted by Dr. Vinay Prasad, Professor in the
Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics at the University of California San Francisco,
“medical mandates are impermissible if they do not provide benefit to third parties.” 1358

The COVID-19 vaccine mandates also largely ignored the notion of naturally acquired
immunity. By the standard of most COVID-19 vaccine mandates, there was no exception made
for those who had previously contracted the virus. Rather, the more common exception was to
allow weekly testing in place of being fully vaccinated. Chairman Wenstrup has direct
experience with the disregard for natural immunity acquired from previous infection. The
Chairman was vaccinated with the two-shot Pfizer vaccine. Six months later, he got COVID with
mild symptoms. 1359 A House healthcare provider told the Chairman he needed a booster shot
prior to going on official travel. 1360 Concerned about a hyperimmune response because of his
recent recovery from infection, the Chairman asked for his antibody numbers—a strong number
is 40, but the Chairman’s number was 821. 1361

1356
President Joe Biden, Remarks by President Biden on Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic (Sept. 9, 2021).
1357
Umair Irfan, Some Vaccinated People Have Gotten COVID-19, That’s No Reason to Panic, VOX, (July 15,
2021).
1358
Vinay Prasad (@VPrasadMDMPH), Twitter, (May 13, 2023, 1:46 PM) available at
https://twitter.com/VPrasadMDMPH/status/1657442159904038913.
1359
Because I Said So, supra note 1348, at 42.
1360
Id.
1361
Id.

Page 346 of 520

 This appears to fly in the face of decades of scientific research. While COVID-19 was a
novel virus, there was clear science that infections from coronaviruses, including SARS-CoV-1,
produced natural immunity. 1362 In 2021, once research began to emerge specifically about
SARS-CoV-2, this notion was further supported. A study published in October 2021, using data
from Italy, showed that re-infections were rare, and that protection lasted around one year. 1363
Further studies concurred with this, and some even directly questioned the logic of COVID-19
vaccine mandates. 1364

In February 2023, a study was published in The Lancet that showed that natural immunity
provides the same protection as two doses of an mRNA vaccine. 1365 Specifically, it showed that
infection-acquired immunity cut the risk of hospitalization and death by 88 percent for at least 10
months. 1366 This study was the first to “comprehensively assess natural immunity protection
against COVID-19 reinfection by variant (primary infection and reinfection) and to evaluate
waning immunity with time since primary infection." 1367

Relatedly, the COVID-19 vaccine mandates applied a one-size-fits-all approach to

medicine which seriously undermined the patient-physician relationship. The mandates
decreased the doctor’s decision-space to make individualized risk-based assessments to
determine the proper course of action. This meant that regardless of previous infection from
COVID-19, previous adverse reactions to vaccines, likelihood to suffer an adverse effect from
the COVID-19 vaccine, or risk of serious illness from COVID-19 – all individuals were seen the
same by COVID-19 vaccine mandates.

FINDING: COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates Hampered U.S. Military Readiness.

According to reports, only 43 of the more than 8,000 separated servicemembers rejoined
the military. 1368 The DOD COVID-19 vaccine mandate directly led to the separation of
thousands of US servicemembers, but it has also hindered the military’s ability to recruit. In
fiscal year 2022, the military missed its recruiting goal by 15,000 personnel—25 percent of its
target. 1369

1362
Li-Ping Wu, et al. Duration of Antibody Responses After Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome PUBMED
CENTRAL (Oct. 13, 2007).
1363
Jose Vitale, et al. Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Reinfection 1 Year After Primary Infection in a Population in
Lombardy, Italy, PUBMED CENTRAL (May 28, 2021).
1364
Sheena Meredith, COVID-19: Why Are We Ignoring Infection-Acquired Immunity?, MEDSCAPE (Feb. 28,
2022).
1365
Akshay Syal, Immunity acquired from a COVID infection is as protective as vaccination against severe illness
and death, study finds, NBCNEWS (Feb. 16, 2023).
1366
Caroline Stein, et al., Past SARS-CoV-2 infection protection against re-infection: a systematic review and meta-
analysis, THE LANCET (Mar. 11, 2023).
1367
Steven Lim, et al. Past SARS-CoV-2 Infection Protection Against Re-Infection: A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, THE LANCET (Feb. 16, 2023).
1368
SEE OREN IBERMAN CNN ARTICLE
1369
David Barno & Nora Bensahel, Addressing the U.S. Military Recruiting Crisis, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Mar. 10,
2023).

Page 347 of 520

 While it is true that the recruiting shortfalls are likely also driven by other factors such as
the increasing ineligibility of young people, low unemployment, and decreasing confidence in
the military, there is little question that the COVID-19 vaccine mandate added to this problem.
Plus, these other factors have also been exacerbated by our response to COVID-19 inside and
outside of the military. For example, lockdowns and school closures certainly did little to help
with the crisis of military eligibility in young people. 1370

Some military leaders have agreed that the COVID-19 vaccine mandate negatively
impacted recruitment and military readiness. In August 2022, Major General James O. Eifert of
the Florida National Guard penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled The Vaccine
Mandate Puts National Security at Risk. Maj. Gen. Eifert wrote:

I’ve never been more worried about the future of the U.S. armed forces than
I am right now. I say that as a concerned citizen who has served for more
than 40 years, the last three of which have been as the adjutant general of
the Florida National Guard. One of the military’s most foundational duties
is to recruit and retain men and women willing to defend their country.
Unfortunately, current federal policy is rendering that goal unattainable.1371

Eifert goes on to argue that COVID-19 itself had not hurt his units’ readiness, but rather
the military’s policy responses had. He also said he agreed with mandating the vaccine in the
military at first but that “the circumstances have changed” and that the vaccines efficacy
“appears to be shorter-lived than once thought.” 1372

Similarly, in December 2022 during the Reagan Foundation Defense Forum, the now
former Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger conceded that the COVID-19 vaccine
mandate was “for sure” hurting military recruitment efforts. 1373

Overall, it is highly concerning that the DOD elected to issue this controversial and
sweeping mandate at a time when it was falling well short of recruiting goals. Also concerning is
the questionable necessity of mandating the vaccine for such a young and healthy cohort of
individuals who simultaneously faced higher risk of adverse events from the vaccine. 1374 Our
nation’s adversaries stood back and watched as we weakened our own military readiness due to
this misguided policy.

1370
Dave Philipps, With Few Able and Fewer Willing, U.S. Military Can’t Find Recruits, THE N.Y. TIMES, (July 14,
2022).
1371
James O. Eifert, The Vaccine Mandate Puts National Security at Risk, THE WALL ST. JOURNAL (Aug. 4, 2022).
1372
Id.
1373
Michelle Lee, Top Marine general says COVID vaccine mandate is hurting military recruiting efforts, FOX
NEWS, (Dec. 5, 2022).
1374
Id.

Page 348 of 520

VI. The COVID-19 Vaccine, While Largely Safe and Effective, Had Adverse Events That
Must be Throughoughly Investigated

According to the WHO, pharmacovigilance consists of “the science and activities relating
to the detection, assessment, understanding and prevention of adverse effects or any other
medicine/vaccine related problem.” 1375 Federal health agencies participate in a variety of
interwoven pharmacovigilance efforts, including both passive and active surveillance.

Passive surveillance is the collection of unsolicited reports of adverse events that are sent
to a centralized database. 1376 The Federal Government’s preeminent passive surveillance system
is the VAERS. 1377

Active surveillance involves proactively gathering and analyzing data to verify signals
found via passive surveillance, or to detect new ones. 1378 The Federal Government’s primary
avenues for active surveillance are FDA CBER Sentinel BEST System, CMS data, and CDC’s
VSD and V-Safe systems. 1379

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed some potential shortcomings and issues with these
systems. For example, in mid-2021, concerns arose that CDC and FDA were not able to
successfully utilize their surveillance systems to quickly identify increased risk of myocarditis in
young males receiving the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine, that other countries, including Israel and
France, were able to recognize. 1380 Specifically, on May 17, 2021, CDC reported that “rates of
myocarditis reports in the window following COVID-19 vaccination have not differed from
expected baseline rates.” 1381 One week later, and in the wake of reports from Israel’s Ministry of
Health, CDC reversed their stance by saying the rates were “higher than expected.” 1382

FINDING: The Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System is Insufficient and Not Transparent.

HHS describes VAERS as “a national early warning system to detect possible safety
problems in U.S.-licensed vaccines. VAERS is co-managed by the CDC and the FDA.” 1383
VAERS is operated as a publicly available database which contains millions of reports which
have been submitted by individuals. Importantly, healthcare professionals and vaccine
manufacturers are specifically required to report adverse events that occur after a vaccination to
VAERS, but anyone can report an adverse event.

1375
Regulation and Prequalification: What is Pharmacovigilance?, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
1376
COVID-19 Vaccine Safety Surveillance, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 7, 2021).
1377
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS.), U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (last visited Nov. 14, 2024).
1378
CDC: Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, COVID-19 VaST Work Group Report (May 17, 2021).
1379
Id.
1380
Id.
1381
Id.
1382
Elizabeth Cohen, A link between COVID-19 vaccination and a cardiac illness may be getting clearer, CNN (Jun.
10, 2021).
1383
About VAERS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES available at https://vaers.hhs.gov/about.html.

Page 349 of 520

 Although the system has been operational since 1990, it first became a source of
significant controversy with the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines beginning in late 2020 and early
2021. During this time, many posts circulated on social media calling attention to alarming
numbers of deaths and adverse events associated with COVID-19 vaccines. 1384 These posts were
soon met with a barrage of fact-check articles refuting them. 1385The chart below presents data
from VAERS as of November 2024. 1386

Worldwide VAERS Reports for COVID-

19 Vaccines as of 11/30/2024 1387
Total Adverse Events 1,844,839
Hospitalizations 216,646
Permanent Disabilities 72,161
Deaths 38,068
Deaths Within Two Days 9,167
of Vaccination

Possibly the most alarming figures are the comparisons between COVID-19 vaccines,
which have only been widely available since early 2021, and all other vaccines combined since
1990. The charts below illustrate this comparison. 1388

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1384
See generally, Posts continue to misrepresent VAERS COVID-19 vaccine data, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 23,
2022); Reuters Fact Check, VAERS data does not suggest COVID-19 vaccines killed 150,000 people, as analysis
claims, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2021); Catalina Jaramillo, Viral Posts Misuse VAERS Data to Make False Claims About
COVID-19 Vaccines, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 31, 2021).
1385
See generally, Posts continue to misrepresent VAERS COVID-19 vaccine data, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 23,
2022); Reuters Fact Check, VAERS data does not suggest COVID-19 vaccines killed 150,000 people, as analysis
claims, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2021); Catalina Jaramillo, Viral Posts Misuse VAERS Data to Make False Claims About
COVID-19 Vaccines, FACTCHECK.ORG (Mar. 31, 2021).
1386
CDC WONDER On-line Database available at http://wonder.cdc.gov/vaers.html (last visited Nov 30, 2024).
1387
Id.
1388
Id.

Page 350 of 520

 Worldwide Adverse Events Worldwide Deaths
1,800,000 40,000
1,600,000 35,000
1,400,000 30,000
1,200,000
25,000
1,000,000
20,000
800,000
15,000
600,000
10,000
400,000
200,000 5,000

0 0
COVID-19 Vaccines All Other Vaccines COVID-19 Vaccines All Other Vaccines
(Since December 2020) Combined (Since July (Since December 2020) Combined (Since July
1990) 1990)

As previously noted, anyone can submit a report to VAERS, and these reports are
automatically published and available publicly. Therefore, a report on VAERS has likely not
been proven to be caused by a vaccine. However, the vast discrepancy when comparing COVID-
19 vaccines over three years, with all other vaccines over more than 30 years raises serious
concerns. Pursuant to the EUA for COVID-19 vaccines, manufacturers and providers were
required to report serious adverse events to VAERS irrespective of proof of attribution. 1389

An investigation conducted by the BMJ raised concerns that VAERS “isn’t operating as
intended and that signals are being missed.” 1390 The BMJ found several troubling issues,
including that the system may be severely understaffed in the face of unprecedented number of
new reports being filed in the wake of the massive campaign to administer COVID-19
vaccines. 1391

Specifically, the BMJ reports that “VAERS’s staffing was likely not commensurate with
the demands of reviewing the serious reports submitted, including reports of death,” and that
“Pfizer has around 1,000 more full time employees working on vaccine surveillance than the
CDC.” 1392 The Journal highlighted that other countries have acknowledged deaths that were
“likely” or “probably” caused by COVID-19 vaccines, but CDC has only acknowledged deaths
“causally” caused by COVID-19 vaccines—which may be sign that the system is severely
overwhelmed. 1393

1389
86 Fed. Reg. 54111 (Jan. 19, 2021),
1390
Jennifer Block, Is the US’s Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System broken? BMJ (Nov. 10, 2023).
1391
Id.
1392
Id.
1393
Id.

Page 351 of 520

 The BMJ also found that VAERS representatives were inconsistent at following up on
reports made to the system. 1394 The BMJ spoke to more than 12 people who filed serious reports
to VAERS and were “never contacted or were contacted months later.” 1395 This is made even
worse since, as BMJ reported, the public database only contains preliminary reports, and all
updates and corrections are housed on a “separate, back-end system” which is unavailable to
patients, doctors, and other public users of the database. 1396

The BMJ spoke with was Dr. Whelan. Dr. Whelan testified at a Select Subcommittee
Hearing on March 21, 2024, where he explained that VAERS fails to cultivate trust.

Dr. Patrick Whelan (March 21, 2024)

Q. Dr. Whelan, do you believe that it is appropriate to house all of the

potential updates and corrections to VAERS on a non-public data
base?

A. I think that there is a lot of trust involved in the medical community,

but also for the general public, that something is happening behind
the scenes when you can’t see it right out in front. And I think, two,
that people were very aware that you did not have the kind of follow
up on vaccination generally that we expect, for instance, from our
pediatricians, where you got a nurse who is going to call the
following week and make sure that your child is doing OK. And, I
mean, my own strong feeling is that we really needed a much more
proactive surveillance mechanism, and I think that many of us
understand that the FDA was under enormous pressure and also that
it was an overwhelming task. And just judging by the number of
VAERS reports that there have been and knowing how challenging
it can be to actually file a VAERS report, the task could have been
even vastly larger than the large task that it already is. I mean, you
have to have some level, I think, of internal dialog that takes place.
But I think ultimately, as you alluded earlier, you have to be able to
create some level of trust among people, and I think the system
currently does not cultivate that. 1397

During an interview about VAERS, vaccine expert and member of the CDC’s ACIP, Dr.
Paul Offit, told a story of a colleague who, to prove a point, successfully submitted a VAERS
report saying that “he got a vaccine and he turned into the Incredible Hulk.” 1398 Surprisingly,
Director Walensky testified before the Select Subcommittee in June 2023 and said, “we at CDC
have a responsibility to comb through every single one of them [VAERS reports] to review the

1394
Id.
1395
Id.
1396
Id.
1397
Assessing America’s Vaccine Safety Systems Part II: Hearing Before Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic, 118th Cong. 2 (Mar. 21, 2024).
1398
MicrobeTV, Beyond the Noise #26: VAERS, YouTube (Jan. 16, 2024).

Page 352 of 520

medical charts and to see if they are related.” 1399 Per the BMJ investigation, it appears that these
updates and corrections may not be reflected in the public version of VAERS.

All this controversy raises questions about whether VAERS is a sufficient or effective
surveillance system as currently operated.

FINDING: Existing Vaccine Safety Systems May Be Missing Important Safety Signals,
Especially Related to Neurological Conditions.

In May 2024, The New York Times published an article which discussed the issue of
COVID-19 vaccine injuries and the fact that many of those who have experienced one feel they
have been ignored. 1400 The article focused on neurological issues that people believed were
caused by the COVID-19 vaccine but have limited scientific evidence. For example, the article
contained stories of individuals who had tinnitus after receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, including
the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Vaccine, and a doctor who led several COVID-19 vaccine
trials at Vanderbilt University. 1401

Further, in the article Dr. Woodcock, expressed regret about the way that the FDA
handled vaccine injuries during the pandemic.

I believe their suffering should be acknowledged, that they have real

problems, and they should be taken seriously.

***

I’m disappointed in myself. I did a lot of things I feel very good about, but
this is one of the few things I feel I just didn’t bring it home. 1402

Dr. Woodcock explained that she believes these neurological symptoms are difficult to
establish causality for because they don’t have well-defined research definitions.

I mean, you’re not going to find ‘brain fog’ in the medical record or claims
data. 1403

During her transcribed interview with the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Woodcock expanded
on her statements to The New York Times. Dr. Woodcock testified that this difficulty with
finding causality for neurological conditions existed before the COVID-19 pandemic because it
is difficult to neatly put neurological symptoms into any diagnostic category.

1399
Oversight of CDC Policies and Decisions During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Hearing Before Select Subcomm.
on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. 1 (June 13, 2023) (statement of Dr. Rochelle Walensky, Dir., U.S. CDC
1400
Apoorva Mandavilli, Thousands Believe Covid Vaccines Harmed Them. Is Anyone Listening?, THE N.Y. TIMES
(May 3, 2024, updated May 4, 2024).
1401
Id.
1402
Id.
1403
Id.

Page 353 of 520

 Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. The article indicates that you believe that some recipients of COVID
vaccines "experienced uncommon but 'serious' and 'life changing'
reactions beyond those described by federal agencies." What kinds
of reactions are you referring to there?

A. I'm referring to reactions that medical science has trouble dealing

with. A common problem that occurred before this, before COVID
used to be called chronic fatigue syndrome or myalgic encephalitis.
And the medical establishment has struggled for 20 years trying to
figure out what it is and still have no idea. All right. That's typically
a post viral or post infectious illness. However, I think it could occur
post any immune stimulus. So to answer your question, folks had
brain fog, fatigue, prostration, some of them had neurologic
symptoms. None of them fit neatly into any diagnostic category.

Q. So because they didn't fit neatly inside a diagnostic category, you're

saying they're harder to be described or analyzed?

A. Well, they're harder to be identified because many of these folk

struggled for months and months to even be acknowledged that there
was anything wrong with them. Many of them were told, you know,
they were just – It's all in your head. And that's very similar to
chronic fatigue syndrome, myalgic encephalitis. 1404

Dr. Woodcock also testified that while Acting FDA Commissioner she had pushed for the
NIH to establish a research arm to study these neuropathies’ possible association with COVID-
19 vaccines, so that the people experiencing them could get acknowledged and also to start
exploring possible treatments.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

A. I even talked to NIH, I talked to even see if they would add an arm,
because this is very similar to some of the things that people get with
long COVID. You get-- people get long COVID much more
frequently after getting COVID than they do getting this after
vaccination. But it does seem to happen. So I wanted to get it
studied because I think what the first thing we need is study. And
the NIH study on long COVID is looking for syndromic definitions.
That's mainly what they're doing, they're trying to find syndromic
clusters so they can name these conditions in some the same way
that people get POTS, postural orthostatic tachycardic syndrome,
which is another probably autonomic neuropathy, okay? So my goal

1404
Woodcock TI, at 110.

Page 354 of 520

 was to try and, number one, get the people studied so they can be
acknowledged, that they were having a problem, and also start
working up ideas of treatment. Now, I wasn't really that hopeful
because CFS ME has gone so long without effective
interventions. 1405

Dr. Woodcock explained that these efforts ultimately stalled, apparently due to a lack of
funding. 1406 However, she also indicated that she believed others at the FDA did not appear to
have taken this issue as seriously as her.

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Why do you think that that stalled?

A. Well, I had too many things to do. And I think the main reason is
without a signal, you know, like we get a lot of signals in our real,
like I was telling you earlier. You have to work them up and they
aren't causally related. That requires some strong causality –
potentially causally related signals hardly get the companies to pay
for it. They would have had to pay for a study like that at NIH.

Q. So do you feel that others within FDA took this as seriously as you
did?

A. No. 1407

It therefore appears that the government must do more to prioritize research into these
conditions for the sake of those experiencing them, but also to preserve public trust in
vaccination going forward.

FINDING: The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Created a New Surveillance
System Specifically for COVID-19 but has not been Fully Transparent in Sharing
the Data Collected in it.

Launched in December 2020, V-Safe is an active surveillance system which specifically

monitors the safety of COVID-19 vaccines. 1408 It prompts enrollees for health check-ins via text
messages and web surveys whereby individuals report on post-vaccination experiences. 1409

1405
Woodcock TI, at 112.
1406
Woodcock TI, at 114-115
1407
Woodcock TI, at 115.
1408
V-safe Landing Page, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE AND CONTROL,
available at
https://vsafe.cdc.gov/vsafeportal/s/login/?language=en_US&ec=302&startURL=%2Fvsafeportal%2Fs%2F.
1409
What is V-safe,? U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE AND CONTROL; Tanya R. Myers, et al., The v-safe after vaccination
health checker: Active vaccine safety monitoring during CDC’s COVID-19 pandemic response, VACCINE (Jan. 23,
2023).

Page 355 of 520

According to CDC, 10.1 million V-Safe participants completed more than 151 million surveys
about their health experiences after receiving COVID-19 and mpox vaccines. 1410

V-Safe is subject to a substantial amount of litigation. Specifically, CDC is defending

against FOIA lawsuits filed by groups seeking data and millions of free-text responses gathered
through the program. 1411 ICAN obtained and released the “checkbox” data in October 2022. 1412
ICAN also created a public dashboard which highlights the data, which they say contains
“numerous alarming results.” 1413 Specifically, ICAN reports that the data show 782,913
individuals, or more than 7.7 percent of users, reported a health event requiring medical
attention, emergency room intervention, and/or hospitalization. 1414

CDC is resistant to providing the free-text entries and have cited concerns that their
release would be too burdensome, but a January 2024 court decision required the CDC release
them over the course of the next 12 months. 1415 The plaintiffs claim the CDC “design[ed] V-Safe
to assure harms are hidden in free-text fields,” and that analysis of this data will allow “the rate
of and adverse reaction [to] be calculated” which is “not possible with VAERS.” 1416 If a system
like V-Safe would be better equipped to actually calculate the rate of a particular adverse event,
it is concerning that public health agencies have not leveraged this approach fully.

1410
About V-safe,? U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE AND CONTROL
1411
Jenna Greene, New data is out on COVID vaccine injury claims. What's to make of it? REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2022).
1412
Press Release, Informed Consent Action Network, Breaking News: ICAN Obtains CDC V-safe Data (Oct. 3,
2022).
1413
Id.
1414
Id.
1415
Freedom Coalition of Doctors for Choice v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2:23-cv-00102-Z,
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2024); Greg Piper, Judge orders CDC to quickly turn over millions of COVID vaccine-injury
reports by early patients, JUST THE NEWS (Jan. 13, 2024).
1416
Aaron Siri, V-Safe Part 4: CDC Designs V-Safe to Assure Harms Are Hidden in Free-Text Fields So It Can
Control What Becomes Public, Including Limiting the Harms Submitted to VAERS, INJECTING FREEDOM (Jan. 10,
2023).

Page 356 of 520

VII. The U.S. Government’s Insufficient Systems for Compensating COVID-19 Vaccine
Injuries

Generally, vaccines are safe and effective. However, it is inevitable that some individuals
will experience adverse events, sometimes serious, life-altering, or life-threatening. This is true
for practically any pharmaceutical product and COVID-19 vaccines are no exception. Since
vaccines are an important tool to protect public health, it is imperative to preserve the public’s
trust in vaccination, and therefore compensating for these rare but inevitable harms is of vital
importance. Conversely, limiting the liability of manufacturers also promotes the expeditious
development of new and innovative vaccine technology which saves lives.

Furthermore, the modern American legal system has long provided tools for proper
compensation for injuries of all types. While this type of litigation is often misunderstood and
sometimes abused, the system provides a crucial tool for people who have suffered harm to be
made whole financially, emotionally, and otherwise. Vaccine injuries are no exception, and
therefore modern societies have an obligation to ensure that there are proper systems in place to
provide accountability, justice, and financial support for those who experience an injury
attributable to a vaccination.

In pursuit of these goals, Congress created the VICP as part of the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. 1417 VICP covers all vaccines which are recommended for routine
administration to children and/or pregnant women by the CDC. 1418 This list currently consists of
16 individual vaccines. 1419 VICP allows individuals to file a petition for compensation, and these
petitions are then adjudicated by the Office of Special Masters [hereinafter “OSM”] which falls
within the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 1420 Awards are paid out from the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Trust Fund which gets its funding from a $0.75 excise tax on each covered
vaccine dose. 1421

In 2005, Congress passed the PREP Act which contains provisions designed to promote
the rapid development of vaccines in the case of a public health emergency, including the
CICP. 1422 The CICP has a more limited scope than the VICP and provides compensation only for
“covered countermeasures,” including vaccines. 1423 Because the COVID-19 vaccines were
purchased and distributed by the federal government under PREP Act authority, any serious
injuries caused by them are compensated via CICP rather than VICP. The PREP Act also limits

1417
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.
1418
Comparison of Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) to the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (VICP), HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., available at
https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicp-vicp.
1419
Id.
1420
Hannah-Alise Rogers, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., IF 12213, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
and the Office of Special Masters (Sept. 14, 2022).
1421
Id.
1422
42 U.S.C. § 247-6d(a)–(b).
1423
Countermeasure Injury Compensation Program (CICP), HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN. available at
https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp.

Page 357 of 520

 COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $1,033
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $12,403
COVID-19 Vaccine Anaphylaxis $2,020
COVID-19 Vaccine Myopericarditis $3,958
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $4,919
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $1,900
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $4,934
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $5,392
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $370,376
COVID-19 Vaccine Syncope $4,493
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $1,171
COVID-19 Vaccine Myocarditis $1,161
COVD-19 Vaccine Guillain-Barre $3,546
Syndrome

As indicated above, claims made under VICP are adjudicated via a judicial process in the
US Court of Federal Claims. Meanwhile, claims made under the CICP are adjudicated by an
administrative process that is managed by HRSA. The details of each CICP decision are not
made public which means that the rationale of each case’s compensation award or decision are
indiscernible to the public and to other claimants in the program. This opacity means that the
rationale of each case’s compensation award or decision are indiscernible to the public and to
other claimants in the program. For example, the CICP’s rationale to award $370,376 for one
myocarditis claim but $1,033 for another is unclear. While it is likely that the higher award was
for a death claim, that is not explicitly noted, nor is it clear how that number was determined
when the maximum award for a death claim is $437,503 for fiscal year 2024. 1429

The nature of CICP being a HRSA administrative process also means that all decision-
making authority ultimately lies with the HHS Secretary. Meanwhile, HHS acts as a fervent
promotor of vaccines in general, including the COVID-19 vaccine. This situation calls into
question whether countermeasures which were mandated by the government can be fairly
adjudicated by an executive branch agency that is inexorably connected to such vaccine policy.
This arrangement poses an apparent conflict of interest and may undermine public trust in the
compensation process and in vaccines broadly.

The Select Subcommittee heard from several claimants to CICP who shared their
personal experiences with the program. Mr. Cody Flint, a commercial agriculture pilot from
Mississippi, explained how he experienced a severe adverse reaction to the Pfizer COVID-19
vaccine within 30 minutes of receiving it in February 2021. Mr. Flint was diagnosed with left

1429
Countermeasure Injury Compensation Program, Request for Benefits Form Instructions (last updated Apr. 23,
2023) available at https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/cicp/cicp-request-form-instructions.pdf; Benefits by
the Year, Public Safety Officers Benefits Program available at https://bja.ojp.gov/program/psob/resources/benefits-
by-
year#:~:text=Contact%20Us&text=The%20amount%20of%20the%20PSOB,October%201%2C%202023%20is%20
%241%2C488.00 (PSOB indicates the FY2024 maximum is $473,503).

Page 360 of 520

and right perilymphatic fistulas due to increased intracranial pressure and was unable to working
as a pilot as a result. 1430

Mr. Flint submitted a claim to CICP in April 2021 and did not receive any
communication until Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-M.S.) brought up his case to HHS Secretary
Becerra during a Senate Appropriations Committee hearing on May 4, 2022. 1431 Two weeks after
the hearing, Mr. Flint received a denial letter for his claim. 1432 The denial letter from HRSA
indicated that CICP was not aware of any links between the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine and
intracranial pressure. 1433 Mr. Flint immediately submitted a reconsideration package which
included a letter from his surgeon, but he received another denial letter a few months later.
Unfortunately, unlike the VICP, the CICP’s design does not permit judicial appeal. 1434
Therefore, individuals like Mr. Flint have little recourse if their claim is denied.

This is just one example, but many other people’s experiences tell a similar story – that
the program does not appear to be working sufficiently to achieve its aims. According to Ms.
Renée Gentry, director of The George Washington University’s Vaccine Injury Litigation Clinic
who has represented numerous claimants, CICP provides “little more than the right to file and
lose.” 1435 If the government wishes to absolve manufacturers of liability and take over the role
that the courts would typically provide, then it must facilitate a fair and robust process.

FINDING: The Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program Failed to Handle a Mass-

Vaccination Program.

The CICP was created to provide compensation benefits for injuries associated with
countermeasures deployed to combat a public health emergency or security threat. While the
U.S. certainly confronted serious public health threats before, the COVID-19 pandemic was a
once-in-a-generation event that brought unprecedented challenges to many public health
institutions and systems. Unfortunately, CICP appears to not be designed to handle compensation
for a countermeasure which was as widely distributed as the COVID-19 vaccine.

As of August 1, 2024, the total number of claims ever filed to CICP is 13,920, and
COVID-19 claims account for 13,356—more than 97 percent of the total. On February 15, 2024,
CDR Reed Grimes testified about the challenges facing the program. CDR Grimes specifically
noted this immense uptick in caseload in his opening statement.

CDR George Reed Grimes (February 15, 2024)

1430
Cody Flint Letter (in possession of the Select Subcommittee)
1431
A Review of the President’s FY 2023 Funding Request and Budget Justification for the Dep’t of Health and
Human Services: Hearing Before U.S. Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 117th Cong. 2 (May 4, 2022).
1432
Cody Flint Letter (in possession of Select Subcommittee)
1433
Id.
1434
Comparison of Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) to the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (VICP), HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN.
1435
Renée Gentry written testimony, VAERS Part II hearing, March 21, 2024.

Page 361 of 520

 While injuries are rare and these claims represent a small fraction of the
approximately 676 million total COVID-19 vaccines that have been
administered in the United States, the current caseload is of a different order
than the previous volume of claims in the Program given the scale of the
utilization of COVID-19 covered countermeasures. 1436

Congresswoman Miller-Meeks questioned CDR Grimes about the cause of the backlog.
CDR Grimes testified that the backlog was because the CICP only had four staff when the
pandemic began.

CDR George Reed Grimes (February 15, 2024)

Q. I understand that there’s a current backlog of claims in CICP by

about more than 10,000. Why is there a backlog of claims for the
COVID–19 vaccines?

A. Thank you for that question. So, at the beginning of the COVID–19
pandemic, we had not had a direct appropriation with the CICP. We
also had only four staff. When we received our first direct
appropriation in Fiscal Year 2022, we were able to ramp up quickly,
and now we have over 35 staff who are assisting to adjudicate
claims. 1437

HRSA’s updated figures indicate that as of August 1, 2024, there are 10,226 claims
pending or under review. 1438 With the staff increased to 35, CDR Grimes testified that the
number of claims resolved each month increased from an average of zero per month to an
average of more than 90 per month:

CDR George Reed Grimes (February 15, 2024)

We’ve also implemented other key process improvements to resolve claims

at a faster rate. In 2023, we averaged more than 90 claims resolved each
month, which is up from zero per month the year before I started in this
role. 1439

However, even with this increased rate, the current backlog would take nearly a decade to
eliminate without accounting for any new claims. 1440 It therefore appears that more must be done
to streamline the process to ensure timely decisions. CDR Grimes additionally testified about
CICP’s efforts to establish an Injury Table for COVID-19 vaccines, which he argued would
allow for a streamlined claims review process:

1436
Commander Grimes written testimony, VAERS Part 1 hearing, February 15, 2024.
1437
VAERS Part 1 hearing, February 15, 2024, page 35 of transcript
1438
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP) Data: Aggregate, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 1, 2024) available at https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/cicp-data.
1439
VAERS Part 1 hearing, February 15, 2024, Grimes opening statement, page 9 of transcript
1440
10,226 claims pending review / 90 per month = 113.6 months (Staff math)

Page 362 of 520

 CDR George Reed Grimes (February 15, 2024)

The CICP is also in the process of establishing an injury table for COVID–
19 vaccine injuries that are presumed to be directly caused by a covered
countermeasure. In order to establish this table, HHS must meet the high
evidence standards set by Congress. The injury table is another tool that will
allow us to streamline the claims review process and more expeditiously
address requests. 1441

This will be an important step toward improving efficiency. For claimants whose injuries
appear on the injury table and were sustained within the relevant time window, CICP will
automatically assume the injury was the direct result of the countermeasure. 1442 Whereas, for
non-table injuries, the claimant must prove that the injury was a “direct result” of the
countermeasure, based on “compelling, reliable, medical and scientific evidence.” 1443 Thus, non-
table injuries are significantly more complicated and time consuming to adjudicate, and act as
yet another barrier to compensation for claimants.

As of September 12, 2024, it appears that HRSA has not established an injury table for
COVID-19 countermeasures. 1444 Yet, since at least June 2021, the federal government
acknowledges some conditions, such as Myocarditis, as known side effects of COVID-19
vaccines. 1445

FINDING: A Robust and Transparent Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Is Necessary for
Promoting Trust in Vaccines.

Regardless of any claims that COVID-19 vaccines are particularly dangerous, it appears
that the federal government mandated them without an adequate system in place to adjudicate the
inevitable injuries they cause. This may have significant effects on the trust of the public and
damage confidence in vaccines. A June 2022 Politico article discussed how efforts in Congress
to reform the “overwhelmed” system had failed so-far and highlighted the fact that this could
fuel vaccine hesitancy. 1446 According to Dr. Renée Gentry, “the cost of [CICP’s] failing will be
like throwing kerosene on the antivax fire.” 1447

Dr. Woodcock agreed that adequate vaccine injury compensation is important,

particularly in promoting confidence in vaccines:

1441
Assessing America’s Vaccine Safety Systems, Part 1, February 15, 2024, transcript page 13, Grimes opening
statement
1442
Kevin J. Hickey, et al., Cong. Research Servs., R46982, Compensation for COVID-19 Vaccine Injuries (Updated
Mar. 31, 2023).
1443
Id.
1444
CICP aggregate data
1445
Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., CDC safety group says there’s a likely link between rare heart inflammation in young
people after Covid shot, CNBC (June 23, 2021).
1446
Lauren Gardner, Vaccine injury compensation programs overwhelmed as congressional reform languishes,
POLITICO, (June 1, 2022).
1447
Id.

Page 363 of 520

 Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. [D]o you agree that adequate and comprehensive compensation for

individuals who experience rare but serious adverse events relating
to vaccines is an important element of promoting confidence in
vaccines?

A. I agree with that.

Q. Would you care to elaborate on why that is?

A. Because any medical intervention will cause some harm as well as

some as well as major benefit. So the statutes say safe and effective,
but safe really means relative to the magnitude of the benefit, not
without any harm. So people who are taking vaccines are not only
protecting themselves but doing it to protect others, and so forth.
And my understanding is the Vaccine Incentive Compensation Act
was passed in order to recognize that people can be harmed and to
adequately compensate them and protect them. 1448

On March 21, 2024, Dr. Gentry testified that the success of America’s immunization
programs relies on public confidence in vaccines.

Dr. Renee Gentry (March 21, 2024)

A critical part of vaccine confidence is ensuring that those rare individuals

who are injured by vaccines have a reasonable and effective forum in which
to make their claims. 1449

To properly prepare for a future pandemic, it is critical that the federal government and
public health officials foster trust in vaccines. No matter how safe a vaccine may be, trust cannot
be adequately fostered without efficient and transparent compensation systems. Therefore, it
appears that significant reform may be necessary.

FINDING: Debating or Discussing Vaccine Injury Compensation Is Not “Anti-Vax,” and

Implications Otherwise Are Counterproductive to Protecting Public Health.

It is paradoxical to imply that the vaccine injured are “anti-vax” since a person must be
vaccinated to experience a serious adverse event. This fact was well defined by Dr. Gentry:

Dr. Renee Gentry (March 21, 2024)

1448
Woodcock TI, Page 127-128,
1449
Assessing America’s Vaccine Safety Systems, Part II, March 21, 2024, Gentry opening statement

Page 364 of 520

 [I]t is critical to distinguish the vaccine injured from the anti-vax. All of my
clients were vaccinated. They suffered real and often catastrophic injuries
that are supported by medical and scientific literature and expert
opinion. 1450

Dr. Gentry also argued that it is counterproductive to their goals for pro-vaccine
advocates to use such pejoratives when discussing vaccine injury compensation, as it bolsters
vaccine hesitancy.

Dr. Renee Gentry (March 21, 2024)

The well-meaning, the often dismissive and critical comments of the pro-
vaccine side directed at those individuals asserting vaccine injury also
creates and bolsters vaccine hesitancy in those individuals who were
previously vaccinated and are pro-vaccine. The vaccine injured that I and
my colleagues represent are not anti-vax. 1451

This divisive language was a critical misstep of the COVID-19 vaccination campaign
which alienated and dismissed people who had experienced rare but life-altering adverse
reactions to the vaccine.

1450
Assessing America’s Vaccine Safety Systems, Part II, March 21, 2024, Gentry opening statement
1451
Assessing America’s Vaccine Safety Systems, Part II, March 21, 2024, Gentry opening statement

Page 365 of 520

VIII. The Erosion of the Doctor-Patient Relationship During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Available data show the relationship between a physician and their patient is a key
element to providing high quality care. 1452 A doctor knowing their patient and the nuance of the
patient’s medical history has extraordinary value. It allows the doctor to make informed
decisions about patient care and more accurate diagnoses. This relationship is also essential in
ensuring mutual trust and respect. Similarly, doctors must have the ability to seize upon the value
of this relationship and make critical decisions, without outside interference.

In a 2006 legal opinion, an Illinois court defined the doctor-patient relationship as “a

consensual relationship in which the patient knowingly seeks the physician’s assistance and in
which the physician knowingly accepts the person as a patient.” 1453 However, this legalistic
definition does little to properly explain what is so powerful and important about this dynamic.
According to the American Medical Association [hereinafter “AMA”] code of ethics, this
relationship is described as:

The practice of medicine, and its embodiment in the clinical encounter

between a patient and a physician, is fundamentally a moral activity that
arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate suffering. The
relationship between a patient and a physician is based on trust, which gives
rise to physicians’ ethical responsibility to place patients’ welfare above the
physician’s own self-interest or obligations to others, to use sound medical
judgment on patients’ behalf, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare. 1454

A paper published in 2015 titled Impact of the Doctor-Patient Relationship identified the
four elements that form the doctor-patient relationship as trust, knowledge, regard, and
loyalty. 1455 The paper notes some of the powerful benefits a strong relationship can yield,
including that “a physician’s knowledge of the patient’s ailments and emotional state is
associated positively with whether or not those physical ailments resolve.” The paper’s
conclusion was as follows:

As our vignettes intended to illustrate, the doctor-patient relationship is a

powerful part of a doctor’s visit and can alter health outcomes for patients.
Therefore, it is important for physicians to recognize when the relationship
is challenged or failing. If the relationship is challenged or failing,
physicians should be able to recognize the causes for the disruption in the
relationship and implement solutions to improve care. 1456

Since a doctor’s direct relationship with their patient is such a significant aspect of health
care delivery, it is therefore important that health care policies and systems prioritize and

1452
R. Henry Olaisen, et al., Assessing the Longitudinal Impact of Physician-Patient Relationship on Functional
Health, ANNALS OF FAMILY MEDICINE (Sept. 18, 2020).
1453
QT, Inc. v. Jacksonville, No. 05 C 6387 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2006).
1454
American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 1.1.1, Patient-Physician Relationships.
1455
Fallon E. Chipidza, et al., Impact of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, PUBMED CENTRAL (Oct. 22, 2015).
1456
Id.

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preserve this relationship. As the American health care system continues to evolve to confront
new challenges and utilize new technologies, it is ever important that we consider the human-to-
human element and its direct link with positive health outcomes. This was a component of the
global response to COVID-19 that was tragically ignored in favor of short-sighted one-size-fits-
all solutions.

FINDING: Pandemic-Era Policy Often Disregarded or Outright Violated the Sanctity of the
Doctor-Patient Relationship.

Some of the most consequential decisions of the COVID-19 pandemic were surrounding
COVID-19 vaccines. Unfortunately, government policy on this front violated the sanctity of the
doctor-patient relationship and may have permanent consequences. One glaring example is the
fact that hundreds of millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines were distributed under a
regulatory arrangement that did not ensure the same standards of informed consent that fully
approved drugs are subject to.

Generally, informed consent is “the process in which a health care provider educates a
patient about the risks, benefits, and alternatives of a given procedure or intervention.” 1457 The
American Medical Association (AMA) states “the process of informed consent occurs when
communication between a patient and a physician results in the patient’s authorization or
agreement to undergo a specific medical intervention.” 1458 The FDA’s guidance documents
indicate that informed consent “is not required for administration or use of an EUA product.” 1459
During a transcribed interview conducted by Select Subcommittee staff, Dr. Woodcock readily
admitted this fact:

Dr. Janet Woodcock (May 13, 2024)

Q. Does an EUA necessitate informed consent from individuals?

A. My understanding is it does not. 1460

Dr. Woodcock testified that instead of the typical legal documents, there were
“information sheets” given out for COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics which “spelled
out…what the parameters were.” 1461 The CDC produces Vaccine Information Statements
[hereinafter “VIS”] which Federal law requires healthcare staff provide to a patient, parent, or
legal representative before each dose of certain vaccines. 1462 Because COVID-19 vaccines are

1457
Parth Shah, et al., Informed Consent, STATPEARLS (Oct. 15, 2024).
1458
American Medical Association, Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.1.1, Informed Consent.
1459
Guidance Document: Emergency Use Authorization of Medical Products and Related Authorities, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2017).
1460
Woodcock TI, at 871-873.
1461
Woodcock TI, at 37.
1462
Vaccines & Immunizations, Ctrs. For Disease Control and Prevention, available at
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/about-vis/?CDC_AAref_Val=https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/about/facts-
vis.html.

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not covered under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, healthcare staff are not required to
provide VISs before administering COVID-19 vaccines. 1463

Additionally, during the pandemic, vaccines were often administered at pharmacies rather
than in a doctor’s office or hospital. In August 2020, HHS issued an amendment to the PREP Act
declaration which permitted State-licensed pharmacists to administer vaccines under certain
circumstances. 1464 A January 2023 report on trends in vaccine administration found that “across
all vaccines for adults in-scope, a large majority off the administration took place at the
pharmacy level compared to a non-pharmacy medical setting…” 1465 This report did not factor in
locations where claims wouldn’t be generated, including mass vaccination centers which
administered a significant share of COVID-19 vaccine doses early in the rollout.

While these flexibilities were ostensibly put in place to increase access to vaccines, they
may have also served to further erode the role of doctors in these important medical decisions.
Following HHS’ August 2020 amendment, representatives of the AMA publicly urged HHS to
“reconsider the negative health repercussions of funneling children away from their primary care
physicians and rescind this declaration.” 1466

Worse, mandatory vaccination policies represented a direct assault on the doctor-patient

relationship. Vaccine mandates may be the most salient example of pandemic-era policies where
governments and other political entities inserted themselves in a decision that should be between
each patient and their doctor. This is inherently incompatible with the definition of the doctor-
patient relationship.

The COVID-19 vaccine mandates also largely ignored the notion of naturally acquired
immunity. By the standard of most COVID-19 vaccine mandates, there was no exception made
for those who had previously contracted the virus. The mandates also left no room for women
who were pregnant or trying to get pregnant. If left up to doctors, who are familiar with their
patients and their health, individual patient risk and benefit could have been much better
assessed. During the Select Subcommittee’s July 27, 2023 hearing on vaccine mandates,
Chairman Wenstrup shared his own experience dealing with this one-size-fits-all approach:

Chairman Brad Wenstrup (July 27, 2023)

I got vaccinated, Pfizer, both doses. Six months later, I got COVID. The
only reason I knew is I couldn’t smell garlic salt. I was told I needed a
booster to travel. I said I would like to check my T-cells and antibodies. The
lab here couldn’t do the T-cells. I got my antibodies. Strong number was
40. My number was 821. Should I get a booster? That is a legitimate
question. I don’t want a hyperimmune response. 1467

1463
Id.
1464
Notice, Third Amendment to Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for
Medical Countermeasures Against COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Aug. 24, 2020).
1465
Trends in Vaccine Administration in the United States, THE IQVIA INSTITUTE (Jan. 13, 2023).
1466
Andis Robeznieks, AMA opposes HHS move to expand pharmacists’ scope of practice, AMA (Aug. 24, 2020).
1467
Vaccine Mandates Hearing Transcript Page 42

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 Relatedly, some pandemic policies also created intense political pressure for doctors to
toe the line and recommend COVID-19 vaccines and boosters regardless of whether they
believed the evidence supported such a recommendation. Doctors saw colleagues who spoke out
being ridiculed and silenced and many likely chose to keep their own dissent to themselves. 1468
Some medical boards and state governments took things even further and pursued legal and
administrative action against doctors who were perceived to be purveying misinformation. 1469

Dr. Azadeh Khatibi testified during the Select Subcommittee’s September 14, 2023
hearing about the rigid anti-free speech policies which were imposed on medical providers in
California during the pandemic. 1470 One such example was a California law signed by Governor
Gavin Newsom in August 2022 which declared it to be “unprofessional conduct” for doctors to
disseminate misinformation or disinformation about COVID-19, which was state-defined as
“contradicted by contemporary scientific consensus contrary to the standard of care.” 1471 Dr.
Khatibi testified that, as a doctor in California, she believed that scientific consensus is “always
behind the cutting edge” which is why doctors have historically “had liberty to contradict
consensus opinion.” 1472 California eventually repealed this law in October 2023 after mounting
legal pressure, however significant damage had already been done. 1473

Vaccine mandates were not only ineffective, but they were also harmful. As was
established during the Select Subcommittee’s July 2023 hearing on the subject, vaccine
mandates caused significant collateral damage. 1474 A BMJ paper from May 2022 titled The
unintended consequences of COVID-19 vaccine policy: why mandates, passports and
restrictions may cause more harm than good found that COVID-19 vaccine mandates caused
significant collateral damage. The paper’s summary stated:

Our analysis strongly suggests that mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policies

have had damaging effects on public trust, vaccine confidence, political
polarization, human rights, inequities and social wellbeing. We question the
effectiveness and consequences of coercive vaccination policy in pandemic
response and urge the public health community and policymakers to return
to non-discriminatory, trust-based public health approaches. 1475

1468
Timothy Bella, A vaccine scientist’s discredited claims have bolstered a movement of misinformation, THE
WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2022).
1469
Alicia Ault, ABIM Revokes Certification for Two Physicians Accused of COVID Misinformation, MEDSCAPE
(Aug. 15, 2024).
1470
Oh Doctor, Where Art Thou? Pandemic Erosion of the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Hearing Before Select
Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. 1 (Sept. 14, 2023).
1471
Steven Lee Myers, California Approves Bill to Punish Doctors Who Spread False Information, THE N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2022).
1472
Oh Doctor, Where Art Thou? Supra note 18.
1473
Sean Salai, California repeals COVID misinformation law, bowing to legal pressure, The Wash. Times (Oct. 2,
2023).
1474
Because I Said So: Examining the Science and Impact of COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates: Hearing Before Select
Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. 1 (July 27, 2023).
1475
Kevin Bardosh, et al., The unintended consequences of COVID-19 vaccine policy: why mandates, passports and
restrictions may cause more harm than good, BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH, (May 25, 2022).

Page 369 of 520

 The paper also asserts that these vaccine mandates may “be in tension with” bioethical
principles:

Denying individuals education, livelihoods, medical care or social life

unless they get vaccinated—especially in light of the limitation with current
vaccines—is arguably in tension with constitutional and bioethical
principles, especially in liberal democracies. While public support
consolidated behind these policies in many countries, we should
acknowledge that ethical frameworks were designed to ensure that rights
and liberties are respected even during public health emergencies. 1476

During the Select Subcommittee’s hearing on September 14, 2024, Dr. Jeffrey Singer—a
surgeon who has written about medical ethics—testified that vaccine mandates hindered trust
and undermined the doctor-patient relationship:

Dr. Jeffrey Singer (September 14, 2024)

Q. Finally, very simply, do you feel that vaccine mandates facilitate

fracturing the patient-doctor relationship?

A. I think mandating does because, first of all, it’s a natural tendency

for people to recoil when they’re mandated even if what’s being
mandated is actually a good idea. People don’t like being told they
have to do things. And so, when you have somebody who it’s
important that they have a very trusting relationship, the doctor and
the patient, and the patient understands that they’re being compelled
to do something, I think it just undermines the relationship of trust
between the doctor and the patient. 1477

Dr. Singer published a study titled “A Hippocratic Oath for a Free Society,” wherein he
argues that doctors must always “prioritize the autonomy and rights of individual patients” and
should take an oath which declares:

I will respect the crucial scientific advances in medicine but will always
question the assumptions my profession has inherited and will judge them
in the light of the latest evidence. I will gladly share any knowledge I have
gleaned from years of research, study, and clinical experience with health
professionals in all disciplines. I will respect my patients’ autonomy,
thoroughly explain all the diagnostic possibilities and therapeutic options as
I understand them, offer my best opinion and advice from among these
options, and accept their decisions. 1478

1476
Id.
1477
Because I Said So, supra note 22, at 35.
1478
Id., (statement by Jeffrey A. Singer, M.D.)

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 When asked to expand on his study on the Hippocratic Oath, Dr. Singer testified that he
did not believe the government had the right to compel vaccination:

Dr. Jeffrey Singer (September 14, 2024)

Q. Dr. Singer, you have written about the ethical questions of COVID–
19 vaccine mandates, and you have often said, and I’m quoting at
this point, as a medical doctor, I enthusiastically endorse COVID–
19 vaccine, and you personally had been vaccinated and will
encourage others to be vaccinated. But you continued brilliantly by
saying, but I will use persuasion, not coercion. Your words. Dr.
Singer, do you believe that vaccine mandates without exemption are
incompatible with the Hippocratic oath or the tenets of the basic
doctor-patient relationship?

A. Representative Joyce, Dr. Joyce, yes, I do. I think it’s actually you
have no right to force someone to be vaccinated. Obviously, I
believe that the vaccines saved hundreds of thousands of lives, and
I got vaccinated. I got the first two shots, and I got the booster
shortly thereafter, and I’m glad I did. But my role is to recommend
to people, not to force people, not to compel people. In addition,
there are some people who have very good reasons to not be
vaccinated. They may have allergies. They may have already had
COVID, and they have natural immunity, and they are concerned
about getting a reaction to a vaccine that is of a new technology and
hadn’t been subjected to clinical trials because there was an
emergency use authorization. These are not unreasonable concerns.
I need to respect those concerns. 1479

Overall, Americans would be better served by a health care system that encouraged
patients to seek out advice of a trusted doctor regarding their individual medical history and the
risks and benefits of being vaccinated. This relationship between doctor and patient is a crucial
cornerstone of overall trust in medicine and could have helped prevent some of the anti-science
rhetoric and misinformation that erupted during the COVD-19 pandemic.

FINDING: The Use of Off-Label Prescriptions Was Unjustly Demonized and Further Eroded
the Doctor-Patient Relationship.

The COVID-19 pandemic deepened political and social divides and opened new wounds
in the public discourse. Unfortunately, health care was no exception. The onslaught of
controversy, polarization, shame, and censorship damaged the profession as well as the health
care system more broadly. One extremely common and important tool at the disposal of doctors
is prescribing an FDA-approved medication for a use which the drug is not specifically approved

1479
Id. at 34.

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for—known as “off-label use.” Studies have shown that up to 33 percent of all prescriptions in
the U.S. are for off-label uses. 1480

One reason why off-label use is so common is because of the difficulty for
pharmaceutical companies to get a drug approved by the FDA for each possible indication, dose,
patient population, etc. Thus, off-label usage of drugs is particularly important for those suffering
with diseases or ailments for which there are few or even no approved treatments, especially rare
diseases, or novel viruses.

However, during the pandemic, the off-label uses of possible treatments for COVID-19
were swiftly and systematically demonized. Doctors frequently reprimanded, threatened,
censored, or even fired by their employers for doing so. The federal government weaponized
public health agencies to promote fear surrounding drugs such as Ivermectin and
Hydroxychloroquine. Most infamously, the FDA tweeted from its official Twitter (now X)
account “You are not a horse. You are not a cow. Seriously, y’all. Stop it.” 1481

This tweet seemingly conflated the off-label prescription of Ivermectin as being the same
as humans intentionally taking the veterinary version of the drug without a doctor. In doing so,
the FDA politicized the issue, forever poisoning any future discussion about the veracity of
claims that any repurposed drugs may be effective against COVID-19. Similarly, on August 29,
2021, Dr. Fauci appeared on CNN’s State of the Union with Jake Tapper and failed to correct
Mr. Tapper’s implication that Ivermectin is only a “anti-parasite horse drug.” 1482

Dr. Anthony Fauci (August 29, 2021)

1480
Gail A. Van Norman, Off-Label Marketing of Drugs, PUBMED CENTRAL (Feb. 8, 2023).
1481
Jen Christensen, FDA settles lawsuit over ivermectin content that doctors claimed harmed their practice, CNN
(Mar. 27 2024).
1482
State of the Union, CNN (Aug. 29, 2021).

Page 372 of 520

 Q. Poison control centers are reporting that their calls are spiking in
places like Mississippi and Oklahoma because some Americans are
trying to use an anti-parasite horse drug called Ivermectin to treat
coronavirus, to prevent contracting coronavirus. What would you
tell someone who’s considering taking that drug?

A. Don’t do it. There’s no evidence whatsoever that that works, and it

could potentially have toxicity, as you just mentioned, with people
who’ve gone to poison control centers because they’ve taken the
drug at a ridiculous dose and wind up getting sick. There’s no
clinical evidence that indicates that this works. 1483

This campaign against certain off-label prescriptions, specifically Ivermectin, has also
been the subject of litigation. On September 1, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit revived a lawsuit from a group of doctors who argued their reputations were unduly
harmed by the FDA’s actions, with one of the judges writing “[t]he Doctors have plausibly
alleged that FDA’s Posts fell on the wrong side of the line between telling about and telling
to.” 1484 Ultimately, as part of a settlement, the FDA agreed to delete and not repost this tweet
(and several related social media posts) and retire the consumer update article originally posted
on March 5, 2021. 1485

During the Select Subcommittee’s September 14, 2023 hearing, Dr. Jerry Williams
testified that prescribed medications off-label many times before and during the COVID-19
pandemic, including Ivermectin and Hydroxychloroquine. 1486 He also testified that he believed
the government’s pressure campaign had made them more difficult to obtain.

Dr. Jerry Williams (September 14, 2023)

Q. Do you believe that actions taken by the FDA or other Federal

officials may have caused this?

A. Yes. Without question. 1487

In his opening statement, Dr. Williams testified how when the pandemic began, his
quiver of “arrows” to fight the virus consisted of only one—Zinc tablets from his local
pharmacy. 1488 When an in-vitro study was published in March of 2020 showing that
hydroxychloroquine may be effective in the inhibition of SARS-CoV-2, Dr. Williams began
preparing a treatment protocol for COVID-19 patients:

1483
Id.
1484
Kevin McGill, Court revives doctors’ lawsuit saying FDA overstepped its authority with anti-ivermectin
campaign, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 1, 2023).
1485
Paul Bond, FDA Settles Lawsuit over Ivermectin Social Media Posts, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2024).
1486
See generally, Doctor patient relationship hearing transcript
1487
Oh Doctor, Where Art Thou? Supra note 18, at 22.
1488
Id. at 14.

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 Dr. Jerry Williams (September 14, 2023)

We never attempted to do a publishable study. Our goal was to kill this virus
and save the next patient coming through the door. We never took a one-
size approach fits all. We treated each patient with as much of our protocol
as was appropriate and safe and our anecdotal evidence accrued.

In summary, I simply adhered to my Hippocratic oath and a basic tenet of

medicine, specifically infectious disease medicine—which the medical-
industrial complex and bureaucracy asked us to all forget—treat early to
prevent the afflicting agents, whether bacterial, viral, fungal, or protozoal
from getting a toehold.

I rolled up my sleeves and applied what I had learned, was transparent and
honest with my patients, observed carefully, followed up and documented
compulsively, adjusted when necessary, learned to unlearn, and refused that
which was antithetical to medical science. 1489

In his written statement, Dr. Williams further testified how once the EUA for
Hydroxychloroquine was revoked by the FDA and pharmacy boards began threatening
pharmacists for filling prescriptions, it became difficult to obtain off-label drugs to treat his
desperate patients. Dr. Williams testified:

Dr. Jerry Williams (September 14, 2024)

Pharmacists had always been my partners, my teammates, in rendering care

to my patients. But that changed soon as well during the pandemic when the
EUA for hydroxychloroquine was revoked by the FDA. With the
government’s misinformation campaigns, pharmacy Boards sending
threatening letters to pharmacists, some soon started refusing to fill
hydroxychloroquine prescriptions. I had the off-label discussions with my
patients.

As a child neurologist, I was used to this because many drugs are delayed
or never get FDA approval in children. All risks and benefits were discussed
and the patient made an informed decision yet pharmacists started
dishonoring the doctor-patient relationship. Pharmacy Boards in states such
as Washington and others instructed pharmacists to report doctors for
prescribing hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin for off-label use.
Pharmacists were for the first time in my career not my teammates and
partners, they were my potential adversaries. Another hurdle to cross to get
my patients the medications and care they desperately needed and
wanted. 1490

1489
Id. at 15.
1490
Id. (written testimony of Dr. Jerry Williams, M.D.).

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 During the Select Subcommittee’s September 14, 2023 hearing, Dr. Singer testified that
approaches like Dr. Williams’ are important because they are how the clinical field gains
scientific knowledge:

Dr. Jeffrey Singer (September 14, 2024)

Q. Dr. Singer, why is it important to preserve a doctor’s right to

prescribe medications off-label?

A. Well, first of all, much of clinical knowledge comes from

prescribing drugs off-label. We read in the medical literature much
of the time comparative effectiveness studies showing how different
drugs that were developed for one particular disease appear to have
a use in another disease…this is the way we gain scientific
knowledge in the clinical field. You really can’t gain knowledge
unless you try different things and report on it to your colleagues. 1491

1491
Id. at 22.

Page 375 of 520

The Economic Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Associated
Government Response on Individuals, Communities, Small Businesses, Health
Care Providers, States, and Local Government Entities

The COVID-19 pandemic had profound economic impacts across the U.S., affecting
individuals, communities, small businesses, healthcare providers, and state and local
governments.

Americans faced widespread job losses, reduced income, and financial insecurity,
particularly among low-wage workers and minorities. Government responses, including
enhanced unemployment benefits, stimulus payments, and eviction moratoriums provided
critical relief but also sparked debates about long-term economic dependency and labor
shortages.

Communities experienced disruptions in daily life, with heightened economic inequality

and strained social services. The pandemic deepened existing disparities, especially in low-
income and minority communities, where access to healthcare and financial resources was
limited.

Small businesses were hit hardest, particularly those in the retail, hospitality, and
entertainment sectors. Many faced closures or severe revenue losses. Government interventions
such as the PPP and EIDL offered lifelines, yet challenges in accessing funds and adapting to
new market conditions led to widespread permanent closures.

Healthcare providers were overwhelmed by the surge in COVID-19 cases, leading to

financial strain from increased operational costs and postponed elective procedures. Government
support included emergency funding and cutting unnecessary red tape, but the sector still faced
significant challenges, including supply shortages and staff burnout.

State and local governments faced declining tax revenues and increased demand for
public services, forcing budget cuts and layoffs. Federal aid packages provided some relief, but
the financial pressures exposed vulnerabilities in public sector funding and highlighted the need
for more sustainable fiscal policies.

Overall, the pandemic underscored the importance of preparedness, resilience, and access
to resources, with the U.S. government’s response playing a crucial role in mitigating the worst
economic impacts while also revealing areas for improvement in crisis management and support
distribution.

I. The COVID-19 Pandemic’s Impact on American Business

The COVID-19 pandemic was an unprecedented global health crisis that triggered
profound economic disruption. Businesses around the world faced severe challenges as
governments-imposed lockdowns, travel restrictions, and social distancing measures to contain
the spread of the virus. These public health responses had devastating economic consequences,
forcing millions of businesses to close temporarily or permanently. The scale of business

Page 376 of 520

closures during the COVID-19 pandemic was immense, with numerous sectors facing reduced
demand, forced shutdowns, and operational constraints. Small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), in particular, bore the brunt of the crisis, given their limited financial resources and
reduced ability to withstand prolonged periods of low or no revenue.

FINDING: Government Imposed Mandatory Lockdowns Were the Primary Cause of

Temporary and Permanent Business Closures, but Other Factors Contributed as
Well.

By the end of August 2020, industry survey data showed a staggering 163,735 U.S.
businesses closed due to the pandemic, with 60 percent (97,966) of those closures classified as
permanent. 1492 Having almost 100,000 businesses unable to reopen during the recovery phase
represents a significant portion of the U.S. business landscape. The impact of business closures
varied across sectors. The hospitality and food service industries were particularly hard-hit.
According to a National Restaurant Association report in December 2020, 17 percent of the
country’s restaurants had closed long term or permanently. 1493 Similarly, the retail industry
experienced widespread closures as foot traffic in brick-and-mortar stores plummeted due to
lockdowns and the shift to online shopping. 1494 These closures had far-reaching effects on
employment, local economies, and the overall business environment, resulting in significant
long-term consequences.

While many businesses initially hoped to reopen once restrictions were lifted, several
factors contributed to many closures becoming permanent.

One of the primary reasons for permanent closures was the extended duration of
government-mandated lockdowns. 1495 As businesses were forced to remain closed for months,
they experienced a sharp decline in revenue, while many still had to cover fixed costs such as
rent, utilities, and payroll. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, during 2020 80
percent of businesses that were subjected to mandatory government mitigation measures told
employees not to work or reduced hours compared to 54 percent of businesses that were not
subjected to government-mandated mitigation measures. 1496 Additionally, according to the Small
Business Pulse Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, 31 percent of small businesses
reported that social distancing measures significantly reduced their revenue in 2020, leading
many to furlough or lay off workers. 1497 This financial strain was particularly acute for SMEs,

1492
Anjali Sundaram, Yelp data shows 60% of business closures due to the coronavirus pandemic are now
permanent, CNBC (Sept. 16, 2020).
1493
Restaurant Industry in Free Fall; 10,000 Close in Three Months, Nat’l Restaurant Association (Dec. 7, 2020).
1494
Erin Gilliam Haije, How the Retail Industry Has Been Affected by The Global Pandemic, MOPINION (Jan. 28,
2021).
1495
See generally, Steve Cuozzo, Years after the end of COVID, NYC remains trapped in ‘Long Lockdown’, N.Y.
POST (June 22, 2024); Joe Nocera & Bethany McLean, COVID Lockdowns Were a Giant Experiment. It Was a
Failure. A key lesson of the pandemic, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Oct. 30, 2023).
1496
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., RESULTS OF THE 2020 BUSINESS RESPONSE SURVEY (2020).
1497
Jane Callen, Weekly Census Bureau Survey Provides Near-Real-Time Info on Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(May 14, 2020).

Page 377 of 520

which often lacked the cash reserves to sustain operations for an extended period without
income.

The uncertainty surrounding the pandemic further exacerbated the situation. With no
clear timeline for when restrictions would ease or when consumer demand would return, many
business owners faced difficult decisions about whether to continue operating or shut down
permanently. The lack of clarity on how long the pandemic would last made it challenging for
businesses to plan for the future or secure loans to stay afloat.

While government shutdowns played a primary role in closing businesses, the pandemic
also caused a dramatic shift in consumer behavior, with long-lasting implications for businesses
that remained open. As people stayed home to minimize their exposure to the virus, demand for
certain goods and services plummeted, while online shopping, delivery services, and remote
work gained popularity. Brick-and-mortar stores, restaurants, entertainment venues, and personal
service businesses such as salons and gyms suffered as foot traffic dried up. By mid-2020, 75
percent of U.S. consumers tried a new shopping behavior, such as purchasing from a different
brand or retailer, due to the pandemic. 1498

Many of these behavioral shifts are expected to persist post-pandemic, leaving businesses
that rely on in-person interactions—particularly small local businesses—struggling to adapt. The
acceleration of e-commerce further displaced traditional retail models, leading to the permanent
closure of numerous small businesses that could not compete with larger online platforms or
afford the necessary technological investments to pivot to digital sales. 1499

While governments around the world introduced relief packages to support businesses
during the pandemic, these measures were often insufficient to stave off permanent closures. In
the U.S., programs like PPP offered critical financial assistance to small businesses, allowing
them to retain employees and cover operational costs. However, many businesses found the aid
inadequate, especially as the pandemic persisted longer than expected. Additionally, not all
businesses were able to access financial support due to bureaucratic hurdles, eligibility criteria,
or the speed at which funds were distributed. 1500According to a compilation of government
surveys, 65 percent of “nonemployer” (very small) business owners reported that they did not
apply for PPP because they assumed they would not qualify, or the process was too
confusing. 1501

1498
Tamara Charm, et al., The great consumer shift: Ten charts that show how U.S. shopping behavior is changing,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 4, 2020).
1499
Impact of COVID Pandemic on eCommerce, Int’l Trade Administration, available at
https://www.trade.gov/impact-covid-pandemic-ecommerce (last visited Oct. 21, 2024).
1500
Alexander W. Bartik, et al., The impact of COVID-19 on small business outcomes and expectations, PNAS (July
10, 2020).
1501
Emily Garr Pacetti & Maria Thompson, Smallest Firms Reveal Barriers to Economic Inclusion: Lessons from
Pandemic Support Programs, ECONOMIC INNOVATION GROUP (Nov. 5, 2021) (Many nonemployers reported
uncertainty about the different programs and eligibility requirements, or they lacked banking relationships necessary
to secure funding. For the PPP specifically, 57 percent of nonemployer firms received the full funding amount they
sought, compared to 77 percent of employer firms. Of the 65 percent of nonemployers who did not apply for the
PPP, the most cited reasons were that the owner expected that the “business would not qualify for a loan or for loan
forgiveness” and “the program/process was too confusing.).

Page 378 of 520

 The challenges in securing financial aid, combined with ongoing expenses and uncertain
future revenue, led many business owners to make the difficult decision to close permanently.

FINDING: Business Closures Disproportionately Impacted Rural and Low-Income Areas and
Have Led to Long-Term Changes in These Areas.

While all regions faced economic challenges, the impact was not evenly distributed.
Business closures disproportionately affected rural and low-income areas, exacerbating existing
socioeconomic disparities and leaving lasting consequences.

Although businesses in urban and affluent areas also suffered during the pandemic, rural
and low-income communities faced unique vulnerabilities that made them more susceptible to
prolonged economic distress. Limited access to capital, dependence on small businesses, and
fewer alternative employment opportunities amplified the negative effects of COVID-19-related
shutdowns in these areas.

According to the Federal Reserve Board, approximately 400,000 businesses expected to

close permanently during the first year of the pandemic in the U.S., driven primarily by the
economic shock from COVID-19. 1502 While businesses across all sectors and geographies were
affected, the burden fell disproportionately on small enterprises and those located in rural and

Leland D. Crane, et al., Business Exit During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Non-Traditional Measures in Historical
1502

Context at 5, FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES (Apr. 2021).

Page 379 of 520

low-income areas as businesses in rural and low-income communities faced higher rates of
closure than their urban counterparts. 1503 A survey conducted by Main Street America found
that, by mid-2020, nearly 7.5 million small businesses in rural areas were at risk of permanent
closure, with an estimated 34 percent of small business owners in these areas predicting they
would not survive past the year. 1504

Businesses in rural and low-income areas are often more reliant on certain sectors like
agriculture, manufacturing, retail, and service industries, all of which were hard-hit by the
pandemic. A National Bureau of Economic Research [hereinafter “NBER”] report found that
rural and low-income regions were disproportionately affected by closures in hospitality, retail,
and local services, which form the backbone of many local economies. 1505

The heightened vulnerability of rural and low-income areas to business closures during
the pandemic can be attributed to several structural and economic factors.

One of the most significant challenges faced by businesses in rural and low-income
communities was limited access to financial resources. Small businesses in these areas often
lacked relationships with large banks or financial institutions, making it more difficult to secure
loans or government aid. Data from SBA reveals that businesses in wealthier, urban areas were
more likely to receive PPP loans during the pandemic than those in rural and low-income
areas. 1506 Counties with the lowest median incomes received less than half the per capita aid
compared to wealthier counties. 1507 This disparity was even more pronounced in rural areas,
where many small businesses struggled to access the application process due to lack of digital
infrastructure or access to financial advisors.

Without sufficient access to financial assistance, many small businesses in these areas
were unable to maintain operations during prolonged shutdowns. As a result, rural and low-
income communities experienced higher rates of business closures, further slowing their
economic recovery.

Rural and low-income communities are often more dependent on small, local businesses
to provide employment and essential services. In contrast to urban areas with diverse economies,
these communities tend to rely on a limited number of industries and businesses. The closures of

1503
Hanna Love & Mike Powe, Rural small businesses need local solutions to survive, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
(Dec. 1, 2020).
1504
Michael Powe & Matthew Wagner, The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Businesses, Findings from Main Street
America’s Small Business Survey, NATIONAL MAIN STREET CENTER (2020).
1505
Yoshie Sano & Sheila Mammen, Mitigating the Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Rural Low-Income
Families, J FAM ECON ISSUES (Feb. 22, 2022); Ariadna Capasso, et al., Socioeconomic predictors of COVID-19-
related health disparities among United States workers: A structural equation modeling study, PLOS GLOB. PUBLIC
HEALTH (Feb. 9, 2022).
1506
Jamie Smith Hopkins, et al., PPP loans were supposed to prioritize low-income areas during the pandemic.
They didn’t., THE CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 11, 2020).
1507
Garrett Borawski & Mark E. Schweitzer, How Well Did PPP Loans Reach Low- and Moderate-Income
Communities?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (May 27, 2021).

Page 380 of 520

key local businesses, such as grocery stores, restaurants, and manufacturing facilities, had a
ripple effect on the entire community.

Many rural and low-income areas had higher unemployment rates even before the
pandemic. The pandemic exacerbated these trends, with rural counties experiencing some of the
steepest employment declines. As local businesses closed permanently, the loss of jobs hit these
communities particularly hard, as there were fewer alternative employment options. While urban
areas were much quicker to recover jobs, rural areas have returned employment to pre-pandemic
numbers within the last year. 1508

The closure of local businesses also affected residents' access to essential services such as
healthcare, groceries, and childcare. The closure of rural grocery stores and retail outlets left
many low-income residents facing "food deserts" and longer travel times to obtain basic
necessities. 1509 This further intensified the economic hardship experienced in these communities.

The digital divide—characterized by unequal access to high-speed internet and

technology—worsened the impact of the pandemic on businesses in rural and low-income areas.
With lockdowns forcing a rapid shift to online shopping, remote work, and e-commerce, many

1508
Rural employment has returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic level, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, available at
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=108586 (last updated Feb. 21,
2024).
1509
Stacy Mitchell, Fighting Monopoly Power, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (July 2020).

Page 381 of 520

small businesses in these communities struggled to adapt. Approximately 22 percent of rural
Americans lacked access to high-speed broadband internet in 2020, compared to just 6 percent in
urban areas. 1510 This lack of digital infrastructure made it difficult for businesses in rural areas to
pivot to e-commerce or offer remote services, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Low-
income businesses, even in urban areas, also faced similar challenges due to the costs associated
with upgrading technology and infrastructure.

While larger companies and urban-based businesses were able to quickly transition to
online platforms, businesses in rural areas often lacked the resources and technical expertise to
do so. As a result, many rural and low-income businesses missed out on the surge in e-commerce
demand that occurred during the pandemic, contributing to their closure. Less than 50 percent of
rural small businesses have an online sales presence, further reducing their ability to generate
revenue during the pandemic. 1511

The closure of businesses in rural and low-income areas has deepened pre-existing
economic inequalities. Many of these regions have seen slower economic recovery compared to
wealthier urban areas, further widening the economic gap. Rural and low-income areas
experienced slower growth during the post-pandemic recovery period compared to urban
areas. 1512 According to the Economic Innovation Group [hereinafter “EIG”], nearly 50 percent of
rural counties saw slower employment recovery between 2021 and 2023, and many continue to
experience higher unemployment rates and slower business re-openings. 1513 With fewer
employment opportunities and the permanent closure of small businesses, poverty rates have
surged in rural and low-income areas.

In rural and low-income communities, small businesses are not just economic entities;
they are integral to the social and cultural fabric of the area. The loss of these businesses has had
profound effects on community cohesion and local identity. The closure of local businesses—
such as restaurants, shops, and community centers—has diminished the sense of community in
many rural and low-income areas. These businesses often served as gathering places for
residents, and their absence has left many communities feeling more isolated and fragmented.
The closures of small businesses also reduced local tax revenue, leading to cuts in public services
such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure maintenance. 1514

While some rural and low-income communities have begun to recover, the long-term
effects of business closures continue to pose significant challenges for economic revitalization.

1510
Letter from Michael Cloud, et al., Ranking Member, Subcomm. On Economic and Consumer Policy, to Jessica
Rosenworcel, Acting Chairwoman, U.S. Fed. Communications Commission (Oct. 21, 2021); Emily A. Vogels, Some
digital divides persist between rural, urban and suburban, America, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 19, 2021).
1511
Unlocking the Digital Potential of Rural America, U.S. CHAMBER TECHNOLOGY ENGAGEMENT CTR., available
at https://americaninnovators.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Unlocking-the-Digital-Potential-of-Rural-
America.pdf (Mar. 2019) (About one-third of rural small businesses sell their products and services through their
own websites and nearly 13% sell their products and services through third-party websites).
1512
Ira Regmi, How Topline Economic Indicators-like Low Unemployment-Miss Struggling Communities,
ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE (Jan. 16, 2024).
1513
August Benzow, Economic Renaissance or Fleeting Recovery? Left-Behind Counties See Boom in Jobs and
Businesses Amid Widening Divides, ECONOMIC INNOVATION GROUP (July 8, 2024).
1514
Alana Semuels, All the Way Retail’s Decline Could Hurt American Towns, THE ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017).

Page 382 of 520

Without robust investment in local businesses and infrastructure, many areas face an uphill battle
in rebuilding their economies. Economists emphasize the need for targeted investment in rural
and low-income areas to support business creation, job training, and infrastructure development.
According to a report by the Harvard Business Review, revitalizing these areas will require
greater federal and state support, including grants and loans for small businesses, improved
digital infrastructure, and policies that encourage entrepreneurship in underserved regions. 1515

The COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately impacted businesses in rural and low-

income areas, leading to higher rates of permanent closures and deeper economic distress. These
communities faced unique challenges, including limited access to financial resources,
dependence on small businesses, and a lack of digital infrastructure, all of which exacerbated the
effects of the pandemic. The economic disparities created or worsened by these closures continue
to shape the recovery process, leaving rural and low-income areas struggling to regain their
economic footing. To address these challenges, targeted investment, equitable access to financial
resources, and digital infrastructure improvements are essential

FINDING: The Lack of Supply Chain Diversity Exacerbated Economic and Business
Recovery.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed critical vulnerabilities in global supply chains,

disrupting industries and economies around the world. In the U.S., the pandemic underscored the
risks of highly concentrated and poorly diversified supply chains, leading to prolonged economic
instability, shortages of essential goods, and widespread business closures. Supporting data is
used to illustrate how these supply chain failures led to lasting consequences for American
businesses and the broader economy.

Before the pandemic, global supply chains were structured for efficiency, with a focus on
minimizing costs, maximizing profit margins, and just-in-time inventory management. However,
this focus on efficiency left many industries, especially in the U.S., vulnerable to disruptions. A
lack of geographical and supplier diversity, overreliance on single regions or countries, and
limited inventory reserves created fragile systems that could not withstand the shock of the
pandemic.

Certain sectors in the U.S. were particularly reliant on concentrated supply chains, which
contributed significantly to economic disruptions during the pandemic. The pandemic
highlighted the U.S.’s reliance on a small number of countries, particularly China and India, for
essential medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. According to the FDA, approximately 72
percent of active pharmaceutical ingredients used in U.S. drug manufacturing are sourced from

Suntae Kim & Anna Kim, Research: How Entrepreneurship Can Revitalize Local Communities, HARVARD
1515

BUSINESS Review (Jan. 17, 2022).

Page 383 of 520

overseas, primarily from China and India. 1516 When these countries imposed export restrictions,
the U.S. faced critical shortages of PPE, ventilators, and other essential medical supplies. 1517

Similarly, the automotive and electronics industries experienced severe supply chain
disruptions due to their heavy reliance on components sourced from a limited number of regions.
The semiconductor shortage, which began in 2020 and persisted into 2022, severely affected the
automotive industry. 1518 U.S. auto production reduced by 1.3 million vehicles in 2021 due to
semiconductor shortages, leading to billions in lost revenue and job cuts across the industry. 1519

The COVID-19 pandemic quickly exposed the fragility of these concentrated supply
chains, causing widespread disruptions in production and distribution. Factories in key
manufacturing regions were forced to shut down, transportation networks were disrupted, and
logistical bottlenecks arose, leading to shortages and delays across a wide range of industries.

The initial wave of COVID-19 forced factories in China, which manufactures nearly 30
percent of the world’s goods according to the World Bank, to close or reduce production. 1520
This caused immediate disruptions in the global flow of goods. Companies that relied heavily on
Chinese suppliers for components, including tech, apparel, and consumer goods industries, faced
significant production delays. The Institute for Supply Management reported in March 2020 that
nearly 75 percent of U.S. companies experienced supply chain disruptions due to the pandemic,
with more than half of those companies facing operational delays of several weeks or longer. 1521

The pandemic caused widespread disruptions to global shipping and transportation

networks, further exacerbating supply chain challenges. Port closures, a shortage of shipping
containers, and reduced air and sea freight capacity caused massive delays in the movement of
goods. By mid-2021, the cost of shipping a container from China to the U.S. had surged by more
than 400 percent, leading to increased costs for businesses and consumers alike. 1522 These delays
resulted in inventory shortages for numerous businesses, forcing many to shut down or scale
back operations due to a lack of available products.

The pandemic revealed that many U.S. companies had not diversified their supply chains
adequately, creating systemic risks for their operations. Overreliance on a few suppliers or

1516
Safeguarding Pharmaceutical Supply Chains in a Global Economy: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Health, H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 116th Cong. (Oct. 30, 2019) (Testimony of Dr. Janet Woodcock, Dir. of the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Admin.).
1517
Chrisine Ngoc Ngo & Huong Dang, COVID-19 in America: Global supply chain reconsidered, WORLD ECON
(July 26, 2022), see generally, Chad P. Bown, COVID-19: China’s exports of medical supplies provide a ray of hope,
PIIE (Marh. 26, 2020); Simon Evenett, et al., Trade policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis: Evidence
from a new data set, WORLD ECON (Mar. 15, 2021).
1518
Darin Iraj, The Ongoing Semiconductor Chip Shortage and the Sustainability of the Automotive Industry’s Profit
Boom: Outlook for 2023 and Beyond, WESLEYAN BUSINESS REVIEW (Dec. 3, 2023).
1519
Jack Ewing & Neal E. Boudette, A Tiny Part’s Big Ripple: Global Chip Shortage Hobbles the Auto Industry,
THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2021, last updated Oct. 14, 2021).
1520
China is the world’s factory, more than ever, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2021).
1521
75% of Companies See Supply Chain Distributions Due to Coronavirus, INSTITUTE FOR SUPPLY MANAGEMENT
(Apr. 14, 2020).
1522
Eric Kulisch, Are you shipping me?!? $32,000 container move from China to LA, FREIGHT WAVES (July 30,
2021).

Page 384 of 520

countries for critical components led to a concentration of risk, as disruptions in one part of the
world had far-reaching effects on entire industries.

The concentration of supply chains in a few low-cost manufacturing hubs, particularly in

Asia, made many U.S. industries vulnerable to regional disruptions. When COVID-19 shut down
factories and ports in those regions, the lack of alternative suppliers or production hubs made it
difficult for U.S. companies to pivot and find new sources of materials or components. 1523

Many companies also adopted just-in-time inventory practices, minimizing their

stockpiles to reduce costs. While this approach is efficient in stable conditions, it left businesses
with little buffer when the pandemic disrupted supply chains. With inventory depleted and
suppliers unable to deliver on time, many businesses were forced to halt operations. The National
Association of Manufacturers found that more than 78 percent of manufacturers reported
significant supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, with more than half citing just-in-time
inventory as a contributing factor. 1524

The inability to secure necessary inputs or products during the pandemic led to
widespread business closures, especially for SMEs. The lack of diversified supply chains
magnified the challenges businesses faced, as they struggled to cope with inventory shortages,
rising costs, and production delays.

SMEs were particularly vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. Unlike large

multinational corporations with diversified suppliers or the financial resources to weather the
crisis, many SMEs had limited bargaining power and fewer options for securing alternative
suppliers. SMEs accounted for nearly 60 percent of all business closures during the first year of
the pandemic. 1525 A survey by Goldman Sachs found that 88 percent of small businesses in the
U.S. reported supply chain disruptions, with more than 70 percent citing it as a major reason for
their financial difficulties. 1526

Supply chain disruptions hit the retail and manufacturing sectors particularly hard,
leading to thousands of business closures. Retailers, already grappling with reduced consumer
demand, faced additional challenges from inventory shortages. The National Retail Federation
(NRF) reported that more than 8,700 retail stores closed in 2020, driven in part by supply chain
disruptions that made it impossible to meet customer demand. 1527 The manufacturing sector also

1523
Xu Z, et al., Impacts of COVID-19 on Global Supply Chains: Facts and Perspectives, IEEE ENG’G MGMT. REV.
(Aug. 24, 2020).
1524
Press Release, Nat’l Associate of Manufactures, Manufacturers’ Third Quarter Outlook Shows Continued Supply
Chain Issues, Growing Workforce Needs and Rising Costs (Sept. 19, 2022).
1525
David Dam, et al., Many Small Businesses in the Services Sector Are Unlikely to Reopen, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y. (May 5, 2021).
1526
88% of Small Business Owners Say Inflation is Impacting Their Business, According to Bank of America Small
Business Owners Report; Despite Concerns, 64% of Entrepreneurs Anticipate Revenue Growth and Business
Expansion, BANK OF AMERICA (May 3, 2022).
1527
Melissa Minkow, Over 8,700 store closures in 2021 – What retailers should consider to stay relevant, THE
SUPPLY CHAIN (Sept. 6, 2021).

Page 385 of 520

saw significant closures, with the U.S. Census Bureau reporting that more nearly 65 percent of
U.S. manufacturers reporting supply chain disruptions in mid-2021. 1528

Supply chain disruptions also led to rising costs for raw materials and finished goods,
further squeezing businesses’ profit margins. By late 2021, prices for materials such as lumber,
steel, and plastics had surged by 20-40 percent due to supply shortages, according to the
Producer Price Index (PPI). 1529 Many businesses were unable to absorb these costs and passed
them on to consumers, reducing demand and exacerbating the financial strain on companies
already struggling with supply chain disruptions.

The failure to diversify supply chains before the pandemic not only extended the
immediate economic damage but also increased long-term vulnerabilities for U.S. businesses.
Even as the pandemic receded, supply chain disruptions continued to cause financial strain and
business closures.

One of the most significant examples of persistent supply chain disruptions is the global
semiconductor shortage, which continued to affect the automotive, electronics, and consumer
goods sectors well into 2022 and 2023. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that the
shortage cost the U.S. economy $240 billion in 2021 alone, with major automakers reporting
billions in lost revenue due to reduced production. 1530 Without a diversified semiconductor
supply chain, U.S. businesses remain vulnerable to future disruptions in chip production,
especially as demand for semiconductors continues to rise with the growth of electric vehicles
and 5G technologies.

In response to these challenges, policymakers and business leaders have called for greater
supply chain diversification to mitigate future risks. However, rebuilding and diversifying supply
chains is a long-term process, and many U.S. businesses continue to face vulnerabilities
stemming from the lack of diversified supply networks.

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the fragility of global supply chains and the dangers
of overreliance on concentrated suppliers and regions. In the U.S., the lack of diversified supply
chains exacerbated the economic impact of the pandemic, leading to widespread business
closures, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises. Supply chain disruptions not
only increased immediate economic vulnerability but also extended the long-term risks facing
American businesses. To build resilience against future crises, it is essential for U.S. companies
to invest in diversifying their supply chains, expanding domestic manufacturing capabilities, and
reducing dependence on single sources of critical inputs.

1528
Jane Callen, Census Bureau’s Small Business Pulse Survey Reveals Delays From Domestic, Foreign Suppliers,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 9, 2021).
1529
Ana Maria Santacreu & Jesse LaBelle, Supply Chain Disruptions and Inflation During COVID-19, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (May 12, 2022).
1530
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Analysis for CHIPS Act and BIA Briefing (Apr. 6, 2022).

Page 386 of 520

II. The COVID-19 Pandemic’s Impact on American Workers

The COVID-19 pandemic had a profound impact on the U.S. labor market. The rapid
spread of the virus led to widespread lockdowns, social distancing measures, and a sudden halt in
economic activity. As a result, unemployment rates in the U.S. surged to levels exceeding the
2007-09 Great Recession and not seen since the 1929-39 Great Depression. 1531

The spike in unemployment during the pandemic was largely fueled by mass lockdowns
and the subsequent abrupt closure of businesses across the country. Industries that rely heavily
on physical interaction, such as hospitality, retail, and travel, were particularly hard hit. As state
and local governments imposed lockdowns and social distancing measures to curb the spread of
the virus, many businesses were forced to shut down or operate at significantly reduced capacity,
leading to mass layoffs and furloughs. 1532

Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding the duration of the pandemic and its economic
impact led many businesses to implement hiring freezes and reduce their workforce as a
precautionary measure. Furthermore, the supply chain disruptions caused by the global nature of
the pandemic also contributed to job losses, particularly in manufacturing and other export-
dependent industries. 1533

Before analyzing unemployment during the pandemic in more detail, a brief discussion of
Federal Government actions intended to alleviate unemployment is necessary.

In response to the unprecedented economic impacts of the pandemic, the U.S.

government implemented a series of economic relief measures to support workers and
businesses. The most significant of these was the $2.2 trillion CARES Act 1534 passed in March
2020 and was amended several times. The following provisions of the CARES Act have a nexus
to alleviating unemployment.

Three Provisions Enhancing Unemployment Benefits 1535

First, FPUC provided an additional $600 per week to individuals receiving

unemployment benefits from March to July 2020. 1536 This was later reduced to $300 per week in
subsequent extensions, provided the beneficiary’s state agreed to certain conditions. Next, PUA
provided benefits to those not typically eligible for regular unemployment, such as self-

1531
See, Rakesh Kochhar, Unemployment rose higher in three months of COVID-19 than it did in two years of the
Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jun. 11, 2020) (noting peak unemployment rate of 14.4% during the
pandemic exceeded the peak unemployment of 10.6% during the Great Recession).
1532
COVID-19 ends longest employment recovery and expansion in CES history, causing unprecedented job losses
in 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (June 2021).
1533
Susan Helper & Evan Soltas, Why the Pandemic Has Disrupted Supply Chains, The White House (June 17,
2021).
1534
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) as amended through Pub. L. No. 118-47 (2024).
1535
See, “Enhanced Unemployment” at ## for a more comprehensive discussion and analysis of these provisions
1536
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 § 2104 (2020).

Page 387 of 520

employed workers, freelancers, and gig workers. 1537 PEUC 1538 extended unemployment benefits
13 weeks beyond the usual duration for those who had exhausted regular state unemployment
benefits.

Direct Payments to Households

The CARES Act also included direct stimulus payments to individuals and families, with
most Americans receiving $1,200 per adult and $500 per child. These payments were intended to
provide immediate relief to those affected by the pandemic and stimulate economic activity. First
round (March 2020): the CARES Act provided $1,200 per eligible adult and $500 per child. 1539
Second round (December 2020): the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA), 2021 provided
$600 per eligible adult and $600 per child. 1540 Third round (March 2021) the ARPA provided
$1,400 per eligible adult and $1,400 per child. 1541 More than 475 million total payments were
made through the CARES Act, CAA, and ARPA, and the total of these payments exceed $1.4
trillion dollars. 1542

Paycheck Protection Program 1543

PPP provided forgivable loans to small businesses to help them cover payroll costs and
avoid layoffs. This program indirectly benefited employees since it was intended to assist the
businesses that employed them. While the program was successful in preventing some job losses,
it faced criticism for being poorly targeted and for delays in the distribution of funds. Some
businesses, particularly those in lower income communities, struggled to access PPP loans due to
complex eligibility criteria and bureaucratic hurdles. PPP was also the target of rampant fraud,
waste, and abuse.

Employee Retention Credit [hereinafter “ERC”] 1544

1537
Id.
1538
Id.
1539
See, Id. Individuals earning less than $75,000 received a stimulus payment of $1,200; married couples earning
less than $150,000 received a payment of $2,400; and households received an additional $500 for each dependent
they claimed. The payments were reduced at higher levels of income and phased out entirely for households with
incomes above $99,000 (for single filers without children) or $198,000 (for married couples without children).
1540
Pub. L. No.116-260, 134 Stat. 1182, et seq. (2020). Eligibility criteria largely followed those for the earlier
round of stimulus, with single households eligible for the full stimulus amount up to $75,000 in income ($150,000
for married households). The stimulus amount fell at higher income levels, with childless households with incomes
up to $87,000 (or $174,000 if married filing jointly) receiving a payment.
1541
Pub. L. No.117-2, 135 Stat. 4, et seq. (2021). This plan continued to pay the full stimulus amount of $1,400 to
households earning up to $150,000, but phased the payments out more rapidly beyond that threshold than initially
proposed, so that households with incomes above $80,000 (for single filers without children) or $160,000 (for
married couples without children) received no stimulus.
1542
Update: Three rounds of stimulus checks. See how many went out and for how much, PANDEMIC OVERSIGHT,
available at https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/data-interactive-tools/data-stories/update-three-rounds-stimulus-
checks-see-how-many-went-out-and (Feb. 17, 2022) (citing Internal Revenue Service compiled data as of December
31, 2021).
1543
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 § 1102 (2020). For a more comprehensive discussion of PPP, see section ##
above.
1544
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 § 2301 (2020).

Page 388 of 520

 ERC was a broad-based refundable tax credit designed to encourage employers to keep
employees on their payroll. This program also indirectly benefited employees since it was
intended to assist the businesses that employed them. The credit is 50 percent of up to $10,000 in
wages paid by an employer whose business is fully or partially suspended because of COVID-19
or whose gross receipts decline by more than 50 percent.

Augmenting the Emergency Food Assistance Program [hereinafter “TEFAP”] 1545

The CARES Act provided an additional $450 million for TEFAP, a federally funded
program that distributes food to food banks, food pantries, soup kitchens and other facilities
serving low-income Americans.

Economic Injury Disaster Loans 1546

Small businesses, including agricultural businesses and nonprofits, could apply for low-
interest loans to help cover working capital and operating expenses. The EIDL program included
an advance of up to $10,000 that did not need to be repaid, even if the loan application was
denied. Again, this did not directly benefit unemployed persons but could indirectly benefit them
if EIDL facilitated their employer staying in business.

FINDING: Public Health Officials’ Arbitrary and Overly Broad Mitigation Measures and
Aggressive Efforts to Squash Legitimate Scientific Debate Unnecessarily
Exacerbated Unemployment.

Public health officials advised all Americans to socially distance six feet away from
others, in addition to masking, as vital protective measures essential to curbing the pandemic.
Furthermore, then-NIAID Director, White House Coronavirus Tak Force member, and the
country’s face of the pandemic, Dr. Fauci, made the decision to recommend that the President
“shut the country down.” 1547 Most states quickly operationalized this advice and mandated stay
at home orders. At some point between March to June 2020, 38 states and Washington, D.C.
mandated lockdowns, shelter in place, or other similar orders for all persons. 1548 Two states
mandated stay at home measures for persons at risk. 1549 Six issued advisory guidance, and five
states did not issue any orders or guidance. 1550

In 2024, numerous senior public health officials that promoted social distancing admit
that it lacked a scientific basis. As has been previously discussed in this report, Dr. Fauci and
other senior U.S. public health officials advised Americans to socially distance six feet apart. 1551
For example, Dr. Fauci admitted that six-foot social distancing is not supported by an underlying

1545
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 § 11001 (2020).
1546
Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 § 1101 (2020).
1547
Aristos Georgiou, Fauci Says He Told Trump to ‘Shut the Country Down’, NEWSWEEK (OCT. 7, 2020).
1548
Amanda Moreland, et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home Orders and Changes in
Population Movement – United States, March 1-May 31, 2020, MMWR (Sept. 4, 2020).
1549
Id.
1550
Id.
1551
Kevin B. O’Reilly, Dr. Fauci outlines 5 ways to blunt COVID-19 pandemic’s resurgence, JAMA (Aug. 4, 2020).

Page 389 of 520

scientific study and “sort of just appeared.” 1552 Further, Dr. Collins, testified that he was “not
involved in that conversation” at the time and “did not see evidence” at the time, nor since, that
supported six-foot social distancing. 1553

While public health officials and other medical professionals are trained to be
conservative in their recommendations and reduce health risk as much as possible, this
unsupported advice—stay at home orders and maintaining six feet of distance, which states
promptly implemented as mandates, had severe adverse impacts across society. Relevant to the
discussion here, this advice significantly exacerbated business closures and unemployment.

At its peak, total employment rates across all industries decreased by 25 percent in mid-
April 2020 from January 2020 levels and remained well below that level for two years.

While all unemployment cannot be attributed to social distancing and stay at home
orders, statistics do show it played a considerable role. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, during 2020, 80 percent of businesses that were subjected to mandatory government
mitigation measures told employees not to work or reduced hours compared to 54 percent of
businesses that were not subjected to government-mandated mitigation measures. 1554 Finally,
according to the Small Business Pulse Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, 31 percent

1552
Fauci TI 2, supra note 81, at 183-184.
1553
Collins TI, supra note 221, at 224.
1554
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., RESULTS OF THE 2020 BUSINESS RESPONSE SURVEY (2020).

Page 390 of 520

of small businesses reported that social distancing measures significantly reduced their revenue
in 2020, leading many to furlough or lay off workers. 1555

Social distancing not only restricted business operations but also led to a significant
reduction in consumer demand, which also added to unemployment. The fear of contracting the
virus, combined with government mandates, led consumers to avoid engaging in normal
economic activity. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis [hereinafter “BEA”] reported a sharp
decline in consumer spending during the early months of the pandemic, with a 6.7 percent
decrease in March 2020 and a record 13.2 percent drop in April 2020. 1556 For context, the BEA
has collected consumer spending data since 1959 and prior to the pandemic the worst monthly
decline 2.5 percent in early 1987. 1557 This decline was driven by reduced spending on services,
particularly in the sectors most affected by social distancing.

Public health officials not only made recommendations not supported by science which
had devastating impacts on employment and the overall economy, they also doubled down on
these decisions. For example, Dr. Collins’ reaction to the Great Barrington Declaration.

The Great Barrington Declaration, published in October 2020, proposed an alternative

strategy to the widespread social distancing, lockdowns, and restrictions implemented during the
COVID-19 pandemic. 1558 The primary argument is that protecting the vulnerable while allowing
others to maintain normal activities would minimize the economic fallout of the pandemic. By
keeping businesses open, maintaining consumer demand, and avoiding large-scale layoffs, the
economy might have avoided the severe contractions experienced in 2020.

The Great Barrington Declaration was one of the first publications that challenged the
scientific basis of a “one size fits all” approach to social distancing and lockdowns. Dr. Collins
called for a “quick and devastating published takedown of [the paper’s] premises.” 1559

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1555
Jane Callen, Weekly Census Bureau Survey Provides Near-Real-Time Info on Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(May 14, 2020).
1556
Emily Wavering Corcoran & Sonya Ravindranath Waddell, Income, Consumption, and the COVID-19
Pandemic, FED. RESERVE OF RICHMOND (June 18, 2020).
1557
Id.
1558
Dr. Martin Kulldorff, et al., THE GREAT BARRINGTON DECLARATION (Oct. 4, 2020).
1559
E-Mail from Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D., Dir. Nat’l Insts. of Health, to Anthony Fauci, M.D., Dir., Nat’l Inst. of
Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, et al. (Oct. 8, 2020, 2:31 PM.)

Page 391 of 520

 Dr. Collins testified that he Great Barrington Declaration was a “dangerous approach”,
and he was “looking for a response from credible experts to get that response out there quickly
before this becomes somehow a U.S. policy…” 1560

Had legitimate scientific debate been allowed to occur, alternative courses of action, such
as those proposed in the Great Barrington Declaration, may have been attempted with improved
impacts of employment and the economy. In 2023 at a Braver Angels panel, Dr. Collins
acknowledged that, during the pandemic, public health officials never really considered the
downstream impacts of aggressive public health policy and that was a mistake:

The public health people — we talked about this earlier and this really
important point — if you’re a public health person and you’re trying to
make a decision, you have this very narrow view of what the right decision
is. And that is something that will save a life; it doesn’t matter what else
happens. So you attach infinite value to stopping the disease and saving a
life. You attach zero value to whether this actually totally disrupts people’s
lives, ruins the economy, and has many kids kept out of school in a way that
they never quite recover from. So, yeah, collateral damage. This is a public
health mindset and I think a lot of us involved in trying to make those
recommendations had that mindset and that was really unfortunate. It’s
another mistake we made. 1561

Social distancing measures had significant economic consequences that exacerbated

unemployment and accelerated business closures. The data demonstrates that the reduction in
consumer demand, operational restrictions, and the long-term economic ripple effects of social
distancing contributed to one of the most severe economic downturns in recent history. As such,
while public health considerations were paramount, the economic costs of social distancing
underscore the need for a balanced approach that supports both health and economics. In other

Collins TI, supra note 221, at 242.

1560

Wesley J. Smith, Francis Collins Disappointed as Public-Health Leader, NATIONAL REVIEW (Dec. 30, 2023)
1561

(emphasis added).

Page 392 of 520

words, a more diverse voices from different disciplines (e.g., economists, industry leaders,
educators) should have been part of the discussion to ensure downstream effects of these policies
could be fully considered.

FINDING: Pandemic Unemployment Disproportionately Impacted Sectors with Lower Wage

Earners Compared to Higher Wage Earners, Such as Those in Professional
Services, and Lower Wage Earners Continue to Remain Unemployed at Higher
Rates and Will Likely Remain So Over the Next Decade.

It is not surprising that industries that necessarily involve close contact and face-to-face
interaction, suffered worse unemployment than industries that could effectively function without
close contact. For example, 70 percent of establishments in arts, entertainment, and recreation,
and food services told employees not to work at some point during the pandemic in 2020. 1562

In the figure below, the professional and business industry saw a brief 10 percent dip in
employment rates in the earliest days of the pandemic, while leisure and hospitality experienced
a nearly 60 percent plunge. Many professionals, particularly those in high-paying sectors like
technology, finance, and consulting, were able to transition to remote work with relative ease. 1563
This allowed them to maintain employment and income levels despite the economic downturn
caused by the pandemic. Lower-wage workers, especially those in service sectors such as
hospitality, retail, and food services, were and remain unable to telework and faced much higher
rates of job loss. These sectors were heavily affected by lockdowns and social distancing
measures, leading to widespread layoffs and reduced working hours. 1564

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1562
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., RESULTS OF THE 2020 BUSINESS RESPONSE SURVEY (2020).
1563
Id. (industries with the highest percentages of telework options in 2020 included educational services (60%),
finance and insurance (58%), and corporate management (54%).).
1564
Id. (Industries with largest percentage not offering telework in 2020 included accommodation and food service
(91%), agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (86%), and retail trade (75%).).

Page 393 of 520

 What is surprising, however, is, that as of June 2024, retail and transportation and leisure
and hospitality employment rates are still well under pre-pandemic levels—more than 20 percent
lower in the case of leisure and hospitality. A vast majority of retail, transportation, leisure, and
hospitality employees are lower wage earners, which is reflected in the figure below showing
that low wage earner employment rates remain 10 percent below pre-pandemic rates.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 394 of 520

 Why haven’t lower wage earners’ employment rates recovered? The answer is likely that
the conditions of the pandemic, specifically social distancing and lockdowns, greatly accelerated
trends that were emerging before the pandemic, specifically remote work, e-commerce, and
automation. 1565

While remote work was already occurring prior to 2020 for many high wage earners, the
pandemic pushed the rapid development of tools to improve teleworking, such as
teleconferencing (e.g., Microsoft TEAMS, Zoom, etc.), document sharing tools, and cloud-based
computing capacity. 1566 Remote work continues. In December 2023, nearly 35 percent of
management and professionals reported teleworking at least one day a week. 1567 Service industry
workers, who are predominately lower wage earners, only report 4 percent remote work. 1568

E-commerce grew at five times faster than before the pandemic and “[o]ther kinds of
virtual transactions such as telemedicine, online banking, and streaming entertainment have also
taken off.” 1569 This trend has only increased in the years following the pandemic, making many
retail and administrative support jobs obsolete.

1565
Susan Lund, et al., The future of work after COVID-19, at 5, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Feb. 18, 2021).
1566
Id.
1567
About 1 in 3 workers in management, professionals, and related occupations teleworked, November 2023, U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 19, 2023).
1568
Id.
1569
Susan Lund, et al., The future of work after COVID-19, at 10, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Feb. 18, 2021).

Page 395 of 520

 The pandemic caused rapid development of automation and artificial intelligence
[hereinafter “AI”]. 1570 The common feature of pandemic-driven automation technology is their
correlation to replacing human interaction and physical proximity. 1571 Two-thirds of executives
surveyed stated they intend to increase investment in automation and AI, 1572 which will
predominately take the place of lower-wage workers.

Prior to the pandemic and with relative ease, a lower wage-earning employee could move
from retail and service entry to an entry-level data entry position with little or no additional
skills, education, and training required. The trends discussed above make such a transition
unlikely because the opportunities will very likely not be there. By 2030, up to 25 percent of all
U.S. workers could need to shift to other occupations that require greater training, education, and
skills than they currently possess. 1573

1570
Id.
1571
Id.
1572
Id. at 11.
1573
Id. at 16.

Page 396 of 520

III. The Federal Reserve’s Efforts to Mitigate the Economic Impacts of the COVID-19
Pandemic

The Federal Reserve took several actions to mitigate the economic impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic.

The Federal Reserve System and its Functions

In 1913 Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act 1574 with the purpose of creating “a
safer, more flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system.” 1575 in which they rejected
having one central national bank. 1576 Instead, Congress opted for a three-feature Federal Reserve
System composed of three bodies: a central governing body of the Board of Governors, “a
decentralized operating structure” of the 12 Reserve Banks, and the FOMC consisting of all
members of the Board of Governors and the presidents of all the Reserve Banks. 1577

Congress provides oversight of the Board of Governors, 1578 whose seven members are
appointed by the President of the U.S. with the advice and consent of the Senate. 1579 The Federal
Reserve System, however, operates largely independent from the legislative and executive
branches of government. 1580

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1574
12 U.S.C. § 221 et seq.
1575
U.S. FED. RSRV. SYS., PUB. EDUC. & OUTREACH, THE FED EXPLAINED: WHAT THE CENTRAL BANK DOES, at 21
(2021).
1576
Id. at 2.
1577
Id.
1578
12 U.S.C. § 225b.
1579
12 U.S.C. § 241.
1580
See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF0054, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE FEDERAL
RESERVE 2 (2023) (“Economists have justified the Fed’s independence on the grounds that monetary policy
decisions that are insulated from short-term political pressures result in better economic outcomes.”).

Page 397 of 520

 The Federal Reserve System executes five core functions in the public interest. The
functions relevant to the COVID-19 pandemic are:

Conducting the Nation’s Monetary Policy

In a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, Congress updated the Federal
Reserve’s mandate, namely for the two decision-making bodies, the Board of Governors and the
FOMC, to specifically promote the goals of “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates.” 1581 The primary monetary policy tool the Federal Reserve uses to
implement its mandate is the federal funds rate, which is often referred to as the overnight bank
lending rate. 1582 The Federal Reserve makes policy decisions to adjust this rate to manage
financial conditions, reducing interest rates to stimulate economic activity during economic
downturns and increasing interest rates to cool an overheating economy and curb inflation.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

12 U.S.C. § 225a.
1581

MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF0054, INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE FEDERAL RESERVE 1
1582

(2023).

Page 398 of 520

 In addition to adjusting the federal funds rate, the Federal Reserve uses open market
operations as a tool to implement monetary policy. 1583 This occurs when the FOMC directs the
Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to permanently or temporarily buy
or sell government securities in the open market to influence the supply of money by increasing
or decreasing reserves in the banking system, respectively. 1584 These operations also help control
short-term interest rates and the amount of money in circulation.

Beyond adjusting the short-term interest rates and open market operations, the Federal
Reserve will use quantitative easing [hereinafter “QE”] as a monetary policy tool to stimulate the
economy when traditional methods, such as lowering short-term interest rates, become
ineffective—usually during periods of very low or near-zero interest rates. 1585 QE involves the
large-scale purchase of financial assets by the Federal Reserve, particularly government
securities like U.S. Treasury bonds, as well as mortgage-backed securities [hereinafter “MBS”].
The goal is to inject liquidity into the economy, lower long-term interest rates, and encourage
lending and investment. 1586 When the Federal Reserve, purchases large quantities of government
and mortgage-backed securities from banks and other financial institutions, it increases the
demand for these securities, which in turn raises their prices and lowers their yields (interest
rates). QE sends a powerful message to financial markets that the Federal Reserve is committed
to support the economy, which also boosts confidence among investors, businesses, and
consumers. 1587

Finally, the Federal Reserve also uses a tool referred to as ‘forward guidance” to conduct
monetary policy. Forward guidance is a communication tool used by central banks, including the
Federal Reserve, to provide information to the public and financial markets about the future path
of monetary policy, particularly interest rates. 1588 The goal of forward guidance is to influence
expectations and behavior by giving clear indications of what the central bank plans to do in the
future, which can help stabilize the economy and achieve policy objectives like price stability

1583
U.S. FED. RSRV. SYS., PUB. EDUC. & OUTREACH, THE FED EXPLAINED: WHAT THE CENTRAL BANK DOES (2021),
AT 36.
1584
Id.
1585
Anna-Louise Jackson, Quantitative Easing Explained, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2024, at 1.
1586
Id.
1587
Id.
1588
PUB. EDUC. & OUTREACH, THE FED EXPLAINED: WHAT THE CENTRAL BANK DOES, U.S. FED. RSRV. SYS., at 32
(2021).

Page 399 of 520

and full employment. 1589 During economic crises, such as the 2008 financial crisis or the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Fed has used forward guidance to reassure markets and the public that
it would maintain accommodative policies (e.g., low interest rates) to support economic
recovery.

Maintaining Stability of the Financial System

“A financial system is considered stable when financial institutions—banks, savings and

loans, and other financial product and service providers—and financial markets are able to
provide households, communities, and businesses with the resources, services, and products they
need to invest, grow, and participate in a well-functioning economy.” 1590 In other words, a stable
financial system effectively links individual and institutional savers and lenders with borrowers
and spenders.

The Federal Reserve monitors the financial system for signs of instability, such as
excessive risk-taking, asset bubbles, or emerging vulnerabilities. 1591 By identifying and
addressing potential threats early, the Federal Reserve can take preventive measures to avert
financial crises.

1589
U.S. FED. RSRV. SYS., PUB. EDUC. & OUTREACH, THE FED EXPLAINED: WHAT THE CENTRAL BANK DOES (2021),
AT 32.
1590
Id.
1591
Id. at 50.

Page 400 of 520

 By providing emergency liquidity to financial institutions facing short-term funding
problems, the Federal Reserve helps maintain confidence in the financial system and prevents the
failure of institutions that are otherwise solvent. 1592 The main mechanism through which the
Federal Reserve acts as a lender of last resort is the discount window. 1593 Banks and other
eligible financial institutions can borrow money from the Federal Reserve’s discount window
when they cannot obtain sufficient liquidity from other sources, such as the interbank lending
market. 1594 These loans are typically short-term and are collateralized by high-quality assets held
by the borrowing institution. 1595

In times of “unusual or exigent circumstances,” the Federal Reserve is authorized to

provide liquidity to non-depository institutions under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act. 1596 A primary way in which the Federal Reserve operationalizes this authority is the creation
of lending facilities to support overall market liquidity. It is rare for the Federal Reserve to use
this authority, but it did use it during the 2007–09 financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic to
prevent harm to the U.S. economy. 1597 Under amendments enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act,
emergency lending programs under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act must be broad-
based and not designed to support a single institution, among other requirements. 1598 In addition,
Congress requires that the Federal Reserve ensure that taxpayers are protected against losses
through not bailout insolvent institutions and collateral requirements. 1599 Consistent with this,
actions taken under section 13(3) authority are taken with the approval of the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Treasury. 1600 The Dodd-Frank Act amendments allow the Federal Reserve to
disclose details of emergency lending programs, including the names of borrowers, the amounts
borrowed, and the terms of the loans to Congress. 1601 This transparency is intended to increase
public accountability for the Federal Reserve’s emergency actions.

Supervising and Regulating Financial Institutions

The Federal Reserve supervises and regulates banks to ensure they operate safely and
soundly. This involves regular examinations, monitoring financial conditions, and enforcing
regulatory requirements to mitigate risks that could threaten the stability of the financial system.

1592
See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING 15
(2020) (noting that the Federal Reserve is not authorized to act as a lender of last resort to insolvent firms and
discussing the debate of whether the four “too big to fail” banks were actually insolvent at the time of the Federal
Reserve’s intervention during the 2007-09 financial crisis).
1593
Id.
1594
The Discount Window, THE FED. RSRV. DISC. WINDOW PAYMENT SYS. RISK, available at
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Pages/General-Information/The-Discount-
Window#:~:text=Most%20performing%20or%20investment%20grade,to%20secure%20Discount%20Window%20l
oans (June 7, 2024).
1595
Id.
1596
12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A).
1597
MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING 6-7 (2020).
1598
12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A).
1599
12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(B)(ii).
1600
12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(B)(iv).
1601
12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(C).

Page 401 of 520

 Most notably, the Federal Reserve conducts stress tests on large financial institutions to
assess their ability to withstand severe economic shocks. These tests help ensure that banks have
adequate capital to continue lending during crises. These stress tests are mandated by the Dodd-
Frank-Act, enacted in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The Federal Reserve engages in other
supervisory and regulatory activities, but further explanation of those activities is not necessary
to assess the Federal Reserve’s actions in response to the pandemic.

Summary of Federal Reserve’s Major Actions During the Pandemic

The Federal Reserve's aggressive and unprecedented response to the COVID-19

pandemic involved using all monetary policy tools available to it. These actions were essential in
preventing a more severe economic downturn, though they also may have set new precedents for
the Federal Reserve's role in future crises.

January – February 2020: Early Monitoring and Initial Posture

January 2020: The Federal Reserve began monitoring the emerging COVID-19 outbreak,
assessing potential risks to the U.S. economy. During this period, it
maintained its monetary policy stance, with no immediate changes to
interest rates. 1602

February 28, 2020: In response to increasing concerns about the economic impact of COVID-
19, Chair Jerome Powell issued a statement indicating that the central
bank was prepared to "use our tools and act as appropriate to support the
economy." 1603

March 2020: Federal Reserve takes Several Monetary Policy Actions

March 3, 2020: The Federal Reserve made an emergency 50 basis point cut to the federal
funds rate, lowering it to a range of 1.00 percent to 1.25 percent. This
marked the first emergency rate cut since the 2008 financial crisis and was
aimed at addressing the growing economic risks from the pandemic. 1604

March 15, 2020: The Federal Reserve made another emergency rate cut, this time by 100
basis points, bringing the federal funds rate down to a range of 0 percent
to 0.25 percent. This move effectively returned rates to the near-zero
levels seen during the financial crisis. The Federal Reserve also launched a
new round of QE, pledging to purchase at least $700 billion in Treasury
securities and MBS. 1605

1602
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Meeting, January 28-29, 2020 (Jan. 29, 2020).
1603
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Statement from Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell, February 28, 2020
(Feb. 28, 2020).
1604
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Meeting, March 3, 2020 (Mar. 3, 2020).
1605
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Meeting, March 15, 2020 (Unscheduled) (Mar. 15, 2020).

Page 402 of 520

March 17, 2020: The Federal Reserve established the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
[hereinafter “CPFF”] to support the flow of credit to households and
businesses by providing liquidity to the commercial paper market. 1606

March 18, 2020: The Federal Reserve created the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility [hereinafter “MMLF”] to enhance the liquidity and functioning of
money markets, ensuring that money market mutual funds could meet
investor redemption demands. 1607

March 23, 2020: The Federal Reserve announced extensive measures to support the
economy, including open-ended purchases of Treasury securities and MBS
(essentially unlimited QE). Additionally, it introduced several new
facilities:
• Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility: To support corporate bond
issuance.
• Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility [hereinafter “SMCCF”]:
To support trading in corporate bonds.
• Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: To support the issuance
of asset-backed securities.
• Expanded CPFF and MMLF: To provide further liquidity to financial
markets. 1608

April 2020: Support to Small Businesses and Municipalities

April 6, 2020: The Federal Reserve announced the Paycheck Protection Program
Liquidity Facility to support the SBA’s PPP by providing liquidity to
participating financial institutions. 1609

April 9, 2020: The Federal Reserve further expanded its interventions, introducing the
Main Street Lending Program to provide up to $600 billion in loans to
small and medium-sized businesses. It also established the Municipal
Liquidity Facility to purchase short-term debt directly from state and local
governments, providing them with essential liquidity. 1610

1606
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Board Announces Establishment of a Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF) to Support the Flow of Credit to Households and Businesses, March 17, 2020 (Mar. 17, 2020).
1607
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Board Broadens Program of Support for the Flow of Credit to
Households and Businesses by Establishing a Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), March 18,
2020 (Mar. 18, 2020).
1608
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Announces Extensive New Measures to Support the Economy,
March 23, 2020 (Mar. 23, 2020).
1609
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve will Establish a Facility to Facilitate Lending to Small
Businesses Via the Small Business Administration's Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) by Providing Term
Financing Backed by PPP Loans, April 6, 2020 (Apr. 6, 2020).
1610
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Takes Additional Actions to Provide up to $2.3 Trillion in Loans
to Support the Economy, April 9, 2020 (Apr. 9, 2020).

Page 403 of 520

May - June 2020: Implementation and Adjustments

May 12, 2020: The Federal Reserve began purchasing corporate bond exchange-traded
funds through the SMCCF, marking the first time it had intervened in the
corporate bond market in this manner. 1611

June 8, 2020: The Federal Reserve expanded the Main Street Lending Program to allow
more businesses to qualify for support by adjusting loan terms and
eligibility criteria. 1612

July - August 2020: Continued Support and Policy Adjustments

July 29, 2020: The FOMC reaffirmed its commitment to using its full range of tools to
support the U.S. economy, maintaining the federal funds rate at 0 percent
to 0.25 percent and continuing its asset purchases. 1613

August 27, 2020: The Federal Reserve amended its policy framework under its "Statement
on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy," adopting a flexible
form of average inflation targeting. This allowed inflation to run
moderately above 2 percent for some time to make up for periods when it
had been below that target. 1614

September - December 2020: Ongoing Adjustments and New Measures

September 16, 2020: The Federal Reserve reiterated its commitment to maintaining
accommodative monetary policy, signaling that rates would remain near
zero until labor market conditions had reached levels consistent with the
FOMC's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to
2 percent and was on track to moderately exceed that rate for some
time. 1615

December 16, 2020: The Federal Reserve announced that it would continue purchasing at least
$120 billion of Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities
per month until substantial further progress had been made toward the
Committee’s goals of maximum employment and price stability. 1616

1611
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Publishes Updates to the Term Sheet for the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) and Announces Information to be Disclosed Monthly for the TALF and the
Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility, May 12, 2020 (May 12, 2020).
1612
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Board Expands Its Main Street Lending Program to Allow More
Small and Medium-Sized Businesses to be Able to Receive Support, June 8, 2020 (Jun. 8, 2020).
1613
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Board Announces an Extension Through December 31 of Its
Lending Facilities That Were Scheduled to Expire on or Around September 30, July 28, 2020 (Jul. 29, 2020).
1614
Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, Board of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. System
(Adopted effective Jan. 24, 2012, reaffirmed effective Jan. 30, 2024).
1615
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Sep. 16, 2020).
1616
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Dec. 16, 2020).

Page 404 of 520

January - March 2021: Transition and Sustained Support

January 27, 2021: The Federal Reserve maintained its accommodative stance, keeping
interest rates near zero and continuing its asset purchase program,
emphasizing that the economic recovery was still uneven and far from
complete. 1617

March 17, 2021: The Federal Reserve reiterated its commitment to supporting the economy,
signaling that it would not raise interest rates until 2023 at the earliest, and
that asset purchases would continue until substantial progress was
made. 1618

April - December 2021: Preparing for Policy Normalization

April 28, 2021: The Federal Reserve maintained its policy stance but began discussing the
potential for tapering asset purchases as the economy showed signs of
recovery. 1619

June 16, 2021: The Federal Reserve indicated it might begin to taper asset purchases
sooner than previously anticipated, acknowledging that inflation was
running higher than expected. 1620

November 3, 2021: The Federal Reserve announced it would begin tapering its asset
purchases, reducing the pace of its monthly bond-buying by $15 billion
each month, with the goal of ending the program by mid-2022. 1621

December 15, 2021: The Federal Reserve accelerated its tapering process, doubling the pace of
asset purchase reductions to $30 billion per month, and signaled that
interest rate hikes could begin in 2022 in response to rising inflation. 1622

January - March 2022: Transition to Policy Tightening

March 16, 2022: The Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 25 basis points, marking its
first-rate hike since 2018, and signaled a series of rate increases to combat
inflation and begin the process of normalizing monetary policy. 1623

FINDING: The Federal Reserve’s Aggressive, Early Actions Blunted Economic Damage of
the Pandemic but Contributed to Staggering Inflation in Late 2021 Through 2022.

1617
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Implementation Note issued January 27, 2021(Jan. 27, 2021).
1618
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Mar. 17, 2021).
1619
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Apr. 28, 2021).
1620
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Jun. 16, 2021).
1621
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Nov. 3, 2021).
1622
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Dec. 15, 2021).
1623
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Mar. 16, 2022).

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 Within two weeks of COVID-19 being declared a pandemic, the Federal Reserve threw
every tool at its disposal to blunt the economic impact of the pandemic. The Fed quickly slashed
the federal funds rate to near zero to increase liquidity and cushion the economic impact of the
pandemic. 1624 The Federal Reserve embarked on an aggressive QE program, initially purchasing
large $500 billion U.S. Treasury and $200 billion mortgage-backed securities to provide liquidity
to the financial system. 1625 And under its Federal Reserve Act section 13(3) authority, the Federal
Reserve revived or stood up the first few of what would become many emergency lending
facilities to support businesses, municipalities, and financial markets. 1626

These actions helped stabilize financial markets, preventing a deeper financial crisis. The
Federal Reserve’s measures, combined with fiscal stimulus measures passed by Congress,
provided critical support to businesses and households, mitigating the economic downturn.

The Federal Reserve’s actions, along with substantial government spending, helped the
economy recover more rapidly than many expected. By late 2020 and into 2021, economic
growth had rebounded strongly, with Gross Domestic Product growth rates returning to positive
territory. 1627 Without the Federal Reserve’s aggressive intervention, the economic damage from
the pandemic could have been much more severe and prolonged, potentially leading to a deeper
and longer-lasting recession. 1628

However, the combination of the aggressive monetary policy and fiscal stimulus fueled a
surge in demand as businesses reopened and consumers spent their savings and stimulus checks.
Global supply chains were already strained due to the pandemic, and the surge in demand
exacerbated these issues, leading to higher prices for goods and services. For example, U.S. auto
production decreased from 11.7 million vehicles in July 2020, close to the pre-pandemic rate, to
fewer than 9 million in late 2021. 1629 With interest rates at historic lows and stimulus money
injected into the economy, there was considerable consumer demand for automobiles, but
prolonged shortages of chips and other key components restrained production and increased
prices. 1630 The tight labor market, with employers struggling to fill positions, also contributed to
wage growth and further inflationary pressures. 1631

1624
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Meeting, March 15, 2020 (Unscheduled) (Mar. 15, 2020).
1625
Press Release, The Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Releases a FOMC statement (Mar. 15, 2022).
1626
See, Eric Milstein & David Wessel, What did the Fed do in response to the COVID-19 crisis?, THE BOOKINGS
INST., Jan. 2, 2024, at Table 1 (listing pandemic-era facilities established by the Fed).
1627
MARC LABONTE & LIDA R. WEINSTOCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R47115, U.S. ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE WAKE
OF COVID-19: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES, AT 2-3 (2022).
1628
See, Eric Milstein & David Wessel, What did the Fed do in response to the COVID-19 crisis?, THE BOOKINGS
INST. (Jan. 2, 2024) (assessing the Fed’s aggressive, unprecedented actions blunted the economic damage of the
pandemic); see also Celso J. Costa Junior, et al., Macroeconomic policies and the pandemic-driven recession, INT’L
REV. OF ECON. & FIN. (Mar. 2021) (describing the considerable role QE plays in mitigating a pandemic-driven
recession).
1629
Olivier J. Blanchard & Ben S. Bernanke, What Cause The U.S. Pandemic-Era Inflation?, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RSCH. WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 31417, at 22 (June 2023).
1630
Id.
1631
Id.

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 By late 2021 and into 2022, inflation had accelerated to levels not seen in decades. The
Consumer Price Index and other inflation measures indicated significant price increases across a
broad range of goods and services.

The Federal Reserve’s early actions, while crucial in preventing economic collapse, also
contributed to the inflationary pressures seen later. The prolonged period of low interest rates and
large-scale asset purchases, combined with supply chain issues and labor market dynamics,
created an environment where inflation could take hold.

The Federal Reserve’s aggressive actions during the early stages of the pandemic were
vital in blunting the economic damage and facilitating a quicker recovery. However, these same
actions, along with other factors like supply chain disruptions and labor shortages, also
contributed to the significant inflation observed in late 2021 and 2022. In summary, while the
Federal Reserve’s use of all available tools helped avert a much longer and more severe
economic downturn, it also played a role in the inflationary pressures that emerged later.

FINDING: After Immediate Actions to Stabilize the Economy and Financial Markets, the
Federal Reserve Should Have Placed More Emphasis on Monitoring and
Addressing Long-Term Risks Associated with Prolonged Low Interest Rates and

Page 407 of 520

 Increased Government Debt and Ensuring that Policies Did Not Lead to Future
Financial Instability.

Monitoring and addressing the long-term risks associated with prolonged low interest
rates and increased government debt is crucial for maintaining financial stability, especially in
the aftermath of a crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. The Federal Reserve could have better
managed these risks and ensured that these policies did not lead to future financial instability.

The Federal Reserve could have produced more detailed and frequent reports on financial
stability, focusing on the risks associated with prolonged low interest rates and rising government
debt. These reports should have included analyses of asset price bubbles and credit risk within
the financial system. Furthermore, implementing robust monitoring systems to track risks across
different sectors, including housing, corporate debt, and financial institutions, could have helped
identify vulnerabilities early. The Federal Reserve should have conducted regular analyses of
government debt sustainability, including assessing the potential impact of rising debt on future
interest rates, inflation, and fiscal policy.

The Federal Reserve should have also provided clear forward guidance on how and when
it plans to normalize interest rates and unwind unconventional monetary policies.
Communicating a well-defined exit strategy would help manage expectations and reduce market
uncertainty about future policy changes. Being transparent about the potential risks associated
with low interest rates and high government debt would help market participants and
policymakers understand the challenges and prepare for potential adjustments. This includes
publishing detailed analyses of how current policies could impact future economic conditions.

In summary, the Federal Reserve could have better managed long-term risks associated
with prolonged low interest rates and increased government debt by enhancing risk assessment
and providing clear communication. These measures would help ensure that policies promote
financial stability and avoid creating future vulnerabilities.

FINDING: The Federal Reserve Likely Exceeded Its Role and Responsibilities to Provide
Market Liquidity and Acting as a “Lender of Last Resort” by Assuming the Role
and Responsibilities of the Department of the Treasury by Acting as a Spender to
Prevent Market Insolvency.

The Federal Reserve took unprecedented steps to stabilize the economy, many of which
extended beyond its traditional roles and responsibilities. The Federal Reserve's actions to
provide market liquidity and act as a "lender of last resort" were crucial in preventing broader
economic collapse, but in doing so, it also assumed some roles traditionally associated with the
Department of the Treasury.

As explained above, the traditional role of the Federal Reserve is to use monetary policy
to influence the economy. The goal is to manage the money supply, control inflation, and
stabilize the economy by adjusting interest rates, affecting borrowing and lending, and regulating
bank reserves. One the other hand, the Department of the Treasury manages fiscal policy. Fiscal

Page 408 of 520

policy is how the federal government spends money, collects revenue (e.g., taxes), and manages
its budget to influence the economy.

The Federal Reserve significantly increased its asset purchases, including Treasury
securities and mortgage-backed securities, far beyond the levels seen during previous crises. This
expansion was intended to support financial markets and ensure liquidity, but it also led the
Federal Reserve to take on a more active role in stabilizing asset prices and market functioning.
The Federal Reserve established facilities to purchase corporate bonds, including investment-
grade and high-yield bonds, which was a significant departure from its usual practice of focusing
primarily on government securities. This move aimed to support corporate liquidity and prevent
a credit crunch, but it also meant the Federal Reserve was directly involved in private-sector
credit markets.

The Federal Reserve's interventions went beyond providing liquidity and began to
resemble direct economic support, akin to fiscal spending. 1632 By purchasing corporate bonds
and providing loans to businesses and municipalities, the Federal Reserve was effectively
injecting capital into the economy, a role traditionally reserved for fiscal authorities. 1633 The
Federal Reserve’s actions were crucial in preventing a financial crisis, but they also created a
situation where market participants came to rely heavily on the Federal Reserve for economic
support. This dependence on central bank interventions raised concerns about potential long-term
consequences, such as asset price distortions and market inefficiencies.

The Federal Reserve created several novel lending facilities, such as the Main Street
Lending Program to provide loans to small and medium-sized businesses, a role typically
handled by the Treasury. This program aimed to fill gaps in the financial system by offering
loans to businesses that were unable to access traditional credit markets. The Federal Reserve's
involvement in this program was more akin to direct fiscal intervention rather than its traditional
monetary policy functions. 1634 The Federal Reserve also created the Municipal Liquidity Facility
to purchase short-term municipal debt, helping state and local governments manage their
liquidity needs. This was a significant expansion of the Federal Reserve's role into state and local
government financing, which traditionally falls under the purview of fiscal policy and Treasury
activities.

By intervening extensively in markets and assuming roles typically associated with the
Treasury, the Federal Reserve risked creating moral hazard—where businesses and investors
might come to expect ongoing support from the Federal Reserve, potentially leading to
irresponsible risk-taking. 1635 The Federal Reserve's expanded role in economic support and
market interventions raised questions about the independence of monetary policy and the
potential for political pressures. 1636 The blending of monetary and fiscal policies could affect the

1632
Nicolas Cachanosky, et al., The Federal Reserve’s response to the COVID-19 contraction: An initial appraisal,
at 1171, SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL (Apr. 2021).
1633
Id.
1634
Id.
1635
Jean-Pierre Zigrand, et al., Moral hazard, the fear of the markets, and how central banks responded to COVID-
19, CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y RSCH. (Jan. 28, 2021).
1636
Nicolas Cachanosky, et al., The Federal Reserve’s response to the COVID-19 contraction: An initial appraisal,
at 1172-1173, SOUTH ECON. J. (Apr. 2021).

Page 409 of 520

Federal Reserve’s ability to act autonomously in its traditional monetary policy role. The Federal
Reserve's actions during the pandemic set new precedents for its role in economic crises. While
these actions were maybe necessary to stabilize the economy, they also prompt discussions about
the boundaries of central bank interventions and the appropriate roles for monetary and fiscal
authorities in future crises.

The Federal Reserve exceeded its traditional role by taking on responsibilities usually
associated with fiscal policy, such as direct economic support and market interventions. The
Federal Reserve’s expanded actions, including asset purchases and lending programs, were
crucial for stabilizing the economy, but they also blurred the lines between monetary and fiscal
policy and introduced new risks and challenges and expectations of the Federal Reserve’s role in
future crises.

Page 410 of 520

The Societal Impact of Decisions to Close Schools, How the Decisions Were
Made and Whether There is Evidence of Widespread Learning Loss or Other
Negative Effects as a Result of These Decisions

I. COVID-19 Pandemic-Era School Closures

On March 13, 2020, the CDC released a resource document advising schools on how to
implement temporary school closures to contain COVID-19. 1637 Representing AFT, Ms.
Weingarten remarked, “[c]losing schools is an agonizing decision, but, with caveats, it’s the
inevitable and correct one in the midst of this unprecedented national emergency.” 1638 Already,
schools across the country had begun to transition to remote learning in an effort to stem
transmission in the face of enormous pressure from teachers, parents, and teachers unions. 1639

Accordingly, many public health authorities—including the CDC—supported closing the

schools until more could be learned about the novel virus. Still, even the CDC appeared to not be
convinced that short- or medium-term school closures would have any substantial impact on
transmission, citing data retrieved from Hong Kong and Singapore showing that countries that
closed schools did not have more success reducing transmission than places that did not. 1640
Nonetheless, by the end of March 2020, nearly all schools across the country were closed.

On December 8, 2020, in response to then President-Elect Biden’s promise to reopen a

majority of schools within the first 100 days of his term, 1641 Ms. Weingarten wrote:

Hallelujah! Unlike Trump, President-elect Biden understands that if we

secure the resources and put the public health safeguards in place, we can
open schools safely in the second semester—and his first 100 days. This is
what visionary, steady and effective leadership during a pandemic looks
like. Between this, a vaccine and a Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention director who is ready to give national guidance free of political
interference, we see a path forward for safe school buildings reopening. 1642

1637
Erica Green, Administration Offers Guidance to Schools as They Shut Down on Their Own, THE N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 13, 2020).
1638
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT Says National Schools Shutdown Inevitable Amid Coronavirus
Pandemic (Mar. 16, 2020).
1639
Laura Meckler & Lena Sun, States are rushing to close schools. But what does the science on closures say?, THE
WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2020); See also, Howard Markel, Coronavirus School Closings: Don’t Wait Until It’s Too
Late, THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020).
1640
Considerations for School Closures, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20200313224825/https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/downloads/considerations-for-school-closure.pdf; See also, Laura Meckler & Lena Sun, States are rushing to
close schools. But what does the science on closures say?, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2020).
1641
Will Weissert, Biden vows to reopen most schools after 1st 100 days on job, ASSO. PRESS (Dec. 8, 2020); But see,
Erica Green, Biden Trims Ambitions on School Reopening Pledge, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb 11, 2021) (writing that the
Biden Administration narrowed President Biden’s 100 pledge to apply to K-8 schools and defined reopening to
include schools that provided in-person instruction at least one day a week).
1642
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT’s Weingarten on President Biden’s Plan to Reopen Schools in First
100 Days (Dec. 8, 2020) (emphasis added).

Page 411 of 520

 Unfortunately, many schools across the country were not reopened within 100 days. In
fact, only 54 percent of schools K-12 were fully open. 1643 This was despite a desperate attempt
by the Biden-Harris Administration to redefine school reopening to include schools that were
only open one day per week. 1644

Instead, many schools remained closed because of AFT and Ms. Weingarten’s political
interference into the CDC issuance of the Biden Administration’s first school reopening guidance
entitled “Operational Strategy for K-12 Schools through Phased Prevention” [hereinafter
“Operational Strategy”] on February 12, 2021. 1645

FINDING: Long Term School Closures Were Not Supported by Available Science and
Evidence.

As more data related to COVID-19 became readily available, it was clear that the
“science” did not justify school closures. Early data from Wuhan, China—the epicenter of the
outbreak—showed that children were unlikely to suffer serious illness or death as a result of
COVID-19. 1646 This was later confirmed by CDC data showing that children comprised less than
0.01 percent of hospitalizations and 0.0005 percent of COVID-19 deaths between March 1, 2020
and July 25, 2020. 1647

Moreover, subsequently acquired data confirmed the CDC’s previous suspicion that
school closures were unlikely to stem the transmission of COVID-19. 1648 The science indicated
that schools were not vectors for viral spread. 1649 Early data from Iceland showed that young
children were less likely than adults to transmit COVID-19. 1650 Teachers, individually, were also
shown by early data to have no higher risk of infection and of developing serious COVID-19
than other professionals. 1651

1643
U.S. Dep’t. of Education, Press Release, Statement from U.S. Secretary of Education Miguel Cardona on Results
of the March 2021 NAEP Survey on School Reopening (May 6, 2021).
1644
Morgan Phillips, Biden’s promise to open half the schools in 100 days: Here is how it’s going, FOXNEWS (Feb.
19, 2021); Ebony Bowden, Biden plan would only reopen half the schools ‘one day a week’ by end of April, N.Y.
POST (Feb. 9, 2021).
1645
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE FOR K-12 SCHOOLS AND EARLY CARE AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT SAFE
IN-PERSON LEARNING, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last updated Oct. 4, 2023).
1646
The Consequences of School Closures: Intended and Unintended: Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on the
Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, 118th Cong. (Testimony by Tracy Beth Høeg)
(Mar. 28, 2023).
1647
Lindsay Kim, et al., Hospitalization Rates and Characteristics of Children Aged <18 Years Hospitalized with
Laboratory-Confirmed COVID-19 – COVID-New, 14 States, March 1-July 25, 2020, MMWR (Aug. 7, 2020).
1648
Jay Bhattcharya, et al., The Norfolk Group Presents: Questions for a COVID-19 Commission (Feb. 6, 2023).
1649
See Emily Oster, Schools Aren’t Super-Spreaders, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2020).
1650
Roger Highfield, Coronavirus: Hunting Down COVID-19, SCI MUSEUM GROUP (Apr. 27, 2020).
1651
Id.

Page 412 of 520

 Comparatively, school closures had an immediate negative impact on students. Many
struggled academically 1652 and became especially susceptible to physical 1653 and mental health
issues. 1654 These consequences—which only worsened the longer schools remained closed—
could hardly have come as a surprise, as previous closures had been understood to result in
negative outcomes for students. 1655

Regrettably, however, these disastrous consequences coupled with evidence that children
were unlikely to transmit or suffer serious illness due to COVID-19 were ignored by public
health authorities. Instead, many advocates of closures seemingly relied only on favorable data
or wrongly attempted to mischaracterize, misrepresent, or exaggerate data.

For example, the CDC published a study from Wood County, Wisconsin to support the
proposition that multi-layered mitigation efforts—namely, masking and social distancing—were
effective at reducing in-school transmission. 1656 However, these conclusions appear to be a gross
exaggeration of the scope of the data, as the study explicitly stated that it did not include a
comparative unmasked control group to make such a conclusion. 1657

Similar studies were not just relied on by public health officials, they were used by
teacher unions—specifically AFT—to argue that schools could not be opened safely without
multi-layered mitigation efforts, such as masking and social distancing. 1658 In fact, Ms.
Weingarten cited the previously noted Wood County, Wisconsin study in her testimony before
the Select Subcommittee on April 28, 2023. 1659 This prompted Dr. Tracy Hoeg—one of the
senior authors of the study, who testified to the Select Subcommittee on March 28, 2023 1660—to

1652
Rebecca Jack, et. al., Pandemic Schooling Mode and Student Test Scores: Evidence from U.S. School Districts,
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, (Apr. 26, 2022).
1653
Paulo Puccinelli, et al., Reduced level of physical activity during COVID-19 pandemic is associated with
depression and anxiety levels: an internet-based survey, BMC PUB. HEALTH, (Mar. 1, 2021); D.S. Burstein,
Cardiopulmonary Exercise Performance in the Pediatric and Young Adult Population Before and During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, PEDIATRIC CARDIOLOGY (May 3, 2022).
1654
News Release, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, New CDC data illuminate youth mental health
threats during the COVID-19 pandemic (Mar. 31, 2022).
1655
Keith Meyers & Melissa Thomasson, Paralyzed By Panic: Measuring the Effect of School Closures During the
1916 Polio Pandemic on Educational Attainment, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Sept. 2017); Chad Aldeman,
Analysis: How Devastating Floods in Thailand in 2011 Harmed Students’ Academic Growth, and What Lessons We
Can Use in Confronting Learning Loss During the Pandemic, THE74 (Aug. 18, 2020); Chad Aldeman, Aldeman:
What a Wave of Teacher Strikes in Argentina Can Teach Us About Learning Disruptions, Degree Attainment, Higher
Unemployment & Lower Earnings, THE74 (Aug. 12, 2020); Chad Aldeman, Aldeman: What a 2005 Earthquake in
Pakistan Can Teach American Educators About Learning Loss After a Disaster, THE74 (July 28, 2020).
1656
Amy Falk, et al., COVID-19 Cases and Transmission in 17 K-12 Schools—Wood County, Wisconsin, August 31-
November 29, 2020, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, MMWR (Jan. 29, 2021).
1657
Id.; See, Jay Bhattacharya, et al., Questions for a COVID-19 Commission, The Norfolk Grp, (Feb. 6, 2023).
1658
Amy Falk, et al., COVID-19 Cases and Transmission in 17 K-12 Schools—Wood County, Wisconsin, August 31-
November 29, 2020, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, MMWR (Jan. 29, 2021).
1659
The Consequences of School Closures, Part 2: The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Ms. Randi
Weingarten: Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Accountability, 118th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2023) (Testimony by Randi Weingarten).
1660
The Consequences of School Closures: Intended and Unintended, Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on
the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, 118th Cong. (Mar. 28, 2023),

Page 413 of 520

rebuke Ms. Weingarten’s conclusion; stating that she ignored the results of the study indicating
less than four percent of cases were transmitted at school. 1661

1661
Josh Christenson, Randi Weingarten misrepresented COVID study to Congress, author claims, N.Y. POST (Apr.
28, 2023).

Page 414 of 520

II. The American Federation of Teachers’ Influence

FINDING: The American Federation of Teachers Is Not a Scientific or Medical Organization.

AFT is not a scientific organization—it does not employ epidemiologists or

immunologists. 1662 Instead, it is a political union—committed to activism on behalf of its 1.7
million members—that donated $2.4 million dollars to Democrat candidates during the 2020
election cycle. The extent of the AFT’s political influence is reflected in the fact that the Biden
Administration reached out to AFT for advice on school reopening rather than the AFT reaching
out to the Biden Administration:

Ms. Randi Weingarten (April 26, 2023)

Q. …. What did the consultation look like? Did the AFT first engage
the CDC or did the CDC reach out to you [the AFT]?

A. So, what essentially happened, sir, was that we were talking to the
Biden transition team before he was sworn into office.

*****

Q. Did they reach out to you or…

A. Yes, they reached out. No, the Biden transition team reached out to
us and.... 1663

In a letter to the Select Subcommittee on April 19, 2023, AFT disputed the notion that it
had “no scientific expertise.” 1664 However, Ms. Weingarten admitted in her testimony before the
Select Subcommittee that they did not employ any epidemiologists or immunologists. 1665 The
fact that AFT is not a scientific organization is supported by its own employees.

Ms. Kelly Nedrow (Trautner) (June 23, 2023)

1662
See, The Consequences of School Closures, Part 2: The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Ms.
Randi Weingarten: Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight
& Accountability, 118th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2023) (Answering affirmatively that they “consult” epidemiologists and
immunologists); See, Nedrow TI,
1663
The Consequences of School Closures, Part 2: The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Ms. Randi
Weingarten: Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Accountability, 118th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2023) (Testimony by Randi Weingarten), pp. 8-9.
1664
Letter from Michael Bromwich, Counsel, American Federation of Teachers, to Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman,
Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic (Apr. 19, 2023).
1665
The Consequences of School Closures, Part 2: The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Ms. Randi
Weingarten: Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Accountability, 118th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2023) (Answering affirmatively that they “consult” epidemiologists and
immunologists).

Page 415 of 520

 Q. You’ve been at AFT twice and for a number of years. Would you
categorize AFT as a scientific or medical organization?

A. AFT is a labor union. 1666

Accordingly, “AFT was out of its league” in representing that it had scientific expertise
and making policy-based scientific interpretations and recommendations throughout the
pandemic. 1667

FINDING: The American Federation of Teachers Did Not Support Reopening Schools and
Predicated Its Support for Reopening Schools on Non-Scientific Policies.

While AFT and Ms. Weingarten have attempted to rewrite history by arguing that they
were always trying to reopen the schools, this simply is not true. AFT continually pushed for
school closures throughout the pandemic. Restricting in-person schooling was always the
default—not the alternative—mitigation measure underlying AFT’s positions.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Nedrow TI, at 19.

1666

The Consequences of School Closures, Part 2: The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Ms. Randi
1667

Weingarten: Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Accountability, 118th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2023)

Page 416 of 520

 During the summer of 2020, AFT and Ms. Weingarten attacked the Trump Administration
for pushing to return students back to the classrooms for the start of the 2020-2021 school
year. 1668 To Ms. Weingarten, incentivizing the reopening of schools was “reckless,” “callous,”
and “cruel.” 1669

AFT released an ad on reopening schools that claimed that students were “being used as
guinea pigs.” 1670 In an official press release, Ms. Weingarten wrote:

1668
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT’s Weingarten Rejects Trump’s Schools Reopening Guidelines as Too
Little, Too Late (Aug. 12, 2020); Eliza Shapiro, How Trump’s Push to Reopen Schools Backfired, THE N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 15, 2020).
1669
Jessica Glenza, ‘Reckless, callous, cruel’: teachers’ chief denounces Trump plan to reopen schools, THE
GUARDIAN (July 17, 2020).
1670
Am. Fed’n of Teachers (AFTHQ), Enough is Enough, YouTube (Aug. 26, 2020), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svnqsKd8Y4I.

Page 417 of 520

 Schools cannot reopen safely and equitably until we have effectively
contained the virus spread and have a robust testing system, a plan for a
future surge, and appropriate safety protocols in place, including physical
distancing, proper ventilation, deep cleaning procedures and adequate
personal protective equipment. 1671

AFT repeatedly denounced and fought against individual states’ plans to reopen schools.
AFT even supported efforts by affiliate teacher unions to sue state and local governments
attempting to reopen schools for in-person instruction. 1672 In an official press release, Ms.
Weingarten wrote:

The push to reopen schools full time without any precautions or new
resources, and, most importantly, amid a skyrocketing COVID-19 surge,
ignores science, safety and basic humanity. 1673

AFT emboldened its affiliates —calling on its members and affiliates to conduct “safety
strikes” in some cases. 1674 In a transcribed interview, Ms. Ucelli-Kashyap testified that AFT
supported affiliate organizations striking if mitigation measures were not deemed appropriate. 1675

Ms. Marla Ucelli-Kashyap (June 20, 2023)

Q. Did AFT ever advocate a school district going on strike if a school

pushed reopening prior to vaccinations?

A. So, again, you are making me think of resolution language, but we

did indicate that when all other possibilities were not being
used -- so when appropriate mitigation strategies were not in place,

1671
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT President Randi Weingarten Says Educators Remain Confused over
CDC Guidance on School Reopening, Nothing Is Off the Table for Teachers if Schools Aren’t Safe (July 24, 2020);
See also, Future of Employability, AXIOS (Aug. 20, 2020) (Weingarten remarks that “[w]e have an obligation to
make remote [learning] better until we can really decrease (coronavirus) community spread throughout the United
States, distancing learning and distance working is going to be a fact of life.”).
1672
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Florida educators file lawsuit to stop reckless, unsafe reopening of public
school buildings (July 20, 2020); Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Educators React to Latest Proceedings in
Florida Case on School Reopening (Aug. 13, 2020), Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Cypress-Fairbanks AFT
Seeks Injunction to Halt Requirement For School Employees to Return to School Buildings (Aug. 14, 2020); Press
Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Florida educators win temporary injunction against the executive order (Aug. 24,
2020); Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Florida Educators to Appeal Court Ruling, Continue to Fight for Local
Control and School Safety (Oct. 9, 2020); Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, PTU Files Lawsuit Seeking to
Close Greene Middle School in Providence (Nov. 2, 2020).
1673
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Florida puts students, teachers at risk despite union lawsuit (Aug. 17,
2020).
1674
Resolution, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Safely Reopening Schools (2020); Speech, Confronting America’s Three
Crises, AFT President Randi Weingarten (July 28, 2020); Gabrielle Wanneh, Teachers Union Considers Strikes Over
School Reopenings (July 28, 2020); Valerie Strauss, New York City Schools closing because of rising coronavirus
rates—and so are all schools in Kentucky, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2020).
1675
Kashyap TI at 66-67.

Page 418 of 520

 when guidance was not being followed when there was reason to
suspect harm, that when there was an issue of student and teacher
safety, that that might -- there might be situations in which a safety
strike would be appropriate. We did not encourage those or call for
them, but we indicated that there may be situations in which they
would be appropriate.

In response, many of its local affiliates resisted school reopening plans. 1676 For example,
the Chicago Teachers Union , tweeted that “the push to reopen schools is rooted in sexism,
racism and misogyny” and continued to stage COVID-19 related safety strikes—which
necessitated school closures—as late into the pandemic as January 2022. 1677 Another affiliate,
the United Teachers of Los Angeles, similarly cited safety concerns throughout the pandemic as
to keep schools closed, however, made political demands—not related to COVID-19—including
but not limited to enacting a millionaire tax, defunding the police, and providing Medicare for
all. 1678

Finally, in New York City, the New York State United Teachers resisted reopening
schools unless Mayor de Blasio agreed to close schools if the COVID-19 positivity rate exceeded
three percent—an extremely conservative threshold. 1679 Ms. Weingarten supported the decision
to close New York City schools when, predictably, the positivity rate exceeded three percent—
seemingly disregarding the advice of the CDC and evidence that transmission was low within
schools. 1680 AFT would continue to support efforts within the state to close schools. 1681

Like their affiliates, AFT relied more on “politics” than “science.” In her testimony to the
Select Subcommittee, Ms. Weingarten stated that AFT was always working to reopen the school
and had released a “commonsense science-based plan to open schools safely.” 1682

The plan Ms. Weingarten was referring to was released April 29, 2020 and entitled “A
Plan to Safely Reopen America’s Schools and Communities” [hereinafter “AFT Plan”] 1683 The
AFT Plan could hardly be considered “science based.” Among other things, the AFT Plan called
on Congress to make significant public investments into areas not related to the pandemic, such

1676
Mike Antonucci, Teacher Union Resistance to Reopening Schools: An Examination of the Largest U.S. School
Districts, DEFENSE OF FREEDOM INSTITUTE available at https://dfipolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/10/DFI_Teachers-Union-Resistance-to-Reopening-Schools-Report.pdf.
1677
Mitch Smith & Dana Goldstein, In a Clash With the Teachers’ Union, Chicago Cancels Classes for a Day, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2022).
1678
Mike Antonucci, Teacher Union Resistance to Reopening Schools: An Examination of the Largest U.S. School
Districts, Defense of Freedom Institute
1679
Eliza Shapiro & Dana Rubinstein, Did It Hit 3%? Why Parents and Teachers Are Fixated on One Number, THE
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2020; Lauren Camera, School Reopening Thresholds Vary Widely Across the Country, U.S.
News (Aug. 13, 2020).
1680
The Story with Martha MacCallum, Fox News (Nov. 19, 2020).
1681
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT and NYSUT on Reopening New York State’s Schools (Jan. 6, 2021).
1682
See The Consequences of School Closures, Part 2: The President of the American Federation of Teachers, Ms.
Randi Weingarten: Hearing Before the H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight
& Accountability, 118th Cong. (Apr. 26, 2023); see also AFT report
1683
A Plan to Safely Reopen America’s Schools and Communities, American Federation of Teachers (Apr. 29, 2020)
[herein after “AFT Report.”]

Page 419 of 520

as improving broadband infrastructure, increasing Medicaid and SNAP benefits, and cancelling
student loans. 1684 Specifically, the AFT Plan wrote “COVID-19 has exacerbated the deep
inequalities in our society and underscored the need for additional public investments to combat
this inequity.” 1685 The AFT Plan directed that “[i]t is not the time to be concerned with
deficits.” 1686

In addition, the AFT Plan called for limited student testing and a suspension of teacher
performance evaluations. 1687 Like those before, these measures—which presumably aimed to
combat parental oversight and accountability of America’s educators—were not related to
science nor combatting the spread of COVID-19 in schools.

FINDING: The Biden Administration’s U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Broke Precedent and Shared a Draft Guidance with the American Federation of
Teachers.

According to testimony, the CDC began drafting the Operational Strategy late December
1688
2020. In a transcribed interview, Dr. Massetti testified that she was the “lead drafter” of the
guidance. 1689 Dr. Massetti testified that the main purpose for drafting the new guidance was to
get students back in the classroom.

Dr. Greta Massetti (October 30, 2023)

Q. What was the goal of [the Operational Strategy]?

A. So…we had released several version of school guidance, starting

from February 2020. We had done—we had developed resources
for schools to provide kind of supportive information about how to
provide safe in-person instruction. We’d done a lot of technical
assistance, a lot of outreach, webinars, presentations, tools, all
through kind of the summer and fall of 2020. And in December, we
were very acutely aware that the new school semester was about to
start. And we didn’t have great data at the time, but to our best
estimate, more than half of the school districts in the United States
were not providing any in-person instruction at all. We were very
concerned about that. We were worried about impact on children.
We were worried about a number of concerns. And so we were
thinking about what did we need to do to really support schools in

1684
A Plan to Safely Reopen America’s Schools and Communities, American Federation of Teachers (Apr. 29, 2020),
available at https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/media/2020/covid19_reopen-america-schools.pdf.; See also,
Letter from Randi Weingarten, President, American Federation of Teachers, et. al., to U.S. House of Representatives
(Apr. 21, 2020).
1685
A Plan to Safely Reopen America’s Schools and Communities, American Federation of Teachers (Apr. 29, 2020),
available at https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/media/2020/covid19_reopen-america-schools.pdf.
1686
Id.
1687
Id.
1688
Massettii TI, at 26.
1689
Id. at 24.

Page 420 of 520

 reopening for in-person instruction in January, and we were very
worried about the possibility that another semester would go by
and schools wouldn’t be able to take that step… 1690

By early January 2021, Dr. Massetti testified that she had completed the first draft of the
guidance. 1691

It seems likely that AFT was aware that the CDC—under the newly inaugurated Biden
Administration—would be issuing new guidance related to schools. One of President Biden’s
first acts after being inaugurated was issuing an executive order directing the Department of
Education and HHS to develop evidence-based guidance on reopening schools. 1692 Ms.
Weingarten commended the act saying that the “order will produce guidance that embeds and
disseminates best practices—based on science—for safe and effective in-person, remote and
hybrid learning.” 1693

By January 27, 2021, however, AFT was aware that the CDC was preparing new
guidance and were anxious to review it. That morning, Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) began inquiring
into receiving an “advance copy” of the Operational Strategy. 1694

1690
Id. at 24.
1691
Id. a4 26.
1692
Exec. Order No. 14000, 86 Fed. Reg. 7215 (Jan 26, 2021), See also National Strategy for the COVID-19
Response and Pandemic Preparedness, Pres. Joseph Biden (Jan. 21, 2021), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/National-Strategy-for-the-COVID-19-Response-and-
Pandemic-Preparedness.pdf.
1693
Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT’s Weingarten on President Biden’s Executive Order on Safely
Reopening Schools (Jan. 21, 2021).
1694
Text from [Redacted], Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to Ms. Kelly Trautner, Am. Fed’n of Teachers (Jan. 27, 2021,
11:04 AM).

Page 421 of 520

 Within hours, Ms. Weingarten was connected in an email with members of the Biden-
Harris Administration and the White House COVID-19 Response Team to set up a meeting to
discuss the guidance in the coming days. 1695

After coordinating schedules, a call between AFT and the CDC was set up for January 29,
1696
2021. Dr. Walensky also wanted to participate and was added to the call. 1697 In an email to
Ms. Weingarten, Ms. Johnson wrote, “[w]e would really benefit from having the opportunity to
hear you and your members perspectives directly.” 1698

In the meantime, AFT staff were scrambling to prepare to review the guidance. On
January 28, 2021, Ms. Ucelli-Kashyap—who was also a member of the Biden Transition
team 1699—emailed other AFT staff to be ready to serve as “rapid reviewers” of the new
guidance. 1700 Specifically, providing a “quick summary of what it does and doesn’t say, and how
that purports with our must haves, et cetera.” 1701

The next day, January 29, 2021, Ms. Ucelli-Kashyap followed up with her team regarding
her instructions, which she wrote was likely going to be released the following Monday,
February 1, 2021, informing the team that hopefully she would have more information following
the call between AFT and Ms. Weingarten later that afternoon: 1702

FINDING: The American Federation of Teachers Advocated for Mitigation Measures that
Were Overly Broad and Not Scientific, including Closure Triggers, Delaying the

1695
EMail from Carmel Martin, Policy Advisor, The White House, to Randi Weingarten, President, Am. Fed’n of
Teachers, et. al. (Jan. 29, 2021).
1696
E-Mail from Carole Johnson, Testing Coordinator, COVID-19 Response Team, The White House, to Randi
Weingarten, President, Am. Fed’n of Teachers (Jan. 29, 2021).
1697
Id.
1698
Id.
1699
Kashyap TI, at 9 & 46.
1700
E-Mail from Marla Ucelli-Kashyap, Senior Director, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to Robin Vitucci, Am. Fed’n of
Teachers, et al. (Jan. 28, 2021).
1701
Id.
1702
E-Mail from Marla Ucelli-Kashyap, Senior Director, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to Robin Vitucci, Am. Fed’n of
Teachers, et al. (Jan. 29, 2021).

Page 422 of 520

 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Issuance of the Operational
Strategy.

While AFT was uncertain of the specifics of the guidance, they knew what they wanted to
see included in it. Among other things, AFT wanted the CDC to implement a “trigger” that
would automatically cause schools to close if COVID-19 positivity rate exceeded a certain
threshold. 1703 These priorities were included in meeting notes prepared for Ms. Weingarten for
her phone call with Dr. Walensky on January 29, 2021. 1704

According to Dr. Massetti, AFT made additional requests during the January 29 phone
call, including a recommendation that schools should not be reopened unless teachers were fully
vaccinated.

1703
Notes prepared by staff, for Ms. Weingarten, for call with Dr. Walensky (week of Jan. 1, 29, 2021) (on file with
Subcomm).
1704
Id.

Page 423 of 520

 Dr. Greta Massetti (October 31, 2023)

Q. What were the additional requests [AFT made], if you can

remember?

A. So they very strongly advocated for strengthening our

recommendations around vaccination and in particular were
encouraging CDC to recommend that schools should not be
reopened for in-person instruction unless teachers were all fully
vaccinated. We did not accept that guidance.

They also were strongly recommending that schools should not

reopen or that CDC should say schools should not reopen unless
they upgraded their ventilation, HVAC.

And for both of those recommendations we actually made it clear

that schools did not to have all teachers vaccinated or have upgrade
ventilation to provide in-person instruction.

They also wanted us to specify the types of masks that should be

required, in particular respirators or more protective masks. We did
not accept that recommendation.

And they had also recommended that we should specify that 6 feet
of physical distance should be a minimum requirement but it really
should be higher than that when possible. 1705

Dr. Massetti understood that certain things AFT advocated for would have made openings
more difficult.

Dr. Gretta Massetti (October 31, 2023)

Q. The four kind of larger recommendations that they made

previously—vaccinations, ventilation, masks, and the 6-foot
minimum—if those were implemented, would fewer schools have
opened?

A. It’s hard to kind of entertain a hypothetical. It would have made

reopening more challenging for schools certainly, yes. 1706

1705
Massetti TI, at 43.
1706
Masetti at 57

Page 424 of 520

 Among its other priorities, AFT advocated that the guidance included a closure “trigger”
that would automatically close schools if the positivity rate of COVID-19 exceeded a certain
threshold. Ms. Ucelli-Kashyap testified regarding how AFT interpreted closure triggers to work.

Ms. Ucelli-Kashyap (June 20, 2023)

Q. If you recall or are able to describe just generally, what is a closure

trigger?

A. That would be a measure of viral prevalence or spread that would

cause or trigger a decision to not operate fully in person. 1707

These “triggers” were not only desired by AFT, but other teachers unions across the
country. As previously noted, New York City teachers were able to negotiate with Mayor de
Blasio to implement a closure “trigger” threshold of a three percent positivity rate. 1708

Dr. Massetti testified that the CDC never recommended a closure trigger and that there
was no “scientific evidence” supporting such a mitigation measure. 1709

Dr. Greta Massetti (Oct. 31, 2023)

Q. Did the CDC ever evaluate a closure trigger or a closure threshold?

A. We never recommended a closure trigger or closure threshold.

When it was recommended. We assessed the evidence and did not
feel that there was any scientific evidence to suggest that one was
necessary. 1710

Dr. Walensky testified that AFT had requested that closure “triggers” be included in the
Operational Strategy, but that it was not accepted because the goal of the guidance was to open
schools—not close them.

Director Rochelle Walensky (June 13, 2023)

Q. [D]id the American Federation of Teachers provide suggested edits

to the [Operational Strategy], including a trigger to automatically
close schools, that if implemented, would have kept more schools
closed and kids out of the classroom?

A. The AFT was interested in having closure triggers. That is my

understanding, yes.

1707
See, Ucelli-Kashyap TI at 26
1708
Id.
1709
See, Massetti TI. 63
1710
Id.

Page 425 of 520

 …

Q. Did the AFT’s suggested closure trigger run contrary to the

prevailing science and data at that time?

A. Again, this was something where we had layered mitigation

strategies in the operational guidance to keep our schools
open…our goal was not to talk about school closure triggers. Our
goal in this guidance was to keep them open. 1711

According to documents reviewed by the Select Subcommittee, the initial feedback from
AFT and other teacher unions made it unlikely that the CDC would be able to release the
Operational Strategy according to the previously planned release date of February 3, 2021. 1712

AFT’s feedback was also apparently serious enough to necessitate the CDC scheduling
another meeting with AFT staff to discuss the Operational Strategy the following Monday,
February 1, 2021. 1713

It is unclear when the CDC initially decided that they would be open to accepting
suggestions and edits in the guidance from AFT. According to emails reviewed by the Select
Subcommittee, Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) wrote to Ms. Weingarten that the CDC “did not seem to
be super open to suggested edits” on January 31, 2021. 1714 On February 1, 2021, Ms. Nedrow
(Trautner) again emailed Ms. Weingarten writing that “it seems very unlikely any of our changes
will be incorporated because the document is mostly through their internal review process.” 1715

1711
Walensky Hearing Cite.
1712
E-Mail from Sherri Berger, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, to Dawn O’Connell, Dep’t. of Health and
Human Serv., et. al. (Jan. 30, 2021).
1713
Id.
1714
E-Mail from Kelly Trautner, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to Randi Weingarten, President, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, et.
al. (Feb. 1, 2021, 6:27 PM).
1715
Id.

Page 426 of 520

 Another AFT employee, Ms. Chelsea Prax, seemed less enthusiastic after the follow-up
meeting with the CDC on February 1, 2021, writing in an email to colleagues that “it’s not clear
that CDC wanted feedback, despite their “we’re listening” opening comments.” 1716 However,
Ms. Prax openly wondered if AFT was pursing “other dialogues” with the Biden-Harris
Administration related to the guidance. 1717

Regardless, it is hardly surprising that AFT staff may have felt that the CDC was not open
to their feedback. AFT staff clearly were not satisfied with the guidance and believed that its
mitigation measures did not go far enough.

According to emails reviewed by the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Walke described the
follow-up meeting with AFT staff on February 1, 2021 as “difficult.” 1718 Specifically, Dr. Walke
wrote that “it seemed as though the staff had not read it, confused it with another document, or
perhaps, did not understand the intent.” 1719 Among other things, AFT wanted the guidance to
support more testing, ventilation standards, and enforcement mechanisms for mitigation
efforts. 1720

Dr. Massetti testified that the type of feedback received from AFT made the call difficult.

Dr. Greta Massetti (Oct. 31, 2023)

Q. Can you explain what made the call difficult?

A. …[T]he type of feedback they gave was inconsistent with what we

had heard from other partners. And in particular they were
encouraging us to incorporate a lot of language in the guidance that
really is not CDC’s kind of scope.

1716
E-Mail from Chelsea Prax, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to Marla Ucelli-Kashyap, Am. Fed’n of Teachers (Feb. 1,
2021, 2:38 PM).
1717
Id.
1718
E-Mail from Henry Walke, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, to Sherri Berger, Ctrs. for Disease Control
and Prevention, Carole Johnson, Testing Coordinator, COVID-19 Response Team, The White House (Feb. 1, 2021,
8:03 PM).
1719
Id.
1720
Id.

Page 427 of 520

 ***

Q. On the call, if you remember, what did they mean by, “Wanted
enforcement mechanisms for mitigation efforts in schools”?

A. I think they wanted for us to be able to—or for CDC to mandate—

or had made suggestions that CDC could require wearing masks,
things like that. But we really don’t have any authority and would
not be able to make those kinds of recommendations. 1721

FINDING: The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Accepted American
Federation of Teachers Edits to the Operational Strategy.

According to documents and communications reviewed by the Select Subcommittee, Dr.

Walensky asked Ms. Weingarten and AFT to provide explicit language during the January 29,
2021 meeting. 1722

Dr. Massetti testified that, while the CDC invites input from stakeholders, it is not
obliged to accept edits.

Dr. Greta Massetti (October 31, 2023)

Q. Would those outside groups be given the opportunity to edit or

provide comment [on draft guidance]?

A. Yes. And generally we invited comments or requests for

clarification, but we—our standard practice was to make it clear
that we would consider any inputs, but we were not obligated to
make changes based on those inputs.

Q. Did you ever receive line-by-line edits from any of the outside
groups on the school reopening guidance?

1721
Masetti TI, at 51-51.
1722
E-Mail from Kelly Trautner, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to Marla Ucelli-Kashyap, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, et. al.
(Jan. 29, 2021, 6:43 PM).

Page 428 of 520

 A. Could I get some clarification on what you mean—how you would
define a line-by-line edit?

Q. Like a traditional, like, strike and replace or a traditional we need

this specific line added. Not like general ideas or thoughts, but
actual—the outside group providing language.

A. Yes, sometimes we had outside groups providing language, yes. 1723

Dr. Massetti’s testimony is seemingly contradicted by Dr. Walke who testified that, while
the CDC often receives comments and suggestions from outside partners, it is “uncommon” for
outside partners to send line-by-line edits. Dr. Walke also testified that it was “uncommon” for
the CDC to “incorporate” such edits.

Dr. Henry Walke (February 18, 2022)

Q. So, knowing that it’s uncommon to send draft guidances outside

the government, is it uncommon for outside groups to send draft
language to…the CDC?

A. It’s uncommon.

…
Q. Uncommon for, like, line-by-line edits or additions?

A. That’s correct.

Q. In general, if an outside group send [the CDC] a line-by-line edit,

do you think it is appropriate to accept it?

A. As I have said before, it would be uncommon for us to incorporate

line-by-line edits into our guidance. 1724

On February 1, 2021, Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) sent a follow-up email to staff at the White
House and the CDC. 1725 Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) then provided proposed language on behalf of
Ms. Weingarten that included several accommodations “to limit the risk of workplace
exposure.” 1726 [hereinafter “AFT Edit 1”]. 1727

1723
Masetti TI, at 19020.
1724
Walke TI., at 60-61 & 66.
1725
E-Mail from Kelly Trautner, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, to Ms. Carole Johnson, Testing Coordinator, COVID-19
Response Team, The White House, et. al. (Feb. 1, 2021, 7:27 PM) (hereinafter AFT Edit 1).
1726
Id.
1727
Id.

Page 429 of 520

 On February 3, 2021, Dr. Walensky replied to Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) to inform her that
the accommodation language was being “worked” into the guidance. 1728

1728
E-Mail from Dr. Rochelle Walensky, Dir., U.S. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, to Carole Johnson,
Testing Coordinator, COVID-19 Response Team, The White House, et. al. (Feb. 3, 2021, 5:04 PM).

Page 430 of 520

 On the morning of February 10, 2021, AFT was able to review a copy of the Operational
Strategy that was leaked to The New York Times. 1729 AFT staff quickly expressed concern that the
Operational Strategy draft allowed for schools to be open at any level of community
transmission. 1730 In relevant part, the draft language directed: 1731

At any level of community transmission, all schools can provide in-person

instruction (either full or hybrid), through strict adherence to mitigation
strategies. Recommended learning modes vary to minimize risk of SARS-
CoV-2 transmission in school by emphasizing layered mitigation,
including school policies requiring universal and correct mask use. The
recommended learning modes (in-person, hybrid) depend on the level of
community transmission and strict adherence to mitigation. 1732

AFT—specifically, Ms. Weingarten—was not pleased that Operational Strategy would

allow schools to open at any level of community transmission. On the morning of February 11,
2021, Ms. Weingarten texted her concerns to Dr. Walensky, asking for a meeting after the
Operational Guidance was leaked. 1733 Dr. Walensky responded that she could meet that
afternoon. 1734

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1729
E-Mail from Marla Ucelli-Kashyap, Am. Fed. of Teachers, to Justin Stone, Am. Fed. of Teachers, et. al. (Feb.
10, 2021, 1:52 PM).
1730
Id.
1731
Id. (emphasis added).
1732
Id.
1733
Newly Revealed Texts Show Relationship Between Teachers Unions, Biden’s CDC, FAIRFAX REPUBLICANS (June
5, 2023).
1734
Id.

Page 432 of 520

Page 433 of 520
 Shortly after the text exchange between Ms. Weingarten and Dr. Walensky, Ms. Nedrow
(Trautner) emailed Dr. Walensky expressing AFT’s concerns with the guidance and provided
another edit. 1735 Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) stated that AFT was “deeply concerned” about the
language and stated that AFT did not “believe that any current research ha[d] demonstrated that
all schools…can safely reopen.” 1736

1735
E-Mail from Ms. Kelly Trautner, American Fed. Of Teachers, to Dr. Rochelle Walensky, Dir., U.S. Ctrs. For
Disease Control & Prevention, et. al. (Feb. 11, 2021, 4:25 PM).
1736
Id.

Page 434 of 520

 Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) then provided language that would permit the CDC to update the
Operational Strategy in the event of a new SARS-CoV-2 variant [hereinafter “AFT Edit 2”]. 1737

In the event high-community transmission results from a new variant of

SARS-CoV-2, a new update of these guidelines may be necessary.

These edits were intended to make it more likely that schools would close to in-person
learning. According to Ms. Nedrow’s (Trautner) email to Ms. Weingarten, the draft language was
meant to address AFT’s concerns about the absence of “triggers” that would automatically cause
schools to close. 1738 Specifically, the AFT advised Dr. Walensky that its draft language should be
incorporated to remediate “the absence of a closure threshold” and AFT’s continued efforts to
“urge the inclusion of clear closure triggers in the imminent guidance.” 1739

On February 11, 2021, Ms. Ucelli-Kashyap told her colleagues that the guidance would
not include “a closing metric, but there may be some useful nuanced language there.” 1740 Ms.
Nedrow (Trautner) testified that the edit was not “necessarily rooted in science.”

Ms. Kelly Nedrow (Trautner) (June 23, 2023)

Q. I’m just wondering why [the suggested change] is

necessary…considering the CDC was already qualifying that
schools could go hybrid learning if they needed to and had to
follow all the mitigation strategies that CDC was advocating for,
which at that time and throughout the pandemic has been masking
and social distancing and the other things that you’ve talked about.
So I just don’t understand why adding the qualifier was
scientifically necessary.

A. So…we had two top priorities. One was making sure that the
environment was safe. The other was making sure that our
members felt safe, which isn’t necessarily rooted in science, but,
practically speaking, was necessary to get people to be willing to
go back into buildings, and that was the thrust of this sentence that
we recommended.

Q. So there was no science supporting that sentence; it was strictly to

persuade your members to go back to school?

1737
Id.
1738
E-Mail from Kelly Trautner, American Fed. Of Teachers, to Rochelle Walensky, M.D., Dir., U.S. Ctrs. For
Disease Control & Prevention, et. al. (Feb. 11, 2021, 4:25 PM).
1739
Id.
1740
E-Mail from Ucelli-Kashyap, Am. Fed. of Teachers, to Rob Well, Am. Fed. of Teachers, et. al. (Feb. 11, 2021,
5:46 PM).

Page 435 of 520

 A. We knew that the CDC—we were pretty certain the CDC would
update guidance if it needed to update guidance. 1741

Additionally, Ms. Nedrow (Trautner) testified that “everything” that was proposed for the
guidance was cleared by Ms. Weingarten.

Ms. Kelly Nedrow (Trautner) (June 23, 2023)

Q. Did you ever have a conversation with Ms. Weingarten about a

closure threshold or a closure trigger?

A. About—with respect to the CDC guidance?

Q. Um-hum.

A. I mean, we discussed it. Everything that was in the emails in the

record was discussed with our President. There was no position
that we took that was not okayed by our President. 1742

According to documents reviewed by the Select Subcommittee, Ms. Weingarten had a

call with Dr. Walensky regarding the guidance shortly after the guidance was leaked. 1743 Later
that night, Ms. Weingarten and AFT staff also had a “Confidential Briefing” with members of the
Department of Education as well as the CDC. 1744

While the specific content of those calls is unknown, Dr. Walensky directed her staff to
organize a call with AFT and NEA the next morning prior to the guidance being released. 1745

According to emails reviewed by the Select Subcommittee, on February 12, 2021, Dr.
Walensky instructed Dr. Walke to incorporate the AFT’s language into the Operational Strategy,
even though the Operational Strategy had already been previewed for the media. 1746 Specifically,
Dr. Walensky emailed “[a]re we able to add the bolded line below, bolding is mine.” Dr. Walke
replied, “[y]es, will work with team.” 1747

Accordingly, AFT Edit 2 also made it into the final Operational Strategy largely
unchanged.

1741
Trautner TI. At 71-71.
1742
Trautner TI. 77
1743
E-Mail from Christopher Jones, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, to Randi Weingarten, Am. Fed. of
Teachers, et. al. (Feb. 11, 2021, 5:58 PM).
1744
E-Mail from Donna Harris-Aikens, Dep’t of Edu., to Randi Weingarten, Am. Fed. of Teachers (Feb. 11, 2021,
7:43 PM)
1745
Id.
1746
E-Mail from Walke, COVID-19 Incident Manager, U.S. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, to Dr. Rochelle
Walensky, Dir. U.S. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention (Feb. 12, 2021); Trevor Hunnicutt, U.S. CDC
Recommends Schools Reopen With Masks and Rigid Health Protocols, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2021).
1747
E-Mail from Walke (Feb. 12, 2021).

Page 436 of 520

III. The Harmful Impacts from School Closures

The decision to close schools had predictable, but disastrous consequences for students’
academics and mental and physical health. While the full scope of negative consequences of
school closures is likely incalculable, certain adverse effects are documented.

The evidence makes it clear that any public health response that warrants closing schools
should face the highest levels of scrutiny. School closure policy should be informed by science
and data, not fear and politics.

FINDING: Pandemic-era School Closures Adversely Impacted Academic Performance that

Will Continue for Years.

There has been a significant decline in students’ academic performance because of

pandemic-era school closure policies. Standardized test scores show that children lost decades
worth of academic progress. 1748 The performance of 9-year-olds in math and reading declined to
levels recorded two decades ago, and the average composite score for the ACT by high school
graduates dropped below 20 for the first time since 1991. 1749 The students whose classes were
less disrupted in the 2020-2021 school year lost about 20 percent of math learning compared to
losses of 50 percent for students who did not have access to in-person instruction. 1750

1748
Sarah Mervosh, The Pandemic Erased Two Decades of Progress in Math and Reading, THE N.Y. TIMES, (Sep. 1,
2022); Cheyanne Mumphrey, ACT test scores drop to lowest in 30 years in pandemic slide, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct.
12, 2022); Rebecca Jack, et. al., Pandemic Schooling Mode and Student Test Scores: Evidence from U.S. School
Districts, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES (Apr. 26, 2022).
1749
Id.
1750
Leonhardt, David, Not Good for Learning, THE N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2022).

Page 438 of 520

 Disturbingly, these declines were the most significant among low-income children and
children from racial minorities. 1751 Schools in urban areas attended by low income and minority
children were kept closed longer. 1752 Accordingly, Black and Latino students and low-income
students fell further behind in learning than their peers. 1753

The effects of pandemic-era school closure policies continue to impact students today.
Students are not rebounding from the effect of the school closure policies: “Analyses of student
test scores have repeatedly shown severe declines in academic achievement… accelerating
student learning… is notoriously challenging.” 1754 More troubling than students’ inability to
“catch up” with where they should be academically, though, is the fact that the problem is
growing worse: “except for the youngest learners, students are progressing more slowly than
their pre-pandemic peers – furthering widening academic gaps.” 1755

Many students never returned to public schools following prolonged pandemic-era school
closures. While many students were enrolled in private schools, 1756 an estimated 230,000
students have simply “disappeared” from public schools since the pandemic closed schools. 1757

According to Eric Hanushek, an economist at the Hoover Institution, pandemic-era

students could lose an estimated $70,000 in lifetime income. 1758 These losses are estimated to be
two to nine percent of lifetime earnings, depending on the state they live and the severity of
school closures. 1759 As a result of a lower-skilled workforce, states are estimated to have 0.6 to
2.9 percent lower gross domestic product (GDP), as total societal losses could amount to $28
trillion over the century. 1760

The fact that these children had the poor fortune of being children during a global
pandemic has only been exacerbated by pandemic-era school closure policies. While initial
government action erring on the side of caution in response to a novel pandemic is a sensible
course of action, the failure to adjust to current data and understanding of COVID-19 cost these
students valuable time inside of the classroom. Again, the complete scope of academic loss is

1751
Id.
1752
Id.
1753
Id.
1754
Sarah Schwartz, Students Aren’t Rebounding From the Academic Effects of the Pandemic, EDUCATION WEEK
(July 11, 2023).
1755
Id.
1756
Jason L. Riley, School Choice Made Big Gains During the Covid Pandemic, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov.
22, 2022).
1757
Bianca Vazquez Toness & Sharon Lurye, Thousands of kids are missing from school. Where did they go?,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 9, 2023); Thomas S. Dee, Where the Kids Went: Nonpublic Schooling and Demographic
Change during the Pandemic Exodus from Public Schools, URBAN (Feb. 9, 2023).
1758
Emily Baumgaertner, Students Lost One-Third of a School Year to Pandemic, Study Finds, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
30, 2023; Eric A. Hanushek, The Economic Cost of the Pandemic: State by State, HOOVER EDUCATION SUCCESS
INITIATIVE (2023).
1759
Id.
1760
Id.

Page 439 of 520

impossible to measure. However, the data is clear enough to display that these policies had a
significant adverse impact education

FINDING: School Closures Significantly Contributed to Increased Instances of Mental and

Behavioral Health Issues.

During the pandemic, rates of psychological distress among students, including anxiety,
depression, and other mental health problems, significantly increased. Among other things, these
mental health issues can be attributed to pandemic-era school closure policies, which isolated
students from their peers, restricted sports and other extracurricular activities, and led to
excessive screen time. 1761

Initially, school closures primarily impacted students with pre-existing mental conditions.
Many of these students lost access to critical mental health resources usually available through
school. 1762 As the pandemic progressed, however, these mental health issues broadened to affect
all students. 1763

In 2021, according to CDC data, 37 percent of high school students reported experiencing
poor mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic, and 44 percent reported they persistently
felt sad or hopeless during the past year compared to 36.7 percent in 2019. 1764

Suicide attempts increased sharply for adolescents with suicide attempts by 12- to 17-
year-old girls rising 51 percent from early 2019 to early 2021. 1765

A 2021 NIH study acknowledged that COVID-19 related disruptions to everyday life led
to increases in anxiety and depression, which in turn led teens to self-medicate. 1766 As a result,
the U.S. Surgeon General issued a warning, and the American Academy of Pediatrics declared a
national state of emergency in children’s mental health. 1767

1761
Tracy Hoeg, et al., Our next national priority should be to reopen all America’s schools for full time in-person
learning, THE HILL (Mar. 20, 2021).
1762
Joyce Lee, Mental health effects of school closures during COVID-19, THE LANCET (June 2020).
1763
Tracy Hoeg, et al., Our next national priority should be to reopen all America’s schools for full time in-person
learning, THE HILL (Mar. 20, 2021).
1764
Erica Green, Administration Offers Guidance to Schools as They Shut Down on Their Own, THE N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 13, 2020); See, News Release, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, New CDC data illuminate youth
mental health threats during the COVID-19 pandemic (Mar. 31, 2022).
1765
Id.
1766
Chopra, Deepti, et al., Prevalence of self-reported anxiety and self-medication among upper and middle
socioeconomic strata amidst COVID-19 pandemic, JOURNAL OF EDUCATION AND HEALTH PROMOTION (Feb. 27,
2021).
1767
Press Release, U.S. Surgeon General Issues Advisory on Youth Mental Health Crisis Further Exposed by
COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Dec.7, 2021); Press Release, American Academy of
Pediatrics, AAP-AACAP-CHA Declaration of a National Emergency in Child and Adolescent Mental Health (Oct.
19, 2021).

Page 440 of 520

 Reports have shown that for “children between the ages of 11 and 17, additional weeks of
home schooling in the early months of the pandemic correlated with worsening mental health
measures.” 1768 This study found that “younger children were more adversely affected,” a
troubling, yet again predictable, consequence of the isolation of the most vulnerable of the
population. 1769

The data are clear that prologued school closures had an adverse effect on the mental
health of students. Science shows that the prolonged closures had negative effects. When science
showed that the shutdowns were no longer necessary, policies should have acted to mitigate the
harm done.

FINDING: School Closures Made an Already Alarming Trend in Declining Physical Health
Worse.

Pandemic-era school closure policies not only affected academics and students’ mental
health, but also had negative consequences on their physical health. As with students’ academic
performance and mental health, the adverse physical effects were predictable; prolonged school
closures had a measured impact on students’ physical health. 1770 Among other things, in-person
schooling provides students with access to nutritious lunches and regularly scheduled physical
activity, including exercise classes, sports, and other extracurricular activities. 1771

As a result of school closures, physical activity significantly decreased and sedentary

behavior, including but not limited to watching television, playing video games, and using the
computer, increased. 1772

Accordingly, the rate of BMI increases for children ages 2-19 approximately doubled
from pre-pandemic rates. 1773 The number of new cases of Type 2 diabetes among children during
the first year of the pandemic increased 182 percent from pre-pandemic levels. 1774 These
increases disproportionately affected black youth. 1775

1768
Gretchen Vogel, Pandemic school closures were especially hard on the mental health of younger, more
vulnerable children, SCIENCE.ORG (Aug. 18, 2023); citing Christina Felfe, et al., The youth mental health crisis:
Quasi-experimental evidence on the role of school closures, SCIENCE ADVANCES (Aug. 18, 2023).
1769
Id.
1770
Andrew Rundle, et al., COVID-19—Related School Closings and Risk of Weight Gain Among Children, THE
OBESITY SOCIETY, (Mar. 30, 2020).
1771
Id.; Jennifer Nuzzo, We Don’t Need to Close Schools to Fight the Coronavirus, THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020).
1772
Paulo Puccinelli, et al., Reduced level of physical activity during COVID-19 pandemic is associated with
depression and anxiety levels: an internet-based survey, BMC PUBLIC HEALTH (Mar. 1, 2021); D.S. Burstein,
Cardiopulmonary Exercise Performance in the Pediatric and Young Adult Population Before and During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, PEDIATRIC CARDIOLOGY (May 3, 2022).
1773
Press Release, Ctrs. For Disease Control and Prevention, Longitudinal Trends in Body Mass Index Before and
During the COVID-19 Pandemic Among Persons Aged 2-19 Years – United States, 2018-2020, MMWR Morb
Mortal Wkly Rep, (Sep. 17, 2021).
1774
Brynn Marks, et al., Increase in the Diagnosis and Severity of Presentation of Pediatric Type 1 and Type 2
Diabetes during the COVID-19 Pandemic, HORMONE RESEARCH IN PEDIATRICS (Sept. 24, 2021).
1775
Id.

Page 441 of 520

 It should come as no shock that isolation is not healthy, in any respect, for people—let
alone children. The results of prolonged school closures have exacerbated physical health issues
while simultaneously hampering activities that would otherwise mitigate those issues, such as
communal sport and exercise, and a healthy diet.

Generally, the immune system benefits from physical activity. It is well established that
accelerated weight gain and obesity can cause long-term metabolic changes that increase the risk
of heart disease, cancer, mental health issues, and diabetes, as well as complications with
subsequent morbidity and premature mortality, for children. 1776 During the pandemic, studies
showed that obese children were more likely to suffer severe respiratory complications as a result
of COVID-19. 1777

Yet again, warnings from scientists, and the common sense understanding that isolation is
bad for a child, were largely unheeded by policymakers. A February 2021 preprint of a study
(finally published in January 2022) found negative health impact on children due to school
closures, and warned of already troubling data that would only compound if closures continued:

Available data are short-term and longer-term harms are likely to be

magnified by further school closures. Data are urgently needed on longer-
term impacts using strong research designs, particularly amongst vulnerable
groups. These findings are important for policymakers seeking to balance
the risks of transmission through school-aged children with the harms of
closing schools. 1778

Despite the evidence of incredibly low morbidity among children, students were not
given the benefit of balanced policy.

1776
Sandeep Tripathi, et al., The Impact of Obesity on Disease Severity and Outcomes Among Hospitalized Children
With COVID-19, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS (Nov. 1, 2021); Lyudmyla Kompaniyets, et al., Underlying
Medical Conditions Associated With Severe COVID-19 Illness Among Children, JAMA NETWORK (June 7, 2021).
1777
Brynn Marks, et al., Increase in the Diagnosis and Severity of Presentation of Pediatric Type 1 and Type 2
Diabetes during the COVID-19 Pandemic, HORMONE RESEARCH IN PEDIATRICS (Sept. 24, 2021).
1778
Russell Viner, et al., Impacts of school closures on physical and mental health of children and young people: a
systematic review, MEDRXIV (Feb. 12, 2021); Russell Viner, et al., School Closures During Social Lockdown and
Mental Health, Health Behaviors, and Well-being Among Children and Adolescents During the First COVID-19
Wave, JAMA PEDIATRICS (Jan. 18, 2022).

Page 442 of 520

Cooperation By the Executive Branch and Others with Congress, the
Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, and Others in
Connection with Oversight of the Preparedness for and Response to the
Coronavirus Pandemic

I. The Biden Administration’s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Obstructed the Select Subcommittee’s Investigation

The Executive Branch largely coordinated the U.S. government’s pandemic response,
specifically through departments like HHS and its various sub-agencies. Therefore, the Select
Subcommittee, to properly fulfill its Constitutionally mandated oversight and legislative
responsibilities, requested documents and information from HHS and its sub-agencies. This
included both the production of underlying documents and testimony from numerous agency
officials.

During the course of the Select Subcommittee’s investigation, HHS sought to impede and
slow-roll requests for documents vital to our investigation. HHS also repeatedly hampered the
Select Subcommittee’s access to and interviews of key witnesses. In fact, based on statements
from Ms. Egorin, it appears HHS intentionally under-resourced its component that responds to
legislative oversight requests as a pretextual excuse regarding why they cannot timely comply
with requests from Congress. 1779 HHS did not specifically refute this point in subsequent
letters. 1780 Furthermore, Congresswoman Jill Tokuda (D-HI) offered Ms. Egorin an opportunity
to refute intentionally under-resourcing her legislation office during testimony before the
subcommittee but chose not to refute this point. 1781

The Honorable Melanie Egorin (January 31, 2024)

Q. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Before I get started I would like to take a
moment to clear some things up for the record. We have heard
accusations that the Department has intentionally devoted minimal
resources towards handling congressional oversight and inquiries,
but let's also remind people that every day your primary
responsibility is the health and wellness of 340 million Americans,
keeping them alive and well. Assistant Secretary Egorin, would
you like to clarify anything briefly regarding this claim?
1779
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, to Hon. Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., at 7
(Nov. 2, 2023).
1780
See e.g., Letter from Hon. Melanie Anne Egorin, Ass’t Sec’y for Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., to Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Accountability (Nov. 8, 2023); Letter from Hon. Samuel Bagenstos, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., to Hon. Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., et. al., Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability (Nov. 9, 2023).
1781
Overseeing the Department of Health and Human Services’ Compliance with Congress: Hearing Before the
Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, 118th Cong. (Jan. 31, 2024), p. 29 [hereinafter “Overseeing HHS
Hearing”].

Page 443 of 520

 A. I want to just acknowledge the mission of the Department is to
make sure we are taking care of the welfare of the American
people and that that is a very broad set of activities.

FINDING: The Biden Administration’s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Deliberately Obfuscated Evidence that Could Incriminate or Embarrass Senior
Public Health Officials.

The volume of HHS’ production of documents is completely unsatisfactory. The Select

Subcommittee’s requests for records concerning the origins of COVID-19 and funding of gain of
function research is illustrative of this conclusion. During its two-year investigation, the Select
Subcommittee made repeated requests for records pertaining to the origins of COVID-19 and the
U.S. funding of gain of function research. To limit HHS’ search efforts, the Select Subcommittee
identified specific employees and search terms. 1782 In the past 22 months, during which it was
supposed to search multiple employees’ email accounts using a long list of search terms, HHS
only produced 14,799 pages of documents that it claims pertain to the origins of COVID-19 or
gain of function research. The vast majority of these documents contained some form of
redaction or were entirely already publicly available. In contrast, a FOIA search of only Dr.
Morens’ official email account for only documents between himself and Dr. Daszak or using the
terms “Daszac” [sic] or “gain-of-function” yielded more than 30,000 pages of documents. 1783

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1782
See e.g., Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic,
H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability, et. al., to Hon. Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., at Appendices II & III. (Nov. 2, 2023).
1783
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, et.
al., to David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health (May
8, 2024).

Page 444 of 520

Page 445 of 520
 In sum, the Select Subcommittee requested documents from 12 custodians that were
responsive to questions regarding the origins of COVID-19, the work of EcoHealth, interactions
with the WIV, and gain-of-function research. This request resulted in HHS producing 14,799
pages of documents. However, one FOIA search of one custodian for only two search terms
resulted in 30,000 pages of documents. These facts support that HHS obstructed the Select
Subcommittee.

The substance and quality of HHS’ production of documents is unacceptable. For

example, a document production on March 11, 2024 consisted of 413 pages of documents. All
but 37 pages—about nine percent—of that production are printed media stories that were part of
an NIH officials’ regular morning news distribution list. Many other productions contained
similar public documents. At a hearing in January 2024, the Select Subcommittee unequivocally
told HHS that it had produced documents that are simply unrelated to our requests—“You [HHS]
have produced documents that are not relevant to our requests or hundreds of pages of news
articles. This is unacceptable....” 1784 Yet, HHS continued to produce these irrelevant documents.
These productions demonstrate that HHS created an appearance of compliance by increasing its
production page count by feeding the Select Subcommittee hundreds of pages of nonresponsive,
irrelevant, and public documents.

The pace of HHS’ production of documents has been abysmal. Focusing on its
production of documents relevant to the origins of COVID-19, HHS’ pace of production has
slowed over time. In the months prior to November 2023, HHS routinely produced three or even
four productions per month. 1785 Since November 2023, HHS is averaging just two productions
per month and has not made a single production since September 6, 2024. 1786

HHS’ productions are incomplete or overly redacted. HHS produced to the Select
Subcommittee many documents more heavily redacted than those same documents produced via
FOIA. 1787 FOIA explicitly does not apply to Congressional requests. According to the law itself,
“[t]his section is not authority to withhold information from congress.” 1788 Additionally, the
accompanying bill report states, “[f]urther, it is made clear that, because this section only refers
to the public’s right to know, it cannot, therefore be backhandedly construed as authorizing
the withholding of information from the Congress, the collective representative of the
public.” 1789

For example, the first document below was produced by HHS to the Select Subcommittee
on June 26, 2023 and the second document was produced to a FOIA requester in June 2021—
HHS redacted more information produced to Congress than it did to the FOIA requester.

1784
Overseeing HHS Hearing, supra, note 2, at 3 (Statement of Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm.
on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability).
1785
Letter Hon. Melanie Egorin, Ph.D., Ass’t Sec’y for Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs, to Hon.
Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Accountability et. al., at 7-8 (Mar. 1, 2024).
1786
Id. at 9-10.
1787
See e.g., SSCP_NIH002640 – 2967 where all names of individuals are redacted versus documents obtained via
FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. where names are, largely, unredacted.
1788
5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(d).
1789
S. Rep. No. 813 (Oct. 4, 1965).

Page 446 of 520

Page 447 of 520
 In this one example, HHS redacted the names of federal government employees, non-
governmental employees, and foreign nationals—including members of the CCP—under the
guise of a “concerning escalation of threats and harassment, particularly towards public health
professionals and scientists.” 1790 In response, the Select Subcommittee asked, “[i]s the

E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
1790

Pandemic (June 27, 2023).

Page 448 of 520

Department tracking a rise in threats since its last production on June 8? Moreover, how does the
Department know that the foreign nationals living in China whose names are redacted have
received threats? Is the Department in personal contact with these individuals?” 1791 HHS failed
to answer these questions.

Finally, HHS frequently made no effort to hide their intentional noncompliance. When
the Select Subcommittee questioned the paucity of documents produced and requested HHS’
searches, HHS refused to explain its methodology regarding how it conducted its searches. 1792
When the Select Subcommittee questioned why HHS was not complying with its requests, it
sought to interview Ms. Egorin on September 28, 2023. 1793 While never specifically refusing to
appear to be interviewed, HHS staff twice postponed the interview for a total of two weeks due
to illness. During many e-mails and phone calls, HHS staff never stated Ms. Egorin would refuse
to comply with the interview. On the eve of the scheduled interview, HHS sent a letter in which it
cravenly stated that the interview was unwarranted.

FINDING: The Biden Administration’s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Unreasonably and Possibly Illegally Limited Access to Key Witnesses.

First, HHS unreasonably delayed scheduling interviews. On February 13, 2023, the
Select Subcommittee initially requested interviews with HHS employees regarding the origins of
COVID-19 and gain of function research. 1794 It took two follow-up letters and numerous emails
and phone calls before the Select Subcommittee conducted its first interview of an HHS
employee pertaining to the origins of COVID-19 on November 2, 2023.

When HHS eventually complied with and facilitated its employees for interviews with
Select Subcommittee, the Department sought to unreasonably limit their testimony. There are
two illustrative examples of this obstruction.

First, for the Select Subcommittee’s interview with Dr. Lauer—and many subsequent
HHS officials—HHS instructed Dr. Lauer to only answer questions regarding his “review,
management, and oversight of NIH grant #R01AI110964 through April 26, 2023.” This
instruction prohibited Dr. Lauer from speaking about the renegotiation and reinstatement of
EcoHealth’s grant—a primary line of inquiry of the Select Subcommittee. 1795

1791
E-Mail from Select Subcomm. Staff to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (June 27, 2023).
1792
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Accountability, et. al., to Hon. Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 2,
2023).
1793
Id.
1794
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Accountability (Feb. 13, 2023).
1795
Letter from Hon. Melanie Egorin, Assistant Sec’y for Legislation, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, to
Michael Lauer, M.D., Deputy Dir. For Extramural Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health (Nov. 1, 2023).

Page 449 of 520

 Second, for the Select Subcommittee’s first interview of Dr. Morens, HHS instructed Dr.
Morens to only answer questions regarding his use of personal e-mail, not any substantive
questions regarding the origins of COVID-19 or his work as Senior Scientific Advisor to Dr.

Page 450 of 520

Fauci. 1796 The Select Subcommittee requested an interview with Dr. Morens even prior to
discovering his use of personal e-mail. 1797 Further, it was clear the Select Subcommittee had
questions for Dr. Morens regarding his involvement with or knowledge of the origins of COVID-
19, gain of function research, and other areas articulated in the SSCP’s mandate. 1798 On the eve
of Dr. Morens’ first interview, HHS instructed Dr. Morens to not provide “information about
your work for NIAID.” 1799

1796
See generally, Morens TI 1.
1797
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Accountability, et al., to Hon. Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Feb.
13, 2023).
1798
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Accountability, et. al., to Hon. Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Jun.
29, 2023).
1799
Letter from Hon. Melanie Anne Egorin, Ass’t Sec’y for Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to
Dr. David Morens, M.D., Senior Scientific Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health (Dec. 28, 2023).

Page 451 of 520

 These purported “authorization letters” not only obstructed the Select Subcommittee’s
investigation but are also questionably illegal. At the interview, HHS counsel attempted to
persuade the Select Subcommittee that the letter to Dr. Morens was not directive nor mandatory
in nature yet still instructed the Dr. Morens to not answer questions. Instructing a federal
government employee to not comply with Congress is unacceptable and unlawful.

Dr. David Morens (December 29, 2023)

Q. Thank you. Dr. Morens, before we get into the

substance last night, I'm presuming you, Tim, and we
received an authorization memo from HHS Assistant
Secretary Egorin. I would like to introduce that as
Exhibit 1.

HHS Counsel. Do you have copies for Agency staff?

Q. I'll wait for it to get around.

Q. Did you receive this memo last night?

Dr. Morens. I did.

Q. Did counsel receive this memo last night?

Mr. Belevetz. Yes.

Q. I would like to state for the record that the Select

Subcommittee did not and does not agree to the terms
of this memo. Despite that, the operative paragraph
reads: "Given that the subject matter of the Select
Subcommittee's requests center on communications
from your personal, rather than official NIH,
accounts, it is the Department of Health and Human
Services' understanding that you will not be
providing information about your work for NIAID.
If you have any questions regarding the scope of your
authorization to discuss information pertaining to
your official work, please consult with agency
counsel prior to disclosure of such information to the
Select Subcommittee." The premise that the Select
Subcommittee's inquiry only involves your use of
personal email is false. The letter sent to you by
Chairman Wenstrup, in fact, cited emails sent from
your official email and other documents through
which you have knowledge regarding COVID

Page 452 of 520

 origins. The Department knows this. Second, the
Department cannot block you from providing
testimony regarding your official work at NIAID or
on COVID origins. The decision as to what
testimony you give rests solely with you. The
Department also knows this.

Q. I would like to introduce Majority Exhibit 2.

Q. While it is working its way around, I will identify it.

At the bottom right side of the second column, this is
Title 5, Section 7211 of the United States Code. It
reads: "The right of employees, individually or
collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of
Congress, or to furnish information to either House
of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof,
may not be interfered with or denied." Dr. Morens,
the Department's authorization memo is attempting
to obstruct this committee and attempting to interfere
with your legal right to furnish information to
Congress.

HHS Counsel. Mitch, I'm going to object to your characterization of

the authorization memo.

Q. That's fine. 1800

Dr. David Morens (December 29, 2023)

Q. If this is legally binding on Dr. Morens, this is a

crime. So it's either advisory and he can answer
whatever questions we ask him, or HHS is taking
the position that you can interfere with an
employee's ability to talk to Congress.

HHS Counsel. HHS does not take the position that we can interfere
with an employee's ability to talk to Congress.

Q. So then the scope of this authorization is, I guess,

advisory to Dr. Morens?
HHS Counsel. John, in the memo itself, it says, "The purpose of
this memorandum is to provide you with guidance

1800
Morens TI 1, at 10-11.

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 on the extent to which you are authorized to provide
information to the Select Subcommittee in your
capacity as an NIH employee." That's the purpose
of the memorandum.
Q. "If you have any questions regarding the scope of
your authorization to discuss information pertaining
to your official work, please consult with agency
counsel prior to disclosure of such information to
the Select Subcommittee." That sounds mandatory.
And I guess the concern is particularly acute with
Dr. Morens, because the previous ones have more or
less been within the scope of, like, the February
letters. But with Dr. Morens, we unfortunately have
the situation where he isn't able to be represented by
agency counsel, but he's retained counsel on his
own dime, so there's a divergence of legal interests
between Dr. Morens and the Department. I might
also add that the Department is going to be the one
that's adjudicating the NARA, the records retention
issues. And so the impression that this memo gives
is that you guys are essentially precluding him from
speaking to stuff that's relevant to the origins
investigation uniquely to him. But you also have a
unique degree of leverage over him because he is
under investigation, like any I don't know the
probability of this, but, like, technically, he's at risk
of being separated from federal service, he's at risk
of having portions of his pension forfeited for these
violations. Those are adjudications of, like, OGC
HHS are going to be involved in making. And
you're now telling him, you can't talk about your
official work at NIAID when every other NIAID
employee that we've done a voluntary interview
with has been allowed to talk about that.
HHS Counsel. John, this memorandum is separate and apart from
any internal personnel process that might be
happening. To be clear, it is not any kind of
compulsion or threat that there will be adverse
employment consequences if he does not abide by
the terms of it. That is not the case.

Page 454 of 520

 Q. So this is purely advisory? We can ask him
questions like we have every other NIAID official?
HHS Counsel. You can ask him questions as you would any other
NIAID official. We will instruct him to limit his
responses to his personal, non official activities.
He, as a witness, is free to respond as he sees fit. 1801

Despite HHS’ position that Dr. Morens was free to answer questions regardless of
instruction otherwise, Dr. Morens interpreted these instructions as binding and informed the
Select Subcommittee he would not answer questions if instructed. 1802

In sum, during two years of interaction with the subcommittee HHS has proven itself to
be thoroughly disingenuous, unreliable, and cowardly in responding to oversight requests.

1801
Morens TI 1, at 13-15.
1802
See generally, Morens TI 1.

Page 455 of 520

II. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. and Dr. Peter Daszak Obstructed the Select
Subcommittee’s Investigation and Misled the Public

FINDING: EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Obstructed a Congressional Investigation

On February 13, 20223, the Select Subcommittee first requested documents from Dr.
Daszak and EcoHealth. 1803 Since, Dr. Daszak has attempted to obstruct the Select
Subcommittee’s investigation. Maybe most illustrative of this is that, according to Dr. Daszak,
his goal of the May 1, 2024 public hearing before the Select Subcommittee was to “respond in a
way that minimizes damage to EHA as much as possible.” This conspicuously is not the same as
telling the truth.

Some examples of Dr. Daszak’s and EcoHealth’s obstruction include:

1. As a preliminary matter, before the Select Subcommittee intervened, Dr. Daszak was
searching, collecting, and producing documents and communications himself. 1804 This
provides the opportunity for the subject of an investigation to either delete, ignore, or
alter evidence. This is wholly inappropriate. As discussed, the Select Subcommittee has
evidence that Dr. Daszak did, in fact, doctor documents he released to the public.

2. In response to the Select Subcommittee’s request for documents and communications

between Dr. Daszak and Dr. Marion Koopmans, a member of the WHO origins
investigation, Dr. Daszak planned to obstruct the Select Subcommittee by claiming
“diplomatic immunity” and “WHO privacy rules.” 1805

1803
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Accountability, to Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Feb. 13, 2023)
1804
E-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, Consultant (May 4, 2024
2:33 PM).
1805
E-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, Consultant (May 13, 2024
2:43 AM).

Page 456 of 520

3. In preparation for Dr. Daszak’s public hearing on May 1, 2024, his consultant suggested
Dr. Daszak respond in a “slow, deliberate cadence” and “with agonizingly slow delivery.”
Dr. Daszak responded, “I like both of these.”

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 457 of 520

Page 458 of 520
 4. On April 26, 2024, after the Select Subcommittee threatened to subpoena EcoHealth for
documents, Dr. Daszak wrote, “[o]nce they write to us with issues on our production,
we’ll rapidly produce more and try to head this off at the pass.” 1806 Dr. Daszak stated that
he was withholding documents and then, once the Select Subcommittee threatened a
subpoena, decided to produce more.

1806
E-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, et. al., Consultant (Apr.
26, 2024 5:42 PM).

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 5. Since February 2023, the Select Subcommittee has requested all communications
between Dr. Daszak and the FBI. On April 11, 2024, Dr. Daszak transmitted a letter to the
Select Subcommittee that stated, “[t]he Federal Bureau of Investigation were dealing with
threats to EcoHealth Alliance, and to EcoHealth Alliance staff, including Dr. Daszak and
his family. For this reason, and because some likely relate to active investigations,
EcoHealth Alliance cannot provide these records to the SSCP. If you have further
questions, please contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation.” 1807 This is not true.

In fact, a draft of Dr. Daszak’s response letter more accurately stated, “[t]he Federal
Bureau of Investigation were dealing with threats to EcoHealth Alliance and to Dr.
Daszak and his family, as well as other intelligence matters…” 1808

On April 19, 2024, Dr. Daszak in an email to his counsel, stated, “[m]ost emails are about
threats…some are mixed in with responses to [the FBI] about covid origins and there are
a few where I give them information on the situation in China, on people we’ve worked
with etc. Its massively damaging to our reputation to reveal the discussions I had with
them about this and we need to avoid this at all costs in my opinion.” 1809

6. On March 30, 2023, Dr. Daszak wrote that he transmitted documents to the Select
Subcommittee that were “very reduced in scope” and that EcoHealth was not “sending
every record” nor searching “all staff.” 1810

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1807
Letter from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Chairman, Select
Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability (Apr. 11, 2024).
1808
E-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, et. al., Consultant (Apr. 5,
2024 1:06 AM) (emphasis added).
1809
E-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, et. al., Consultant (Apr.
19, 2024 9:05 PM).
1810
E-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, et. al., Consultant (Mar.
20, 2023 11:51 PM).

Page 460 of 520

 7. On February 14, 2023, Dr. Daszak, after receiving a letter from the Select Subcommittee,
wrote an e-mail to his counsel, “[p]lease do what you can to slowly extend the timeline
and significantly reduce the scope…” 1811

8. As a courtesy, the Select Subcommittee allows witnesses to review their transcribed

interview transcripts prior to release. The Select Subcommittee is not required to accept
any of the witnesses’ edits. However, as a condition of this review, the witness agrees that
“the transcript is property of the Committee and you and your client agree not to share or
take pictures or digital representations of the transcript.” Dr. Daszak violated this
agreement and stated in an email that he took “screenshots of each of the issues that I
think people will try to make news out of…” 1812

1811
E-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, et. al., Consultant (Feb.
14, 2023 12:26 AM).
1812
-mail from Dr. Peter Daszak, Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., to Dr. Jeffrey Sturchio, et. al., Consultant (Jan. 25,
2024 7:14 PM).

Page 461 of 520

 Again, these actions raise serious questions regarding Dr. Daszak’s integrity and continue
to support that he is not a good steward of taxpayer dollars.

FINDING: EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. Doctored Documents It Released to the Public.

On April 7, 2024, the Select Subcommittee received a tip regarding Dr. Daszak, Dr.
Morens, and Dr. Keusch communicating regarding EcoHealth’s research activities, including
over Dr. Morens’ Gmail. 1813 The tip included the following e-mail headers:

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1813
E-mail from [REDACTED] to Select Subcomm. Staff (Apr. 7, 2024 7:07 PM).

Page 462 of 520

 In response, the Select Subcommittee sent a document request to Boston University for
responsive records from Dr. Keusch. 1814 After Dr. Keusch received the letter, he wrote, “[o]n the
advice of the lawyers, however, I have stopped deleting anything that could be construed to be
on the subcommittee’s request list…” and “[m]y plan – but not necessarily one that the lawyers
will concur is reasonable – is to tell the subcommittee that my views are well known…[and] that
I have the right to have private conversations.” 1815 Despite Dr. Keusch’s plan, Boston University
produced responsive documents to the Select Subcommittee.

On April 12, 2024, in response to the Select Subcommittee’s letter, EcoHealth issued a
press release stating the reporting “[did] not show the full text of the emails in question” and

1814
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability, to Dr. Gerald Keusch (Apr. 11, 2024).
1815
E-mail from Dr. Gerald Keusch to Dr. Peter Daszak, et. al., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Apr. 20, 2024 9:57
AM).

Page 463 of 520

claimed to release “the full text of these email chains.” 1816 In reality, Dr. Daszak personally
doctored some of the documents and did not release the entirety of the full chains to the public.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1816
https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/2024/04/ecohealth-alliance-releases-emails-that-are-the-subject-of-false-
allegations-in-the-press

Page 464 of 520

FINDING: Dr. Peter Daszak Provided False Statements to Congress in Violation of 18 U.S.C.
1001 and 18 U.S.C. 1621.

In comparing Dr. Daszak’s testimony—both during his transcribed interview and public
hearing—to available documents, it is likely Dr. Daszak provided false statements to the Select
Subcommittee in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 18 U.S.C. 1621.

Page 466 of 520

III. Dr. David Morens Likely Destroyed Evidence, Used Personal Email to Hide from
Accountability, and Acted Unbecoming of a Federal Employee

In times of great peril and uncertainty, it is up to our nation’s leaders to help guide the
country and inspire confidence in the face of doubt. During the COVID-19 pandemic, there was
no one that was looked to more than public health officials.

However, over the course of this investigation, the Select Subcommittee discovered
documents and took testimony that raised serious concerns regarding wrongdoing on behalf of
America’s public health leaders.

FINDING: Dr. David Morens Used Personal E-Mail Accounts to Avoid the Freedom of
Information Act and Accountability.

FOIA was designed to ensure a public right of access to non-privileged federal records. It
is the responsibility of federal employees to ensure official records are retained and maintained.
Dr. Morens knowingly and intentionally used personal e-mails to avoid FOIA, transparency, and
accountability. 1817 Dr. Morens displayed a pattern of disrespect and blatant disregard to his
responsibility as a federal employee.

Dr. Morens took active steps to attempt to avoid accountability, going as far as informing
other colleagues of his tactics. On July 13, 2020, Dr. Morens e-mailed Dr. Keusch and Dr.
Daszak, articulating the exact steps he takes to “immunize” himself “from trouble.” 1818

Dr. Morens goes as far as admitting he knew he was using Gmail to avoid FOIA. On June
30, 2023, from an end-to-end encryption e-mail account, Dr. Morens stated “I will need to read
up on whether what I did was a ‘crime’ or, as I have always understood, merely a policy.” 1819

1817
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2022).
1818
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Gerald Keusch, M.D. (July 13, 2020, 5:21 PM).
1819
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Gerald Keusch, M.D. (June 30, 2020, 10:31 AM).

Page 467 of 520

 This is unacceptable behavior. Even if he did not believe his actions to be a crime, Dr.
Morens was still comfortable violating NIH policy. Not understanding an action is a crime is not
an adequate defense for breaking the law and the trust of the American public.

Dr. Morens reminded colleagues around him of best practices for how to try to evade
accountability. On August 1, 2022, Dr. Morens e-mailed several associates, reiterating the point
that they needed to only use his personal Gmail, and to delete any other e-mail from their
contacts.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 468 of 520

 This pattern of behavior appeared to escalate beyond utilizing a Gmail account to avoid
FOIA. On April 4, 2023, Dr. Morens sent an e-mail to several colleagues from his end-to-end
encrypted Proton account. 1820 This message was to alert them that the Select Subcommittee
requested hard copies of Dr. Morens’ Gmail account, and because he and his colleagues had
inadvertently sent an e-mail to his Gmail account, their correspondence would be included. Dr.
Morens then provided further instructions on how to proceed when communicating with him via
e-mail. He stated, “[p]lease make sure [anything that you] send me 1) [goes] to my new account
and 2) does not contain an e-mail trail with old emails containing my Gmail or [government]
account.” 1821

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1820
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Gerald Keusch, M.D. (Apr. 4, 2023, 7:02 AM).
1821
Id.

Page 469 of 520

 Dr. Morens knew using a separate personal e-mail account to evade FOIA was not
allowed. Yet, he took, additional, further steps to try to avoid transparency and accountability. He
created an additional, end-to-end encrypted e-mail address, and instructed his colleagues to send
communications to that protected one, and to not “contaminant” the new e-mail by resending any
old correspondences.

During the transcribed interview with Dr. Morens, the Select Subcommittee asked if he
had any other e-mail accounts other than his work or personal ones. 1822 He answered no.

Dr. David Morens (January 18, 2024)

Q. Do have any other personal e-mail accounts like AOL of Yahoo?

Gmail wasn’t always around.

A. Did I have something before Gmail?

1822
Morens TI 2, at 51.

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 Q. Before or contemporaneous to Gmail. When you say addresses, are
you specifically talking about just the Gmail?

A. The only e-mail I had was my government e-mail and my Gmail. 1823

Dr. Morens discussed avoiding FOIA and keeping communications on private e-mails to
individuals outside of his circle of cohorts. On December 7, 2021, Dr. Morens e-mailed a
member of the Board of EcoHealth Alliance Inc. Even though he was using his personal e-mail,
he immediately recognizes himself as an NIH scientist, associates himself with Dr. Fauci, and
clearly states he has to use a personal e-mail because his government address is susceptible to
FOIA. Dr. Morens is clearly establishing he is using his G-mail to conduct business in his official
capacity as an NIH employee, in an effort to evade FOIA.

Dr. Morens, via Dr. Keusch, expressed a concern, that apparently came from Dr. Fauci,
that a FOIA could capture Dr. Morens’ text messages on his government phone. Dr. Keusch
stated that Dr. Morens is concerned about the privacy of text and other messages from his cell
phone…This came from Tony in their conversation this morning.” 1824

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1823
Morens TI 2, at 51.
1824
Id.

Page 471 of 520

 Dr. Morens continuously schemed to bypass FOIA. On November 18, 2021, Dr. Morens
stated that he worked with NIH information technology staff to load “ant-hacking [sic] software
on my phone and discussed the situation with me.” 1825 Dr. Morens concluded that, because of
these actions, his “gmail is now safe from FOIA.” 1826

1825
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Gerald Keusch, M.D. (Nov. 18, 2021, 5:06 PM).
1826
Id.

Page 472 of 520

 FOIA is a cornerstone piece of legislation that fosters transparency, accountability, and
trust in government institutions and its leaders. 1827 It is essential to ensuring government entities
are held accountable. This process allows for the scrutiny of records that otherwise might be
overlooked, and has the potential to uncover corruption, inefficiency, or failures. FOIA informs
the public and, as such, strengthens the foundations of democracy. It is meant to be a system that
encourages transparency, not one to hide behind.

Dr. Morens testified that he understood his e-mails are considered a record pursuant to
FOIA and that he was required to maintain these records. 1828 Further, Dr. Morens testified that he
did not attempt to circumvent FOIA by using his personal e-mail accounts.

Dr. David Morens (January 18, 2024)

Q. …Are you aware of the Freedom of Information Act, which is

commonly referred to as FOIA, and the obligations it places on
federal agency employees?

1827
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2023).
1828
Morens TI 1, at 59-60.

Page 473 of 520

 A. I think I am, yes.

Q. And FOIA provides the public the right to request access to records
from federal government agencies, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And a federal agency employee's work e-mails are considered a

record under FOIA, correct?

A. I think so, yes.

Q. And federal agency employees are required to maintain government

records for FOIA requests to be properly processed, right?

A. Yes.

Q. FOIA is one of the main ways for the public to hold government
accountable, and, as such, it is important that all federal agency
employees maintain records properly for agency FOIA officers to be
able to respond to FOIA requests fully and completely; is that
correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you attempt to circumvent FOIA by using a personal e-mail

account for official work discussions?

A. No. 1829

FINDING: Dr. David Morens Deleted Federal Records in Violation of 18 U.S.C. 2071.

Maintaining and preserving federal records is the responsibility of all federal employees.
In fact, it is a crime to delete or attempt to delete federal records. Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. 2071
states:

Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates,

obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes
and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or
other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the
United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer

1829
Id.

Page 474 of 520

 of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both. 1830

This crime is a broad prohibition against destruction of government records or any

attempts to destroy such records. 1831 Dr. Morens either intentionally deleted federal records or, if
his records are automatically preserved, he intentionally attempted to delete federal records.

On January 21, 2022, Dr. Morens wrote, “[t]wice in the past, including a month or so ago,
I deleted everything with [EcoHealth] people from my entire outlook….” 1832

On August 1, 2022, Dr. Morens wrote, “hopefully no problems with the emails that came
to me at my nih address. I deleted them quickly…” 1833

1830
18 U.S.C. § 2071, emphasis added.
1831
Criminal Resource Manual § 1663: Protection of Government Property—Protection of Public Records and
Documents, U.S. Dep’t of Justice.
1832
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc (Jan. 21, 2022, 10:34 PM).
1833
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc (Aug. 1, 2022, 1:39 PM).

Page 475 of 520

 On October 5, 2021, Dr. Morens discussed how he deleted a specific e-mail, one that
contained langauge he did not want public. 1834

1834
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc (Oct. 5, 2021, 5:28 PM).

Page 476 of 520

 On February 24, 2021, Dr. Morens stated he deleted e-mails after forwarding them to his
1835
Gmail.

On September 10, 2021, Dr. Morens stated he deletes specific e-mails he doesn’t “want to
see in the New York Times.” 1836

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1835
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Gerald Keusch, M.D. (Feb. 24, 2021, 9:21 AM).
1836
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
to Jason Gale, Bloomberg, et al. (Sept. 10, 2021, 7:35 AM).

Page 477 of 520

 On June 28, 2021, Dr. Morens stated, [t]hat email somehow feel into the hands of the
Congressman, probably via FOIA of someone who didn’t delete it, as I did (delete all of [Dr.
Daszak’s] emails and others relating to [COVID-19] origin…” 1837 Dr. Morens then proclaimed
that “[t]he best way to avoid FOIA hassles is to delete all emails when you learn a subject is
getting sensitive…” 1838

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1837
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health
(June 28, 2021, 4:10 PM).
1838
Id.

Page 478 of 520

 On June 16, 2022, Dr. Morens lamented the “old days” of conducting FOIAs, stating how
they had to be done by hand. 1839 He stated that “[w]e are all smart enough to know to never have
smoking guns, and if we did we wouldn’t put them in emails and if we found them we’d delete
them.” 1840

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1839
E-Mail from David Morens, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health,
to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al. (June 16, 2020, 2:22 PM).
1840
Id.

Page 479 of 520

 On January 18, 2024, in a transcribed interview, when asked if he’d ever deleted anything
from his official account, Dr. Morens answered “[n]o.” 1841

Dr. David Morens (January 18, 2024)

Q. Did you ever delete anything from your official account or anything
from your Gmail account that could be considered an official
record?

A. No. 1842

On May 22, 2024, during a public hearing, Dr. Morens was reminded of his answer and
further asked if he deleted federal records. Dr. Morens answered, “[n]ot to my knowledge.” 1843

Dr. David Morens (May 22, 2024)

Q. Did you ever delete any official records?

A. Not to my knowledge, I mean, but again, at the issue of defining

what is a Federal record, I deleted a lot of emails. I do it every day.
But in my mind, they are trivial things not related to government
business. 1844

At his public hearing, Dr. Morens contended that he is unaware of what a federal record
is. Dr. Morens also testified that at no point was a federal record defined as an “email.” 1845
However, during Dr. Morens’ transcribed interview he testified that he understood emails to be

1841
Morens TI 2, at 51.
1842
Id.
1843
See generally, Morens Hearing.
1844
Morens hearing, at 32.
1845
Morens hearing, at 7.

Page 480 of 520

federal records. 1846 According to the HHS Policy for Records Management, “[a]ll records created
or received by an official, employee, or contractor of HHS in the course of conducting federal
government business for HHS are the property of HHS, wherever the record resides…” 1847 At
the time Dr. Morens stated he was routinely deleting emails, he was a government employee for
more than two decades. Federal employees are required to participate in records management
training.

FINDING: Dr. David Morens Shared Internal U.S. National Institute of Health Information
with Dr. Peter Daszak and EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

By virtue of his position within the Office of the Director of NIAID, Dr. Morens was
privy to information the public was not. Through this access, Dr. Morens sent “one of his oldest
and best friends,” Dr. Daszak, numerous e-mails containing sensitive and, sometimes
confidential, NIAID information surrounding EcoHealth Alliance’s terminated grant or other
materials relevant to the origins of COVID-19. 1848

On March 31, 2021, Dr. Morens received an email from Ms. Hillary Hoffmann—an
employee of NIAID’s Office of Communications and Government Relations—notifying him that
all requests for comment regarding the WHO’s pandemic origins report should be directed to the
National Security Council at the White House. 1849

1846
See generally, Morens Hearing.
1847
HHS Policy for Records Management, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, available at
https://www.hhs.gov/web/governance/digital-strategy/it-policy-archive/hhs-ocio-policy-for-records-
management.html.
1848
Morens TI 2, at 26.
1849
Morens Subpoena 021231

Page 481 of 520

 In an egregious display of Dr. Morens’ willingness to share sensitive internal information,
he forwarded this email chain directly to Dr. Daszak, Dr. Keusch, and Dr. Richard Roberts. 1850

In an email dated September 7, 2021, Dr. Morens received an official email draft and
deliberative responses to an Intercept reporter’s inquiry regarding EcoHealth’s NIAID grant.
Sixteen minutes after receiving this email, Dr. Morens forwarded it to Dr. Daszak, Dr. Kessler,
and Dr. Keusch, and commented that it illustrated that “behind the scenes, NIH [was] sticking up
for EcoHealth.” 1851

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

E-Mail from David Morens, M.D. to Gerald Keusch, M.D., et. al. (Mar. 30, 2021 4:25 PM).
1850

E-Mail from David Morens, M.D. to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., Pres., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (Sept. 7, 2021 3:29
1851

PM).

Page 482 of 520

Page 483 of 520
Page 484 of 520
 On August 11, 2021, Dr. Morens received an internal e-mail containing a draft response
to a letter sent to Dr. Fauci by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Senator Paul. 1852 Later that
day, Dr. Morens forwarded this e-mail to Dr. Daszak, Dr. Keusch, and Dr. Kessler. 1853 In an
apparent admission that this was an act of impropriety, Dr. Morens wrote “strictly
CONFIDENTIAL, please. I fixed a few things in this but it seems like Tony is conveying the
right message here.” 1854

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1852
E-mail from to David Morens, Senior Advisor to the Director, NIAID, to Peter Daszak, et al., President,
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., (Aug. 11, 2021, 12:52 PM).
1853
Id.
1854
Id.

Page 485 of 520

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 486 of 520

 On September 3, 2021, Mr. Folkers alerted NIH/NIAID staff to upcoming e-mail releases
from requests from minority members of House Committee on Oversight and Reform. 1855 Mr.
Folkers sent a follow up e-mail, alerting Dr. Morens and other staff that “900 pages of EcoHealth
Alliance grant materials are going out (with redactions) today under a lawsuit with First Look
Institute (The Intercept).” 1856 On September 5, 2021, Dr. Morens forwarded the e-mail from Mr.
Folkers to Dr Daszak, Dr. Kessler, and Dr. Keusch. 1857

1855
E-Mail from Greg Folkers, Chief of Staff, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases Staff (Sept. 3, 2021, 9:29 AM).
1856
E-Mail from Greg Folkers, Chief of Staff, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases Staff (Sept. 3, 2021, 12:09 PM).
1857
E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al. (Sept. 5, 2021, 1:34 PM).

Page 487 of 520

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

Page 488 of 520

Page 489 of 520
Page 490 of 520
FINDING: Dr. David Morens Violated His Oath of Office and Assisted Dr. Peter Daszak and
EcoHealth Alliance, Inc Avoid Oversight.

In April 2020, NIH began enforcement actions into Dr. Daszak and EcoHealth. Dr.
Morens was an employee of NIH at the time, and as such was bound by 5 U.S.C. 3331. This
states:

An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of

honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the
following oath: “I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take
this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which
I am about to enter. So help me God.” This section does not affect other
oaths required by law. 1858

Dr. Morens, as a civil servant, was required to faithfully discharge the duties of his office. Dr.
Morens’ failed to uphold this oath.

Among many examples, Dr. Morens’ supporting Dr. Daszak’s efforts to obstruct NIH’s
oversight of his grant is illustrative of Dr. Morens’ failure to be a faithful steward of his office.
These actions including advocating to EcoHealth’s Board of Directors and editing letters Dr.
Daszak was transmitting to NIH.

For example, on March 29, 2021, Dr. Morens edited a letter Dr. Daszak was sending to
NIH. 1859 By editing this letter, Dr. Morens was actively undermining the position of the NIH and
the U.S.

5 U.S.C. 3331.
1858

E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
1859

Health, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al. (Mar. 29, 2021, 1:08 PM).

Page 491 of 520

Page 492 of 520
Page 494 of 520
Page 495 of 520
Page 496 of 520
 agree that it violates NIAID policy to use personal email for official
purposes?

A. The Dr. Morens issue that was discussed by this Committee violates
NIH policy, yes.

Q. But does using official email—using a personal email for official

business, does that violate policy?

A. Using a personal email for official business violates NIH policy.

Q. Does it violate NAID—NAI—NA—NIAID policy to delete records

to intentionally avoid FOIA?

A. Yes.

Q. OK. On April 28, 2020, Dr. Morens edited an EcoHealth press

release regarding the grant termination. Does that violate policy?

A. That was inappropriate, for him to be doing that for a grantee, as a

conflict of interest, among other things.

Q. So, on March 29, 2021, Dr. Morens edited a letter that Dr. Daszak
was sending to NIH. Does that violate policy?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. On October 25, 2021, Dr. Morens provided Dr. Daszak with advice
regarding how to mislead NIH on EcoHealth’s late progress report.
Does that violate policy?

A. That was wrong and inappropriate and violated policy.

Q. On December 7, 2021, Dr. Morens wrote to the chair of EcoHealth’s

board of directors to, quote, ‘‘put in a word,’’ end quote, for Dr.
Daszak. Does that violate policy?

A. He should not have done that. That was wrong.

Q. And that violates policy?

A. Well, I’m not sure of a specific policy, but I imagine it does violate
policy. He should not have been doing that. 1861

1861
Fauci Hearing, supra note 233, at

Page 498 of 520

Dr. Lawrence Tabak (November 14, 2024)

Q. Thank you. Dr. Tabak, is Dr. David Morens still employed by the
NIH?

A. He is still an employee.

Q. When you testified this summer, I asked you a series of questions

about some of Dr. Morens' actions. The first was if the NIH FOIA
Office teaches employees how to avoid FOIA. You said, and I quote,
"I certainly hope not." Are you aware one of your former FOIA
officers invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about this issue?

A. I have learned that in the lay press, yes.

Q. I then asked if Dr. Morens' deleting emails and using his personal
email to hide his relationship with EcoHealth was consistent with
NIH policy, and you said no. Do you stand by that?

A. Absolutely.

Q. I then asked if Dr. Morens' sharing internal NIH deliberations or

helping EcoHealth craft responses was consistent with NIH policy.
You said, quote, "If those actions occurred, they would not be
consistent." Do you stand by that?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

Q. If I show you proof of those actions, will you take more employment
action against Dr. Morens?

A. Sir, we are taking the actions necessary in all cases –

Q. Okay. On the screen, in an email chain, it shows an internal NIH

email about a draft letter from Dr. Fauci to Senators Graham and
Paul. Dr. Morens forwarded this first to his Gmail and then to Dr.
Daszak. Does sharing that draft letter violate NIH policy?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. The next email is the NIH informing Dr. Morens that the National
Security Council will be leading the communications on the WHO
origins report. Dr. Morens forwarded this first to his Gmail and then
to Dr. Daszak. Does sharing this internal deliberation violate NIH
policy?

Page 499 of 520

A. Yes, it does.

Q. The next email is Dr. Daszak soliciting Dr. Morens' help in

responding to NIH. Dr. Morens responded with his edits to the letter.
But let's not take Dr. Morens' word for it. The attachment includes
comments and track-changes done by Dr. Morens. Sir, does an NIH
employee editing a grantee's oversight response to NIH violate NIH
policy?

A. It absolutely is inappropriate.

Q. Have you read Dr. Morens' transcript of his interview before the
Select Subcommittee?

A. I have not.

Q. Well, I'd like to share you with a few examples of his testimony. Dr.
Morens was asked if he ever deleted an official record from his NIH
account, and he answered, "No." On January 21st, 2022, Dr. Morens
wrote, and I quote, "Twice in the past, including a month or so ago,
I deleted everything with EHA people from my entire Outlook," end
quote. Then, on August 1st, 2022, Dr. Morens wrote, and I quote,
"Hopefully no problems with the emails that came to me at my NIH
address. I deleted them quickly," end quote. Did Dr. Morens lie to
Congress?

A. Sir, I don't know if he successfully deleted the emails or not. If he's

a Capstone employee, he would not be able to delete the emails. It
goes out of his –

Q. Well, he thought he deleted them.

A. Well, he may have that thought that, but if he's a Capstone employee
–

Q. So –

A. -- it would remain in the record.

Q. -- it looks to me like he lied to Congress. And that's a felony.

A. Well, again, I –

Q. Dr. Morens was asked if he provided any advice to Dr. Daszak on

how to respond to NIH oversight requests, and he said, "No." As we
discussed and you saw earlier, Dr. Morens personally edited a letter

Page 500 of 520

 for Dr. Daszak that was directly related to NIH oversight of
EcoHealth, the company at the center of the entire COVID
pandemic. Did Dr. Morens lie to Congress?

A. Again, those types of actions would be completely inappropriate.

Q. "Yes." The answer is "yes." The evidence is on the screen. There's

evidence that Dr. Morens violated numerous NIH policies and lied
to Congress multiple times. Dr. Tabak, will you fire Dr. Morens?

A. As you know, we don't discuss specific personnel matters, but we

are following all of our procedures to the letter. 1862

Despite Dr. Morens violating NIH policy numerous times, he was not fired. Instead, NIH
placed him on paid administrative leave for more than a year. As of November 14, 2021, nearly
18 months after the Select Subcommittee made Dr. Morens’ actions public, he was still employed
by NIH and Dr. Tabak refused to commit to fire him. 1863

FINDING: Dr. David Morens Acted in a Manner Unbecoming of a Federal Public Health
Official.

Working as a leader in the U.S. government should be a position that is held with honor
and prestige. Being in a position of power, being able to affect change and help people in times
of crisis, should be a responsibly accept with the utmost of respect. Yet, over the course of this
investigation, the Select Subcommittee reviewed evidence of Dr. Morens blatantly abusing his
position and making inappropriate, misogynistic, and crude statements. These statements express
a lack of respect for the office he represents and the country he serves.

On November 18, 2021, Dr. Morens admitted that he tried to “pour cold water on [Dr.
Walensky]” when Dr. Fauci was recommending her to be CDC Director, because she “wear[s] a
skirt.” 1864

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1862
Preparing for the Next Pandemic, supra note 232.
1863
Id.
1864
E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Gerald Keusch, M.D. (Nov. 18, 2021).

Page 501 of 520

 On May 22, 2024, during the Select Subcommittee’s public hearing with Dr. Morens, Dr.
Morens claimed that this was “a snarky joke” but admitted that it was indeed “misogynistic.” 1865

Dr. David Morens (May 22, 2024)

Q. Now, I have had differences, political and scientific differences, with

Dr. Walensky. I have disagreed with her on infection acquired
immunity. I have disagreed with her on school closures. I have
disagreed with her on the lack of transparency of adverse outcomes
from COVID-19 vaccines. I would have expected it when I was in
medical school in 1982, and I can understand the embarrassment of
having personal emails shared, but you were doing work-related
stuff on your personal emails that you would have commented in an
email. Dr. Fauci got Rochelle Walensky her job as CDC director by
lobbying for her to Ron Klain. Well, she does wear a skirt. I poured
a little cold water on her, but he was undeterred in thinking that she
is the cat's pajama. So let me just say, am I the cat's pajama? Do you
know how many women sit on this subcommittee? Do you know
what it takes for any of these women to get elected to Congress,
because I find your comments to be disgusting. You had an
illustrious career, an amazing track to get to where you are. You are
trusted with one of the highest positions in government to combat
public health crisis, and instead of doing your job, you are too busy

1865
Morens hearing at 40-42

Page 502 of 520

 worrying about avoiding FOIAs and challenging someone's position
because they happened to wear a skirt. The American people deserve
a whole lot better in their public servants. We don't need to worry
about your trying to avoid FOIAs or what the quality of your
mattress is, quite frankly, sir. You should be ashamed of your
character and embarrassed. I am glad that you are, and you should
in fact, apologize to this subcommittee, to Congress, and to our
Nation. With that, I yield.

A. May I apologize to you and the Committee. It is a misogynistic

statement, and, you know, it was the same snarky joking stuff, but
let me say I have been an advocate –

Q. Sir, that is not a snarky joke. That is an underlying behavior that

indicates how you approach women and how you think of women,
and it is disgusting. 1866

In this exchange, Congresswoman Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA) also mentions the

“quality of [Dr. Morens’] mattress.” 1867 This is a reference to another remark made by Dr.
Morens over email. The email was sent by Dr. Morens from his personal Gmail to a group of
recipients which included NIH and NIAID colleagues. Specifically, Dr. Morens indicated that he
planned to celebrate his submission of a manuscript by getting “a mattress that will take more of
a pounding” so long as he was “lucky enough to find a girlfriend.” 1868

1866
Morens hearing at 40-42
1867
Id.
1868
E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Gerald Keusch, M.D. (July 22, 2020, 5:59 PM).

Page 503 of 520

 In another email with the same theme, Dr. Morens made a misogynistic remark where he
indicated that he preferred his beverages to be delivered to him by blonde “nymphomaniac”[s],
but that he would settle for a brunette or red-haired woman, or one with “any hair at all”
instead. 1869

These misogynistic statements are bad enough, yet Dr. Morens also made other types of
inappropriate statements. For example, on August 27, 2020, Dr. Morens implied that he should
receive a “kickback” from Dr. Daszak after NIAID awarded EcoHealth a $7.5 million dollar
grant which Dr. Morens said was “too much fooking money.” 1870 Despite this statement, the
Select Subcommittee did not find evidence that Dr. Morens in fact received a kickback.
Regardless, it is wholly inappropriate for a federal employee of a grant making institution to
suggest he is deserving of a kickback.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1869
E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al. (Dec. 11, 2020, 1:17 PM).
1870
E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al. (Aug. 27, 2020, 7:54 PM).

Page 504 of 520

 Dr. Morens dismissively characterized these statements as simply being “typical black
humor” that he shared with Dr. Daszak and others. 1871

Dr. David Morens (May 22, 2024)

Q. It does seem that you have a very cozy relationship with Peter
Daszak. You indicated that he was a good friend. I mean, I have to
after reading this email from Exhibit 6, on August 27, 2020, after
NIH was awarded a $7.5 million grant to EcoHealth Alliance, you
wrote to him and you asked, "Do I get a kickback? Too much
fooking F-o-o-k-i-n-g money. Do you deserve it all? Let's discuss."
Would you like to explain?

1871
Morens hearing at 24 (Malliotakis questions)

Page 505 of 520

 A. That is typical black humor between people, like Peter and me and
other folks who show up in these emails.

Dr. Morens also sent several emails that included violent or denigrating language about
Senator Paul due to his oversight efforts regarding NIAID and investigation of the origins of
COVID-19. Specifically, Dr. Morens wrote that Senator Paul “probably doesn’t know how to
“f*%$ himself.” 1872

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
1872

Health, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al. (July 25, 2021, 3:10 PM).

Page 506 of 520

Page 507 of 520
 On June 10, 2020, Dr. Morens promised Dr. Daszak that they would “settle scores” and
“kick some ass. Hard” regarding the COVID-19 origins debate and Dr. Daszak’s terminated
grant. 1873 Dr. Morens went so far as to say “[r]ectal spikes not prohibited.” 1874

Dr. Morens was Senior Scientific Advisor to Dr. Fauci for more than two decades. The
unprofessional actions of Dr. Morens raise serious questions regarding the integrity of the Office
of the Director of NIAID under Dr. Fauci’s leadership.

On May 22, 2024, during Dr. Morens’ hearing before the Select Subcommittee, Chairman
Wenstrup stated:

Frankly, some of the documents we received from Dr. Morens were difficult
to read. I can't imagine saying some of the things, let alone putting them in
writing. The select subcommittee uncovered communications in which Dr.
Morens acted inappropriately and entirely unsuitably for a member of the
public health service who receives a taxpayer-funded paycheck. 1875

FINDING: Dr. David Morens Likely Provided False Testimony to Congress in Violation of
18 U.S.C. 1001.

The evidence presented throughout this report establishes Dr. Morens provided false
testimony to the Select Subcommittee.

It is a federal crime to make materially false statements or representations to Select

Subcommittee staff and Members of Congress during a Congressional investigation “conducted
pursuant to the authority of any … subcommittee, … consistent with applicable rules of the
House or Senate.” 1876 In order to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001, the Department of
Justice must prove the following elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt:

1873
E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
Health, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (June 10, 2020, 8:56 PM).
1874
Id.
1875
Morens Hearing, at 5-6.
1876
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

Page 508 of 520

 1) The defendant made the statement charged;
2) The statement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent;
3) The statement was material;
4) The defendant acted knowingly and willfully; and
5) The false statement pertained to a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch
of the government of the United States. 1877

Dr. Morens was aware that it is a crime to make materially false statements during his
transcribed interview. On January 18, 2024, prior to testifying at a transcribed interview before
the Select Subcommittee, Select Subcommittee counsel warned Dr. Morens that, although he was
participating in the transcribed interview voluntarily and was not sworn under oath, he was
“required pursuant to Title 18, Section 1001 of the United States Code to answer questions from
Congress truthfully.” Select Subcommittee counsel informed Dr. Morens that this obligation to
answer truthfully “also applie[d] to questions posed by congressional staff…” Dr. Morens was
asked if he understood, and he responded in the affirmative. Additionally, Select Subcommittee
counsel warned Dr. Morens that “[i]f at any time [he] knowingly ma[d]e false statements, [he]
could be subject to criminal prosecution.” 1878 Dr. Morens was asked if he understood, and he said
yes. 1879 Finally, Select Subcommittee counsel asked Dr. Morens if there was “any reason [he
was] unable to provide truthful testimony in today’s interview.” 1880 Dr. Morens said no. 1881

Documents and information in possession of the Select Subcommittee likely establish

that Dr. Morens violated 18 U.S.C. 1001.

During his transcribed interview, Select Subcommittee staff asked Dr. Morens if he ever
purposefully used his personal e-mail account to avoid FOIA. He answered, “[n]o.” Documents
establish that to be a false statement.

Dr. David Morens (January 18, 2024)

Q. Did you ever circumvent FOIA by using a personal E-Mail account

for official work discussions?

A. No. 1882

During his transcribed interview, Select Subcommittee staff asked Dr. Morens if he ever
deleted e-mails from his official account. He answered, “[n]o.” Documents establish that to be a
false statement.

1877
See United States v. Bowser, 318 F. Supp. 3d 154, 171 (D.D.C. July 17, 2018) (setting forth the elements of the
statute).
1878
Morens TI 2, at 15.
1879
Id.
1880
Id. at 16.
1881
Morens TI 2, at 60.
1882
Id.

Page 509 of 520

 Dr. David Morens (January 18, 2024)

Q. Did you ever delete anything from your official account or anything
from you G-Mail account that could be considered an official
record?

A. No. 1883

During his transcribed interview, Select Subcommittee staff asked Dr. Morens if ever
assisted Dr. Daszak or EcoHealth in their responses to NIH oversight efforts. He answered,
“[n]o.” Documents establish that to be a false statement.

Dr. David Morens (January 18, 2024)

Q. Did you ever assist in any of the drafting of the correspondence that
[Dr. Daszak] sent back [to NIH]?

A. No. No. 1884

During his transcribed interview, Select Subcommittee staff asked Dr. Morens if he
possessed or used any other personal e-mail accounts other than his Gmail. He answered, “[t]he
only e-mail I had was my government e-mail and my Gmail.” Documents establish that to be a
false statement.

Dr. David Morens (January 18, 2024)

Q. Do have any other personal e-mail accounts like AOL of Yahoo?

Gmail wasn’t always around.

A. Did I have something before Gmail?

Q. Before or contemporaneous to Gmail. When you say addresses, are

you specifically talking about just the Gmail?

A. The only e-mail I had was my government e-mail and my Gmail. 1885

Prior to Dr. Morens May 22, 2024 public hearing, the Select Subcommittee was under the
impression he planned to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refuse
to testify. A couple hours before the hearing, Dr. Morens decided to proceed with testifying. On
May 23, 2024, Dr. Morens lamented to Dr. Daszak, “[w]hatever mistakes I made, and however
poor my judgment and understanding of nih do’s and don’ts, I was trying to do the right thing to

1883
Morens TI 2, at 51.
1884
Morens TI 2, at 136.
1885
Morens TI 2, at 51.

Page 510 of 520

help you. One of the reasons I made what turned to be a very bad choice not take [sic] the
5th…” 1886

E-Mail from David Morens, M.D., Senior Advisor, Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of
1886

Health, to Peter Daszak, Ph.D., EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., et al. (May 23, 2024, 8:12 AM).

Page 511 of 520

IV. New York Governor Kathy Hochul’s Administration Withheld Key Documents from
the Select Subcommittee Based on Claimed Privilege

As previously discussed in this report, age and comorbidities were the most important
risk factor for predicting hospitalization and death from COVID-19. This fact was known by then
New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo in the earliest days of the pandemic. Despite knowing
the threat COVID-19 posed to the elderly, the Cuomo Administration issued the March 25
Directive that ordered potentially COVID-19-positive nursing home residents be admitted or re-
admitted to a nursing home and prohibited testing. 1887 The Cuomo Administration sought to
cover-up the impact of the March 25 Directive by continually altering the methodology of how
nursing home fatalities were counted and by repeatedly asserting the March 25 Directive
followed federal guidance—from both the U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—regarding protecting
residents in nursing homes and other long-term care facilities. 1888

During the 117th and 118th Congresses, the Select Subcommittee’s predecessor sent
numerous document request letters to the Cuomo Administration and even invited Mr. Cuomo to
testify. All of these were ignored. According to documents obtained by the Select Subcommittee
and the current posture of Mr. Cuomo and his allies, they believe this investigation to be
illegitimate. 1889

1887
March 25 Order
1888
Cuomo TI, at 129; Zucker TI, at 90-91.
1889
E-Mail from Richard Azzopardi, to Kyle Kotary, et al., (July 10, 2020, 12:27 PM).

Page 512 of 520

 Mr. Cuomo’s successor, current New York State Governor Kathy Hochul, promised to be
“fully transparent” regarding COVID-19 in nursing homes. 1890 Once the Select Subcommittee
began its investigation in 2023, it became evident that the Hochul Administration was not fully
transparent regarding the former-Cuomo Administration’s failures.

In May 2023, the Select Subcommittee requested documents and information from New
York and two other states that had orders similar to New York’s March 25 Directive. 1891 On
October 10, 2023, the Select Subcommittee sent a follow-up request to the Executive
Chamber. 1892 On November 6, 2024, the Select Subcommittee sent a third letter to the Executive
Chamber. 1893 Eight months after the original request, in February 2024, the Executive Chamber
produced its first tranche of documents.

FINDING: The Executive Chamber’s Production Is Incomplete, Overly Redacted, and

Withheld Thousands of Responsive Records Without Apparent Legal Basis.

While, as of November 29, 2024, the Executive Chamber has produced nearly 375,000
documents, it is apparent that it has failed to fully fulfill the Select Subcommittee’s requests. As
outlined below, the documents produced by the Executive Chamber are incomplete and
substantially redacted—often, without apparent legal basis. Further, there are responsive
documents the Select Subcommittee knows exist—through public reporting and witness
testimony—that were not included in the productions.

Additionally, the Executive Chamber withheld thousands of pages of responsive

documents pursuant to tenuous legal privileges. At the beginning of this investigation, it was not
apparent that the Executive Chamber would provide the Select Subcommittee with a privilege
log to explain redactions until the Select Subcommittee requested one. Finally, the Executive
Chamber did not inform the Select Subcommittee it was withholding responsive documents until
all the productions had been completed and the privilege log was produced.

This resulted in the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability issuing a

subpoena to Governor Hochul on September 10, 2024. 1894

1890
Matt Sedensky, Cuomo Exit Isn’t Stopping Push For Answers on Nursing Homes, NBC NEW YORK (Aug. 13,
2021).
1891
Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic & Nicole
Malliotakis, Member of Congress, to Kathy Hochul, Governor of New York (May 19, 2023); Letter from Brad
Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Phil Murphy, Governor of New
Jersey (May 19, 2023); Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic & John Joyce, M.D., Member of Congress, to Josh Shapiro, Governor of Pennsylvania (May 19, 2023).
1892
Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic & Nicole
Malliotakis, Member of Congress, to Kathy Hochul, Governor of New York (Oct. 10, 2023); Counsel to the New
York State Department of Health stated that it had delivered a responsive set of documents to the Select
Subcommittee on June 2, 2023 via FedEx. The Select Subcommittee never received this production.
1893
Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic & Nicole
Malliotakis, Member of Congress, to Kathy Hochul, Governor of New York (Nov. 6, 2023).
1894
Letter from Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M., Chairman, H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Hon.
Kathy Hochul, Governor of New York (Sep. 10, 2024).

Page 513 of 520

The Executive Chamber Failed to Adequately Notify the Select Subcommittee it was
Withholding Responsive Documents

Prior to production of documents, the Executive Chamber did not inform the Select
Subcommittee it would be withholding responsive documents or redacting certain information.
Once the Executive Chamber began producing documents, the cover letter accompanying the
first production of documents from the Executive Chamber stated that the Executive Chamber
was producing “non-privileged” documents, but did not explicitly state that responsive
documents were being withheld or produced with redactions. 1895

On February 14, 2024, considering the redacted documents, the Select Subcommittee
requested a privilege log for all redactions. 1896 Counsel for Executive Chamber responded that
they would be producing a privilege log after the production of all non-privileged documents. 1897
At that point, the Executive Chamber did not explicitly inform the Select Subcommittee that, in
addition to redacting documents, it was actively withholding responsive documents.

On September 24, 2024, after being served with the subpoena, Counsel for the Executive
Chamber transmitted a letter to the Select Subcommittee. 1898 Among other things, this letter is
misleading regarding the production of the privilege log. As explained above, the Select
Subcommittee requested a privilege log. The Executive Chamber’s letter conspicuously leaves
this request out and simply states that it “notified the Majority Staff in writing that we would be
preparing and producing a privilege log for review once we finish our review and production of
non-privileged documents.” 1899

Further, the September 24 Letter states the Executive Chamber has been “clear and
consistent about our approach towards privileged documents from the very outset of our
review.” 1900 The September 24 Letter claimed “our production of various redacted documents
further emphasized that certain documents were being withheld on the basis of privilege.” 1901
The Executive Chamber’s apparent position was that because some documents were partially
redacted, the Select Subcommittee is to assume that thousands of other documents were being
withheld in their entirety.

The Executive Chamber Withheld Thousands of Pages of Responsive Documents Pursuant

to Tenuous Legal Privileges

1895
Letter from Stephen M. Juris, Counsel, New York Executive Chamber, to Mitchell Benzine, Staff Dir., Select
Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability (Jan. 16, 2024).
1896
E-mail from Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability Staff to
Stephen M. Juris, Counsel, New York Executive Chamber (Feb. 14, 2024, 2:34 PM).
1897
E-mail from Stephen M. Juris, Counsel, New York Executive Chamber to Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability Staff (Apr. 24, 2024, 4:21 PM).
1898
Letter from Stephen M. Juris, Counsel, New York Executive Chamber, to Mitchell Benzine, Staff Dir., Select
Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability (Sep. 24, 2024).
1899
Id.
1900
Id.
1901
Id.

Page 514 of 520

 With regard to the privilege log, it provided insufficient, and in some areas incomplete,
information for the Select Subcommittee to adequately identify and assess the documents or
information that the Executive Chamber redacted or withheld. In particular, the privilege log
includes email entries that entirely redact the subject of the email. 1902

Moreover, the communication descriptions within the privilege log are entirely too vague
to adequately inform the Select Subcommittee of the documents at issue. For example, the
description is limited in numerous entries to an “[e]mail thread reflecting governmental
deliberations regarding NYS information.” 1903

The Executive Chamber claimed that the deliberative process privilege—assuming it is

recognized—applies to communications from individuals apparently not employed by New York
state government. Among other things, the Executive Chamber withheld documents and
communications related to the July 6, 2020 NYSDOH report, titled, “Factors Associated with
Nursing Home Infections and Fatalities in New York During the COVID-19 Global Health Crisis
[hereinafter, “NYDOH Report”]—which was explicitly requested by the Select Subcommittee’s
November 6 Letter—that were sent by Michael Dowling of Northwell Health, 1904 David
Grabowski of Harvard University, 1905 and individuals from McKinsey & Company. 1906

Although the Select Subcommittee does not recognize the deliberative process privilege,
even if it did, the Executive Chamber’s assertions are incorrect and overly broad. The
deliberative process privilege serves to protect government personnel’s internal, predecisional
communications—not external communications with non-governmental personnel that are purely
factual in nature or that are not deliberative in nature. 1907 The Executive Chamber has not
explained why communications from, to, or among individuals who were not employed by the
Executive Chamber, and in many instances, were not even employed by the State of New York,
are protected by the deliberative process privilege, even if it were to be recognized here. Nor has
the Executive Chamber explained why any potential privilege claim was not waived by the
inclusion of these third parties.

1902
See NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374006; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374007; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374047;
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374053.
1903
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374006-07; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374007; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374030;
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374032; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374042-43; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374046-47.
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374052-53.
1904
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374009 (Email from Michael Dowling, Northwell Health, to Melissa DeRosa,
Secretary to the Governor, New York State (June 30, 2020)).
1905
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374009 (Email from David Grabowski, Professor, Harvard, to Melissa DeRosa,
Secretary to the Governor, New York State (July 5, 2020)).
1906
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374030; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374037; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374039-40.
1907
The deliberative process privilege serves to “protect the deliberative process of the government by ensuring that
person[s] in an advisory role would be able to express their opinions freely to agency decision makers.” Matter of
Moody's Corp. & Subsidiaries v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 35 N.Y.S.3d 785, 790 (N.Y. App. Div.
2016) (internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted). It applies to records that are “deliberative,”
meaning “communications exchanged for discussion purposes not constituting final policy decisions.” Id. at 1001
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Page 515 of 520

 If recognized, the deliberative process privilege may apply to records prepared by
consultants retained by the government. 1908 However, the Executive Chamber has failed to
provide a reasonable explanation for claims of deliberative process privilege for communications
involving third parties. Namely, whether the third-party individuals were retained as a consultant
and the communication withheld involved a record produced in furtherance of their retention.

The Executive Chamber also unduly extended the attorney-client privilege in order to
withhold responsive documents and communications. For instance, the Executive Chamber
claimed that the privilege applied to communications from non-attorneys, including but not
limited to communications from Senior Executive Chamber staff. In one example, the Executive
Chamber withheld four consecutive emails from an administrative assistant on the apparent
grounds that they were covered by attorney-client privilege. 1909 While the Executive Chamber
claims that many of these communications are requests for legal advice, the excessive use of this
description throughout the productions, without sufficient context, raised serious questions.

In addition, the Executive Chamber has seemingly extended the attorney-client privilege
to shield communications from individuals who do not have an attorney-client relationship with
the Executive Chamber. For instance, Linda Lacewell testified to the Select Committee that she
was acting as Superintendent of DFS during the pandemic—a position that did not require the
provision of legal advice to the Governor or the Executive Chamber—yet the Executive
Chamber has asserted that communications with her are somehow protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 1910 Ms. Lacewell testifies that in addition to her actual role as Superintendent,
she also served as a counsel to the Executive Chamber and New York’s COVID-19 Task
Force. 1911 However, the Select Subcommittee disagrees there was an attorney-client relationship
between Ms. Lacewell and the Executive Chamber or New York’s COVID-19 Task Force.

An illustrative example of this is the following email the Executive Chamber marked as
protected by both the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]

1908
Matter of Xerox Corp. v. Town of Webster, 490 N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. 1985).
1909
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374033.
1910
Lacewell TI.
1911
Lacewell TI, at 11.

Page 516 of 520

 When the Select Subcommittee asked the Executive Chamber to explain how this e-mail
was protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege, its counsel stated that numbers “4”
and “5” were attorney communications, but that the principal rationale for withholding was
deliberative process. Neither number “4” nor “5” appear to not fall under attorney-client
privilege since they are not clearly the furnishing of legal advice. Further, the author of this e-
mail marked it as “attorney-work product” which is distinguishable from attorney-client
privilege. For attorney work product to apply, this e-mail must have been prepared during actual
litigation or in anticipation of potential litigation. The State of New York has never taken the

Page 517 of 520

position that litigation regarding the distribution of PPE to nursing homes was occurring or
anticipated in June 2020.

The Select Subcommittee Had Limited Access to Additional Responsive Communications

In a transcribed interview, Ms. Lacewell testified that Executive Chamber employees

communicated through various means, including text messages and BlackBerry PIN
messaging. 1912 Similarly, Mr. Cuomo testified to using BlackBerry PIN messaging to
communicate with staff and conduct official business. 1913 Also, Ms. DeRosa testified that the
former Governor didn’t have an official email account and that BlackBerry PIN messaging was
typically how she communicated with him. 1914

Since the Select Subcommittee issued the subpoena, the Executive Chamber produced
some BlackBerry PIN messages, although nearly all of them are from a two-month period in
2021 and arguably not responsive to the Select Subcommittee’s investigation. 1915 When asked
about the apparent discrepancy and lack of responsive material, Counsel for the Executive
Chamber stated, “[w]e were working with the universe of documents we had and did not limit by
date.” 1916 The lack of availability of evidence hamstrung the Select Subcommittee’s
investigation.

Furthermore, the Executive Chamber has completely withheld certain responsive

documents necessary to inform legislative action. For example, the Select Subcommittee is
keenly interested to understand the decisions that led to the issuance of the March 25 Directive—
including documents supporting claims it followed applicable federal guidance. This starts with
understanding who was involved in developing, drafting, and issuing March 25 Directive.
Accordingly, the November 6 Letter requested that the Executive Chamber produce “[a]ll
documents and communications regarding or relating to the March 25, 2020 NYSDOH Advisory
entitled, “Advisory: Hospital Discharges and Admission to Nursing Homes.” 1917

The only other email from March 25, 2020, produced by the Executive Chamber is the
issuance of the Order. 1918 The email—which attached the Order—is limited to the following:

1912
Transcribed Interview of Linda Lacewell, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff (May. 31,
2024) [hereinafter Lacewell TI].
1913
Transcribed Interview of Andrew Cuomo, former Governor, New York, by H. Select Subcomm. on the
Coronavirus Pandemic Staff (June 10, 2024) [hereinafter Cuomo TI].
1914
Transcribed Interview of Melissa DeRosa, by H. Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic Staff (June 21,
2024).
1915
As of December 4, 2024, the Executive Chamber identified additional BlackBerry PIN messages from other
custodians and dating back to the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and stated its intent to produce additional
BlackBerry PIN messages to the Select Subcommittee.
1916
E-Mail from Stephen Juris, Counsel, Executive Chamber, New York State, to Select Subcomm. Staff (Nov. 9,
2024, 12:51 PM).
1917
Supra, n.1.
1918
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00063814 (Email from Joseph Popcun, Department of State, New York State, to Beth
Garvey, Special Counsel to the Governor, New York State, et al. (Mar. 25, 2020)).

Page 518 of 520

 However, the privilege log produced by the Executive Chamber asserts that it was
withholding this exact communication elsewhere in the production because it was protected by
the deliberative process privilege, noting that it was an “[e]mail reflecting governmental
deliberations regarding draft March 25, 2020 Advisory, attaching draft advisory reflecting
governmental deliberations.” 1919 This is another example of an inconsistency that leads to
questions about the accuracy of the Executive Chamber’s claims of privilege.

Similarly, the Select Subcommittee specifically requested all documents and

communications regarding or relating to the NYSDOH Report. 1920 However, the documents
provided by the Executive Chamber are insufficient. The Executive Chamber did not produce a
single draft of the July 6 Report. Any documents containing drafts of the July 6 Report were
provided to the Select Subcommittee by a whistleblower.

Despite its importance to our investigation, the Executive Chamber withheld all
documents and communications related to the NYDOH Report between June 6, 2020 and July 6,
2020—the publication date of the report. 1921 These documents and communications included
numerous priority custodians that we specifically requested, including Senior Executive
Chamber staff. 1922 As noted previously, the Executive Chamber also withheld emails from
McKinsey & Company 1923 and Michael Dowling, of Northwell Health, another individual
identified as a priority custodian. 1924

1919
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374049.
1920
New York State Department of Health, Factors Associated with Nursing Home Infections and Fatalities in New
York State During the COVID-19 Global Health Crisis, (July 6, 2020), available at
https://health.ny.gov/press/releases/2020/docs/nh_factors_report.pdf.
1921
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374008-14; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374030; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374032;
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374033; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374035-40; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374049;
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374057-62; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374068; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374070-71;
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374076; NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374078.
1922
Id.
1923
Supra, n. 11.
1924
Supra, n. 9.

Page 519 of 520

 The Executive Chamber is also withholding documents and communications involving
nursing home data. For example, the Executive Chamber withheld an email thread between
Melissa DeRosa, Linda Lacewell, and Megan Baldwin related to presumed nursing home
fatalities. 1925 The privilege log claims these emails are an “[e]mail thread reflecting
governmental deliberations regarding NYS information, attaching draft spreadsheet reflecting
deliberations.” 1926 It is highly concerning that the Executive Chamber would allege that nursing
home death data could be interpreted as deliberative—facts are facts, facts and data are not
deliberative.

In summary, the Executive Chamber has withheld responsive documents entirely and
redacted some excessively without any proper legal basis. While the Select Subcommittee does
not recognize attorney-client and deliberative process privileges, even if it did, the Executive
Chamber’s privilege log includes numerous privilege assertions that are ill-founded, inconsistent,
or overly vague, all of which has impeded the Select Subcommittee’s ability to challenge the
asserted privileges.

1925
NYSEC_SUBCOMM_00374014.
1926
Id.

Page 520 of 520