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Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
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Defensiveness Versus Remediation: Self-Theories and Modes of Self-Esteem Maintenance

A. David Nussbaum and Carol S. Dweck
Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2008; 34; 599 originally published online Feb 14, 2008;
DOI: 10.1177/0146167207312960

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 Defensiveness Versus Remediation:
Self-Theories and Modes of
Self-Esteem Maintenance
A. David Nussbaum
Carol S. Dweck
Stanford University

How people maintain and repair their self-esteem has Much attention has been paid to defensive processes
been a topic of widespread interest. In this article, the that can be used to safeguard and repair self-esteem.
authors ask, What determines whether people will use For example, people can dismiss the validity of nega-
direct, remedial actions, or defensive actions? In three tive feedback by rejecting it as inaccurate or biased
studies, they tested the hypothesis that a belief in fixed (Baumeister, 1998; Kernis, 2003; Kunda, 1990). If
intelligence (entity theory) would produce defensive- undermining the feedback itself is impractical, people
ness, whereas a belief in improvable intelligence (incre- can compare their performance with relatively worse off
mental theory) would foster remediation. In each study, others (Taylor & Lobel, 1989; Wills, 1981) or compen-
participants assigned to the entity condition opted for sate for their shortcomings symbolically (Wicklund &
defensive self-esteem repair (downward comparison in Gollwitzer, 1982). Indeed, Tesser (2000) has docu-
Studies 1 and 3; a tutorial on already mastered material mented such a wide range of mechanisms for self-esteem
in Study 2), but those in the incremental condition repair that he has labeled them a “self-zoo” of inter-
opted for self-improvement (upward comparison in changeable processes. As noted, these processes also
Studies 1 and 3; a tutorial on unmastered material in share an important shortcoming: They are defensive in
Study 2). Experiment 3 also linked these strategies to nature (see Sherman & Cohen, 2002). Each of these
self-esteem repair; remedial strategies were the most processes is defensive because it restores lost self-esteem
effective in recovering lost self-esteem for those in the without addressing the underlying cause of the negative
incremental condition, whereas defensive strategies feedback. Instead, by employing these processes, people
were most effective for those in the entity condition. adjust to the problem psychologically rather than con-
fronting it head on (Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter,
Keywords: defensiveness; remediation; self-esteem; theories DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986; Heckhausen & Schultz,
of intelligence 1995; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Research on

O ver time, difficulties and setbacks are an inevitable

part of experience in any domain. An important
determinant of eventual success is how people deal with
Authors’ Note: The authors would like to thank Christopher Bryan,
Julie Garcia, Allison Master, Benoit Monin, Jane Risen, David
Sherman, Kelly Wilson, and the members of the Carol Dweck lab
these difficulties and, in particular, whether they repair group at Stanford for their helpful comments on the manuscript, as
the deficiencies that led to them. However, in addition to well as Marni Gasn, Katie Lingras, Stephanie Potter, Jocelyn Ross,
Melanie Thomas, and Sarah Willeman for their assistance with data
dealing with the setback itself, people must also contend collection. Correspondence may be addressed to A. David Nussbaum,
with the implications of the setback for their self-esteem, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305;
and sometimes these two responses are in conflict. As a e-mail: davenuss@psych.stanford.edu.
result, people may sometimes pass up opportunities to PSPB, Vol. 34 No. 5, May 2008 599-612
repair deficiencies in order to tend to self-esteem concerns DOI: 10.1177/0146167207312960
(e.g., Berglas & Jones, 1978; see Crocker & Park, 2004). © 2008 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

599

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600 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

defensive mechanisms, however, may paint an incom- different. Negative feedback, while perhaps disappoint-
plete picture of self-esteem management processes, since ing, is not an indictment of a permanent ability but is
in most defensiveness paradigms participants are not part of a learning process (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, &
given the option of choosing a direct remedial response. Dweck, 2007; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999).
In one study that did offer the possibility of directly In a framework in which intelligence can be acquired,
responding to a threat, people did prefer a direct reso- exerting additional effort is typically the means of doing
lution to a defensive one (Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & so. Moreover, because additional failed efforts do not
Aronson, 1997). reflect on a permanent ability, attempts at remediation
The aim of the current research is to explore what appear less risky. Therefore, although the self-esteem of
determines when people will respond to setbacks defen- both entity and incremental theorists might suffer as a
sively and when they will actively pursue remedial result of important negative feedback, the relative attrac-
strategies. We propose that one of the critical factors tiveness of direct remediation as a means of repairing
in determining this response is people’s perception of self-esteem might be substantially different.
the choices they have in responding to the situation There is already evidence of important differences in
(Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Lazarus & Folkman, entity and incremental theorists’ willingness to pursue
1984) and particularly whether they believe that direct remedial strategies, but it has not been linked to self-
improvement is possible (Heine et al., 2001, Study 3; esteem concerns. In a field study at the University of
Stone et al., 1997; Testa & Major, 1990). In keeping Hong Kong (Hong et al., 1999, Study 2), students
with Heckhausen and Schulz’s (1995) contention that who had performed poorly on their English proficiency
people generally resort to indirect psychological adjust- examinations—a subject that is essential to success at the
ment (secondary control) only when they perceive a university because all classes are taught in English—were
direct option (primary control) to be impractical, we less interested in taking remedial English classes when
propose that people tend to respond defensively to neg- they held an entity theory of intelligence than when they
ative feedback primarily when they perceive that an held an incremental theory. In a follow-up study, a sim-
attempt to improve on a poor performance may be ilar response was found among participants who were
futile or will present a further risk to their self-esteem. experimentally induced to hold either an entity or an
However, when improvement seems possible and not incremental theory of intelligence and given negative
unduly risky, people should opt to repair their self- performance feedback (Hong et al., 1999, Study 3).
esteem by directly confronting their poor performance. A consistent pattern was also apparent in a recent
Specifically, when receiving negative academic feedback, longitudinal study of students making the transition
people’s lay theories about the nature of intelligence— into middle school (Blackwell et al., 2007). In this
their beliefs about whether intelligence is fixed or study, incremental theorists were more likely than entity
improvable—should play an important role in their theorists to endorse working harder and spending more
response to this feedback (Dweck, 1999). Building on time studying next time in response to an academic set-
this framework, in the current research we seek to exper- back, whereas entity theorists were more likely than
imentally assess whether indirect, defensive processes incremental theorists to report that they would spend
(secondary control) are prevalent when people hold an less time on the subject and would attempt to avoid it
entity theory of intelligence (believing that intelligence altogether in the future (Blackwell et al., 2007, Study 1).
cannot be changed) and whether more direct, remedial Taken together, these studies provide convergent evi-
responses (primary control) will be more prevalent when dence that incremental theorists are more inclined to
people hold an incremental theory of intelligence (believ- pursue remedial strategies following a poor performance
ing that intelligence can be improved). than are entity theorists.
The link between persistence after failure and the
belief that skills can be developed is also supported by
Lay Theories of Intelligence and Remediation
cross-cultural work (Heine et al., 2001; White &
Entity theorists have good reason to be wary of Lehman, 2005). In one study by Heine and his col-
making efforts to remediate their shortcomings. From leagues (Heine et al., 2001, Study 3), persistence on a
their perspective of fixed intelligence, exerting additional difficult task was found to be a function of differences
effort in order to master a task may not seem to be par- in cultural beliefs about the efficacy of effort. These
ticularly effective. Moreover, in trying to improve they results are consistent with the hypothesis that people’s
risk repeating the failure, which could confirm their beliefs about the possibility of improvement play a role
inability and could further compromise their self-esteem. in determining whether or not they are willing to con-
For incremental theorists the situation appears quite front failure directly.

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 Nussbaum, Dweck / DEFENSIVENESS VS. REMEDIATION 601

Overview of the Current Research upward comparisons, although potentially threatening,

would help them improve on the task in the future.
Building on Leary’s idea that a drop in self-esteem
serves as a signal that action is required (e.g., Leary,
2005), the present studies ask, What action? Leary
METHOD
contends that self-esteem acts as a “sociometer” that
monitors one’s level of social acceptance—when one’s
Participants and Design
self-esteem drops, something must be done to regulate
it. The sociometer’s call to action, however, may lead Twenty-nine undergraduates at an East Coast univer-
to different responses depending on whether one believes sity (14 females and 15 males) were recruited to partici-
its reading is a reflection of an adaptable reality—in pate in a 30-min speed-reading study and paid $6 for their
which case one can try to make adjustments—or an participation. The speed-reading context allowed us to
immutable one—in which case the only available carry out the theory inductions unobtrusively as well as to
response is to tinker with the sociometer itself until it give participants plausible negative feedback on a task
outputs the desired reading. that could credibly be described as important. After giving
In the current research, we examine two of the para- written consent, participants completed the remainder of
digms in the self-zoo of defensive processes: downward the study on the computer in a private cubicle.
social comparison (e.g., Tesser, 1988; Wills, 1981) and
a form of symbolic self-esteem repair (Wicklund & Theory Induction
Gollwitzer, 1982). In Study 1, we test our hypotheses in
The first part of the study consisted of a “baseline”
the context of social comparison, inducing either an
reading task in which participants were instructed to read
entity or incremental theory of intelligence and then giv-
a short Psychology Today–style scientific article at a
ing participants the chance to make upward or down-
comfortable pace and to answer questions on their com-
ward comparisons following negative feedback. In
prehension of the materials. Participants were randomly
Study 2, after an initial test with mixed results, we offer
assigned to read one of two articles, supporting either an
entity and incremental participants a choice of tutorials:
entity (n = 14) or an incremental (n = 15) view of intelli-
a remedial tutorial that will help them improve or one
gence (Bergen, 1991). For example, in the entity theory
which guarantees success but little opportunity to improve.
condition, participants read that “current research shows
Finally, in Study 3 we return to social comparison to
that almost all of a person’s intelligence is either inherited
investigate whether the different responses of those in
or determined at a very young age”; in the incremental
the entity and incremental theory conditions are indeed
theory condition, participants read parallel but opposite
a response to self-esteem concerns and whether or not
research concluding that “current research shows that
these responses are effective in repairing self-esteem.
intelligence can be increased substantially.” The passage
was followed by eight multiple-choice reading compre-
hension questions to ensure that participants read and
EXPERIMENT 1
understood the material. After this manipulation, partic-
ipants in both conditions were treated identically.
According to Wills’s (1981) seminal review, people
often compare themselves to relatively worse others in
Self-Esteem Threat
order to improve their subjective well-being, particu-
larly following an ego threat. In contrast, an upward Next, in order to be able to present participants with
comparison offers the potential benefit of helping to self-esteem-threatening negative feedback, they were
improve performance (Festinger, 1954; Taylor & Lobel, given a speed-reading test that was designed to be very
1989; White & Lehman, 2005) but can exacerbate a difficult. Speed reading was presented as an important
threat to self-esteem. skill and indicative of general intellectual ability.
In Study 1, we manipulated participants’ theories of Participants were given only 4 min to read a lengthy
intelligence, turning some people toward an entity excerpt of a passage from Freud’s The Interpretation of
theory and others toward an incremental theory. Dreams. The passage was selected to be confusing, and
Following negative feedback on a very difficult task, par- the 4-min time limit was far too short to allow much
ticipants in both conditions were presented with the comprehension. Moreover, the eight multiple-choice
option of engaging in either downward or upward social reading comprehension questions were designed to be
comparison. Downward comparisons would provide ambiguous in order to prevent participants from being
them with little useful information but would make certain of whether or not they had answered correctly.
them feel better about their own performance, while After a short delay, during which the computer was

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602 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

ostensibly scoring the test, all participants were told of intelligence. This debriefing procedure was followed
that they had scored in the 37th percentile of students in all subsequent studies. When probed, no participants
at their university. This predetermined score was reported suspicion that the theory induction article was
selected to be low enough to be a threat to participants’ intended to influence either their beliefs or actions.
self-esteem and yet leave open the possibility of both
upward and downward comparison. In order to ensure
that participants in both conditions had similar experi- RESULTS
ences, before proceeding to the comparisons, partici-
pants were asked whether they thought speed reading Preliminary Analyses
was useful and important, how well they thought they Participants in both conditions scored equally well
had done, and how much they would want to be a (Minc = 7.67, Ment = 7.79) on the eight-question reading
better speed reader, all on 7-point Likert-type scales. comprehension test that followed the article used for the
theory of intelligence induction, t(27) = 0.60, ns. These
Selection of Social Comparison Targets scores also ensured that participants had understood the
article well.
Finally, participants were given the opportunity to
There were no gender differences for any of the
engage in upward or downward comparisons in the
dependent variables, and all subsequent analyses are
context of reviewing strategies for success used by past
collapsed across gender.
participants who had achieved varying levels of perfor-
There were also no differences between the two con-
mance. They were presented with a table listing eight
ditions in their reports of how well they felt they had
past participants identified only by a participant identi-
done on the test (on 7-point scales, with higher values
fication number and their percentile score. There were
reflecting more positive responses), Mincremental = 3.73,
three strategies associated with each past participant,
SD = 0.93; Mentity = 3.64, SD = 1.34, t(27) = –0.21, ns;
and in order to review a strategy, participants simply
how helpful, Minc = 4.40, SD = 1.35; Ment = 4.07, SD =
had to click the link provided in the table and the strat-
1.07, t(27) = –0.72, ns, or important they believed speed
egy appeared on the right-hand side of the screen. The
reading to be, Minc = 4.53, SD = 1.25; Ment = 4.36, SD =
scores of the eight prior participants ranged from the
1.39; t(27) = –0.36, ns; or how much they would like to
14th to the 98th percentile, spaced at roughly even
be a better speed reader, Minc = 4.13, SD = 1.64; Ment =
intervals. Lower scoring participants were associated
3.57, SD = 1.70, t(27) = -0.91, ns. Thus, it was not dif-
with less useful strategies, such as “I try to skim the text
ferences in any of these beliefs about speed reading that
as quickly as possible while trying to understand as
led to any subsequent differences in behavior by partic-
much as I can.” In contrast, strategies associated with
ipants in the two conditions.1
higher scoring participants were selected to be more
instructive, for instance, “I read the first and last sen-
Social Comparison Choices
tences of each paragraph the most carefully. Those usu-
ally have the most information, and I can skim the rest Before proceeding to the analysis of which strategies
more quickly.” Participants were told that they were participants chose to examine, we should note that on
free to review as many strategies as they liked and could average, participants chose to examine approximately
move on to the next part of the study whenever they felt one third of the 24 available strategies (M = 8.76, SD =
ready. They were not explicitly told whether or not 4.82). Participants in the incremental condition (incre-
there would be any further speed-reading tasks, but we mental participants) reviewed somewhat more strategies
ensured that there was sufficient time left in the session (M = 10.0, SD = 4.26) than those in the entity condition
that this remained a distinct possibility. (entity participants; M = 7.4, SD = 5.12), but this differ-
When participants were finished reviewing strategies, ence was not significant, t(27) = –1.46, p = .16.
they were told that the study was over, and they were Recall that our central hypothesis was that partici-
fully debriefed about the goals and procedures of the pants would prefer to examine different strategies
study. Particular care was taken to explain that the depending on whether they had been induced to have an
theory induction article was fictitious and that there was entity or an incremental theory of intelligence. In order
no final consensus in the scientific community about the to test this hypothesis, we analyzed participants’ choice
nature of intelligence but that intelligence was generally of strategies in terms of the average level of strategy
understood to have both stable and changeable qualities. chosen, the first three strategies chosen, and the pro-
Participants were also provided with references for fur- portion of strategies chosen that were true downward
ther reading both about the nature of intelligence and comparisons. We began by comparing the average level
research on the psychological effects of people’s theories of strategy that participants chose to examine. Because

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 Nussbaum, Dweck / DEFENSIVENESS VS. REMEDIATION 603

all choices below the midpoint of the scale were actually

6 downward comparisons (their score placed them just
above the third lowest of the eight scores). While it is true
Level of Social Comparison

5 that entity participants did choose to examine the strate-

gies of relatively poorer performers than incremental par-
4
ticipants, we wanted to know to what extent participants
3 in the two conditions (and entity participants in particu-
lar) were doing true downward comparisons, examining
2 strategies of past participants scoring below the 37th per-
centile. On average, incremental participants’ social com-
1 parison choices were true downwards comparison only
13% of the time, compared to 42% of entity partici-
0 pants’ social comparison choices, t(24) = 2.99, p < .01.2
Condition Furthermore, looking only at participants’ first three choices,
we found that no incremental participant engaged in true
Entity Incremental downward comparison, while 45.5% of entity partici-
pants made at least one true downward comparison,
Figure 1 Mean Level of Strategy Selected by Participants in the χ2(1, N = 29) = 6.47, p < .01.
Entity and Incremental Conditions (Study 1)

DISCUSSION
the social comparison targets’ percentile scores were
roughly evenly spaced, we coded the strategies associ- Consistent with our hypotheses, participants induced
ated with the lowest score a 1 and the one associated to hold entity and incremental theories of intelligence
with the highest score an 8. By this measure, incremen- displayed different patterns of social comparison fol-
tal participants chose to examine significantly “better” lowing negative feedback. Entity participants preferred
strategies (M = 5.41, SD = 0.92) than did entity partic- to examine the strategies of relatively lower performers,
ipants (M = 3.30, SD = 2.33), t(27) = –3.25, p < .01, with over 40% of their comparison targets being down-
d = 1.2 (see Figure 1). ward comparisons. As most research on defensiveness
Simply comparing the average strategy, however, suggests, entity participants responded to negative feed-
may obscure an important aspect of participants’ social back with a defensive self-esteem-restoring process.
comparison choice. Participants choosing to examine Incremental participants, however, responded in a dif-
the best (or worst) strategies first would have nowhere to ferent manner. Having been induced to believe in the
go but down (or up) after exhausting the top (or bot- malleability of intelligence, they engaged in very little
tom) choices, thus artificially moving the means closer downward comparison, choosing instead to examine
together. Also, it is important to determine which the strategies of high performers and providing them-
strategies participants chose to examine first, since these selves with the opportunity to improve. These results
should provide the best indication of their initial complement the findings of Testa and Major (1990),
response to the opportunity to engage in social compar- who report that following an initial failure, participants
ison following their poor performance. Therefore, we were more interested in downward comparison infor-
also compared the first three strategies that participants mation when they believed that they were unlikely to
opted to examine. Comparing participants’ first three improve on a subsequent test than when they thought
choices, we found again that incremental participants improvement was possible.
opted to examine significantly better strategies (M = It is true, however, that it may not be particularly
7.11, SD = 1.40) than participants in the entity condi- damaging to respond defensively to a setback on a task,
tion (M = 3.31, SD = 3.12), t(27) = –4.29, p < .001. such as speed reading, that may not figure prominently
Notably, incremental participants showed interest in in one’s life. It is considerably more costly to do so
even higher comparisons in their first three choices than when one is performing poorly on a task that is vital to
in their overall choices, t(14) = –4.49, p = .001, but success in a domain central to one’s identity. Therefore,
entity participants made equally low comparison in Experiment 2, participants were given feedback on
choices throughout, t(13) = –0.023, ns. just such an identity-relevant task and were then given
Finally, it is important to note that because partici- the opportunity to do a tutorial that would help them
pants believed they had scored in the 37th percentile, not improve on their shortcomings.

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604 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

EXPERIMENT 2 Engineering Test and Tutorial Selection

The engineering test was described as a four-part test
Symbolic self-completion theory (Wicklund &
of spatial-reasoning abilities that had been found to be
Gollwitzer, 1982) predicts that when people’s impor-
predictive of academic success as an engineer. It was
tant identities are threatened, they can restore their self-
emphasized that each of the four modules was impor-
esteem by seeking out symbols relevant to that identity
tant and that good engineers were proficient in all four.
that serve to re-establish the “completeness” of the
The test actually consisted of spatial-reasoning exercises
threatened identity. For example, a doctor who makes
from the dental admissions test administered to
an error diagnosing a patient might feel that her identity
prospective students of dentistry. These tests were par-
as a doctor has been threatened. To compensate, this
ticularly useful for our purposes because it was difficult
doctor may resort to repairing her self-esteem symboli-
to determine whether one had answered correctly or
cally by prominently displaying her medical school
incorrectly with any degree of certainty, making both
diploma or wearing a stethoscope around her neck.
high and low scores plausible. One of the tests, for
Important to note, these symbolic acts typically do
instance, required participants to rank four similar
nothing to improve the deficient skills that led to the
angles in order of acuteness. Participants were given 20
failure. Instead of brushing up on the medical literature
min to complete the test, which consisted of five ques-
or re-examining the patient’s file to discover the source
tions in each of the four modules. The experimenter
of her error, the doctor has acted defensively, indirectly
returned after 20 min and graded the test. Participants
restoring her self-esteem.
then received predetermined feedback, scoring a perfect
Drawing on this theoretical framework, in the cur-
5 out of 5 on three of the modules but only 2 out of 5
rent study we again manipulated participants’ theories
on a fourth module.
of intelligence and, following negative feedback on a
Following the feedback, participants were told that
task in a self-defining area, presented them with the
as a part of the study they would have the opportunity
option to either directly redress their performance or
to do a tutorial for only one of the four modules. After
defensively engage in symbolic self-esteem repair.
completing the tutorial of their choosing, they would be
given another test on the material specific to the module
METHOD they had chosen. They were also told that they would
receive a certificate that would indicate their score on
Twenty-six undergraduates at a West Coast univer- the posttutorial test. Thus, participants could choose
sity (13 female and 13 male) were recruited with an either a tutorial on one of three already mastered mod-
e-mail advertising a psychology study for engineering ules, which would assure them of a certificate with a
majors. All participants reported planning to major in high score but would teach them little, or they could
engineering and had taken at least two classes required choose the tutorial on the failed module, which did not
for the major (M = 7.8, SD = 7.3). After signing the con- guarantee success, but provided them with an opportu-
sent form, participants were informed that the study nity to improve.
sought to compare engineers’ spatial-reasoning abilities Participants were asked about their interest in doing
with those of nonengineers. They were asked to confirm each of the four tutorials, as well as in the tutorials as a
their identity by checking a box labeled “I am an engi- whole, on a 9-point Likert-type scale, with higher
neer” in order to make salient their commitment to the numbers indicating more positive responses. Then they
identity. were asked to choose one tutorial to complete. They
were also asked to rate how well they thought they had
Theory Induction done on the test, the importance of the abilities being
tested, and how much they desired to improve. After
Before completing the engineering test, participants answering these questions, participants were informed
were given a reading comprehension exercise, ostensibly that the experiment was over and they were fully
for the purposes of having a comparison point with debriefed.
nonengineers outside the domain of spatial reasoning.
As in Study 1, the reading comprehension exercise was
an article followed by an eight-question test intended to
RESULTS
induce a theory of intelligence. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to either the entity theory (n = 15) or the Preliminary Analyses
incremental theory (n = 11) condition. After this
manipulation, participants in both conditions were Participants in both conditions scored equally well
treated identically. (Minc = 7.40, SD = 0.65; Ment = 7.27, SD = 0.65) on the

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 Nussbaum, Dweck / DEFENSIVENESS VS. REMEDIATION 605

eight-question reading comprehension test that fol-

Percentage Selecting Failed Tutorial

lowed the article used for the theory of intelligence 100
induction, t(24) = 0.50, ns. These scores also ensured 90
that participants had understood the article well. 80
Although there were some gender differences in the 70
data, such as the number of engineering classes taken by
60
males and females, none of these differences interacted
50
with the dependent variables of interest.3
There were also no differences between the two con- 40
ditions in their reports of how well they felt they had 30
done on the test, Minc = 4.64, SD = 0.51; Ment = 4.80, 20
SD = 1.15, t(24) = 0.44, ns; how good they felt follow- 10
ing the test, Minc = 4.00, SD = 1.18; Ment = 4.67, SD = 0.90, 0
t(24) = 1.64, ns; how important they believed the test to Condition
be, Minc = 4.00, SD = 1.27; Ment = 3.93, SD = 1.34, t(24)
= –0.13, ns; or how much they would like to improve, Entity Incremental
Minc = 5.27, SD = 0.79; Ment = 5.27, SD = 0.80, t(24) =
–0.02, ns. There were also no differences between con- Figure 2 Percentage of Participants Selecting the Failed Tutorial in
ditions in terms of individual difference variables the Entity and Incremental Conditions (Study 2)
including SAT scores or grade point average (GPA), but
there was a trend for entity participants to have taken guaranteed success and could thereby, we propose, repair
more engineering classes (M = 9.7, SD = 8.73) than their damaged self-esteem. This pattern was almost entirely
incremental participants (M = 5.3, SD = 3.80), t(24) = absent among incremental participants, with over 90% of
–2.03, p = .055. Although random assignment failed to them choosing the tutorial for the module on which they
equalize the two conditions in this regard, the relative needed help.
advantage of those in the entity condition in terms of
coursework worked against our hypotheses.
EXPERIMENT 3
Interest in Remediation
There was no difference between the two conditions In Study 3, we employed a procedure similar to that
in terms of either participants’ self-reported interest in in Study 1, but we also introduced two extensions
completing a tutorial or their interest in any of the three designed to link our findings to self-esteem and to clar-
tutorials for the modules on which they had succeeded ify the processes underlying participants’ behavior.
(all ps > .5). Incremental participants, however, expressed First, to test the hypothesis that participants’ responses
significantly more interest in the tutorial for the module were indeed related to their self-esteem concerns, we
on which they had performed poorly (M = 7.73, tracked participants’ state self-esteem during the course
SD = 1.27) than did entity participants (M = 6.13, SD = of the experiment. If our reasoning is correct, then par-
2.00), t(24) = –2.32, p < .05, d = 0.90. This pattern was ticipants in both the entity and the incremental condi-
also evident in participants’ ultimate choice of tutorials, tions should experience a drop in self-esteem following
with 91% of incremental participants choosing to do the negative feedback, and the greater the drop in self-
tutorial for the module on which they had a low score, esteem, the more likely they should be to pursue char-
but only 53% of entity participants making the same acteristic self-esteem-maintenance strategies. Moreover,
choice, χ2(1, N = 26) = 4.21, p < .05 (see Figure 2). tracking self-esteem allowed us to test whether these
divergent responses in the entity and incremental theory
conditions were effective in repairing self-esteem.
DISCUSSION Study 3 also included two new conditions designed to
rule out alternative hypotheses, including a positive feed-
Despite having a useful tutorial available, almost half of back condition and a condition in which participants
engineering majors induced to hold an entity theory of were given a distracter task rather than the opportunity
intelligence still opted for a defensive, “symbolic” response to engage in social comparison. We included the positive
to their performance. Instead of repairing a deficit that had feedback condition to test whether our participants’
been presented as an important determinant of success in different social comparison preferences were actually a
their field, they chose to respond by selecting a tutorial that response to negative feedback or whether they would

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606 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

have behaved similarly regardless of the valence of feed- self-esteem and is more situationally responsive than a
back. The distracter-task condition was included to con- typical trait self-esteem scale, allowing us to observe
firm that it was in fact the social comparison process changes in self-esteem throughout the course of the study.
that helped repair participants’ self-esteem and not The “performance” component scale solicits participants’
merely the distraction of doing another task or the agreement with seven statements such as “I feel as smart
simple passage of time. as others,” “I feel confident that I understand things,” and
In replicating Study 1 with these additional measures “I feel like I'm not doing well” (reverse scored), on a 7-
and conditions, we were able to more carefully test our point scale. The full version of the scale also includes sub-
hypotheses in a 3 (positive feedback vs. negative feed- scales for social and appearance self-esteem; these scales
back vs. negative feedback without social comparison) × 2 were not included in the present research.
(entity theory vs. incremental theory) design. We antici-
pated that the more that entity participants lost self- Theory Induction
esteem, the more they would engage in downward
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were randomly
comparison. We also expected that the more they
assigned to do a “baseline” reading exercise that was a sci-
employed this defensive response, the more they would
entific article supporting either an entity or an incremental
recover lost self-esteem. For incremental participants, we
theory of intelligence. After reading the article, they were
anticipated that the more their self-esteem dropped in
given a five-question reading comprehension test that
response to negative feedback, the more they should
allowed us to ensure that they read the article carefully.
engage in upward comparison, and the more they
engaged in upward comparison (with its skill-building Self-Esteem Threat
information), the more they would recover self-esteem.
Moreover, if our hypotheses are correct, then we Recall that we had three conditions for entity and incre-
should not see this divergent pattern of social compari- mental participants: one in which participants received neg-
son from entity and incremental participants when they ative feedback (a replication of Study 1; nent = 13, ninc = 15),
receive positive feedback, because in this condition their one in which participants received positive feedback (nent =
self-esteem is not under threat. Finally, if it is actually 13, ninc = 13), and one in which participants received nega-
the opportunity to be defensive or to seek improvement tive feedback but completed a distracter task instead of the
that allows participants to recover self-esteem, then self- social comparison task (nent = 13, ninc = 13). Accordingly, par-
esteem should not be recovered when instead of social ticipants in the first and third condition received feedback that
comparison, participants do a distracter task. they had scored in the 37th percentile on the speed-reading
test. Participants in the positive feedback condition were told
that they had scored in the 91st percentile.
METHOD
Selection of Social Comparison Targets
Participants and Design The strategy-review portion of the study was slightly
Eighty undergraduates at a West Coast university adjusted in Study 3. Instead of allowing participants an
(38 females and 42 males) were recruited to participate unlimited number of social comparisons, we sought to
in exchange for course credit. The basic design of the equate the number of strategies participants examined.
study was identical to Study 1 but included two new Thus, the computer program automatically moved on
conditions (positive feedback and distraction) and the after participants had reviewed five strategies. In addi-
tracking of participants’ self-esteem. tion, there were now nine levels of strategy to choose
from, rather than eight as in Study 1, providing an addi-
tional downward comparison option.
Self-Esteem Tracking
Participants in the distracter-task condition were not
Participants’ state self-esteem was measured using the given the opportunity to review any strategies. Instead,
performance subscale of Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) they completed a task that required them to concentrate
State Self-Esteem Scale at three different points: first, at on words that appeared on the screen and to click as
the very outset of the study (Time 1), then immediately soon as a target word appeared. The task was designed
following feedback on the speed-reading task (Time 2), to take roughly the same amount of time as the strategy
and finally at the end of the study (Time 3). review. It was also selected to require concentration in
The performance subscale of Heatherton and Polivy’s order to minimize participants’ opportunity to engage
(1991) State Self-Esteem Scale measures participants’ current in alternate means of self-esteem repair.

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 Nussbaum, Dweck / DEFENSIVENESS VS. REMEDIATION 607

TABLE 1: Self-Esteem Levels and Social Comparison by Condition

Feedback Condition

Positive Feedback and Negative Feedback and Negative Feedback and

Social Comparison Social Comparison No Social Comparison

Theory Incremental Entity Incremental Entity Incremental Entity

n 13 13 15 13 13 13
Baseline self-esteem (Time 1) 43.08 45.46 45.67 43.38 45.08 44.46
Self-esteem after feedback (Time 2) 42.38 42.62 36.73 34.69 36.54 36.92
Final self-esteem (Time 3) 43.00 43.08 43.60 41.85 39.85 37.46
Level of social comparison (1-9) 5.34a 5.11a 6.63b 3.06c

NOTE: Means in the same row with different subscripts are significantly different from one another at the p < .05 level.

RESULTS between the entity and incremental conditions in terms

of social comparison preferences (incremental partici-
Preliminary Analyses pants, M = 5.34, SD = 2.13; entity participants, M =
5.11, SD = 2.18), t(24) = –0.273, ns. After negative
Because there were no significant differences between
feedback, incremental participants preferred higher
males and females, all subsequent analyses are collapsed
social comparisons (M = 6.63, SD = 1.26) than partici-
across gender.
pants in the entity condition (M = 3.06, SD = 2.29),
Participants in both the entity (M = 4.77, SD = 0.43)
t(26) = –5.21, p = .001 (see Table 1). These differences
and the incremental (M = 4.88, SD = 0.33) conditions
offer initial evidence that negative feedback led entity
scored extremely well on the five-question test follow-
and incremental participants to adopt different social
ing the theory induction, and their scores did not differ
comparison strategies.
from one another, t(78) = –1.28, ns.

Selection of Social Comparison Targets Self-Esteem Threat and Social Comparison

Choices
We first sought to determine whether the results of
Study 3 replicated those in Study 1. In Study 3, after Given this initial experimental evidence that negative
negative feedback, incremental participants again chose feedback played a causal role in participants’ social com-
to review better strategies (M = 6.63, SD = 1.26) than parison choices, we sought to determine how changes in
entity participants (M = 3.06, SD = 2.29), t(26) = 5.21, self-esteem affected these choices and whether these
p < .001, d = 1.9. When we examined only true down- social comparisons were effective in restoring lost self-
ward comparisons (i.e., scores of 3 or lower) we also esteem. Our analytical strategy was to begin by examin-
found that, on average, incremental participants’ social ing the effect of theory and feedback condition on
comparison choices were true downward comparisons self-esteem changes over time. We then examine differ-
5% of the time, compared to 49% of entity partici- ences between participants in the entity and incremental
pants’ social comparison choices, t(26) = 3.63, p < .001. conditions in terms of (a) how self-esteem affected their
In addition, only 20% of incremental participants social comparison choices and (b) how these social com-
engaged in any true downward comparison at all, as parison choices in turn affected their level of self-esteem.
compared to 69% of entity participants, χ2(1, N = 28) = Accordingly, our first step was to conduct an
6.89, p < .01. omnibus 3 × 3 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA compar-
Next, in order to test whether the differences in ing levels of state self-esteem at three time intervals as a
social comparison preferences between entity and incre- function of feedback condition (positive feedback, neg-
mental participants depended on feedback, we con- ative feedback, and distraction) and theory of intelli-
ducted a 2 (theory: entity vs. incremental) × 2 (feedback: gence condition (entity and incremental). The main
positive vs. negative) ANOVA. There was no main effect of time, F(2, 148) = 22.77, p < .001, was qualified
effect of feedback condition, F(1, 50) < 1, ns, but there by the two-way interaction between time and feedback,
was a significant main effect for theory of intelligence, F(4, 148) = 4.43, p = .002. Neither the two-way inter-
F(1, 50) = 12.31, p = .001. However, this effect was action between time and theory, F(2, 148) = .22, ns, nor
qualified by the hypothesized interaction between feed- the three-way interaction between time, theory, and
back and theory, F(1, 50) = 9.50, p < .01. When partic- feedback, F(4, 148) = .25, ns, was significant. In other
ipants received positive feedback, there was no difference words, state self-esteem changed over time as a function

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608 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

Figure 3 Feedback Condition. Level of State Self-Esteem (out of 49) at Baseline (Time 1), Following Feedback (Time 2), and Following Social
Comparison or Distracter Task (Time 3) Among Participants in Each of the Three Feedback Conditions: Positive Feedback and Social
Comparison, Negative Feedback and Social Comparison, and Negative Feedback With No Social Comparison (Study 3)

of feedback condition but independent of theory condi- Having established that self-esteem levels followed
tion (see Figure 3). Additional t tests confirmed that the predicted patterns according to feedback condition,
there were no differences in self-esteem as a function of we next focused specifically on the negative feedback
theory condition in any of the feedback conditions at condition, which replicated Study 1, and examined the
any time, all ts < 1, ps > .40 (see Table 1). relationship between social comparison and self-esteem
Follow-up analyses revealed that at Time 1 (baseline), change in that condition as a function of our theory of
there were no self-esteem differences among the condi- intelligence manipulation. Accordingly, we tested the
tions, F(2, 77) = .02, ns. At Time 2 (immediately fol- hypotheses that (a) participants’ drop in self-esteem
lowing feedback), a planned contrast indicated that would predict their social comparison choices and that
participants in the two conditions that received negative this would be moderated by condition and (b) that
feedback had lower self-esteem than those who received participants’ social comparison choices would in turn
positive feedback t(77) = −2.44, p = .02. This was, in predict the rebound in their self-esteem levels and that
essence, a manipulation check confirming that partici- this, too, would be moderated by condition. In other
pants’ self-esteem dropped following negative feedback. words, we predicted that participants would restore
Finally, at Time 3 (following social comparison), a planned their self-esteem following negative feedback using
contrast revealed that as hypothesized, participants who social comparison, but that entity participants would do
had the opportunity to engage in social comparison had this using downward comparison, while incremental
significantly higher self-esteem than those who were given theorists would use upward comparison.
a distracter task instead t(77) = 2.13, p = .04. As can be First, we tested the hypothesis that participants’
seen from Figure 3, all participants receiving negative social comparison choices would be a function of the
feedback experienced a drop in self-esteem, but only those degree to which their self-esteem dropped (operational-
who had the opportunity to engage in social comparison ized as self-esteem at Time 2 – Time 1), but that this
recovered their self-esteem by Time 3. effect would be moderated by our manipulation of their

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 Nussbaum, Dweck / DEFENSIVENESS VS. REMEDIATION 609

Entity Theory Condition Incremental Theory Condition

= 0.49
***
= 0.77*** = 0.33* = 0.86*
r = .64** r = .58** r = .57 ** Upward r = .50 *
Downward
Drop in Recovery of Drop in Social Recovery of
Social
Self-Esteem Self-Esteem Self-Esteem Comparison Self-Esteem
Comparison

Figure 4 The Relationship Between Drop in Self-Esteem and Social Comparison and the Relationship Between Social Comparison and the
Recovery of Self-Esteem for Participants Receiving Negative Feedback in the Entity Theory (4a) and Incremental Theory (4b)
Conditions (Study 3)
* p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

theory of intelligence. We conducted an ordinary least well as the interaction between these two variables, as
squares (OLS) regression analysis that included partici- predictors of the improvement in their state self-esteem
pants’ theory of intelligence (dummy coded 0 for the following social comparison. There was a marginally
incremental condition and 1 for the entity condition) significant main effect of social comparison choices, β =
and the drop in participants’ self-esteem (mean cen- 0.86, t(24) = 1.81, p = .08, and no main effect of theory,
tered, M = –8.82), as well as the interaction between β = 0.01, t(24) = 0.04, ns. These effects were qualified
these two variables, as predictors of their social com- by a significant interaction between theory of intelli-
parison choices. There was a marginally significant gence and social comparison choices, β = –1.16, t(24) =
main effect of self-esteem drop, β = –0.33, t(24) = –1.82, –2.94, p = .01. The simple slopes analyses revealed that
p = .08, and a significant main effect of theory, for participants in the entity condition, downward
β = –0.72, t(24) = –6.38, p = .001, in predicting social social comparison was a significant predictor of self-esteem
comparison choices. However, these main effects were recovery, β = –0.77, t(24) = –2.72, p = .01; the lower
qualified by a significant interaction between theory of these participants’ social comparison targets, the more
intelligence and self-esteem drop, β = 0.64, t(24) = 3.53, their self-esteem rose (see Figure 4a). The opposite was
p = .002. Following Aiken and West (1991), we con- true for participants in the incremental condition, for whom
ducted simple slopes analyses to determine how partici- upward social comparison choices were a marginally sig-
pants’ theory of intelligence moderated the effect of nificant predictor of self-esteem recovery, β = 0.86, t(24) =
self-esteem drop on their social comparison choices. As 1.81, p = .08; the higher their social comparison targets,
hypothesized, for participants in the entity condition, the more self-esteem they recovered (see Figure 4b).
self-esteem drop was a significant predictor of social
comparison, β = 0.49, t(24) = 3.41, p = .002; the more
their self-esteem dropped, the more downward compar- DISCUSSION
isons they made (see Figure 4a). For participants in the
incremental condition, the effect of self-esteem drop had Studies 1 and 2 revealed that following negative feed-
a marginally significant, but opposite, effect on social back, entity participants tended to respond defensively
comparison choices, β = –0.33, t(24) = –1.82, p = .08; while incremental participants preferred to directly
the more their self-esteem dropped, the more upward address the cause of their poor performance. In Study 3,
comparisons they made (see Figure 4b). we found support for the hypothesis that these different
responses are a reaction to threatened self-esteem and
Self-Esteem Repair and Social Comparison
that both are effective means of restoring self-esteem for
Choices
those who employ them.
Although entity and incremental participants responded Among entity participants who received negative feed-
to self-esteem threat by making different social compar- back, the more their self-esteem dropped, the lower were
ison choices, we wanted to know whether or not these their social comparison targets; they responded to the
choices were effective in actually repairing self-esteem threat by defensively comparing themselves to others
(operationalized as self-esteem at Time 3 – Time 2). We who had performed relatively poorly. As it turns out, this
again conducted an OLS regression analysis that included was an effective response for entity participants, as the
participants’ theory (dummy coded 0 for the incremen- lower their social comparison targets, the more their self-
tal condition and 1 for the entity condition) and their esteem was restored (i.e., the more they once again agreed
social comparison choices (mean centered, M = 4.97), as with statements such as “I feel confident I understand

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610 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

things”). As a group, entity participants’ self-esteem Consequences for Self-Esteem

returned to its original level when they were given the
In Study 3, we measured the consequences of entity
opportunity to engage in social comparison, but not
and incremental participants’ responses for self-esteem
when they simply did a distracter task.
repair. As noted, both responses were effective—entity
We found a parallel pattern among incremental par-
and incremental participants who engaged in social com-
ticipants. For these participants, the more their self-
parison recovered lost self-esteem, while participants
esteem dropped after negative feedback, the higher their
who did a distracter task did not. Entity participants
comparison targets became. Although it would be rea-
recovered more self-esteem the lower their social com-
sonable to expect that engaging in these upward compar-
parison targets. It is worth noting that although they
isons might harm incremental participants’ self-esteem
spent much of their time examining ineffective strategies,
(e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970; but see Taylor & Lobel,
entity participants subsequently expressed renewed con-
1989; Testa & Major, 1990), it actually did the opposite.
fidence in their abilities and understanding nonetheless.
There was a trend for incremental participants to regain
For incremental participants, in contrast, self-esteem
self-esteem the more they engaged in upward comparison
tended to recover more the higher their social compari-
and, like entity participants, their self-esteem returned to
son targets. Ultimately, although both responses restored
its original level when they were given the opportunity to
participants’ self-esteem to the same level as before neg-
do social comparison, but not when they did a distracter
ative feedback, incremental participants gave themselves
task. It appears that after having their self-esteem deflated
an opportunity to directly improve their abilities while
by a poor performance, incremental participants’ self-
entity participants did not.
esteem was restored by engaging in remedial learning—
These results are in line with the work of Crocker and
though whether it was the actual learning or the mere
her colleagues (Crocker, Brook, Niiya, & Villacorta, 2006;
process of attempting to learn that had this effect, our
Crocker & Park, 2004) who suggest that the pursuit of
data cannot determine. Thus, both entity and incremen-
self-esteem can have costly consequences. In particular, for
tal participants have at their disposal effective, though
participants in the entity condition, the cost of repairing
different, means of restoring self-esteem through social
their self-esteem was the sacrificing of an opportunity to
comparison.
learn from their mistakes. As the results of Study 3 indi-
cate, the more negatively these participants’ self-esteem
was affected by their initial failure, the more they resorted
GENERAL DISCUSSION
to self-esteem-repairing downward social comparisons at
the expense of learning. Moreover, the response of partic-
In the current set of studies, our manipulation of par-
ipants in the incremental condition also supports Crocker’s
ticipants’ theories of intelligence appears to have changed
contention that an incremental theory can make self-
their assessments of the best way to respond to a setback.
esteem pursuit less costly (e.g., Crocker & Park, 2004;
In three studies, we found that following negative feed-
Niiya, Crocker, & Bartmess, 2004). Participants in the
back, participants’ decisions to either try to improve or to
incremental condition also responded to their initial set-
simply make themselves feel better depended on whether
back by repairing their self-esteem, but they did so without
they had been induced to believe that intelligence was
costing themselves the opportunity to improve.
fixed or malleable. We also confirmed that these deci-
sions were a response to the experience of decreased self-
Different Meanings of Self-Esteem?
esteem and that participants induced to hold entity and
incremental theories were both able to restore their self- Entity and incremental theories can be seen as reflecting
esteem to its original level, although in different ways. two fundamentally different perspectives on the self: a sta-
It is not always easy to improve following a setback, tic self with fixed traits versus a dynamic self capable of
nor obvious how to do so; in such cases, defensive self- constant development (Dweck, Higgins, & Grant, 2003;
esteem repair strategies can be a reasonable course of Molden & Dweck, 2006). In both systems, self-esteem
action. However, each of the current studies was carefully reflects the judgment that one is competent. However, in
designed to present participants with a clear opportunity an entity self-system, self-esteem comes from validating
to either improve or to respond defensively by engaging in one’s fixed competence; in an incremental self-system, self-
either downward comparison (Studies 1 and 3) or sym- esteem comes from assessing one’s acquired competence.
bolic self-esteem repair (Study 2). Attempting to improve Negative feedback is a threat to both kinds of self-esteem
was a salient option but, at least in the eyes of many entity because it signals that the desired level of competence is
participants, it was not their preferred option. lacking. However, as we have shown, when self-esteem is

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 Nussbaum, Dweck / DEFENSIVENESS VS. REMEDIATION 611

threatened, different responses are required. In the entity true profits, the results could be costly. If, fearing the dis-
self-system, with no clear way to change one’s level of approval of their mentors, surgical interns defensively
underlying ability, the most direct and effective thing dismiss criticism of their techniques or diagnoses, the
people can do is to re-adjust their thinking about their abil- results could be even worse. We contend that the evalu-
ity, and defensive processes fit the bill. In an incremental ative context can play an important role in determining
self-system, the most direct and effective thing people can the way negative feedback is interpreted and whether
do is to work to bring their skills into line with the level of one tries to learn from it or responds to it defensively
competence they desire. instead. While an evaluative context focused on nurtur-
ing development may not be ideal for every setting, it
The Limitations of Self-Improvement may be effective in reducing defensiveness in settings
where learning is valued and the goal is to minimize lost
As noted, because all three of the current studies were
opportunities to improve.
designed to compel participants to choose between an
In conclusion, defensiveness can stand in the way of
available remedial response and a defensive one, striving
learning and thus have serious consequences in class-
for self-improvement could be considered the more adap-
rooms and workplaces. This research shows that an
tive response in each case. However, there are certainly
incremental theory has a role to play in leading people
instances in which disengagement may be a better response
away from defensiveness and toward confronting and
than prolonged persistence in a futile effort to improve
addressing their shortcomings.
(Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003; Wrosch,
Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003; Wrosch, Schulz,
& Heckhausen, 2004), or instances in which dealing with
the psychological effects of failure may be more important NOTES
than dealing with the failure itself. At times, dealing with 1. In reporting their attitudes toward speed reading, participants
the psychological effects of failure may be a prelude to cop- had an apparent opportunity to restore self-esteem by disparaging the
ing with the actual failure. Indeed, the stress and coping lit- importance of speed reading. However, their willingness and ability to
pursue this route of self-esteem repair was constrained by the fact that
erature (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) maintains that they had been told, immediately prior to the test, that it was a valid and
dealing with stress—of which negative feedback can be one important indicator of competence and a predictor of future success.
instance—usually requires a mix of problem-focused cop- 2. Three participants in the entity condition made no social com-
parisons and were therefore excluded from this analysis.
ing (directly addressing the source of the stress) and 3. Females reported having taken marginally fewer engineering-
emotion-focused coping (dealing with the emotions result- related classes (M = 5.1) than males (M = 10.5), t(24) = 2.02, p = .06.
ing from the stress). Thus, employing defensive processes Females also reported greater interest in doing a generic tutorial (M =
7.5) than did males (M = 5.6), t(24) = –2.57, p < .05, and were mar-
to repair one’s self-esteem may be adaptive when a direct ginally more interested in the tutorial for the module they had done
response is either impossible or when protecting self- poorly on (M = 7.5) than were males (M = 6.2), t(24) = 0.08. However,
esteem sustains motivation and facilitates later attempts at females made up a similar percentage of participants in the entity con-
dition (53%) as in the incremental condition (45%), and gender does
engaging one’s problems (Nussbaum & Steele, 2007; not interact with any of the dependent variables of interest.
Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Wayment & Taylor, 1995;
Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985; see also Heckhausen &
Schulz, 1995; Rothbaum et al., 1982).
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