Diary No.

42779 / 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(ORDER XXII RULE 2(1))
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2024

Against the impugned judgment and final order dated 09.05.2024 passed
by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal
Application No. 3788 of 2022

WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

WITH
Crl. M.P. No. of 2024 : Application for Condonation of Delay
in filing SLP.

AND WITH
Crl. M.P. No. of 2024 : Application for exemption from filing
official translation of Annexure P1, P2
and P4

AND WITH
Crl. M.P. No. of 2024 : Application for Permission to bring on
record Additional Documents.

PAPER BOOK
(FOR INDEX KINDLY SEE INSIDE)
(VOL. I – Page A to 421)

(ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER : TARUNA SINGH GOHIL)

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(ORDER XXII RULE 2(1))
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2024

Against the impugned judgment and final order dated 09.05.2024 passed
by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal
Application No. 3788 of 2022

WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

WITH
Crl. M.P. No. of 2024 : Application for Condonation of Delay
in filing SLP.

AND WITH
Crl. M.P. No. of 2024 : Application for exemption from filing
official translation of Annexure P1, P2
and P4

AND WITH
Crl. M.P. No. of 2024 : Application for Permission to bring on
record Additional Documents.

PAPER BOOK
(FOR INDEX KINDLY SEE INSIDE)
(VOL. II – Page 422 to 601)

(ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER : TARUNA SINGH GOHIL)

 INDEX

# Date of Record of Proceeding Pages

10
 ITEM NO.57 COURT NO.6 SECTION II-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) DIARY NO(S). 42779/2024

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 09-05-2024

in SCRA No. 3788/2022 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad)

MEHUL VIBHAKAR BHATT Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date : 01-10-2024 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY S. OKA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH

For Petitioner(s) Mr. B.S. Patel, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Chirag B. Patel, Adv.
Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, Adv.
Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil, AOR
Mr. Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Adv.
Ms. Hetvi K. Patel, Adv.
Mr. Rushabh N. Kapadia, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Singh, Adv.

For Respondent(s)

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

Delay condoned.

Issue notice, subject to curing of defects.

To be heard along with SLP (Crl.) No.8591/2024 and connected

cases.

As and when First Information Report is registered against the

petitioner, it will be open for the petitioner to move this Court

Signature Not Verified

for appropriate interim relief.

Digitally signed by
ASHISH KONDLE
Date: 2024.10.01
20:57:12 IST
Reason:

(ASHISH KONDLE) (AVGV RAMU)

COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)
 MASTER INDEX

Sl. No. Particulars of Document Pages No. of part to Remarks

which it belongs
Part 1 Part II
(Contents (Contents
of Paper of file
Book)) alone)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1. O/R on Limitation A A
2. Listing Proforma A1-A2 A1-A2

3. Cover Page of Paper Book A-3

4. Index of Record of Proceedings A-4

5. Limitation Report prepared by the A-5

Registry

6. Defect List A-6

7. Note Sheet NSII to..

8. Synopsis & List of Dates B-L

9. Against the impugned judgment 1-421

and final order dated 09.05.2024
passed by the Hon’ble High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in
R/Special Criminal Application
No. 3788 of 2022.

10. Special Leave Petition with 422-495

Affidavit.

11. ANNEXURE P-1 496-500

A true copy of the rent agreement
dated 01.01.1953 alongwith
Translations.
12. ANNEXURE P-2 501-510
A true copy of rent agreement
dated 28.04.1998 between
Petitioner no.1 as partner of M/s
Murlidhar B Vamdot, with
Respondent No. 3 (Complainant)
and other land owners alongwith
Translations.

13. ANNEXURE P-3 511-526

A true copy of Selling License
Agreement with Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Limited dated
25.06.2020.

14. ANNEXURE P-4 527-530

A true copy of summons dated
28.03.2022 alongiwth
Translations.

15. ANNEXURE P-5 531-551

A true copy of Memo in Special
Criminal Application No.
3788/2022.

16. ANNEXURE P-6 552-553

A true copy of the order dated
12.04.2022 passed by Hon’ble
High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad Special Criminal
Application No. 3788/2022.

17. ANNEXURE P-7 554

A true copy of the Order dated
03.06.2024 passed by this
Hon’ble Court in SLP (Crl) No.
7725 of 2024.

18. ANNEXURE P-8 555-556

A true copy of the order dated
05.08.2024 passed by this
 Hon’ble Court in Special Leave
Petition (Civil
) 17769 of 2024 (Diary No. 27717
of 2024).

19. ANNEXURE P-9 557-559

A true copy of the Order dated
12.08.2024 passed by this
Hon’ble Court in Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 17710 of 2024.

20. Application for Condonation of 560-562

Delay in filing SLP.

21. Application for Exemption from 563-564

filing Official Translation of
Annexure P1, P2 and P4.

22. Application for Permission to bring 565-567

on record Additional Documents.

23. ANNEXURE P-10 568

True copy of the Death Certificate
of the Vibhakar Ramashanker
Bhatt.

24. ANNEXURE P-11 569-580

True copy of the Partnership Deed
dated 05.03.2024.

25. ANNEXURE P-12 581-598

True copy of the DPSL Agreement
dated 08.06.2024.

26. F.I.R. DETAIL 599

27. F/M 600

28. V/A 601

 A
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

OFFICE REPORT ON LIMITATION

1. The petition is/are within time.

2. The petition is barred by time and there is delay of 36 days in filing

the same against the impugned judgment and final orders dated

09.05.2024 for condonation of 36 Days delay has been filed.

4. There is delay of ------------------ days in refilling the petitioner and

petition for condonation of ------------------- days in refilling has been

filed.

BRANCH OFFICER

NEW DELHI
DATED: 17/09/2024
 A1
PROFORMA FOR FIRST LISTING
SECTION – III
The case pertains to (please tick /check the correct box):
1. Central Act: (Title) N/A

2. Section: N/A
3. Central Rule: (Title) N/A
4. Rule No (s) : N/A
5. State Act: (Title) N/A
6. Section : N/A
7. State Rule : (Title) N/A
8. Rule No (s) : N/A
9. Impugned Interim Order : (Date) N/A
10. Impugned Final Order/Decree: (Date) 09.05.2024

11. High Court : (Name) HIGH COURT OF

GUJARAT AT
AHMEDABAD

12. Names of Judges: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS.

JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA
P. MAYEE

13. Tribunal/ Authority: (Name) N/A

1. Nature of matter: CRIMINAL

2. (a) Petitioner/appellant No.1: Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt
(b) e-mail ID: NA
(c) Mobile Phone Number: NA
3. (a) Respondent No.1: The State of Gujarat & Ors.

(b) e-mail ID: N/A

(c) Mobile phone number: N/A
4. (a) Main category classification: 1800 : Criminal Matters
(b) Sub Classification: 1807 – Others
5. Not to be listed before: N/A
6. (a) Similar disposed of matter with No similar matter has been
citation, if any, & case details:: disposed off.
 A2
b) Similar pending matter with case No similar matter is pending
details:
7. Criminal Matters: YES
(a) Whether accused/convict has surrendered: No
(b) FIR NO.: No FIR Registered Date: N/A
(c) Police Station: No
(d) Sentence Awarded: No
(e) Period of sentence undergone No
including period of detention / custody
undergone :
8. Land Acquisition Matters:
(a) Date of Section 4 notification: N/A
(b) Date of Section 6 notification: N/A
(c) Date of Section 17 notification: N/A
9. Tax Matters: State the tax effect: N/A
10. Special Category (first petitioner/appellant only) : N/A

Senior citizen>65years  SC/ST  Woman/child

 Disable  Legal Aid case  In Custody
11. Vehicle Number (in case of Motor Accident Claim matters): N/A

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

Date: 17.09.2024 AOR for Petitioners
 B
SYNOPSIS

The present Special Leave Petition is filed by the Petitioner challenging

the impugned judgment and final order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the

Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Special Civil Application

No. 3788 of 2022, whereby the Hon’ble High Court has dismissed the writ

petition challenging the vires of the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition)

Act, 2020 (“the Act”).

The facts in brief are that the property i.e. land bearing original survey

no. 164 situated at Village Kadodara, Tal : Palsana, District- Surat

currently numbered as No. 193, 194 paiki , out of which the land bearing

survey no. No. 162/4, Block No. 193 admeasuring 1518 sq. mts and land

bearing survey no. 162/4, Block no. 194 admeasuring 1275.77 sq. mts.

(‘Land’) is being used as a Petrol Pump by the Petitioners by virtue of the

rent agreement dated 01.01.1953 of said land executed by Burma Oil Shell

Storage Company Ltd through the Father-in-law of Petitioner No.1 i.e.

Murlidhar Bhagvatilal Vamdot. After the demise of Murlidhar Bhagvatilal

Vamdot, Petitioner No. 1 as a partner of M/s Murlidhar B Vamdot executed

rent agreement dated 28.04.1998 with Respondent No.3(land owner).

Subsequently, certain land was acquired by National Highway authorities

for Road Margin, leaving behind 3125 sq. mts of land.

 C
It is stated that Special Civil Suit no. 05/2021 regarding the encroachment

on the same land is pending before the Principal Senior Civil Judge,

Veraval

Thereafter, Respondent No.3 Shankerbhai Dahyabhai Nayak preferred a

complaint under Gujarat Land (Prohibition) Act, 2020 and Gujarat Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 2020 (‘Impugned Act’) for encroachment

and subsequently summons dated 28.03.2022 were issued to the

Petitioners.

Upon filing of the complaint which came to be challenged by the Petitioner

before the Hon’ble High Court along with challenging the validity of the

Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020 along with quashing and

setting aside of the summons, the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated

12.04.2022 granted stay on the proceedings. However, ultimately, vide

the impugned judgment, the Hon’ble High Court has upheld the validity

of the Act, which requires interference by this Hon’ble Court primarily on

the following grounds:

1. The provisions of the Act seek to encroach upon the field occupied

by the provisions of various Central legislations. Moreover, there is

also an absence of presidential assent to the Act, which further

 D
renders the Act null and void. Hence, the enactment and

enforcement of the Act is contrary to the mandate of Article 254 of

the Constitution of India.

2. By enacting the Act, the State legislature has travelled beyond its

power to enact a law on a subject enlisted in List II of the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution of India and, even by applying the

doctrine of Pith and Substance, the Act cannot be said to be one

falling within the entries mentioned in List II of the Seventh

Schedule. Thus, there is a violation of the mandate of Article 246 of

the Constitution of India.

3. The provisions of the Act also prejudices the rights accrued in favour

of the parties under various other State laws and Central laws. Thus,

the provisions of the Act are in direct conflict with Section 5 and

Section 27 of the Limitation Act; Sections 5, 6, 37, 38 and 39 of the

Specific Relief Act; Section 2(2) and Section 11 of the Code of Civil

Procedure; Section 53A and Section 58 of the Transfer of Property

Act and Sections 6 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus,

the Act is repugnant to the Central laws and the absence of

presidential assent make it invalid. The Hon’ble High Court also

 E
brushed aside the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Rame Gowda

v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769.

4. The Act fails the test of two conditions required under Article 14 i.e.

classification on the basis of intelligible differentia and such

differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be

achieved by the Act. In the present case none of these conditions

are fulfilled as the Act equates the Government land and the private

land, the provisions making "land grabbing" an offence even with

respect to private lands belonging to a private persons, is not based

on any ineligible differentia and has no nexus with the object, the

legislative seeks to achieve, which is securing 'public order' in the

State.

5. The Act has failed the test of palpable arbitrariness as held in

Shashikant Laxman Kale v. Union of India, 1990 4 SCC 366

as while understanding the purpose or object of the legislation,

there is a need to apply the 'Mischief Rule' to understand the gap of

mischief the legislation intended to cover, to give effect to the

intention of the Legislature so as to “advance the remedy and

suppress the mischief”.

 F

6. Several provisions of the Act are totally against the validity of a

legislative enactment recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s

ratio in Shayra Bano v. Union of India, 2017 9 SCC 1.

7. Hon’ble High Court erred in upholding validity of section 11 of the

Act which reverses burden of proof upon the accused. As per section

11 and other provisions High Court failed to examine that in the

present case accused has to go through 3 rounds of interrogation.

Starting from the inquiry conducted by the Committee chaired by

the District Collector, Civil Proceedings where he will have to prove

the title, possession over the land and in the Criminal Proceedings

where the entire onus will be on him to prove him non-guilty. Thus,

shifting of burden of proof upon the person against whom the

allegations of land grabbing has been made by virtue of Section 11

of the Act is further proof of tinkering with the common principles

of criminal law that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the

allegations of the commission of criminal offence beyond reasonable

doubt. The Hon’ble High Court also brushed aside the judgment of

this Hon’ble Court in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16

SCC 417.
 G

8. Several provisions of the Act give more power to the executive than

judiciary, blurring the lines of judicial separation such as section 7

and Section 12. For instance Section 12(a) speaks of the Committee

notified by the Government. The power given to the State

Government to constitute a Committee, which has been conferred

important function of inquiry at the inception stage, on receipt of

the complaint of land grabbing, is not guided under the impugned

enactment. The constitution of the Committee is a legislative Act,

delegation of the legislative power that too in an unguided manner

makes the delegation excessive. The impugned order is passed in

complete ignorance of the judgments of this Hon’ble Court in I.R.

Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1 and Minerva Mills Ltd.

v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 in this regard.

9. By not following the Doctrine of Proportionality since the Act

provides for unusually harsh and cruel punishment of a minimum

mandatory sentence of 10 years, which may extend to 14 years,

which is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence as the offence

of land grabbing is an offence against the property and not against

a human body.
 H

10. There is a usurpation of power since the Executive Committee

constituted by the State Government under Section 2(a) r/w Section

12(a) of the Act while making inquiry under the Rules passes a

conditional order on the complaint of land grabbing asking the

accused person to surrender the land occupied by him within a

certain period or else FIR is lodged. The disputed question of title

or right in the property cannot be decided by Executive Committee,

these powers are to be exercised by judicial court.

11. There are unbridled and untrammeled powers provided to the

Collector since under Rule 5(2), the Collector is allowed to take sou

motu cognizance against a person who grabs land or is a headstrong

person, but nowhere “headstrong” has been defined.

12. There is an absence of consideration of mens rea in imposing liability

for the act of land grabbing since the person who has succeeded

any piece of land alleged to be ‘grabbed land’, cannot be held liable

for the criminal act, if any, done by his predecessor.

 I
13. There is retrospectivity since Land Grabbing was never an offence

prior to 29.08.2020. Any person who occupied the alleged ‘grabbed

land’ prior to the commencement of Act cannot be held to be a land

grabber by giving retrospective effect to the definition of land

grabber under section 2(d).

Hence, the present Special Leave Petition is filed.

LIST OF DATES

DATE EVENT
01.01.1953 The dispute pertains to property i.e. land bearing original
survey no. 164 situated at Village Kadodara, Tal :
Palsana, District- Surat currently numbered as No. 193,
194 paiki , out of which the land bearing survey no. No.
162/4, Block No. 193 admeasuring 1518 sq. mts and land
bearing survey no. 162/4, Block no. 194 admeasuring
1275.77 sq. mts. (‘Land’) is being used as a Petrol Pump
by the Petitioners by virtue of the rent agreement dated
01.01.1953 of said land executed by Burma Oil Shell
Storage Company Ltd through the Father-in-law of
Petitioner No.1 i.e. Murlidhar Bhagvatilal Vamdot

A true copy of the rent agreement dated

01.01.1953 alongwith Translations is annexed herewith
and marked as ANNEXURE P-1 (pages 496-500).
 J
28.04.1998 After the demise of father in law, the partnership firm was
reconstituted and rent agreement was executed by
Petitioner no.1 as partner of M/s Murlidhar B Vamdot,
with Respondent No. 3 (Complainant) and other land
owners

A true copy of rent agreement dated 28.04.1998

between Petitioner no.1 as partner of M/s Murlidhar B
Vamdot, with Respondent No. 3 (Complainant) and
other land owners alongwith Translations is annexed
herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-2 (pages
501-510).
25.06.2020 Petitioners entered into an agreement for carrying on the
business of selling petrol, diesel, oils etc with Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited through ‘Selling License’
Agreement which came into effect from 12.01.2019.

A true copy of Selling License Agreement with Bharat

Petroleum Corporation Limited dated 25.06.2020 is
annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-3
(pages 511-526).

NIL Respondent No. 3 preferred complaint for encroachment

on the above said land under Gujarat Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2020.

28.03.2022 Summons were issued to Petitioner by Respondent No.2

dated 28.03.2022 bearing no. JMN/Land Grabbing
Application/ Reg No. 20/2022/ Vashi.393/2022
 K

A true copy of summons dated 28.03.2022

alongiwth Translations is annexed herewith and
marked as ANNEXURE P-4 (pages 527-530).

11.04.2022 Being aggrieved by the impugned summons dated

28.03.2022, the Petitioner preferred the said Special
Criminal Application No. 3788/2022

A true copy of Memo in Special Criminal Application

No. 3788/2022 is annexed herewith and marked
as ANNEXURE P-5 (pages 531-551).

12.04.2022 Vide order dated 12.04.2022, Hon’ble High Court of

Gujarat at Ahmedabad was pleased to grant stay in the
case bearing no. JMN/Land Grabbing Application/ Reg
No. 20/2022/ Vashi.393/2022

A true copy of the order dated 12.04.2022 passed

by Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
Special Criminal Application No. 3788/2022 is annexed
herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-6 (pages
552-553).
09.05.2024 Being aggrieved by the impugned summon dated
28.03.2022, the Petitioner preferred the said Special Civil
Application No. 3788/2022 which got dismissed by the
impugned order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble
High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad.
 L
A true copy of the Order dated 03.06.2024 passed by
this Hon’ble Court in SLP (Crl) No. 7725 of 2024 is
annexed herewith and marked as Annexure P-7
(Pages 554)

A true copy of the order dated 02.08.2024 passed by

this Hon’ble Court in SLP (Crl) No. 7725 of 2024 is
annexed herewith and marked as Annexure P-8
(Pages 555-559)

A true copy of the order dated 05.08.2024 passed by

this Hon’ble Court in Special Leave Petition
(Civil ) 17769 of 2024 (Diary No. 27717 of 2024) is
annexed herewith and marked as Annexure P-9
(Pages 560-561)

A true copy of the Order dated 12.08.2024 passed by

this Hon’ble Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.
17710 of 2024 is annexed herewith and marked as
Annexure P-10 (Pages 562-564)

17.09.2024 Hence, the present Special Leave Petition is filed.

 1

HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3788 OF 2022

MEMO OF PARTIES

IN THE MATTER OF:-

1. Vibhakar Ramashanker Bhatt

Partner of M/s Murlidhar B Vamdot
Aged about 84 yrs

2. Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt

Partner of M/s Murlidhar B Vamdot
Aged about 61 yrs
Petitioners
Both having address at:
Sardarbaug, Station Road, Bardoli
District Surat,
Gujarat

VERSUS

1. The State of Gujarat

Through Secretary, Home
Department,
Government of Gujarat,
Gandhinagar,
Gujarat.

2. The Deputy Collector,

Having office at
Office of the Deputy Collector & Sub
Taluka Seva Sadan,
Navagam, Tal: kamrajRajkot
 2

SuratGujarat

3. Shankerbhai Dahyabhai Nayak

Male Aged 64 years
Residing at : Desai Faliyu,
Kadodara, Tal: Palsana
District: Surat
Respondents

FILED BY:

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONERS

Date: 17.09.2024
3
4
 NEUTRAL CITATION

5
C/SCA/2995/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/05/2024

2024:GUJHC:26840-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2995 of 2021

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 32 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 47 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 211 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 214 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 50 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 57 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 55 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 79 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 64 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 156 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 65 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 65 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 238 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 351 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 265 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 205 of 2022
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of
2022
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 205 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 200 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 283 of 2022
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)
NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 283 of 2022

Page 1 of 417

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 NEUTRAL CITATION

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C/SCA/2995/2021 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/05/2024

2024:GUJHC:26840-DB

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 287 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 279 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 368 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 358 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 384 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 316 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 664 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 524 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1311 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 460 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 419 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1006 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 943 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 909 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 634 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 797 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 740 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1214 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 818 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1691 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CLARIFICATION) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1691 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1628 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1381 of 2022

Page 2 of 417

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 865 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1707 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1727 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1930 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2186 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 938 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 946 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1965 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2582 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1099 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1033 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1132 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1103 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1098 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1203 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1221 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1214 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2715 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2401 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2599 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1348 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1296 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1355 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1402 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1451 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2780 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2699 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1466 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2701 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1512 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1542 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1517 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1544 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2805 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2784 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2879 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3136 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1664 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1713 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1724 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3141 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3334 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3318 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1856 of 2022
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of
2022
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1856 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1867 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3352 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1916 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1923 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1937 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1989 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4155 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1972 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1969 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1970 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2029 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3860 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3976 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3926 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2138 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4048 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2642 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2281 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4355 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2332 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2408 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2392 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2472 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2549 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2524 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4949 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5041 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2659 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6061 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6004 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4863 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2654 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2695 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2694 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2754 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5323 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5250 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2748 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2775 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2792 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6014 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5575 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2824 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2832 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5452 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2820 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6044 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 1 of 2024

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In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6044 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5974 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6255 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5906 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6089 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5744 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6135 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7090 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3090 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3085 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3064 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3065 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3068 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3109 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3104 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3127 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3180 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6580 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6581 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3230 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6644 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6645 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3355 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3329 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3350 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3555 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3348 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7018 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4028 of 2021
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4028 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7307 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6772 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3372 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4730 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3371 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3381 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3402 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7474 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3439 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7590 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3440 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3473 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3453 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3472 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3572 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3505 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3558 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3552 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3550 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9217 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7373 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4581 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3725 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3716 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3659 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3660 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7352 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7354 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7351 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3837 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3730 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3743 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3780 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3769 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3791 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3788 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3842 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3825 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3843 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8183 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3949 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3961 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7753 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4213 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4013 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4016 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7750 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4024 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4025 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4056 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4032 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4084 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4073 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6215 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4783 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4132 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4147 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8007 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4158 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8273 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8241 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4338 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4442 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7522 of 2021

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8806 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4594 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8706 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4771 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4425 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4497 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4473 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8875 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4556 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4577 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8726 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4634 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4536 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8621 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4566 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4615 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4554 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4555 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4952 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4761 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8853 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4754 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9134 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4936 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4774 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5320 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8932 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4752 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9072 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8980 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4868 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9001 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9266 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4865 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4910 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4967 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4866 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4864 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9106 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9006 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10466 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9426 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9162 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CLARIFICATION) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9162 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5568 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5043 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5041 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5129 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5128 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9579 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5154 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5198 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5206 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5210 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5559 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5323 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5284 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5745 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9829 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9830 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5374 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5787 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5388 of 2022
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)
NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5388 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5439 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5437 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9913 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5441 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9883 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10114 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6169 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10306 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5457 of 2022
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)
NO. 1 of 2024
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5457 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9928 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10059 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5604 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5548 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5547 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9997 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10180 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5595 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5701 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5638 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5822 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10219 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10815 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10629 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5659 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10435 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5744 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10774 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5718 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6310 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5727 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12995 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12996 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5719 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6116 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10270 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6697 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6578 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10001 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6780 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6792 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6711 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6091 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6053 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11287 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11545 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10698 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6069 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10754 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10998 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11396 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6111 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6114 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10996 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11380 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6122 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11375 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6259 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6339 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6313 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6993 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7049 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7002 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7094 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6267 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11395 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6407 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6289 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11394 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11485 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10680 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10851 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6389 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6433 of 2022
With

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6442 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7347 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6481 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11706 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11667 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7636 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12245 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11489 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12344 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7969 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7050 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14595 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8045 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8048 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8336 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12345 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8299 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8249 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8242 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8282 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8284 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8855 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10795 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9598 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13245 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9522 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9608 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14523 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8958 of 2021
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)
NO. 1 of 2021
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8958 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14524 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7770 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7771 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9637 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12951 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9640 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9771 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13389 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9086 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9416 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9216 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9650 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9807 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9371 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9110 of 2021
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9883 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9653 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9273 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13814 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14147 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9292 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9299 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9435 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9714 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9583 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10194 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13789 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9615 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15533 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14583 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9618 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10557 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9674 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9854 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9704 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9705 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11046 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10546 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9773 of 2021

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14529 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14903 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14549 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10867 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9942 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9940 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10077 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10002 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11172 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10916 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10928 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15418 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10107 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10114 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16402 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15722 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11400 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11164 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10844 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10865 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10204 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16532 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14661 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14926 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11003 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14984 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10273 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10821 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11179 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11286 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11317 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11192 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14977 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15957 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14912 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16870 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10419 of 2021
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10419 of 2021
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING STAY) NO. 2 of
2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10419 of 2021
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 3 of 2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10419 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11267 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10734 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15978 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15076 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10752 of 2021

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11350 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11354 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11425 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11362 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11771 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16401 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11770 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10627 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16530 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10825 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11690 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15911 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11721 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16589 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10901 of 2021
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of
2021
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10901 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10876 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11859 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11051 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 235 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11422 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11920 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17034 of 2021

With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of
2023
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17034 of 2021
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR FIXING DATE OF HEARING) NO. 2 of
2023
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17034 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15903 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16694 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16725 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11112 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11096 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11207 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11159 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16895 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17012 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17046 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11260 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11259 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11339 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17447 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17118 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18340 of 2021
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of
2024
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18340 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17314 of 2021

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11579 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17316 of 2021
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of
2024
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17316 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11684 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11447 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11583 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11543 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11685 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11580 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17535 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19024 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12153 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12118 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 251 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11697 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17959 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17884 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17991 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18402 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11915 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11972 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11917 of 2021
With

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CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)

NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11917 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18080 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18074 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11916 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18443 of 2021
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of 2021
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18443 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12052 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12112 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18634 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12306 of 2021
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)
NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12306 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12343 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12412 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12482 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12459 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12512 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12689 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12545 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12541 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12597 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12611 of 2021
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12658 of 2021

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19947 of 2021
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING STAY) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19947 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12657 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12656 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12659 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12661 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19600 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12700 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12691 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12695 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12690 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12694 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 300 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12708 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19839 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12791 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12765 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19951 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12831 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12819 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13045 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13046 of 2021
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12891 of 2021

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13049 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 290 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12965 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 148 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13010 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13033 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 27 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 34 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1931 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1942 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11392 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR ORDERS) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11392 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11540 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11838 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11839 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11921 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11943 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11960 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12050 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12051 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12051 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12052 of 2022

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With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12052 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12108 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12178 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12245 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12262 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12264 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12268 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12272 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12273 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12277 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12382 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12384 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12467 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12468 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12625 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12626 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12777 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12790 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12802 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12840 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12884 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12890 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12891 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12990 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12993 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12999 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13056 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13057 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13108 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13177 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13237 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13238 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13242 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13251 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13321 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13337 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13371 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13372 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13373 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13405 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13449 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13492 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13959 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13961 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13962 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13969 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13971 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13972 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13974 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14034 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14072 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14083 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14088 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14521 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14600 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14705 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14738 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14745 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14746 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14832 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of
2023
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14832 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14833 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14837 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14839 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14840 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14848 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14948 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14953 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14955 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14957 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14967 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14969 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14971 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14972 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14974 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14975 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14976 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14977 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15045 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15127 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15160 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15206 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15207 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15208 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15209 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15327 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15328 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15375 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15411 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15442 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15500 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15528 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15530 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15553 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15576 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15578 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15579 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15580 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15581 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15583 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15584 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15585 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15590 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15593 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15693 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15730 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15852 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15966 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15967 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 2 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15967 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15968 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 2 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15968 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15969 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 2 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15969 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15971 of 2022

With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 2 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15971 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15976 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR DIRECTION) NO. 2 of 2022
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15976 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16043 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16064 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16107 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16108 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16204 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16453 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16582 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16585 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16632 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16649 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16789 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16945 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17117 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17126 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17312 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17391 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17429 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17457 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17664 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17677 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17678 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17695 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17703 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17713 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17721 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17873 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17878 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17992 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18013 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18149 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18150 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18165 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18239 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18470 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18474 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18685 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18691 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18935 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19028 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19066 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19137 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19519 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19705 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19785 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19787 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19810 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19823 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19836 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19860 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20086 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20260 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20416 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20417 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20418 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20419 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20420 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20421 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20422 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20423 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20424 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20485 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20507 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20549 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20561 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20562 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20636 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20666 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20690 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20774 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20902 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21001 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21171 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21190 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21191 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21314 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21776 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21787 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21791 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22073 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 1 of
2023
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22073 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22105 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22117 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22329 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22355 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22409 of 2022
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 2 of
2023
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22409 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22543 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22599 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22604 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22614 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22635 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22995 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 23003 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 23005 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 23007 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 23786 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 24596 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 25068 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 25747 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 25930 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26228 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26244 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26317 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26349 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26350 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26453 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26586 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 26617 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 22 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 31 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 78 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 114 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 253 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 313 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 315 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 332 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 333 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 355 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 358 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 364 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 391 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 394 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 455 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 473 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 547 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 552 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 574 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 679 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 704 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 705 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 766 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1211 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1217 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1218 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1235 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1259 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1291 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1532 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1533 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1585 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1681 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1682 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1685 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1792 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1829 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1855 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2030 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2033 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2093 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2100 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2127 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2153 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2177 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2181 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2191 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2192 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2226 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2235 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2289 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2320 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2468 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2474 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2503 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3411 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3685 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3697 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3782 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3786 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3830 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3832 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3949 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3968 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4228 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4267 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4268 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4298 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4301 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4310 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4392 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4531 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4655 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4736 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4764 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4823 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4849 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5153 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5335 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5392 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5403 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5404 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5527 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5533 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5544 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5563 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5564 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5635 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5637 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5757 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5908 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6158 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6160 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6178 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6179 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6182 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6258 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6386 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6398 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6443 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6469 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6597 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6906 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6909 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6916 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6917 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6965 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7221 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7333 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7370 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7445 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7468 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7506 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7530 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7538 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7586 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7837 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7909 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7949 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7958 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7960 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8128 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8150 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8168 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8329 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8333 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8410 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8568 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8596 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8642 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8775 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8973 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9061 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9328 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9363 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9399 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9439 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9480 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9547 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9588 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9614 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9690 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9725 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9813 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9822 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9828 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9833 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9870 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9917 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9932 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10132 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10137 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10171 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10377 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10463 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10591 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10592 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10660 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10716 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10735 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10818 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10823 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10908 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11036 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11134 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11269 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11284 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11326 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11336 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11383 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11384 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11480 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11626 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11639 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11665 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11670 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11737 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11741 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11759 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11810 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11829 of 2023
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FIXING DATE OF EARLY HEARING) NO. 1
of 2024
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11829 of 2023
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF) NO. 2 of
2024
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11829 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11838 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11908 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11912 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11933 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11970 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12118 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12120 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12295 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12387 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12479 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12497 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12500 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12501 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12588 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12949 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13134 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13286 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13428 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13656 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13760 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13898 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13967 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13971 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13999 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14016 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14018 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14025 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14070 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14154 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14220 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14255 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14297 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14319 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14488 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14492 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14680 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14776 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15244 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15419 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15483 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15511 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15588 of 2023
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15588 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17130 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17501 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17556 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17594 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17600 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17759 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17788 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17830 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17834 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17946 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 17962 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18081 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18106 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18161 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 18957 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19563 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19620 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20843 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 21190 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3212 of 2021
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4358 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5250 of 2022
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of
2022
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5250 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6602 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6606 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6663 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6694 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6700 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6780 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6897 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6918 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6975 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6976 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7011 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7023 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7037 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7039 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7040 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7056 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7061 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7071 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7098 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7148 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7166 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7168 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7189 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7190 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7194 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7208 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7259 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7305 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7308 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7310 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7311 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7313 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7315 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7449 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7457 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7482 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7494 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7507 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7519 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7528 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7540 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7562 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7607 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7613 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7618 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7655 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7695 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7733 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7765 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7767 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7795 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7796 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7805 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7827 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7835 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7845 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7850 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7865 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7866 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7868 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7870 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7872 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7908 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7911 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7922 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7938 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7942 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7965 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8003 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8022 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8024 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8031 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8050 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8052 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8064 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8086 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8099 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8101 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8108 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8113 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8164 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8172 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8183 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8191 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8214 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8215 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8262 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8301 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8321 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8333 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8339 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8340 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8387 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8412 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8415 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8433 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8496 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8498 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8513 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8523 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8543 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8545 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8546 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8550 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8569 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8582 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8584 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8645 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8661 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8666 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8730 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8731 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8781 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8797 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8798 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8827 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8868 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8894 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8930 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8935 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8941 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8942 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8965 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8982 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8985 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8986 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8993 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8999 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9049 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9055 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9057 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9063 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9090 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9108 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9119 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9124 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9142 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9188 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9189 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9250 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9328 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9381 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9399 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9427 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9474 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9483 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9490 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9572 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9585 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9586 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9616 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9663 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9687 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9716 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9776 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9781 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9818 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9838 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9851 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9884 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9901 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9914 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9951 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9954 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10075 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10142 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10144 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10210 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10214 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10319 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10408 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10412 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10439 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10446 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10448 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10560 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10589 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10590 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10644 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10650 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10662 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10729 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10737 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10739 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10741 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10752 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10822 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10878 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10903 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10936 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10937 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10938 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10998 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11004 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11007 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11013 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11020 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11072 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11073 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11082 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11233 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11244 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11264 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11269 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11328 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11345 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11349 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11388 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11392 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11393 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11396 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11402 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11450 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11478 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11624 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11645 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11708 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11742 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11799 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11804 of 2022
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11860 of 2022

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11862 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11868 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11967 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12017 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12137 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12175 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12189 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12200 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12262 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12273 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12339 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12343 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12663 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12665 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12709 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12714 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12725 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12747 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12770 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12883 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12888 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12943 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12974 of 2022

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12978 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13141 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13163 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13280 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13329 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13391 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13412 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13440 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13478 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13508 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13555 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13640 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13722 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13728 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13808 of 2022
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 14 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 52 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 81 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 123 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 218 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 273 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 319 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 326 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 583 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 689 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 702 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 728 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 738 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 778 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 829 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 891 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 967 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 986 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1054 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1108 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1263 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1265 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1273 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1284 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1377 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1382 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1422 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1427 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1459 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1484 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1516 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1517 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1520 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1539 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1558 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1641 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1666 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1805 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1872 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1879 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1935 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1994 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2050 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2051 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2052 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2058 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2160 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2190 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2221 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2313 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2709 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2713 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2729 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2745 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2746 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2763 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2781 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2803 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2901 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2915 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2963 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2973 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2979 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2981 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3026 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3094 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3097 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3098 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3110 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3112 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3139 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3167 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3197 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3208 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3210 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3265 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3266 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3267 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3270 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3276 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3290 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3308 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3355 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3379 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3390 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3396 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3410 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3419 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3443 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3476 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3515 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3557 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3564 of 2023
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)
NO. 1 of 2024
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3564 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3634 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3637 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3653 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3678 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3690 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3699 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3717 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3735 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3737 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3751 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3780 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3802 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3805 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3807 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3808 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3809 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3810 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3811 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3812 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3813 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3817 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3820 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3822 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3823 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3825 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3826 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3828 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3861 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3897 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3914 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3936 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4009 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4020 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4026 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4040 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4126 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4156 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4211 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4234 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4340 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4355 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4361 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4417 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4419 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4420 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4483 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4489 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4519 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4553 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4611 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4641 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4654 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4695 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4746 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4771 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4777 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4778 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4779 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4780 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4781 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4807 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4823 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4891 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4923 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 4961 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5016 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5046 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5050 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5101 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5139 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5193 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5221 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5232 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5263 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5265 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5289 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5312 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5377 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5404 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5428 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5442 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5467 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5468 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5485 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5515 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5532 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5543 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5556 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5558 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5568 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5572 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5591 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5622 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5692 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5908 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5917 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5999 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6030 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6048 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6053 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6192 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6195 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6341 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6399 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6497 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6528 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6549 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6605 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6606 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6644 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6671 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6682 of 2023
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR VACATING INTERIM RELIEF)
NO. 1 of 2024
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6682 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6762 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6770 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6779 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6783 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6845 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6846 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6848 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6849 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6875 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6885 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6896 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6897 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6898 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 6911 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7023 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7059 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7104 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7387 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7433 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7472 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7484 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7493 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7532 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7654 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7688 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7858 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7957 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7958 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7980 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8031 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8128 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8160 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8184 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8249 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8280 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8313 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8336 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8348 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8402 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8431 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8432 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8448 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8453 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8454 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8456 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8516 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8523 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8524 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8576 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8582 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8584 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8597 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8610 of 2023
With
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR JOINING PARTY) NO. 1 of
2023
In R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8610 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8652 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8668 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8681 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8687 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8725 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8736 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8744 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8840 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8893 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8953 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8956 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 8978 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9042 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9058 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9116 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9172 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9189 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9191 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9232 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9269 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9275 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9289 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9364 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9366 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9449 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9703 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9737 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9840 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9846 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9848 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 9999 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10016 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10019 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10055 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10072 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10103 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10104 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10114 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10127 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10192 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10193 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10210 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10245 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10258 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10260 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10266 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10278 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10333 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10334 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10335 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10350 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10429 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10439 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10605 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10615 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10679 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10696 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10701 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10715 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10723 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10730 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 10734 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11292 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11583 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11659 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 11976 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12029 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12032 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12181 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12182 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12199 of 2023
With

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R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12230 of 2023

With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12235 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12248 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12249 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12277 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12306 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12350 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12402 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12407 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12451 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12494 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12594 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12600 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12647 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12656 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12713 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12715 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12719 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12761 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12765 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12794 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12839 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12870 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 12938 of 2023

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With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13088 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13160 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13184 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13185 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13222 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13246 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13251 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13270 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13324 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13327 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13443 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13488 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13490 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13549 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 13605 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 15618 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 16244 of 2023
With
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 16619 of 2023

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL

and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE

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==========================================================

1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be Yes

allowed to see the judgment ?

2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes

3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the No

fair copy of the judgment ?

4 Whether this case involves a substantial Yes

question of law as to the interpretation
of the Constitution of India or any order
made thereunder ?

==============================================================
KAMLESH JIVANLAL DAVE & ANR.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==============================================================
Appearance:
Mr. Asim Pandya, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Gaurav
Vyas, Ms. Megha Jani with Mr. Arjun Joshi with Mr. Mit
S.Thakkar with Ms. Aditi Sheth, Ms. Krisha Bhimani, Mr.
Virat Popat, Mr. Tejas M. Barot, Advocate assisted by Ms.
Rhea Chokshi, Mr.Maulik Shah, Mr.Masoom Shah, Mr.Rasesh
Parikh, Mr.Vishwas Shah, Mr.Vikram Thakore, Mr.Vikas
Nair, Mr.A.V.Nair, Mr.Jigar Gadhvi and Mr.M.M.Saiyed for
the respective parties in the concerned petitions

Mr.Kamal Trivedi, Advocate General, assisted by Ms.

Manisha Lavkumar, Additional Advocate General, Mr. Mitesh
Amin, Additional Advocate General, Mr. Vinay Vishen,
Assistant Government Pleader and Ms. Ankita Rajput,
advocate for the State respondents.
==============================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA

AGARWAL
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE

Date : 09/05/2024

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CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL)

1. For the convenience of readers, the judgment

is divided into parts as indicated in the
table of contents, given hereinbelow :-

Table of contents

Sl. No. Subject Page

Nos.
1 Preface 81

2 Topics – Issues of Challenge 92

Part I Presidential Assent and Repugnancy – 95
Article 254 of the Constitution of
India
(A) Arguments of the learned counsels 95
for the parties
(B) Topics of Analysis 120

(a) Scope and interpretation of

120
entries in the Seventh Schedule;

(b) Pith and substance of The

127
Gujarat Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2020;

(c) Repugnancy and Presidential 143

Assent;

(d) Incidental Trenching; 155

(e) Dealing with the arguments of 167
the learned counsels on the
apparent conflict of different
provisions of the Gujarat Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020
with Central laws:-

(i) Conflict with the Civil 168

Procedure Code and

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Criminal Procedure Code;

(ii) Effect of Section 15 of 180

the Act' 2020;

(iii) Contradictions shown 193

with The Specific
Relief, The Limitation
Act and The Transfer of
Property Act;

(C) Conclusion on Repugnancy and 204

Presidential Assent.

Part II Manifest Arbitrariness – violation of 218

Article 14 of the Constitution
(A) Arguments of the learned counsels 218
for the parties:-

(a) Mischief Rule; 228

(b) Manifest Arbitrariness in the 232

provisions of the Land Grabbing
Act' 2020 and the Rules made
thereunder;

(B) Analysis - 255

(a) General Principles of

255
testing the
constitutionality of an
Enactment;
(b) Analysing the Statement of 260
Objects and reasons of the
Act' 2020;
(c) Dealing with the plea of
violation of Article 14 by 266
treating unequals as
equals;

(d) Taking aid of the 284

decisions of the Apex
Court pertaining to Andhra
Pradesh Land Grabbing Act,
1982;

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(C) Conclusion: 297

Reverting to the Land Grabbing 297
Act, 2020 :-
(a) Object and purpose of Act’ 297
2020, Scope of
jurisdiction of Special
Court;
(b) Reverse burden; 304

(c) Section 7(2)- Dispute re: 308

jurisdiction of Special
Courts;
(d) Section 9 of the Act’ 311
2020 - unguided and
unbridled power to Special
Courts ;
(e) Section 12(a) – re: 320
Constitution of the
Committee :-

(f) Rule 5 of Rules’ 2020 –

re: Procedure of inquiry 322
into the complaints :-

Part III Doctrine of proportionality and 324

Validity of Mandatory Minimum Sentence

(A) Arguments of the learned 324

counsels :-

(a) Law of Proportionality; 324

(b) Usurpation of power by 342
Legislature in providing
sentencing policy;
(c) Vesting of discretion in 347
authorities;

(d) Unbridled & untrammeled 350

discretion leads to
arbitrariness;

(B) Analysis & Conclusion: 360

(a) Proportionality doctrine 360

and test of reasonableness

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(b) Proportionality and 364

sentencing under criminal
law
(c) Legislative supremacy and 371
power of Judicial review
Part IV Mens rea and retrospectivity – 382
violation of Article 20 of the
Constitution

Part V Rule 5(2) – Effect of inclusion of the 402

word:-
“headstrong”

Part VI Pari materia Enactment of other States 408

Part VII Conclusion : Operative portion :- 412

2. In this group of writ petitions invoking the

jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, the subject
matter of challenge is the constitutionality
of the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Act, 2020 (Gujarat Act No.11 of 2020) and
Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules,
2020 made thereunder.

3. With the consent of the learned counsel for

the parties, we have deliberated on the only
question of vires of the Gujarat Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2020 (“Land Grabbing Act’
2020” or “Act' 2020” for short) and the
Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules,
2020 (“Land Grabbing Rules' 2020”) made
thereunder, and have not entered into the

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merits of the individual claims of the

petitioners herein.

4. The common prayer made in this bunch of writ

petitions, to hold and declare the provisions
of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 and the Land
Grabbing Rules’ 2020 made thereunder as ultra
vires to the Constitution of India, being
violative of Articles 14, 20, 21 and Article
254 of the Constitution of India, has been
pressed into service and the arguments of the
learned counsels for the parties have been
heard on this issue as a common question of
law. All the writ petitions having been heard
together, as such, are being decided by this
common judgment on the above-referred issue.

1 - PREFACE

5. The Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

2020, is an Act of the Gujarat legislature and
having received the assent of the Governor, it
was published in the Gujarat Government
Gazette on 9th October, 2020. The long title
of the Act reads as under:-

"An Act to prohibit land grabbing activities

and connected matters in the State of Gujarat"

6. The Act extends to the whole of the State of

Gujarat and has been enforced with effect from

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29.08.2020 (29 August, 2020, by virtue of Sub-

section (3) of Section 1.

7. Section 2 of the Act provides definition of

"land", "land grabber" and "land grabbing".

8. Section 3 of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 makes

"land grabbing" to be unlawful by stating that
the land grabbing in any form shall be
prohibited and declared unlawful and any
activity connected with or arising out of
"land grabbing" shall be an offence punishable
under this Act (Act' 2020).

9. Section 4 is couched in negative language

casting prohibition on "land grabbing" and
provides that no person shall commit or cause
to be committed "land grabbing" by himself or
through any other person. Sub-section (2) of
Section 4 further provides that any person
who, on or after the commencement of the Act,
continues to be in occupation of a "grabbed
land" belonging to the Government, local
authority, religious or charitable institution
or endowment or other private person,
otherwise than a lawful tenant shall be guilty
of the offence under the Act. Sub-section (3)
of Section 4 provides for punishment and
penalty for commission of offence of "land

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grabbing", for contravention of the provisions

of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of
Section 4.

10. Section 5 provides for punishment with

imprisonment for 10 years on conviction and
penalty in the form of fine, for other
offences in connection with "land grabbing",
such as sale or allotment of any land grabbed;
including instigating or inciting any person
for "land grabbing"; use or cause or permit to
be used not only any land grabbed for the
purposes connected with sale or allotment;
entering into agreement for construction of
any structure or buildings on the grabbed
land; causes or procure or attempts to procure
any person to do any of the aforementioned
Acts.

11. Section 6 deals with the commission of

offences under the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 by
a person which is a Company.

12. Section 7 provides for constitution of Special

Courts by the State Government with the
concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High
Court of Gujarat and provides that where any
question arises as to the jurisdiction of any
Special Court, it shall be referred to the

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State Government, whose decision in the matter

shall be final. The constitution of the
Special Court and the qualification of the
persons manning the Special Court having been
provided therein from Sub-section (3) to Sub-
section (7).

13. Section 9(1) confers power on the Special

Courts to take cognizance and try every case
arising out of any alleged act of land
grabbing, either suo motu or on an application
made by any person. It further confers power
on the Special Court to try any dispute with
respect to the ownership and title or lawful
possession of the land grabbed, whether before
or after commencement of the Act.

14. Sub-section (2) of Section 9 further clarifies

that notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, any case in
respect of an alleged act of "land grabbing"
under the Act' 2020, shall be triable in the
Special Court, subject to the provisions of
this Act and attaches finality to the decision
of the Special Court.

15. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 further states

that notwithstanding anything in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, the Special Court may

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follow its own procedure in conformity with

the principles of natural justice and fair
play and subject to the provisions of the Act'
2020 and the Rules made thereunder while
deciding the civil liability.

16. Sub-section (4) of Section 9 confers power on

the Special Court to try all offences
punishable under the Act, notwithstanding
anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

17. Sub-section (5) of Section 9 further confers

power on the Special Court to mould its own
procedure to decide both civil and criminal
proceedings, to determine civil and criminal
liability against a "land grabber".

18. Sub-section (6) of Section 9 provides timeline

for disposal of the cases, cognizance of which
has been taken by the Special Court under Sub-
section (1), either suo motu or on application
made by any person.

19. Sub-section (7) of Section 9 contains two

provisos, requiring the Special Court to
notify the fact of taking cognizance under the
Act by public notice and invite objections
from any person by pubic notice and further
cause a notice of taking cognizance of the

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case under the Act' 2020, served on any person

known or believed to be interested in the
land.

20. Sub-section (7) of Section 9 further states

that finding of the Special Court with regard
to any alleged act of "land grabbing" shall be
conclusive proof of the fact of "land
grabbing" and of the person who committed such
grabbing and every judgment of the Special
Court with regard to the determination of
title and ownership to a lawful person or any
"land grabbed" shall be binding on all persons
having interest in such land.

21. Sub-section (8) of Section 9 provides that

when an offence of "land grabbing" is proved,
the Special Court may order that possession of
the land be restored to the person having
interest in such land, after evicting by
force, if necessary, any other person who may
be in possession of the property.

22. Sub-section (9) of Section 9 confers power on

the Special Court to award compensation in
terms of money for wrongful possession of the
land grabbed and recover as arrears of land
revenue in case Government is the owner or as
decree of the Civil Court, in any other case,

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which is to be executed by the Special Court.

Proviso to Sub-section (9) states that before
passing order to award compensation,
opportunity of making representation or of
adducing evidence, shall be granted to the
land grabber and representation and evidence,
if any, submitted shall be duly considered.

23. Section 10 provides for application of the

provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, and the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, to the proceedings before the Special
Court and confers power of Civil Court and
Court of Sessions upon the Special Court
conducting proceedings under the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020.

24. Section 12A provides remedy of Appeal to the

High Court against the final judgment and
order passed by the Special Court under the
Land Grabbing Act, 2020 and states that
separate appeals shall lie from the judgment
and order made by the Special Court in the
civil or criminal proceedings.

25. Section 15 gives overriding effect to the Land

Grabbing Act’ 2020, on other laws for time
being in force or custom, usage or agreement
or decree or order of a court or any other

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tribunal or authority.

26. Section 16 confers power on the State

Government to make Rules to carry out the
purposes of the Act.

27. Section 17 makes any transaction relating to

alienation of the land grabbed or any part
thereof, which has taken place, whether before
or after the commencement of the Act, except
to the extent ordered by the Special Court, to
be null and void.

28. Section 11 provides for shifting of burden of

proof on a person who is alleged to have
grabbed the land, on a prima facie proof of
the land being owned by the Government or by a
private person other than the person who is
alleged to have grabbed the land.

29. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 provides for

inquiry into the pecuniary resources of a land
grabber or any person on his behalf and to
draw a presumption that such property or
pecuniary resources have been acquired or
derived by his activities as a land grabber,
unless contrary is proved.

30. Section 12(a) further states that the police

officer shall not record any information about

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the commission of offence under the Land

Grabbing Act’ 2020 without prior approval of
the District Collector in consultation with
the Committee notified by the State
Government.

31. The Committee defined under Section 2(a)

notified by the State Government is to be
constituted under the Chairmanship of the
District Collector for the purposes of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020.

32. The Rules namely, the Gujarat Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Rules, 2020, framed in exercise
of the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of
Section 16 of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 has
been notified by the Revenue Department in the
Official Gazette dated 16.12.2020 providing
for the procedure for making application;
inquiry by the Committee; power and functions
of the Committee and provision for Special
Court to refer cases to the Committee,
cognizance of which has been taken by it
either suo motu or an application made by any
person to the Court, asking for scrutiny
report from the Committee after inquiry as per
Rule 5. The form of application as per the
Rule 3(1) has also been provided therein.

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33. By the notification dated 06.11.2020 of the

Legal Department, the Government of Gujarat,
in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-
section (1) of Section 7 of the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020, with the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the High Court of Gujarat has
notified for the designation of the Judge,
City Civil Court, Ahmedabad and the Court of
Senior most Additional District Judge of each
district at the headquarters in the State of
Gujarat, to be Special Courts 'to try the
offences registered under the Act'.

34. By the notification, published in the Gujarat

Government Gazette dated 16th December, 2020
in Part - B, the Government of Gujarat in
exercise of the power conferred by Section
2(a) of the Act, 2022, has provided for
constitution of the District Committee for
each district, consisting of the District
Collector as the Chairman with the members in
the following manner :-

1. District Development Officer - Member

(District Panchayat)
2. Municipal Commissioner - Member
(For Municipal Corporation Area)

3. CEO of Urban Development Authorities/- Member

CEO of Area Development Authority
(If applicable)

4. Superintendent of Police - Member

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5. Police Commissioner - Member

(For Police Commissionerate area)
6. Resident Additional Collector - Member-
Secretary

The Notification provides that the

constitution of the said Committee shall be
there until further notification.

35. The aforesaid provisions of the Land Grabbing

Act’ 2020 and the Rules made thereunder as
also the Government Notifications for
designation of the Special Court and
constitution of the Committee have been
challenged by the petitioners herein with the
contentions that the entire Act is
unconstitutional, invalid, ultra vires,
violative of Articles 14, 20, 21, 254 of the
Constitution of India as also of the basic
structure of the Constitution of India. The
contention is that the provisions of the Act
and the Rules made thereunder are vague,
ambiguous, unworkable, contrary to the Rule of
law, Rule of propriety and manifestly
arbitrary. The entire Act, as such, is
required to be declared as invalid
constitutionally.

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2 - Topics - Issues Of Challenge

36. The arguments made on different aspects by the

learned counsels for the parties elaborating
the issues of challenge, are to be aligned
issue-wise for convenience in the following
manner :-

Main points of challenge :-

(i) The Act is ultra vires Articles 246 and

254 of the Constitution of India, for want of
Presidential assent.

(ii) The Act is repugnant to the Central

Legislations, inter alia :-

(a) The Limitation Act, 1963

(b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908
(c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(d) Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(e) Specific Relief Act, 1963
(f) Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(g) Indian Contract Act, 1872

- and hence invalid, in absence of

Presidential assent.

(iii) The Act has been given retrospective

effect as it partakes the character and
consequences of any action undertaken before
its promulgation and hence, ultra vires
Article 20 of the Constitution.

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(iv) The Act is hit by Article 14 of the

Constitution on the principles of
classification of having nexus with the
object, the principle of manifest
arbitrariness, mischief rule and treating
unequals as equal.

(v) The Act is ultra vires Articles 13, 14,

19 and 21 of the Constitution on the doctrine
of proportionality and sentencing as it
prescribes minimum sentence of imprisonment
for a term of 10 years for every act of land
grabbing, which is harsh, disproportionate and
manifestly arbitrary.

(vi) The Act deprives the benefit of probation

to convicts under the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958.

Other ancilliary points :-

(vii) The Act is hit for making the act of

grabbing of land as a continuous offence,
which can be committed only once, though
continuing in possession itself is not an
offence.

(viii) Section 7 which provides for

determination of question of jurisdiction by
the State Government is contrary to the

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principles of separation of power and judicial

review, rule of law and independence of
judiciary.

(ix) Section 9 is manifestly arbitrary and is

unworkable as it gives a complete go-by to the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and
is in teeth of the provisions of the
Limitation Act, Code of Criminal Procedure,
Code of Civil Procedure and Evidence Act, more
particularly when it empowers the Special
Court to determine the order in which Civil
and Criminal proceedings are to be conducted
without any guidance and further in making the
decision of the Special Court, procedurally
and substantively final operating in rem, i.e.
against all those having interest in such
land, irrespective of the fact that they are
not party to the proceedings.

(x) Section 11 which provides reverse burden

of proof, is vague, manifestly arbitrary,
without any guidelines and in teeth of
Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act.

(xi) Section 15 is repugnant to inter alia

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Section 40 of the Evidence Act and the
provisions of the Indian Contract Act, while

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it gives overriding effect over all laws

including agreement, decree and order of the
Court, thus, unsettling the rights of parties
and violating rule of law.

(xii) On a comparative reading of the

Gujarat Act with analogous legislations
enacted by the State of Assam, Karnataka and
Andhra Pradesh, the provisions of the Gujarat
Land Grabbing Act, 2020 can be seen as vague,
arbitrary and unworkable.

(xiii) The challenge to the notification for

establishment of the District Committee and
designation of Special Courts, being in
arbitrary exercise of power, having been
issued without any guidance by the
legislature.

Part I : Presidential Assent And Repugnancy –

Article 254 of the Constitution Of India

(A) Arguments of the Learned Counsels for the

Parties

Mr. Asim Pandya, learned senior advocate, Mr.

Tejas Barot, Mr. Virat Popat, Mr. Masoom Shah,
Mr. Vishwas Shah, Mr. Rashesh Parikh and Mr.
Vikram Thakore, learned advocates have
addressed the Court on the issue.

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37. It is argued by Mr.Asim Pandya, learned senior

counsel for the petitioners that the Gujarat
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020 violates
Article 254 of the Constitution of India for
the following reasons:-

(i) It is a law, which has been enacted with

respect to many of the matters enumerated in
the Concurrent List (List III) and the Union
list (List I) of Schedule VII to the
Constitution of India and, thus, it encroaches
upon several laws made by the Parliament under
the Concurrent List and Union List.

(ii) It is sui generis, a combination of Civil

and Criminal laws. 'Land Grabbing' has been
defined and included as a new offence by
prescribing different set of procedure under
the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020.

(iii) Section 15 of the impugned Act gives

an overriding effect over other laws, judgment
and decree and is not in addition to other
laws thereby completely ousting the
application of Central legislations occupying
the same field. The result of overriding
effect given to the impugned law is sweeping
to the effect that any decree granted by a
Court of law such as on 'adverse possession'

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can be held nullity and even the law laid down

by the Apex Court having effect on the
provisions of the Act, has been held nullity.

(iv) Section 2(c) of the Act, which defines

'land', includes not only lands, but
buildings, structures and things attached to
the earth or permanently fastened to anything
attached to the earth. Meaning thereby, the
Act covers immovable properties other than the
'land' as well.

(v) The 'land grabber' defined in Section 2(d)

includes successors, not only the person who
committed land grabbing, but also such persons
who abets the act and also includes the
successors in interest.

(vi) Section 2(e) defines 'land grabbing',

which affects individual rights, i.e., private
disputes and is not confined to the right of
the State Government. The words 'without any
lawful entitlement' occurring in the
definition of "land grabbing" is having a far
reaching effect, inasmuch as, it defies
protection to a person who is in long
possession of 'land' defined in Section 2(c).

(vii) Section 4 only recognises and

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protects lawful tenant and not only prohibits

the act of "land grabbing", but makes it an
offence by prescribing punishment with
imprisonment, which may even extend to 14
years.

(viii) Section 9 empowers the Special Courts

to take suo motu cognizance in the matter of
any alleged act of "land grabbing", whether
before or after the commencement of the Act,
thus, confers unbridled power on the Special
Court to take cognizance of the cases on the
allegations of land grabbing, which had
occurred prior to the commencement of the Act
and, thus, gives retrospective effect to the
Act itself.

(ix) Section 9(2) and Section 9(3) give

overriding effect to the provisions of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, to the Parliamentary
legislation occupying the field, viz., Code of
Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal
Procedure, providing procedure pertaining to
civil and criminal proceedings; respectively.

(x) Section 17 makes any transaction in

relation to alienation of land grabbing by way
of any instrument of transfer or partition as
void.

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(xi) The impugned law further encroaches upon

the provisions of Section 27 of the Limitation
Act, the principle of adverse possession in
relation to an immovable property. It defies
Articles 64, 65, 66, 67 of the Limitation Act
and renders the period of institution of suit
for possession prescribed in the Limitation
Act as nugatory.

(xii) No limitation is prescribed for

institution of the original proceedings under
the impugned Act. Quite contrary to the
prevalent laws that provides for initiating
proceedings at the instance of the party
aggrieved, suo motu initiation of proceedings
with regard to even private land disputes has
been recognised. The result is that a time
barred suit or action is allowed to be
initiated and the rights created/accrued in
favour of the other side by operation of law
is nullified.

(xiii) Only limitation provided under

Section 12A(c) to file an appeal by a person
aggrieved against the final judgment and order
passed by the Special Court is 30 days from
the date on which the impugned judgment or
order has been made. Sub-section (3) of

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Section 12A also prescribes for the period of

30 days to be reckoned from the respective
date of the judgment and the order passed in
the proceedings. Proviso to Sub-section (3)
further limits the competence of the Special
Court to condone the delay in preferring
appeal upto a further period of 60 days, that
too in a case where the person aggrieved is
prevented by sufficient cause from preferring
the appeal within the aforesaid time period.
By providing limitation of 30 days for filing
an appeal under the Act, the State Legislature
has encroached upon the provisions of
Limitation Act, which is 90 days from the date
of the decree or order under Article 116 of
the Limitation Act and 60 days for an appeal
under the Code of Criminal Procedure against
any sentence other than death sentence or any
order from the date of sentence or the order.

(xiv) The impugned law further encroaches

upon the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides for
recovery of possession of immovable property
based on mere possessory title by bringing a
suit in the manner provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure by any person who has been
dispossessed otherwise than in due course of

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law.

If the provisions of the Gujarat Land

Grabbing Act’ 2020 are given effect to,
enforcement of the decree or recovery of the
possession under Section 6 would be an offence
and the decree of the court passed in favour
of the person based on the possessory title
would be nullified. The provisions of
Sections 37, 38 and 39 of grant of temporary
and perpetual injunction as also mandatory
injunction are nullified by Section 15 of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, as injunction order,
if any, cannot be enforced for the overriding
effect given to the provisions of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 over the decree or order of
a Court of law or any tribunal or authority.

(xv ) The provisions contained in Section 9

giving overriding effect to Act '2020 over the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and
Criminal Procedure Code completely obliterate
hierarchy of the Courts under the Code of
Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure Code.
The Special Courts are created and all
procedures to be undertaken by the Magistrate
under Cr.P.C. are to be conducted by the
Special Courts. Section 9 provides for a
different procedure than the procedure

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prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure or

Criminal Procedure Code for trying civil and
criminal proceedings with respect to the
ownership and title or lawful possession of a
person over the land defined therein. Special
set of Rules of Evidence have been prescribed
under Section 9(5) and Section 11 of the
impugned Act.

38. In the crux, it was argued that the impugned

law is repugnant to the Central laws, viz,
Section 5 and Section 27 of the Limitation
Act; Sections 5, 6, 37, 38 and 39 of the
Specific Relief Act; Section 2(2) and Section
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Section 53A
and Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act
and Sections 6 and 145 of the Criminal
Procedure Code.

39. It was argued that the State of Gujarat while

enacting the Gujarat Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2020 was required to take
assent of the President of India as has been
taken by the State of Karnataka, Assam and
Andhra Pradesh while enacting the Land
Grabbing laws for their respective States.
The assertion of the State of the Gujarat that
the impugned law falls in Entry 18 and 64 of
the State List, is incorrect. The impugned

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legislation falls in Entry 1 and 6 of List III

(Concurrent List). Even Entry 11A which was
initially in the State list has been shifted
to the Concurrent List by 42nd Amendment of
the Constitution of India and the matters
pertaining to Administration of Justice,
Constitution and Organisation of all Courts,
except the Supreme Court and High Court, now
fall in the Concurrent List (List III) of the
Seventh Schedule.

40. The contention is that Article 254 of the

Constitution of India clearly lays down where
there is a direct collision/conflict or
repugnancy between the provisions of law made
by the State Legislature and that made by the
Parliament with respect to the matters
enumerated in the Concurrent List, then,
subject to the provisions of Clause (2) the
State law would be void to the extent of
repugnancy.

41. The contention is that the matter of taking of

Presidential assent under Article 254 (2) of
the Constitution of India is not an exercise
of legislative power of the President as
contemplated under Article 123 of the
Constitution, but is a part of legislative
procedure. The question whether the procedure

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prescribed by the Constitution before enacting

the law is followed or not can always be
looked into by the Court in exercise of the
power of judicial review. If such a procedure
is not followed, such law can be held to be
invalid as a whole.

42. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex

Court in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and Another
Vs. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra
North) Ltd. And Others1, to submit that while
considering the conflict between the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)
Act, 1971, and the Bombay Rents, Hotel and
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the
question as to whether it is permissible for a
Court of law to inquire into and ascertain the
circumstances in which the assent under
Article 254(2) was given and hold as a result
of such consideration that the State law even
with respect to a matter enumerated under the
Concurrent List (if having been reserved for
the consideration of the President and having
received his assent) does not prevail in that
State. Meaning thereby, the manner in which
the assent was to be taken and the efficacy of
the President's assent, if accorded, had been

1
[(2002) 8 SCC 182] Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. National Textile
Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd. and Others

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examined by the Apex Court by observing that

the question whether the procedure prescribed
by the Constitution before enacting the law is
followed or not can always be looked into by
the Court. It was submitted that in the said
case, the Apex Court has held that granting of
assent under Article 254 (2) is not an
exercise of legislative power of the
President, as contemplated under Article 123,
but is part of legislative procedure.

43. Reliance is further placed on the decision of

the Apex Court in Rajiv Sarin vs. State of
Uttarakhand2, to submit that the assent of the
President under Article 254(2) of the
Constitution is not a matter of idle
formality. The President has, at least, to be
apprised of the reason why his assent is
sought, if there is any special reason for
doing so. If the assent is sought and given
in general terms, it will be effective for all
purposes.

44. Reference has been made to the decision of the

Apex Court in Forum for People's Collective
Efforts (FPCE) vs. State of West Bengal 3 , to
submit that applying the test to ascertain the

2
[(2011) 8 SCC 708] Rajiv Sarin vs. State of Uttarakhand
3
[(2021) 8 SCC 599] Forum for People's Collective Efforts (FPCE) vs. State of West
Bengal

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repugnancy between the State Act, viz., the

West Bengal Housing Industry Regulation Act,
2017 and Parliamentary enactment, viz., the
Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act,
2016, it was held therein that before
enactment of the West Bengal Housing Industry
Regulation Act, Presidential assent under
Article 254(2) of the Constitution has not
been obtained though it was necessary as the
State Act was going to occupy the same field
as RERA Act, a law enacted by the Parliament.
The twin test laid down by the Apex Court in
Rajiv Sarin vs. State of Uttarakhand2 have
been applied therein to hold that since the
State law did not have Presidential assent
and was repugnant to RERA under Article 254
and in view of admission of the State that the
Act enacted by it comes in List III (the same
as RERA), it was unconstitutional.

45. Further reference has been made to the

decision of the Apex Court in Yogendra Kumar
Jaishwal vs. State of Bihar4 where the
constitutional validity of the Orissa Special
Court Act, 2006, and the Bihar Special Court
Act, 2009, was tested, in the wake of the
decision of the High Court of Orissa and
Cuttack and the High Court of Patna to uphold
4
[(2016) 3 SCC 183] Yogendra Kumar Jaishwal vs. State of Bihar

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the validity of the said Acts, respectively.

It was noted therein that the Orissa Act had
been assented to by the President of India.
It was noted that the entire Bill was sent to
the President for obtaining assent and, thus,
it can safely be concluded that the President
was apprised of the reason when the assent was
sought. The assent has been given in general
terms so as to be effective for all purposes.
It, therefore, cannot be said that the general
assent by the President was not obtained. It
was submitted that for the fact that the
Orissa Act had obtained Presidential assent,
its constitutional validity was upheld.

46. We may note that all the above noted judgments

have been placed by Mr. Asim Pandya, learned
senior counsel appearing for the petitioners
to impress upon us as to what would be the
effect of Presidential assent in the wake of
provisions of Article 254(2) of the
Constitution of India and as to how it can be
ascertained that the Presidential assent has
been granted.

47. The twin test to determine the repugnancy

under Article 254 of the Constitution of
India, as laid down in Rajiv Sarin2, have been
pressed into service to submit that with

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regard to the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, it has

been demonstrated that the Act is repugnant to
the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the
Limitation Act, 1963, the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882, the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Indian Contract
Act, 1872, inasmuch as, the provisions of the
Act negate the provisions of aforesaid Central
Acts occupying the fields. This enactment
negates various provisions of the aforesaid
Central Acts occupying the fields, it is,
thus, to be held as constitutionally invalid
or ultra vires to the Constitution of India. .

48. Adding to the contentions of Mr. Asim Pandya,

Mr. Tejas Barot, learned counsel for the
petitioner would submit that a Special Law,
which is repugnant to the general law
applicable to the field, would require
Presidential assent to stand as a valid law.

49. Reference has been made to the communication

sent by the Principal Secretary to the Hon'ble
Governor of Gujarat to seek Presidential
assent before enactment of the Gujarat Control
of Terrorism and Organised Crime Bill, 2015 by
Mr. Masoom K. Shah, the learned advocate for
the petitioner to submit that noticing that

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the said bill falls under Entry Nos. 1, 2, 6,

11A, 12 and 46 in List III apart from Entry
No.7, 64 and 65 in List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution of India, and it
was repugnant to the provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882, Civil Procedure Code, 1908,
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Information
Technology Act, 2000, the existing laws passed
by the Parliament, it was felt that there was
a necessity for obtaining assent of the
President of India to the Bill.

50. The contention is that the Gujarat Control of

Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 was
enacted after obtaining Presidential assent
noticing that it has encroached upon the
fields occupied by the Central legislations.
Similar is the position with respect to the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, which provides for
the constitution of Special Courts by the
State Government, strict limitation for filing
appeal against the order of Special Courts and
a separate set of Rule of Evidence. It is to
be held in conflict with Entries No.1, 6, 7,
11A, 13 and 18 of List III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution of India and
having not received Presidential assent, it
is required to be held invalid.

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51. Mr. Masoom Shah, learned counsel for the

appellant made a comparative demonstration of
the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised
Crime Act, 2015, which has been enacted on
05.11.2019, having received the assent of the
President of India, to assert that the
provisions of the impugned law, viz., Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020, are comparable to the
fields in which the provisions of the Gujarat
Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act
are enacted and from the own stand of the
State Government, there being conflict in the
subject matter of the Bill, falling in Entries
in List III of the Seventh Schedule, the
assent of the President was necessary and was,
thus, obtained.

52. Mr. Virat Popat, learned advocate has drawn

attention of the Court to the decision of the
Karnataka High Court in upholding the
constitutional validity of the Karnataka Land
Grabbing Prohibition Act, 2011 to assert that
the said enactment passed by the State
legislature under Entry 18 and 64 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution
has been enforced after receipt of the assent
of the President.

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53. Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Advocate General

in his opening argument has taken the Court to
the general principles laid down by the Apex
Court while dealing with the challenge to the
constitutional validity of a legislation. We
may record that the said aspect would be
looked into by us at an appropriate stage of
this judgment. At this juncture, coming to
the answer to the contentions of the learned
counsels for the parties on the issue of
Presidential assent and repugnancy, noted
hereinabove, in rebuttal, it was argued by the
learned Advocate General that :-

(i) The Gujarat Act is relatable to Entry 18

of List II, which inter alia, deals with
'land', i.e., "right in or over the land". The
pith and substance of the Gujarat Act is
'land' and the matters related thereto, which
is referable to Entries 18, 64 and 65 of List
II and hence even assuming without admitting
that the Gujarat Act trenches upon the
subjects of Entries 1, 2, 6, 7, 11A, 12 and 13
of List III, then in that as well, it would
have no significance, inasmuch as, the same
would be merely incidental trenchings
irrespective of the extent and degree of such
trenching.

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(ii) The question of repugnancy can only arise

in connection with subjects enumerated in List
III (the Concurrent List) as regards which
both the Union and the State legislatures have
concurrent powers, in case of conflict between
the laws made by both the legislatures
relating to the same subject matter in three
eventualities :-

(1) When there is direct collision between

the State law and the Central law, in such
a manner that one cannot be obeyed without
disobeying the other;

(2) When the Parliament has evinced its

intention to occupy the entire field in
respect of subject matter of List III, and

(3) Where both the State and Central laws

seek to relate the same subject matter
under List III with the result that both
the legislations overlap.

(iii) It was contended that none of the

three eventualities are applicable to the
Gujarat Act. The assent is required as per
Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India
for any State legislation only when it is
relatable to any Entry in List III, repugnant

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to the Central legislation which is also

relatable to the Entry in List III. There was
no need to obtain Presidential assent as
Gujarat Act is relatable to Entry 18 of List
II and not to any Entry in List III.

(iv) In the absence of the aforesaid

constitutional requirement in the instant
case, the contention of the learned advocates
Mr. Massoom Shah and Mr. Virat Popat on the
legislative practice adopted by various
States, including the State of Gujarat in the
matter of requisitioning Presidential assent
in case of various bills of State legislation
referred by them, would be completely
misconceived. The Gujarat Act is neither a
law relating to Civil Procedure relatable to
Entry 13 of List III, nor a law relating to
criminal procedure relatable to Entry 2 of
List III, nor it is a criminal law for the
offence punishable under the IPC relatable to
Entry 1 of List III.

(v) The question of repugnancy would not arise

as Gujarat Act is not violative of the
provisions of the CPC, Cr.P.C. and IPC, more
particularly in view of Sections 4 and 5 of
Cr.P.C. and Section 5 of IPC, which permit the
enactment of such special laws, in exclusion

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to the general provisions contained therein.

(vi) The Gujarat Act neither deals with

transfer or alienation or devolution of any
property nor does it deal with the property of
the Central Government or of the Public
Corporation controlled by the Central
Government and hence, no question arises of
the Gujarat Act being relatable to Entries 6,
7 and 13 of List III. The reliance placed by
Mr. Masoom Shah, learned advocate for the
petitioner on the decisions in Accountant &
Secretarial Services Ltd. vs. Union of India5
and in Ashok Marketing Ltd. vs. Punjab
National Bank6, therefore, is of no relevance.

(vii) The Gujarat Act is not repugnant to

Sections 6, 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 as asserted by the learned counsels
for the petitioners, rather, the provisions of
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and that
of the Gujarat Act are complementing to each
other, inasmuch as, Section 6(4) of the
Specific Relief Act provides that the
provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 6
shall not bar any person from filing suit to
establish his title to protect the property

5
[(1988( 4 SCC 324] Accountant & Secretarial Services Ltd. vs. Union of India
6
[(1990) 4 SCC 406] Ashok Marketing Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank

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and to recover possession thereof. This

provision, thus, does not restrict the
complainant from initiating proceedings under
the Gujarat Act whereby the possession can be
restored by following the procedure contained
therein.

(viii) Similarly, there is no conflict or

repugnancy between Section 38 and Section 39
of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, inasmuch as,
any order passed under Sections 38 or 39 of
the Specific Relief Act may always be a good
defence in the proceedings under the Gujarat
Act before the Special Court, the reason being
that perpetual injunction or mandatory
injunction under Section 38 or mandatory
injunction under Section 39 of the Specific
Relief Act cannot be granted in favour of any
person in absence of any existing legal right.
The Gujarat Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, however,
proceeds on the principle of taking possession
of the land or creating illegal tenancies or
lease or license, agreements or transfer or
sale, etc., without any lawful entitlement,
thereto.

(ix) The Gujarat Act is not repugnant to

Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, read
with Articles 58, 64, 65, 66, 67, 111 and 112

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of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the

reason being that the Gujarat Act does not
exclude the applicability of the Limitation
Act at all.

(x) The Gujarat Act cannot be said to be

repugnant to Articles 64 and 65 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, as the
principle of adverse possession has not been
rendered redundant by the Gujarat Act. The
defence of adverse possession can also be
raised before the Special Court by a person
against whom allegations of land grabbing has
been made to establish his lawful entitlement
to retain his possessory title.

(xi) To substantiate the contentions with

regard to the Gujarat Act being relatable to
Entry 18 of List II, reliance is placed on the
following decisions :-

Sr. Name of Parties Citation

No.
1. Megh Raj vs. Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72
2. Atmaram vs. State of Punjab AIR 1959 SC 519
3. Rani Ratnaprova vs. State of AIR 1964 SC 1195
Orissa
4. Union of India vs. Valluri (1979) 3 SCC 324
Basavaiah Chaudhary
5. Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs. (1993) 1 SCC 287
Land Tribunal
6. Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. 1995 Supp. (1) SCC
State of Gujarat 596

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(xii) To impress upon the assertion that

in pith and substance, the Gujarat Act is
relatable to Entries 18, 64 and 65 of List II
and incidental trenching would not make it
repugnant to the Central enactments of List
III, reference has been made to the followings
decisions :-

Sr. Name of Parties Citation

No.
1. Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee vs. AIR 1947 PC 60
Bank of Commerce Ltd.
2. State of Bombay vs. Narottamdas AIR 1951 SC 69
Jethabhai
3. A.S. Krishna vs. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 297
4. M/s. Hoecst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (1983) 4 SCC 45
vs. State of Bihar
5. Offshore Holdings Private Ltd. (2011) 3 SCC 139
vs. Bangalore Development
Authority and Ors.

(xiii) On the issues of repugnancy and

Presidential assent, the following decisions
have been placed before us :-

Sr. Name of Parties Citation

No.
1. Innoventive Industries Ltd. Vs. (2018) 1 SCC 407
ICICI Bank
2. State of Kerala vs. Mar Appraem (2012) 7 SCC 106
Kuri Co. Ltd.
3. Forum for Peoples Collective (2021) 8 SCC 599
Efforts vs. State of West Bengal

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54. To deal with the arguments of the learned

counsels for the petitioners that the impugned
Act is in conflict with CPC, Cr.P.C. and
repugnant to the provisions of IPC, with the
aid of the following decisions, it was
asserted that the procedure prescribed in CPC
and Cr.PC are to be followed to the hilt, save
as inconsistency in the statutory regime of
the impugned enactment.

Sr. Name of Parties Citation

No.
1. P.S. Sathappan vs. Andhra Bank (2004) 11 SCC 672
Ltd.
2. Nilratan Sircar vs. Lakshmi AIR 1965 SC 1
Narayan Ram Niwas
3. Gangula Ashok vs. State of U.P. (2002) 2 SCC 504
4. Lalitakumari vs. Government of (2014) 2 SCC 1
Uttar Padesh

55. At the outset, we find it pertinent to deal

with the question of the Land Grabbing Act’
2020 being hit by Articles 246 read with
254(2) of the Constitution for want of
Presidential assent, on the ground that the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 is repugnant to
several Central legislations, inasmuch as,
this issue goes to the root of the validity of
the impugned Act and if it is well founded, no
other question need be gone into. We may note
that there is no dispute about the competence

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of the State legislature to enact the impugned

Act. The contention of the learned counsels
for the petitioners is that since the impugned
law made by the legislature of the State is
inconsistent, repugnant to the existing
central laws, it could have been survived only
if it has been enacted after receiving
Presidential assent.

56. The stand of the State, however, is that the

impugned Act is a relatable to Entry 18 of
List II, which is State list and the field to
which this law deals with, viz., 'land', i.e.,
"right in or over land" is exclusively within
the scope of Entry 18 of List II. As the
impugned Act does not relate to any of the
entries in the List III, i.e. concurrent
list, there is no question of conflict or
repugnancy and as such, no question of seeking
Presidential assent arise.

57. It is the argument of the State that the Land

Grabbing Act’ 2020 is relatable to three
entries of List II in the Seventh Schedule of
the Constitution of India:-

(i) Entry 18 - Land, that is to say, rights in

or over land, land tenures including the
relation of landlord and tenant, and the

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collection of rents; transfer and alienation

of agricultural land; land improvement and
agricultural loans; colonization.

(ii) Entry 64 - Offences against laws with

respect to any of the matters in this List.

(iii) Entry 65 - Jurisdiction and powers

of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with
respect to any of the matters in this List.

(B) Topics of Analysis :-

(a) Scope and interpretation of Entries in the

Seventh Schedule:-

58. In order to deal with the above, the scope and

interpretation of the entries in the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India, we may
go through the decisions placed by the learned
Advocate General.

59. In Megh Raj vs. Allah Rakhia7, the question was

as to whether the Act enacted by the Punjab
Legislature, viz. "Punjab Restitution of
Mortgaged Land Act", went beyond the
limitation of the Legislature, powers of the
Province under the List II. It was urged that
the impugned Act therein could not be
supported by invoking the concurrent powers of
7
Megh Raj vs. Allah Rakhia (AIR 1947 PC 72)

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the Province under List III, because the

provisions, which had to be invoked for the
purpose were repugnant to the existing Indian
laws and were, thus, invalid under Sections
107 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
Item no.21 of the List II, which was a
Provincial List under the Government of India
Act, 1935 is pari materia to Entry No.18 of
List II (State List) in the Seventh Schedule
of the Constitution of India.

While interpreting Item No. 21 (pari

materia to Entry No. 18), it was observed that
the key to Item No. 21 is to be found in the
opening word "Land". That word is sufficient
in itself to include every form of land,
whether agricultural or not. Land indeed is
primarily a matter of provincial concern. The
land in each province may have its special
characteristics in view of which it is
necessary to legislate, and there are local
customs and traditions in regard to land-
holding and particular problems of provincial
or local concern which require provincial
consideration. It would be strange if the
land in a province were to be broken up into
separate portions some within and some outside
the legislative powers of the Province. Such a
conflict of jurisdiction is not to be

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expected.

60. While considering the scope of the Entry, it

was noted that Item No.21 is a part of the
Constitution and would on ordinary principles
receive the widest construction, unless for
some reason it is cut down either by the terms
of item 21 itself or by other parts of the
Constitution which has to be read as a whole.
Further, giving meaning to the words in the
Entry, viz. Item No.21, it was noted that the
"Land", the governing word, is followed by the
rest of the item, which goes on to say, "that
is to say". These words introduce the most
general concept "rights in or over land".
"Rights in land" must include general rights
like full ownership or leasehold or all such
rights. "Rights over land" would include
easementary or other collateral rights,
whatever form they may take. The words
followed thereafter such as "relation of
landlord and tenant" etc., are not words of
limitation but of explanation or illustration,
giving instances which may furnish a clue to
the particular matters. It was observed that
these words are applicable to lands which are
not agricultural equally with agricultural
lands. Rent is that which issue arises from

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the land. The "Land" is not used in Item No.

21 with restricted reference to agricultural
land, but relates to land in general.

61. This view was followed by the Apex Court in

Atmaram vs. State of Punjab8, wherein it was
observed that Entries of the Constitution
should on ordinary principles, receive widest
consideration. A decision of the Federal
Court in United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum9, was
referred and relied wherein the Federal Courts
speaking through Gwyer, C.J. has observed that
items in the several lists of the Seventh
Schedule, should not be read in a narrow or
restricted sense, and that each general word
should be held to extend to all ancillary and
subsidiary matters which could fairly and
reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.

62. In Union of India vs. Valluri Basavaiah

Chaudhary10, it was held that the subject
matter of Entry 18, List II of the Seventh
Schedule i.e. "land" covers "land and
buildings" and would, therefore, necessarily
include "vacant land". It would take in lands
of every description, i.e. agricultural land,
urban land or any other kind.
8
[AIR 1959 SC 519] Atmaram vs. State of Punjab
9
[AIR 1941 (FC) 16] United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum
10
[(1979) 3 SCC 324] Union of India vs. Valluri Basavaiah Chaudhary

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63. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. State of

Gujarat11, it was noted that as per the settled
law of interpretation, entries in the Seventh
Schedule are not powers but fields of
legislation. The legislature derives its power
from Article 246 and other related Articles of
the Constitution. Thus, the language of the
respective entries should be given the widest
scope of their meaning, fairly capable to meet
the machinery of the Government settled by the
Constitution. Each general word should extend
to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which
can fairly and reasonable be comprehended in
it. When the vires of an enactment is
impugned, there is an initial presumption of
its constitutionality and if there is any
difficulty in ascertaining the limits of the
legislative power, the difficulty must be
resolved, as far as possible in favour of the
legislature putting the most liberal
construction upon the legislative entry so
that it may have the widest amplitude. It
must be remembered that when the Court is
called upon to interpret the Constitution, it
must not be construed in any narrow or
pedantic sense and adopt such construction
which must be beneficial to the amplitude of

11
[1995 Supp. (1) SCC 596] Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat

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legislative powers. The broad and liberal

spirit should inspire those whose duty is to
interpret the Constitution to find whether the
impugned Act is relatable to any entry in the
relevant List.

Placing reliance on the decision of the

Apex Court in India Cement Ltd. v. State of
Tamil Nadu12, it was noted in paragraph '8'
therein as under :-

"Entries in the three lists of the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution, are legislative
heads or fields of legislation. These
demarcate the area over which appropriate
legislature can operate. It is well settled
that widest amplitude should be given to the
language of these entries but some of these
entries in different lists or in the same list
may overlap and sometimes may also appear to
be in direct conflict with each other. Then,
it is the duty of the court to find out its
true intent and purpose and to examine a
particular legislation in its pith and
substance to determine whether it fits in one
or the other of the Lists, The Lists are
designed to define and delimit the respective
areas of respective competence of the Union
and the States. They neither impose any
implied restriction on the legislative power
conferred by Article 246 of the Constitution,
nor prescribe any duty to exercise that
legislative power in any particular manner.
Hence, the language of the Entries should be
given widest scope to find out which of the
meaning is fairly capable in the set up of the
machinery of the government. Each general word
12
[(1990) 1 SCC 12] India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu

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should be held to extend to all ancillary or

subsidiary matters which can fairly and
reasonably be comprehended in it. In
interpreting an Entry, it would not be
reasonable to impart any limitation by
comparing or contrasting that Entry with any
other one in the same list."

64. While dealing with the controversy therein

pertaining to Entry 18 of List II (State
List), it was noted with the aid of The Law
Lexicon (Reprint edn. 1987) by Ramanatha Iyer
(p. 701), that :-

"...the word 'land' in the ordinary legal

sense comprehends everything of a fixed or
permanent nature and, therefore, growing
trees, land includes the benefit arise out of
the land and things attached to the earth or
permanently means everything attached to the
earth and also the share in or charges on, the
revenue or rent of villages or other defined
portions of territory. Land includes the bed
of the sea below high water mark...Land shall
extend to messuages, and all other
hereditaments, whether corporal or incorporeal
and whether freehold or of any other tenure
and to money to be paid out in the purchase of
land. Land in its widest signification would
therefore include not only the surface of the
ground, cultivable, uncultivable or waste
lands but also everything on or under it."
(Para 12)

65. It is in this background, we have to examine

the present controversy as to whether the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 as a whole falls within
the powers given to the State Legislature by

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Entry No.18 in List II, inasmuch as, if the

State draws power by this Entry read with
Entries No. 64 and 65 which are with respect
to any of the matters in the State List, there
would be no necessity to draw power from any
of the other Entries of the Constitution, such
as Entry Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 11A, 12 and 13 of
List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution, as relied by the learned
counsels for the petitioners. The question of
repugnancy does not arise and need not be
considered in such a situation. To deal with
the above, we find it apt to first understand
the main object and scope of the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020 and the Legislative Scheme by
applying the doctrine of Pith and Substance.

(b) Pith and Substance of The Gujarat Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020 :-

66. It was argued by the learned Advocate General

that the Pith and Substance of the Gujarat Act
is "Land", which is referable to Entry Nos.
18, 64 and 65 of List II and hence while
assuming without admitting that the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 trenches upon the subject
of Entries No. 1, 2, 6, 7, 11A, 12 and 13 of
List III, even in that eventuality, it would
be merely an incidental trenching and would

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have no bearing on the validity of the

legislation, irrespective of the extent and
degree of such trenching.

67. Understanding the doctrine of Pith and

Substance, which is to be applied to determine
whether the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 falls in
the field of legislation with respect to
matters in one List or other, the true nature
and character of the Act by ascertaining the
object and main purpose of the provisions of
the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 has to be seen.
In other words, the impugned statute is to be
examined as a whole to ascertain its Pith and
Substance or its true nature and character for
the purpose of determining whether it is a
legislation with respect to matters in one
list or the other. The settled principle is
that where subject overlapped, the question
must be asked, what in Pith and Substance is
the effect of the enactment. It is to be
ascertained whether overlapping is such that
the legislature enacting them have entered
into a forbidden sphere. Incidental trenching
may inevitably happen from time to time that
the legislature though purporting to deal with
the subject in one list, touches upon a
subject in another list (Ref.: Prafulla Kumar

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Mukherjee vs. Bank of Commerce Ltd.13).

68. It is to be seen as to whether the State

legislature is competent to make the law with
respect to the matters referred to in the
relevant entries in List II. Once the State
legislature is found competent to make the law
with respect to the field in List II, there is
no question of conflict, as the competence of
the State cannot be questioned. However, the
apparent conflict with the Central legislative
power with respect to the matters provided in
List I or the Parliamentary enactments on the
subjects of entries in List III (Concurrent
List), can be resolved in a given case by
invoking the doctrine of Pith and Substance
and incidental trenching.

69. The test for determining whether in Pith and

Substance, a particular enactment falls within
one List or another, as elucidated in Bank of
Commerce Ltd. v. Amulya Krishna Basu 14, was
considered by the Apex Court in the State of
Bombay vs. Narottamdas Jethabhai15, summarising
the effect of Privy Council decisions, that
"It seems quite possible" on the point "that a
particular Act regarded from one aspect might
13
Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee vs. Bank of Commerce Ltd. [AIR 1947 PC 60]
14
Bank of Commerce Ltd. v. Amulya Krishna Basu [AIR 1944 FC 18]
15
State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai [AIR 1951 SC 69]

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be intra vires of a Provincial Legislature and

yet regarded from another aspect might also be
intra vires of the Dominion Parliament
(Central legislation)”, it was said that the
subject matter of an Act may depend upon what
is true aspect of the Act. The cases which
illustrated this principle show, by 'aspect'
it must be understood as the aspect or point
of view of the legislator in legislating the
object, purpose and scope of the legislation.
The word is used subjectively of the
legislator rather than objectively of the
matter legislated upon.

While construing a Federal Constitution,

it must be remembered that it is of essence of
such a constitution that there should be
distribution of the legislative powers of the
federation between the Centre and the
Provinces. It has been seen that even when
the Constitution enumerates elaborately the
topics which the Centre and States could
legislate, some overlapping of the field of
legislation is inevitable.

70. The decisions of the Canadian Courts was noted

by Justice Venkatarama Ayyar (As he then was)
in A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras16, that

16
[AIR 1957 SC 297] A.S. Krishna vs. State of Madras

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notwithstanding that the List in the British

North America Act, 1867, which established a
federal Constitution for Canada, enumerated in
Sections 91 and 92, the topics on which the
Dominion and the Provinces could respectively
legislate, though the Lists were framed so as
to be fairly full and comprehensive, yet it
was found that the topics enumerated in the
two Sections overlapped. It was in that
situation, the Privy Council faced with the
challenge on the constitutionality of the laws
made by the Dominion and Provincial
legislations, evolved the doctrine that for
deciding whether an impugned legislation was
intra vires, regard must be had to its pith
and substance. That is to say, if a statute
is found in substance to relate to a topic
within the competence of the legislature, it
should be held to be intra vires, even though
it might incidentally trench on topics not
within its legislative competence.(Ref.Para:8,
A.S. Krishna16).

71. The above principles noted in Para:8, A.S.

Krishna16 have also been applied in deciding
the question as to the vires of statutes
passed by the Indian Legislatures under the
Government of India Act, 1935 in Subrahmanyan

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Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan17. The question

therein was as to whether the Madras
Agriculturalists Relief Act IV of 1938, which
was within the exclusive competence of the
Provincial Legislature under Entries 20 and 21
in List II, was ultra vires, in so far as it
related to Promissory Notes executed by
agriculturists by reason of the fact that
under Entry 28, List I, "cheques, bills of
exchange, promissory notes and other like
instruments" were matters falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre. In
holding that the legislation was intra vires,
Sir Maurice Gwyer (C.J.) stated the reasons in
these terms:

"It must inevitably happen from time to

time that legislation, though purporting to
deal with a subject in one list, touches
also on a subject in another list, and the
different provisions of the enactment may
be so closely intertwined that blind
adherence to a strictly verbal
interpretation would result in a large
number of statutes being declared invalid
because the Legislature enacting them may
appear to have legislated in a forbidden
sphere. Hence the rule which has been
evolved by the Judicial Committee whereby
the impugned statute is examined to
ascertain its ' pith and substance' or its
'true nature and character', for the
purpose of determining whether it is
17
[AIR 1941 FC 47] Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan

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legislation in respect of matters in this

list or in that............"
(Noted in Para 9 A.S. Krishna16 )

72. There is a reference of the decision in

Prafulla Kumar13 in para '10' of A.S. Krishna16,
where the question was whether the Bengal
Money Lenders Act, 1940, which related to the
amount recoverable by Money lender for
principle and interest on his loans was valid
insofar as it related to Promissory Notes.
While quoting with approval the observations
of Sir Maurice Gwyer (C.J.) in Subrahmanyan
Chettiar17, Lord Porter observed therein
(Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee13 ) that :-

"Their Lordships agree that this passage

correctly describes the grounds on which the
rule is founded, and that it applies to Indian
as well as to Dominion legislation.

"No doubt experience of past difficulties has

made the provisions of the Indian Act more exact
in some particulars, and the existence of the
Concurrent List has made it easier to
distinguish between those matters which are
essential in determining to which list
particular provision should be attributed and
those which are merely incidental. But the
overlapping of subject matter is not avoided by
substituting three lists for two, or even by
arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions.
Subjects must still overlap, and where they do,
the question must be asked what in pith and
substance is the effect of the enactment of
which complaint is made, and in what list is its
true nature and character to be found. If these

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questions could not be asked, much beneficent

legislation would be stifled at birth, and many
of the subjects entrusted to Provincial
legislation could never effectively be dealt
with."
(Ref. Para 10 A.S. Krishna16)

73. Dealing with the question of the extent of the

invasion by the Provincial Legislation into
Federal fields, Lord Porter further
observed :-

"No doubt it is an important matter, not, as

their Lordships think, because the validity of
an Act can be determined by discriminating
between degrees of invasion, but for the purpose
of determining what is the pith and substance of
the impugned Act. Its provisions may advance so
far into Federal territory as to show that its
true nature is not concerned with ProVincial
matters, but the question is not, has it
trespassed more or less, but is the trespass,
whatever it be, such as to show that the pith
and substance of the impugned Act is not money-
lending but promissory notes or banking? Once
that question is determined the Act falls on one
or the other side of the line and can be seen as
valid or invalid according to its true content."
(Ref. Para 10 A.S. Krishna16)

74. The decision of the Federal Court in Lakhi

Narayan Das v. Province of Bihar 18 was noted in
paragraph 11 of A.S. Krishna16, wherein the
question related to the validity of Ordinance
No.IV of 1949 promulgated by the Government of
Bihar, was examined. The Ordinance was

18
(AIR 1950 FC 59) Lakhi Narayan Das v. Province of Bihar

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attacked on the ground that it was void under

Section 107 (1) of the Government of India
Act, inasmuch as, it provided for preventive
detention, imposition of collective fines,
control of processions and public meetings and
there were special provisions for the offences
under the Act. The contention was that though
the Sections of the Ordinance relating to
maintenance of public order might be covered
by Entry I in List II, the Sections
constituting the offences and providing for
search and trial fell within Items I and 2 of
the Concurrent List, and they were void as
being repugnant to the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code. In rejecting this
contention, Mukherjea, J. observed therein:-

"Thus all the provisions of the Ordinance

relate to or are concerned primarily with the
maintenance of public order in the Province of
Bihar and provide for preventive detention and
similar other measures in connection with the
same. It is true that violation of the
provisions of the Ordinance or of orders
passed under it have been made criminal
offences but offences against laws with
respect to matters specified in List II would
come within Item 37 of List II itself, and
have been expressly excluded from Item I of
the Concurrent List. The ancillary matters
laying down the procedure for trial of such
offences and the conferring of jurisdiction on
certain courts for that purpose would be
covered completely by Item 2 of List II and it

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is not necessary for the Provincial

Legislature to invoke the powers under Item 2
of the Concurrent List."
(Ref. Para 9 A.S. Krishna16)

75. The position summed up therein (A.S.

Krishna16), in paragraph '12' reads as under :-

"When a law is impugned-on the ground. that it

is ultra vires the powers of the legislature
which enacted it, what has to be ascertained
is the true character of the legislation. To
do that, one must have regard to the enactment
as a whole, to its objects and to the scope
and effect of its provisions. If on such
examination it is found that the legislation
is in substance one on a matter assigned to
the legislature, then it must be held to be
valid in its entirety, even though it might
inci- dentally trench on matters which are
beyond its competence. It would be quite an
erroneous approach to the question to view
such a statute not as an organic whole, but as
a mere collection of sections, then
disintegrate it into parts, examine under what
heads of legislation those parts would
severally fall, and by that process determine
what portions thereof are intra vires, and
what are not."

76. Applying the above principles, it was held in

A.S. Krishna16 that the Madras Prohibition Act,
validity of which was subject matter of
challenge therein, both in form and in
substance, a law relating to intoxicating
liquors. The presumptions in Section 4(2)
which are to be raised in the trial of

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offences under section 4(1) of the Act, as

also the provisions relating to search,
seizure and arrest in Sections 28 to 32, are
only with reference to offences committed or
suspected to have been committed under the
Act. They have no operations generally apart
from the offences created by the Act. They
are no presumptions which are to be raised in
the trial of criminal cases, as are those
enacted in the Evidence Act, having no
application to offences which fall outside the
Act. They were, thus, held to be wholly
ancillary to the exercise of the legislative
power in respect of Entry 31 of List II. It
was concluded that the Madras Prohibition Act,
in its entirety, is a law within the exclusive
competence of the Provincial Legislation and
the question of repugnancy under Section
107(1) does not arise.

77. Applying the test, in the instant case, we may

note the long title of the Gujarat Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020, which shows
that it is an enactment to prohibit land
grabbing activities and connected matters in
the State of Gujarat. Section 2(c) of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, which defines "land",
reads that :-

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"land" includes rights in or over land,

benefits to arise out of land and buildings,
structures and other things attached to the
earth or permanently fastened to anything
attached to the earth"

78. The "land grabber" and "land grabbing, are

defined in Sections 2(d) and (e) as under :-

"(d) "land grabber" means a person who commits

land grabbing and includes any person who
gives financial aid to any person for taking
illegal possession of lands or for
construction of unauthorized structures
thereon, or who collects or attempts to
collect from any occupiers of such lands rent,
compensation and other charges by criminal
intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of
the above mentioned acts, and also includes
the successors-in-interest;

(e) "land grabbing" means every activity of

land grabber to occupy or attempt to occupy
with or without the use of force, threat,
intimidation and deceit, any land (whether
belonging to the Government, a Public Sector
Undertaking, a local authority, a religious or
charitable institution or any other private
person) over which he or they have no
ownership, title or physical possession,
without any lawful entitlement and with a view
to illegally taking possession of such land or
creating illegal tenancies or lease or
licence, agreements or transfer or sale or by
constructing unauthorized structures thereon
for sale or hire or use or occupation of such
unauthorized structures and the term “grabbed
land” shall be construed accordingly;"

79. As noted hereinbefore, Sections 3 and 4 make

land grabbing in any form as unlawful and

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prohibited and declared any activity connected

with or arising out of land grabbing, to be an
offence, punishable under the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020. Section 5 provides penalty and
Sections 7 to 11 provide for the constitution
of Special Courts, procedure and power of
Special Courts to deal with the complaints of
any act of land grabbing. Section 12 provides
as to how investigation shall be carried out
by the police officer on receipt of
information about the commission of offence of
land grabbing under the Land Grabbing Act’
2020. Section 12(a) provides the remedy of
appeal to the High Court against the final
judgment and order made by Special Court under
the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020. Sections 13 and
14 pertains to the protection to the officers
of the Government acting under the provisions
of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 and any officer
or employee of the Special Court, as has been
granted to a public servant within the meaning
of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code against
any suit, prosecution or legal proceedings,
for the actions taken in good faith or
intended to be made under the Act or Rules
made thereunder.

80. Section 15 gives overriding effect to the

provisions of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020,

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over the existing laws or custom, usage or

agreement, as also decree or order of the
Court or any tribunal or authority,
inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.
Section 16 confers power on the State
Government to make Rules to carry out the
purposes of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020.
Rule 17 prohibits alienation of land grabbed
or any part thereof by way of sale, lease,
gift, exchange, settlement, surrender,
usufructuary mortgage or otherwise, or any
partition effected or a trust created in
respect of such land, which has taken place
whether before or after the commencement of
this Act and states that such transaction
shall, except to the extent ordered by the
Special Court be null and void. Section 18
is removal of difficulties provision, whereas
Section 19 is the repeal and saving provision
of the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Ordinance, 2020 (Guj Ord. 10 of 2020).

81. Applying the doctrine of pith and substance

considering the whole of the Land Grabbing
Act, 2020 it is more than evident that in
substance, the impugned Act aimed at
prohibiting "land grabbing activities" in the
State of Gujarat.

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82. A conjoint reading of Sections 2(c), 2(d) and

2(e) of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 indicates
that every activity to occupy or attempt to
occupy any land, over which, a "land
grabber/s" have no ownership, title or
physical possession without any lawful
entitlement, with or without the use of force,
threat, intimidation and deceit, would be
"land grabbing". Section 2(e), in its second
part, also includes activities of land
grabbing to occupy or attempt to occupy such
lands, with a view to illegally taking
possession of such land or creating illegal
tenancies or lease or license, agreement or
transfer or sale or by constructing
unauthorised structures thereon for sale or
hire or use or occupation of such unauthorised
structures and provides that the term "grabbed
land" shall be construed accordingly.

83. The "land grabber" is defined to include the

persons who committed land grabbing or
abettors, who provide financial aid to any
person for taking illegal possession of lands
or for construction of unauthorised structure
thereon. It also includes persons who collect
or attempt to collect from any occupier such
lands, rent, compensation and other charges by

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criminal intimidation. It also includes the

"successors-in-interest" of the land grabber,
within the meaning of "land grabber" as per
section 2(d).

84. As can be seen, paramount purpose and object

of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 pertaining to
the activity related to "land" within the
meaning of Section 2(c) of the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020, would fall within the field of
legislation under Entry 18 of List II of
Seventh Schedule, with respect to which the
State legislature is competent to enact the
law. As noted hereinabove, with the aid of
the observations of Lord Wright speaking for
Federal Court in Megh Raj7 , the key Entry 18
of List II, is to be found in the opening word
"land". 'Land' indeed is primarily a matter
of State concern because of its special
characteristics in view of local customs and
traditions in regard to land holding, specific
problems of State or a locals concerned, which
require provincial consideration. The State
Legislature, thus, is empowered to enact a law
in relation to “land and matters connected
thereto”. In pith and substance, the dominant
purpose of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 being
the prohibition of land grabbing activities

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and/or related activities, in its true nature

is an Act, essential subject of which is
"land" falling in Entry 18, List II.

(c) Repugnancy and Presidential Assent

85. Now the next question would arise in view of

the arguments of the learned counsels for the
petitioners as to whether there is any
repugnancy with the Central Legislations. As
noted hereinabove, there is no dispute about
the competence of the State Legislature in
enacting the impugned law. Various sections
of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 have been read
in piecemeal by the learned advocates for the
petitioners to assert that these provisions
encroached upon the territory of the fields
occupied by Entries 1, 2, 6, 7, 11A, 12 and
13 of List III of Seventh Schedule, and being
falling in the subject of Concurrent List,
lack of Presidential assent would make the
whole enactment null and void.

86. The argument of the learned counsels for the

petitioners is that though the impugned
legislation may be said to be relatable to
Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule,
yet there is repugnancy with the Central
Legislations in view of various sections
incorporated under the Land Grabbing Act’

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2020. As noted above, it was argued that the

impugned law encroaches upon the provisions of
Section 27 of the Limitation Act as it defies
the Articles of the Limitation Act, providing
period of instituting suit/appeal for the
possession. The impugned law encroaches upon
the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the
Specific Relief Act, which recognises mere
possessory title for bringing a suit for
recovery of the possession. The provisions of
grant of temporary and perpetuatory injunction
as also mandatory injunction are nullified by
Section 15, which gives overriding effect to
the provisions of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020
over the decree or order of a Court of law or
any Tribunal or Authority. The procedure for
trying the civil and criminal proceedings
under the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 is different
from the procedure prescribed in CPC and
Cr.P.C for civil and criminal proceedings.
Section 9(5) and Section 11 of the impugned
Act prescribe different procedure than what
has been prescribed in the Evidence Act. The
impugned Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 is repugnant
to Section 2(2) and Section 11, CPC; Section 6
and 145 Cr.P.C. and Section 53A and Section 58
of the Transfer of Property Act, as well.

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87. In view of the apparent conflict, the State

law being repugnant to the Central
Legislations, the Presidential assent under
Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India
was mandatory, and as such the impugned law
found foul to Article 254 (2) of the
Constitution, cannot be sustained.

88. Dealing with the above question, we must, at

this stage, set out Articles 246 and 254 of
the Constitution of India. Article 246
imposes limitations on the legislative power
of the Parliament and the State Legislature
and it reads that :-

"246. Subject-matter of laws made by

Parliament and by the Legislatures of States.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2)
and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule
(in this Constitution referred to as the
“Union List”).
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3),
Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the
Legislature of any State also, have power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule
(in this Constitution referred to as the
“Concurrent List”).
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the
Legislature of any State has exclusive power
to make laws for such State or any part
thereof with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule

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(in this Constitution referred to as the

“State List””).
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with
respect to any matter for any part of the
territory of India not included in a State
notwithstanding that such matter is a matter
enumerated in the State List."

89. On analysis of this Article, it was noted by

the Apex Court in Hoecst Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
vs. State of Bihar19 that :-

1. Parliament has exclusive power to legislate

with respect to any of the matters enumerated
in List I notwithstanding anything contained
in clause (2) and (3). The non-obstante
clause in Art. 246(1) provides for
predominance or supremacy of Union
Legislature. This power is not encumbered by
anything contained in cls. (2) and (3) for
these causes them selves are expressly limited
and made subject to the non-obstante clause in
Art. 246(1). The combined effect of the
different clauses contained in Art. 246 is no
more and no less than this: that in respect of
any matter falling within List I, Parliament
has exclusive power of legislation.

2. The State Legislature has exclusive power

to make laws for such State or any part
thereof with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule
and it also has the power to make laws with
respect to any matters enumerated in List III.
The exclusive power of the State Legislature
to . legislate with respect to any of the
matters enumerated in List II has to be
exercised subject to cl. (l) i.e. the

19
[(1983) 4 SCC 45] Hoecst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of Bihar

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exclusive power of Parliament to legislate

with respect to matters enumerated in List I.
As a consequence, if there is a conflict
between an entry in List I and an entry in
List II which is not capable of
reconciliation, the power of Parliament to
legislate with respect to a matter enumerated
in List II must supersede pro tanto the
exercise of power of the State Legislature.
3. Both Parliament and the State Legislature
have concurrent powers of legislation with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in
List III.

90. Article 254 provides for method of resolving

conflict between the law made by the
Parliament and law made by the legislature of
a State with respect to matters falling in the
Concurrent List and it reads that:-

"254. Inconsistency between laws made by

Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures
of States
(1) If any provision of a law made by the
Legislature of a State is repugnant to any
provision of a law made by Parliament which
Parliament is competent to enact, or to any
provision of an existing law with respect to
one of the matters enumerated in the
Concurrent List, then, subject to the
provisions of clause (2), the law made by
Parliament, whether passed before or after the
law made by the Legislature of such State, or,
as the case may be, the existing law, shall
prevail and the law made by the Legislature of
the State shall, to the extent of the
repugnancy, be void.

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(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a

State with respect to one of the matters
enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any
provision repugnant to the provisions of an
earlier law made by Parliament or an existing
law with respect to that matter, then, the law
so made by the Legislature of such State
shall, if it has been reserved for the
consideration of the President and has
received his assent, prevail in that State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall

prevent Parliament from enacting at any time
any law with respect to the s ame matter
including a law adding to, amending, varying
or repealing the law so made by the
Legislature of the State."

91. The Parliament and the State Legislature have

concurrent powers with respect to subjects
enumerated in List III, provided the
provisions of the State Act do not conflict
with those of any Central Act on the subject,
however, in case of repgunancy, as provided
under clause (2) of Article 254, the State law
must yield to the Central law unless it has
been reserved for the assent of the President
and has received the assent. The effect is
that the question of repugnancy arises only
where both the legislatures are competent to
legislate in the same field, i.e. when both
the Union and the State laws relate to a
subject specified in List III and occupy the
same field unless there is an irreconcilable

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conflict between the entries in the Union and

the State List. The words "notwithstanding
anything contained in clause (2) and (3)" in
Article 246(1) and the words "Subject to
clauses (1) and (2)" in Article 246(3) lays
down the principle of federal supremacy viz.
that in case of inevitable conflict between
the Union and State powers as enumerated in
List II and List III, in case of overlapping
between List II and List III, the former shall
prevail. In the case of seeming conflict
between the two lists, the entries should be
read together without giving a narrow or
restricted sense to either of them. The
attempt should be made to see whether the two
Entries cannot be reconciled so as to avoid a
conflict of jurisdiction. It should be
considered whether a fair reconciliation can
be achieved by giving to the language of the
Union Legislative List a meaning (List I &
List III) that can properly be given to it and
equally giving to the language of the State
Legislative List (List III) the meaning in the
same way. The non-obstante clause in Article
246(1) must only operate if such
reconciliation is impossible. However, no
question of conflict between the two Lists
will arise if the impugned legislature by the

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application of the doctrine of "pith and

substance" appears to fall exclusively under
one list and the encroachment upon another
list is only incidental. (Ref. Para 41, M/s.
Hoecst Pharmaceuticals Ltd.19)

92. It was noted in the words of Gwyer, C.J. in

C.P. and Berar Taxation Act case20:-

"For the clause ought to be regarded as a

last re-source, a witness to the
imperfections of human expression and the
fallibility of legal draftsmanship."

93. The observations noted hereinabove of Gwyer,

C.J. and Lord Porter in Subrahmanyan Chettiar17
and Prafulla Kumar13 are noted in Hoecst
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.19 to hold that apparent
conflict with the federal power had to be
resolved by application of the doctrine of
Pith and Substance and the incidental
encroachment, once it is found that a law made
by the Provincial Legislature was with respect
to one of the matters enumerated in the
Provincial List, the degree or extent of
invasion into the forbidden field was
immaterial. The observation of the Privy
Council in Prafulla Kumar13 was noted that the
priority of the Federal Legislature would not

20
[AIR 1945 PC 98] C.P. and Berar Taxation Act case

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prevent the Provincial Legislature from

dealing with any matter within List II though
it may incidentally affect any item in List I.
The constitutionality of the law is to be
judged by its real subject matter and not by
its incidental effect on any topic of
legislation in any field.

94. The Apex Court in Hoecst Pharmaceuticals Ltd.19

had also considered the doctrine of
paramountcy and stated that the said doctrine
is tied up with the "trenching doctrine". The
Rule as to predominance of Dominion Act can be
only invoked in cases of absolutely
conflicting legislation in pari materia, when
it would be an impossibility to give effect to
both the Dominion and the Provincial
enactment.

95. It was further noted therein that no issue of

paramountcy can arise unless there is any
existent federal and provincial legislation
which, independently considered, is in each
case valid. If either piece of legislation,
stand alone, is invalid, there is no occasion
to consider whether the field has been
occupied. The issue that will have to be
resolved in such a case two valid legislations
would be anterior one of the "matter embraced

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by the legislation, whether of Parliament or

of the provincial legislature, as the case may
be", i.e the doctrine of occupied field
applies only where there is a clash between
Dominion legislation and provincial
legislation within an area common to both.
Where Union and the State law operate in two
different and distinct fields and both the
laws are capable of being obeyed, there is no
question of conflict. It is, thus, held in
paragraphs '57' and '67' as under :-

"58. It is well settled that the validity of an

Act is not affected if it incidentally
trenches upon matters outside the authorized
field and therefore it is necessary to inquire
in each case what is the pith and substance of
the Act impugned. If the Act, when so viewed,
substantially falls within the powers
expressly conferred upon the legislature which
enacted it, then it cannot be held to be
invalid merely because it incidentally
encroaches on matters which have been assigned
to another Legislature."

"67. Article 254 of the Constitution makes

provision first, as to what would happen in
the case of conflict between a Central and
State law with regard to the subjects
enumerated in the Concurrent List, and
secondly, for resolving such conflict. Art.
254(1) enunciates the normal rule that in the
event of a conflict between a Union and a
State law in the concurrent field, the former
prevails over the latter. Cl. (1) lays down
that if a State law relating to a concurrent
subject is 'repugnant' to a Union law relating

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to that subject, then, whether the Union law

is prior or later in time, the Union law will
prevail and the State law shall, to the extent
of such repugnancy, be void. To the general
rule laid down in cl. (1), cl. (2) engrafts an
exception, viz., that if the President assents
to a State law which has been reserved for his
consideration, it will prevail notwithstanding
its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union,
both laws dealing with a concurrent subject.
In such a case, the Central Act will give way
to the State Act only to the extent of
inconsistency between the two, and no more. In
short, the result of obtaining the assent of
the President to a State Act which is
inconsistent with a previous Union law
relating to a concurrent subject would be that
the State Act will prevail in that State and
override the provisions of the Central Act in
their applicability to that State only. The
predominance of the State law may however be
taken away if Parliament legislates under the
proviso to cl. (2). The proviso to Art. 254(2)
empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or
amend a repugnant State law, either directly,
or by itself enacting a law repugnant to the
State law with respect to the 'same matter'.
Even though the subsequent law made by
Parliament does not expressly repeal a State
law, even then, the State law will become void
as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament
creating repugnancy is made. A State law would
be repugnant to the Union law when there is
direct conflict between the two laws. Such
repugnancy may also arise where both laws
operate in the same field and the two cannot
possibly stand together.: See: Zaverbhai
Amaidas v. State of Bombay(1), M. Karunanidhi
v. Union of India(2) and T. Barai v. Henry Ah
Hoe"

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96. Referring to the decision in Deep Chand v.

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors21, interpretation
of Article 254(1) was noted in Hoecst
Pharmaceuticals Ltd.19 in the following
manner :-

"Article 254(1) lays down a general rule.

Clause (2) is an exception to that Article and
the proviso qualified the said exception. If
there is repugnancy between the law made by
the State and that made by the Parliament with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in
the Con current List, the law made by
Parliament shall prevail to the extent of the
repugnancy and law made by the State shall, to
the extent of such repugnancy, be void."

97. In Innoventive Industries Ltd. Vs. ICICI

Bank22, the law pertaining to repugnancy in
Article 254 of the Constitution has been
summarised as follows:-

"51.10 The only exception to the above is when

it is found that a State legislation is
repugnant to Parliamentary legislation or an
existing law if the case falls within Article
254(2), and Presidential assent is received
for State legislation, in which case State
legislation prevails over Parliamentary
legislation or an existing law within that
State. Here again, the State law must give way
to any subsequent Parliamentary law which adds
to, amends, varies or repeals the law made by
the legislature of the State, by virtue of the
operation of Article 254(2) proviso."

21
[AIR 1959 SC 648] Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors
22
[(2018) 1 SCC 407] Innoventive Industries Ltd. Vs. ICICI Bank

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(d) Incidental Trenching

98. The question of repugnancy under Article 254

(1) between a law made by Parliament and a law
made by the State Legislature would arise only
in case both the Legislations occupy the same
field with respect to one of the matters
enumerated in the Concurrent List, and there
is direct conflict between the two laws. It
is only when both these requirements are
fulfilled that the State Law will, to the
extent of repugnancy, become void. Article
254 (1) has no application to the cases of
repugnancy due to overlapping found between
the List II on the one hand and List I and
List III on the other. If such overlapping
exists in any particular case, the State law
will be ultra vires because of the non-
obstante clause under Article 246(1) read with
the opening words “subject to” in Article
246(3). In such a case, the State law will
fail not because of repugnancy to the Union
law but due to want of legislative competence.
But if Article 254(1) is read as a whole, it
will be seen that it is expressly made subject
to clause (2), which makes reference to
repugnancy in the field of Concurrent List.
In other words, if clause (2) is to be the
guide in determination of scope of clause (1),

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the repugnancy between Union and State law

must be taken to refer only to the concurrent
field. The underlying principle is that the
question of repugnancy arises only when both
the Legislatures are competent to legislate in
the same field, i.e. with respect to one of
the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List.
Hence, Article 254(1) cannot apply unless both
the Union and the State laws relate to a
subject specified in List III and occupy the
same field. (Ref. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals
Ltd.19).

99. In Ch. Tika Ramji & ors v. State of Uttar

Pradesh & Ors.23, the Apex Court has observed
that there is no question of repugnancy under
Article 254 of the Constitution where
parliamentary legislation and State
legislation occupy different fields and deal
with separate and distinct matters even though
of a cognate and allied character and where
there was no inconsistency in the actual terms
of the Acts enacted by the Parliament and the
State Legislature relatable to List III.

100. In Innoventive Industries Ltd.22, referring

to the aforesaid principles in Tika Ramji23 and
Deep Chand21, it was noted in paragraphs '42'

23
[AIR 1956 SC 676] Ch. Tika Ramji & ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

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and '43' as under :-

“42. In Tika Ramji v. State of U.P., (1956)

SCR 393, this Court, after setting out Article
254 of the Constitution, referred in detail to
a treatise on the Australian Constitution and
to various Australian judgments as follows:
(SCR pp.424-27 : AIR pp.698-700, paras 27-32)

“27. Nicholas in his Australian

Constitution, 2nd ed., p. 303, refers to
three tests of inconsistency or
repugnancy:—

(1) There may be inconsistency in the

actual terms of the competing statutes (R.
v. Brisbane Licensing Court).

(2) Though there may be no direct

conflict, a State law may be inoperative
because the Commonwealth law, or the award
of the Commonwealth Court, is intended to
be a complete exhaustive code (Clyde
Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Cowburn, [1926] 37
CLR 466).

(3) Even in the absence of intention, a

conflict may arise when both State and
Commonwealth seek to exercise their powers
over the same subject-matter (Victoria v.
Commonwealth, [1937] 58 CLR 618; Wenn v.
Attorney-General (Vict.), [1948] 77 CLR
84)

28. Isaacs, J. in Clyde Engineering

Company, Limited v. Cowburn [(1926) 37 CLR
466, 489] laid down one test of
inconsistency as conclusive:

“If, however, a competent legislature

expressly or implicitly evinces its

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intention to cover the whole field, that

is a conclusive test of inconsistency
where another Legislature assumes to enter
to any extent upon the same field."

29. Dixon, J. elaborated this theme in Ex

parte McLean [(1930) 43 CLR 472, 483]:

“When the Parliament of the Commonwealth

and the Parliament of a State each
legislate upon the same subject and
prescribe what the rule of conduct shall
be, they make laws which are inconsistent,
notwithstanding that the rule of conduct
is identical which each prescribes, and
section 109 applies. That this is so is
settled, at least when the sanctions they
impose are diverse. But the reason is
that, by prescribing the rule to be
observed, the Federal statute shows an
intention to cover the subject matter and
provide what the law upon it shall be. If
it appeared that the Federal law was
intended to be supplementary to or
cumulative upon State law, then no
inconsistency would be exhibited in
imposing the same duties or in inflicting
different penalties. The inconsistency
does not lie in the mere co-existence of
two laws which are susceptible of
simultaneous obedience. It depends upon
the intention of the paramount Legislature
to express by its enactment, completely,
exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall
be the law governing the particular
conduct or matter to which its attention
is directed. When a Federal statute
discloses such an intention, it is
inconsistent with it for the law of a
State to govern the same conduct or
matter”.

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30. To the same effect are the

observations of Evatt, J. in Stock Motor
Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth [(1932) 48 CLR 128,
147]:

“It is now established, therefore, that

State and Federal laws may be
inconsistent, although obedience to both
laws is possible. There may even be
inconsistency although each law imposes
the very same duty of obedience. These
conclusions have, in the main, been
reached, by ascribing “inconsistency” to a
State law, not because the Federal law
directly invalidates or conflicts with it,
but because the Federal law is said to
“cover the field”. This is a very
ambiguous phrase, because subject matters
of legislation bear little resemblance to
geographical areas. It is no more than a
cliche for expressing the fact that, by
reason of the subject matter dealt with,
and the method of dealing with it, and the
nature and multiplicity of the regulations
prescribed, the Federal authority has
adopted a plan or scheme which will be
hindered and obstructed if any additional
regulations whatever are prescribed upon
the subject by any other authority; if, in
other words, the subject is either touched
or trenched upon by State authority”.

31. The Calcutta High Court in G.P.

Stewart v. B.K. Roy Chaudhury [AIR 1939
Cal 628] had occasion to consider the
meaning of repugnancy and B.N. Rau, J. who
delivered the judgment of the Court
observed at p. 632:

“It is sometimes said that two laws cannot

be said to be properly repugnant unless
there is a direct conflict between them,

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as when one says “do” and the other

“don’t”, there is no true repugnancy,
according to this view, if it is possible
to obey both the laws. For reasons which
we shall set forth presently, we think
that this is too narrow a test: there may
well be cases of repugnancy where both
laws say “don’t” but in different ways.
For example, one law may say, “No person
shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in
quantities of less than five gallons at a
time” and another law may say, “No person
shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in
quantities of less than ten gallons at a
time”. Here, it is obviously possible to
obey both laws, by obeying the more
stringent of the two, namely the second
one; yet it is equally obvious that the
two laws are repugnant, for to the extent
to which a citizen is compelled to obey
one of them, the other, though not
actually disobeyed, is nullified”.

The learned Judge then discussed the

various authorities which laid down the
test of repugnancy in Australia, Canada,
and England and concluded at p. 634:

“The principle deducible from the English

cases, as from the Canadian cases, seems
therefore to be the same as that
enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the Australian
44 hour case (37 C.L.R. 466) if the
dominant law has expressly or impliedly
evinced its intention to cover the whole
field, then a subordinate law in the same
field is repugnant and therefore
inoperative. Whether and to what extent in
a given case, the dominant law evinces
such an intention must necessarily depend
on the language of the particular law”.

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32. Sulaiman, J. in Shyamakant Lal v.

Rambhajan Singh [(1939) FCR 188, 212] thus
laid down the principle of construction in
regard to repugnancy (SCC OnLine FC):

“When the question is whether a Provincial

legislation is repugnant to an existing
Indian law, the onus of showing its
repugnancy and the extent to which it is
repugnant should be on the party attacking
its validity. There ought to be a
presumption in favour of its validity, and
every effort should be made to reconcile
them and construe both so as to avoid
their being repugnant to each other; and
care should be taken to see whether the
two do not really operate in different
fields without encroachment. Further,
repugnancy must exist in fact, and not
depend merely on a possibility. Their
Lordships can discover no adequate grounds
for holding that there exists repugnancy
between the two laws in districts of the
Province of Ontario where the prohibitions
of the Canadian Act are not and may never
be in force: (Attorney-General for Ontario
v. Attorney-General for the Dominion)
[(1896) AC 348, 369-70].” (at pages 424-
427)
(Emphasis Supplied)

This Court expressly held that the pith

and substance doctrine has no application
to repugnancy principles for the reason
that:(SCR pp. 420-21 : AIR p.696, para 24)

“24.....The pith and substance argument

also cannot be imported here for the
simple reason that, when both the Centre
as well as the State Legislatures were
operating in the concurrent field, there
was no question of any trespass upon the

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exclusive jurisdiction vested in the

Centre under Entry 52 of List I, the only
question which survived being whether,
putting both the pieces of legislation
enacted by the Centre and the State
Legislature together, there was any
repugnancy, a contention which will be
dealt with hereafter.”

43. In Deep Chand v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp.

(2) SCR 8, this Court referred to its earlier
judgments in Zaverbhai (supra) and Tika Ramji
(supra) and held:

“29.....Repugnancy between two statutes

may thus be ascertained on the basis of
the following three principles:

(1) Whether there is direct conflict

between the two provisions;

(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay

down an exhaustive code in respect of the
subject matter replacing the Act of the
State Legislature; and

(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and

the law made by the State Legislature
occupy the same field.”

101. Keeping in mind all the above principles, we

may reiterate that the impugned enactment
pertains to the field viz. “land”, that is to
say “rights in or over land”, which is within
the exclusive field relatable to Entry 18 of
List II (State List). The Parliament, neither
in List I (Union List), nor in List III
(Concurrent List), has been given power to

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enact a legislation, which deals with a "land

or subject relatable to activities pertaining
to land" in a particular Province or State.
As to Entry 18 "land", the governing word is
followed by rest of the items, viz. “rights in
lands, rights over land”, relatable to
ownership or leasehold rights or easement or
other collateral rights etc. Reading Entry 18
with Entry 64 further shows that the State is
empowered to enact any law, making any
activity against laws with respect to any of
the matters in the State List (List II) on
offence against such laws. “Land grabbing”,
an activity wherein any person occupies or
attempts to occupy any land over which he has
no ownership, title or physical possession
without any lawful entitlement, has been made
an offence against law, which prohibits land
grabbing. The making of land grabbing an
offence against the law of holding land in the
State by lawful means, would relate to Entry
64 as it has been made an offence with respect
to the matter, viz. “land" in Entry 18 of the
List II, which is again within the exclusive
domain of the State Legislature.

102. Coming to Entry 65, it enables the State

Legislature to confer jurisdiction and power
of the Court, within its territorial

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jurisdiction, with respect to any of the

matters in the List II (State List). Thus,
conferment of jurisdiction and power of the
Special Courts, for any area or areas within
the territorial jurisdiction of the State
under Section 7 of the Land Grabbing Act’
2020, would fall in Entry 65, as such
conferment of jurisdiction and power on the
Court will be with respect to the matter in
the State List which is “land”, i.e. to say
“rights in or over land”. The result is that
the impugned enactment made by the State
Legislature falls squarely in the fields
occupied by List II, inasmuch as, making land
grabbing an offence and conferment of
jurisdiction and power to the Special Courts
to try every case arising out of any alleged
act of land grabbing would be relatable to the
subject “land”, i.e. to say “right in or over
land”, relatable to Entry 18 and thus, would
fall in the fields occupied by Entries 64 and
65 of List II (State List).

103. As noted by the Apex Court in Hoechst

Pharmaceuticals Ltd.19, it would be axiomatic
that the power of the State Legislature to
make a law with respect to Entry in List II of
the Seventh Schedule and make ancillary
provisions in that behalf is plenary and is

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not subject to the power of the Parliament to

make a law under Entry of List III. When one
entry is made “subject to” another entry, all
that it means is that out of the scope of the
former entry, a field of legislation covered
by the latter has been reserved to be
specifically dealt with the appropriate
Legislature. Entries 18, 64 and 65 have not
been made subject to any of the entries in
List III, Entries 1 to 6, 7, 11A, 12, 13, 46
of List III, as sought to be agitated before
us.

104. As noted above, taking clue from the

observations of the Apex Court in Tika Ram23,
it may be held that there is no question of
repugnancy in Article 254 of the Constitution,
inasmuch as, the State Legislature is
competent to legislate in the field pertaining
to “lands”, i.e. to say “right in or over
land”, a separate and distinct matter
relatable to its State subject in Entry 18 and
the matters cognate and of allied character in
Entries 64 and 65 of the same List, i.e. List
II.

105. As noted above, applying the doctrine of pith

and substance, considering the whole of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 in substance, the

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impugned Act is aimed at prohibiting land

grabbing activities in relation to the lands
in the State of Gujarat, and as such, there is
no inconsistency in actual terms, insofar as
the fields occupied by Entries 1, 2, 6, 7,
11A, 12, 13, 46 of List III.

106. Applying the well-established rule of

construction that the entries in the three
lists must be read in a broad and liberal
sense and must be given the widest scope which
their meaning is fairly capable of because
they set up a machinery of Government, we find
that the Constitution has made the power of
the State to provide for offence against laws
and jurisdiction and powers of the Court with
respect to any of the matters in the State
List (List II) and that of the Union in
Entries 1, 11A and 46 of List III, mutually
exclusive, so as to avoid difficulties which
may arise from overlapping powers of such
fields. It is evident that there is a
distinction between general subjects of
legislation in Entries 1, 2, 6, 7, 11A, 12, 13
and 46 in List III and specific State subject
“land” in List II. The general subjects of
legislation dealt in the aforesaid entries and
the power to legislate with respect to the
matters relatable to Entry 18, i.e. to say

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“right in or over land” are under a separate

group. This mutual exclusiveness is further
substantiated by the fact that in List III
(Concurrent List), there is no entry relating
the “land”, i.e. to say, “right in or over
land”. Thus, in our Constitution, a conflict
of legislative power of the Union and of the
State on the exclusive State subject of
"land", i.e. to say “rights in or over land”
cannot arise. That being so, we find it
difficult to comprehend the submission that
there can be intrusion by laws made by the
Parliament under the Entries 1, 2, 6, 7, 11A,
12, 13 and 46 of List III into a forbidden
field, viz. State’s exclusive power to make a
law with respect to "land" i.e. to say, "right
in or over land", relatable to Entry 18 of
List II of the Seventh Schedule.

(e) Dealing with the Arguments of the learned

Counsels on apparent conflict with different
Provisions of the Land Grabbing Act' 2020 with
Central laws :-

107. Coming to the next contention of the learned

counsel for the petitioners about the apparent
collision with the Central laws, viz. Civil
Procedure Code, Criminal Procedure Code,
Limitation Act, Specific Relief Act and
Transfer of Property Act, we may deal with

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each of the provisions hereinunder :-

(i) Conflict with the Code of Civil Procedure and

Code of Criminal Procedure

108. It has been contended that the impugned Act

provides a different procedure than what has
been prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code
and Criminal Procedure Code. Section 2 and
Section 9(3) give overriding effect to the
provisions of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 to
the Parliamentary Legislation occupying the
field, providing procedure pertaining to civil
and criminal proceeding; respectively.

109. To deal with the same, we may note that

Section 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure is
in the nature of Saving clause as it provides
that the provisions of the Code shall be
deemed to limit or otherwise affect any
special or local law now in force or any
special jurisdiction or power conferred, or
any special form of procedure prescribed, by
or under any other law for the time being in
force. Moreover, we may go through Section
9(2) of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, to
understand the import and purport of the said
provision, which reads as under:-

"9(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of

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Civil Procedure, 1908(V of 1908), any case in

respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or
the determination of question of title and
ownership to, or lawful possession of any land
grabbed under this Act, shall, subject to the
provisions of this Act, be triable in the Special
Court and the decision of Special Court shall be
final."

110. Careful reading of Section 9(2) of the Land

Grabbing Act’ 2020 indicates that it confers
exclusive jurisdiction upon the Special Courts
constituted under Section 7 of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 to try and determine the
questions of title and ownership to, or lawful
possession of any land, which is alleged to
have been grabbed falling within the meaning
of section 2(e) of the said Act.

111. The argument of the learned counsel for the

petitioners is that the non-obstante clause in
sub-section (2) of Section 9 excludes all
procedure pertaining to trial of civil suit
prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure
and significantly omits the procedure of trial
for determination on questions of title,
ownership or possession of immovable property,
which is in direct conflict with the Central
law, namely the Code of Civil Procedure
enacted to provide comprehensive procedure for
trial of all suits of civil nature.

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112. To answer this submission, suffice it to say

that the reading of non-obstante clause
contained in sub-section (2) of Section 9 of
the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 shows that it
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Special Courts constituted under the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020, which excludes expressly
the jurisdiction of regular civil courts to
try all Civil Suits of civil nature. Section
9 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes
for exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
courts, defined as District Courts therein, to
try all suits of civil nature, except those of
which cognizance is either expressly or
impliedly barred.

113. A conjoint reading of Section 9(2) of the Land

Grabbing Act’ 2020 and Section 9 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, makes it clear that the
Legislature intended to confer jurisdiction on
the Special Courts constituted under the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 to try all disputes of
civil nature pertaining to the alleged act of
land grabbing, which may include the question
of title, ownership or possession thereof.
This can further be clarified from the meaning
of the act of "land grabbing" given in section
2(3), which defines "land grabbing" being an
activity of occupying or attempting to occupy

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any land over which a person against whom the

allegations are made as having no ownership,
title or physical possession without any
lawful entitlement.

114. Proceeding further, we are required to note

the provisions of Section 10 of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020, which provides for
applicability of the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure to the proceedings before the
Special Court, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 and further states that for
the purpose of provisions of the said
enactment, viz. the Code of Civil Procedure,
Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil
Court.

115. The contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that non-obstante clause under sub-
section (2) of Section 9 whittle down the
procedure prescribed in Code of Civil
Procedure is, thus, liable to turned down
being a result of misreading/misinterpretation
of the said provision. It is settled that a
non-obstante clause cannot whittle the wide
import of the principal part where the
enacting part is clear; the non-obstante
clause cannot cut down its scope. In the same

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manner, sub-section (3) of Section 9 which

provides procedure in the matter of
determination of civil liability to be
consistent with the principles of natural
justice and fair play, and makes the
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure subject
to the provisions of the impugned Act and of
Rules made thereunder, cannot be said to cut
down the scope of applicability of the
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure as
provided in Section 10 of the Act’ 2020.

116. We may further note that sub-section (3) of

Section 9 of the impugned Act pertains to the
procedure for determination of civil liability
which is to be imposed as per Section 4(3) of
the impugned Act, on a person who is found to
be guilty of committing or cause to be
committed the Act of "land grabbing" by him or
through any other person. A careful reading
of Section 4(3) indicates that the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 imposes both civil and
criminal liability on the person found guilty
of commission of the act of land grabbing. The
criminal liability, upon conviction, is
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10
years, whereas the civil liability is of fine,
which may extend to Jantri value of the
property in question (grabbed land). As per

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the said provision, both civil and criminal

liability can be imposed simultaneously and
separately. In view of this provision, when
Section 9(3) is read carefully, it can be
understood to have been providing the
procedure for deciding the 'civil liability',
by computation of fine, to be imposed upon
land grabber as per Section 4(3) of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020, by complying with the
principles of natural justice and fair play,
subject to the provisions of the Act and the
Rules made thereunder.

117. Further, the contention that under Section 15

of the impugned Act, even a decree or order of
the court of law has been nullified, which
runs contrary to the decree defined under
Section 2(2) and Section 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, as overriding effect has been
given to the provisions of the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020 over an enforceable order or decree
of the Civil Court, this issue may be dealt
by us a little later in this part (Part I) of
the judgment itself.

118. Now coming to the provisions of the Criminal

Procedure Code, 1973 related to the mechanism
of initiating criminal proceedings,
investigation, trial before the Criminal

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Courts and the provisions of appeal and

revision, etc., we may read Sections 4 and 5
of the Criminal Procedure Code and reproduce
them as under :-

"4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal

Code and other laws.—(1) All offences under
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and
otherwise dealt with according to the
provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and
otherwise dealt with according to the same
provisions, but subject to any enactment for
the time being in force regulating the manner
of place of investigating, inquiring into,
trying or otherwise dealing with such
offences.

5. Saving.—Nothing contained in this Code

shall, in the absence of a specific provision
to the contrary, affect any special or local
law for the time being in force, or any
special jurisdiction or power conferred, or
any special form of procedure prescribed, by
any other law for the time being in force."

119. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 deals with

offences under the Indian Penal Code and Sub-
section (2) deals with the exclusion, "but
subject to any enactment for the time being in
force regulating the manner of place of
investigating, inquiring into, trying or
otherwise dealing with such offences".

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Reading of Section 5 of the Criminal Procedure

Code shows that it would be applicable to
investigation, inquiring into and trial of
cases by criminal courts of various
descriptions, being penal statute, in absence
of any contrary provisions in the special
statute or special provisions, provided for
special jurisdiction or the power conferred,
or prescribing any special form or procedure.

120. In State (Union of India) vs. Ram Saran24,

while dealing with the question of conviction
made by the Assistant Commandant of Central
Reserve Police Force under Section 10(m) of the
Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 and
consequential sentence imposed, it was held by
the Apex Court that "a special law means a law
enacted for special cases, in special
circumstances, as distinguished from the
general rules of law laid down as being
applicable to all cases dealt with by the
general law". It was held that the CRPF Act
being a special law providing special
procedure for the manner or place of
investigation or inquiring into the offences
under which the provisions thereof must be
waived and no provisions of Code of Criminal
Procedure can apply. It was, thus, held that
24
[(2003) 12 SCC 578] State (Union of India) vs. Ram Saran

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the Assistant Commandant, CRPF was clothed

with necessary jurisdiction for trial of the
matter.

121. However, reverting to the provisions in

Section 9(4) and Section 10 of the impugned
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, we may note that Sub-
section (4) of Section 9 confers jurisdiction
on the Special Courts to try all offences
punishable under the Act, punishment of which
has been provided in Section 4(3). Section 10
further clarifies that the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to the
proceedings of the Special Court, insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act and the Special Court shall be
deemed to be the Court of Sessions and shall
have all the powers of the Sessions as also
the person conducting the prosecution before
the Special Court shall be deemed to be an
Assistant Public Prosecutor.

122. Meaning thereby, the provisions of the Code of

Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal
Procedure have been applied to the proceedings
of civil and criminal trial into the
complaints of the land grabbing and the
procedure of Civil Procedure Code and Criminal
Procedure Code are to be followed save as

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inconsistency with the special statute.

123. It is also pertinent to note, at this

juncture, that the District Courts in the
local limits of the ordinary civil
jurisdiction and the Court of Sessions for
every Sessions Division have been designated
as the Special Courts for trying both disputes
of Civil and Criminal nature on the complaints
of land grabbing by Notification dated
06.11.2020 published under Section 7 of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 by the State
Government. Conferment of power to try the
dispute of civil and criminal nature to the
regular Civil Court and the Court of Sessions
at the level of "District Judge" by
designating them as the "Special Courts", is
in conformity with the provisions of both the
Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure enacted
by the Parliament.

124. In view of the above discussion, the

contention of learned counsels for the
petitioners about the inconsistency in the
provisions of Section 9(4) of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 with the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, is liable to be
turned down.

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125. Further submission of the learned senior

counsel and other advocates appearing for the
petitioners is that in the Criminal Procedure
Code, Section 6 provides for hierarchy of
Courts mentioned as Classes of criminal
courts. Apart from the Court of Sessions,
there are Courts of Judicial Magistrates of
First and Second Class to whom power has been
specifically conferred to take cognizance of
any offence under Section 190 contained in
Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Section 193 contained in the same Chapter
excludes the jurisdiction of the Court of
Sessions to take cognizance of any offence, of
a Court of original jurisdiction, unless the
case has been committed to it by a Magistrate
under the Code. Similarly, in a case where
the report has been submitted by the Police
Officer on completion of investigation under
Section 173, Cr.P.C., cognizance can be taken
by the Judicial Magistrate under Section
190(1)(b). Section 173(8) empowers the
Magistrate to direct for further investigation
on a report submitted under Section 173(2) of
the Code. The contention, thus, is that in
view of the provisions contained in Chapter
XIV of Code of Criminal Procedure, the
conferment of power on the Special Court (as a

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Court of Sessions) to take cognizance suo motu

or on an application of any person, is
inconsistent with the aforesaid provisions.

126. This submission does not detain us for long as

from the reading of Section 193, Cr.P.C. which
makes it clear that exceptions to the
provisions contained in Section 193, if any,
by any other law for the time being in force,
are saved. The 'Land Grabbing Act’ 2020'
being a Special law, powers conferred on the
Special Courts (A Court of Sessions as per
Section 10 of the Land Grabbing Act' 2020)
cannot be said to confront the provisions of
the Cr.P.C in any manner.

127. Lastly, on the submission with regard to the

provisions of Section 145(5) Cr.P.C. relating
to disputes as to immovable property, suffice
it to note that the provisions contained
therein speak for the power of the Executive
Magistrate appointed by the State Government
as provided in Section 20, Cr.P.C. Any order
passed by an Executive defined under Section
20 Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be binding on the
Judicial Magistrate or the Court of Sessions.
Moreover, it is settled law that the
proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. are
summary in nature and the order passed therein

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would have no bearing on any substantive

proceedings before any Court of law.

128. We may also take note of Section 5 of the

Indian Penal Code which prescribes that
nothing in the Indian Penal Code shall affect
the provisions of any special or local law.
No inconsistency, therefore, can be perceived
from any of the provisions of the Civil or
Criminal Procedure Code or Indian Penal Code,
providing for offence against laws.

(ii) - Effect Of Section 15

129. Coming to the arguments of the learned

counsels for the petitioners based on the
overriding effect given to the provisions of
the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 under Section 15
of the Act, we may extract the same for ready
reference:-

"15. The provisions of this Act shall have

effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
therewith contained in any other law for the
time being in force or custom, usage or
agreement or decree or order of a court or any
other tribunal or authority."

130. From a conjoint reading of Section 15 and

Section 2(e) of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020,
we may note that the relevant words in Section
15 "any decree or order of a Court (Civil

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Court)", the subject matter of consideration

herein, "inconsistent with the provisions of
the Act" must yield to the provisions of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020. Meaning thereby, any
such order or decree in favour of the land
grabber, in relation to the grabbed land
"without any lawful entitlement" would be
inconsistent with the provisions of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020. The key words in Section
2(e) "without any lawful entitlement" will
have to be given effective meaning so as to
understand the effect and import of Section 15
of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020. The Statute
provides that whosoever occupies or attempts
to occupy, any land, to which he is not in
ownership, title or physical possession,
"without any lawful entitlement" commits the
act of "land grabbing" within the meaning of
the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, such person would
be defined as "land grabber" in relation to
the subject land, which will have to be
construed as "grabbed land". The words
"grabbed land" draw their meaning under
Section 2(e) itself.

131. Under the impugned statute which came into

force on 29.08.2020, "land grabbing" has been
made an offence punishable under the Act,

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cognizance of which is to be taken by the

Special Court like a complaint case, to try
for the criminal offence under Section 3 of
the Act. An information may also be given to
the competent police authority of commission
of offence under the Act, which then would
have to be investigated by the police officer
after recording the information only after
prior approval of the District Collector which
would have to be given in consultation with
the Committee notified by the State
Government. Under the Scheme of the Rules
framed under the Act, the competent committee
defined in Section 2(a) notified by the State
Government would make a prima facie inquiry
into the veracity of the complaint, the
allegations of land grabbing before any report
of commission of offence is lodged in the
concerned police station. Section 9 (2) of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, as noted hereinabove,
excludes the jurisdiction of the regular civil
court other than Special Court designated by
the State Government to try the cases in
respect of alleged act of land grabbing.

132. Reading Section 15 in the above context, would

indicate that with effect from the date of
enactment i.e., 29.08.2020, the ordinary Civil

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Courts are not competent to try the cases

having allegations of land grabbing. The
Special Court as a Court of Sessions would be
competent to take cognizance of the complaint
of land grabbing, either suo motu or on an
application made by any person. The intention
of the legislature, as can be found from the
reading of Section 15 along with Section 9(2)
of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, is that even
if a Decree or Order has been passed in favour
of a person against whom allegations of land
grabbing are made, the same would not be a bar
to the Special Courts to take cognizance or
try the case specifically to examine the
correctness of the allegations of land
grabbing. In other words, a person against
whom allegations of land grabbing are made,
would not be able to protect his possession,
simply based of any order or decree of the
Civil Court, without any lawful entitlement,
to the land in question. The effect of the
order or decree of any court, tribunal, or
authority in favor of such a person, in
protecting his possession, shall have to be
examined by the Special Court to draw a
conclusion, whether such order or decree would
be binding on the complainant and protects the
possession of the alleged land grabber to the

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land, which is otherwise alleged to have been

obtained by illegal means, without any backing
of law.

133. We may further record the submissions of the

learned Advocate General that overriding
effect to the decree or order of a Court,
tribunal, or authority in no manner can tinker
with a binding decree or order of the
competent court of civil jurisdiction inter-se
parties. The provisions under Section 15 does
not and cannot unsettle the settled position
of law based on the order or decree passed by
the competent court inter se parties "about
lawful entitlement" of the person against whom
the complaint has been made, to retain his
possession. The order or decree of the
competent court is to be respected and
followed by the Special Courts once the
parties cite and draw attention of the court
to the same. It was further submitted that the
provisions of Section 15 are to be applied,
prospectively. It would not be having an
effect of nullifying any existing decree of
the competent Civil Court passed prior to the
enactment i.e., before 29.08.2020.

134. However, any order or decree passed by the

ordinary Civil Court on or after 29.08.2020,

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jurisdiction of which has been ousted by

virtue of Section 9(2) would be inconsistent
with the impugned Act. In other words, only
such order or decree of the Court which is not
competent to try the matter will not be a
protection to the person in whose favour such
a decree or order is passed, being in
consistent with the provisions of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 and would not have to be
respected after enforcement of the Act.

It was submitted that a person against

whom a complaint of land grabbing is made,
will not be able to seek protection of the
Civil Court order obtained after the
enactment, i.e. 29.08.2020, and has to
establish his better claims, i.e. right,
title, or interest in the property and his
lawful entitlement to retain possession or
ownership. The Special Court, in such cases,
is empowered to deal with the complaints
independently without being guided by the
order of the Civil Court, which otherwise did
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
matter.

135. Applying Section 15 in this manner

prospectively, we find that a careful reading
of Section 15 clearly indicates that the

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Legislature has taken a precaution in giving

overriding effect to the provisions of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 against a decree or
order of a court or tribunal or authority
inconsistent with its provision, when the
overriding effect given against the law is
"for the time being in force", whereas no such
phrase has been added after the words "decree
or order of a court or any tribunal or
authority". Giving a purposive interpretation
to the provisions of Section 15, reading the
said provision along with other provisions of
the Act, in effect, we find that Section 15
cannot be interpreted to mean that it can
nullify or override an existing decree of a
competent court, unless it is inconsistent
with the law which provides that a person who
has grabbed the land by deceitful means and
who has no ownership, title or physical
possession, and has occupied or attempted to
occupy the land, without any lawful
entitlement, would be termed a land grabber.
There will be no estoppel or res judicata for
the Special Court to examine a complaint of
land grabbing even in the case of a decree or
order in favour of a person who is termed as
"land grabber" and who is claiming right or
possession in or of any "grabbed land" under

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the Act.

136. This opinion drawn by us is further

substantiated from the general provisions of
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Section
6(1) and (2) protects the possession of a
person who has been dispossessed, without his
consent, of immovable property otherwise than
in due course of law, by permitting him to
institute a suit to recover possession within
a period of six months from the date of such
dispossession, notwithstanding any other title
that may be set up in such suit. In such a
suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief
Act, simply for recovery of possession, only
question that has to be determined by the
Court is whether the plaintiff was in the
possession of the disputed property and
whether he had been illegally dispossessed
therefrom on any date within six months prior
to the filing of the Suit.

137. The purpose behind Section 6 of the Specific

Relief Act is to restrain a person from using
force to dispossess a person, otherwise than
in due course of law. Due course of law
implies the right of a person affected thereby
to have determination of the controversy by
proof of every material fact which bears on

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the question of fact or liability, to be

conclusively proved or presumed against him.
Sub-section (4) of Section 6, thus, implies
that there shall be no bar against any person
to bring a suit to establish his title to such
property so as to recover its possession.

138. On the aforesaid principle, once the

provisions of Section 15 are tested, they
imply that a trespasser, even if he has
obtained a decree in his favour to protect his
possession of immovable property, any other
person claiming a title of the property has a
right to bring his own action, suit to recover
possession, by establishing his title, by
proof of the material facts having bearing on
the question of fact or liability, to have a
conclusive proof or presumption against the
possessor.

139. The effect is that the cases wherein the

right, title and interest inter-se parties are
settled and crystallised, they cannot be
reopened by the Special Court on the mere
ground of being inconsistent with the
provisions of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 and
there would be no overriding effect against
such orders or decrees of the Civil Courts.
However, the claims which are not settled

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conclusively or are pending in the regular

court, there would be no estoppel or res-
judicata for the Special Courts to entertain
and examine the allegations of land grabbing
in relation to the subject property. Section
15, thus, can effectively be used in
collateral proceedings without tinkering with
the effect and import of the order or decree
of a Court. A trespasser having obtained an
interim injunction from an ordinary Civil
Court will not be able to dispute the
jurisdiction of the Special Court to try the
case having allegations of land grabbing.

140. In any case, a statutory direction or

prohibition cannot be defeated by the previous
judgments between the parties. A person found
guilty of commission of the offence of land
grabbing, after a full-fledged trial into the
complaint, will not be able to seek protection
of law based on some decree or order wherein
these aspects have not been gone into.[Ref.
P.G. Eshwarappa vs. R. Rudrappa & Ors.25]

141. It is a settled position in law that the

legislature cannot by a mere declaration,
without anything more, directly overrule,
reverse or override a judicial decision.

25
[(1996) 6 SCC 96] P.G. Eshwarappa vs. R. Rudrappa & Ors.

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However, it may, at any time, in exercise of

the plenary powers conferred on it by the
Constitution render a judicial decision
ineffective by enacting a valid law on a topic
within its legislative field, fundamentally
altering or changing with retrospective,
curative or neutralising effect the condition
on which the decision is based [Ref:- I.N.
Saksena vs. State of M.P.26; State Bank's
Staff Union Madras27]

142. In the crux, giving a purposive meaning to the

provisions of Section 15, a harmonious reading
of the same with the other provisions of the
Act' 2020, makes it clear that section 15 does
not and cannot unsettle the order or decree
passed by the competent court having
jurisdiction over the subject land, inter se
parties, which crystallised the rights of the
parties, and they shall have to be respected
and followed by the Special Courts, once
attention of it has been drawn to the same.
However, such interpretation cannot be applied
generally or uniformly and shall have to be
examined in the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Moreover, the designated
Special Courts being the regular Civil Courts/

26
[(1976) 4 SCC 750] I.N. Saksena vs. State of M.P.
27
[2005 (7) SCC 584] State Bank'S Staff Union Madras vs Union Of India

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Sessions Courts are well-versed with the

nuances of law (both civil and criminal) and
are expected to apply the well established
principles of law in examining a particular
case or deal with such a situation before it.
All other questions, hypothetically raised
before us, therefore, shall have to be left to
the wisdom of the Special Court.

143. We may note that in the instant bunch of

petitions, however, no such instance has been
brought before us. None of the counsels for
the petitioners urged that any of the
petitioners have been got any decree or order
in his/or favour, which crystallised their
right, title and interest in the subject
property or their better right to retain
possession, obtained by lawful means.

144. We may draw support from the decision of the

Apex Court in State Bank's Staff Union Madras27
wherein the Apex Court has examined the
legislative intent of Section 8(1) of the
Amended Act, 2015 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 which contains the
words “notwithstanding any judgment, decree or
order of the Supreme Court or any Court”. The
question was as to whether by insertion of
these words, the Legislature intended to do

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away with the decision of the judgments of the

Supreme Court laying down that the Consumer
Protection Act being special remedy can be
initiated and continued despite there being
any arbitration agreement between the parties.
To answer the said question, the Apex Court
had examined the 2015 Amendments in the
Arbitration Act incorporating Sub-section (6A)
and 11 and the real intent and consequence in
relation to the proceedings under the Consumer
Protection Act, in reference to the
Arbitration Agreement under the 1996 Act.

145. It was held that the words “notwithstanding

any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme
Court or any Court” added by amendment in
Section 8 were with an intent to minimise the
intervention of judicial authority in context
of arbitration agreement. As per the amended
Section 8 and 8(1), the judicial authority has
only to consider the question "whether the
parties have a valid arbitration agreement".
The amended provision, limits the intervention
by judicial authority to only on aspect,
refusal by judicial authority to refer is
confined to only one aspect, when it finds
that prima facie no valid arbitration
agreement exists.

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146. It was held that the words “notwithstanding

any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme
Court or any Court”, were meant only to those
precedents where it was laid down that the
judicial authority while making reference
under Section 8 shall be entitled to look into
various facets of the arbitration agreement,
subject matter of the arbitration whether the
claim is alive or dead, whether the
arbitration agreement is null and void. The
above words added in Section 8 cannot be meant
for any other meaning.

147. With the above discussion, the challenge to

the validity of the Land Grabbing Act' 2020
based on the interpretation of Section 15 by
the learned counsels for the petitioners, is
liable to be turned down.

(iii) - Contradictions shown with The Specific

Relief Act, The Limitation Act and The Transfer of
Property Act

148. The next submission is with regard to the

alleged inconsistency with Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act. As noted hereinbefore,
Sub-section (4) of Section 6 is in the nature
of exception to the provisions in Sub-section
(1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 6, which
protects possession of even a trespasser. The

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proceedings instituted by a land owner against

the 'land grabber', therefore, cannot be said
to be hit by Section 6 of the Specific Relief
Act. We may, however, note that the contention
is about the concept of adverse possession on
the premise that Section 5 of the Specific
Relief Act recognises mere possessory title
and provides that for bringing an action
before the Code of Civil Procedure for
recovery of possession, mere possessory title
is enough.

149. The further submission is that the provisions

of Articles 64, 65, 66 and 67, which provide
limitation for possession of immovable
property have been rendered nugatory by the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 when it makes land
grabbing an offence with retrospective effect
by virtue of Section 4(2), which provides that
any person who continues to be in occupation
of a grabbed land on or after commencement of
the Act, shall be guilty of offence under the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020.

150. The submission is that Article 64 of the

Limitation Act by prescribing period of 12
years from the date of dispossession,
recognises the right to bring a suit of
possession, based on previous possession, and

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not on title, when the plaintiff in possession

of the property has been dispossessed.
Articles 65 and 66 recognise hostile
possession or adverse possession and put an
embargo on filing a suit for immovable
property, even based on title, after a period
of 12 years. A suit for recovery of possession
on the allegations of land grabbing,
therefore, cannot be filed under the general
laws of Limitation Act when the possessor
perfected his possession hostile to the land
owner. Such established provisions of law are
sought to be defeated by bringing action under
the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 even beyond the
period of limitation prescribed under the
Limitation Act, for recovery of possession of
an immovable property, whether based on the
title or not.

151. To answer this submission, we may note Section

29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 relied by
the learned Advocate General, which reads as
under :-

"29. Savings.—

(1) x x x x

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes

for any suit, appeal or application a period
of limitation different from the period

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prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of

section 3 shall apply as if such period were
the period prescribed by the Schedule and for
the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and
to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law."

152. A bare reading of Section (2) of Section 29

shows that in the event of the period of
limitation prescribed in any special law or
local law for bringing any suit, appeal or
application, different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation
Act, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply
as if such period has been prescribed by the
Schedule. Further, for the purpose of
determining any period of Limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by any special or local law, the provisions of
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) providing for
expiry, extension, exclusion and computation
of time, etc., shall apply, to the extent they
are not expressly excluded by such special or
local laws.

153. Under the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, though no

time period has been provided for bringing
action before the Special Court, but the

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period of 30 days has been provided for filing

appeal against the order of the Special Court,
by an aggrieved person. In any case, there is
no express exclusion of the Limitation Act and
the general provisions prescribed therein in
Article 137 shall apply. It is, thus, to be
noted that there is no inconsistency between
the provisions of the Limitation Act and the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 insofar as Section
4(2) of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 which
makes the occupation of grabbed land, by a
person on or after the commencement of the Act
and who continues to be in occupation of a
grabbed land, an offence.

154. We may further record that the concept of

adverse possession as brought in by Section 27
of the Limitation Act, 1963 providing for
extinguishment of the right to property to any
person for instituting a suit for possession
of any property based on his right to such
property, is based on the principle that the
plaintiff, the person in possession, who
brings a suit to get his right perfected,
though does not have a title to property, must
have to plead and prove the date on and from
which he claims to be in exclusive continuance
and undisturbed possession, and also that such
possession was actual and to the knowledge of

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the real owner. He is also required to

establish a hostile title and communication of
which to the real owner. [Ref.:- Krishnamurthy
S. Setlur Dead By Lrs vs O. V. Narasimha Setty
& Ors28].

155. As against this concept of adverse possession,

Section 4(2) provides that any person who, on
or after commencement of the Act, continues to
be in occupation of a grabbed land, belonging
to any private person or authority or
Government, shall be guilty of an offence
under the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020. Sub-
section (3) of Section 4 provides punishment
for the Act of Land Grabbing. This provision
being a special law, which has been enacted
"to prohibit land grabbing activities" in the
State of Gujarat, in no way, can be said to be
in conflict with Section 27 of the Limitation
Act, inasmuch as, 'land grabbing' is an
activity defined in Section 2(e), where a
person recognised as 'land grabber' within the
meaning of Section 2(d) occupies or make an
attempt to occupy any land over which he or
they have no ownership, title or physical
possession "without any lawful entitlement".
For establishing possession adverse to the

28
[2007 (3) SCC 569] Krishnamurthy S. Setlur Dead By Lrs vs O. V. Narasimha Setty
& Ors

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land owner, a person against whom the

complaint of land grabbing has been made, has
to establish that his physical possession to
the land in question is protected by law or he
has obtained possession by lawful means, on or
after the commencement of the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020, and has a right to retain the same.

156. As to the provisions of Sections 38 and 39 of

the Specific Relief Act, pertaining to
perpetual injunction or mandatory injunction,
our discussion above about the impact of
Section 15 would take care of the issue of
conflict as asserted by the petitioner.

157. Further, about Section 53A and Section 58 of

the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, pertaining
to part performance of the contract and
usufructuary mortgage, we may note that the
settled law pertaining to the protection of
the doctrine of part performance under Section
53A is that to qualify for the protection of
the said doctrine, it must be shown that there
is a contract to transfer immovable property
for consideration and the contract is
evidenced by a writing signed by the person
sought to be bound by it and from which the
terms necessary to constitute the transfer can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty.

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After establishing these circumstances, it

must be further shown that the transferee had
in part performance of the contract, either
taken possession of the property or any part
thereof, or the transferee being already in
possession continues in possession in part
performance of the contract and had done some
act in furtherance of the contract. (Ref.:-
Sardar Govindrao Mahadik & Anr vs Devi
Sahai29).

158. Thus, for invoking the equitable doctrine of

part performance, it is necessary that there
has to be a contract in writing from which the
terms necessary to constitute the transfer can
be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
Part performance also pre-supposes a completed
agreement. There can be no part performance
where there is no completed agreement in
existence. It must be obligatory that what is
done must be under the terms of the agreement
and by force of the agreement. These
principles cannot be applied to a "land
grabber" seeking to protect his possession who
has not obtained physical possession of any
land, by lawful means.

159. Coming to the principle of usufructuary

29
[1982 (1) SCC 237] Sardar Govindrao Mahadik & Anr vs Devi Sahai

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mortgage in Section 58(d) of the Transfer of

Property Act, it refers to the delivery of
possession by the mortgager, either expressly
or by implication of the mortgaged property to
the mortgagee and authorise him to retain such
possession until payment of the mortgaged
money and to receive the rents and profits
accruing in the property in lieu of interest
or partly in payment of mortgaged money, such
transaction is called a usufructuary mortgage.
To apply this provision, existence of mortgage
within the meaning of Section 58 (a) is
necessary, which provides that a mortgage is a
transfer of an interest in a specific property
for the purpose of securing the payment of
money advanced or to be advanced by way of
loan, an existing or future debt or the
performance of an engagement, which may give
rise to a pecuniary liability. The definition
itself shows that a mortgage is a transfer of
an interest in the land mortgaged and not a
mere contract. A registered valid mortgaged
deed is, thus, must be in existence to
transfer an interest in the property
mortgaged.

160. In absence of any contract to the contrary,

notwithstanding the fact that the mortgaged
money has not been paid by the mortgagee to

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the mortgager, the existence of a registered

valid mortgage deed, a registered document
valid in the eye of law, is necessary to
create a mortgage over the property which
again talks of "lawful entitlement" of a
mortgagee to retain possession of the
mortgaged land as a lawful transfer of
interest in his favour. These provisions, in
no way, are contravened by the impugned
enactment, namely Land Grabbing Act’ 2020,
which at the cost of repetition, makes
physical possession of land violative to law,
when it is obtained and retained by unlawful
means.

161. In view of the above discussion, applying the

doctrine of occupying field, as asserted by
the learned counsels for the petitioners, to
examine inconsistency in the provisions of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 with the Central laws,
we do not find any repugnancy. There is no
conflict between the State law and the Central
laws, referred hereinbefore, as both the laws
operate in different fields. It is not a case
where any parliamentary law prescribed for
making the activity of land grabbing an
offence providing for both criminal and civil
liability.

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162. The general provisions of Central laws

referred above, cannot override the specific
legislation enacted by the State Legislature
to prevent the Act of Land Grabbing in the
State of Gujarat. There is no question of
harmonising both the laws as there is no
overlapping or collision. We, therefore, hold
that the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, a law passed
by the State Legislature substantially is a
law enacted within the scope of Entry 18 in
the State List. The other two Entries, viz.
64 and 65 in the State list cover the
incidental provisions enacted in respect of
the matter of Land Grabbing covered by Entry
18 of the State List. By applying the
doctrine of pith and substance, on an
exhaustive analysis of the provisions of the
Land Grabbing Act' 2020 it appears that by and
large, the impugned law falls within the four
corners of the State List (List II) and
alleged encroachment, even if perceived, is
purely incidental and inconsequential as the
law made by the State Legislature is not on a
subject covered by the Concurrent List. There
is no question of inconsistency with or
repugnancy to any previous laws made by the
Parliament. The result is that there was no
need or requirement of obtaining assent of the

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President under Article 254(2) of the

Constitution, to save the impugned law.

(iv) Conclusion on Repugnancy and Presidential

Assent :-

163. It is well settled that the presumption is

always in favour of the Constitutionality of a
statute and the onus lies on a person
assailing the Act to prove that it is
inconsistent. Applying the test of repugnancy,
the conditions noted hereinabove, which must
be satisfied, we find that there does not
appear to us to be an inconsistency between
the State Act and Central enactments referred
by the learned counsels for the petitioners.
The doctrine of pith and substance,
overlapping, incidental encroachment, are, in
fact species of the same law. It is quite
possible to apply these doctrines together to
examine repugnancy or otherwise of an
encroachment. In a case of overlapping, the
Courts have taken the view that it is
advisable to ignore an encroachment, which is
merely incidental in order to reconcile the
provisions and harmoniously implement them. If
ultimately, the provisions of both the Acts
coexist without conflict, then it is not
expected of the Courts to invalidate the law
in question.

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164. It is a settled canon of law that courts

normally would make every effort to save a
statute and resolve the conflicts/repugnancy,
if any, rather than invalidating the statute.
Therefore, it will be the purposive approach
to permit both the enactments to operate in
their fields by applying them harmoniously.
The Court also has to keep in mind the
distinction between "ancillaries incidentally
affecting" and overlapping. The distinction
is that "ancillaries" relates to a law which
merely falls in the periphery of Entry and
the "incidental effect" relates to a law,
which in potential is not controlled by the
other legislation. A self-contained Code is
an exception to the Rule of referential
legislation. The slight overlapping would not
take the colour of repugnancy. The schemes of
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 and the Central
Legislations (referred by learned counsels)
did not admit of any conflict or repugnancy in
their implementation.

165. In the instant case, the doctrine of pith and

substance would clearly be applicable and
rigours of Article 254(1) are not attracted.
Even if fractional overlapping is accepted
between the State statute with Central laws,
then it will be saved by the doctrine of

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incidental encroachment and it shall also be

inconsequential as both the constituents have
enacted the respective laws within their
legislative competence and, moreover, both the
Statute can eloquently coexist and operate
with compatibility. On the arguments advanced
on behalf of the petitioners, it is not
permissible in law to disintegrate the
provisions of the Act for the purposes of
determining legislative competence. Such
approach shall be contrary to the accepted
canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the
Act should be read as a whole for the purpose
[Reference has been taken of Bondu Ramaswamy &
Ors vs Bangalore Development Authority30].

166. There is one more aspect of consideration for

arriving at a final conclusion on the issue.
The Apex Court in Offshore Holdings P.Ltd vs
Bangalore Development Authority31, while
testing the validity of certain provisions of
the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976
has referred to the 'Concept of Fragmentation'
while testing the said Act holding that it was
referable to Entry 5 and 18 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule. An argument was advanced by
the appellants therein that adopted provisions

30
[(2010) 7 SCC 129] Bondu Ramaswamy & Ors vs Bangalore Development Authority
31
[(2011) 3 SCC 139] Offshore Holdings P.Ltd vs Bangalore Development Authority

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of the Land Acquisition Act, in terms of

Section 36 of Banglore Development Authority
Act, are relatable only to Entry 42 of List
III and such law enacted by Parliament cannot
be construed incidental to any other law.
While holding that the Bangalore Development
Authority Act was referable to Entries 5 and
18 of List II of Seventh Schedule, the
question considered therein was whether it is
feasible and possible to disintegrate the
provisions of the Act for the purposes of
examining their legislative competence.

167. Referring to the "Concept of Fragmentation",

it was held therein that the Concept of
'Fragmentation' may not be an appropriate tool
to be used for repugnancy or plea of ultra
vires. The collective and cohesive reading
of an Act has been considered by the Courts as
a prerequisite to interpretation. Thus, the
Concept of 'Fragmentation' is least applied by
the Courts for proper interpretation. The
observations in paragraphs '109 to 114' are
relevant to be noted hereinunder :-

"109. Fragmentation by itself is not a tool of

interpretation which can lead to any final
conclusion. It is a concept which can be
pressed into service either to attain greater
clarity of the relevant statutory provisions,
its ingredients or spell out its requirements.

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Sometimes, it may be useful to disintegrate or

fragment a statute to examine proper
legislative intent and to precisely define its
requirement. Mere dissection of the language
of a provision would be inconsequential unless
it is coupled with, or is intended to bring
into play, another accepted doctrine of
statutory interpretation. In other words,
fragmentation may be of great help and used as
a prior step to application of principles like
ancillariness, pith and substance, incidental
encroachment, severability etc. Concept of
fragmentation has been understood differently
in different contexts vis-`-vis doctrines of
severability and ancillariness.

110. Laskin, in his classic, Canadian

Constitutional Law, 4th edition, 1973, whilst
studying the logic of Sections 91 and 92 of
the Canadian Constitution, embarked on an
analysis of what constitutes "matter," which
he described as a concern with `the pith and
substance' of the statute, as follows at page
99:

"The typical statute is a composite,

assembling many specific and detailed
provisions into a single package,
separating them into parts and sections,
each with its own morsel of meaning. Since
ordinary litigation arises out of the
attempt to apply some one provision and
even many references have addressed
themselves especially to designated
portions, one must start by settling on
the pith and substance of what is
relevant."

In this manner, he termed the determination of

the "matter" of the statute as a threshold
inquiry which precedes and must proceed
independently of the content of the competing

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legal categories whose application flow from

it. He acknowledges a situation where although
the pith and substance of the whole statute is
such as to come within an available class of
subjects, the separately considered matter of
a particular provision might not. This is the
very situation that has seized us in the
present case and in Laskin's own words, "Does
the good redeem, perish with, or survive the
bad?"

111. The doctrine of ancillariness adds

further legitimacy to the statute whose
validity has been upheld on the basis of the
doctrine of pith and substance. On the other
hand, the doctrine of severability comes into
play to determine the issue of guilt by
association or salvation by disassociation. It
is Laskin's submission that the doctrine of
ancillariness operates by suppressing the
special tendencies of special provisions and
treating them as merely elements in the common
structure. In such manner "it polarizes the
statute so that no part of it is conceived as
having an independent direction but all are
seen as pointed toward the one central
matter."Thus, Laskin uses ancillariness and
severability as devices in identifying the
statutory `matter'. This view paves the way
for fragmenting the statute theoretically to
determine whether the impugned portion is
redeemed by the rest of the statute or must
perish so that the remainder may survive.

112. Such a theory of fragmentation is

supported by Laskin's discourse "Ancillariness
deals with fusion, severability with fission.
Each arises where there is possibly a
different orientation of a statute and of some
of its components. They are mutually exclusive
in their operation. With ancillariness, the
pith and substance of the whole swallows up

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the matter of the part which then has no

independent significance; with severability,
the difference is not only preserved but
insisted on and the question is what
consequences flow from a plurality of
'matters'."

113. In a variation of the view that the

statute is to be adjudged as an integrated
whole Laskin, in the above discussed backdrop,
entertains the alternative of disaggregating
the statute into components or fragments as
preceding such judgment as follows:

"The quality of severability becomes

relevant only on the premise that one at
least of the "matters," whether that of
the whole statute or that of a part, may
not come within any class of subjects
within the ambit of the enacting
legislature's authority. If, in that
situation, the portion is severable, the
matter of each fragment into which the
statute is decomposed is assigned to the
class of subjects deemed appropriate.
Either the portion exscinded or the mass
from which it is drawn may then be
sustained despite the shakiness of the
other. But if, resisting assimilation
under the doctrine of ancilliarity, a part
of the statute deals with some `matter'
which is alien to the pith and substance
of the whole statute and they are not
severable, the illegitimacy of either's
matter affects the other and both must
fall."

114. Fragmentation is neither synonymous with

nor an alternative to the doctrines of
severability or ancillariness. Later are the
doctrines which can be applied by themselves
to achieve an end result, while fragmentation,

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as already noticed, is only a step prior to

final determination with reference to any of
the known principles. In this manner
fragmentation of statute may be theoretically
undertaken in the process of arriving at the
pith and substance of a statute or even
determining the field of ancillariness."

168. By drawing distinction between the "Doctrine

of severability" and the "Concept of
Fragmentation", it was held in Offshore
Holdings Private Ltd.31 that for applying the
'Doctrine of severability', it is to be
determined whether the valid parts of the
statutes are separable from the invalid parts
thereof and it is the intention of the
Legislature, which is the determining factor.
The test to be applied is whether the
Legislature would have enacted the valid part,
if it had known that the rest of the Statute
was invalid. Another principle used by the
Courts while applying the doctrine of
severability is to find out whether the
separated valid parts form a single scheme
which is intended to operate as a whole
independent of the invalid part. However,
severability is not fragmentation.
Fragmentation will be effectively used to
apply at the threshold stage prior to
declaration of repugnancy or ultra vires of a
statute, while severability is a doctrine to

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be applied post such declaration.

169. Applying the test laid down therein, we may

further note that the entire Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020 is directed towards prohibiting
“land grabbing activities” in the State of
Gujarat by making it an offence with
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10
years and civil consequence of fine, which
extends to Jantri value of the property.
Different provisions of the Land Grabbing Act’
2020 are found to be pointing towards the one
central matter, i.e. "land grabbing". The
provisions in the entire scheme of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020, prescribing procedure of
trial, etc. cannot be conceived as having an
independent direction. Having exhaustively
gone through each and every alleged offending
provision of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, we
do not find any reason to apply the Concept of
Fragmentation to determine the pith and
substance of the Act, which we held to be
"land grabbing" related to "land" referrable
to Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule. Even if various provisions of the
Act are fragmented, they still lead to the
same result and the pith and substance of the
Act would still be traceable to Entries 18, 64
and 65 of the List II of the Seventh Schedule.

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The main purpose of the Act is to curb the

offence of "land grabbing" and inquiry into
ownership and title of the person in
occupation is incidental to the main inquiry,
as to the lawful entitlement of the person
alleged as land grabber, to retain the
possession of the "grabbed land".

170. Having examined the pith and substance of the

impugned Legislation and holding that it is
relatable to Entries 18, 64 and 65 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution,
the question of repugnancy can hardly arise.
Furthermore, the constitutionality of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 is not determined by the
degree of invasion into the domain assigned to
the other Legislature, by its pith and
substance. The true nature and character of
the Legislation has been analysed to find out
whether the matter falls within the domain of
the enacting legislation. Incidental or
ancillary encroachment on a forbidden field
does not affect the competency of the
Legislature to make the impugned law.

171. Thus, in our view, the ground of repugnancy

raised by the petitioners in the present set
of petitions, merits rejection.

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172. Coming to the judgments relied by Mr. Asim

Pandya, learned senior advocate and Mr. Masoom
Shah, learned advocate, in the case of Forum
for People's Collective Efforts (FPCE)3, the
ratio thereof does not apply to the facts of
the instant case, inasmuch as, the Apex Court
therein was faced with the question of
constitutional validity of the West Bengal
Housing Industry Regulation Act, 2017 enacted
by the Legislature in light of the existing
Central law, viz. Real Estate (Regulation and
Development Act), 2016. There is no dispute
that the subject of both the Central and the
State enactments was covered by Entries 6 and
7 of the Concurrent List to the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. The State law
was found to be 'copy and paste' replica of
the Central Legislation (except for certain
provisions which were inconsistent with RERA)
and covering the field which was occupied by
the Central enactment. In the said facts and
circumstances of the case, it was, thus, held
that the West Bengal Act was repugnant to RERA
and was hence unconstitutional.

173. The other decisions referring to the law

discussed above also lead to the same
conclusion as drawn by us hereinabove.

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174. As regards the decision in State Of Orissa vs

M. A. Tulloch And Co.32, the Apex Court while
deciding the validity of the Orissa Mining
Areas Development Fund Act has noted that the
Orissa Act had been rendered ineffective by a
Central enactment, viz. the Mines And Minerals
(Development And Regulation) Act, 1957, which
came into force on 01.06.1958. It was noted
that the Orissa Act had been enacted by virtue
of the legislative power conferred by Entry 23
of the State Legislative List reading
"Regulation of mines and mineral development
subject to the provisions of List I with
reference to regulation and development under
the control of the Union." The legislative
entry under which the later Central Act was
enacted was item 54 of the Union List (List
I), "Regulation of mines and mineral
development to the extent to which such
regulation and development under the control
of the Union is declared by Parliament by law
to be expedient in the public interest."

175. The dispute in the said case was concerning

the fees which became due from the period
July, 1957 to March 1958. The legality of the
said demand was challenged on the ground that
on the coming into force of the Central Act,
32
[AIR 1964 SC 1284] State Of Orissa vs M. A. Tulloch And Co.

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1957, the Orissa Act ceased to be operative by

reason of the withdrawal of the legislative
competence by force of the Entry in the said
List being subject to Parliamentary
declaration and the law enacted by Parliament.

176. Having examined the provisions of the Orissa

Act, the State enactment and the Central Act,
it was noted that Entry 23 provides that the
legislative competence of the State
Legislature is subject to the provisions of
List I with respect to regulation and
development under the control of the Union and
Entry 54 in List I requires a declaration by
law that regulation and development of mines
should be under the control of the Union in
public interest. Therefore, if a Central Act
has been passed for the purpose of providing
for the conservation and development of
minerals, and if it contains the requisite
declaration, then it would not be competent to
the State Legislature to pass an Act in
respect of the subject-matter covered by the
said declaration. It was further noted that
the Central Act of 1948, which was pre-
constitution law, did not contain the
requisite declaration as in terms of Entry 54,
however, the Central Act 67 of 1957, which was
a post-constitution enactment contains the

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requisite declaration by the Union Parliament

under Entry 54 and that the Act covers the
same field as that of Act of 1948 in regard to
Mines and Mineral Development. It was, thus,
held that there can be no doubt that the field
covered by the Orissa Act (impugned Act) is
covered by the express provisions contained in
Central Act of 1957, which was wider in its
scope and amplitude and confer larger powers
on the Central Government than the
corresponding Act of 1948. When such was the
position, it was held that the inconsistency
was demonstrated not by a detailed comparison
of the provisions of the two statutes, but by
the mere existence of the two pieces of
legislation. By the specific provision of the
Central Enactment of 1947, it was clear that
the intention of Parliament was to cover the
entire field and, thus, to leave no scope for
the argument that untill rules were framed,
there was no inconsistency and no super-
session of the State Act.

177. It was held that if by reason of the

declaration by Parliament the entire subject
matter of "conservation and development of
minerals" has been taken over, for being dealt
with by Parliament, thus depriving the State
of the power which it therebefore possessed,

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it would follow that the "matter" in the State

List is, to the extent of the declaration,
subtracted from the scope and ambit of Entry
23 of the State List. There would, therefore,
after the Central Act of 1957, be "no matter
in the List" to which the fee could be related
in order to render it valid.

178. In view of the above discussion, in the facts

of the instant case, the said principle would
not be applicable.

Part II - Manifest Arbitrariness - Violation of

Article 14 of the Constitution

(A) - Arguments of the learned Counsels for the

Parties:-

Heard Ms. Megha Jani, Mr. Masoom Shah,

Mr.Vikram Thakore, Mr. Rasesh Parikh on this
issue.

179. Further, Ms. Megha Jani, learned advocate

assisted by Mr.Arjun Joshi, learned advocate,
Mr. Amit S. Thakker, Ms.Aditi Sheth and Ms.
Krisha Bhimani made submissions on the
challenge to the validity of the impugned Act
on three grounds namely:-

(i) The Act is violative of basic structure

of the Constitution;

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(ii) It's provisions violate Article 14;

(iii) The procedure of civil and criminal

trial provided by the impugned legislation is
manifestly arbitrary.

180. Her contention is that the following aspects

of the Act makes it manifestly arbitrary,
which is a ground to challenge the validity of
a legislative enactment, recognized by the
Apex Court in Shayara Bano vs Union Of India
And Ors. Ministry Of Women33.

181. To elaborate her submission, Ms. Jani would

contend that the main features of the Act,
which are inextricably mixed up are manifestly
arbitrary, such as:-

(i) Equating private land and Government land,

occupied by the accused by putting them on the
same pedestal, the act of possession of any
land, irrespective of its nature, whether
against a private land or a Government land or
a rented property have been treated as
similar. The punishment of 10 years
imprisonment for the offence of land grabbing
does not depend upon the nature or the extent
of the land, which would decide the gravity of
offence.

33
[2017 (9) SCC 1] Shayara Bano vs Union Of India And Ors. Ministry Of Women

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(ii) It applies to everyone equally guilty of

whether positive action, omission, providing
aid or instigation for the act of land
grabbing. The same term of imprisonment is
provided though the criteria of violation may
not be the same.

(iii) The Act blends Civil and Criminal

Procedure in the inquiry into the allegation
of commission of offence of land grabbing. The
result is that the finding recorded during the
course of civil trial will be binding in
criminal proceedings.

(iv) Serious civil and criminal consequences

have been provided irrespective of nature and
gravity of offence. This aspect needs close
examination by this Court.

(v) The definition of "land grabbing" under

the Act has a swaying effect by including the
dispute pertaining to title, possession etc.
which is essentially a civil dispute.

(vi) The Special Courts are left to follow

their own procedure by complying with the
principles of natural justice, which confers
unfettered discretion upon the Special Courts
not to try civil disputes by complying with

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the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(v) The power conferred upon the Special

Court under Section 9(2)(3) for trial of civil
dispute and 9(4) for trial of criminal dispute
as also sub-section(5) of Section 9 are
couched in a manner that the Legislature has
conferred unguided and unfettered
discretionary power to the Special Courts in
the matter of trial of both civil and criminal
liability. The result is that while trying the
Civil Suit or Criminal proceedings, the
Special Court would be competent to give a go-
by to the procedure prescribed in the Code of
Civil and Criminal Procedure.

(vi) The provision pertaining to imposition

of fine upto Jantri value of the property has
no clarity as to with reference to what date,
the Jantri value of the property would be
applicable to compute the fine.

(vii) Sub-section (8) of Section 9 conferring

power on the Special Court also provides that
the Special Court may pass an order for
restoration of possession to the complainant,
after evicting any person by force, who may be
in the possession of the property.

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(viii) Sub-section (9) further speaks of

payment of compensation and profits earned by
the person in possession besides the Jantri
value of the property, in an unguided manner.

(ix) The provisions are so harsh that they

make the "land grabbing" offence punishable
with minimum 10 years of imprisonment which
may extend to 14 years, which is the period of
life imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code.

(x) For trial of such an offence, where

civil and criminal both aspects are to be
looked into, the powers conferred on the
Special Court should have been circumscribed
by certain limits provided in the Act itself,
so that all excesses in the matter of
implementation of the Act would have been
checked.

(xi) Further the provisions of the Act' 2020

that the information about the commission of
offence of "land grabbing" cannot be recorded
by a police officer unless prior approval of
the District Magistrate, in consultation with
the Committee notified by the Government, is
nothing but a mechanism to scuttle the
criminal machinery, which otherwise can be set
in motion by writing a complaint of an offence

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committed under the Indian Penal Code. No

guidance has been provided to deal with the
complaints of "land grabbing" before
information of the same is registered by a
police officer.

(xii) No qualification of the member of the

committee has been prescribed under the Act.
The result is that any one can be included as
a member of the committee, which leads to
uncertainty, in implementation of the statute.

(xiii) The Statement of Objects and Reasons

of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 has been read
over by Ms. Megha Jani to assert that the Act'
2020 contains the statement that the
legislature has brought the enactment as
'public order' is being adversely affected by
the unlawful activities of the land grabbers
in the State, which shows that the Act' 2020
is aimed at securing the "public order".
However, the provisions of the Act are set out
in a manner that they equate the 'private
land' and 'Government land'.

(xiv) A private dispute with respect to a

private land, where the issues pertaining to
ownership, title and possession are to be
adjudicated, has no correlation to the 'public

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order'. Private land and the Government land

are, thus, put up on the same pedestal.
Moreover, “breach of public order” has not
been made an offence under the Act' 2020.

(xv) As the impugned enactment equates the

Government land and the private land, the
provisions making "land grabbing" an offence
even with respect to private lands belonging
to a private persons, is not based on any
ineligible differentia and has no nexus with
the object, the legislative seeks to achieve,
which is securing 'public order' in the State.
Neither the land grabbing has been made an
offence for the breach of public order nor the
'land grabber' is defined as a person who is
guilty of breach of maintenance of public
order. The dispute pertaining to private land,
between two or few individuals, in any case,
has no bearing on the public order.

(xvi) The judgments of the Apex Court in the

case of Ram Manohar Lohia vs. The State of
Bihar and another34, Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya
Shaikh vs. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police35
and Banka Sneha Sheela vs. State of Telangana

34
[AIR 1966 SC 740] Ram Manohar Lohia vs. The State of Bihar and another
35
[(1995) 3 SCC 237] Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh vs. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of
Police

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and Ors.36] have been placed to make us

understand the meaning of public order, to
vehemently assert that the inclusion of two
separate classes of lands for the offence of
land grabbing, both against private land and
Government land, under the impugned enactment
Act' 2020 has no nexus with the object sought
to be achieved, which is maintenance of public
order. Unequals are treated as equals without
any rationale.

(xvii) To understand the object of the Act,

applying Mischief rule, the mischief which is
sought to be addressed by the enactment, the
purpose or object of the Act has to be
determined and the material which can be used
for such an exercise are:-

“The circumstances prevailed at the time

when the law under consideration has been
passed and which insisted the passing of
the law.“

(xviii) Referring to the observation in

Paragraph No.'9' of the decision of
Mustakmiya35, it was argued that the
distinction has to be drawn between the “law
and order” and “maintenance of public order”.
In order to bring the activities of a person
within the expression of “acting in a manner
36
[(2021) 9 SCC 415] Banka Sneha Sheela vs. State of Telangana and Ors.

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prejudicial to the maintenance of public

order”, the fall out, the extent and reach of
the alleged activities must be of such a
nature that they travel beyond the capacity of
the ordinary law to deal with the offender or
to prevent his subversive activities affecting
the community at large or a large section of
the society. The degree of disturbance and its
impact upon the even tempo of life of the
society or the people of a locality which
determines whether the disturbance caused by
such activity amounts only to a 'breach of law
and order', or it amounts to 'public order.'
Only if the activity falls within the category
of “disturbance of public order”, then it
becomes essential to treat such a criminal and
deal with him differently than an ordinary
criminal under the law as his activities would
fall beyond the frontiers of law and order
disturbing the even tempo of life of the
community of the specified locality.

(xix) Much emphasis has been laid to the

observations made by the Apex Court in the
aforesaid decisions to argue that the act of
the “land grabbing” by itself is not
determinative of its own gravity, inasmuch as,
the activity of occupying private person’s
land may not affect adversely the maintenance

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of public order. There must be material to

show that there has been a feeling of
insecurity among the general public and such
act must be said to have direct bearing on the
question of maintenance of public order. The
commission of offence will not necessarily
come within the purview of public order, which
can be dealt with under ordinary general law
of the land. With this idea of difference
between the expressions “maintenance of land
and order” and “acting in a manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order”, it was
vehemently argued that in no manner, a person
who occupies land belonging to a private
person can be said to be threat to the
maintenance of public order, so much so that
such an act of that person creates panic or
fear in the minds of members of the public
upsetting the even tempo of life of the
community, or results in bringing a feeling of
insecurity among the general public.

(xx) The submission, thus, is that the

impugned enactment though is aimed at
maintenance of law and public order and to
address the disturbance of public order, but
in the garb of maintenance of public order,
even the activity related to a land belonging

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to a private person which gives rise to an

ordinary civil dispute between two private
individuals, has been brought under the
umbrella of the impugned enactment Act' 2020
giving it a colour of criminal activity.

(a) Mischief Rule

182. It was further submitted that :-

(i) As held by the Apex Court in Shashikant

Laxman Kale and anr. vs. Union of India and
another37, it is necessary to look to the
purpose of the law and apply the test of
“palpable arbitrariness” in the context of
felt needs of the times and societal
exigencies to determine reasonableness of the
classification.

(ii) The test of “palpable arbitrariness” is

to be applied keeping in mind that those who
have been included as similarly situated for
the purpose of enactment, whether would render
the classification palpably arbitrary. If this
test applied in this manner is satisfied, the
provision has to be faulted as discretionary,
falling short of the rule of equality under
Article 14 of the Constitution. It is,
therefore, necessary to discern the purpose or
37
[(1990)4 SCC 366] Shashikant Laxman Kale vs. Union of India

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object of the impugned enactment, to

understand the circumstances of a rational
nexus of differentia of which two classes are
treated equally. The object sought to be
achieved by the impugned enactment has to be
examined to test the validity of the
classification. The submission is that while
understanding the purpose or object of the
legislation, there is a need to apply the
'Mischief Rule' to understand the gap of
mischief the legislation intended to cover, to
give effect to the intention of the
Legislature so as to “advance the remedy and
suppress the mischief”.

(iii) The Statement of Objects and Reasons

of the impugned legislation is to be read over
for judging the reasonableness of a
classification made in the enactment to see if
it infringed or was contrary to the
Constitution. The circumstances which
prevailed at the time when the legislation had
been passed and which necessitated the passing
of the law can be relied upon to determine the
purpose or object of the legislation while
dealing with the validity of the
classification. The rational nexus of the
differentia on which the classification is

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based has to exist, with the purpose or object

of the legislation, so determined.

(iv) To understand the purpose or object of

the impugned enactment when one reads the
Statement of objects and reasons pertaining to
the impugned enactment, it is evident that the
statute was passed to remedy the adversarial
affect on the public order by unlawful
activities of the land grabbers in the State.

(v) The legislative intention which can be

discerned from the various provisions of the
impugned enactment, however, is to make “land
grabbing” an offence or in other words to curb
the activities of land grabbing and connected
matters in the State of Gujarat. Looking to
the Statement of objects and reasons of the
impugned enactment which actuated the step to
provide a remedy for then existing malady,
with the legislative intention, related to the
meaning or exposition of the remedy as
enacted, would make it clear that evil which
was sought to be remedied was to address the
adverse effect to the public order by unlawful
activities of the land grabbers in the State.

(vi) However, none of the provisions enacted

by the Legislature under the impugned Act'

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2020 remedies the object or purpose of the

legislation, which is maintenance of public
order. The reason being that any dispute
between two private parties pertaining to the
ownership, title or possession cannot be said
to be threat to the maintenance of public
order, which may not be so in the cases of
grabbing of Government lands. Thus equating
the offence against public land and private
land, one against the State and another
against private persons, applying the
"Mischief Rule", would establish that there
does not exist a rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved by the impugned
enactment, which, thus, fall short of the test
of validity of the classification. The
submission is that Article 14 has both
negative and positive facets. The impugned
enactment, cannot withstand the test of
negative equality, inasmuch as, two sets of
disputes, i.e. the dispute between two private
persons pertaining to the right, title or
interest in the land, cannot be equated with
the activities against the interest of the
State by illegally occupying the Government
land.

(vii) The contention, thus, is that the

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impugned enactment is hit by Vice of

constitutionality, as it fails the test of
validity applying the "Mischief Rule".

(b) Manifest Arbitrariness in the provisions of the

Land Grabbing Act and the Rules’ 2020 made
thereunder:-

183. It was further urged that manifest

arbitrariness, a judicially evolved principle
to test the validity of the Act, is to be
applied to examine the validity of the
impugned law namely, the Land Grabbing Act’
2020 as various provisions of the impugned
Act, both procedural and substantial are
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

184. Elaborating this submission, it was argued

that the impugned Act makes every act of Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 an offence, irrespective of
the value of the land allegedly grabbed and
the nature of evil, which is to be looked into
in individual cases, to decide on the gravity
of the offence and the punishment commensurate
to it. The Act' 2020 makes every action
irrespective of the aforesaid factors, a
criminal offence punishable with rigorous
imprisonment. Several provisions of the Act,
which are stated to be manifestly arbitrary,
vague, contrary to the rule of law, hit by

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equality principle and make the Act' 2020

unworkable, which hit at the constitutionality
of the Legislation, as per the contention of
the learned counsel for the petitioners, have
been placed before us. The contention is that
to understand the said aspect, the provisions
of the Act are required to be analyzed
separately.

(i) Section 2(e) of the impugned Act makes

every activity of land grabber to occupy or
attempt to occupy with or without the use of
force, threat, intimidation and deceit, has
been included within the meaning of land
grabbing, while making it a criminal offence
when there is no mens rea, if the above three
situations, namely force, threat, intimidation
and deceit are excluded. The fact that the
activity of the land grabber without the use
of the above, force, threat, intimidation and
deceit, to occupy or attempt to occupy, has
been made a criminal offence, is a reflection
of vagueness and arbitrariness of the statute,
inasmuch as, mens rea is the most important
ingredient of any criminal activity.

(ii) Inclusion of successor-in-interest for

making him liable for the activity of a person
who actually commits the act of land grabbing,

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within the meaning of “Land Grabber” under

Section 2(d), is against the principles of
criminal jurisprudence, inasmuch as, no
criminal liability can be imposed on a person
who occupies land, possession of which has not
been taken by him by adopting illegal means.
The contention is that the person, who has
committed the activity of land grabbing, can
only be held liable for the criminal act done
by him and criminal liability cannot be
fastened on any other person for the act of
another.

(iii) Section 4 while prohibiting the land

grabbing and making it an offence also
includes a person, who continues to be in
occupation of a grabbed land. The factum of
possession of a grabbed land by a person in
occupation cannot be a reason to make him
liable for activity of land grabbing, inasmuch
as, the role played by the person concerned
(in occupation) may be different than the
person who committed the activity of land
grabbing by occupying or attempt to occupy,
with or without the use of force, threat,
intimidation and deceit.

(iv) If these provisions of the Act' 2020 are

read, even a bona fide purchaser of a grabbed

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land can be held to be a land grabber, making

him liable for the offence of land grabbing
with the punishment of imprisonment, which is
grave for a term not less than 10 years.

(v) Section 6 imposes liability on the

Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer
of the company, for the contravention of the
impugned Act, if the offence is committed by
the company. Making the Director or other
officers of the company vicariously guilty of
the offence of land grabbing by deeming
provision, further establishes the vagueness
and far reaching consequences of the impugned
Act, which aspect has not been clarified by
the legislation.

(vi) Section 7 (2) of the impugned Act confers

jurisdiction on the State Government to decide
any question relating to the jurisdiction of
any Special Court, which is contrary to the
principle of separation of power, which is the
basic feature of the Constitution, inasmuch
as, the question of jurisdiction of a Court is
a legal question which can only be decided in
a judicial proceeding. Conferring power on the
State to decide the dispute pertaining to the
question of jurisdiction of the Special Court
by Section 7(2) blurs the distinctive line

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between the judiciary and the executives,

drawn clearly by the Constitution of India.

(vii) Section 9(1) confers suo motu power

on the Special Court to take cognizance of the
cases, for the alleged act of land grabbing
committed whether before or after the
commencement of the Act. The result is that
the Special Court can take cognizance of any
alleged act of land grabbing even committed
prior to commencement of the Act' 2020. Thus,
making the legislation retrospective, meaning
thereby that any activity of land grabbing
committed prior to the commencement of the
impugned Act can be held to be “land grabbing”
within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act,
even though the land grabbing was not an
offence prior to the commencement of the
impugned Act.

(viii) There is flaw in the procedure

prescribed in Section 9(2),(3) and (4) of the
impugned Act, to be followed by the Special
Court. The provisions of Sub-sections (2),(3)
and (4) of Section 9 speak of summary disposal
of both civil and criminal proceedings, as
against the common procedure of law provided
by the Code of Civil Procedure and procedure
of Code of Criminal Procedure. The power given

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to the Special Court for summary disposal of

the civil and criminal proceedings is unguided
and uncanalized and in summary disposal of the
proceedings, there is no provision of public
notice or filing appeal.

(ix) The provisions of the impugned Act are

harsh, inasmuch as, minimum sentence of 10
years has been prescribed for commission of
the offence of land grabbing. Section 9(7)
attaches conclusivity to the finding of the
Special Court and, thus, denying further
remedy of appeal to the aggrieved person. Sub-
section (8) of Section 9 confers powers on the
Special Court to evict a person who is in
possession of the property, once the offence
of land grabbing is proved. Sub-section (9)
provides for compensation in terms of money
for the activity of land grabbing, which shall
not be less than the amount equivalent to the
Jantri value of the land grabbed. Thus,
stringent provisions of sub-section (7), (8)
and (9) of Section 9 providing for the
procedure and powers of the Special Courts are
without any guiding principles.

(x) Liberty granted to the Special Courts to

derive its own procedure in the matter of
determination of civil and criminal liability

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as also the discretion to the Special Court to

not deliver its decision or order until both
civil and criminal proceedings are completed,
is proof of manifest arbitrariness in exercise
of the legislative power of the State.

(xi) Shifting of burden of proof upon the

person against whom the allegations of land
grabbing has been made by virtue of Section 11
of the impugned Act is further proof of
tinkering with the common principles of
criminal law that it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the allegations of the
commission of criminal offence beyond
reasonable doubt.

(xii) Sub-section (2) of Section 11 which

confers the powers on the Special Court to
draw presumption against any person in
possession of movable or immovable property
which cannot be satisfactorily accounted or
disproportionate to his own source of income,
does not have any relation with any of the
provisions of the impugned Act, which makes
the activity of the land grabbing an offence.
No inquiry can be permitted under several
provisions of the Act to ascertain as to
whether the pecuniary resources are
disproportionate to the source of income of a

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person against whom the allegation of the land

grabbing has been made.

(xiii) Section 12 puts a rider on the

registration of the complaint of commission of
an offence under the impugned Act by a police
officer, without the prior approval of the
District Collector in consultation with the
Committee. The effect of this provision is
that a police officer is empowered to refuse
to register the information of commission of a
criminal offence, unless a prior approval is
granted by the District Collector and the
Committee. Deferment of registration of the
complaint or information of commission of a
criminal offence by giving power to the
Executives, the members of the Committee or
the District Collector, to make an inquiry to
examine the correctness of the complaint is
against the provisions of Section 154 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates the
police officer to register an information of
commission of a cognizable criminal offence,
without any inquiry.

(xiv) Section 9 which confers suo motu

powers on the Special Courts to take
cognizance of complaint of commission of
criminal offence is incoherent to the

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provisions of Section 12, which requires a

preliminary inquiry by the Committee when the
information was brought before the police
officer.

(xv) Section 12A which provides for appeal to

the High Court, is the only statutory remedy
to an aggrieved person that too within the
limitation of 30 days from the date of the
judgement or the order. The remedy is only
against the final decision of the Special
Courts and no appeal is provided against the
interim order. The statutory remedy to
aggrieved persons is, thus, illusionary.
Further, in view of the provisions of the
appeal brought by way of an amendment, with
the incorporation of Section 12A, finality
cannot be attached to the judgement of the
Special Courts, as provided in Section 9(7).

(xvi) Section 15 gives overriding effect to

the provisions of the impugned Act against any
decree or order of the Court or any other
Tribunal or authority. It gives overriding
effect to the provisions of the Act over an
agreement arrived at between the parties.
First part of Section 15 giving it overriding
effect against any decree or order of the
Court, is contrary to the principles of

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separation of power. The fact is that a decree

or order passed by a Court of law inter se
parties determining their rights and
liabilities has been nullified. The
supersession of judicial verdict by the
legislature is completely prohibited as it
encroaches upon the principles of separation
of powers between the legislature and the
judiciary.

(xvii) Section 17 makes the Act' 2020

retrospective, inasmuch as, it nullifies any
transaction or alienation of the land grabbed
or any part thereof by way of sale, lease etc.
made even before the commencement of the Act.

(xviii) Rules framed in exercise of powers

under Section 16 of the Act, namely the
Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules,
2020 are having overreaching effect as many of
the provisions therein, go beyond the scope of
the Act itself. Rule 5(2) which confers power
on the Collector or the State Government to
take suo motu cognizance of any allegation of
land grabbing of a Government land, in a case
where the person against whom allegations of
land grabbing are made is a "head strong
person", and proceed for inquiry under sub-
rule (3) to sub-rule (10), goes beyond the

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scope of the Act' 2020, where the power to

take suo motu cognizance and inquiry has been
conferred upon the Special Court only.
Moreover, who can be termed as “Head strong
person” has not been defined in the Act or the
Rules which makes the provision of Rule 5(2)
vague as it confers unbridled power on the
Collector or the State Government to label any
person a “head strong person” to initiate
inquiry against him under Rule 5.

(xix) Rule 5(8) confers jurisdiction upon the

Committee to decide the future course of
action including filing of an FIR on
consideration of the inquiry report drawn as
per Rule 5, which further goes beyond the
provisions of the Section 12(a), conferring
jurisdiction upon the Committee to grant
approval for registration of the First
Information Report on an information received
by a police officer about the commission of an
offence under the impugned Act.

(xx) It was further argued that the

constitution of the Committee defined in
Section 2(a) which has been conferred an
important function to inquire into the
allegations of the land grabbing, has not been
provided in the impugned Act.

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(xxi) Section 12(a) speaks of the Committee

notified by the Government. The power given to
the State Government to constitute a
Committee, which has been conferred important
function of inquiry at the inception stage, on
receipt of the complaint of land grabbing, is
not guided under the impugned enactment. The
constitution of the Committee is a legislative
Act, delegation of the legislative power that
too in an unguided, uncanalized manner makes
the delegation excessive.

(xxii) From a comprehensive reading of various

provisions of the impugned enactment, it is
evident that there is high possibility of
abuse of the process of the Court and the
powers conferred on the executives such as
Committee to make inquiry into the allegations
of complaint of land grabbing.

(xxiii) The manner in which the provisions of

Section 9(5) are constructed giving unbridled
power to the Judge manning the Special Court
to decide as to how and in what manner he will
proceed on the complaint which may result into
imposition of both civil and criminal
liability, shows that it would be easy for the
Judge to proceed according to his own whims
and fancies.

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(xxiv) The law of evidence has also been

tinkered with by the provisions contained in
Section 9(5) which makes the accused of land
grabbing a competent witnesses for the defence
to give evidence in disproof of the charge
made against him in criminal proceedings. The
manner in which Section 9(5) has been worded
for appreciation of evidence adduced in civil
and criminal proceedings, it is against the
settled principles of law of evidence.

(xxv) The fact that the Judge may decide the

order in which the civil and criminal
liability against the land grabber be
initiated, would result in contradictions in
many ways in conclusion of both civil and
criminal proceedings. For proceedings in
criminal trial, accused has a right to remain
silent whereas if civil proceedings starts
first, the accused has to enter into the
witness box and will have to speak. What would
happen to the evidence of the accused recorded
in the civil proceedings?, there is no
guidance in the Act' 2020. The result is that
the evidence recorded in civil matter may
influence or impact the mind of the Judge in
criminal proceedings, if taken later. Further
both civil and criminal proceedings are to be

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conducted by the Specially Designated Courts.

The result is that the same Judge who has
recorded evidence in civil proceedings is
prone to be influenced or impacted by the
evidence adduced in civil matter while
conducting the criminal trial. The quality of
prosecution evidence is compromised in case of
pendency of the criminal matter and civil
proceedings started first, as it would allow
any witness to improvise or change his version
depending upon the statement of the accused in
civil matter where the accused is bound to
speak.

(xxvi) The discretion granted to the Special

Court to keep the judgement pending until both
civil and criminal proceedings are completed,
is contrary to the procedure prescribed in
Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and Order XX, Rule (1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which mandate every Court drawing
criminal or civil proceedings to pronounce the
judgement in the open Court, after hearing is
concluded either at once or as soon as
thereafter, as may be practicable. It is
mandated under both Civil and Criminal Code
that as soon as hearing is completed, the

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pronouncement or delivery of judgement be

made.

With these submissions, it was vehemently

argued that several provisions of the impugned
Act are inextricably linked and cannot be
separated. All provisions noted hereinabove
are taken individually and together would make
the entire Act' 2020 unworkable being hit by
the Principle of equality, rule of law, the
principle of vagueness of the statute and hit
by constitutional provisions. The result is
that the entire Act' 2020 is to be declared
ultra vires.

185. To support the above submissions, reliance has

been placed upon the decisions of the Apex
Court noted as under:-

Sr. Names of the parties Citations

No.
1 Shashikant Laxman Kale andanother 1990(4) SCC 366
vs. Union of India andanother
2 Shayara Bano vs. Union of India 2017(9) SCC 1
and others
3 K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) and 2019(1) SCC 1
Anr. (AADHAAR) vs. Union of India
and another
4 Shreya Singhal vs Union ofIndia 2015 (5) SCC 1
5 Medical Council of India vs. 2019(13) SCC 185
State of Kerala and others
6 Madras Bar Association vs. Union 2022(12) SCC 455
of India

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7 A.N. Parasuraman and others vs. 1989 (4) SCC 683

State of Tamil Nadu
8 Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar 2001(7) SCC 318

186. Mr. Virat Popat, learned advocate adding to

the submissions made by Ms.Megha Jani, noted
hereinabove, would contend that the entire Act
is unconstitutional as certain provisions of
the Act in operation are manifestly arbitrary,
and if they are implemented, they would lead
to arbitrariness, chaotic situation and would
make the Act' 2020 wholly unworkable.

187. Elaborating his submissions, it was urged that

the "land grabbing" is a cognizable offence,
as worked out under the impugned enactment. As
per Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, every information relating to a
cognizable offence, even if given orally to a
police officer in-charge of the police
station, shall have to be reduced in writing
by him and registered necessarily, whereas
under the impugned enactment, Section 12(a),
however, provides a rider in registering
information about the commission of offence
under the impugned Act which is cognizable
offence, by a police officer without the prior
approval of the District Collector in

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consultation with the Committee. The mandate

of the Act' 2020 not to lodge the First
Information Report without prior approval of
the District Collector in consultation with
the Committee is repugnant to Section 154 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Committee
constituted under the Act cannot decide the
fate of the information. The power conferred
on the Committee to make inquiry under the
Rules and to decide further course of action
including filing of the First Information
Report is adjudicatory.

188. As per the decision of the Apex Court in the

case of Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and others38 in the matter of lodging
of the First Information Report of a
cognizable offence, no preliminary inquiry can
be conducted that too by a third agency like a
District Level Committee. It was submitted
that Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 is substantively
a penal law, providing for punishment of
imprisonment. The procedure prescribed in the
Code of Criminal Procedure is to be followed
and no inquiry by a civil authority is
permissible. The investigation at the pre-
cognizance stage cannot be entrusted to the
Executive Committee that too when the Special
38
[(2014) 2 SCC 1] Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others

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Court after taking cognizance only can refer

the matter to the Committee for inquiry.

189. It is further contended that the uncontrolled

power has been given to the Collector in the
matter of making inquiry under the Rule' 2020
and the language of Sub-rule (7) and Sub-rule
(8) of Rule 5, providing the procedure for
making inquiry giving power to the Committee
to decide on the question of any act of Land
Grabbing, the future course of action
including filing an First Information Report
after consideration of the inquiry report, are
exceeding the provisions of the main enactment
and they do not fall within the parameters
within which a Rule framed under an enactment
should work.

190. The further contention is that while making

land grabbing an offence, mens rea is excluded
by the fact that the "successor-in-interest or
successor by inheritance" has also been
included within the meaning of land grabber
defined under Section 2(t) though they cannot
have intention or knowledge of the wrong doing
that constitutes part of the crime, as a
course of the action or conduct of his
predecessor. The basic principle of criminal

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jurisprudence, an important component of

criminal responsibility under the Indian Penal
Code viz. the concept of mens rea, which is
used to determine whether the person can be
held responsible for a criminal act, is
lacking when the successors in interest are
also included within the meaning of land
grabbing. Further the words used in Section
2(e) “ with or without the use of force,
threat, intimidation or deceit”, to define
the activity of land grabbing, by implication
excludes mens rea, the definition of “land
grabber” and “land grabbing” by Sections 2(d)
and 2(e) do not differentiate between civil
and criminal wrong.

191. The words used in Section 2(e) “without any

lawful entitlement” are not clear. Because of
the vagueness in the definition of “land
grabbing” the Act becomes arbitrary. The
constitution of the Act' 2020 and overriding
effect given to Section 15 thereof further
aggravates the situation. Reliance is placed
on the decision of the Apex Court in the case
of Union Of India vs M/S. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt.
Ltd.39 to impress upon us that mens rea is an
essential ingredient of a criminal offence.

39
[(2023) 3 SCC 315] Union Of India vs M/S. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd.

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Mens rea by necessary implication may be

excluded from a statute only when it is
absolutely clear that the implementation of
the object of the statute would otherwise be
defeated. Mere fact that the object of the
statue is to promote welfare activities or to
eradicate grave social evil by itself is not
decisive of the question as to whether the
element of a guilty mind is excluded from the
ingredients of an offence. It is a sound rule
of construction to constitute statutory
provision creating an offence in conformity
with the common law rather than against it,
unless the statute expressly or by necessary
implication excluded mens rea, the standards
of scrutiny on the criminal side and the
burden on the prosecution would be higher. It,
thus, logically follows that with the
exclusion of mens rea in the impugned Act,
the main ingredient of criminal offence, in
the matter of land grabbing, would defeat the
enactment itself, inasmuch as, without proving
the guilty mind being the cause of offence, no
person can be punished for commission of
criminal offence. Mere possession of a land,
to which occupier may not have right, title or
interest by itself, cannot constitute a
criminal offence, without attributing his

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action to his guilty mind.

192. In response to the above noted submissions of

Ms. Megha Jani and Mr. Virat Popat, learned
advocates for the petitioners, it was urged by
Mr. Kamal Trivedi learned Advocate General
that:-

1) The Statement of Objects and Reasons

cannot be utilized to contradict the plain
language of the statute. The fact that no
corresponding provisions in the statue exist,
in furtherance of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the enactment, will not make the
enactment itself as bad.

2) The Statement of Objects and Reasons

cannot be used to scuttle or narrow down the
enactment itself. Reliance is placed on the
decisions in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose
and another vs. Arabinda Bose and another40 and
in the case of Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional
Officer, Thandla and others41 to substantiate
the above submissions. It was contended that
the submissions of Ms. Megha Jani, based on
the decisions of the Apex Court in carving out
difference between “law and order situation”

40
[AIR 1952 SC 369] Aswini Kumar Ghose and another vs. Arabinda Bose
41
[(2003) 1 SCC 692] Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla

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and “situation affecting public at large or

public order” have no relevance in the facts
of the instant case, inasmuch as, there is no
provision in the impugned enactment to make
public order an offence.

3) On the issue of violation of Article 14 of

the Constitution of India, that different
classes of lands are treated as equal, it was
argued that the main objective of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 is to prohibit land
grabbing activities and, therefore, the Act
speaks of only one single clause of “grabbed
land”. The allegations of commission of
offence of land grabbing are to be seen with
respect to that class, namely “grabbed land”
only. There cannot be any further sub-
classification like “private land” and
“Government land” and distinction between land
grabber, on the basis of size of the land is
impermissible. On the aforesaid grounds “the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020” cannot be said to be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, so long as the aforesaid broad
classification “grabbed land” has nexus with
the object, which is prohibition of land
grabbing activities, sought to be achieved by
the Act.

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193. With the aid of decisions of the Apex Court in

the case of M/s. Prag Ice & Oil Mills and
another vs. Union of India42 and in the case of
Parivar Seva Sanstha vs. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation43, it was argued that even though
the classification of “grabbed land” may be
over-inclusive classification, while treating
unequals and equals, it cannot be held
discriminatory unless it is demonstrated that
there is hostile discrimination. It was, thus,
contended that the judgements relied by the
learned counsels for the petitioners to assail
the validity of the Act on the plea of
discrimination, over-inclusive classification,
by inclusion of both private land and
Government land in one class of “grabbed land’
are of no benefit.

194. Lastly, the decisions relied upon by Ms. Megha

Jani to substantiate that the Act is
unworkable, harsh, discriminatory and
manifestly arbitrary have been sought to be
distinguished with the assertion that the
ratio of the said decisions are not attracted
in the instant case.

42
[(1978) 3 SCC 459] M/s. Prag Ice & Oil Mills and another vs. Union of India
43
[2022 SC OnLine SC 1622] Parivar Seva Sanstha vs. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation

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(B) ANALYSIS

(a) General Principles of testing the

Constitutionality of an Enactment

195. Dealing with the above contentions, we find it

appropriate to first appreciate as to what
should be the approach of the Court, while
examining the challenge to the
constitutionality of an enactment. The
fundamental principle to be kept in mind is to
start with the presumption of
constitutionality. The Court should try to
sustain the validity of a statute to the
extent possible. It should strike down the
enactment only when it is possible to sustain
it. The Court should not approach the
enactment with a view to pick holes or to
search for defects of drafting, much less
inexactitude of the language employed. Any
such defect of drafting, if appears, a Judge
should iron it out as part of the attempt to
sustain the validity/constitutionality of the
enactment. The reason being that the Act made
by the Legislature represents the will of the
people and that cannot be interfered with.
Unconstitutionality must be plainly and
clearly established before an enactment is
declared as void. [Ref.: State of Bihar and

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others vs Bihar Distillery Ltd and others44].

196. In the words of Lord Denning in Seaford Court

Estates Ltd. v. Asher45], a purposive approach
to the interpretation of a word used in a
statute requires that:-

“a Judge must not alter the material of

which the Act is woven, but he can and
should iron out creases”.
(emphasis supplied)

197. It is a well known rule of interpretation of

statutes that the text and context of the
entire Act must be looked into while
interpreting any of the expressions used in a
statute. The Courts must look to the object
which the statute seeks to achieve while
interpreting any of the provisions of the Act.
A purposive approach for interpreting the Act
is necessary. While dealing with the question
of interpretation of statute, the Apex Court
in the case of Reserve Bank of India v.
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.
Ltd.46 observed in Paragraph No.”13” as under:-

"Interpretation must depend on the text

and the context. They are the bases of
interpretation. One may well say if the
44
[1997(2) SCC 453] State of Bihar and others vs Bihar Distillery Ltd
45
[1949J 2 All ER 155, 164 (CA)] Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher

46
[(1987) 1 SCC 424] Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Ltd.

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text is the texture, context is what

gives the colour. Neither can be ignored.
Both are important. That interpretation
is best which makes the textual
interpretation match the contextual. A
statute is best interpreted when we know
why it was enacted. With this knowledge,
the statute must be read, first as a
whole and then section by section, clause
by clause, phrase by phrase and word by
word. If a statute is looked at, in the
context of its enactment, with the
glasses of the statutemaker, provided by
such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take
colour and appear different than when the
statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these
glasses we must look at the Act as a
whole and discover what each section,
each clause, each phrase and each word is
meant and designed to say as to fit into
the scheme of the entire Act. No part of
a statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. Statutes have to
be construed so that every word has a
place and everything is in its place."

198. It is a well settled proposition of law of

statutory interpretation that to save a
statutory provision from the vice of
unconstitutionality, extended interpretation
of the statute has to be given. This is
because it is a well settled principle of
interpretation that the Court should make
every effort to save a statute from being
unconstitutional. If on giving one

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interpretation a statute becomes

unconstitutional and on another
interpretation, it will be constitutional,
then the Court should prefer the latter on the
ground that the Legislature is not intended to
have crossed its jurisdiction. Sometimes to
uphold the constitutional validity, the
statutory provision has to be read down [Ref:
M. Rathinaswami and others vs. State of Tamil
Nadu and others47].

199. In interpreting a statue the Court must adopt

that construction which suppresses the
mischief and advances the remedy. This is a
rule laid down in Heydon's Case48 also known as
rule of purposive construction or mischief
rule [Ref: D. Vinod Shivappa vs Nanda
Belliappa]. The Court may not only take into
consideration the purpose for which the
statute was enacted, but also the mischief it
seeks to suppress. It is this mischief rule,
first propounded in Heydon’s Case48 which
became the historical source of purposive
interpretation. The Court should avoid the
construction which would reduce the
legislation to futility and should accept the
bolder construction based on the view that

47
48 M. Rathinaswami and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [(2009) 5 SCC 625]
[(1584) 76 ER 637] Heydon's Case

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legislature would legislate only for the

purpose of bringing about an effective result.

200. We may also take note of the wise words of

Justice S. Mukherjee speaking for the Bench in
the case of Atma Ram Mittal vs Ishwar Singh
Punla49 as under:-

“9. Judicial time and energy is more often

than not consumed in finding what is the
intention of the Parliament or in other wards,
the will of the people. Blackstone tells us
that the fairest and most rational method to
interpret the will of the legislator is by
exploring his intentions at PG NO 535 the time
when the law was made, by signs most natural
and probable. And these signs are either the
words, the context, the subject matter, the
effects and consequence, or the spirit and
reason of the law. (Underlined by the Court).
See Commentaries on the Laws of England
(facsimile of lst edition of 1765, University
of Chicago Press, 1979 Vol. 1, p. 59).
Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief justice
then was, in Poppatlal Shah v. State of
Madras, [1953] SCR 677 said that each word,
phrase or sentence was to be construed in the
light of purpose of the Act itself. But words
must be construed with imagination of purpose
behind the said Judge Learned Hand, long time
ago. It appears, therefore, that though we are
concerned with seeking of intention, we are
rather looking to the meaning of the words
that the legislator has used and the true
meaning of what words as was said by Lord Reid
in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v.
Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A G, [1975]
Appeal Cases 591 at 613...”
49
[(1988) 4 SCC 284] Atma Ram Mittal vs Ishwar Singh Punla

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(b) Analysing the Statement of Objects and Reasons

of the Act' 2020

201. In light of the above, when we read the

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020, from the language employed
therein, the social conditions which give rise
to the enactment and of the mischief which it
seeks to remedy, can be clearly discerned as
we set to work on the constructive task of
finding the intention of the Parliament, from
the reading of the statute as a whole, section
by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase
and word by word. Looking in the context of
the enactment, it can be said that the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020 seeks to remedy the
mischief of certain unscrupulous persons, in
occupying or attempt to occupy lands to which
they have no right, title or interest or take
possession without any lawful entitlement.
Consideration of the social condition which
gave rise to the impugned enactment are
clearly narrated in the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 :-

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

It has come to the notice of the Government

that there are attempts on the part of certain
lawless persons operating individually or in
groups to grab either by force, or by deceit
or otherwise lands belonging to the

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Government, a local authority, a religious or

charitable institution or endowment as well as
private individuals. The land grabbers are
setting up fictitious claims and indulging in
large scale and fraudulent sales of land
through unscrupulous real estate dealers or
otherwise. As public order is adversely
affected by such unlawful activities of land
grabbers in the State.

Hence, the State Government of Gujarat with a

view to prohibiting the activities of land
grabbing and to provide for matters connected
therewith has proposed to bring the Gujarat
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020 in
force. Apart from declaring land grabbing as
unlawful, the State Government proposes to
prohibit land grabbing. Therefore, it is
proposed to provide for penalty for offences
in connection with land grabbing to
effectively implement this Act and for the
purpose of providing speedy enquiry into an
alleged act of land grabbing and trial of
cases in respect of the ownership and title
to, or lawful possession of the land grabbed
by constituting a Special Court. It is felt
that the State Government shall be able to
curb the illegal land grabbing by enforcing
the proposed legislation.”

202. We are conscious of the principle that the

Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying
a Bill, cannot be used to determine the true
meaning and effect of substantive provisions
of the statute. They cannot be used except for
limited purpose of understanding the
background and the antecedent state of affairs

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leading up to the legislation and for this

reason only, for the limited purpose of
understanding the reasons which induced the
mover to introduce the Bill in the House and
the object it sought to achieve, we have noted
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, hereinbefore. A
reading of the same indicates that with a view
to prohibit the activities of land grabbing,
the State Government proposed to bring a law
not only declaring the land grabbing unlawful,
but to provide for penalty for offences in
connection with land grabbing to effectively
implement the Act. It is stated therein that
it has come to the notice of the State
Government that attempts were being made by
certain lawless persons operating individually
or in groups to grab lands belonging to the
Government, local authority, religious or
charitable institutions as well as private
individuals, by setting up fictitious claims
and indulging in large-scale and fraudulent
sales of such lands through unscrupulous real
estate dealers or otherwise.

203. The need felt by the State Government to bring

a law to curb the illegal act of land grabbing
is guided by the social conditions prevailing
at the time of bringing the enactment.

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204. Understanding the Objects and Reasons of

bringing the enactment, we shall now deal with
the contentions of Ms. Megha Jani as noted
herein-before, one by one.

(i) The first contention is that the Statement

of Objects and Reasons of the Land Grabbing
Act’ 2020 shows that the Act is aimed at
securing “public order”, meaning thereby, the
Legislature intended to make the land grabbing
an offence only because it resulted into
“disturbance of public order”. However, while
prohibiting the land grabbing and making it an
offence under section 4(1) and (2) of the Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020, the distinction as was
sought to be drawn by the legislature while
bringing the Bill got blurred.

(ii) Secondly, private land and Government land

are equated while making offence of land
grabbing punishable in both categories. The
main object of bringing the legislation,
namely Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 to maintain the
public order by curbing the activities of land
grabbing, has lost nexus with the impugned
enactment. Two separate classes of lands are
treated as equals without any rationale.
Applying the mischief rules, it was argued
that the mischief which the Act' 2020 seeks to

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address is “disturbance of public order”, the

degree of which is higher than the disturbance
caused by such activity which only amounts to
“breach of law and order”. By no stretch of
imagination, the activity of any person or
group of persons occupying private person's
land can be said to have adversely affected
the maintenance of the public order.

205. These submissions also noted in detail

hereinbefore, are based on the reading of the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act'
2020 where it is stated that as public order
is adversely affected by unlawful activities
of land grabbers in the State, the State
Government, with a view to prohibiting the
activities of land grabbing and to provide for
matters connected therewith, has proposed to
bring the legislation.

206. To deal with the above contentions, suffice it

to note that the Statement of Objects and
Reasons appended to the Bill has been ruled
out as an aid to the construction of the
statute. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
cannot be utilized for the purpose of
reconstructing and controlling the plain
meaning of the language employed by the
legislature, in contravening a statute and

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excluding from its portion, such transactions,

which it plainly covers. The Statement of
Objects and Reasons cannot be used for the
purpose of construing any part of the
enactment or of ascertaining the meaning of
any word used in the Act. Reference to the
Statement of Objects and Reasons is
permissible, however, for understanding the
background, the antecedent state of affairs,
the surrounding circumstances in relation to
the statute, and the evil which the statue
sought to remedy. As noted hereinbefore, the
Courts can, by ascertaining the legislative
intent, place such construction on a statute
as would advance its purpose and object. [Ref:
The State of West Bengal vs Subodh Gopal Bose
and others50; Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional
Officer, Thandla51]

207. We would also like to note the observations of

the Apex Court in the case of Aswini Kumar
Ghose40 as under:-

“32. As regards the propriety of the reference

to the statement of objects and reasons, it
must be remembered that it seeks only to
explain what reasons induced the mover to
introduce the Bill in the House and what
objects he sought to achieve. But those
objects and reasons may or may not correspond
50
(AIR 1954 SC 92) The State of West Bengal vs Subodh Gopal Bose and others
51
[(2003) 1 SCC 692] Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and others

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to the objective which the majority of members

had in view when they passed it into law. The
Bill may have undergone radical changes during
its passage through the House or Houses, and
there is no guarantee that the reasons which
led to its introduction and the objects
thereby sought to be achieved have remained
the same throughout till the Bill emerges from
the House as an Act of the Legislature for
they do not form part,of the Bill and are not
voted upon by the members. We, therefore,
consider that the statement of objects and
reasons appended to the Bill should be, ruled
out as an aid to the construction of a
statute.”

208. In view of the above arguments of Ms. Megha

Jani, the learned counsel for the petitioners
based on the language of the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the statute to assail
the validity or constitutionality of the
statute, found to be devoid of substance. The
contention that since the occupation of
private land or any activity of the land
grabbing relating to private land cannot
amount to breach of public order, and making
such activity a criminal offence by the
impugned enactment is proof of manifest
arbitrariness, is liable to be turned down.

(c) Dealing with the plea of violation of Article 14 by

treating unequals as equals

209. Dealing with the contention that treating

offenders against public land and private land

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as equals makes the law palpably arbitrary,

the discrimination alleged by the petitioners
by treating unequals as equals, we may take
note of the doctrine of equality before law
guaranteed under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.

210. The essence of rule of law is to preclude

arbitrary action. Equality before law is one
of the features of the rule of law. The State
in the exercise of its dominion power has to
necessitate to make laws operating differently
on different groups or classes of persons
within its territory. To attend particular
needs to giving effect to its policies, it
must possess for that purpose large powers to
distinguishing and classifying persons or
things to be subjected to such laws. The
principle underlining the guarantee of Article
14 is that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike both in privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws
would have to be applied to all in same
situation, and there should be no
discrimination between one person and another
if as regards the subject matter of the
legislation their position is substantially
the same. The law can make and set apart the

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classes, according to the needs and exigencies

of the society and as suggested by experience.
It can recognize even degree of evil, but the
classification, should never be arbitrary,
artificial or evasive.

211. To pass the test, two conditions must be

fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification
must be founded on a intelligible differentia
which distinguishes those that are grouped
together from others and (ii) that,
differentia must have a rational relation to
the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
The differentia which is the basis of the
classification and the object of the Act are
distinct things and what is necessary is that
there must be a nexus between them. The
classification necessary implies making of
distinction or discrimination between persons
classified and those who are not members of
that class. It is the essence of a
classification that the class segregated are
cast duties and burdens different from those
resting upon the general public. Indeed, the
very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality,in no manner,
determines the matter of constitutionality.

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212. The underlying principle is that while Article

14 forbids class discrimination by conferring
privileges or imposing liabilities upon person
arbitrarily selected out of a large number of
other persons similarly situated in relation
to the privileges sought to be conferred or
the liabilities proposed to be imposed, it
does not forbid classification for the purpose
of legislation, provided such classification
is not arbitrary in the sense above mentioned.
Classification is justified if it is not
palpably arbitrary, and need not be
constituted by exact or scientific exclusion
or inclusion of persons or things. The Courts
should not insist on delusive exactness or
apply doctrinaire tests for determining the
validity of classification in any given case.
This principle propounded in the decision The
Special Court Bill, 197852] and has been noted
with the approval in Shashikant Laxman Kale37.

213. The contention of Ms. Megha Jani, learned

counsel for the petitioners is that the same
principles and the test would apply when two
persons who are not members of the same class
are treated as equals and brought under the
umbrella of one law. The prohibition of “land
grabbing” and making it an offence by the
52
[(1979) 2 S.C.R. 476] The Special Court Bill, 1978

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impugned Act' 2020 may have a rational with

the object to curb the land grabbing
activities of certain lawless persons in
groups or unscrupulous real estate dealers,
which are leading to adversely affect public
order in the State, but bringing private
disputes relating to title and ownership to,
or lawful possession of any land by and
between individuals, private persons, cannot
have any nexus with the object, the Act' 2020
seeks to achieve.

214. It was urged that the activities of groups or

individuals occupying the Government land may
give rise to an adverse situation of public
order but no such situation can be conceived
when the allegations of land grabbing are for
a small piece of land where the issues such as
lawful title, bona fide purchases,
regularization of occupation and compensation
for eviction of persons with respect to the
lands occupied by them would arise. Under the
garb of prevention of land grabbing, such a
sweeping provisions cannot be enacted which
targets every resident of the State as a
suspicious person. Under the impugned law,
mere allegation of land grabbing is sufficient
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special

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Courts. The successors-in-interest have been

termed as land grabber by including them in
the definition of land grabber under Section
2(d) of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020. The
impugned law has a delirious effect on the
people of the State occupying small piece of
land for a long time irrespective of the value
of the land and nature of the evil or gravity
of the offence. The Act though aimed at
addressing the mischief of “adverse effect on
public order” or disturbance of public order
by unlawful activities of land grabbers in the
State”, but brought everyone, even a private
individual into the umbrella of the Act,
causing burden upon him to prove his title and
ownership or lawful possession of the occupied
land, makes it arbitrary. The principles of
manifest arbitrariness propounded by the Apex
Court in Shayara Bano33 have been pressed into
service to assert that the issue whether the
law can be declared unconstitutional on the
ground of arbitrariness has received therein.

215. The observations in paragraph Nos. ‘45’ to

‘52’ of the said decision has been read over
to urge that the objects and reasons of
Statute through law on the background in which
the statute was enacted. While making inquiry

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it should first be ascertained what the

enacting part of Section provides on fair
construction of words used according to their
natural and ordinary meaning. On a fair
construction of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, implying natural and ordinary meaning
of the words used therein makes clear the
intention of the Legislature that the statute
was enacted essentially to maintain public
order by curbing the land grabbing activity in
the State.

216. To understand the historical development of

the doctrine of arbitrariness and its
application to State action, as a distinct
doctrine, on which State action may be struck
down as being violative of the rule of law
contained in Article 14, as noticed by the
Rohinton Fali Nariman, J (as he then was) in
Shayara Bano33, it would be expedient to
reproduce paragraphs No.’67’, ‘68’, ‘69’ and
‘101’ as under:-

“67. We now come to the development of the

doctrine of arbitrariness and its application
to State action as a distinct doctrine on
which State action may be struck down as being
violative of the rule of law contained in
Article 14 .In a significant passage Bhagwati,
J., in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4
SCC 3 stated (at page 38):

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“85. The last two grounds of challenge may

be taken up together for consideration.
Though we have formulated the third ground
of challenge as a distinct and separate
ground, it is really in substance and
effect merely an aspect of the second
ground based on violation of Article 14
and 16. Article 16 embodies the
fundamental guarantee that there shall be
equality of opportunity for all citizens
in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the State.
Though enacted as a distinct and
independent fundamental right because of
its great importance as a principle
ensuring equality of opportunity in public
employment which is so vital to the
building up of the new classless
egalitarian society envisaged in the
Constitution, Article 16 is only an
instance of the application of the concept
of equality enshrined in Article 14. In
other words, Article 14 is the genus while
Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives
effect to the doctrine of equality in all
matters relating to public employment. The
basic principle which, therefore, informs
both Articles 14 and 16 is equality and
inhibition against discrimination. Now,
what is the content and reach of this
great equalising principle? It is a
founding faith, to use the words of Bose.
J., “a way of life”, and it must not be
subjected to a narrow pedantic or
lexicographic approach. We cannot
countenance any attempt to truncate its
all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do
so would be to violate its activist
magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept
with many aspects and dimensions and it
cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined”
within traditional and doctrinaire limits.

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From a positivistic point of view,

equality is antithetic to arbitrariness.
In fact equality and arbitrariness are
sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of
law in a republic while the other, to the
whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit
in it that it is unequal both according to
political logic and constitutional law and
is therefore violative of Article 14, and
if it effects any matter relating to
public employment, it is also violative
of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike
at arbitrariness in State action and
ensure fairness and equality of treatment.
They require that State action must be
based on valid relevant principles
applicable alike to all similarly situate
and it must not be guided by any
extraneous or irrelevant considerations
because that would be denial of equality.
Where the operative reason for State
action, as distinguished from motive
inducing from the antechamber of the mind,
is not legitimate and relevant but is
extraneous and outside the area of
permissible considerations, it would
amount to mala fide exercise of power and
that is hit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala
fide exercise of power and arbitrariness
are different lethal radiations emanating
from the same vice: in fact the latter
comprehends the former. Both are inhibited
by Articles 14 and 16.” [Emphasis
Supplied]”

68. This was further fleshed out in Maneka

Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248,
where, after stating that various fundamental
rights must be read together and must overlap
and fertilize each other, Bhagwati, J.,

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further amplified this doctrine as follows (at

pages 283-284):
“The nature and requirement of the
procedure under Article 21
7. Now, the question immediately arises as
to what is the requirement of Article
14:what is the content and reach of the
great equalising principle enunciated in
this article? There can be no doubt that
it is a founding faith of the
Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on
which rests securely the foundation of our
democratic republic. And, therefore, it
must not be subjected to a narrow,
pedantic or lexicographic approach. No
attempt should be made to truncate its
all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do
so would be to violate its activist
magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept
with many aspects and dimensions and it
cannot be imprisoned within traditional
and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate
here what was pointed out by the majority
in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974)
4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1974) 2
SCR 348] namely, that
“85….from a positivist point of view,
equality is antithetic to arbitrariness.
In fact equality and arbitrariness are
sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of
law in a republic, while the other, to the
whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit
in it that it is unequal both according to
political logic and constitutional law and
is therefore violative of Article 14”.

Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State

action and ensures fairness and equality of
treatment. The principle of reasonableness,
which legally as well as philosophically, is

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an essential element of equality or non-

arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a
brooding omnipresence and the procedure
contemplated by Article 21 must answer the
test of reasonableness in order to be in
conformity with Article 14. It must be “right
and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful
or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no
procedure at all and the requirement of
Article 21 would not be satisfied.”
[Emphasis Supplied]

69. This was further clarified in A.L. Kalra

v. Project and Equipment Corpn., (1984) 3 SCC
316, following Royappa (supra) and holding that
arbitrariness is a doctrine distinct from
discrimination. It was held:

“19… It
thus appears well-settled that
Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in
executive/administrative action because
any action that is arbitrary must
necessarily involve the negation of
equality. One need not confine the denial
of equality to a comparative evaluation
between two persons to arrive at a
conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An
action per se arbitrary itself denies
equal of (sic) protection by law. The
Constitution Bench pertinently observed in
Ajay Hasia case [(1981) 1 SCC 722: 1981
SCC (L&S) 258: AIR 1981 SC 487: (1981) 2
SCR 79:
(1981) 1 LLJ 103] and put the matter
beyond controversy when it said “wherever
therefore, there is arbitrariness in State
action whether it be of the Legislature or
of the executive or of an ‘authority’
under Article 12, Article 14 immediately
springs into action and strikes down such
State action”. This view was further

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elaborated and affirmed in D.S. Nakara v.

Union of India [(1983) 1 SCC 305: 1983 SCC
(L&S) 145: AIR 1983 SC 130: (1983) UPSC
263].
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1
SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597: (1978) 2 SCR 621] it
was observed that Article 14 strikes at
arbitrariness in State action and ensures
fairness and equality of treatment. It is thus
too late in the day to contend that an
executive action shown to be arbitrary is not
either judicially reviewable or within the
reach of Article 14.” (at page 328) The same
view was reiterated in Babita Prasad v. State
of Bihar, (1993) Suppl. 3 SCC 268 at 285, at
paragraph 31.”
xxx xxx xxx
"101. It will be noticed that a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian
Express Newspapers vs. Union of India, (1985)
1 SCC 641, stated that it was settled law that
subordinate legislation can be challenged on
any of the grounds available for challenge
against plenary legislation. This being the
case, there is no rational distinction between
the two types of legislation when it comes to
this ground of challenge under Article 14. The
test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as
laid down in the aforesaid judgments would
apply to invalidate legislation as well as
subordinate legislation under Article 14.
Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be
something done by the legislature
capriciously, irrationally and/or without
adequate determining principle. Also, when
something is done which is excessive and
disproportionate, such legislation would be
manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of
the view that arbitrariness in the sense of
manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us

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above would apply to negate legislation as

well under Article 14.
The same view was reiterated in Babita Prasad
vs.State of Bihar, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 268.”

217. The Apex Court in Shayara Bano33 propounded

that that the thread of reasonableness runs
through the entire fundamental rights chapter.
What is manifestly arbitrary is obviously
unreasonable and being contrary to the rule of
law, would violate Article 14. The
arbitrariness doctrine contained in Article 14
would apply to negate legislation, subordinate
legislation and executive action, which are
from the principles propounded in the earlier
decision of the Apex Court in the case of E.
P. Royappa vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr 53,
considered therein. It was observed in
paragraph Nos.’87’ as under:-

“87. The thread of reasonableness runs through

the entire fundamental rights Chapter. What is
manifestly arbitrary is obviously unreasonable
and being contrary to the rule of law, would
violate Article 14. Further, there is an
apparent contradiction in the three Judges’
Bench decision in McDowell (supra) when it is
said that a constitutional challenge can
succeed on the ground that a law is
“disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable”,
yet such challenge would fail on the very
ground of the law being “unreasonable,
unnecessary or unwarranted”. The arbitrariness
53
[1974 (4) SCC 3] E.P. Royappa vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr

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doctrine when applied to legislation obviously

would not involve the latter challenge but
would only involve a law being
disproportionate, excessive or otherwise being
manifestly unreasonable. All the aforesaid
grounds, therefore, do not seek to
differentiate between State action in its
various forms, all of which are interdicted if
they fall foul of the fundamental rights
guaranteed to persons and citizens in Part III
of the Constitution.”

[Ref: Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi 54;

Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International
55
Airport Authority of India ; Maneka Gandhi vs.
Union of India56; Mohd. Arif vs. Supreme Court
of India57]

218. Equality before law, guaranteed by the first

part of Article 14, is a negative concept,
while the second part is positive concept.
Article 14 frowns upon what constitutes
hostile discrimination, but does not bar
classification which is reasonable. To answer
whether the classification is reasonable, one
must look beyond the classification to the
purpose of law. A reasonable classification is
one which includes all persons, who are
similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of law. The purpose of law may be
either elimination of public mischief or
54
[(1981) 1 SCC 722] Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi
55
[(1979) 3 SCC 489] Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of
India
56
[(1983) 1 SCC 305] Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India
57
[(2014) 9 SCC 737] Mohd. Arif vs. Supreme Court of India

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achievement of some positive public good. In

the case of Shashikant Laxman Kale37, the Apex
Court has taken note of the decisions in P.M.
Ashwathanarayana Setty & Ors. Etc. vs State Of
Karnataka & Ors58; Federation Of Hotel &
Restaurant Association of India vs. Union Of
India & Ors59, to note as under:-

“10.The scope for permissible classification

in a taxing statute was once again considered
in a recent decision. of this Court in P.H.
Ashwathanarayana v. State of Karnataka, [1989]
Suppl. 1 SCC 696. After a review of earlier
decisions, it was stated therein as under:

"It is for the State to decide what

economic and social policy it should
pursue and what discriminations advance
those social and economic policies. In
view of the inherent complexity of these
fiscal adjustments, courts give a larger
discretion to the legislature in the
matter of its preferences of economic and
social policies and effectuate the chosen
system in all possible and reasonable ways
..... "

11. This Court has held in Kerala Hotel and

Restaurant Association & Ors. v. State of
Kerala & Ors. [A.I.R. 1990 SC 913] as under:

"The scope for classification permitted in

taxation is greater and unless the
classification made can be termed to be
palpably arbitrary, it must be left to the

58
[1989 SCC (Supp) 1 696] P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty & Ors. Etc. vs State Of
Karnataka & Ors
59
[(1989) 3 SCC 634] Federation Of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India vs. Union
Of India & Ors,

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legislative wisdom to choose the yardstick

for classification, in the background of
the fiscal policy of the State to promote
economic equality as well .....' "Thus,
it is clear that the test applicable for
striking down a taxing provision on this
ground is one of palpable arbitrariness
applied in the context of the felt needs
of the times and societal exigencies
informed by experience, and the courts
should not interfere with the legislative
wisdom of making the classification unless
the classification is found to be invalid
by this test."
(emphasis supplied)

219. In State Of Gujarat and Anr. vs Shri Ambica

Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad60, the Apex Court
elucidated and explained the distinction
between underinclusive and overinclusive
classification. The classification is
underinclusive when the State benefits or
burdens persons in a manner that furthers the
legitimate purpose but does not confer the
same benefit or place the same burden on
others who are similarly situated and
classification is over-inclusive when it
includes not only those who are similarly
situated with respect to the purpose, but
others who are not so situated as well. In
other words, this type of classification
imposes a burden upon a wider range of

60
[(1974) 4 SCC 656] The State Of Gujarat and Anr. vs Shri Ambica Mills Ltd.,
Ahmedabad

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individuals that are included in the class of

those attended with mischief at which the law
aims. "Herod ordering the death of all male
children born on a particular day because one
of them would sonic day bring about his
downfall employed such a classification".

220. While dealing with the question of the

classification being underinclusive, it was
noted therein that if the law presumably hits
the evil where it is most felt, it is not to
be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied.
The legislature is free to recognize the
degree of harm and it may confine the
restrictions to those classes of cases where
the need seemed to be clearest. Article 14
does not require every regulatory statute
applied to all in the same business “ where
size is index to the evil at which the law is
directed”, discrimination between the large
and the small are permissible, and it is also
permissible for reform to take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind. The legislative authority
acting within its field is not bound to extend
its regulation to all classes which it might

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possibly reach. The legislature is free to

recognize the degree of harm and it may
confine the restrictions to those classes of
cases where the need seemed to be clearest.
It is impossible to tell how successful a
particular approach may be, what dislocation
might occur, what evasions might develop and
what new evils might be generated in the
attempt.

221. The test is that there is a reasonable

classification because it has a rational
relationship to the object sought to be
achieved. It is settled that mere assertion of
transgression of equality doctrine enshrined
in Article 14 cannot be a ground to hold a
legislative enactment invalid. As held by the
Apex Court in Shayara Bano33, the test of
manifest arbitrariness is that there must be
something done by the legislature
capriciously, irrationally and/or without
adequately determining the principle as also
when something is done which is excessive and
disproportionate, such legislation would be
manifestly arbitrary.

222. The principle of arbitrariness in the sense of

manifest arbitrariness which would apply to
make a legislation invalid under Article 14,

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has to be applied to the case at hand to

understand as to whether the impugned
legislation suffers from vice of being
excessive, disproportionate, capricious,
irrational and without adequately determining
the principle of law, as asserted by the
learned counsel for the petitioners.

223. However, before doing so, we would like to

refer to three decisions of the Apex Court
pertaining to the interpretation of the
provisions of the Andra Pradesh Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short as “the A.P.
Act”).

(d) Taking aid of the decisions of the Apex Court

pertaining to Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing Act,
1982

224. We may note that in the decisions referred

hereinafter, there were no challenge to the
validity of the A.P. Act’ 1982. However, the
Apex Court has gone into the details of the
construction and scope of various Sections of
the A.P. Act, which are pari materia to The
Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020.

225. The first decision in this line is in the case

of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs Government of

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A.P. and others61, wherein the challenge was to

the judgement of the High Court upholding the
order of the Special Court in A.P. Act. Three
questions were decided by the Special Court in
a proceeding under the A.P. Act which were
noted by the Apex Court in the aforesaid
decision as under:-

“(1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to

entertain the suit as it raises bona fide
dispute of title?

(2) Whether the respondent perfected title by

adverse possession?

(3) Whether the respondent is a land grabber

within the meaning of the Act?"

226. The provisions of Sections 7 to 10 of the A.P.

Act noted therein are pari materia pertaining
to constitution of Special Courts, procedure
and powers of Special Courts, Special Courts
to have the powers of the Civil Court and the
Court of Sessions, as also the burden of proof
as contained in Sections 7, 9(1), 9(2),9(3),
9(4), 9(5), 10 and 11 of the Gujarat Land
Grabbing Act' 2020.

227. By reading of the provisions pertaining to the

procedure and power of the Special Court
therein under Section 8(1) of the A.P.Act, as

61
[(2002) 3 SCC 258] Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs Government of A.P.

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also Section 15, which contained non-obstante

clause giving overriding effect to the
enactment in case of inconsistency therewith
in any other law for the time being in force,
or custom, usage or agreement or decree or
order of a Court or any tribunal or authority,
it was held by the Apex Court that:-

“A combined reading of these provisions leads

to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of
Civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and under the Civil Courts Act
is ousted and the Act which is special law
will prevail and as such the Special Court
will have jurisdiction in respect of the
matters dealt with thereunder. [See :Sanwarmal
Kejriwal vs. Vishwa Cooperative Housing
Society Ltd. & Ors.[1990 (2) SCC 288].”

228. It was held that a Special Court is having all

the trappings of a Civil Court and also a
Criminal Court having powers of the Court of
Sessions to which the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal
Procedure apply. The Special Court can take
cognizance of and try every case arising out
of any alleged act of land grabbing or with
respect to the ownership and title to, or
lawful possession of, the land grabbed and
determine the ownership, title to, or lawful
possession of the land alleged to have been
grabbed whose decision will be binding on all

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the persons interested. Mere allegation of

land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Special Court either suo
motu or on application by any person including
any officer of authority. The meaning of “land
grabbing” and “land grabber” which are pari
materia to the Gujarat Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2020 were noted and
discussed in Paragraph Nos. ’28 to 39’ as
under:-

“28. Now, adverting to the remaining two

contentions, it is important to note that
under the Act "land grabbing" is not only an
actionable wrong but also an offence and a
"land grabber" is an offender punishable
thereunder. The definitions of the expressions
"land grabber" and "land grabbing", in clauses
(d) and (e), respectively, of Section 2 of the
Act, apply to both civil and criminal
proceedings. It is, therefore, essential to
construe the definitions of the said
expressions strictly. We shall first examine
the relevant provisions of the Act and then
the case set up by the first respondent
against the appellant before the Special Court
to describe him as a land grabber.

29.Clauses (d) and (e) of Section 2 of the Act

may be quoted here :

"2. Definitions : - In this Act, unless

the context otherwise requires, –

(a)-(cc)xxx xxx xxx

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(d) "land grabber" means a person or a

group of persons who commits land grabbing
and includes any person who gives
financial aid to any person for taking
illegal possession of lands or for
construction of unauthorised structures
thereon, or who collects or attempts to
collect from any occupiers of such lands
rent, compensation and other charges by
criminal intimidation, or who abets the
doing of any of the above mentioned acts;
and also includes the successors in
interest;

(e) "land grabbing" means every activity

of grabbing of any land (whether belonging
to the Government, a local authority, a
religious or charitable institution or
endowment, including a wakf, or any other
private person) by a person or a group of
persons, without any lawful entitlement
and with a view to illegally taking
possession of such lands, or enter into or
create illegal tenancies or lease and
licences agreements or any other illegal
agreements in respect of such lands, or to
construct unauthorised structures thereon
for sale or hire, or give such lands to
any person on rental or lease and licence
basis for construction, or use and
occupation, of unauthorised structures;
and the terms "to grab land" shall be
construed accordingly;

30. A perusal of clause (d) shows that the

expression "land grabber" takes in its fold :
(1) a person or a group of persons who commits
land grabbing; (2) a person who gives
financial aid to any person for - (a) taking
illegal possession of the lands, or (b)
construction of unauthorised structures
thereon; (3) a person who collects or attempts

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to collect from any occupiers of such lands

rent, compensation and other charges by
criminal intimidation; (4) a person who abets
the doing of any of the above mentioned acts;
and (5) the successors in interest of such a
person. Among these five categories, the first
category is relevant for the present
discussion -- a person or a group of persons
who commits land grabbing.

31. Clause (e) of Section 2, quoted above,

defines the expression "land grabbing" to mean
: (1) every activity of grabbing of any land
(whether belonging to the Government, a local
authority, a religious or charitable
institution or endowment, including a wakf, or
any other private person) by a person or group
of persons; (2) such grabbing must be : (i)
without any lawful entitlement and (ii) with a
view to : (a) illegally taking possession of
such lands; or (b) to enter into or create
illegal tenancies, lease and licences
agreements or any other illegal agreements in
respect of such lands; or (c) to construct
unauthorised structures thereon for sale or
hire; or (d) to give such lands to any person
on (i) rental or (ii) lease and licence basis
for construction, or (iii) use and occupation
of unauthorised structures.

32. Inasmuch as the afore-mentioned

expressions are defined employing the term
"grabbing", it is necessary to ascertain the
import of that term. It is not defined in the
Act. It is not a technical term or a term of
art so it has to be understood in its ordinary
common meaning.

33. The meaning of the term "grab" in the New

International Webster's Comprehensive
Dictionary of the English Language, is given

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as follows :
"To grasp or seize forcibly or suddenly;
to take possession of violently or
dishonestly; to make a sudden grasp. See
synonyms under grasp - (i) The act of
grabbing, or that which is grabbed. (ii) A
dishonest or unlawful taking possession or
acquisition (iii) An apparatus for
grappling."

34.In Words and Phrases, permanent edition,

Vol.18, the meaning of "grab" is noted as
under :

"The word "grab" means an act or practice

of appropriating unscrupulously, as in
politics. Smith v. Pure Oil Co., 128
S.W.2d 931, 933, 278 Ky.430.The word
"grab" means a seizure or acquisition by
violent or unscrupulous means. Smith v.
Pure Oil Co., 128 S.W.2d 931, 933, 278
Ky.430.

The word "grab" means to seize, grasp, or

snatch forcibly or suddenly with the hand,
hence to take possession of suddenly,
violently, or dishonestly. Smith v. Pure Oil
Co., 128 S.W.2d 931, 933, 278 Ky.430."

35. Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 38, records

the meaning of the term "grab" thus :

"As a verb, to seize, grasp or snatch

forcibly or suddenly with the hand, hence
to take possession of suddenly, violently,
or dishonestly."

36. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, the

following meanings of the word "grab" are
noted :

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"A seize suddenly; capture, arrest; take

greedily or unfairly; attract the
attention of, impress; make a sudden
snatch at; intr. (of the brakes of a motor
vehicle) act harshly or jerkily. - n. (i)
a sudden clutch or attempt to seize; (ii)
a mechanical device for clutching."

37. The various meanings, noted above,

disclose that the term "grab" has a broad
meaning - to take unauthorisedly, greedily or
unfairly - and a narrow meaning of snatching
forcibly or violently or by unscrupulous
means. Having regard to the object of the Act
and the various provisions employing that term
we are of the view that the term "grab" is
used in the Act in both its narrow as well as
broad meanings. Thus understood the
ingredients of the expression "land grabbing"
would comprise of (i) the factum of an
activity of taking possession of any land
forcibly, violently, unscrupulously, unfairly
or greedily without any lawful entitlement and
(ii) the mens rea/intention -- "with the
intention of/with a view to" (a) illegally
taking possession of such lands or (b) enter
into or create illegal tenancies, lease and
licences agreements or any other illegal
agreements in respect of such lands; or (c) to
construct unauthorised structures thereon for
sale or hire; or (d) to give such lands to any
person on (i) rental or (ii) lease and licence
basis for construction, or (iii) use and
occupation of unauthorised structures.
38. A combined reading of clauses (d) and (e)
would suggest that to bring a person within
the meaning of the expression "land grabber"
it must be shown that : (i) (a) he has taken
unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, snatched
forcibly, violently or unscrupulously any land
belonging to government or a local authority,
a religious or charitable institution or

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endowment, including a wakf, or any other

private person; (b) without any lawful
entitlement; and (c) with a view to illegally
taking possession of such lands, or enter or
create illegal tenancies or lease and licences
agreements or any other illegal agreements in
respect of such lands or to construct
unauthorised structures thereon for sale or
hire, or give such lands to any person on
rental or lease and licence basis for
construction, or use and occupation of
unauthorised structures; or (ii) he has given
financial aid to any person for taking illegal
possession of lands or for construction of
unauthorised structures thereon; or (iii) he
is collecting or attempting to collect from
any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation
and other charges by criminal intimation; or
(iv) he is abetting the doing of any of the
above-mentioned acts; or (v) that he is the
successor-in-interest of any such persons.

39. It must be borne in mind that for purposes

of taking congnizance of a case under the Act
existence of an allegation of any act of land
grabbing is the sine qua non and not the truth
or otherwise of such an allegation. But to
hold that a person is a land grabber it is
necessary to find that the allegations
satisfying the requirements of land grabbing
are proved."

229. It was then observed that for the purpose of

taking cognizance of a case under the A.P.
Act, the existence of an allegation of any act
of land grabbing is sine quo non and not the
truth or otherwise of such an allegation. But
to hold that person is a land grabber, it is
necessary to find that the allegations

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satisfying the requirement of land grabbing

are proved. To make out a case in civil
proceeding that a person is a land grabber,
the person who made a complaint himself aver
and prove both the ingredients : the factum as
well as the intention, that the person termed
as “land grabber” has occupied the land in
dispute, which belonged to the complainant,
without any lawful entitlement and, with a
view to or with the intention of illegally
taking possession of the said land or enter
into the land for any of the purposes
mentioned in Section 2(e) of the A.P.Act,
which defined “land grabbing” and is pari
materia to Section 2(e) of the Gujarat Land
Grabbing Act’ 2020. It was held that in regard
to the ingredients of the expression “ the
land grabber”, it is necessary to point out
that it is only when a person has lawful
entitlement to the land alleged to be grabbed
that he cannot be brought within the mischief
of the said expression. A mere prima facie
bona fide claim to the land alleged to be
grabbed by such a person, cannot avert being
roped in within the ambit of expression “land
grabber”. What is germane is lawful
entitlement to and not a mere prima facie bona
fide claim to the land alleged to be grabbed.

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230. In the second decision in M/S Mahalaxmi Motors

Ltd vs Mandal Revenue Officer & Ors62, the
question arose as to whether the Special Court
has jurisdiction to decide the questions
relating to title and possession. Considering
the above noted decision in Konda Laxmana
Bapuji61, it was observed therein that lawful
entitlement on the part of a party to possess
the land being the determinative factor, it is
axiomatic that so long as the land grabber
would not be able to show his legal
entitlement to hold the land, the jurisdiction
of the Special Court cannot be held to be
ousted. An averment that a person had been in
unlawful possession itself is sufficient to
invoke the provisions of the Act, in view of
the decision of the Apex Court in Konda
Laxmana Bapuji61 .

231. In the third decision in the case of

Industrial Investment Bank Of India Ltd vs
Bishwanath Jhunjhunwala63, the question
referred to the larger Bench (three Judges
Bench) of the Apex Court was whether the
Special Court created under the A.P. Act would
have jurisdiction to deal with the question of
adverse possession. Taking note of the
62
[2007 (11) SCC 714] M/S Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd vs Mandal Revenue Officer & Ors
63
[2009(5) SCC 478] Industrial Investment Bank Of India Ltd vs Bishwanath
Jhunjhunwala

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provisions of the A.P. Act, it was held by the

Apex Court that the Act undisputedly confers a
wide jurisdiction upon the Special Court and
the Special Tribunal. For all intent and
purport, the Tribunals and the Special Courts
are substitutes for Civil Court and the
appellate Court. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons for enacting the A.P.Act clearly
established that the said Act was enacted to
achieve a special purpose; “ the object being
to prohibit the land grabbing” resulting in
breakage of public law and order. The A.P.
Act brings within its umbrage not only
“grabbing of lands” of Government or local
authorities, but also statutory authorities
and private persons. It aims at those persons,
who form a distinct class. The Special Courts
have both civil and criminal jurisdiction. The
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and
Code of Criminal Procedure are ordinarily
applicable, subject of course to the
provisions to the contrary. A legal fiction is
created that it would be Civil Court and/or
the Court of Sessions and would otherwise have
the same power as the Civil Court or the Court
of Sessions as provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure.

232. It was, thus, held that the Special Courts and

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the Tribunal, undisputedly are entitled to

determine any question or issue including the
question of title or possession in the
proceedings initiated before it, inasmuch as,
they not only have trappings of a Court but
virtually are Civil Courts and, thus, are
entitled to determine complicated questions of
title. There was, thus, no reason that the
question of adverse possession be kept beyond
the purview of its jurisdiction.

233. It was, thus, held that the acquisition of

indefeasible title by prescription is creation
of a statute. Section 27 of the Limitation
Act provides for extension of title of the
owner of the land and vesting thereof in a
person who has acquired the same by adverse
possession. The plea of adverse possession,
however, must expressly be raised and
established. If it is a Civil Court, all
questions relating to title and possession can
be gone into, if and when the proceeding is
initiated under the A.P. Act. The opposite
party not only can raise jurisdictional
question but can also raise the questions
relating to his title and possession. It is
observed that it is difficult to comprehend as
to how the Special Court would be debarred

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from determining the questions raised by the

parties thereto.

(C) Conclusion :-

Reverting to the Land Grabbing Act, 2020 :-

(a) Object and purpose of Act' 2020, Scope of

jurisdiction of Special Court;

234. Taking clue from the above observations of the

Apex Court referring to the pari materia
provisions of the A.P.Act, when we look to the
provisions of the impugned enactment, we find
that the impugned enactment has been brought
to remedy the mischief of land grabbing. The
activity of grabbing of any land (whether
belonging to the Government, local authority,
a religious or charitable institution or
endowment or any private person) by a person
or group of persons, such grabbing must be :
(i) without any lawful entitlement, and (ii)
with a view to: (a) illegally taking
possession of such lands; (b) or to enter into
or create illegal tenancies, lease or licence
or any other illegal agreements in respect of
such lands; (c) to construct unauthorised
structures thereon for sale or hire; or use or
occupation of such unauthorized structures and
the term “grabbed land” is to be construed in

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the same manner.

235. The meaning of the expression “land grabber”

in Section 2(d) is inclusive, to take in its
fold:(i) a person or a group of persons, who
commits land grabbing ; (ii) a person who
gives financial aid to any person for (a)
taking illegal possession of the lands, or (b)
construction of unauthorized structures
thereon; (iii) a person who collects or
attempts to collect from any occupiers of such
lands rent, compensation and other charges by
criminal intimidation; (iv) a person who abets
the doing of any of the above mentioned acts ;
(v) the successors in interest of such a
person.

236. The expression “land grabber” and “land

grabbing” have been defined in a very broad
sense by giving a wide meaning to umbrage all
such persons, who commit, financiers and
abettors within the ambit of “land grabber”
and even an attempt within the ambit of land
grabbing. As per Section 3, the land grabbing
in any form and any act connected with or
arising out of the land grabbing has been made
a criminal offence. The broad sweep of the
penal provision is indicative of the

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legislative intent to punish all those who are

connected with the offence of land grabbing,
directly or indirectly in the manner provided
therein. The Special Court are constituted and
a time line has been given to dispose of the
complaints of land grabbing, which is further
indicative of the intention of the legislature
to curb and punish unlawful activity of the
land grabbing.

237. When the Statement of Objects and Reasons of

the Act are read conjointly with the various
Sections of the Gujarat Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2020, it is evident that
the legislature had conceived of only one
class of lands, which is “grabbed lands” and
the offence or mischief which the law aims to
remedy is “grabbing of lands in the State”.
The term “grabbing” includes all types of
activities, whereby a person takes possession
of land, forcibly, dishonestly, violently,
unauthorizedly or by unscrupulous means. It
is, therefore, difficult to comprehend as to
how persons, who commit offence of land
grabbing in relation to the lands belonging to
a private persons would fall in a separate
class, when they entered into private person’s
property to take possession or deal with the

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same by creating unauthorized tenancies etc,

they would otherwise be a land grabber. The
ingredients of land grabbing, noted above, of
occupying or attempt to occupy a private
person’s property having no ownership, title
or physical possession, without any lawful
entitlement, would all be present even in a
case of activity to occupy or attempt to
occupy a private person’s property. It is
axiomatic that so long as the land grabber
occupies private property, he would be forming
a different class or would be excluded from
the purview of the Act, the main object of
which is to prohibit the unlawful activities
of land grabbing in the State. The question in
regard to lawful entitlement of the occupier,
therefore, for invoking the charging section
plays an important and significant role. The
petitioners have failed to show that "any
activity of land grabbing“ in relation to any
land belonging to a private person, falls in a
separate class and the occupant or the
offenders cannot be included within the
meaning of “land grabber” under the Act' 2020.

238. As far as the plea of the petitioners that

various issues pertaining to lawful title,
bona fide purchases, adverse possession,

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regularization of long occupation of

Government land, would arise in a complaint of
land grabbing pertaining to the land belonging
to a private person, suffice it to say that
the Special Courts constituted under the Act
have been provided with the powers of Civil
Court for trying civil proceedings and a Court
of Sessions for conducting criminal trial.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
and Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable
in the proceedings, if not inconsistent with
the provisions of the Act.

239. The Civil Court’s jurisdiction is ousted and

the Act' 2020, which is a special law would
prevail and, as such, the Special Courts only
have jurisdiction in respect of the matter
dealt with thereunder. The Special Courts have
been conferred with the power to try every
case arising out of any alleged act of land
grabbing, as also for determination of
acquisition of title and ownership to or
lawful possession of the land alleged to have
been grabbed. It is equipped with the power to
pass such orders including interim orders as
it deems fit. The Courts under the Act are
nonetheless Civil Courts which follow the Code
of Civil Procedure and are competent to grant

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the same relief which can be obtained from

ordinary Civil Courts. At the cost of
repetition, it may be noted that the conjoint
reading of Section 9(2) and Section 15 of the
Land Grabbing Act' 2020 which contain non-
obstante clause lead to the conclusion that
the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court
under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is ousted and the Act, which is a special law
will prevail and, as such, the Special Court
will have jurisdiction in respect of the
matters dealt with thereunder.

240. As noted by the Apex Court in Konda Laxmana

Bapuji61, the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020 is
designed by the Legislature to obviate the
difficulty of duplication of trial once in the
Special Court under the Act' 2020 and over
again in the ordinary Civil Court. The purpose
of the Act is to identify cases involving
allegation of land grabbing for speedy inquiry
and trial. It is one thing to say that Special
Courts are not competent to adjudicate the
civil or criminal dispute pertaining to
allegations of land grabbing, but it is
another thing to say that though Special Court
are equipped with the power of Civil Court and
the Court of Sessions, relegating the dispute

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pertaining to allegations of land grabbing

would cause prejudice to a particular class of
persons, who can otherwise be termed as land
grabber.

241. The right to possess the land must be

referable to the title or lawful entitlement
of the land and not to mere entitlement to
occupy the same. The mere allegations of the
land grabbing would be sufficient for the
purposes to taking cognizance of a case under
the impugned enactment, however, to hold the
person as a land grabber, it is necessary to
prove the allegations by satisfying the
requirement of land grabbing. In the same
manner, a person who has lawful entitlement to
the land, if alleged to be a land grabber,
cannot be roped in within the ambit of the
expression “land grabber”. What is germane is
lawful entitlement to and not a mere prima
facie bona fide claim to the land alleged to
be grabbed. Only if the ingredients of the
expression “land grabber” are fulfilled, the
person against whom allegations of land
grabbing are made can be held to be guilty of
the offence of land grabbing.

242. The questions as to bona fide purchase of the

property for valuable consideration, right of

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regularization for long uninterrupted

occupation of Government land, perfecting the
title by way of adverse possession can very
well be gone into and decided by the Special
Courts on the oral and documentary evidences
led by the parties. The person against whom
the allegations of land grabbing are made has
to establish his rival claim of having lawful
entitlement to the land/property in question
for determination of such issues. The Special
Court will be entitled to take into
consideration the rival claims of the parties
by framing appropriate issues.

(b) Reverse burden :-

243. Coming to the provisions of Section 11, about

burden of proof, a plain reading of this
Section would indicate that in any proceeding
under Act' 2020; (i) whether the land is
alleged to have been grabbed; and (ii) such
land is prima facie proved to be the land
owned by the Government or by a private
person, the Special Court shall draw
presumption that the person against whom
allegations are of “land grabbing”, is a “land
grabber”. Only when such presumption under
Section 11 is drawn by the Special Court, the
burden of proving that the land has not been

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grabbed by him is cast on the person alleged

as “land grabber”.

244. We may take note of Section 106 of the Indian

Evidence Act 1872, which says that when any
fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person,the burden of proving that fact is upon
him. In a criminal trial, burden is always on
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and it is
settled law that Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act is not intended to relieve the
prosecution of its burden. Only when the
prosecution proves certain facts from which
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding
certain other facts, which unless explained by
the accused by virtue of his special
knowledge, tend to inculpate the accused, in
such circumstance, the accused owe an
explanation, otherwise Section 106 does not
cast any burden on the accused to prove his
innocence. This reverse burden drawn by
Section 106 is not a substitute for the burden
of proof that rests upon the prosecution, in a
criminal trial.

245. When we read Section 11 of the Land Grabbing

Act in light of the above provision, it can be
seen that prima facie proof of the land which

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is alleged to have been grabbed, to be owned

by the Government or any private person other
than the person, who is occupying or dealt
with the land, is to be brought by the
prosecution, to enable the Special Court to
draw a presumption that the person, who is
alleged to have grabbed the land, is a land
grabber. Only when from the facts proved by
the prosecution, a reasonable inference can be
drawn with regard to the ownership of the
grabbed land rests with a person other than
the person who is alleged to be a land
grabber, the burden would shift on the alleged
land grabber to prove his lawful entitlement
to the grabbed land. In such circumstance, the
accused owe an explanation as the fact that
the land belonged to some other person proved
by the prosecution tend to inculpate the
accused. The accused or the person against
whom allegations of land grabbing has been
made, cannot remain silent in such
circumstances as onus to speak to prove his
lawful entitlement to the land in question.
shifted on him. This is more so as the fact
about the right, title or interest in the land
is in special knowledge of the person who is
in occupation or who attempts to occupy the
same.

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246. The provision of Section 11 of the Land

Grabbing Act, thus, are in conformity with the
law of evidence, which would guide the Special
Courts in both, in the civil and criminal
proceedings. The contention of the learned
counsels for the petitioners to show
arbitrariness in the impugned enactment by
making submissions about Section 11 being
against the principle of presumption of
innocence of the accused under the criminal
jurisprudence, is liable to be turned down.
The assertion that making the activity of land
grabbing an offence both against the private
land and Government land by itself would prove
arbitrariness in the statutory provision
cannot be justified as the petitioners failed
to demonstrate any hostile discrimination.

247. The discussion on Section 15 in the foregoing

paragraphs of this judgment is sufficient to
deal with the arguments of the learned counsel
for the petitioners to show arbitrariness in
the impugned enactment on the premise that it
tends to supersede judicial verdict or
nullifies the decree or order in the Courts of
law. There is no substance in the submissions
of the learned counsels for the petitioners
about the overriding effect on Section 15. The

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assertion that several provisions of the Act

are violative of Article 14 being hit by
equality doctrine, contrary to rule of law
making the Act' 2020 unconstitutional are
found to be devoid of force on an exhaustive
analysis of the above noted provisions of the
impugned enactment.

248. There are two more contentions of the

petitioners to emphasize on the plea of
manifest arbitrariness which are pertaining to
the provisions contained in Sections 7 and
9(5), which are to be dealt with before
drawing the final conclusion on the issues
raised by Ms. Megha Jani, learned counsel for
the petitioners.

(c) Section 7(2) - Dispute re : Jurisdiction of

Special Courts :-

249. By reading Section 7(2) of the Act, it was

contended by Ms. Megha Jani that the said
provision strikes at the basic structure of
the Constitution of India as it blurs the
principle of separation of power between the
legislature and the judiciary.

250. The contention is that Section 7(2) confers

power on the State Government to decide the
question of jurisdiction of any Special Court,

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if arises and it also attaches finality to the

decision of the State Government. Whereas the
question of jurisdiction of any Court
essentially is a question which requires
adjudication by the said Court. The
contention, thus, is that Section 7(2) itself
makes the entire enactment manifestly
arbitrary.

251. To deal with this submission, suffice it to

say that the contentions of the learned
advocate are a result of misreading and
misinterpretation of Section 7(2), which only
talks of any question relating to constitution
of Special Courts for conferring jurisdiction
upon them for Special area or areas, or for
such cases or class or group of cases, as may
be specified in the Notification. The
effective meaning which is to be given to
Section 7(2) is that in case any question
arise with regard to the jurisdiction of any
Special Court, as specified in the
Notification, about its establishment for a
particular area or areas for cases or class, a
group of cases etc, the said question is to be
referred to the State Government, as creation
of Special Court for a particular area or
cases or class of persons is within the

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competence of the State Government. The words

“question as to the jurisdiction of any
Special Court” cannot be confused with the
question of jurisdiction to take cognizance of
any complaint or try any case arising out of
any alleged act of land grabbing, either suo
motu or on an application made by any person,
i.e. to take suo motu cognizance or
entertain any application beyond the
jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted
under Section 7 under the notification issued
by the State Government. There cannot be any
quarrel about the proposition that once the
Special Courts are constituted by notification
under Section 7(1) of the Act, their
jurisdiction is confined to the territorial
area as notified by the State Government and
any question pertaining to jurisdiction of the
Special Court to initiate suo motu action or
entertain a complaint, raised by the party
against whom action is taken or complaint is
entertained, has to be decided invariably by
the Special Court only. To initiate action
either suo motu or on complaint, the Special
Court has to satisfy itself about its
jurisdiction first, before proceeding to
decide on the merits of the complaint or its
own action against any other person.

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(d) Section 9 of the Act' 2020 - unguided and

unbridled power to Special Courts :-

252. Coming to the submissions with regard to the

provisions of Section 9(5) of the Act' 2020,
extracted hereinbefore, dealing with the
arguments of the learned counsel for the
petitioners, about the unbridled, unguided
power given to the Presiding Judge manning the
Special Courts, suffice it to note that it is
well settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can go
simultaneously.

253. On the issue of continuance of criminal

proceedings arising out of Section 476-B of
the Criminal Procedure Code, a Constitution
Bench of the Apex Court in M. S. Sheriff vs
the State Of Madras64 has held that there
cannot be any hard and fast rule as to which
of the two proceedings should be given
precedence. However, the assertion with
regard to the possibility of conflicting
decisions in the Civil and Criminal Codes has
been ruled out, while noting that the law
envisages such an eventuality when it
expressly refrains from making a decision of
one court binding on the other or even

64
[AIR 1954 SC 397] M.S. Sheriff vs the State Of Madras

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relevant, except for certain limited purposes,

such as sentence or damages.

254. It is further pertinent to note that the

standard of proof required in the two
proceedings are entirely different. The civil
cases are decided on appreciation of evidence
on the principles of preponderance of
probability, while in a criminal case, the
burden lies on the prosecution to prove the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is
neither any statutory provision nor any legal
principle that the findings recorded in one
proceeding may be treated as final or binding
in the other, as both the cases have to be
decided on the basis of the evidence adduced
therein. The possible conflict of findings
between the civil and criminal proceedings by
the Special Court, therefore, is simply
hypothetical. The discretion given to the
Special Court to decide the order in which the
civil and criminal liability against the land
grabber be initiated, seems to be in
conformity with the principle that it has to
be left to the wisdom of the Court to decide
as to which of the proceedings should go
first, depending upon the facts of a
particular case.

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255. However, to elaborate further, as noted above,

the main object of the impugned enactment is
to protect the owner and possessor of the land
having right, title and interest in the land,
from a person who unauthorisedly occupied his
land, by holding him a land grabber and award
punishment for the criminal offence. In such
proceedings, mere allegations of land grabbing
though would be sufficient to initiate action,
but the Special Court may be called upon to
determine the complicated questions of title.
It is to be established by the complainant
that he is the owner having absolute title to
the property and has right to retain the
possession, and on a rival claim in defence,
of a better title or interest over the
property, the Special Court will be entitled
to take into consideration the evidence of the
parties to adjudicate on the issue.

256. Thus, in a proceeding before the Special

Court, either on taking suo motu cognizance or
on a complaint, if the alleged land grabber
claims or puts up a defence of proprietary
right or ownership or possessory right over
the land in question, then the civil
proceedings will have to be proceeded first.
The reason being that without adjudicating on

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the question of rival claims, no definite

finding can be arrived at about the right of
the claimant to seek restoration of possession
of the land, which according to him has been
grabbed by the person against whom proceeding
has been initiated as a 'land grabber', and if
the alleged land grabber fails to establish
any such right claimed by him, then criminal
proceedings for prosecution of the land
grabber would recommence.

257. Thus, if in the proceedings under the Act'

2020, the alleged land grabber takes up the
defence of better title or better claim over
the land in question, the Special Court shall
first determine that question and keep the
criminal trial in abeyance till such
determination. However, it is to be kept in
mind that in the civil proceeding, the
adjudication shall be of the rival claims of
the parties, if any, put up in defence by the
land grabber. This is so because the alleged
land grabber had not approached the Court for
declaration of his right, title, interest or
possession over the land in question; it is
only when he is prosecuted as a land grabber,
that he takes up the plea of better claim over
the land in question as his defence. The

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question of determination of civil liability

under Section 9(3) in a case where the land
grabber has not been able to put up a better
title or claim in defence, has to be of
summary nature and cannot partake the
character of a full-fledged civil suit, which
is ordinarily a long drawn affair, thereby
frustrating the very purport and object of the
Act' 2020.

258. It is for this reason, to our mind, Section

9(3) prescribes that the Special Court may
follow its own procedure which shall be guided
by the principles of natural justice and fair
play while deciding the civil liability, which
of course be subject to the other provisions
of the Act and the Rules made thereunder.

259. The essence is that if there is no defence to

claim a better title, there would not be a
requirement of full-fledged civil trial as
Special Courts are specially created to
adjudicate on the complaints of land grabbing.
If no defence or claim is put up by the person
alleged to be a land grabber, the criminal
proceedings be continued and the proceedings
for determination of civil liability as per
Section 9(3) would be of summary nature, which

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may be conducted simultaneously.

260. From a further reading of section 9(2) of the

Act' 2022, it is clear that all incidental or
ancillary issues pertaining to the right,
title, interest or possession in respect of
the alleged act of land grabbing, have to be
adjudicated to arrive at the conclusion of the
occupied land being a "grabbed land" within
the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act' 2020
in civil proceedings. The question whether
the person against whom the allegations are
made had indulged in land grabbing or is to be
held guilty of the offence of land grabbing
would be subject matter of criminal
proceedings.

261. In this view of the matter, the leverage given

by the Legislature to the Special Court which
are well equipped with the powers of the Civil
Court and the Court of Sessions, being well
versed with the procedure under the Code of
Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure Code,
well informed with the law of evidence, cannot
be said to be unguided or unbridled. The
procedure prescribed in Section 9(5) read with
Sub-section (1) to (4) of Section 9 and
Section 10 of the Land Grabbing Act cannot be
said to be suffering from manifest

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arbitrariness, as against the concept of

Article 14. The criminal culpability of the
accused would have to be adjudicated guided by
the principles of criminal jurisprudence. It
cannot be said that he is being condemned
unheard.

262. From the Scheme of the Act' 2020 employed in

Sections 9, 10 and 11, it is evident that
Special Courts are created to expedite the
trial of the complaint of land grabbing, to
conduct in a time bound manner by satisfying
substantive due process of law and to obviate
delay, which marr the civil proceedings in
ordinary Civil Court so as to restore the
grabbed land to its original owner by eviction
of unauthorised and unscrupulous person having
entered into his property.

263. On the plea of vagueness of statute, nothing

could be demonstrated before us. We may add
that when the jurisdiction is conferred on the
regular Courts dealing with both civil and
criminal matters, as Civil Courts and Court of
Sessions, they are expected to be well versed
with both the substantive as well as the
procedural laws. They are expected to follow
the procedure and take decisions guided by the
settled principles of law and justice. The

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apprehension of the petitioners that the

discretion given to the Special Court to fix
priority to civil or criminal proceedings is
prone to misuse, is absolutely unfounded.

264. The reliance placed on the decision of the

Apex Court in Shreya Singhal vs. Union of
India65, to impress upon us that the entire
Land Grabbing Act' 2020 is to be held to be
invalid, unconstitutional, being vague, is
wholly misplaced. The possibility of abuse of
power is not a reason to hold the Legislative
enactment invalid or unconstitutional.
Moreover, checks and balances are provided in
the statute in the shape of appeal to the High
Court under Section 12A against the final
judgment and order of the Special Court, both
against the order passed in the civil or
criminal proceeding. The High Court can also
exercise supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in
case of any excesses or defect of
jurisdiction.

265. The procedure to conduct both civil and

criminal proceedings is guided by Civil and
Criminal Procedure Code. Rules of evidence as
per the Evidence Act, 1872 are applicable to
65
[2015 (5) SCC 1] Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India

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appreciate evidence in both the proceedings.

Full-fledged trial is conceived to adjudicate
dispute, claims and in case of no dispute
about the title, criminal proceedings have to
be conducted following the principles of
criminal jurisprudence. The land grabbing
though has been made a criminal offence, but
it may involve issues of civil nature
pertaining to ownership, title and possession.
Criminal proceedings would involve inquiry on
the question of mens rea in view of the words
"with a view to illegally taking possession of
such land or creating illegal tenancies" etc.
used to define the words "land grabbing" under
Section 2(e).

266. There is, thus, no reason not to keep the

process flexible for the Special Court to
decide its course of action in the facts of a
given case. However, it is open for the
Special Court to conduct both Civil and
Criminal proceedings simultaneously, if the
situation demands. In any case, there is no
question of the Special Court being influenced
from the evidence of one or other proceeding
as the principles of appreciation of evidence
in both the proceedings defer.

267. With the above discussion, the arguments on

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the vagueness of the provisions pertaining to

the procedure and power of the Special Courts
to try Civil and Criminal proceedings
simultaneously or one after the other, are
liable to be turned down.

(e) Section 12(a) - re: Constitution of the

Committee :-

268. Moving further on the issue of constitution of

the Committee and the procedure prescribed in
the Rules' 2020 framed under the Act, we do
not find any fault in Section 12(a), which
talks of the Committee defined in Section
2(a), to be notified by the State Government,
which is an Executive Committee entrusted with
the task of making preliminary inquiry to
verify the complaints of land grabbing. The
contention of the petitioners that the
Committee has been conferred adjudicatory
power to decide on the complaint, is a result
of misreading of the Act' 2020 and the Rules'
2020 made thereunder. The contention that
Rule 5(8) of the Land Grabbing Rules' 2020
while conferring jurisdiction on the Committee
to decide the further course of action
including filing of an FIR, goes beyond the
provisions of Section 12(a), is wholly
misconceived. All the arguments pertaining to

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the power of the State Government to

constitute a Committee and the power of
inquiry conferred upon the Committee by virtue
of Rules' 2020 framed under the Act are
without substance.

269. Suffice it to note that the composition of the

Committee is prescribed in Section 2(a) of the
Act' 2020, which says that that the Committee
shall be notified by the State Government
under the chairmanship of the District
Collector. The Committee defined under
Section 2(a) means an Executive Committee
wherein officers of the State other than the
District Magistrate/Collector are to be
inducted. It is neither possible for the
Legislature nor advisable to provide the full
constitution of the Committee by prescribing
as to who would be its members, inasmuch as,
functions of the Committee are purely
executive. Looking to the varied nature of
complaints that have arisen in the matter of
land grabbing in this bunch of writ petitions
and otherwise also, we find that it should be
left within the exclusive domain of the State
Government to decide as to which executive
officer of the concerned Department would have
to be inducted as a member in the Committee to

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make inquiry.

(f) Rule 5 of Rules' 2020 - re: Procedure of

inquiry into the complaints :-

270. Coming to Rule 5 of the Gujarat Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Rules, 2020 enacted in exercise
of the power conferred by Sub-section (1) of
Section 16 of the Act' 2020, we may note that
Rule 5(4) provides for a prima facie inquiry
into the complaint of land grabbing. The
Committee has been entrusted with the task to
make a prima facie inquiry into the locus
standi of the applicant and to conclude as to
whether the applicant can establish his land
title, by getting reports and records from
various authorities. A preliminary inquiry
as per Rule 5(5) is to be conducted by the
Prant officer or the Officer to whom the
application has been referred to, whether the
land in question has been occupied or
attempted to occupy in an unauthorised manner
or by using unlawful means. The preliminary
inquiry report is to be submitted to the
District Collector, which shall be placed
before the Committee, which is also empowered
to ask for further inquiry.

271. Rule 5 prescribes the manner in which the

inquiry is to be conducted and the statement

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therein shows that the Committee may derive a

conclusion of establishment of land title of
the complainant or the occupation of the land
grabber being unauthorised constituting an act
of land grabbing, but all the conclusions are
in a preliminary inquiry directed towards the
veracity and genuineness of the complaint or
allegations of land grabbing.

272. Looking to the gravity of the punishment

prescribed under the Act for the proven act of
land grabbing, the checks provided at the
preliminary stage are aimed to curb frivolous
complaints of land grabbing, and, as such,
cannot be said to suffer from vice of
constitutionality.

273. The decision or the opinion drawn by the

Committee as per Rule 5(8) on consideration of
the inquiry report, in any case, is prima
facie and is provided as the check to curb
frivolous complaints of land grabbing. There
is no substance in the submission that the
Committee may withhold the complaint though
there may be substance in the allegations of
land grabbing. The plea of excessive
delegation of power by virtue of Section 12(a)
of the Act' 2020 is, thus, turned down being
devoid of force.

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274. In view of the above, all the contentions to

assail the validity of the Land Grabbing Act
being manifest arbitrary, hit by the principle
of equality, rule of law, the principle of
vagueness of the statute and in violation of
constitutional provisions, noted hereinbefore,
are hereby rejected.

Part III - Doctrine Of Proportionality And Validity

Of Mandatory Minimum Sentence

(A) Arguments of the learned counsels:-

(a) Law of Proportionality :-

275. Mr. Tejas Barot, learned advocate for the

petitioners had urged that the Act' 2020
provides for unusually harsh and cruel
punishment of minimum mandatory sentence of 10
years, which may extend to 14 years, which is
disproportionate to the gravity of offence.
Pressing the doctrine of proportionality of
punishment or sentence into service, it was
vehemently urged that the offence of land
grabbing is an offence against the property
and not against a human body.

(i) "Injury" word in the legal parlance as

stated in Section 44 of the Indian Penal Code
denotes "any harm whatsoever illegally caused
to any person, in body, mind, reputation or

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property". Section 235 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure mandates that after
conviction of the accused, the judge shall
hear the accused on the question of sentence
before passing sentence on him.

Right of the accused to plead for grant of

lesser period of sentence has been taken away
by the Legislature by providing for punishment
with imprisonment for a fixed tenure. An
offender can argue that his right not to be
imposed harsher punishment has been infringed
on the doctrine of proportionality, which is
also a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.

It is the duty of the Court to consider

mitigating circumstances before awarding
sentence which has become redundant by the
statute by providing minimum sentence that too
of 10 years imprisonment. Anomalies created
due to the minimum mandatory sentence, as
asserted, are that by providing standard
mandatory sentence in place of an
individualised sentence not proportionate with
the gravity of offence, very harsh and cruel
punishment has been incorporated in the
statute, which serves no social purpose.
Minimum mandatory sentence cannot be reduced

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even by the Appellate Court though the

Appellate Court may be of the opinion that
there are mitigating and extenuating
circumstances or other intervening
circumstances, which warrant reduction of
sentence for the period already undergone.

(ii) Right to life enshrined in Article 21

of the Constitution of India envisages that no
person can be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except by due process of law.
Reasonableness of legislative action in
depriving a person of his personal liberty
must be projected in the statutory provision
or else, it would be hit by Article 21.
Doctrine of proportionality is to be tested on
the anvil of Article 21.

It is argued that any statute providing

for disproportionate punishment is arbitrary
and can be tested on the anvil of
proportionality which is also known as
"primary review" by the Courts when the
validity of legislation offends fundamental
freedom. The concept of due process has been
incorporated in our Constitution as an
integral part of guarantee under Articles 13,
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and,
thus, a sentence which is disproportionate

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violates the constitutional guarantee.

(iii) The Apex Court in the case of State

Of Punjab vs Dalbir Singh66 while examining the
constitutional validity of Section 27(3) of
the Arms Act, 1959, providing for maximum
punishment with death, has held that the said
provision deprives the judiciary from
discharging its Constitutional duties of
judicial review whereby it has the power of
using discretion in the sentencing procedure.
The decision of the Apex Court has in Bachan
Singh Vs. State of Punjab67, been referred
therein that this power has been acknowledged
in Section 302 IPC where it has been held that
the sentencing power has to be exercised in
accordance with the statutory sentencing
structure under Section 235(2) and also under
Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Imposing mandatory death penalty
under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, the
legislation runs contrary to those statutory
safeguards which give judiciary the discretion
in the matter imposing death penalty. Section
27(3) has, thus, been held ultra vires the
concept of judicial review, which is one of
the basic feature of our Constitution.

66
[2012 (3) SCC 346] State Of Punjab vs Dalbir Singh
67
[(1982) 3 SCC 24] Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab

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While holding so, the Apex Court has

observed that Article 13(2) clearly prohibits
the making of any law by the State which takes
away or abridges rights, conferred by Part III
of the Constitution. In the event of such a
law being made, the same shall be void to the
extent of contravention. It is the judiciary
which can give the declaration that a law
being in contravention of the mandate of Part-
III of the Constitution is void. The power of
judicial review, thus, inheres in our
Constitution. It is a fundamental principle
of just sentencing that the punishment imposed
on a convict should be proportionate to the
gravity of the crime of which he has been
convicted. The criminal culpability of those
convicted of murder varies very widely.

Further, the administration of justice was

considered a function of the Judiciary. The
entire process of trial from the arraignment
of an accused person to his/her sentencing is
what constitutes administration of justice.
The imposition of mandatory minimum punishment
for a particular offence is neither authorised
nor prohibited in the Constitution. As the
Constitution is silent, it is for the Courts
to give a valid constitutional interpretation

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on the mandatory nature of sentence.

A convicted accused ought to be given an

opportunity to show why the particular
sentence should be passed against him. There
is denial to a fair hearing when no
opportunity is given to an accused person to
offer mitigating circumstances before
sentence, which is the normal procedure in all
other trials for non-capital offences.
Sentencing is part of the trial and mitigation
is an element of fair trial. Sentencing is a
matter of law and part of the administration
of justice which is the preserve of the
Judiciary. It was, thus, observed that the
Parliament should only prescribe the maximum
sentence and leave the courts to administer
justice by sentencing the offender according
to the gravity and circumstances of the case.

(iv) Reference has been made to decision of the

Apex Court in Bachan Singh vs State Of Punjab 67
to submit that it was noted therein that the
Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi's56 case, by a
process of judicial interpretation brought in
the procedural due process clause of the
American Constitution by reading in Article 21
the requirement that the procedure by which a
person may be deprived of his life or personal

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liberty must be reasonable, fair and just. It

was urged that a penalty should be considered
'unusually' imposed if it is imposed
arbitrarily or discriminatorily.

(v) V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., in Sunil Batra vs

Delhi Administration68, has observed
emphatically that though our Constitution has
no "due process" clause, but what is
punitively outrageous, scandalizingly unusual
or cruel and rehabilitatively
counterproductive, is unarguably unreasonable
and arbitrary and is shot down by Articles 14
and 19 of the Constitution of India and if
inflicted by procedural unfairness, falls foul
of Article 21.

(vi) In Mithu vs. State of Punjab69, it was

noted with reference to the observations in
Maneka Gandhi56, that principally the concept
of reasonableness must be projected in the
procedure contemplated by Article 21, having
regard to the impact of Article 14 on that
Article. The word 'Law' in the expression
'procedure established by law' in Article 21
has been interpreted to mean in Maneka
Gandhi's56 case that the law must be right,

68
[(1948) 4 SC 494] Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration
69
[1983 (2) SCC 277] Mithu vs. State of Punjab

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just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or

oppressive. Otherwise it would be no
procedure at all and the requirement of
Article 21 would not be satisfied. If it is
arbitrary, it would be violative of Article
14.

(vii) It was urged that a sentence can be

attacked on the ground that it is grossly
disproportionate to the punishment that is
appropriate. The constitutional principle of
proportionality in sentencing policy brought
into the US Constitution by Eighth Amendment,
reads as under:-

"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor

cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
The test to be applied by a US Court on
the proportionality principle under the Eighth
Amendment has been laid down by US Supreme
Court 156, wherein it is held that when
sentences are reviewed under the Eighth
Amendment, Courts should be guided by
objective factors, including (i) the gravity
of the offence and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on the
other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.

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Application of these factors assumes that the

Courts are competent to judge the gravity of
an offence at least on a relative scale. The
comparison can be made in light of the harm
caused or threat to the victim or society, and
the culpability of the offence.

(viii) A decision of the Supreme Court of

Canada in R vs. Nur reported in Supreme Court
of Canada70 has been placed before us wherein
it was held that the test of gross
disproportionality “is aimed at punishments
that are more than merely excessive”. A
prescribed sentence may be grossly
disproportionate as applied to the offender
before the court, or because it would have a
grossly disproportionate impact on others,
rendering the law unconstitutional. The
principle of sentencing contemplated that the
sentencing judge must also have regard to the
aggravating and mitigating factors, including
that a sentence should be similar to sentences
imposed on similar offenders for similar
offences committed in similar circumstances.

With the aid of the said decision, it was

urged that imposing a proportionate sentence
is highly individualised exercise tailored to
70
[2015 SCC 15] R vs. Nur reported in Supreme Court of Canada

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the gravity of offence, the blameworthiness of

the offender and the harm caused by the crime.
Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just
sentence. The principle ensures that a
sentence reflects the gravity of the offence.
This is closely tied to the objective of
denunciation. It promotes justice for victims
and ensures public confidence in the justice
system. The principle of proportionality also
ensures that a sentence does not exceed what
is appropriate, given the moral
blameworthiness of the offender. The principle
serves a limiting or restraining function and
ensures justice for the offender.

It was vehemently urged by placing

reliance on the observations therein that
minimum mandatory sentences, by their very
nature, have the potential to depart from the
principle of proportionality in sentencing.
They emphasize denunciation, general
deterrence and retribution at the expense of
what is a fit sentence for the gravity of the
offence, the blameworthiness of the offender.

(ix) The submission is that this concept was

brought in India and was taken into account
for the first time in the decision of the Apex
Court in Francis Coralie Mullin vs The

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Administrator, Union Territory Of Delhi71

wherein the constitutional validity of sub-
clauses (i), (ii) of Clause 3 (b) of the
conditions of the detention order was
challenged principally being violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India, as arbitrary and unreasonable. The
Apex Court while analysing the question before
it has taken note of evolution of the law
pertaining to the scope and ambit of the
guarantee embodied in Article 21 in Maneka
Gandhi56 and Sunil Batra68, noted hereinbefore.
The emphasis have been laid to the
observations in paragraph 8, which reads
that :-

"8. But the question which arises is

whether the right to life is limited only
to protection of limb or faculty or does
it go further and embrace something more.
We think that the right to life includes
the right to live with human dignity and
all that goes along with it, namely, the
bare necessaries of life such as adequate
nutrition, clothing and shelter and
facilities for reading, writing and
expressing one-self in diverse forms,
freely moving about and mixing and
commingling with fellow human beings. Of
course, the magnitude and content of the
components of this right would depend upon
the extent of the economic development of
the country, but it must, in any view of
71
[1981 (1) SCC 608] Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory
Of Delhi

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the matter, include the right to the basic

necessities of life and also the right to
carry on such functions and activities as
constitute the bare minimum expression of
the human-self. Every act which offends
against or impairs human dignity would
constitute deprivation protanto of this
right to live and it would have to be in
accordance with reasonable, fair and just
procedure established by law which stands
the test of other fundamental rights. Now
obviously, any form of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment would be
offensive to human dignity and constitute
an inroad into this right to live and it
would, on this view, be prohibited by
Article 21 unless it is in accordance with
procedure prescribed by law, but no law
which authorises and no procedure which
leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment can ever stand the
test of reasonableness and non-
arbitrariness: it would plainly be
unconstitutional and void as being
violative of Articles 14 and 21. It would
thus be seen that there is implicit in
Article 21 the right to protection against
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment which is enunciated in Article 5
of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. This right to live which
is comprehended within the broad
connotation of the right to life can
concededly be abridged according to
procedure established by law and therefore
when a person is lawfully imprisoned, this
right to live is bound to suffer
attenuation to the extent to which it is
incapable of enjoyment by reason of
incarceration. The prisoner or detenu

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obviously cannot move about freely by

going outside the prison walls nor can he
socialise at his free will with persons
outside the jail. But, as part of the
right to live with human dignity and
therefore as a necessary component of the
right to life, he would be entitled to
have interviews with the members of his
family and friends and no prison
regulation or procedure laid down by
prison regulation regulating the right to
have interviews with the members of the
family and friends can be upheld as
constitutionally valid under Articles 14
and 21, unless it is reasonable, fair and
just."

(x) With the aid of the above principles, it

was argued by Mr. Tejas Barot, learned
advocate for the petitioners that minimum
mandatory sentence under the Land Grabbing
Act' 2020 has the effect of deprivation of two
benefits, namely :-

(a) A person who may be the first

offender, not a land mafia, occupied a
small piece of land, or the successor in
interest bonafide obtained possession
without any knowledge of the title of his
predecessors have been treated equally
with that of persons who are indulging in
organised crime or can be termed as land
mafia. There may be a situation where a
person termed as "land grabber" has

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entered into property by lawful means or

has lawful entitlement to the property,
such a person cannot be said to be a "land
grabber". However, even innocent person
or a person having lawful entitlement to
the subject land is forced to face
criminal trial. The sentencing policy
under the impugned enactment, thus, does
not distinguish between one time offender
and a land mafia.

(b) It deprives an offender benefits

under the Probation of Offences Act, 1958
("PO Act" for short). In a given case,
the Court may find it justified to release
the accused under the PO Act, but such
benefits cannot be granted, for the Act'
2020 prescribes a minimum sentence.
Placing reliance on the decision of the
Apex Court in Superintendent, Central
Excise vs. Bahubali72, it was argued that
the benefit of Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the
PO Act, as observed by the Apex Court in
Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab73, is a
milestone in the progress of the modern
liberal trend of reform in the field of
penology, which can be claimed subject to

72
[(1979) 2 SCC 279] Superintendent, Central Excise vs. Bahubali
73
[AIR 1965 SC 444] Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab

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conditions specified therein by all

offenders other than those found guilty of
offences punishable with death or life
imprisonment. However, since the
provisions of the Act' 2020 are excluded,
by Section 4(3) and 5 of the Act' 2020,
which prescribes of minimum sentence of
imprisonment, it being a case of offence
under a Special Act, enacted after the PO
Act, the provisions of PO Act cannot be
invoked. The result is that a person who
is found to be guilty of the offence
specified in Section 4(3) of the Land
Grabbing Act, 2020, cannot take recourse
to the provisions of PO Act.

(xi) With the aid of the decision of the Apex

Court in State Through S.P., New Delhi vs
Ratan Lal Arora74 placed before us, it was
submitted that the broad principle is that the
punishment must be proportionate to the
offence and ought to be of universal
application, save where the statute bars the
exercise of judicial discretion either in
awarding punishment or in releasing an
offender on probation in lieu of sentencing
him. In cases where a specific enactment
enacted after the Probation Act, prescribes a
74
[(2004) 4 SCC 590] State Through S.P., New Delhi vs Ratan Lal Arora

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minimum sentence of imprisonment, the

provisions of the Probation Act cannot be
invoked if the Special Act contains any
provision to enforce the same without
reference to any other Act containing the
provision in derogation of the special
enactment. The result is that there is no
scope for extending the benefit of the
Probation Act to the accused of the offence of
land grabbing.

(xii) With this, it was argued that no

standard sentencing policy can be claimed,
inasmuch as, while sentencing, the right to be
informed of the mitigating circumstances
against the accused person has been taken away
by providing minimum sentence for the offence
of "land grabbing". It has a savaging effect
and cannot withstand the test of scrutiny
within the power of judicial review on the
principles of reasonableness.

(xiii) A decision of the Constitutional Court

of South Africa appended at page '146' of Part
I of the compilation given by Mr. Tejas Barot
has been placed before us to demonstrate that
the decisions of this Court in Bachan Singh67
and Jagmohan Singh vs The State Of U.P.75 have

75
[(1973) 1 SCC 20] Jagmohan Singh vs The State Of U.P.

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been noted therein. It was held therein that

the Legislature is not empowered to compel any
Court to pass a sentence, which is
inconsistent with the Constitution.

(xiv) Reference has been made to the

provisions of Prohibition of Dowry Act, 1961
(the "PD Act" for short) to submit that for
the minimum sentence provided therein,
discretion is left with the Court to reduce
for special reasons, and as such, the
provisions of PO Act may be applied.

(xv) The submission, thus, is that striking a

balance on the principle of proportionality,
minimum mandatory sentence of 10 years'
rigorous imprisonment to offender under the
Land Grabbing Act' 2020 which results in the
deprivation of right to life to an offender is
to be read down, to give discretion to the
Courts to decide as to what would be the
proportionate sentence considering the gravity
of the offence and the degree of
responsibility of the offender in a given
case, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the said case. The Court may
be able to evaluate the gravity and mitigating
factors to prescribe a sentence, which is
proportionate and not excessive. The

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provision of sentencing under Section 4(3),

according to Mr. Barot, can be, thus, saved
from the vice of unconstitutionality, by
reading it down.

It was submitted that the Statement of

Object and Reasons of the Land Grabbing Act
shows that the Act has been enacted with a
laudable object to curb the acts or attempts
of Land Grabbing, creating third party rights
by sale or attempt to sale, etc. However,
the legislature remains oblivious of the small
offenders while prescribing a minimum
mandatory punishment of 10 years of
imprisonment, which is cruel and unusual
punishment. The assertion is that the whole
object of the Act' 2020 is to curb social evil
of grabbing of someone else's land. The PD
Act has also been brought with the laudable
object to curb social evil of demand of dowry.
Demand of dowry is a grave offence as it
affects the society at large, however, while
providing minimum sentence of six months, a
proviso has also been added giving liberty to
the Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment
for a term of less than six months, for
adequate and special reasons to be mentioned
in the judgment.

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(b) Usurpation of Power by Legislature in Providing

Sentencing Policy

(i) There is another limb of argument to

challenge the proportionality of sentence
under the Land Grabbing Act' 2020. It was
urged that disproportionate sentence,
excessive, cruel and harsh punishment is not a
question of overlapping, but it is usurpation
of judicial function. It was argued that in
providing minimum mandatory sentence, the
legislature has usurped the power of the Court
in the matter of sentencing policy. Reference
has been made to the decision of the Apex
Court in Bhim Singh vs U.O.I76 [(2010) 5 SCC
538]. As per the ratio of the said decision,
the concept of Separation of Powers, even
though not found in any particular
constitutional provision, but is inherent in
the polity the Constitution has adopted. The
aim of separation of powers is to achieve the
maximum extent of accountability of each
branch of the Government. The Separation of
Powers is an essential feature. While
understanding this concept, two aspects must
be borne in mind. One, that the separation of
powers is an essential feature of the
Constitution and two, in modern governance, a

76
[(2010) 5 SCC 538] Bhim Singh vs U.O.I

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strict separation is neither possible, nor

desirable. Nevertheless, till this principle
of accountability is preserved, there is no
violation of separation of powers.

(ii) Elaborating further, it was urged that

the doctrine of separation of powers has been
deliberated in the celebrated decisions in
Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala &
Another77, Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain78. The
Apex Court declared separation of powers to be
a part of basic structure of the Constitution.
It was held that a legislation which upsets
the balance between the various organs of the
State, it takes over essential function of the
other branch, leading to lapse in
Constitutional accountability, falls foul of
the principle of separation of powers under
the Constitution.

(iii) Elaborating his submission, it was

argued that the experience shows that the
Executive Committee constituted by the State
Government under Section 2(a) read with
Section 12(a) of the Act' 2020 while making
inquiry under the Rules' 2020 passes a
conditional order on the complaint of land

77
[(1973) 4 SCC 225] Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala & Another
78
[(1976) 3 SCC 321] Indira Gandhi vs. Raj Narain

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grabbing asking the accused person to

surrender the land occupied by him within a
certain period or else FIR is lodged. The
Committee of Executives cannot be expected to
understand the nuances of law, the disputed
questions of title or right in the property
cannot be decided by the Committee. However,
ample power has been given to the Committee in
the inquiry by virtue of Rule 5(4)(5) of
Rules' 2020 to conclude on the question of
land title and occupation of land in
unauthorised manner with the use of force,
threat, etc. The result is that the Committee
is conferred with the decision making power
which is otherwise to be exercised by judicial
Court.

(iv) With the aid of the said decision, it was

argued that if the language of Rule 5 Sub-Rule
(4) and Sub-Rule (7) of the Rules' 2020, made
in the Land Grabbing Act, 2020 are read and
interpreted, they not only overlap judicial
functions of the Court to decide on the
question of title and/or the act of land
grabbing, but the Executive Committee takes
over the essential function of judicial branch
of the State, leading to lapse in
Constitutional accountability. In the result,

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the task entrusted to the Committee to decide

the question of title and/or the act of land
grabbing is violative of the principle of
separation of powers and, thus, the basic
structure of the Constitution. Moreover, the
said Rules framed by the legislature are
excessive delegation of power to the
Committee, which otherwise has been entrusted
to the Court under the main enactment, namely,
the Land Grabbing Act.

The submission is that the enabling

provisions in the Act' 2020 are under Section
2(a) and 12 and the Rules framed by the State
must fulfill the purpose of the Act' 2020.
However, since the scope and extent of the
power is not set out in the Act, the Rules
travel beyond the provisions of the Act' 2020.
Rules are not in conformity with the Act'
2020, inasmuch as, the enabling provisions are
silent on the conferment of power to the
Committee.

Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 confers quasi

judicial power to the Collector or the State
Government in taking suo motu cognizance and
action against a person who has allegedly
grabbed the land and is a "headstrong person".
The word "headstrong person" has not been

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defined under the Rule and surprisingly, used

in the Rules, though there is no reference of
the said word in the entire Act. The
discretion given to the Collector to decide as
to who would be a 'headstrong person', thus,
is unguided and unbridled. For the above
reasons, the Rules' 2020 framed under the Act
suffer from the vice of excessive delegation.

(v) Reliance is placed on the decision of the

Apex Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh and
Another vs Baldeo Prasad79 to submit that in
the similar circumstances, the Apex Court
while considering the validity of the Central
Provinces and Berar Goondas Act X of 1946 (in
short "Goonda Act') as amended by the Madhya
Pradesh Act XLIX of 1950, has held that where
a statute empowers the specified authorities
to take preventive action against the
citizens, it is essential that it should
expressly make it a part of the duty of the
said authorities to satisfy themselves about
the existence of what the statute regards as
conditions precedent to the exercise of the
said authority. If the statute is silent in
respect of one of such conditions precedent it
undoubtedly constitutes a serious infirmity
which would inevitably take it out of the
79
[AIR 1961 SC 293] Madhya Pradesh and Another vs Baldeo Prasad

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provisions of Art. 19(5). The result of this

infirmity is such that it has left to the
unguided and unfettered discretion of the
authority concerned to treat any citizen as a
goonda (a 'headstrong person' under the Rules'
2020 framed under the Act' 2020).

(c) Vesting Of Discretion In Authorities

276. It was urged that vesting of discretion in

authorities in exercise of power under an
enactment does not by itself entail
contravention of Article 14. However, what is
objectionable is conferment of arbitrary and
uncontrolled discretion without any guidelines
whatsoever with regard to the exercise of that
discretion. The enactment must prescribe the
guidelines for the furtherance of the objects
of the enactment and it is within the
framework of those guidelines that the
authorities can use their discretion in the
exercise of the powers conferred upon them.
The discretion which is absolute, uncontrolled
and without any guidelines in the exercise of
powers can easily degenerate into
arbitrariness.

277. It was contended that the Apex Court has added

a word of caution in the State Of Punjab And

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vs Khan Chand80 that when individuals act

according to their sweet will, there is bound
to be an element of 'pick and choose'
according to the notion of the individuals. If
a Legislature bestows such untrammeled
discretion on the authorities acting under an
enactment, it abdicates its essential function
for such discretion is bound to result in
discrimination which is the negation and
antithesis of the ideal of equality before law
as enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution. It is no answer to the above
that the executive officers are presumed to be
reasonable men who do not stand to gain in the
abuse of their power and can be trusted to use
"discretion" with discretion. It was noted by
the Apex Court therein that the point is that
no one ought to be trusted with power without
restraint. Where after scrutiny court finds
that the statute provides for the delegation
of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the
Government so as to enable it to discriminate
between persons or things similarly situate
and that, therefore, the discrimination is
inherent in the statute itself. In such a
case, the Court will strike down both the law
as well as the executive action under such

80
[1974 (1) SCC 549] State Of Punjab And vs Khan Chand

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law.

278. Referring the Sub-Rule (8) of Rule 5, which

empowers the Committee to decide the further
course of action on consideration of the
inquiry report, including filing of the FIR,
it was urged that the said Rule also gives
excessive power to the Committee to decide as
to whether action is to be initiated against a
person alleged to be a land grabber, more so
when the power to take cognizance of a
complaint of land grabbing either suo motu or
on application of a person, has been conferred
upon the Special Court under the Act.
Reference has been made to the following
decisions of the Apex Court :-

Sr. Name of Parties Citation

No.
1. Lala Hari Chand Sarda vs. Mizo AIR 1967 SC 829
District Council
2. The State of Punjab vs. Khan (1974) 1 SCC 549
Chand
3. Air India vs. Nergesh Meerza (1981) 4 SCC 335
4. Indian Express News Papers (1985) 1 SCC 641
(Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union
of India and Ors.
5. State of Tamil Nadu vs. P. (2006) 4 SCC 517
Krishnamurthy

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(d) Unbridled and untrammeled discretion leads to

arbitrariness

279. It was submitted that the subordinate

legislation can be challenged on the ground of
unreasonableness and that it must confirm to
the statute, however, same degree of immunity
is not available to the subordinate
legislation. It was further argued that the
arbitrariness in the constitution of Committee
for which no guidelines have been provided
under the Act, would make the constitution of
Committee unconstitutional.

280. Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Advocate General

for the State, in rebuttal, would submit that
mens rea is an essential ingredient of Section
4(2) of the Land Grabbing Act and the same is
expressly included within the scope of the
said provision, with the use of expression
"grabbed land", which is otherwise referred to
section 2(e) defining the term "land
grabbing". With the words "with a view to
illegally taking possession or creating
illegal tenancies, etc. or by constructing
unauthorised structures thereon for sale, etc.
or use or occupation of such unauthorized
constructions", the presence of mens rea that
is implied in the statute, creating "land

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grabbing" an offence in line with the object

and purpose of the Act, can be gathered.

281. Assailing the contentions of the learned

counsel for the petitioners on the principle
of proportionality of punishment, reliance is
placed the decisions of the Apex Court in
Vikram Singh @ Vicky & Anr vs Union Of India 81
and Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of
Maharashtra82 to submit that interference in
the sentencing policy on the principle of
proportionality, i.e. disproportionate
punishment is extremely rare, inasmuch as, it
is the legislature's work to decide on the
sentencing considering the circumstances in
which law was made. Judicial interference in
the sentencing policy is confined to the
contours of grossly disproportionate, harsh,
cruel and unreasonable in rare cases. In
Indian perspective, the said principles laid
down in Bachan Singh67 and Mithu69 by the Apex
Court cannot apply as a general principle.

282. With the aid of the decision in Vikram Singh @

Vicky81, wherein the vires of Section 364A
inserted in Indian Penal Code, which
prescribed death sentence for anyone found

81
[(2015) 9 SCC 502] Vikram Singh @ Vicky & Anr vs Union Of India
82
[(2019) 16 SCC 380] Raju Jagdish Paswan v. State of Maharashtra

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guilty for ransom was subject matter of

challenge. It was argued that the Apex Court
has drawn a line therein by applying the
principle that a presumption is attached to
the law enacted by Parliament or State
Legislature within their respective
legislative fields specified under the
Constitution. It was observed that in a
parliamentary democracy like ours, the
legislatures are meant to cater to the
societal demands and meet the challenges of
the time, for the legislature is presumed to
be supremely wise and aware of such needs and
challenges of the time. The means for
redressing a mischief are also in the realm of
legislation and so long as those means are not
violative of the constitutional provisions or
the fundamental rights of the citizens, the
Courts will show deference towards them.
However, this does not mean that laws that are
outrageously barbaric or penalties that are
palpably inhuman or shockingly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offence
for which the same are prescribed cannot be
interfered with. However, the Courts are
bound but not free to apply a fanciful
procedure to examine the reasonableness or
proportionality.

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283. It was placed that the guiding principles for

determining whether the sentence is
disproportionate to the offence, culled out
therein from the previous decisions of the
Apex Court, is that prescribing punishment for
crimes rests with the legislature and not
Courts and that Courts ought to show deference
to the wisdom of the Legislature. It was
placed that the aforesaid principle has been
drawn on consideration of the decisions of the
US Supreme Court on the application of Eighth
amendment of US Constitution. It was held
therein that the Eighth amendment does not
mandate adoption of any one penalogical theory
and the principle that guide criminal
sentencing have varied with the times.
Proportionality review by the Federal Courts
must be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent. It was, thus,
concluded that prescribing punishments is the
function of the legislature and not the
Courts. The Legislature is presumed to be
supremely wise and aware of the needs of the
people and the measures that are necessary to
meet those ends. Courts cannot interfere with
the prescribed punishment only because the
punishment is perceived to be excessive.

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284. In Raju Jagdish Paswan82, the principles of

proportionality recognised by the Apex Court
in Vikram Singh @ Vicky81, were noted and
applied to examine the question whether the
death penalty imposed on the appellant therein
was disproportionate to the crime committed by
him. It was submitted that, however, the
decisions rendered in capital cases are not of
much assistance while deciding the
constitutionality of punishments in non-
capital cases.

285. With the aid of the observations of the Apex

Court in paragraph '43' in Vikram Singh @
Vicky81 , with reference to the US Supreme Court
decision in Herman Solem v. Jerry Buckley
Helm83, it was submitted that the Apex Court
has noted therein that outside the context of
capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of sentences were
extremely rare. However, it does not mean that
proportionality analysis was entirely
inapplicable to the non-capital cases. In any
case, the courts have jurisdiction to
interfere with the punishment prescribed by
applying the principle of judicial review
keeping in mind the basic structure of the
constitution of separation of power. Judicial
83 [1983 SCC Online USSC 1556] Herman Solem v. Jerry Buckley Helm

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interference in the sentencing policy cannot

be casual and is to be invoked in a case where
the sentence is so outrageously
disproportionate, abhorrent or intolerable, so
excessive as to outrage standards of decency.

286. The attention of the Court is invited to the

observations of the Apex Court in Prakash
Kadam vs Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr 84,
where the Apex Court has observed that the
worst state of affairs possible in society is
the state of lawlessness. When the rule of law
collapses, it is replaced by the law of the
jungle. There is nothing worse in the world
than lawlessness and it is the duty of the
King carrying the rod of punishment to protect
the earth so that the strong persons do not
destroy the weaker ones, just like in water
the big fish eat the small fish. The Apex
Court therein had noted these principles from
the statement of ancient thinkers, such as
Kautilya in Matsyapurana.

287. The learned Advocate General has further

placed several Sections of Indian Penal Code,
providing for mandatory minimum sentence, to
submit that none of them have so far been held
to be unusual or disproportionate. There are
84
[2011 (6) SCC 189] Prakash Kadam vs Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr

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punishments ranging from minimum sentence of 6

months to 7 years or so. There are various
provisions where minimum sentence has not been
provided as the Sections prescribes for
imprisonment of either description with
maximum punishment. All these offences
carrying punishment having minimum sentence or
prescribing only maximum sentence are the
creature of the legislature depending upon the
nature and gravity of the offence. There is
no general rule that merely because of
prescribing mandatory sentence, the Courts can
hold that the legislature has overreached its
jurisdiction or encroached upon the
jurisdiction of the judicial courts.

288. It was urged that applying the principle that

prescribing punishments is the function of the
legislature and not the courts, the arguments
of Mr. Tejas Barot, learned advocate for the
petitioners on the doctrine of proportionality
and usurpation of power by the legislature in
prescribing minimum mandatory sentence of 10
years in a proven case of offence of land
grabbing being excessive, are liable to be
rejected, outrightly.

289. Referring to the decisions placed by Mr.

Barot, learned advocate on Francis Coralie

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Mullin71, Bachan Singh67 and Mithu69 it was

argued that all these cases are
distinguishable, inasmuch as, the Apex Court
in those cases were dealing with extreme
punishment of death sentence or a provision in
the conditions of detention order regulating
the right of a detenue to have interview with
the legal adviser of his choice. In Mithu69,
the Court was dealing with the validity of
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, which
prescribes punishment with death for offence
of murder committed by a person who was under
a sentence of life imprisonment. Dealing with
the said punishment, while observing that
Section 303 excludes judicial discretion, it
was noted by the Apex Court that death
sentence even under Section 303 is an
alternative penalty, which could only be
imposed in "rarest of rare cases" leaving
discretion with the Courts to examine its
proportionality, in the facts of a given case.
The principle laid down therein, cannot be
applied to assail the constitutionality of
Section 4(2) and Section 5 providing for
minimum punishment of 10 years to be imposed
on a person found to be guilty of an offence
under the Land Grabbing Act.

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290. With reference to the decision in Herman Solem

v. Jerry Buckley Helm83, relied by the learned
counsel for the petitioners, it was urged that
the US Supreme Court in that case did not
strike down the punishment, rather analysed
the proportionality of the punishment imposed
by the competent court on the principle of
proportionality. It was urged that the ratio
of the decision referred and relied upon by
Mr. Barot are not applicable to the instant
case. The reference to the decision in
Shayara Bano33 on the principle of
proportionality is misplaced.

291. The decision in the State Of Punjab vs Dalbir

Singh66, is sought to be distinguished with the
observations in paragraphs '23' and '24'
therein to submit that the opinion drawn by
the Apex Court while examining the
constitutionality of Sections 27(3) providing
for punishment with death, cannot be brought
into service to decide the question of
validity of mandatory sentence of 10 years'
imprisonment for the offence under the Land
Grabbing Act. The Apex Court while upholding
the challenge to the validity of Section 27(3)
of the Arms Act by declaring it ultra vires

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the Constitution and void, has observed that

the said Section is very wide in the sense
anything done in contravention of Section 7 of
the Act and with the use of prohibited arms
and ammunition, resulting in death, will
attract the mandatory death penalty. A very
drastic provision which imposes a mandatory
death penalty is so widely worded to the
extent that if as a result of any accidental
or unintentional use or any accident arising
out of any act in contravention of Section 7,
death results, the only punishment, which has
to be mandatorily imposed on the person in
contravention, is "death" and the word
'results' means the outcome which is wider
than the expression 'causes'. Therefore, it
was held that very wide expression has been
used in Section 27(3) of the Act and without
any guidelines leading to mandatory punishment
of death penalty. With these arguments, it
was submitted by the learned Advocate General
that none of the decisions relied by the
petitioners can be made basis for exercise of
power of judicial review to examine the
gravity of the punishment prescribed by the
Legislature under the Land Grabbing Act.

(B) ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION:-

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(a) Proportionality doctrine and test of

reasonableness :-

292. Proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

has been highlighted by the Apex Court in Om
Kumar vs. Union of India85. Tracing
developments in the law on the doctrine of
proportionality, it was noted therein that the
principle originated in Prussia in the
nineteenth Century has since been adopted in
Germany, France and other European countries.
However, long before that the Indian Supreme
Court has applied the principle of
"proportionality" to the legislative action
since 1950. By "proportionality", the Court
meant the question whether while regulating
the exercise of fundamental rights, the
appropriate or least restrictive choice of
measures have been made by the legislature so
as to achieve the object of the legislation.
Under this principle, the Court will see that
the legislature "maintain a proper balance
between the adverse effects which the
legislation may have on the rights, liberties
or interests of persons keeping in mind the
purpose which they intended to serve". The
legislature, is however, given an area of
discretion or a range of choices, but as to

85
[(2001) 2 SCC 386] Om Kumar vs. Union of India

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whether the choice made infringes the rights

excessively or not is for the Court to
examine. That is what is meant by
"proportionality". It was further observed in
paragraph '30' as under :-

"30.....While dealing with the validity of

legislation infringing fundamental freedoms
enumerated in Article 19(1) of the
Constitution of India-such as freedom of
speech and expression, freedom to assessable
peacably, freedom to form associations and
unions, freedom to move freely throughout the
territory of India, freedom to reside and
settle in any part of India-this court had
occasion to consider whether the restrictions
imposed by legislation were disproportionate
to the situation and were not the least
restrictive of the choices. The burden of
proof to show that the restriction was
reasonable lay on the State. 'Reasonable
restrictions' under Article 19(2) to (6) could
be imposed on these freedoms only by
legislation and Courts had occasion throughout
to consider the proportionality of the
restrictions. In numerous judgments of this
court, the extent to which 'reasonable
restrictions' could be imposed was
considered..."

"...'Reasonable' implied intelligent care and

deliberations, that is, the choice of a course
which reason dictated. Legislation which
arbitrarily or excessively invaded the right
could not be said to contain the quality of
reasonableness unless it struck a proper
balance between the rights guaranteed and the
control permissible under Article 19(2) to
(6). Otherwise, it must be held to be wanting

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in that quality..."

293. Further, the Apex Court while noticing its

previous decision in State of Madras vs V.G.
Row86, has noted that the Court must keep in
mind, "nature of the right alleged to have
been infringed, the underlying purpose of the
restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency
of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the
prevailing conditions at the time..". The
relevant paragraphs '31' and '32' are
extracted herein as under:-

"31. Article 21 guarantees liberty and has

also been subjected to principles of
'proportionality'. Provisions of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1974 and the Indian Penal Code
came up for consideration in Bachan Singh v.
State of Punjab, the majority upholding the
legislation. The dissenting judgment of
Bhagwati J (See Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab) dealt elaborately with
'proportionality' and held that the punishment
provided by the statute was disproportionate.

32. So far as Article 14 is concerned, the

Courts in India examined whether the
classification was based on intelligible
differentia and whether the differentia had a
reasonable nexus with the object of the
legislation. Obviously, when the Court
considered the question weather the
classification was based on intelligible
differentia, the Courts were examining the

86
[AIR 1952 SC 196] State of Madras vs V.G. Row

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validity of the differences and the adequacy

of the differences. This is again nothing but
the principle of proportionality. There are
also cases where legislation or rules have
been struck down as being arbitrary in the
sense of being unreasonable See Air India v.
Nergesh Meerza and Ors.. [1981] 4 SCC 335 at
372-373. But this latter aspect of striking
down legislation only on the basis of
'arbitrariness' has been doubted in State of
A.P. v. Mc Dowell and Co., [1996] 3 SCC 709.

It is, thus, stated therein that the

reasonableness doctrine of classification
based on intelligible differentia having nexus
the object of the legislation is nothing but
the principle of proportionality.

294. Thus, it is to be noted that the doctrine of

proportionality and the principle of
reasonableness of restrictions "based on
intelligible differentia are interchangeable
or overlapping concepts". The principle that
the legislation relating to restrictions on
fundamental freedoms could be tested on the
anvil of "proportionality" is the settled
position of law. As noted hereinbefore, a
"primary review" by the Courts of the validity
of legislation, which offended fundamental
freedoms, is made on the principle of
proportionality.

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(b) Proportionality and Sentencing under Criminal

Law:-

295. The submission of Mr. Tejas Barot, learned

advocate for the petitioners is that the
concept of principle of proportionality in
sentencing was brought in India and was taken
into account for the first time in the
decision of the Apex Court in Francis Coralie
Mullin71 to test the validity of certain clauses
of the conditions of detention order. It may
be noted that the Apex Court therein was
dealing with the fundamental rights of the
detenue under Conservation of Foreign Exchange
& Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act
(COFEPOSA Act), to have interview with the
lawyer and the members of his family, which
were restricted by Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of
Clause 3(b) of the COFEPOSA Act.

296. While testing the validity of the said

restriction, it was noted by the Apex Court
that the preventive detention is not by way of
punishment, but it is intended to preempt a
person from indulging in a conduct injurious
to the society. It is a drastic power to
detain a person without trial and the
Constitution though recognised the existence
of this power, but it is hedged in by various

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safeguards set out in Articles 21 and 22. It

is a power to be exercised with greatest care
and caution and the Courts have to be ever
vigilant to see that the power is not abused
or misused.

297. It was observed therein that the restriction

placed on a person preventively detained
(detenue) must consistently with the
effectiveness of detention, be minimal. The
question that whether a person preventively
detained in a prison has any rights which he
can enforce in a Court of law was considered
and answered with the aid of the decision in
Sunil Batra68. It was observed that the
prisoner or the detenue has all the
fundamental rights and other legal rights
available to a free person, save those which
are incapable of enjoyment by reason of
incarceration. The Apex Court elaborating on
the right to life enshrined in Article 21
stated that it cannot be restricted to mere
animal existence. The right to life includes
the right to live with human dignity and every
act which offends against or impairs human
dignity would have to be in accordance with
reasonable, fair and just procedure
established by law which stands the test of

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other fundamental rights. As a necessary

component of the right to life, the detenue
would be entitled to have interviews with the
members of his family and friends and no
prison regulation or procedure laid down by
prison regulation regulating the right to have
interviews with the members of the family or
friends. It was further observed that when an
under-trial prisoner or convicted prisoner is
permitted to have interview with his relatives
and friends, as per the Rules, the restriction
imposed under the condition of detention order
is unreasonable and arbitrary, particularly
when a detenu stands on higher pedestal than
an under-trial prisoner or a convict. With
these words, the Apex Court while applying the
doctrine of proportionality, has held the
provisions as violative of Articles 14 and 21,
unconstitutional and void.

298. In the case of Mithu69, the Court was testing

the validity of Section 303 of the IPC when it
applied the principle of reasonableness and
doctrine of proportionality in prescribing
sentence on the anvil of Article 21. The
question considered therein was whether the
sentence of death prescribed by Section 303 of
the IPC for the offence of murder committed by

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a person who is under a sentence of life

imprisonment, is arbitrary and oppressive so
as to be violative of the fundamental rights
conferred by Article 21. It was noted that
the normal sentence for murder is life
imprisonment; and if the death sentence has to
be imposed, the Court is under a legal
obligation under Section 354(3) of the
Criminal Procedure Code to state the special
reasons for imposing the sentence of death.
Section 302, thus, provides for the sentence
of death as an alternative sentence, which may
be imposed for special reasons to be stated by
the Court for departure from the normal rule.

299. In the matter of sentencing, there is no

rational distinction between a person who
commits a murder after serving out sentence of
life imprisonment while a person who commits a
murder who is still under that sentence. The
distinction between two classes proceeds upon
irrelevant considerations and bears no nexus
with the objects of the statute, viz. the
imposition of mandatory sentence of death.
Both have to be treated alike in the matter of
prescription of punishment and whatever
safeguards and benefits are available to the
latter must be made available to the former.

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The minimum mandatory sentence of death

provided under Section 303, IPC was, thus,
held to be violative of Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution of India.

300. The observations that the standardised

mandatory sentence and that too in the form of
sentence of death fails to take into account
the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, was made in the above noted facts and
circumstances of the said case.

301. It cannot be culled out from the ratio of the

said decision that a general principle has
been laid down in the matter of minimum
mandatory sentence by the legislature. The
observations in the said case that the
legislature cannot deprive the Courts of their
legitimate jurisdiction to exercise their
discretion not to impose the death sentence in
appropriate cases, compel them to shut their
eyes to the mitigating circumstances and
inflict upon them the dubious and
unconscionable duty of imposing a preordained
sentence of death, have been made in the
nature of sentencing provision under Section
303 IPC.

302. The ratio in Mithu69 cannot applied to hold

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that the legislature has no power to provide

minimum mandatory sentence for criminal
offence by legislative process. Rather, in
Mithu69, the Court has noted the observation in
the decision of Jagmohan Singh75 ,
as follows:-

“The impossibility of laying down standards is

at the very core of the criminal law as
administered in India which invests the judges
with a very wide discretion in the matter of
fixing the degree of punishment...."
(Ref. Para 16 Mithu69)

303. In Bachan Singh67, there was challenge to the

constitutional validity of the death penalty
provided in Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code read with Section 353(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The doctrine of
proportionality, basic requirement of the
equality clause enshrined in Article 14, the
law pertaining to interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment of the US Constitution, prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, were
considered in view of the gravity of the
sentence which deprives a person of his right
to live. However, it is pertinent to note
that the argument in Bachan Singh67 that the
lack of legislative guidelines to direct
Courts in choosing between the two alternative
punishments in Section 302 amounted to
unlawful delegation of the legislative

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function to the judiciary, was rejected and

the majority has agreed that the imposition of
standards of tailoring the judicial discretion
as to sentence, was a legislative function.

304. The decision placed before us in the

compilation is a dissenting opinion of Hon'ble
Bhagwati, J. The observation therein that the
death penalty is barbaric, cruel and inhuman
and opposed to civilised social values, are of
no assistance, in the instant case, in view of
the nature of offence subject matter of
consideration herein. The standards on which
the sentence of death penalty has been tested
by the Apex Court in Bachan Singh67 cannot be
applied by us to hold that the sentence of 10
years' imprisonment for the offence of "Land
Grabbing" is excessive or inhuman treatment.

305. Coming to the concept of proportionality

principle applied by the US Supreme Court in
Herman Solem83, suffice it to note that the
test of proportionality under the Eight
Amendment, as held therein, is guided by
objective criterias noted hereinbefore. The
said test was applied by the US Supreme Court
to assess the punishment awarded holding that
the Courts should be guided by objective
factors, such as gravity of the offence and

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the harshness of penalty while examining the

question that the punishment is
disproportionate to the offence committed.

306. The judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court in

R vs. Nur70 while observing that mandatory
minimum sentences, by their very nature, have
the potential to depart from the principle of
proportionality in sentencing, and violates
the principle of proportionality, has
recognised the wisdom of Parliamentary
Committee. It has been held therein that
mandatory minimum sentence in Section 95(2) of
the Criminal Code were part of a suite of
legislative changes put forward as “a direct
response to the scourge of handgun crime that
plagues our country”. Observing that the
Parliament's choice to raise the mandatory
minimum in Section 95 must be understood as a
choice reflecting valid and pressing
objectives, it was held therein that it is not
for the Court to frustrate the same.

(c) Legislative Supremacy and Power of Judicial

Review:-

307. All the above noted decisions relied by the

learned counsel for the petitioners have been
considered by the Apex Court in Vikram Singh81,
while dealing with the Constitutional validity

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of Section 364-A IPC providing for the

punishment of death or imprisonment of life
for the offence of kidnapping for ransom. The
decision of the US Supreme Court in Ronald
Allen Harmelin v. Michigan87 has been noted to
record that the US Supreme Court has revisited
the approach to be adopted while determining
the question of constitutionality of sentences
for non-capital offences. Based on a
conspectus of the decisions including Herman
Solem83, the Court has formulated some common
principles applicable in a situation that
required examination of limits of
proportionality. The principles culled out in
paragraphs '47.1 to 47.4' in Vikram Singh81
from the decision of the Apex Court in
Harmelin87 are relevant to be extracted
hereunder :-

"47.1 The first principle culled out from

the decisions earlier pronounced by the Court
was that prescribing punishment for crimes
rests with the legislature and not Courts and
that Courts ought to show deference to the
wisdom of the legislature. The Court observed:

“58. The first of these principles is that

the fixing of prison terms for specific
crimes involves a substantive penological
judgment that, as a general matter, is
“properly within the province of
legislatures, not courts.” Rumel, supra,
87
[1991 SCC OnLine USSC 129] US Supreme Court in Ronald Allen Harmelin v. Michigan

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at 275-276, 63 L Ed2d 382, 100 S Ct 1133.

Determinations about the nature and
purposes of punishment for criminal acts
implicate difficult and enduring questions
respecting the sanctity of the individual,
the nature of law, and the relation
between law and the social order. “As a
moral or political issue [the punishment
of offenders] provokes intemperate
emotions, deeply conflicting interests and
intractable disagreements.” D. Garland,
Punishment and Modern Society 1 (1990).
The efficacy of any sentencing system
cannot be assessed absent agreement on the
purposes and objectives of the penal
system. And the responsibility for making
these fundamental choices and implementing
them lies with the legislature. See Gore
v. United States [51 US 999] 357 US 386,
393, 2 L Ed 2d 1405, 78 S Ct 1280 (1958)
(“whatever views may be entertained
regarding severity of punishment, whether
one believes in its efficacy or its
futility…these are peculiarly questions of
legislative policy). Thus, “[r]eviewing
courts…should grant substantial deference
to the broad authority that legislatures
necessarily possess in determining the
types and limits of punishments for
crimes.” Solem, supra, at 290, 77 L Ed 2d
637, 103 S Ct 3001. See also Rummel,
supra, at 274, 63 L Ed 2d 382, 100 S Ct
1133 (acknowledging “reluctance to review
legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment”); Weems, supra, at 379, 54 L
Ed 793, 30 S Ct 544 (“The function of the
legislature is primary, its exercises
fortified by presumptions of right and
legality, and is not to be interfered with
lightly, nor by any judicial conception of
their wisdom or propriety”).

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47.2 The second principle recognised by the

Court was that the Eight Amendment does not
mandate adoption of any one penological theory
and that principles that guide criminal
sentencing have varied with the times.

47.3 The third principle recognised that

divergences, both in underlying theories of
sentencing and in the length of prescribed
prison terms, is inevitable, because of the
federal structure.

47.4 The fourth principle shaped by the court

was that proportionality review by federal
courts must be informed by objective factors
to the maximum possible extent. While saying
so, the Court held that penalty of death
differs from all other forms of criminal
punishments and that the easiest comparison
between different sentences is the comparison
between capital punishment and non capital
punishment. The decision also recognised that
objective standards to distinguish between
sentences for different terms of years are
lacking with the result that outside the
context of capital punishment, successful
challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences are exceedingly rare. The
Court summed-up in the following
words(Harmelin case, SCC Online US SC 63):

“[3b] All of these principles – the

primacy of the legislature, the variety of
legitimate penological schemes, the nature
of our federal system, and the requirement
that proportionality review be guided by
objective factors – inform the final one:
The Eighth Amendment does not require
strict proportionality between crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme
sentences that are “grossly
disproportionate.....”

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308. It is noted in paragraph '48' with the aid of

the decision in Ewing v. California88 [2003 SCC
Online US SC 16] that a sentence can have a
variety of justifications, such as
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or
rehabilitation. Some or all of these
justifications may play a role in a State's
sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing
rationales is generally a policy choice to be
made by State legislatures, and not the
federal courts. The Canadian view on the
principle of proportionality of sentence in R
v. Smith89 was noted as:-

“In assessing whether a sentence is grossly

disproportionate, the court must first
consider the gravity of the offence, the
personal characteristics of the offender and
the particular circumstances of the case in
order to determine what range of sentences
would have been appropriate to punish,
rehabilitate or deter this particular offender
or to protect the public from this particular
offender. The other purposes which may be
pursued by the imposition of punishment, in
particular the deterrence of other potential
offenders, are thus not relevant at this stage
of the inquiry. This does not mean that the
judge or the legislator can no longer consider
general deterrence or other penological
purposes that go beyond the particular
offender in determining a sentence, but only
that the resulting sentence must not be

88
[2003 SCC Online US SC 16] Ewing v. California
89
[(1987) (1) SCR 1045 (Can SC)] R v. Smith

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grossly disproportionate to what the offender

deserves.”
(Ref. Para 49 of Vikram Singh81)

The conclusion drawn by the Apex Court in

the case of Vikram Singh81, are to be noted
hereinunder:-

"52. To sum up:

52.1 Punishments must be proportionate to the

nature and gravity of the offences for which
the same are prescribed.

52.2 Prescribing punishments is the function

of the legislature and not the Courts.

52.3 The legislature is presumed to be

supremely wise and aware of the needs of the
people and the measures that are necessary to
meet those needs.

52.4 Courts show deference to the legislative

will and wisdom and are slow in upsetting the
enacted provisions dealing with the quantum of
punishment prescribed for different offences.
52.5 Courts, however, have the jurisdiction
to interfere when the punishment prescribed is
so outrageously disproportionate to the
offence or so inhuman or brutal that the same
cannot be accepted by any standard of decency.

52.6 Absence of objective standards for

determining the legality of the prescribed
sentence makes the job of the Court reviewing
the punishment difficult.

52.7 Courts cannot interfere with the

prescribed punishment only because the
punishment is perceived to be excessive.

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52.8 In dealing with questions of

proportionality of sentences, capital
punishment is considered to be different in
kind and degree from sentence of imprisonment.
The result is that while there are several
instances when capital punishment has been
considered to be disproportionate to the
offence committed, there are very few and rare
cases of sentences of imprisonment being held
disproportionate."

309. Considering the circumstances which guided the

legislation in providing for grave punishment
of death in the offence of kidnapping and
abduction for ransom, the need to bring
Section 364A IPC because of the increasing
incidents of kidnapping and abduction for
ransom, it was held therein that the concern
shown by the Parliament for the safety and
security of the citizens and the unity,
sovereignty and integrity of the country, the
punishment prescribed for those committing any
act contrary to Section 364A cannot be dubbed
as so outrageously disproportionate to the
nature of the offence as to call for the same
being declared unconstitutional.

310. In Raju Jagdish Paswan82, the Apex Court has

observed that in the line of decisions ranging
from Herman Solem v. Jerry Buckley Helm83,
Harmelin v. Michigan87 of US Supreme Court and
Vikram Singh81, the proportionality review is

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applicable to the cases involving death

sentence on the principle that punishment must
be proportionate to the nature and gravity of
offence. The legislative supremacy in the
sentencing policy is based on the principle of
separation of power in a parliamentary
democracy like ours, where the legislature are
meant to cater to the societal demands and
meet the challenges of the time. The
presumption attached to the law enacted by
Parliament or State Legislature within their
respective legislative field specified under
the Constitution is that the legislature is
presumed to be supremely wise and aware of
such needs and challenges. The means for
redressing a mischief are also in the realm of
legislation and so long as those means are not
violative of the constitutional provisions or
the fundamental rights of the citizens, the
Courts will show deference towards them.

311. We may also take note of the view expressed by

the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in
State of Madras vs V.G. Row86: -

"...It is important in this context to bear in

mind that the test of reasonableness, whereever
prescribed, should be applied to each
individual statute impugned, and no abstract
standard. or general pattern, of reasonableness
can be laid down as applicable to all cases.

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The nature of the right alleged to have been

infringed, the underlying purpose of the
restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of
the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing
conditions at the time, should all enter into
the judicial verdict. In evaluating such
elusive factors and forming their own
conception of what is reasonable, in all the
circumstances of a given case. it is inevitable
that the social philosophy and the scale of
values of the judges participating in the
decision should play an important part, and the
limit to their interference with legislative
judgment in such cases can only be dictated by
their sense of responsibility and self-
restraint and the sobering reflection that the
Constitution is meant not only for people of
their way of thinking but for all, and that the
majority of the elected representatives of the
people have, in authorising the imposition of'
the restrictions, considered them to be
reasonable."

312. From the above discussion, it can be seen that

the Courts have set a very high bar for what
constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment".
This well settled principle is that the Court
should be careful not to stigmatise every
sentence alleged as disproportionate or
excessive as unconstitutional. The sentencing
policy of the State is guided by various
penalogical theory and consideration of
objective factors to prescribe a sentence for
criminal offence are guided by the societal
conditions that are prevailing at the time,

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the extent and urgency of the evil sought to

be remedied thereby. From the statement of
objects and reasons of bringing the Land
Grabbing Act, as noted hereinbefore, it can be
seen that punishment was proposed for offences
in connection with land grabbing as a
deterrence, for effectively implementing the
Act. The Act aims to prohibit lawlessness on
account of illegal claims over the other
owner's property, whether the owner be
Government or a private individual.
Deprivation of a private individual from the
land or property of his ownership though fall
in the category of offences against property,
but such act results in causing not only
mental injury to the owner, results in
deprivation of his livelihood, social status,
right to augment his income etc. and, thus,
his right to live with dignity. The fact that
a land owner has been deprived of his right to
occupy and use his property or land, which is
elevated to the level of a human right under
Article 300A of the Constitution of India,
though can be pressed against State or its
instrumentality, but it cannot be ignored by
us while dealing with the submissions of the
learned counsel for the petitioners on the
proportionality of the sentence of 10 years

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imprisonment.

313. The assertion of the learned Counsel for the

petitioners that similar punishment has been
provided to different classes of offenders,
such as an offender occupying a small piece of
land and a land mafia and, thus, they have
been put on the same pedestal, does not
impress us, inasmuch as, the offence is "land
grabbing", which results in deprivation of a
person of the land or property of his
ownership. The area or location of the
"grabbed land", within the meaning of Section
2(e) would not make any distinction in the
nature of offence. There cannot be
distinction between the "land grabber", who
has occupied a small piece of land illegally
and a "land mafia" who has occupied a large
tract of land illegally. Both of them would
fall within the meaning of "land grabber"
under Section 2(e) of the Act' 2020 and cannot
be distinguished depending upon the area or
location of the "grabbed land".

314. It is settled that a sentence should be

similar to sentences imposed on similar
offenders for similar offences committed in
similar circumstances. Moreover, any such
interpretation of distincting while testing

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the validity of statutory provision would

result in absurdity and has to be avoided as
such.

315. In conclusion, it may be said that the

Parliament and the legislature, composed as
they are the representative of the people, are
supposed to know and be aware of the need of
the people and what is good and bad for them.
The Court cannot sit in judgement over their
wisdom.

316. In view of the above discussion, the challenge

to the validity of Section 4(5) and Section 5
of the Land Grabbing Act' 2020 providing for a
minimum sentence of imprisonment of 10 years
for the offence of "land grabbing" cannot be
said to suffer from the vice of
constitutionality on the principle of
proportionality and usurpation of power.

Part IV - Mens rea and Retrospesctivity - violation

of Article 20 of the Constitution :-

317. It was argued by Mr. Barot that there is a

complete absence of mens rea in imposing
liability for the act of land grabbing. Mens
rea is clearly and by necessary implication
has been excluded from the meaning of the
words "activity of land grabbing" assigned in

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Section 2(e) and the word "land grabber" under

Section 2(d), when it speaks of inclusion of
successors in interest in the definition. It
was urged that a person who has succeeded any
piece of land alleged to be "grabbed land",
cannot be held liable for the criminal act, if
any, done by his predecessor. There can be no
vicarious liability as criminal liability
cannot pass on or inherited. Successors would
be guilty in absence of mens rea from a
combined reading of Section 2(d) and Section
4(2), which includes, any person who continues
to be in occupation on or after commencement
of the Act' 2020.

318. It was contended that the actual act of land

grabbing may have happened prior to the
enforcement of the Act, but the person in
occupation on or after the commencement of the
Act has been included in the Act as alleged
"land grabber. The commission of criminal act
has a relation with the date of the incident
and the question as to whether any act
committed by anyone would fall within the
purview of the criminal offence has to be
determined with reference to the date of the
incident. "Land Grabbing" was never an
offence prior to 29.08.2020. Any person who
occupied the alleged "grabbed land" prior to

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the commencement of the Act' 2020, cannot be

held to be a "land grabber" by giving
retrospective effect to the definition of
"land grabber" under Section 2(d).

319. The judgment of the Apex Court in the State Of

Maharashtra vs Mayer Hans George90 has been
placed before us to urge that mens rea is an
essential ingredient of a criminal offence and
a master is not vicariously liable in the
absence of mens rea, for offences committed by
his servant and as such, cannot be held guilty
of the offence in absence of their knowledge.
The contention is that the said principle has
to be applied while interpreting the scope of
Section 2(d) of the Act' 2020. Moreover, the
Act while prescribing criminal offence by
excluding mens rea itself, is arbitrary.

320. Reference has further been made to the

decision in Brend v. Wood91 and Judgment in
Religare Finvest Ltd. vs. State of NCT of
Delhi92 to submit that the penal provision must
be strictly construed and no vicarious
liability in criminal law can be perceived
unless the statute takes that also within its
fold.
90
[1966 (1) SCR 123] State Of Maharashtra vs Mayer Hans George
91
[(1946) 110 J.P. 317] Brend v. Wood
92
[Criminal Appeal No. 2242 of 2023] Religare Finvest Ltd. vs. State of NCT of Delhi

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321. The decision of the Apex Court in M.Abbas Haji

vs. T.N. Channakeshava93 has been placed to
submit that legal heirs cannot be held guilty
of any offence and cannot be prosecuted for
criminal offence. Reference has been made to
the decision of the Apex Court in Ravula
Hariprasada Rao vs. State [1951 SCC 241] to
submit that it is utmost important for the
protection of liberty of a person that the
Court should always bear in mind that, unless
the statute, either clearly or by necessary
implication, rules out mens rea as a
constituent part of a crime, a defendant
should not be found guilty of an offence of
criminal law unless he got a guilty mind.
(Ref : Brend vs. Wood91)

322. Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Advocate

General, in rebuttal, would submit that mens
rea is an essential ingredient of Section 4(2)
and the same is expressly included within the
scope of the said provision, with the use of
expression "grabbed land", which is otherwise
referred to Section 2(e) defining the term
"land grabbing". Section 4(2) does not
exclude mens rea with respect to successor-in-
interest for the expression used in Section
4(2) that "a person continues to be in
93
[(2019) 9 SCC 606] M.Abbas Haji vs. T.N. Channakeshava

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occupation of grabbed land" shall be guilty of

an offence under the Act. Meaning thereby,
the ingredients of Section 2(e) have to be
satisfied for invocation of Section 4(2) of
the Act' 2020. Therefore, mere possession is
not sufficient to impose liability on such
successor in interest, but the ingredients
relating to continuous possession without
lawful entitlement and with a view to
illegally deal with the land by sale, illegal
construction or illegal tenancies, etc. are
required to be established. The decision of
the Apex Court in Konda Laxmana Bapuji61 has
been placed before us to draw our attention to
paragraphs '37 to 39', which have been
extracted in the foregoing part of this
judgment.

323. The intention of illegally taking possession

of such land or entering into anybody's land
for any of the purposes mentioned in Section
2(e) of the Act' 2020, must be averred and
proved by the prosecution to hold such person
as guilty of commission of criminal offence of
"land grabbing". It is further argued that
the expression "with or without use of force,
threat, etc." used in Section 2(e) provides as
to how and in what manner any activity can be
considered or termed as "land grabbing". The

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submission is that a combined reading of the

aforesaid provisions would show that if a land
has been grabbed over which the occupant has
no title, ownership or possession, by lawful
entitlement, with or without usage of force,
threat, deceit, etc. and with a view to deal
with the land by sale etc., such an act would
be the offence of "land grabbing" and such
land would be "grabbed land".

324. Before dealing with the submission pertaining

to mens rea, we may also take note of the
contentions of the petitioners that the land
grabbing has been made an offence with
retrospective effect. The argument is that
Section 4(2), which says that any person who
on or after the commencement of the Act' 2020
continues to be in occupation of a grabbed
land belonging to others, shall be guilty of
an offence under the Act.

325. Section 9(1) empowers the Special Court to

take suo motu cognizance or to take cognizance
on an application filed by any person to try
the cases arising out of any alleged act of
land grabbing with respect to the grabbed
land, whether before or after the commencement
of the Act' 2020. Section 17 makes
transactions which has taken place whether

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before or after the commencement of the Act,

in contravention of the Land Grabbing Act,
null and void, except to the extent ordered by
the Special Court. The expressions "on or
after the commencement of this Act" [Section
4(2)]; "whether before or after the
commencement of this Act" [Section 9(1)] and
Section 17; have the effect of imposing
criminal liability for the alleged continuing
wrong. It was urged that the expression "on or
after the commencement of the Act" or "whether
before or after the commencement of this Act"
cannot be read or construed to include
possession taken in the past, which resulted
in continued possession when the provision was
enacted. Section 4(2), 9(1) and 17 cannot
cover cases where possession has been taken or
transferred in the past, prior to the
enactment of the Act' 2020.

326. Reference has been made to the US Supreme

Court decision in Calder vs. Bull94 to submit
that ex-post facto clause cannot be upheld,
meaning thereby laws made to punish actions
done before the existence of such laws, and
which have not been declared crimes by
preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive and

94
[3 US 386 (1798)] Calder vs. Bull

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inconsistent with the fundamental principles

of a free Government.

327. Reference has been made to paragraph 342 of

the judgment in M Siddiq vs Mahant Suresh
Das95, famously known as "Ram Janmabhumi
Temple" case to submit that possessory title
is a wrong once committed. Continuing wrong
contemplate continuing source of injury, act
liable to the continuing injury. An act of
"land grabbing" is complete on the date of
actionable wrong and it is one time wrong.
Meaning thereby, in the case of "land
grabbing", offence is said to have been
committed once and for all, when the land is
grabbed. It is contended that continuing in
possession, in itself, is not an offence.
The submission is that the Land Grabbing Act
by making ex-post facto laws to provide for
criminal liability for the past act, which was
not a criminal offence prior to its
enforcement, is hit by Article 20 of the
Constitution of India.

328. Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, learned Advocate General

in rebuttal would submit that Section 4(2) is
not retrospective in nature. It does not seek
to punish an act of taking illegal possession
95
[2020 (1) SCC 1] M Siddiq vs Mahant Suresh Das

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committed prior to 29.08.2020, the date of the

enactment of the Act' 2020. All that it does
is, to punish an act of land grabbing, i.e.
factum of possession of "grabbed land" found
on or after coming into the force of the Act'
2020 on 29.08.2020. Reference has been made
to the decision of the Bombay High Court in
Syedna Taher Saifuddin vs. Tyebbhai Mossaji
Koicha96 and Mohanlal v. State of Rajasthan97.

329. It was submitted that the Act has a

prospective effect, inasmuch as, it has been
applied to a set of circumstances which
prevailed after the Act' 2020 came into force.
The operation of the statute is confined to
persons who can be termed to be a "land
grabber" within the meaning of Section 2(e),
after the Act' 2020 has been passed. With the
passing of the Act, the legislature only
intended to deal with the acts of land
grabbing which took place after the passing of
the Act' 2020 and it did not wish to interfere
with the rights, which had accrued or
liabilities which had been incurred prior to
the passing of this Act. It was submitted
that in the instant case, Article 20(1) would
have no application. The act of possession

96
[AIR 1953 Bombay 183] Syedna Taher Saifuddin vs. Tyebbhai Mossaji Koicha
97
[(2015) 6 SCC 222] Mohanlal v. State of Rajasthan

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has no with retrospective effect. No offence

is created under Section 4 of the Act' 2020
with retrospective effect. What is punishable
is possession of land without any lawful
entitlement thereto on or after 29.08.2020,
when the statute was enacted creating the
offence of land grabbing. The result is that
if a person is in the possession of the
"grabbed land" on the date when the Act' 2020
was enforced, he would commit the offence, for
on the said date he would have both the
"corpus" and "animus", necessary in law". The
Statute cannot be said to be retrospective
because a part of the requisites for its
actions is drawn from a time antecedent to its
passing.

330. Dealing with these submissions of the learned

counsels for the parties, when we have gone
through the offending provisions of the
enactment, namely Land Grabbing Act, 2020 as
placed the learned counsel for the
petitioners, it may be noted that the
expression "continues to be in occupation"
under Section 4, the meaning assigned to the
term "grabbed land" under Section 2(e), the
expression "with a view to illegally taking
possession of such land or creating illegal

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tenancies, etc." without any lawful

entitlement, have to be understood to mean
that the act of possession is not a punishment
with retrospective effect. What is punishable
is the possession of a "grabbed land" on or
after the commencement of the Act' 2020
without any lawful entitlement thereto, i.e.
the land over which the occupant has no
ownership, title or physical possession
obtained by lawful means.

331. The person in possession of a "grabbed land"

within the meaning of Section 2(e), on the
date when the Act' 2020 came into force, has
been brought under the umbrella of the "land
grabber" under the Act' 2020, as he would
commit an offence on the said date. The
expression "whether before or after the
commencement of the Act" in relation to the
alleged act of "land grabbing" under the Act'
2020, does not make the application of the Act
retrospective in operation. It merely affects
in future, existing rights to occupy such land
to which the occupant has no right, title or
interest or lawful entitlement to possess,
irrespective of the fact that the act of
taking possession had been done before the
commencement of the Act' 2020. The act of

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occupation of the "grabbed land" on the date

of commencement of the Act' 2020, without any
lawful entitlement, thereto constitutes
criminal offence provided under Section 4(2),
irrespective of the fact whether the
possession was taken before the commencement
of the Act' 2020, before making of such
possession a criminal offence. In the result,
a stranger having no right, title or interest
in the land or a trespasser occupying the land
of another person, whether private or
Government or of public trust, etc., without
lawful entitlement thereto, cannot take
shelter as of being in possession prior to the
enactment, under the existing law, as on
29.08.2020, the possession of such a person
would not only be unlawful, but a criminal
offence. Occupation of any land by such a
person after the commencement of the Act' 2020
would be termed as an occupation of a "land
grabber".

332. We may, at this juncture, refer to the

decision of the Apex Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur
Singh And Another vs the State Of Vindhya
Pradesh98 dealing with the import of Article
20(1) of the Constitution of India, wherein

98
[AIR 1953 SC 394] Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh And Another vs the State Of Vindhya
Pradesh

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the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has

held that what is prohibited under Section 20
is only conviction or sentence under "ex post
facto law and not the trial thereof". The
expression "except for violation of a law in
force at the time of the commission of the Act
charged as an offence" occurring in Article
20(1) when read in the context of the
provisions of the Land Grabbing Act, it is
evident that the Act' 2020 talks of commission
of offence of land grabbing on the date of
commencement of the Act' 2020, which is
29.08.2020. The words "continues to be in
occupation" under Section 4(2) of the Act'
2020 has to be read and understood in the way
that the act of possession of a "grabbed land"
became a criminal offence after the
commencement of the Act' 2020 on or after the
commencement of the Act. The aforesaid words
do not make the "land grabbing" a continuing
offence.

333. It may be added that in the case of "land

grabbing", the offence is said to have been
committed once and for all when the land is
grabbed, occupied without lawful entitlement
thereto. The person in occupation of any
Government land or a private property without

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any lawful entitlement thereto would have to

deliver possession to the land owner or else
he would have to face criminal proceedings, on
a complaint of the land owner or on a suo motu
cognizance taken by the Special Court, with
the enforcement of the Land Grabbing Act’
2020.

334. Reference may also be made to the observations

of the Apex court in Sajjan Singh vs The State
Of Punjab99, wherein the Apex Court was dealing
with the presumption in Section 5(3) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which
mentions in four Sub-clauses, the acts on the
commission of which a public servant is said
to have committed an offence of criminal
misconduct in the discharge of his duties.
It was argued therein that the Section speaks
of the accused being in possession of
pecuniary resources or property
disproportionate to his known sources of
income, which mean only pecuniary resources or
property acquired after the date of the
enactment. The argument that to take into
consideration the pecuniary resources or
property in possession of the accused or any
other person on his behalf which are acquired
before the date of the Act amounts to giving
99
[AIR 1964 SC 464] Sajjan Singh vs The State Of Punjab

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the enactment a retrospective operation, has

been turned down. It was discussed in
paragraphs '13 to 15' as under:-

"13. A statute cannot be said to be

retrospective "because a part of the
requisites for its action is drawn from a time
antecedent to its passing". (Maxwell on
interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, p.
211; See also State of Maharashtra v. Vishnu
Ramchandra AIR 1961 SC 307. Notice must be
taken in this connection of a suggestion made
by the learned Counsel that in effect sub-
section 3 of section 5 creates a new offence
in the discharge of official duty, different
from what is defined in the four clauses of s.
5(l). It is said that the act of being in
possession of pecuniary resources or property
disproportionate to known sources of income,
if it cannot be satisfactorily accounted for,
is said by this sub- section to constitute the
offence of criminal misconduct in addition to
those other acts mentioned in cls. a, b, c and
d of s. 5(l) which constitute the offence of
criminal misconduct. On the basis of this
contention the further argument is built that
if the pecuniary resources or property
acquired before the date of the Act is taken
into consi- deration under sub-section 3 what
is in fact being done is that a person is
being convicted for the acquisition of
pecuniary resources or property, though it was
not in violation of a law in force at the time
of the commission of such act of acquisition.
If this argument were correct a conviction of
a person under the presumption raised under
the s. 5(3) in respect of pecuniary resources
or property acquired before the Prevention of
Corruption Act would be a breach of
fundamental rights under Art. 20(l) of the

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Constitution and so it would be proper for the

Court to construe s. 5(3) in a way so as not
to include possession of pecuniary resources
or property acquired before the Act for the
purpose of that subsection. The basis of the
argument that s. 5(3) creates a new kind of
offence of criminal misconduct by a public
servant in the discharge of his official duty
is however unsound. The sub-section does
nothing of the kind. It merely prescribes a
rule of evidence for the purpose of proving
the offence of criminal misconduct as defined
in s. 5(1) for which an accused person is
already under trial. It was so held by this
Court in C.D.S. Swamy v. The State(1) and
again in Surajpal Singh v. State of U.p.(2).
It is only when a trial has commenced for
criminal misconduct by doing one or more of
the acts mentioned in cls. a, b, c and d of s.
5(l) that sub-s 3 can come into operation.
When there is such a trial, which necessarily
must be in respect of acts committed after the
Prevention of Corruption Act came into force,
sub-section 3 places in the hands of the
prosecution a new mode of proving an offence
with which an accused has already been
charged.

14. Looking at the words of the section and

giving them their plain and natural meaning we
find it impossible to say that pecuniary
resources and property acquired before (1)
[1960] 1 S.C.R. 461. (2) [1961] 1 2 S.C.R.
971. the date on which the Prevention of
Corruption Act came into force should not be
taken into account even if in possession of
the accused or any other person on his behalf.
To accept the contention that such pecuniary
resources or property should not be taken into
consideration one has to read into the section
the additional words "if acquired after the
date of this Act" after the word "property".

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For this there is no justification.

15. It may also be mentioned that if pecuniary

resources or property acquired before the date
of commencement of the Act were to be left out
of account in applying subs. 3 of s. 5 it
would be proper and reasonable to limit the
receipt of income against which the proportion
is to be considered also to the period after
the Act. On the face of it this would lead to
a curious and anomalous position by no means
satisfactory or helpful to the accused
himself. For, the income received during the
years previous to the commencement of the Act
may have helped in the acquisition of property
after the commencement of the Act. From
whatever point we look at the matter it seems
to us clear that the pecuniary resources and
property in the possession of the accused
person or any other person on his behalf have
to be taken into consideration for the purpose
of sub- section 3 of section 5, whether these
were acquired before or after the Act came
into force."

335. It was, thus, held therein that if pecuniary

resources or property acquired before the date
of commencement of the Act were to be left out
of account in applying Sub-section (3) of
Section, on the face of it, this would lead to
a curious and anomalous position, inasmuch as,
the income received during the years previous
to the commencement of the Act may have
helped in the acquisition of the property
after the commencement of the Act. It would
further amount to reading into the

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additional words "if acquired after the date

of this Act" after the word "property", for
which there is no justification.

336. Taking a clue from this judgment, if we accept

the contention of the petitioners that any
occupant or transferee of the "grabbed land",
occupied or transferred prior to the
enforcement of the Land Grabbing Act, 2020
would be immune from the operation of the
Act' 2020 or the offence of "land grabbing"
is to be confined to the actual possession or
sale of the land taken or completed prior to
the enactment, it would lead to conflicting
and anomalous situation. The result would be
that any occupant of a "grabbed land", who has
no ownership or title and who occupied the
land prior to the enactment “without lawful
entitlement” will not be included in the act
of "land grabbing", even if he continues to
occupy such land (grabbed land) after the
"land grabbing" has been made an offence under
the Act' 2020. The consequence is that such a
person, if continues to be in occupation of a
"grabbed land", would not be termed as a "land
grabber". Whereas, if a person occupies or
takes possession of the "grabbed land" on any
date on or after the enforcement of the Act'

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2020, would be a "land grabber". This

distinction is neither permissible nor
possible, as it would lead to absurdity. It is
settled law of interpretation of the statute
that the Court would avoid any such
construction of the statute which leads or may
lead to absurdity.

337. For the above discussion, it is held that

retrospectivity cannot read into the Act'
2020. The Act makes the occupation of the
"grabbed land", unlawful and holds a person
guilty of offence of "land grabbing", who
continues to be in possession of the "grabbed
land" on 29.08.2020. In the similar way, the
successor or any successor-in-law of any
person inducted into the property who has
illegally occupied someone else's property, if
continues to be in occupation after the
enforcement of the Gujarat Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2020, their occupation
would be of a "land grabber", of the "grabbed
land", by bringing in those persons who
occupied the land by illicit or illegal means
and continued to occupy such land or those who
stepped into the shoes of such a person and
continue to occupy such lands after the
commencement of the Act' 2020, knowing that

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they do not have any right, title or interest

to the land or they occupy it without any
lawful entitlement thereto.

338. The law is that the nature of mens rea will be

implied in a statute creating an offence
depending upon the object of the Act and the
provisions thereof. In the instant case, the
object and purpose of the Land Grabbing Act,
2020 is to prohibit the activities of "land
grabbing" by making it a criminal offence
leading to imprisonment of guilty. The
enactment works as a deterrence, simply
sending a message that all those who have
occupied someone else's land, whether owner is
Government, a public body or a private person,
shall have to handover the possession or
vacate the "grabbed land" to restore
possession to the rightful person or else they
will be considered as a "land grabber" and
criminal proceedings shall be initiated
against them. With these, we reject the
submissions of the learned counsels for the
petitioners in challenging the constitutional
validity of Land Grabbing Act' 2020, both on
the plea of exclusion of mens rea as an
essential ingredient of criminal offence and
application of the Land Grabbing Act' 2020

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with retrospective effect, thus, violating

Article 20 of the Constitution of India.

Part V - Rule 5(2) - Effect of Inclusion of the

Word : "headstrong"

339. The next issue is about the provision in Rule

5(2) of the Rules' 2020, which gives power to
the Collector or the State Government to take
suo motu cognizance of and action in the case
of Government land, where the person who has
grabbed the land is a "headstrong person". It
was argued that the Act does not define or
assign meaning to "headstrong person" and,
thus, gives unfettered power to the Committee
to label anyone as a "headstrong person" and
initiate action against him.

340. The decision of the Apex Court in Madhya

Pradesh and Another vs Baldeo Prasad79 under the
Goondas Act (noted hereinbefore) has been
pressed into service to substantiate the said
submission. Suffice it to note that Rule 5
prescribes for an inquiry by the Committee
notified by the State Government under the
Chairmanship of the District Collector,
notified by the State Government, before
recording information about the commission of
an offence under the Land Grabbing Act, which

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is only in the nature of a prima facie

inquiry. The inquiry is purely executive
function of a Committee constituted by the
State Government, which comprises of Executive
Officers. The Committee does not discharge
any quasi-judicial or judicial function while
making inquiry as contemplated under Section
12(a) of the Act' 2020, as per the procedure
prescribed in Rule 5. The decision of the
Committee, deciding further course of action
including filing of an FIR does not attain
finality. No decision making power to hold
any person guilty of offence of land grabbing
can be said to have been conferred by Rule 5
upon the Committee. It would, thus, result in
reading too much in statute, if we consider
that the Committee has been conferred
unbridled or uncanalised power to term anyone
as a "land grabber", for holding him guilty of
the offence of "land grabbing".

341. The dictionary meaning of the words

"headstrong person" means a person determined
to have one's own way, willful, stubborn and
obstinate. It is the fundamental principle of
law of interpretation is that any word in the
statute if undefined therein, has to be given
its plain and simple meaning. If the words of

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the statute are precise and unambiguous and

are capable of one construction only, then it
would not be open to the Courts to adopt any
other hypothetical construction on the ground
that such hypothetical construction is more
consistent with the alleged object and policy
of the Act. When the words of the statute are
clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e. they are
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning,
the Courts are bound to give effect to that
meaning irrespective of consequences. When
the language is plain and unambiguous and
admits of only one meaning, no question of
construction of statute arises for the Act
speaks for itself. An elementary Rule in the
words of Viscount Simonds100 would be fruitful
to take note of :-

"No one should profess to understand any part

of a statute or of any other document before
he has read the whole of it. Until he has
done so, he is entitled to say that it, or any
part of it, is clear and unambiguous"

342. Plain meaning rule applies at the stage when

the words have been construed in their context
and the conclusion is reached that they are
susceptible to only one meaning. In that
event the meaning so derived is to be given
effect to irrespective of consequences for no

100
[1957 (1) ALL ER 49] Viscount Simonds

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alternative construction is really open,

subject to the qualification that the statute
is constitutional and unreasonableness and
that the injustice or absurdity is not of the
nature and gravity, which makes the statute
offend the Constitution.
- (Ref. Ajay Hasia54; Smt. Bhagwanti And
Anr vs Union Of India101; State Of Kerala
And Ors vs M/S Travancore Chemicals &
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.102).

343. One of the guiding principles of the rule of

literal construction is that the intention of
the Legislature is primarily to be gathered
from the language used, which means that
attention should be paid to what has been said
as also to what has not been said. As a
consequence, a construction which requires for
its support addition or substitution of words
or which results in rejection of words as
meaningless, has to be avoided.

344. It is settled that when the question arises as

to the meaning of certain provisions in a
statute, it is not only legitimate, but proper
to read that provision in its context. The
context means, the statute as a whole, the
previous state of the law, other statutes in

101
[(1989) 4 SCC 397] Smt. Bhagwanti And Anr vs Union Of India
102
[(1998) 8 SCC 188] State Of Kerala And Ors vs M/S Travancore Chemicals &
Manufacturing Co. Ltd.

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pari materia, the general scope of the

statute and the mischief that it was intended
to remedy. It is a rule now fully established
that the intention of the legislature must be
found by reading the statute as a whole.

- [Ref:-Philips India Ltd v. Labour

Court103; Osmania University Teachers
Association v. State of Andhra Pradesh104;
Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal
Officer, Mercantile Marine Dept.105]

345. Applying the above noted basic principles of

reading of a statute to find the intention of
the legislature, applying the rule of literal
construction, if the language of Rule 5(2) is
read by giving literal or dictionary meaning
to the words "headstrong person", it can be
seen and understood that in case a stubborn
man, habitual of occupying Government land
willfully, if he occupies Government land,
the Collector or the State Government are
empowered to take suo motu cognizance and
action to initiate inquiry in accordance with
Sub-rules (3) to (10) of Rule 5, in order to
lodge a complaint of "land grabbing" by filing
a First Information Report on conclusion of
such inquiry, in the same way as is to be
103
[AIR 1985 SC 1034] Philips India Ltd v. Labour Court
104
[AIR 1987 SC 2034] Osmania University Teachers Association v. State of Andhra
Pradesh
105
[AIR 1991 SC 1632] Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer, Mercantile
Marine Dept.

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concluded on the application of a complaint.

346. Meaning thereby, the Prant Officer or the

Officer to whom such matter is referred after
taking cognizance or action shall be required
to collect the details and furnish the report
about the nature of occupation by such a
person of the Government land. On receipt of
the inquiry report, the Committee defined in
Section 2(a) may draw a prima facie conclusion
of commission of the act of "land grabbing"
and may decide to lodge an FIR with the
police. The investigating officer, thereafter,
shall be required to conduct investigation and
submit its final report before the Special
Court as per Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5. An
officer of the State under the authorisation
of a competent officer of the Government
department may also lodge a complaint directly
before the Special Court.

347. We may draw support from the decisions of the

Apex Court in Benilal vs. State of
Maharashtra106 and State Of Punjab vs Gurmit
Singh107 wherein it is recognised that the
legislative scheme may employ words of
generality conveying its policy and intention

106
[1995 Supp (1) SCC 235] Benilal vs. State of Maharashtra
107
[2014 (9) SCC 632] State Of Punjab vs Gurmit Singh

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to achieve the object setout therein. It was

observed that every word need not be defined.
It may be a matter of judicial construction of
such words or phrases. Mere fact that a
particular word or phrase has not been defined
is not a ground to declare the provisions of
the Act itself or the order as
unconstitutional. It is well settled that
when the words of the statute are not defined,
it is to be understood in their natural
ordinary or popular sense. For this purpose,
it shall be permissible to refer to dictionary
meaning to find out the general sense in which
the word is understood in common parlance.

348. In view of the above, submissions of the

learned counsels for the petitioners about the
validity of Rule 5(2) of the Rules' 2020
providing for the procedure of inquiry into
the complaint of "land grabbing" are liable to
be turned down.

Part VI - Pari Materia Enactment of other States:-

349. Before concluding, we may also take note of

the stand of the State to uphold the
constitutional validity of the Gujarat Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020 on the ground
that the Apex Court while interpreting the

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paria materia provisions of the Andhra Pradesh

Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, has
interpreted them in the manner that no
unconstitutionality or ambiguity can be seen
or demonstrated. The respondent State relies
on the two decisions of the High Court of
Karnataka in Shriram Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
State of Karnataka108. The High Court of
Karnataka has upheld the constitutional
validity of the Karnataka Land Grabbing
Prohibition Act, 2011, which contains pari
materia provision to the Gujarat Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020.

350. Reference has also been made to the decision

of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High
Court in details of the judgment upholding
certain provisions of the Assam Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2010, viz. Section 10(2),
which conferred jurisdiction on the Special
Tribunal to try and dispose of the civil
liability at first and decide and pass order
as to the title, ownership and lawful
possession of the grabbed land "whether before
or after the commencement of this Act", as it
deems fit. It provides that after completion
of the civil proceedings, if the Special

108
[Writ Petition No.47747/2017 decided on 19.01.2021] Shriram Properties Pvt. Ltd.
Vs. State of Karnataka

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Tribunal decides and pass order that the land

in question has been grabbed, the Special
Tribunal may order that the possession of the
land be restored to the person whose land has
been grabbed after evicting the land grabber
or any other person who may be in possession
of the land, if necessary by use of such force
as may be required for the purpose.

351. It has been held by the Assam High Court that

the main object of the Assam Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 2010 is to protect the
owner and possessor of the land from unlawful
land grabbing and to punish the criminal "land
grabbers". The Assam Land Grabbing Act seeks
to prohibit and punish "land grabbing", which
became a menace in the State. It was held
that if the alleged land grabber claims or
puts up a defence to a proprietary right or
ownership or possesory right over the land in
question, then the civil liability would be
adjudicated first and if he fails to establish
any such right, then criminal proceeding for
prosecution of the land grabber would
recommence. As per the Scheme of the 2010
Assam Act, upon cognizance being taken of the
criminal offence of "land grabbing", the
Special Tribunal would proceed with the

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prosecution of the "land grabber", not only

for the purpose of punishment, but also to
recover the "grabbed land" from the "land
grabber" for restoring the possession of the
"grabbed land" to the person from whom the
land was grabbed. If in the Civil proceeding,
the alleged land grabber takes up the defence
of ownership, possession or better claim over
the land in question, the Special Tribunal
shall first determine that question and keep
criminal trial in abeyance till the
determination. However, the principal object
of the Act' 2010 is not of adjudicating right,
title or possession over the land in question.
It is for facilitating a smooth criminal trial
with the defence of a better right, title or
interest or possession over the land in
question, if taken, would be taken up and
determined first. However, the legislature
did not intend to prohibit the proceedings of
the criminal trial of a person alleged to have
committed the offence of land grabbing. This
is so that when a person is prosecuted as a
"land grabber", if he takes up the plea of
better claim over the land in question as his
defence, it would require adjudication as to
whether such a person can be held to be a
"land grabber" having no right, title or

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interest in the land in question, occupying or

possessing the same without any lawful
entitlement thereof.

Part VII - Conclusion : Operative Portion :-

352. With the above threadbare discussion on each

and every aspect of inquiry into the matter of
considering the validity of the Gujarat Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020, on the
issues raised by the learned counsels for the
parties, we do not find any good ground to
hold the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Act 2020, and the Rules' 2020 made thereunder,
as unconstitutional or violative of Articles
13, 14, 19, 20 and 21 of the Constitution of
India.

353. In the conclusion, our answer to the points of

challenge raised before us, is as under:-

(i) Considering the pith and substance

of the Land Grabbing Act’ 2020, we hold
that it is relatable to Entries 18, 64
and 65 of the List II of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution of India
and, as such, there is no question of
repugnancy to the Central laws such as
The Limitation Act, 1963, The Civil

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Procedure Code, 1908, The Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, The Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, The Specific Relief
Act, 1963, The Indian Evidence Act,
1872 and The Indian Contract Act, 1872,
as agitated by the petitioners. As there
is no repugnancy, the Gujarat Land
Grabbing Act' 2020 cannot be said to be
hit by Article 254 of the Constitution of
India, for want of Presidential assent.

(ii) The challenge to the Land Grabbing

Act’ 2020 on the plea of manifest
arbitrariness, being violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India by
treating unequals as equals, is turned
down, taking note of various provisions
of the Land Grabbing Act' 2020, which are
found to have rationale with the object
and purpose of the Act' 2020, which is to
curb the "land grabbing activities" in
the State of Gujarat.

(iii) The Land Grabbing Act' 2020 cannot

be said to be violative of the basic
structure of the Constitution of India.
It's provisions do not violate Article 14
of the Constitution and the procedure of
Civil and Criminal trials provided in the

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impugned legislation cannot be said to be

manifestly arbitrary.

(iv) Testing the validity of the Land

Grabbing Act' 2020 on the doctrine of
proportionality for providing minimum
sentence of imprisonment of 10 years for
the offence of land grabbing, it is
concluded that the wisdom of the
legislature is to be given due credence.
It is for the legislature being the
representative of the people to decide as
to what is good and bad for them as it is
supposed to know and be aware of the
needs of the people. The Court cannot
sit in judgment over its wisdom.
Consequently, the Act' 2020 cannot be
said to be ultra vires Articles 13, 14,
19 and 21 of the Constitution of India on
the doctrine of proportionality and
cannot be invalidated on the plea of the
prescribed punishment being harsh,
disproportionate and manifestly
arbitrary.

(v) The plea to challenge the validity

of the Act’ 2020 on the ground of absence
of mens rea and its retrospective
application and, thus, being hit by

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Article 20 of the Constitution of India,

is found to be without any substance.

(vi) The challenge to the validity of the

Rules’ 2020 made under the Land Grabbing
Act, 2020 is found to be untenable for the
discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs
of the judgment.

(vii) On a comparative reading of the

Gujarat Act' 2020 with the pari materia
legislations enacted by the State of Assam,
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, we find that
the validity of the pari materia provisions
have been upheld by the Karnataka High
Court and Assam High Court in the challenge
to the enactments made by the State
Legislatures therein. The only distinction
pointed out was about the requirement of
the Presidential assent, which has been
dealt with by us.

(viii) On other ancillary points of

interpretation of Sections 7, 9, 11 and 15
of the Land Grabbing Act, 2020, in view of
the discussion made hereinbefore, no
inconsistency or arbitrariness could be
found by us so as to declare the Gujarat
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act' 2020
having been framed in arbitrary exercise
of power or the provisions of the Act’

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2020 and the Rules' 2020 made thereunder

being without any guidance by the
legislature.

354. Consequently, all the writ petitions in this

group, deserve to be dismissed being devoid of
merits and are accordingly, dismissed. No
order as to costs.

All the pending Civil Applications

connected with the concerned writ petitions
would not survive and shall stand dismissed
accordingly.

(SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ)

(ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.)

BIJOY B. PILLAI/SUDHIR ACHUTAN

FURTHER ORDER

After pronouncement of the judgment, a

request has been made by the learned counsels
appearing for the petitioners to extend the
interim order already granted in individual
cases uptill 30.07.2024 from today, which is
hereby turned down for the simple reason that
at the beginning of the arguments, it was
agreed that the Court will examine only on the

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validity of the legislation and the merits of

the individual cases will not be looked into.
Without examining the merits of the individual
cases, it is not possible for tus to grant any
interim order for a further period.

As regards the contention of the learned

counsels for the petitioners that in some of
the matters, they have challenged the orders
passed by the Inquiry Committee on merits and
they may be permitted to raise the challenge
by filing fresh petitions, we clarify that the
dismissal of the writ petitions in this bunch
being confined to the validity of the Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020, will not
come in the way of the petitioners in filing
fresh petitions raising individual challenges
to the action of the statutory committee
during the course of inquiry or the action of
the Committee in lodging F.I.R, in appropriate
cases.

(SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ)

(ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.)

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 422

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(ORDER XXI RULE 3 (1) (A))

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
(UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) No. ________ 2024

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

Before the Before this
Hon’ble Hon’ble
IN THE MATTER OF:- High Court Court

1. Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt

Aged about 61 yrs Petitioner Petitioner
Partner of M/s Murlidhar B Vamdot No. 2
having address at:
Sardarbaug, Station Road, Bardoli
District Surat,
Gujarat

VERSUS

1. The State of Gujarat Respondent Respondent

Through Secretary, Home No. 1 No. 1
Department,
Government of Gujarat,
Gandhinagar,
Gujarat.
Respondent Respondent
2. The Deputy Collector, No. 2 No. 2
Having office at
Office of the Deputy Collector &
Sub
Taluka Seva Sadan,
Navagam, Tal: kamrajRajkot
SuratGujarat
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3. Shankerbhai Dahyabhai Nayak Respondent Respondent

Male Aged 66 years No. 3 No. 3
Residing at : Desai Faliyu,
Kadodara, Tal: Palsana
District: Surat

PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

To,
The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India
and his companion justices of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
The Humble Petition of
the abovenamed Petitioners

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:-

1. The present Special Leave Petition is filed by the Petitioner

challenging the impugned judgment and final order dated

09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at

Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal Application No. 3788 of 2022,

whereby the Hon’ble High Court has dismissed the writ petition

challenging the vires of the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition)

Act, 2020 (“the Act”).

2. QUESTIONS OF LAW:-
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The following questions of law arise for consideration by

this Hon'ble Court:

A. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

is repugnant to Section 5 and Section 27 of the Limitation Act;

Sections 5, 6, 37, 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief Act; Section

2(2) and Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Section 53A

and Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act and Sections 6 and

145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, without

presidential assent, the Act is invalid and unconstitutional in view

of Article 254 of the Constitution of India.

B. Whether the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding that the doctrine

of Pith and Substance favours the constitutionality of the Act

being relating to the entries mentioned in List II of the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution of India.

C. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the State

government does not have the competence to enact the Act and

the Act is, therefore, contrary to the mandate of Article 246 of the

Constitution of India.
 425

D. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act are arbitrary and are in violation of Article

14 of the Constitution as they do not pass the test of reasonable

classification based on intelligible differentia.

E. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

seeks to do away with the provisions of CPC, CrPC and the

Evidence Act, which would cause grave prejudice to the rights of

the litigants.

F. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act are contrary to the basic structure of the

constitution as the same violates the principle of separation of

powers and the independence of judiciary.

G. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act provide unbridled powers to the Executive

in determination of the rights of the parties, including their Right

to Liberty.
 426

H. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

punishment for land grabbing envisaged under the Act are

contrary to the doctrine of proportionality.

I. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act are sought to be applied retrospectively, in

violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

J. Whether the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act are contrary to the protection against self-

incrimination guaranteed under Article 20(1) of the Constitution.

K. Whether the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding the Act

constitutional.

3. DECLARATION IN TERMS OF RULE 3(2): -

That the petitioner has not filed any other petition in this

Hon'ble Court against the impugned judgment and final order

dated 09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at

Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal Application No. 3788 of 2022.

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4. DECLARATION IN TERMS OF RULE 5:-

The Annexure P-1 to P-10 produced along with the

Special Leave Petition are true copies of the pleadings/

documents which formed part of the records of the case

in the Court below against which order the leave to

appeal is sought for in this petition.

5. GROUNDS:-

That the Petitioner herein is seeking the indulgence of

this Hon'ble Court on the grounds mentioned hereby:

A. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act are violative of Article 14, 19 and 21 of the

Constitution of India.

B. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act cannot be made applicable retrospectively.

C. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions of the Act are vague, ambiguous, unworkable, against

the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

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D. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

7(2) of the Act is invalid as decision as to the jurisdiction of the

Special Court is purely a judicial act, which cannot be performed

by an executive. The provision is contrary to the basic structure

of the Constitution, which includes separation of powers between

the executive and judiciary and is also independence of judiciary.

E. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

9 of the Act which deals with the procedure and powers of Special

Court is vague, ambiguous, unworkable and gives unfettered

discretion to the Special Court and does not provide for any

checks and balances which will ensure the conduct of a free and

fair trial like recording of prima facie satisfaction before taking

cognizance, summary dismissal of a vexatious or mala fide

application, notice to all persons interest in the land. Section 9 of

the Act strikes at the very concept of free and fair trial. Thus, the

provision is manifestly arbitrary and is so made that it will lead to

abuse of process of law and miscarriage of justice.

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F. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Article

20(1) states that no person shall be convicted of an offence

except for violation of law in force at the time of its commission.

It is settled that a substantive law is presumed to be prospective

in operation. The Act does not explicitly make the law

retrospectively applicable. However, the Act becomes

retrospective in operation as Section 9(1) empowers the Special

Court to try even those acts and omissions that would have

occurred before the commencement of the Act.

G. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

empowers the Special Court to decide even civil issues of title,

ownership and possession. The same is prescribed to be done

simply by following the principles of natural justice and not as per

the provisions of the CPC and the Evidence Act by virtue of

Section 9(3) of the Act, which grossly prejudices the rights of the

lawful owner or possessor of the land. The operation of such a

provision would render the procedural and evidentiary laws

nugatory.
 430

H. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

9(5) of the Act (i) allows a judge to decide at his own discretion

whether to hear civil matter first or criminal, (ii) allows a judge to

keep the judgment in criminal or civil proceeding pending under

trial in both proceedings are not over, (iii) prohibits consideration

of additional evidence, if any, adduced in civil proceedings while

determining the criminal liability, (iv) makes it possible for the

parties and the Special Court to comment on the person who fails

to give evidence and such failure may also give rise to any

presumption against him or a persons charged together with him

in the same proceedings. In a way, the provisions of the Act does

not allow the truth to be unearthed and does not show any

sensitivity towards true and bona fide owners/possessors of the

land, which is also not in line with the object of having a welfare

state but is essentially making it a police state.

a. The Act fastens both civil and criminal liability. Section 9(5)
of the Act allows a judge to decide in his own discretion
without set standards whether to hear cisil matter first or
the criminal case. It also allows a judge to keep the
judgment in civil matters pending till the trial in another
case is over again at his discretion without set standards.
 431

b. The provision is so made that it allows a judicially trained

mind to come to diametrically opposite conclusion on the
same set of facts.

c. While the Act allows a judge to keep judgment in the first

heard case pending (which can be either civil or criminal),
it prohibits consideration of additional evidence, if any,
adduced in the civil proceedings while determining the
criminal liability.

d. Pronouncement of judgment soon after conclusion of

arguments is an essence of a fair trial. Section 353 of the
CrPC lays down that the judgment in every trial in any
criminal court shall be pronounced in open court
immediately after termination of the trial or at some
subsequent time. O. 20 R. 1 of the CPC requires the court
to pronounce the judgment in open court either at once or
soon thereafter as may be practicable after the case has
been heard. The issue regarding effect of delay in
pronouncement of judgment and on the right of fair trial
has been considered on many occasions by this Hon’ble
Court and the Hon’ble High Courts. This Hon’ble Court, in
case of Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318, deemed
it appropriate to provide guidelines regarding the
pronouncement of judgments, expecting them to be
followed by all concerned, inter alia, providing that normally
the judgment is expected within two months of conclusion
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of the arguments, and on expiry of three months any of the

parties can file an application in the High Court with a
prayer for early judgment, and if, for any reason, no
judgment is pronounced for six months, any of the parties
is entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice
of the High Court to reassign the matter to another
judge/bench for fresh arguments. Delay in pronouncing
judgment after the conclusion of a trial/hearing is in itself a
ground to hold such judgments bad in law and set them
aside.

e. While allowing the Special Court to hear any of the case

first, the Act does not take into account a scenario when
the first case (whether civil or criminal) is finally heard by
one judge and the judgment is reserved for the conclusion
of another case (criminal or civil, as the case may be), but
by the time the said another case is finally heard and
decided the judge who heard the first case gets transferred
or elevated or is assign different roster. The judge before
whom the trial is conducted and who has observed other
aspects than the verbal statements, like the demeanor or
conduct of the witness, etc., is always a better person to
adjudicate a matter then a judge who is adjudicating a
matter only based on the documents. This Hon’ble Court
has, in Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v.
State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657, and Ravi
Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and
 433

Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 410-411 of 2015 (decided

on 11.07.2022), though in a different context,
acknowledged and appreciated the importance of the judge
before whom the trial is conducted.

f. Rules of Evidence require an offence in a criminal trial to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas nature of proof
required in a civil matter is based on preponderance of
probability. Such blending of civil and criminal proceedings
and the order of its conduct at the sole discretion of the
judge, which will differ from case to case and judge to
judge, is manifestly arbitrary and also contrary to the right
to fair trial recognized under Article 21, more so considering
the minimum sentence is imprisonment of 10 years with
fine equivalent to Jantri value.

g. Further, holding the trial of civil and criminal cases by the

same Court will also not allow the judge, who is ultimately
a human, to have distinct way of viewing a particular matter
based on the same evidence as the civil proceedings are
adjudicated on the basis of preponderance of probability
and the criminal proceedings are adjudicated based on the
proof beyond reasonable doubt. This will also give rise to
the more appeals and challenges to the judgment, which
will then be decided separately as the Act requires separate
appeals and does not provide for adjudication of the
appeals by the same judge.
 434

h. Article 20(3) lays down that no person accused of any

offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Unlike provision in the CrPC (particularly Section 315) and
in the Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 9(5) makes it
possible for the parties and the Special Court to comment
on the person who fails to give evidence and such failure
may also give rise to any presumption against him or any
person charged together with him in the same proceeding.
Further, conducting civil and criminal case by the same
Court will also lead to a situation where in civil case the
accused is required to take a witness stand, which would
very well be used against him in criminal trial though the
same is against the very principle of self-incrimination.

I. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

9(7) of the Act results in a judgment of a Special Court binding

on all persons having interest in the land even though they may

not be parties to the lis. There is a provision for issuance of notice

on persons interested in the land. Section 9(7) of the Act is ultra

vires Article 21 and is manifestly arbitrary as It makes every

finding of the Special Court with regarding any alleged act of land

grabbing a conclusive proof of land grabbing and of the persons

who committed such land grabbing, binding on all persons having

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interest in such land even if they are not a party to the

proceedings.

J. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

11 of the Act is manifestly arbitrary because it cases burden of

proof on the person accused of land grabbing, more particularly

considering that it will apply even in cases of deciding issues of

title, ownership and lawful possession of land grabbed which are

essentially of a civil nature, that too, without assistance of the

CPC and Evidence Act and without protection of the right to

remain silent under Article 20(3) of the Act.

K. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

12 of the Act is an example of an excessive delegated legislation

considering that it authorizes recording of information with prior

approval of District Collector in consultation of the Committee. No

guidelines or limitations are provided in the Act for the

constitution of the Committee. There is no provision whatsoever

in the Act as to who would be in this high-powered committee,

how they would be selected/appointed/nominated – ex-officio or

otherwise, what would be the strength of the committee, how

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many members would constitute the quorum, qualification of the

members, their terms, tenure, secretariate, drawing of minutes of

meetings and maintaining a record. The committee would in this

manner be illegal and any action by it would be arbitrary.

L. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

has been enacted with respect to many of the matters

enumerated in the Concurrent List (List III) and the Union list (List

I) of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India and, thus, it

encroaches upon several laws made by the Parliament under the

Concurrent List and Union List. It is sui generis, a combination of

Civil and Criminal laws. 'Land Grabbing' has been defined and

included as a new offence by prescribing different set of

procedure under the Act.

M. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

15 of the Act gives an overriding effect over other laws, judgment

and decree and is not in addition to other laws thereby completely

ousting the application of Central legislations occupying the same

field. The result of overriding effect given to the Act is sweeping

to the effect that any decree granted by a Court of law such as

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on 'adverse possession' can be held nullity and even the law laid

down by the Apex Court having effect on the provisions of the

Act, has been held nullity.

N. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

2(c) of the Act, which defines 'land', includes not only lands, but

buildings, structures and things attached to the earth or

permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Meaning

thereby, the Act covers immovable properties other than the 'land'

as well

O. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the 'land

grabber' defined in Section 2(d) includes successors, not only the

person who committed land grabbing, but also such persons who

abets the act and also includes the successors in interest.

P. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

2(e) defines 'land grabbing', which affects individual rights, i.e.,

private disputes and is not confined to the right of the State

Government. The words 'without any lawful entitlement' occurring

in the definition of "land grabbing" is having a far reaching effect,

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inasmuch as, it defies protection to a person who is in long

possession of 'land' defined in Section 2(c).

Q. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

4 only recognises and protects lawful tenant and not only

prohibits the act of "land grabbing", but makes it an offence by

prescribing punishment with imprisonment, which may even

extend to 14 years.

R. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

9 empowers the Special Courts to take suo motu cognizance in

the matter of any alleged act of "land grabbing", whether before

or after the commencement of the Act, thus, confers unbridled

power on the Special Court to take cognizance of the cases on

the allegations of land grabbing, which had occurred prior to the

commencement of the Act and, thus, gives retrospective effect to

the Act itself.

S. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

9(2) and Section 9(3) give overriding effect to the provisions of

the Act, to the Parliamentary legislation occupying the field, viz.,

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Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure, providing

procedure pertaining to civil and criminal proceedings;

respectively.

T. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Section

17 makes any transaction in relation to alienation of land grabbing

by way of any instrument of transfer or partition as void.

U. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

further encroaches upon the provisions of Section 27 of the

Limitation Act, the principle of adverse possession in relation to

an immovable property. It defies Articles 64, 65, 66, 67 of the

Limitation Act and renders the period of institution of suit for

possession prescribed in the Limitation Act as nugatory.

V. The Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that no limitation is

prescribed for institution of the original proceedings under the

Act. Quite contrary to the prevalent laws that provides for

initiating proceedings at the instance of the party aggrieved, suo

motu initiation of proceedings with regard to even private land

disputes has been recognised. The result is that a time barred suit
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or action is allowed to be initiated and the rights created/accrued

in favour of the other side by operation of law is nullified.

W. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the only

limitation provided under Section 12A(c) to file an appeal by a

person aggrieved against the final judgment and order passed by

the Special Court is 30 days from the date on which the impugned

judgment or order has been made. Sub-section (3) of Section 12A

also prescribes for the period of 30 days to be reckoned from the

respective date of the judgment and the order passed in the

proceedings. Proviso to Sub-section (3) further limits the

competence of the Special Court to condone the delay in

preferring appeal upto a further period of 60 days, that too in a

case where the person aggrieved is prevented by sufficient cause

from preferring the appeal within the aforesaid time period. By

providing limitation of 30 days for filing an appeal under the Act,

the State Legislature has encroached upon the provisions of

Limitation Act, which is 90 days from the date of the decree or

order under Article 116 of the Limitation Act and 60 days for an

appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure against any

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sentence other than death sentence or any order from the date

of sentence or the order.

X. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

further encroaches upon the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provides for recovery of possession

of immovable property based on mere possessory title by bringing

a suit in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure by

any person who has been dispossessed otherwise than in due

course of law.

Y. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that if the

provisions of the Act are given effect to, enforcement of the

decree or recovery of the possession under Section 6 would be

an offence and the decree of the court passed in favour of the

person based on the possessory title would be nullified. The

provisions of Sections 37, 38 and 39 of grant of temporary and

perpetual injunction as also mandatory injunction are nullified by

Section 15 of the Act, as injunction order, if any, cannot be

enforced for the overriding effect given to the provisions of the

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Act over the decree or order of a Court of law or any tribunal or

authority.

Z. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

provisions contained in Section 9 giving overriding effect to Act

over the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and Criminal

Procedure Code completely obliterate hierarchy of the Courts

under the Code of Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure Code.

The Special Courts are created and all procedures to be

undertaken by the Magistrate under Cr.P.C. are to be conducted

by the Special Courts. Section 9 provides for a different procedure

than the procedure prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure or

Criminal Procedure Code for trying civil and criminal proceedings

with respect to the ownership and title or lawful possession of a

person over the land defined therein. Special set of Rules of

Evidence have been prescribed under Section 9(5) and Section 11

of the Act.

AA. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

is repugnant to the Central laws, viz, Section 5 and Section 27 of

the Limitation Act; Sections 5, 6, 37, 38 and 39 of the Specific

 443

Relief Act; Section 2(2) and Section 11 of the Code of Civil

Procedure; Section 53A and Section 58 of the Transfer of Property

Act and Sections 6 and 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

BB. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

State of Gujarat while enacting the Gujarat Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 2020 was required to take assent of the

President of India as has been taken by the State of Karnataka,

Assam and Andhra Pradesh while enacting the Land Grabbing

laws for their respective States. The assertion of the State of the

Gujarat that the impugned law falls in Entry 18 and 64 of the

State List, is incorrect. The Act falls in Entry 1 and 6 of List III

(Concurrent List). Even Entry 11A which was initially in the State

list has been shifted to the Concurrent List by 42nd Amendment

of the Constitution of India and the matters pertaining to

Administration of Justice, Constitution and Organisation of all

Courts, except the Supreme Court and High Court, now fall in the

Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule.

CC. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Article

254 of the Constitution of India clearly lays down where there is

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a direct collision/conflict or repugnancy between the provisions of

law made by the State Legislature and that made by the

Parliament with respect to the matters enumerated in the

Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of Clause (2) the

State law would be void to the extent of repugnancy. The matter

of taking of Presidential assent under Article 254 (2) of the

Constitution of India is not an exercise of legislative power of the

President as contemplated under Article 123 of the Constitution,

but is a part of legislative procedure. The question whether the

procedure prescribed by the Constitution before enacting the law

is followed or not can always be looked into by the Court in

exercise of the power of judicial review. If such a procedure is not

followed, such law can be held to be invalid as a whole.

DD. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate and follow

the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Forum for People's

Collective Efforts (FPCE) vs. State of West Bengal, (2021)

8 SCC 599.

EE. Because, the Hon’ble High Court misplaced its reliance on Megh

Raj v. Alla Rakhia, AIR 1947 PC 72, and Union of India v.

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Valluri Basavaiah Chaudhary, (1979) 3 SCC 324, as in both

the said judgments, the issued involved was whether a particular

type of land would fall within “Land” as mentioned in Entry No.

21 of List II of Government of India Act, 1935 or Entry No. 18 of

List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

However, in the present case, the question is whether making a

penal provision for an act or omission in relation to land would fall

within “Land” as mentioned in Entry No. 18 of the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution of India.

FF. Because, the Hon’ble High Court ignored the words “each general

word should extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which

can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it” - as observed

by this Hon’ble Court in Jilubhai Nanubhai Khachar v. Stae

of Gujarat, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 596, and India Cement Ltd.

v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1990) 1 SCC 12. Clearly, by no

starch of imagination it can be said that making a penal provision,

though in relation to land, would relate to “Land” as mentioned in

Entry No. 18 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

 446

GG. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the

encroachment by the Act upon the subjects of concurrent list is

not incidental but substantial and, therefore, the Act is not saved

with the doctrine of Pith and Substance running in favour of the

competence of the State legislature.

HH. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that the Act

encroaches upon the provisions of Section 27 of the Limitation

Act as it defies the Articles of the Limitation Act, providing period

of instituting suit/appeal for the possession. The Act also

encroaches upon the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of the Specific

Relief Act, which recognises mere possessory title for bringing a

suit for recovery of the possession. The provisions of grant of

temporary and perpetuatory injunction as also mandatory

injunction are nullified by Section 15, which gives overriding effect

to the provisions of the Act over the decree or order of a Court of

law or any Tribunal or Authority. The procedure for trying the civil

and criminal proceedings under the Act is different from the

procedure prescribed in CPC and Cr.P.C for civil and criminal

proceedings. Section 9(5) and Section 11 of the Act prescribe

different procedure than what has been prescribed in the

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Evidence Act. The Act is repugnant to Section 2(2) and Section

11, CPC; Section 6 and 145 Cr.P.C. and Section 53A and Section

58 of the Transfer of Property Act.

II. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to notice the impossibility

of simultaneous obeyance to the Central law provisions, to which

the provisions of the Act are repugnant, and to the provisions of

the Act. Therefore, even by applying the principles laid down and

followed by this Hon’ble Court in Innovative Industries Ltd. v.

ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SC 407, and Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. v.

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 676.

JJ. Because, the Hon’ble High Court also erred in observing that since

the doctrine of Pith and Substance led to imply that the Act is

enacted by exercising the powers available under List II of the

Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India there is no question

of repugnancy. Even if the Act is enacted regarding a List II

subject-matter, if any provision is repugnant to any provision of

the law enacted by the Parliament by exercising the powers under

List I or III (before or after enactment of the impugned Act) or

any provision of the existing law enacted on subject-matter of List

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III, such a provision of the Act would be repugnant. Further, the

provision of Article 254 of the Constitution of India is a provision

centric and, therefore, a single provision repugnant to any

provision of a law enacted by the Parliament or any existing law

enacted on the subject matter under list III can sufficiently be

held invalid on the ground of repugnancy and, for the said

purpose, the underlying subject of the said provision and not the

entire law may be taken into consideration. The Hon’ble High

Court failed to notice this difference between the text of Article

254 of the Constitution of India and Article 246 of the Constitution

of India, the latter being requiring the entire law to be taken into

consideration to test the competence.

KK. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that there is

a clear repugnancy between the provisions of the Act and the

provisions of the various Central laws and, therefore, in the

absence of the assent by the Hon’ble President of India, the Act

could not have been enforced to the extent of such repugnancy.

LL. Because, the Hon’ble High Court erred in ignoring the fact that

while the Act prescribes criminal liability and registration of FIR,

 449

the occasion to prove the lawful entitlement or retention to the

property would only come at the trial, which would happen only

after an investigation and chargesheet, in most of the times, after

arresting the accused and pursuing anticipatory/regular bail

applications. Therefore, when the observations of the Hon’ble

High Court regarding the inconsistency with Section 27 of the

Limitation Act, Sections 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act, Sections

53A and 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, are in ignorance of

the real consequences. Furthermore, the rights conferred by

these provisions are sought to be overridden by the Act, which

clearly amounts to repugnancy.

MM. Because, Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that there is a

clear inconsistency with Sections 2(2) and 11 of the CPC and

Sections 6 and 145 of the Cr.P.C., whereby the Act seeks to

override the procedure prescribed by the CPC and CrPC to ensure

compliance with the principles of natural justice and fair play as

well as the principles laid down by the Evidence Act for the

relevant, admissibility and manner of gathering and laying the

evidence. In fact, by making a provision for following the

principles of natural justice and fair play, by ignoring the

 450

provisions of the CPC, will lead to arbitrariness in determining the

substantive rights of the parties, resulting in grave injustice. Even

by making a provision for trying civil and criminal case together

by the same court will also lead to a situation where the Special

Court would render decision in a civil case based on the principle

of proof beyond reasonable doubt or in a criminal case based on

the principle of preponderance of evidence, both scenarios

leading to gross prejudice to the rights and liberty of a person.

NN. Because, the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding that there is no

question of harmonising as there is no overlapping or collision.

OO. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate and follow

the ratio of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Rame Gowda

v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, wherein this Hon’ble

Court held as under:

“8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned,

the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his
possession and in order to protect such possession he may
even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful
owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may
retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the
use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled
possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the
rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot
take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or
 451

interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a
person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a
rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own
hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the
rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if
the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force.
In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior
peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law
presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted.
The owner of any property may prevent even by using
reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass,
when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy
character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature,
or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not
have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the
cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into
would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.

9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a

person without title which would entitle him to protect his
possession even as against the true owner. The concept of
settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his
possession against the owner has come to be settled by a
catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi
Ram v. Delhi Admn. [AIR 1968 SC 702 : (1968) 2 SCR 455 :
1968 Cri LJ 806] , Puran Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4
SCC 518 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 608] and Ram Rattan v. State of
U.P. [(1977) 1 SCC 188 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 85] The authorities
need not be multiplied. In Munshi Ram case [AIR 1968 SC 702
: (1968) 2 SCR 455 : 1968 Cri LJ 806] it was held that no one,
including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the
trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of
the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due
course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even
against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even
intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against
the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled
to defend against the rightful owner must be settled
possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time
and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of
 452

possession would not have the effect of interrupting the

possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-
enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more
force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as
resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never
been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has
not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or
removed by the true owner even by using necessary force.
In Puran Singh case [(1975) 4 SCC 518 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 608]
the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard-and-
fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature
into settled possession. The “settled possession” must be (i)
effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the
owner or without any attempt at concealment by the
trespasser. The phrase “settled possession” does not carry any
special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which
can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property
by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of
the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The
Court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as
a working rule for determining the attributes of “settled
possession” (SCC p. 527, para 12):

(i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of

the property over a sufficiently long period;

(ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either

express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at
concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element
of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the
trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the
facts and circumstances of each case;

(iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the

trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced
to by the true owner; and

(iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of

settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be
 453

whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession,

had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the
trespasser, then even the true owner, has no right to destroy
the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession.

10. In the cases of Munshi Ram [AIR 1968 SC 702 : (1968) 2

SCR 455 : 1968 Cri LJ 806] and Puran Singh [(1975) 4 SCC
518 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 608] the Court has approved the
statement of law made in Horam v. R. [AIR 1949 All 564 : 50
Cri LJ 868] wherein a distinction was drawn between the
trespasser in the process of acquiring possession and the
trespasser who had already accomplished or completed his
possession wherein the true owner may be treated to have
acquiesced in; while the former can be obstructed and turned
out by the true owner even by using reasonable force, the
latter may be dispossessed by the true owner only by having
recourse to the due process of law for reacquiring possession
over his property.”

PP. Because the Impugned order passed by the Hon’ble High Court

suffers from glaring illegalities while observing that the Act is not

violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. As several

provisions of the Act are totally against the validity of a legislative

enactment recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s ratio in

Shayra Bano v. Union of India, 2017 9 SCC 1. wherein this

Hon’ble Court held as under:

“63. In the pre-1974 era, the judgments of this Court did refer to
the “rule of law” or “positive” aspect of Article 14, the concomitant
of which is that if an action is found to be arbitrary and, therefore,
unreasonable, it would negate the equal protection of the law
contained in Article 14 and would be struck down on this ground.
 454

In S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India [S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of

India, (1967) 2 SCR 703 : AIR 1967 SC 1427] , this Court held :
(SCR pp. 718-19 : AIR p. 1434, para 14)

“14. In this context it is important to emphasise that the absence

of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon
which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system
governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon
executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined
limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions
should be made by the application of known principles and rules
and in general, such decisions should be predictable and the
citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any
principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a
decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with
the rule of law. (See Dicey—“Law of the Constitution”—10th Edn.,
Introduction cx.) “Law has reached its finest moments”, stated
Douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlich [United
States v. Wunderlich, 1951 SCC OnLine US SC 93 : 96 L Ed 113 :
342 US 98 (1951)] : (SCC OnLine US SC para 9)

‘9. … when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion

of some ruler…. Where discretion, is absolute, man has
always suffered.’

It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn
enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic
terms in John Wilkes [R. v. Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2527 : 98 ER
327] , Burr at p. 2539 : (ER p. 334)

‘… means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed

by rule, not by humour : it must not be arbitrary, vague, and
fanciful….’ ”

This was in the context of service rules being seniority rules,

which applied to the Income Tax Department, being held to be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”
 455

QQ. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to consider that the Act has

put all different lands such as Government, private and rented on

same footing without looking nature and the extent of the land.

As nature and extent are essential to decide the gravity of the

offence. However, in the present case irrespective of the nature

of the land each land will be treated at par and punishment of 10

years maximum up to 14 years will be awarded without deciding

the gravity of the offence.

RR. Because the Hon’ble High Court overlooked the contention that

the Act sets terms of imprisonment same for everyone even

though criteria for violation may not be the same for the accused

persons.

SS. Because the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding that The Act is

not violative of Article 14 even though The Act fails the test of

two conditions required under Article 14 i.e. classification on the

basis of intelligible differentia and such differentia must have a

rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.

In the present case none of these conditions are fulfilled as the

Act equates the Government land and the private land, the
 456

provisions making "land grabbing" an offence even with respect

to private lands belonging to a private persons, is not based on

any ineligible differentia and has no nexus with the object, the

legislative seeks to achieve, which is securing 'public order' in the

State. Neither the land grabbing has been made an offence for

the breach of public order nor the 'land grabber' is defined as a

person who is guilty of breach of maintenance of public order.

TT. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to acknowledge that private

land disputes cannot have any effect on the public order and thus,

if the Act’s object doesn’t have any nexus with the provisions of

the Act, such an Act cannot be said to be in accordance with

Article 14.

UU. Because the Hon’ble High Court ignored that the impugned

enactment though is aimed at maintenance of law and public

order and to address the disturbance of public order, but in the

garb of maintenance of public order, even the activity related to

a land belonging to a private person which gives rise to an

ordinary civil dispute between two private individuals, has been

 457

brought under the umbrella of the impugned enactment Act' 2020

giving it a colour of criminal activity.

VV. Because the Hon’ble High Court overlooked the contention of the

Petitioners that the Act blends Civil and Criminal Procedure in the

inquiry into the allegation of commission of offence of land

grabbing. The result is that the finding recorded during the course

of civil trial will be binding in criminal proceedings.

WW. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to examine the issue that

the definition of "land grabbing" under the Act has a swaying

effect by including the dispute pertaining to title, possessions etc.

which is essentially a civil dispute and in the Act they will have

criminal consequences as well.

XX. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to verify the check and

balance within the Act. In the Act Special Courts are left to follow

their own procedure, which confers unfettered discretion upon

the Special Courts.

YY. Because the Hon’ble High Court did not appreciate that power

conferred upon the Special Court under Section 9(2)(3) for trial
 458

of civil dispute and 9(4) for trial of criminal dispute as also sub-

section(5) of Section 9 are couched in a manner that the

Legislature has conferred unguided and unfettered discretionary

power to the Special Courts in the matter of trial of both civil and

criminal liability. The result is that while trying the Civil Suit or

Criminal proceedings, the Special Court would be competent to

give a go- by to the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil and

Criminal Procedure.

ZZ. Because the Hon’ble High Court overlooked that Sub-section (8)

of Section 9 conferring power on the Special Court also provides

that the Special Court may pass an order for restoration of

possession to the complainant, after evicting any person by force,

who may be in the possession of the property.

AAA. Because the Hon’ble High Court did not go in to aspect of

functioning of the Special Court under the Act is as per its whim

and fancies. As for trial of such an offence, where civil and

criminal both aspects are to be looked into, the powers conferred

on the Special Court should have been circumscribed by certain

 459

limits provided in the Act itself, so that all excesses in the matter

of implementation of the Act would have been checked.

BBB. Because the Hon’ble High Court turned the blind eye towards that

under the Act land grabbing has been made a criminal offence

but power to register an FIR has been taken away from the police

and has been given to executive. Section 12(a) of the Act states

that he information about the commission of offence of "land

grabbing" cannot be recorded by a police officer unless prior

approval of the District Magistrate, in consultation with the

Committee notified by the Government, is nothing but a

mechanism to scuttle the criminal machinery, which otherwise

can be set in motion by writing a complaint of an offence

CCC. Because the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding functioning of

the committee under the Act as valid because no qualification of

the member of the committee has been prescribed under the Act.

The result is that anyone can be included as a member of the

committee, which leads to uncertainty, in implementation of the

statute. Because the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding the Act

as constitutionally valid as act of the “land grabbing” by itself is

 460

not determinative of its own gravity, inasmuch as, the activity of

occupying private person’s land may not affect adversely the

maintenance of public order. There must be material to show that

there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public

and such act must be said to have direct bearing on the question

of maintenance of public order. The commission of offence will

not necessarily come within the purview of public order, which

can be dealt with under ordinary general law of the land. With

this idea of difference between the expressions “maintenance of

land and order” and “acting in a manner prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order”, it was vehemently argued that in

no manner, a person who occupies land belonging to a private

person can be said to be threat to the maintenance of public

order, so much so that such an act of that person creates panic

or fear in the minds of members of the public upsetting the even

tempo of life of the community, or results in bringing a feeling of

insecurity among the general public.

DDD. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to hold that the Act has

failed the test of palpable arbitrariness as held in Shashikant

Laxman Kale v. Union of India, 1990 4 SCC 366 as while

 461

understanding the purpose or object of the legislation, there is a

need to apply the 'Mischief Rule' to understand the gap of

mischief the legislation intended to cover, to give effect to the

intention of the Legislature so as to “advance the remedy and

suppress the mischief”.

EEE. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate and follow

the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in A.P. Dairy

Development Corpn. Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy,

(2011) 9 SCC 286, wherein this Hon’ble Court held as under:

“29. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the

Constitution strikes at arbitrariness because an action that is
arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality.
This doctrine of arbitrariness is not restricted only to executive
actions, but also applies to the legislature. Thus, a party has to
satisfy that the action was reasonable, not done in unreasonable
manner or capriciously or at pleasure without adequate
determining principle, rational, and has been done according to
reason or judgment, and certainly does not depend on the will
alone. However, the action of the legislature, violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution, should ordinarily be
manifestly arbitrary. There must be a case of substantive
unreasonableness in the statute itself for declaring the
act ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. [Vide Ajay
Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi [(1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC
(L&S) 258 : AIR 1981 SC 487] , Reliance Airport Developers (P)
Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India [(2006) 10 SCC 1]
, Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Assn. v. Central Valuation
Board [(2007) 6 SCC 668 : AIR 2007 SC 2276] , Grand Kakatiya
Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers
 462

Union v. Srinivasa Resorts Ltd. [(2009) 5 SCC 342 : (2009) 2 SCC

(L&S) 10 : AIR 2009 SC 2337] and State of T.N. v. K. Shyam
Sunder [(2011) 8 SCC 737] .]”

FFF. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate and follow

the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in Sharma

Transport v. State of A.P., (2002) 2 SCC 188, wherein this

Hon’ble Court held as under:

“25. ……. In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown

that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary. The
expression “arbitrarily” means : in an unreasonable
manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure,
without adequate determining principle, not founded in
the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting
according to reason or judgment, depending on the will
alone.”

GGG. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to judge the

unreasonableness under the Act. In the present case upon

reading the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the impugned

legislation it is clear that no reasonableness of a classification

made in the enactment is found and thus, it is contrary to the

constitution.

HHH. Because the Hon’ble High Court made a mistake by overlooking

the fact that under the Act under Section 2(e) of the Act makes
 463

every activity of land grabber to occupy or attempt to occupy with

or without the use of force, threat, intimidation and deceit, has

been included within the meaning of land grabbing, while making

it a criminal offence when there is no mens rea, if the above three

situations, namely force, threat, intimidation and deceit are

excluded. The fact that the activity of the land grabber without

the use of the above, force, threat, intimidation and deceit, to

occupy or attempt to occupy, has been made a criminal offence,

is a reflection of vagueness and arbitrariness of the statute,

inasmuch as, mens rea is the most important ingredient of any

criminal activity.

III. Because the Hon’ble High Court while upholding the Act failed to

appreciate that inclusion of successor-in-interest for making him

liable for the activity of a person who actually commits the act of

land grabbing, land can be held to be a land grabber, making him

liable for the offence of land grabbing with the punishment of

imprisonment, which is grave for a term not less than 10 years.

Thus, such a provision is totally arbitrary.

 464

JJJ. Because the Hon’ble High Court misinterpreted section 7(2) of

the Act as said section is in violation of principle of separation of

powers. Section 7 (2) of the Act confers jurisdiction on the State

Government to decide any question relating to the jurisdiction of

any Special Court, which is contrary to the principle of separation

of power, which is the basic feature of the Constitution, inasmuch

as, the question of jurisdiction of a Court is a legal question which

can only be decided in a judicial proceeding. Conferring power on

the State to decide the dispute pertaining to the question of

jurisdiction of the Special Court by Section 7(2) blurs the

distinctive line between the judiciary and the executives.

KKK. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to examine the flaws of

procedure established in Section 9(2),(3) and (4) of the Act, to

be followed by the Special Court. The provisions of Sub-sections

(2),(3) and (4) of Section 9 speak of summary disposal of both

civil and criminal proceedings, as against the common procedure

of law provided by the Code of Civil Procedure and procedure of

Code of Criminal Procedure. The power given to the Special Court

for summary disposal of the civil and criminal proceedings is

 465

unguided and uncanalized and in summary disposal of the

proceedings, there is no provision of public notice or filing appeal.

LLL. Because the Hon’ble High Court erred in upholding several

provisions of the Act such as provisions granting liberty to Special

Courts to derive its own procedure while conducting civil and

criminal liabilities. Also, the discretion to the Special Court to not

deliver its decision or order until both civil and criminal

proceedings are completed, is proof of manifest arbitrariness in

exercise of the legislative power of the State.

MMM. Because the Hon’ble High Court erred in upholding validity

of section 11 of the Act which reverses burden of proof upon the

accused. As per section 11 and other provisions High Court failed

to examine that in the present case accused has to go through 3

rounds of interrogation. Starting from the inquiry conducted by

the Committee chaired by the District Collector, Civil Proceedings

where he will have to prove the title, possession over the land

and in the Criminal Proceedings where the entire onus will be on

him to prove him non-guilty. Thus, Shifting of burden of proof

upon the person against whom the allegations of land grabbing

 466

has been made by virtue of Section 11 of the Act is further proof

of tinkering with the common principles of criminal law that it is

the duty of the prosecution to prove the allegations of the

commission of criminal offence beyond reasonable doubt.

NNN. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate and follow

the ratio of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Noor Aga v.

State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417, wherein this Hon’ble

Court held as under:

“Burden of proof

56. The provisions of the Act and the punishment prescribed

therein being indisputably stringent flowing from elements such
as a heightened standard for bail, absence of any provision for
remissions, specific provisions for grant of minimum sentence,
enabling provisions granting power to the court to impose fine of
more than maximum punishment of Rs 2,00,000 as also the
presumption of guilt emerging from possession of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, the extent of burden to prove the
foundational facts on the prosecution i.e. “proof beyond all
reasonable doubt” would be more onerous. A heightened
scrutiny test would be necessary to be invoked. It is so
because whereas, on the one hand, the court must strive towards
giving effect to the parliamentary object and intent in the light of
the international conventions, but, on the other, it is also
necessary to uphold the individual human rights and dignity as
provided for under the UN Declaration of Human Rights by
insisting upon scrupulous compliance with the provisions of the
Act for the purpose of upholding the democratic values. It is
necessary for giving effect to the concept of “wider
civilisation”. The court must always remind itself that it is
 467

a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that

more serious the offence, the stricter is the degree of
proof. A higher degree of assurance, thus, would be
necessary to convict an accused. In State of Punjab v. Baldev
Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1080] it was stated:
(SCC p. 199, para 28)

“28. … It must be borne in mind that severer the punishment,

greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguards
provided in a statute are scrupulously followed.”

(See also Ritesh Chakarvarti v. State of M.P. [(2006) 12 SCC 321

: (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 744] )

58. Sections 35 and 54 of the Act, no doubt, raise presumptions

with regard to the culpable mental state on the part of the
accused as also place the burden of proof in this behalf on the
accused; but a bare perusal of the said provision would clearly
show that presumption would operate in the trial of the accused
only in the event the circumstances contained therein are fully
satisfied. An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only
when it stands satisfied, would the legal burden shift. Even then,
the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his
innocence is not as high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the
standard of proof required to prove the guilt of the accused on
the prosecution is “beyond all reasonable doubt” but it is
“preponderance of probability” on the accused. If the
prosecution fails to prove the foundational facts so as to
attract the rigours of Section 35 of the Act, the actus reus
which is possession of contraband by the accused cannot
be said to have been established.

60. Whether the burden on the accused is a legal burden or an

evidentiary burden would depend on the statute in question. The
purport and object thereof must also be taken into consideration
in determining the said question. It must pass the test of the
doctrine of proportionality. The difficulties faced by the
prosecution in certain cases may be held to be sufficient to arrive
at an opinion that the burden on the accused is an evidentiary
burden and not merely a legal burden. The trial must be fair. The
 468

accused must be provided with opportunities to effectively defend

himself. In Sheldrake v. Director of Public Prosecutions [(2005) 1
AC 264 : (2004) 3 WLR 976 : (2005) 1 All ER 237 : 2004 UKHL 43
(HL)] it was stated in the following terms: (WLR pp. 988-89, para
21)

“21. From this body of authority certain principles may be derived.

The overriding concern is that a trial should be fair, and the
presumption of innocence is a fundamental right directed to that
end. The Convention does not outlaw presumptions of fact or law
but requires that these should be kept within reasonable limits
and should not be arbitrary. It is open to States to define the
constituent elements of a criminal offence, excluding the
requirement of mens rea. But the substance and effect of
any presumption adverse to a defendant must be
examined, and must be reasonable. Relevant to any
judgment on reasonableness or proportionality will be the
opportunity given to the defendant to rebut the presumption,
maintenance of the rights of the defence, flexibility in application
of the presumption, retention by the court of a power to assess
the evidence, the importance of what is at stake and the difficulty
which a prosecutor may face in the absence of a presumption.
Security concerns do not absolve member States from their duty
to observe basic standards of fairness. The justifiability of any
infringement of the presumption of innocence cannot be resolved
by any rule of thumb, but on examination of all the facts and
circumstances of the particular provision as applied in the
particular case.”

OOO. Because the Hon’ble High Court failed to protect rights of the

accused person under the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 11

which confers the powers on the Special Court to draw

presumption against any person in possession of movable or

immovable property which cannot be satisfactorily accounted or

 469

disproportionate to his own source of income, does not have any

relation with any of the provisions of the Act, which makes the

activity of the land grabbing an offence. No inquiry can be

permitted under several provisions of the Act to ascertain as to

whether the pecuniary resources are disproportionate to the

source of income of a person against whom the allegation of the

land grabbing has been made.

PPP. Because the Hon’ble High Court made a glaring error while

interpreting applicability and implementation of Section 12a

reading Appeal to the High Court as right to appeal under the said

section is nothing but an illusionary right. Section 12A which

provides for appeal to the High Court, is the only statutory remedy

to an aggrieved person that too within the limitation of 30 days

from the date of the judgement or the order. The remedy is only

against the final decision of the Special Courts and no appeal is

provided against the interim order.

QQQ. Because the Hon’ble High Court erred in holding framed under

the Act are not overreaching the Act. As Rules framed in exercise

of powers under Section 16 of the Act, namely the Gujarat Land

 470

Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 2020 are having overreaching effect

as many of the provisions therein, go beyond the scope of the Act

itself. Rule 5(8) confers jurisdiction upon the Committee to decide

the future course of action including filing of an FIR on

consideration of the inquiry report drawn as per Rule 5, which

further goes beyond the provisions of the Section 12(a),

conferring jurisdiction upon the Committee to grant approval for

registration of the First Information Report on an information

received by a police officer about the commission of an offence

under the Act.

RRR. Because The Hon’ble High Court overlooked underlining abuse of

the power by the executive under the Act. Section 12(a) speaks

of the Committee notified by the Government. The power given

to the State Government to constitute a Committee, which has

been conferred important function of inquiry at the inception

stage, on receipt of the complaint of land grabbing, is not guided

under the impugned enactment. The constitution of the

Committee is a legislative Act, delegation of the legislative power

that too in an unguided, uncanalized manner makes the

delegation excessive.
 471

SSS. Because The Hon’ble High Court erred in holding that Special

court in unguided manner can proceeds with the civil and criminal

proceedings at the same time without looking or examining the

consequences of the same at the time of implementation of the

said Act. the evidence recorded in civil matter may influence or

impact the mind of the Judge in criminal proceedings, if taken

later. Further both civil and criminal proceedings are to be

conducted by the Specially Designated Courts. The result is that

the same Judge who has recorded evidence in civil proceedings

is prone to be influenced or impacted by the evidence adduced in

civil matter while conducting the criminal trial. The quality of

prosecution evidence is compromised in case of pendency of the

criminal matter and civil proceedings started first, as it would

allow any witness to improvise or change his version depending

upon the statement of the accused in civil matter where the

accused is bound to speak.

TTT. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has failed to appreciate that Act

2020 provides for unusually harsh and cruel punishment of a

 472

minimum mandatory sentence of 10 years, which may extend to

14 years, which is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence.

UUU. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has failed to appreciate the

doctrine of proportionality of punishment or sentence into service,

the offence of land grabbing is an offence against the property

and not against a human body.

VVV. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has failed to appreciate that the

right of the accused to plead for grant of lesser period of sentence

has been taken away by the Legislature by proving for

punishment with imprisonment for a fixed tenure.

WWW.Because, the Hon’ble High Court has failed to appreciate that it is

the duty of the court to consider mitigating circumstances before

awarding a sentence that has become redundant by the statute

by providing a minimum sentence that too of 10 years

imprisonment.

XXX. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that there is

no reasonableness in legislative action wherein personal liberty is

 473

deprived without following a due process of law and henceforth

is hit by Article 21.

YYY. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that any

statute providing for disproportionate punishment is arbitrary and

can be tested on the anvil of proportionality which is also known

as primary review.

ZZZ. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the ratio laid

down in State of Punjab vs Dalbir Singh (2012) 3 SCC 346,

wherein while examinging the vaidity of section 27(3) of Arms

Act, 1959, which had provided for maximum punishment with

death, has held that the said provision deprived judiciary from

discharging its constitutional duties of judicial review by stopping

it from exeersing its discretion in sentencing procedure.

AAAA. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the ratio in

Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 24, wherein

it was held that sentencing power has to be exercised in

accordance with statutory sentencing structure under section

235(2) and 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

 474

BBBB. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the

fundamental principle of just sentencing that the punishment

imposed on a convict should be proportionate to the gravity of

the crime of which he has been convicted.

CCCC. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that there is

denial to a fair hearing when no opportunity is given to an accused

person to offer mitigation circumstances before sentence, which

is the normal procedure in all other trials for non-capital offences.

DDDD.Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the ratio as

laid down in Maneka Gandhi vs UOI (1983) 1 SCC 305,

wherein it was said that procedure by which a person may be

deprived of his life or personal liberty must be reasonable, fair

and just.

EEEE. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the Sunil

Batra vs Delhi Administration (1948) 4 SC 494, wherein J,

Krishna Iyer observed that our Constitution has no “due process”

clause, but what is punitively outrageous, scandalizingly unusual

or cruel and rehabilitatively counterproductive, is unarguably

 475

unreasonable and arbitrary and is shot down by Article 14 & 19

and if inflicted by procedural unfairness, falls foul of Article 21.

FFFF. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the

constitutional principle of proportionality in sentencing policy

under Eighth Amendment of US Constitution, wherein Court has

the power to review sentences guided by objective factors.

GGGG. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the decision

of the Supreme Court of Canada, R vs Nur (2015) SCC 15,

hence overlooking the fact that a proportionate sentence is a

highly individualized exercise tailored to the gravity offence, the

blameworthiness of the offender ad the harm caused by the

crime.

HHHH.Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the Land

Grabbing Act 2020, which deprives two benefits, Firstly, it does

not differentiate between a one-time offender and land mafia and

second, it deprives an offender the benefits under the Probation

of Offences Act, 1958.

 476

IIII. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that even in

the Prohibition of Dowry Act, discretion is provided to reduce the

minimum sentence as provided therein.

JJJJ. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that no

standard sentencing policy can be claimed, since while

sentencing, the right to be informed of the mitigating

circumstances against the accused persons have been taken away

by providing a minimum sentence for the offence of land

grabbing.

KKKK. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the

legislature is not empowered to compel any court to pass a

sentence, which is inconsistent with the Constitution.

LLLL. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that

disproportionate sentence, excessive, cruel and harsh

punishment is not a question of overlap but a question of

usurpation of judicial function.

MMMM. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that

Executive Committee constituted by the State Government under

 477

Section 2(a) r/w Section 12(a) of the Act’ 2020 while making

inquiry under the Rules’ 2020 passes a conditional order on the

complaint of land grabbing asking the accused person to

surrender the land occupied by him within a certain period of or

else FIR is lodged. The disputed question of title or right in the

property can not be decided by the Executive Committee.

NNNN. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that

Committee is conferrd with decision making power which is

otherwise to be exercised by judicial court.

OOOO. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that

under sub rule (2) of Rule 5, the collector is allowed to take sou

motu cognizance against a person who grabs land or is

headstrong person, but nowhere headstrong has been defined,

hence giving unbridled and unguided powers to the collector.

PPPP. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate the ratio laid

down in Madhya Pradesh vs Baldeo Prasad AIR 1961 SC

293, where while discussing who should be treated as Goonda

 478

under Goonda Act, it was held that the existence of precedent

conditions is necessary before exercising such authority.

QQQQ. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that

word of caution in State of Punjab vs Khan Chand (1974) 1

SCC 549, which said that no one should be trusted with power

without restraint. If a statute provides delegation of power

without restriction, discrimination is bound to happen in the

statute, hence the court will strike down both law as well as

executive action.

RRRR. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that Sub rule

(8) of Rule 5, allows committee to decide further course of action

on consideration of the inquiry report, gives excessive power

intermixed with discretion to the executive committee.

SSSS. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate that there is

the absence of mens rea in imposing liability for the act of land

grabbing since the person who has succeeded any piece of land

alleged to be ‘grabbed land’, cannot be held liable for the criminal

 479

act, if any, done by his predecessor. There can be no vicarious

liability as criminal liability cannot be passed on or inherited.

TTTT. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has failed to appreciate that

‘Land Grabbing’ was never an offence prior to 29.08.2020. Any

person who occupied the alleged ‘grabbed land’ prior to the

commencement of Act’ 2020, cannot be held to be a land grabber

by giving retrospective effect to the definition of land grabber

under section 2(d).

UUUU. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

Om Kumar vs Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386, wherein

proportionality has been interpreted as the question of whether

while regulating the exercise of fundamental rights, the

appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures have been

made by the legislature to achieve the object of the legislation.

Under this principle, the court’s role is to observe the balance

between adverse effects on rights, and liberties due to legislation

and the intended purpose of the legislation.

 480

VVVV. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

Mithu, that there is a special provision under section 354(3)

wherein a special reason has to be stated to impose sentence of

death, hence an alternate sentence is provided.

WWWW. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by stating that

there is no rational distinction between a person who commits a

murder after serving out sentence of life imprisonment and

person who commits while still serving a serving a sentence

XXXX. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

Bachan Singh, wherein the majority has agreed that the

imposition of standards of tailoring the judicial discretion as to

sentence, was a legislative function.

YYYY. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

R vs Nur, 2015 SCC 15 and observing that mandatory minimum

sentence, have the potential to depart from the principle of

proportionality in sentencing, and violate the principle of

proportionality, has recognized the wisdom of the Parliamentary

Committee, it is the Parliament’s choice to raise the mandatory

 481

minimum sentence to reflect valid and pressing objectives and

therein the Court should not interfere.

ZZZZ. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

Vikram Singh @ Vicky vs Union of India, (2015) 9 SCC

502, in which it was observed that prescribing punishment for

crimes rests with the legislature and not Courts.

AAAAA. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing

reliance on Vikram Singh wherein it was observed Eighth

Amendment does not mandate the adoption of any one

penological theory and that principles that guide criminal

sentencing have varied with the times.

BBBBB. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing

reliance on Ewing vs California, (2003) SCC Online US SC

16 that a sentence can have a variety of justifications and

selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to

be made by State Legislatures, and not the federal courts.

CCCCC. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing

reliance on Raju Jagdish Paswan vs State of Maharashtra

 482

(2019) 16 SCC 380, wherein it has been held that the legislative

supremacy in the sentencing policy is based on the principle of

separation of power in a parliamentary democracy like ours,

where the legislature is meant to cater to the societal demands

and meet the challenge of time.

DDDDD. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate and

follow the ratio of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in I.R.

Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1, wherein this Hon’ble

Court held as under:

“129. Equality, rule of law, judicial review and separation of

powers form parts of the basic structure of the Constitution. Each
of these concepts are intimately connected. There can be no rule
of law, if there is no equality before the law. These would be
meaningless if the violation was not subject to the judicial review.
All these would be redundant if the legislative, executive and
judicial powers are vested in one organ. Therefore, the duty to
decide whether the limits have been transgressed has been
placed on the judiciary.

130. Realising that it is necessary to secure the enforcement of

the fundamental rights, power for such enforcement has been
vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the High
Courts. Judicial review is an essential feature of the Constitution.
It gives practical content to the objectives of the Constitution
embodied in Part III and other parts of the Constitution. It may
be noted that the mere fact that equality, which is a part of the
basic structure, can be excluded for a limited purpose, to protect
certain kinds of laws, does not prevent it from being part of the
 483

basic structure. Therefore, it follows that in considering whether

any particular feature of the Constitution is part of the basic
structure—rule of law, separation of powers—the fact that limited
exceptions are made for limited purposes, to protect certain kind
of laws, does not mean that it is not part of the basic structure.”

EEEEE. Because, the Hon’ble High Court failed to appreciate and

follow the ratio of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Minerva

Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625, wherein this

Hon’ble Court held as under:

“87. It is a fundamental principle of our constitutional scheme,

and I have pointed this out in the preceding paragraph, that every
organ of the State, every authority under the Constitution, derives
its power from the Constitution and has to act within the limits of
such power. But then the question arises as to which authority
must decide what are the limits on the power conferred upon each
organ or instrumentality of the State and whether such limits are
transgressed or exceeded. Now there are three main departments
of the State amongst which the powers of government are
divided; the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Under our
Constitution we have no rigid separation of powers as in the
United States of America, but there is a broad demarcation,
though, having regard to the complex nature of governmental
functions, certain degree of overlapping is inevitable. The reason
for this broad separation of powers is that “the concentration of
powers in any one organ may” to quote the words of
Chandrachud, J., (as he then was) in Indira Gandhi case[(1975)
Supp SCC 1 : AIR 1975 SC 2299 : (1976) 2 SCR 341] “by upsetting
that fine balance between the three organs, destroy the
fundamental premises of a democratic government to which we
are pledged”. Take for example, a case where the executive which
is in charge of administration acts to the prejudice of a citizen and
a question arises as to what are the powers of the executive and
whether the executive has acted within the scope of its powers.
 484

Such a question obviously cannot be left to the executive to

decide and for two very good reasons. First, the decision of the
question would depend upon the interpretation of the
Constitution and the laws and this would pre-eminently be a
matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary
which alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and
secondly, the constitutional and legal protection afforded to the
citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to
determine the legality of its own action. So also if the legislature
makes a law and a dispute arises whether in making the law the
legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence
or the law is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other
provisions of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same
reasons, be left to the determination of the legislature. The
Constitution has, therefore, created an independent
machinery for resolving these disputes and this
independent machinery is the judiciary which is vested
with the power of judicial review to determine the legality
of executive action and the validity of legislation passed
by the legislature. It is the solemn duty of the judiciary
under the Constitution to keep the different organs of the
State such as the executive and the legislature within the
limits of the power conferred upon them by the
Constitution. This power of judicial review is conferred on the
judiciary by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. Speaking
about draft Article 25, corresponding to present Article 32 of the
Constitution, Dr Ambedkar, the principal architect of our
Constitution, said in the Constituent Assembly on December 9,
1948:

“If I was asked to name any particular Article in this

Constitution as the most important — an Article without
which this Constitution would be a nullity — I could not refer
to any other Article except this one. It is the very soul of
the Constitution and the very heart of it and I am glad that
the House has realised its importance. (CAD, Vol. 7, p.953)”
 485

It is a cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one

howsoever highly placed and no authority however lofty
can claim to be the sole judge of its power under the
Constitution or whether its action is within the confines
of such power laid down by the Constitution. The judiciary
is the interpreter of the Constitution and to the judiciary is
assigned the delicate task to determine what is the power
conferred on each branch of government, whether it is limited,
and if so, what are the limits and whether any action of that
branch transgresses such limits. It is for the judiciary to uphold
the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional
limitations. That is the essence of the rule of law, which inter alia
requires that “the exercise of powers by the government whether
it be the legislature or the executive or any other authority, be
conditioned by the Constitution and the law”. The power of
judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional
system and without it, there will be no government of
laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion
and a promise of unreality. I am of the view that if there
is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any
other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of
democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial
review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the
basic structure of the Constitution. Of course, when I say
this I should not be taken to suggest that effective
alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements
for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. But
what I wish to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital
principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated
without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution.
If by a constitutional amendment, the power of judicial
review is taken away and it is provided that the validity
of any law made by the legislature shall not be liable to
be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside
the legislative competence of the legislature or is
violative of any fundamental rights, it would be nothing
short of subversion of the Constitution, for it would make
a mockery of the distribution of legislative powers
between the Union and the States and render the
fundamental rights meaningless and futile. So also if a
 486

constitutional amendment is made which has the effect of taking

away the power of judicial review and providing that no
amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be
questioned on any ground, even if such amendment is violative
of the basic structure and, therefore, outside the amendatory
power of Parliament, it would be making Parliament sole judge of
the constitutional validity of what it has done and that would, in
effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending power
of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Constitution.
The conclusion must therefore inevitably follow that clause (4) of
Article 368 is unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic
structure of the Constitution.”

FFFFF. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

Raju Jagdish Paswan, wherein it has been held that the legislature

is presumed to be supremely wise and aware of such needs and

challenges.

GGGGG. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing

reliance on State of Madras vs V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 1961,

wherein it was observed that judges’ limit to interference with

their legislative judgement in such cases can only be dictated by

their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering

reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of

their way of thinking but for all, and that the majority of the

elected representatives of the people have, in authorizing the

imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.

 487

HHHHH. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by stating that

Objects and Reasons of the Land Grabbing act aims to prohibit

lawlessness on account of illegal claims over the other owner’s

property and thereafter stating that it is a settled principle that

the Court should be careful not to stigmatise every sentence

alleged as disproportionate or excessive as unconstitutional.

IIIII. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by holding that

expressions “continues to be in occupation” under section 4,

“grabbed land’ under section 2(e), have to be understood to mean

the act of possession is not a punishment with retrospective

effect, what is punishable is the possession of grabbed land on or

after the commencement of Act’ 2020, without any lawful

entitlement thereto.

JJJJJ. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

Sajjan Singh vs The State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464,

wherein it was held that a statute cannot be retrospective

because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time

antecedent to its. By following this, the Hon’ble High Court erred

 488

in rejecting the argument of retrospectivity as it would lead to

absurdity.

KKKKK. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by stating that mens

rea is implied in a statute which creates offence and in Land

Grabbing Act, 2020, the objective is to prohibit the activities of

land grabbing by making it a criminal offence leading to

imprisonment of guilty.

LLLLL. Because, the Hon’ble High Court has erred by placing reliance on

Benilal vs State of Maharashtra, (1995) Supp (1) SCC 235

and State of Punjab vs Gurmit Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 632

and stating that mere word or phrase not been defined is not a

ground to declare the provisions of the Act itself or the order as

unconstitutional. The word ‘headstrong’ is to be understood in

their natural ordinary or popular sense by referring it general

meaning in the dictionary.

MMMMM. Because, the impugned order passed by the Hon’ble High

Court is contrary to the provisions of law and appears to have

 489

been passed, without proper appreciation of the law and facts of

the case in hand.

NNNNN. Because, the impugned order passed by the Hon’ble High

Court is erroneous and unsustainable in law and the same is

deserved to be set aside.

6. GROUNDS FOR INTERIM RELIEF:-

The grounds mentioned in para 5 may be considered part and

parcel of the grounds for the interim relief. The Petitioner has

prima facie case in its favour and the balance of convenience also

lies in favour of the Petitioner. The father-in-law of the petitioner

had executed a rent agreement dated 01.01.1953 for the said

land. Subsequnrlty, the partnership firm was reconstituted and

rent agreement dated 28.04.1998 was executed by Petitioner

no.1 as a partner of M/s Murlidhar B Vamdot, with Respondent

No. 3 (Complainant) and other land owners. Thereafter, Petitioner

entered into an agreement dated 12.01.2019 for carrying on the

business of selling petrol, diesel, oils etc with Bharat Petroleum

Corporation Limited and till today have paid all the regular tax

and Cess to Kadodara Panchayat. Moreover, it is stated that

 490

Special Civil Suit no. 05/2021 regarding the encroachment on the

same land is pending before the Principal Senior Civil Judge,

Veraval The Petitioners are even ready to raise the annual rent..

If the interim relief is not granted, the Petitioner shall incur

irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money,

whereas if the interim relief is granted, the Respondent shall not

incur any loss or harm. Despite the civil litigation being pending,

Respondent No. 3, with an only ulterior motive to pressurize and

harass the Petitioner to extort money, filed a complaint under the

Act. The provisions of the Act are such that it would defeat all the

accrued rights of the Petitioner under the agreement to sell and

the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, the interim relief is

required to be granted in favour of the Petitioner.

7. PRAYER:-

In the circumstances set forth above, it is therefore,

most respectfully prayed that your lordships may

graciously be pleased to:-

 491

a) Grant Special Leave to Appeal against the impugned

judgment and final order dated 09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble

High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal

Application No. 3788 of 2022;

b) Pass any other or further orders as may be deemed fit

and proper in the circumstances of the case.

8. PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF: -

a) Stay the operation of the impugned judgment and final order

dated 09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at

Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal Application No. 3788 of 2022;

b) Stay all further proceedings in furtherance of the

summons dated 28.03.2022 issued by Respondent No. 2;

c) Grant ad interim ex parte stay in favour of the Petitioner

in terms of (a) and (b) above;

 492

d) Pass such other/further order, as this Hon'ble Court may

deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of

the present case.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE PETITIONER AS IN

DUTY BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.

FILED BY:

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONERS

Date: 16.09.2024
 493

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

CERTIFICATE

Certified that Special Leave Petition is confined only to the pleadings

of the Hon’ble High Court whose order is challenged and other documents

relied upon in those proceedings. No additional facts, documents or

ground have been taken therein for relief upon in the S.L.P. It is further

certified that the copies of the documents / annexures attached to the

SLP are necessary to answer the question of law raised in the petition or

to make out grounds urged in the SLP for consideration of this Hon’ble

Court. This certificate is given on the basis of the instructions given by

the petitioner whose affidavit is filed in support of the SLP.

FILED BY:-

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

Filed on 17.09.2024 ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER
 494

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt

8 422 495
495
496
ANNEXURE P-1
497
 498

Translation of Annexure P1
499
 500

//TRUE COPY//
501
ANNEXURE P-2
502
503
504
505

Translation of Annexure P-2

506
507
508
509
510
 511 ANNEXURE P-3

INDIA NON TUDICIAL

I

Government of Guiarat
c-e *!fi-"-e!s-oj 9 le-m P P Y tt'

RqkffiA
Certificate No. IN-GJo1810860171099S

Certificate lssued Date 24-Jun-2020 10:59 AM

Account Reference IMPACC (Fl)/ gjelimpl0/ BARDOLI/ GJ-SU

s u B I N -G J GJ E L IM P 1 0427 359 1 43928225

Unique Doc.

Purchased bY BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD

for)
Description of Arlicle 5(h) Agreement (not otherwise provided

Description FOR AGREEMENT

Consideration Price 0
(Zero)

First PartY BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATTON LTD

Second PartY MS MORLIDHAR B VAMDOTE

Stamp DutY Paid BY BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD

Stamp DutY Amount( 300

(Three Hundred onlY)

[aLL-- Partn<lr
{ry2' n

Surat

Statutory Alert:
Certifi[ete si]iilir i€ vetrfi6d ai wllrv'sl-t-'ilestamp cont
I The autnsniiclty of lhls St
ivailabte on ttr6 weusite
? The cnus of chtrck:ntr ihe ry is or ihe s1;9fs 9f the certilicaie
C()mpetent Aulhority
3 ln case of anY ciscrePanc) iiease ir.torm ihe
 512

SELLING
(6Ct'

THIS AGREEMENT made on this

uay or TodL zo2o

BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION ,TD., a Company incorporated under the

Indian Companies Act, l9l3 having its office at Bharat Bhavan, 4 & 6
Currimbhoy Road, Ballard Estate, Mumbai - 001 and carrying on business inter alia,
at hereinafter called "The Co (which term unless repugnant to the
context shall include its successors and assigns of the One Part.

To be filled in, 1)
in the case of
an individual inhabitant

To be filled in, (2)

in the case of a
firm insert
names of all the
partners. and
carrying on business
in
partnershi[r under and style of
I\r's.

OR

To be filled in, (3)

in the case of a
Company or a Limited a Company_ / Trut
Co+perative incorporued ia Registered
Society/Trust 0ffice at

called "The fch expression shall unless

otherwise provide( be lude (l) In the case of an
individual, his/her hei and administrators (2) in the
case of a frm, the ofthe said firm and any other

MIH 6snt
il), Surat
 513
members or member for the time being of the said firm, their and
each of their respective heirs executors and administrators and any
other members or member for the time being of the said firm or
any firm or incorporated body taking in succession to the firm
under the same name or alnother name (3) in the case of companies
or co-operative Societies or Trusts, its successors and permitted
assigns ofthe other part

WHEREAS the company- has at the request of the Licensees agreed to suppty the
Licensee's requirements of Motor Spirit and/or High Speed Diesel Oit in the manner
and
upon the terms and subject to the conditions hereinaftei mentioned.

NOW THESE PRESENTS WITNESS AND IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND

DECLARED AS FOLLOtr'S :-

l.

referred to as the "outfit".

3.

entitled to make any claim against the Company for any loss arising out of any
defect or leak in the outfit.

4. The licensee shall ensure that full and measure is delivered from the said
outfit. In the event of any part of the being found to be defective or any
product dispensed ttrough it in any way, the licensee shall cease to
dispense any products of the Company the said outfit until the outfit is
repaired or the contamination is and further shall take immediate steps
for carrying out the necessary repairs or for removal of the contamination
(including bringing the same to the of the company).

5. The licensee shall keep the underground storage tank properly locked with
padlock.

MIHI 6sHt

B- VarndQte
For, Mof iidhar
oi v
Nl f.ff-fu-
et \/
 514
6. The outfit bearing the name of the company or its principals shall not be used by
the License for stocking and selling/ diSpensing petroleum products ofany other
oil company.

7. The company shall make available to the licensee one emblem which the licensee
shall promptly display on the premises at a by the
Company. The said emblem shall at all times roperty
of the company and the licensee shall pay to ll- per
month as hire charges in respect thereof.

(i) the licensee shall at the request the company lodge with the company
from time to time in cash such as may be stipulated by the company
as security for the due fu of their undertakings and obligations
hereunder and for payment of moneys due by them to the company.
Such deposits shall be in cash to the extent they have not been applied
towards recovery of any due by the licensee to the company, the
company shall allow interest to licensee on such deposits at the end of
each year at such rate as the 's bankers may allow on fixed
deposits tbr 12 months periods. licensee agrees that the company shall
be under no obligation with to the manner of use or disposal of the
funds received as deposits from licensee.

(ii) Upon any revision in the amou4t of the deposit, the licensee shall along
with the further amount (if any) to be deposited to make up the revised
amount surrender the Deposit \eceipt held by them duly discharged in
exchange for a fresh one to be issued by the company for the revised
amount and the Deposit Receip{ issued by the company shall alone be
proof of Deposit with the Compafy and of its value.

(iii) Any suctr deposit shall be by the Licensee as security deposit

only' and the Licensee shall have right to claim that the same be utilized
in payment of sums due by to the Company from time to time. The
amount rcpresenting the said its shall be returnable to the Licensee
subject to sub-clause (iv) here below only on the termination of this
Licence and after receipt by Company of its Deposit Receipt duly
discharged and after all accounts as between the Company and
the Licensee hereunder or ise finally settled. However, in case of
termination of dealership on of malpractices, such security deposit
will be forfeited.

(iv) The Company may, however, at any time apply the deposit money or any
part thereof in payment pro-tanto of any amount due to the Company by
the Licensee. Should the company do so at any time and advise the
licensee of the same, the licertrsee shall immediatery lodge with the
company such further cash deposit as may be necessary to restore the
deposits to the required extent.

(v) lf the licensee is the sole proprietor or a partnership firm, on the death of
the proprietor or of the sole surviving partner thereof, the company shall
be responsible for returning the Security Deposit or so much of it as is due

For

M
 515

only to persons entitled to ve the same under a Probate, Letter of

Administration or Succession ficate granted by a court of competent
jurisdiction in India. The shall recognizp no other persons as
having right or title to the same.

9. The Licensee hereby covenants and with the Company as follows:-

a) To supply to the public Motor or HSD or other petroleum product

either from the outfit or from sealed receptacles and for that purpose to
maintain at their own expense adequate and efficient staffin charge of
the outfit.

b) To promote the sales of the 's products to the satisfaction of the

company and achieve sales as may be set by the Company from
time to time.

c) To permit the Company at all during the currency of this License to

affix to or place upon the outfit any part thereofnotices indicating that
the Motor Spirit or HSD or petroleum products supplied from the
pump/s isr the Company's and showing the current price thereof

d) To paint the outfit including pump/s according to the Company's

recognized color scheme.

e) To place orders orally or in as the circumstances require, for the

purchase of Motor Spirit or or other petroleum products from the
Company at the Company's net ices as applicable for the time being at
the time md place of delivery if in bulk, in quantities at a time for
each pump not being in excess the licensed capacity ofthe underground
storage tank of the outfit. In r ion to pay such amount of sales tax,
turnover tax or such other as may be payable in respect of the
supplies made hereunder. The company shall, having regard to the
availability of the product and accept in writing such order or
part thereof or act upon the a.s may be possible. The orders will be
met in a rnanner, which will economical deliveries being made. No
delivery r;hall be made into or into any receptacle other than the
storage tanks forming part of the

To afford to the Company at all imes during the currency of this Licence
adequate facilities for deliveri the Motor Spirit or HSD or other
petroleunr products into the tanks of the outfit.

g) To give a receipt (in the 's usual form) signed by or on behalf of

the Licenrsees at the time of and each delivery of Motor Sprit or HSD
or other petroleum products hereunder. Such receipts shall be
conclusiv,e evidence against the censees that the quantify of Motor Spirit
or HSD or other petroleum therein mentioned was in fact
delivered to the licensee and the icensee shall not be entitled to make any
claim against the company for compensation or

tr
JOSHI
 516

ground of short delivery or contamination in respect of the Motor Spirit or

HSD or other petroleum products therein mentioned.

h) Not to adulterate the petroleum products supplied by the company and at

all times to take all reasonable precautions to ensure that the Motor Spirit
or HSD or other petroleum products is kept away from water, dirt and
other impurities and served from the outfit in such condition.

Not to assign or part with the benefit of this agreement to any person, firm
or company.

To be responsible for all Motor Spirit or HSD or other petroleum products

delivered to the licensees by the Company from the time of delivery
thereof in,to the storage tanks of the outfit or otherwise and to pay for all
supplies ordered by them prior to the delivery thereof unless otherwise
agreed.

k) Not to do or permit to be done any act or thing which may endanger the
grant or continuance of the storage Licence under the authority of which
Motor Spirit or HSD or other petroleum products may be stored in the
outfit or sold therefrom.

l) To abide by the Petroleum Act, 1934 and the Rules framed thereunder for
the time being in force as also any other laws, rules or regulations either of
the Government or of any local body as may be in force.

m) Not to sell the petroleum products supplied by the company at prices

exceeding the prices fixed by the company from time to time. Nothing
herein c,ontained shall prevent the licensees from selling the petroleum
products at prices lower than the prices fixed by the company but any
reduction made by the licensees shall be to their own account and shall not
be recoverable from the company.

n) To pay ttre stamp duty, if any, in respect of the Security Deposit (s) lodged
by the L:icensees with the Company.

o) At all tirnes and from time to time during the currency of this licence to
give adequate facilities to the company, its officers, agents and servants all
proper and necessary assistance and facilities for carrying out such
inspection and investigation.

p) During tihe continuance of this licence, not to allow anyone except the
duly authorized employees of the licensee to use the land structures or
outfit at this retail outlet nor to sell, sublet or grant any licence in respect
of any of them to any person, firm or company without giving to the
company the first option for refusal.

q) Not to change the constitution of the licensees firm nor to dissolve the
partnership nor admit new member as p

For, Mo#
e4
 517

withdraw from the partnership without obtaining the previous consent in

writing of the company.

r) To carry out the obligations contained in this agreement personally and

not to take up or continue any other employment

s)

1934 and the Rules there under.

10. The Company covenants and agrees with the L,icensees as follorvs: -

a) To bill the licensees in respect of the supplies as stipulated herein

according to the Company's practice for the time being in force at the time
of delivery.

(c) Provided the licensees faithfully observe and perform all stipulations in
the agreement required of them hereunder the Company will do its best at
all times to supply the licensee with their requirement of the Motor Spirit
or HSD and other petroleum products. The company however, shall be
under no liability if prevented from supplying Motor Spirit or HSD or any
other petroleum products by any cause beyond its control ,cr for stoppage
of supplies under the terms hereof.

I l. The Licence may be terminated by either party, upon giving to the other not less
than ninety days notice in writing, to expire at any time of its intention to
terminate it and upon the expiration of any such notice this licence shall stand
cancelled and revoked, provided however that the requisite period of notice may
be reduced or waived by mutual consent.

PROVIDED THAT in the event of termination of this license by the licensees for
any reason whatsoever or by the company on account of the Licensee's default in
carrying out any of the terms and conditions hereof, the company shall have the
right at any time within the three months from the date of such termination to
require the licensee to execute a lease or sub-lease as the case may be of the lad
together with the structures and the outfit thereon used for the purposes hereunder
either to the company or to its nominee for a period of upto five yr:ars at ayearly
rent which shall not be more than l0% of the then prevailing marllet value of the
land and structure and outfit standing thereon. In such event, the licensee shall
forthwith, notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, arrange to
transfer to the company or its nominee all licences in respect of this
outlet/dealership standing in his name.

t2. (a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained the Company shall
be at liberty to terminate this agreement forthwith upon and at any time on
the happening of any of the events following :

For.
MIHI OSHII
TM (Retal Surat
*
 518

i) The Licensee being an individual, whether trading in his individual

name or under firm name, is adjudged insolvent or a compromise is
entered into by him with his creditors, or if a distress, execution or
other process is levied upon or if an encumbrance takes possession
of or a receiver is appointed of any part of the assets or properly of
the Licensee.

ii) The Licensee, being a firm, if any member of the Licensees is

adjudged an insolvent or a compromise is entered into by the firm
or any member of the firm with their or his creditors, or a distress,
execution or other process is levied upon or if an encumbrance
takes possession of or a receiver is appointed of any part of the
assets or property of the firm or any member of the firm.

iii) The Licensee, being a Company or Co-operative Society or Trtst

goes into liquidation, whether voluntary or compulsory or if a
distress, execution or other process shall be levied upon or if any
encumbrancer takes possession or a receiver is appointed of any
part of the property of the Licensee.

If the Licence/s for the storage of petroleum produots in the outfit

is/are cancelled or revoked.

Ifthe Licensee for any reason other than due to the Company,s
default or circumstances beyond their control, faril to maintain
supply to the public through the outfit for any perio,C exceeding 24
hours.

If the Licensees fail to make payment of their outstandings;

If the Licensees shall be guilty of a breach of any o;[ the covenants

and stipulations on their part contained in this agreement.

If the Licensees shall commit or suffer to be committed any act

which in the opinion of the Marketing Director of the Company for
the time being in Mumbai or any other person nominated for this
purpose by the Company is prejudicial to the interest;or good name
of the Company or its products. The decision of s;uch officer or
person shall be final, conclusive and binding on the Licensees.

Upon termination of any other agreement or licence from the

Company to the Licensees without prejudice to any other right or
remedy reserved thereunder.

(b) otwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, where the

:e being an individual, whether trading in his individual name or
a firm name, dies, this agreement shall stand terminated forthwith
such death ofthe Licensee.

MIHI Sosnt
TM (R fl), Surat
 519

(c) On the death or retirement or permanent incapacity of any partner (if a

firm) the Company may at its option at once determine this Agreement
and if such option shall not be exercised within 30 days, the company

Lot be entitled to claim from the Company any portion of the security
,eposit. The death, retirement or permanent incapacity of a partner shall
,e notified to the Company by the surviving or continuing partners within
days of such occurrence.

(d) lach member of the Licensee's firm and also every other person for the
lime being and from time to time es firm shall
[e
jointly and severally liable in in contained
[nd shall be and remain liable that he has
,eased to be a partner in the said firm unless and until written notice of the
hct shall have been received by the Company and the Company shall have
rgreed in writing to relieve him of his responsibility.

(e)

(f) That the supply of Motor Spirit and/or HSD and other petroleum products
by the Company to the Licensees pending the expiry of any notice of
termination or after any act, contravention or omission by the Licensees in
breach of this Licence shall not in any way prejudice or affect the right of
the Company to revoke this Licence or to enforce the termination of this
Licence under the said notice.

13. The termination or purported termination of this agreement shall be without

prejudice to any claims or rights of action previously accrued to either party
against the other.

14. Upon the termination of this Licence for any cause whatsoever :

(a) the licensees shall forthwith cease displaying the name of the company
and./or its identification marks that may be in use from time to time on the
outfit; and

(b) the company shall be entitled to remove its emblem and any other property
belonging to it and for that purpose the company shall have the right to
enter the premises of the licensee.

15. It is hereby expressly agreed and declared as follows :-

a) That the Licensees shall at all times indemnify and keep indemnified the
Company against all actions proceedings claims and demands made against

MIHI JPSHI
TM (R l)l Surat For,
 520

by any person, firm or Company or by government in respect of any loss,

lmage, accident or injury from, due or attributable to the user of the outfit
'the conduct of the selling activities on the premises.

b) the accounts of the Licensees in of their dealings with the

pany shall be kept in the name of the at erach Area Office of
Company where they have a and any credit or deposit for the
being with the Company may be utilized to adjusrt any debit of the
in any other Branch/Area O of the Company. All amounts
time to time becoming due under this Licence by the Licensees to the
shall be paid to the Company free of all deductrions.

c) if the Licensees shall at time fail to pay to the Company on

any sum or sums for time being due and payable to the
by the licensee, the shall be entitled to discontinue
supply of its product to licensee and withorrt prejudice to the
's said right, the shall be also entitled to deduct the same
any part thereof from any or deposit or security or other moneys
ing to the licensees for the time being in the hands of the Company,
the same be credited or ted with the company in respect of
licence or otherwise and for such purpose to sell and realize
such security or deposit to appropriate the proceeds as above
mentioned less all charges and for sale or realization.

d) The company shall be free at all to display its own advertisements and
notices in or upon any part of licensee's premises without payment of
any charges therefore.

e) That all accounts shall be settled and returns made and all moneys paid in
accordance with the instructions laid down by the company from time to
time.

16.

t7.

MIHI
 521
or adjudicated upon or decided in the first inst4nce by the appropriate Court in
[!Wrb6r

18. a) Any dispute or difference of any natqre wha(soever, any claim, cross-claim,
counter-claim or set off
9f the Company againft the Licenseer or regarding any
right, liability, act, omission or account pf any of the parties hereto arlsing Jut of
or in relation to this agreement shall bp refereed to the Sole Arbitratioi of the
Director (Marketing) of the compmy 0r of some officer of the company who
-be
may be nominated by the Director (Marfteting). The licensee will not intitled
to-raise any objection to any such arbitr4tor on the ground that the arbitrator
is an
officer of the Company or that he has doalt with the matters to which the contract
relates or that in the course of his duties as an Offrcer of the Company, he had
expressed view on all or any other mattefs in dispute or difference, tn ttre event
of
the arbitrator to whom the matter is originaliy refered being transferred or
vacating his offrce or being unable to ac! for any reason, the Direitor (Marketing)
as aforesaid at the time of such transfer, vacation of offrce or inability to act miy
in the discretion of the Director (Markgting) designate another person to act as
arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the agreement to the end and intent that
the original Arbitrator shall be entitled to continue the arbitration proceedings
'Corp*yif
notwithstanding his transfer or vacation pf office as an officer of the
f (--
the Director(Marketing) does not designpte another person to act as arbitratoi on
or.
Such person
8r<
which it was left
on other than the
qr a person nominated by such Director
(Marketing) as aforesaid shall act as alpbitrator hereunder. The award of the
arbitrator so appointed shall be frnal, cor[clusive and binding on all parties to the
agreement subject to the provisions of thp Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 or
any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder
for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this
clause.

b) irect either of the parties to abide

the arbitrator may think fit having
, before him. The arbitrator shall
evidence oral and/or documentary,
as the arbitrator in his absolute discre{ion thinks fit and shall be entitled io
under the Indian Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996
of any affidavit I
Ns evidence concerning the matter in
before him.

c) on proceedings have been initiated, that is

ngp shall be entitled to prefer a cross-claim,
rbltrator in respect of any matter in issue
arising out of or in relation to the Agree{nent withoui seeking a formal reference
of arbitration to the Director (Marketing) for such counter-claim, cross claim, or
set offand the Arbitrator shall be entitled to consider and deal with the same as if
the matters arising therefrom has been r$ferred to him originally and deemed to
form part of the reference made by the Difector(Marketing).

MIHI JqSHI
TM (R il), Surat
 522

d) The arbitrator shall be at liberty to appoint, if necessary any accountant or

engineering or other technical person to assist him, and to act by the opinion so
taken.

(e) The arbitrator shall have power to make one or more awards rryhether interim or
otherwise in respect of the dispute and difference and in particular will be entitled
to make separate aw'ards in respect of claims of cross claims of the parties.

(f) The arbitrator shall be entitled to direct any one of the parties to pay the costs to
the other party in such manner and to such extent as the arbitrator may in his
discretion determine and shall also be entitled to require one or both the parties to
deposit funds in such proportion to meet the arbitrators expens$s whenever called
upon to do so.

19' The parties hereby agree that the courts in the city of lYlfnber alone shall have
jurisdiction to
entertain any application or other proceedings in respect of
anything arising under this agreement and any award or awards made by the Sole
Arbitrator hereunder shall be filed (if so required) in the concerrned courts in the
city of llurnb*onty.

20. The Licence sets forth the entire agreement and understandlings between the
parties as to the subject matter of this licence and neither party shall be bound by
any conditions, definitions, warranties, premises or representations with respect to
the subject matter of this Licence except as duly set forth on or subsequenf to the
date hereof in writing and signed by the party or by a proper and duly authorised
representative ofthe party to be bound thereby.

2t. All notices required to be served by either party hereto upon the other shall be
deemed properly served if delivered irt the case of the company, at its office
aforesaid or sent by registered post to itE said office, and in case ofthe licensees,
if sent by post or delivered by hand at his place of business hereinabove
mentioned. All notice required to be given by the Licensees shall be deemed to
is a firm by the
company by the
the Licensee is a
co-operative Society or Trust by any offlce bearer of the Executive, Managing, of
Goveming Committee thereof.

22. This agreement shall be deemed to have commenced rrorlr2'"t ?l0t1",,,

continue in force until terminated in the manner herein provided.

IN MTNESS whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their respective hands and
seals the day and year first above written.

For and on behalfof

BHARAT PET4OLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED
 523

TM (fo\il)' Surat
Witness to s AMmey

tolby me/us and/or has been

explained to me/us and l/We fully understand e same.

V),
iEdature of the Parher

The Licence will have to be executed by as follow's: -

In the case of an individual, the

in the case of a partnership firm, I the ofthe partnership and
in the case of Limited and ive Slocieties, the duly
authorised Constituted will to sign. In the absence of
Constituted Attorney, the Societier; will have to affix
their Common Seal in
 524
BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED
I hereby confirm that the assets described and specified below are the property of M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
and

A. General

lletl0Il IflDODARA DI!t; SURAI

Name of Dealer: M/s M. B. VAMDOTE
Site Dimensions
Location KADODARA, Dist- SURAT
SAP CC NO 123242

I Retaining Walls / Revetment Lensth ltteiont

I Fencino / Compound Wall Lenqth ll-leiottt
Culvert l-enqth lHeioht
'los
IV Driveway
Forecourt
Parking Space
.C. Apron Yes/No
V Buildings No Size Roof
Sales Room / Prefab / Masonrv
Merchandisinq Room
Toilet Block
Service Bavs Prefab / Masonrv
Equipment RopnL

varetins BdytJ
Compressor Room
f LI\LIU[, IUr
Canopy: lntegrated / Petached I Prefab / Masonrv
Anv other Buildino
VI Other Facilities

Yard Liohtino Y'Poles- "1/2 Y' Poles- Nos

Floor/Bracket Lights N Mercury VaDour Fittinos Nos,

Emblem Sign Hanging Touring I Neon t-etterinq

Water Service Muncipal Open/ Tube Well

Size Depth (Yes/No)
Water Pump Descripation
Storage Tank: Sizer Tvoe

Electric Service: In the name of:

Consumer No
Voltage

Drainage Sewer Storm Water

Septic/Municipal
Open TanUUnderqround Ooe,n Tank/Underoround
tl Pumps Asset No Year Make Product

Tanks Asset No. Year Capacity Typeof Erection

X Any otherAsset

x Revenue ltems:
Hoardings
Lubsters
Extinguishers

Checked and Handed Over Checked and Taken Over

For Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

Date
Name
>6lL\t"tz Dealer
Date

MIH SHI.
TM ( '
Surat
 525
Bgur us 1

000002568004 GLOW

0000056491 I 0 ATG
000005652465 BMSS K AUTOMATTON (FCC, , TAG READER, EPS)
000005652848 FRP EDC HOLDER
000005652849 FRP EDC HOLDER
000005652850 FRP EDC HOLDER
AT
 526

CJT PPE t'5I'HI.

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I
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0.62 M O HUME PIPE CELVERT 0,62 M O HUME PIPE OELVERT

I _' _
I

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TO SURAT >>>>
:<<< TO BAPDoLI

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//TRUE COPY//
527
ANNEXURE P-4
 528

Translation of Annexure P-4

529
 530

//TRUE COPY//
531
ANNEXURE P-5
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551

//TRUE COPY//
 552
R/SCR.A/3788/2022 ANNEXURE
ORDER DATED: 12/04/2022 P-6

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3788 of 2022

=============================================
VIBHAKAR RAMASHANKER BHATT PARTNER OF MURLIDHAR B
VAMDOT
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
=============================================
Appearance:
MR BS PATEL SR. ADVOCATE with MR UMANG H OZA(2440) for the
Applicant(s) No. 1,2
for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3
MR MITESH AMIN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR with MR RONAK RAVAL
ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s) No. 1
=============================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR

and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI

Date : 12/04/2022

ORAL ORDER

(PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR)

Connect with Special Civil Application No. 2995 of 2021

and allied matters.

We have heard Mr. B.S. Patel, learned Senior Counsel

assisted by Mr. Umang Oza for the petitioners and Mr. Ronak

Raval, learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent – State.

Issue Notice. Mr. Ronak Raval, learned Additional Public

Prosecutor waives service of notice of admission on behalf of the

Page 1 of 2

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 553
R/SCR.A/3788/2022 ORDER DATED: 12/04/2022

respondent – State.

For the reasons recorded in the earlier interim orders

passed in Special Civil Application No. 2995 of 2021 and allied

matters, the petitioners are entitled for interim relief in this

matter. Accordingly, till further orders of this Court, interim

relief in terms of paragraph 9(iii) is granted qua the petitioners.

Permitted to take out direct service for private

respondent.

(ARAVIND KUMAR,CJ)

(ASHUTOSH J. SHASTRI, J)
phalguni

//TRUE COPY//
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 554 ANNEXURE P-7
ITEM NO.31 COURT NO.12 SECTION II-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).7725/2024

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 09-05-2024 in

SCRA No. 11917/2021 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad)

KISHAN BALABHAI BORIYA & ORS. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. Respondent(s)

(IA No.126773/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

and IA No.126774/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.

Date : 03-06-2024 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH

[VACATION BENCH]

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Virat Popat, Adv.

Mr. Maulik Shah, Adv.
Ms. Shweta Lodha, Adv.
Mr. Lokesh Kumar Choudhary, AOR

For Respondent(s)

UPON hearing the counsel, the Court made the following

O R D E R

Issue notice, returnable on 2nd August 2024.

Pending further orders, no coercive steps shall be taken against

the petitioners in relation to FIR No. A/11208002211615 of 2021 on the

file of Aaji Dam Police Station, District Rajkot, subject to their co-

operating with the investigation therein and abiding by the conditions

prescribed in Section 438(2) Cr.P.C.

(DEEPAK JOSHI) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)

ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

//TRUE COPY//
 555 ANNEXURE P-8
ITEM NO.17+61 COURT NO.16 SECTION III

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16545/2024

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 09-05-2024

in SCA No. 11670/2023 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad)

MANISH ASHOKKUMAR KRISHNANI Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. Respondent(s)

(IA No.163306/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED

JUDGMENT and IA No.163307/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. and IA
No.163305/2024-PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES )

WITH
SLP(Crl) No. 10083/2024 (II-B)
(IA No.164352/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT and IA No.164351/2024-PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

Diary No(s). 27717/2024 (III)

(IA No.164941/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT and IA No.164942/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. and IA
No.164940/2024-CONDONATION OF DELAY IN REFILING / CURING THE
DEFECTS)

WITH

SLP(C) Dy No(s). 33543/2024

([TO BE TAKEN UP ALONG WITH ITEM NO.17 I.E. SLP(C) No.
16545/2024].... IA No.167821/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT and IA No.167825/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
and IA No.167820/2024-PERMISSION TO FILE PETITION (SLP/TP/WP/..) )

Date : 05-08-2024 These petitions were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Priank Adhyaru, Adv.

Mr. Ankit N. Mehta, Adv.
Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR

Mr. Renjith Marar, Adv.

1
 556
Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, AOR
Mr. Shreyas Balaji, Adv.
Mr. Kishan Chakwawala, Adv.
Mr. Meet A. Shah, Adv.
Mr. R M Chakwawala, Adv.

Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil, AOR

Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, Adv.
Ms. Taruna Singh Gohil, Adv.
Ms. Ranu Purohit, Adv.
Mr. Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Adv.
Mr. Rushabh N. Kapadia, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Singh, Adv.
Ms. Hetvi Patel, Adv.

For Respondent(s)

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

Permission to file special leave petition in SLP(C) Dy

No(s). 33543/2024 is granted.

Delay condoned.

Since notice was issued by this Court in other SLP

challenging the common impugned judgment dated 09.05.2024, let

notice be issued.

The matters be tagged with SLP(Crl.) No. 7725 of 2024.

In the meantime there shall be no coercive action against

the petitioners on the strength of the impugned order(s).

(NEETA SAPRA) (RENU BALA GAMBHIR)

COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)

2
 557 ANNEXURE P-9
ITEM NO.33 COURT NO.17 SECTION III

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 17710/2024

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 09-05-2024

in SCA No.16945/2022 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad)

RAMJIBHAI SHAMJIBHAI MOTIVARAS & ORS. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. Respondent(s)

(With I.A. No.174392/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED

JUDGMENT and I.A. No.174394/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

WITH

SLP(C) No. 17737/2024 (III)

(With I.A. No.174529/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED

JUDGMENT, I.A. No.175197/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T., I.A.
No.174530/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. and I.A. No. 175196/2024
- PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

Item No.61

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 17447/2024

([ TO BE TAKEN UP ALONGWITH ITEM NO. 33 I.E. SLP(C)No. 17710/2024 ]

----- FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and IA No.172223/2024-EXEMPTION FROM
FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT and IA No.172222/2024-
PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

WITH

SLP(C) No. 17471/2024 (III)

(With I.A. No.172614/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT, I.A. No.172616/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T., I.A.
No.172615/2024-PERMISSION TO FILE LENGTHY LIST OF DATES and I.A.
No.172613/2024-PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

SLP(C) No. 17266/2024 (III)

(I.A. No.170589/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT, I.A. No.170591/2024-EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. and I.A.
No.170592/2024-PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

1
 558
Date : 12-08-2024 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, Adv.

Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil, AOR
Ms. Ranu Purohit, Adv.
Mr. Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Adv.
Ms. Hetvi Patel, Adv.
Mr. Rushabh N. Kapadia, Adv.
Mr. Siddharth Singh, Adv.

Mr. Huzefa A. Ahmadi, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Md. Tahir M. Hakim, Adv.
Mr. Ejaz Maqbool, AOR
Mr. Muhammad Isa Hakim, Adv.
Mr. Saif Zia, Adv.

Mr. Priank Adhyaru, Adv.

Mr. Pritesh Khambolja, Adv.
Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR

Mr. Shreeyash Uday Lalit, Adv.

Ms. Runjhun Garg, Adv.
Mr. Himanshu Vats, Adv.
Mr. Angad Pahel, Adv.
Mr. Lavam Tyagi, Adv.
Mr. Ishaan George, AOR

For Respondent(s)

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

SLP (C) No. 17710/2024, SLP(C) No. 17737/2024, SLP (C) No.
17447/2024 & SLP(C) No. 17266/2024

1. Issue notice.

2. Tag with Criminal Appeal No.3258/2024.

3. No coercive steps shall be taken against the petitioners till the next date

of hearing.

2
 559

SLP(C) No. 17471/2024

1. Issue notice.

2. Tag with Criminal Appeal No.3258/2024.

3. Interim order dated 30th June, 2022 granted by the High Court of Gujarat

shall continue till the next date of hearing.

(RASHMI DHYANI PANT) (SUDHIR KUMAR SHARMA)

COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)

3
 560

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRL. M.P. NO. Of 2024
IN
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING SPECIAL

LEAVE PETITION

To
The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India
And His Companion Justices of The
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
The humble application of the
Petitioner abovenamed

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH :

1. That the Petitioner above named is filing the present Special Leave

Petition against the impugned judgment and final order dated

09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at

Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal Application No. 3788 of 2022,

whereby the Hon’ble High Court has dismissed the writ petition

challenging the vires of the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

2020 (“the Act”).

 561

2. That the instant application is being filed seeking condonation of delay

in filing the Special Leave Petition. That the delay in filing the Present

Special Leave Petition has been inadvertently caused because the local

counsel is taking necessary instructions from the Petitioner.

3. It is submitted that the Petitioner had sent the entire set of lower court

records to the office of Advocate for filling of Special Leave Petition.

Upon perusal of the record the counsel informed the petitioner that

the documents were in vernacular languages and the same will

require translations. It is submitted that an additional time was

taken by the petitioners to arrange for translations of the Annexures

mentioned in the Special Leave Petition. It is only for the aforesaid

reason that the delay of 36 Days is has occasioned and that the

same is not deliberate.

4. That it is further submitted that the Petitioner has a very good case on

law as well as on merits and has good chance of succeeding before

this Hon’ble Court. It is further submitted that the delay caused has

not been deliberate.

5. The Petitioner submits that the present application is being filed bona

fide and in the interest of justice.

 562
6. The Petitioner therefore, most respectfully prays: -

PRAYER

(a) condone the delay of 36 days in filing the Special Leave Petition

against the impugned judgment and final order dated 09.05.2024

passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in

R/Special Criminal Application No. 3788 of 2022; and/or.

(b) pass such other and further order/s as this Hon’ble Court may deem

fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS IN DUTY

BOUND SHALL EVER PRAY.

FILED BY:-

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER

Filed on: 17.09.2024

 563
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRL. M.P. NO. Of 2024
IN
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING OFFICIAL

TRANSLATIONS OF ANNEXURE P1 TO P7

To
The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India
And His Companion Justices of The
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

The humble application of the

Petitioner abovenamed
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH :

1. That the Petitioner above named is filing the present Special Leave

Petition against the impugned judgment and final order dated

09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

in R/Special Criminal Application No. 3788 of 2022, whereby the

Hon’ble High Court has dismissed the writ petition challenging the vires

of the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2020 (“the Act”).

2. That the Petitioner submits that the Annexure P1, P2 and P4, which

are being filed along with the present Special Leave Petition were
 564
Originally in Gujarati and the Petitioner has got them translated into

English privately as the official translation would have taken a long

time and matter before this Hon’ble Court requires immediate

adjudication.

3. That the Petitioner, therefore, most respectfully prays:-

PRAYER

a) exempt the Petitioner from filing official translation of Annexure P1, P2

and P4; and/or .

b) pass such other and further order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem

just and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS AND JUSTICE THE PETITIONER

AS IN DUTY BOUND SHALL FOR EVER PRAY.

FILED BY:-

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER
Filed on: 17.09.2024
 565
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRL. M.P. NO. Of 2024
IN
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

APPLICATION SEEKING PERMISSION TO BRING ON RECORD

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT

To
The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India
And His Companion Justices of The
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
The humble application of the
Petitioner abovenamed

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH THAT:

1. That the Petitioner above named is filing the present Special Leave

Petition against the impugned judgment and final order dated

09.05.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at

Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal Application No. 3788 of 2022,

whereby the Hon’ble High Court has dismissed the writ petition

challenging the vires of the Gujarat Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

2020 (“the Act”).

 566

2. That the instant application is being filed to bring on record certain

additional documents that are necessary for the effective

adjudication of the matter. Though the said documents did not form

part of the record of the Hon’ble High Court, the same are crucial

for the purpose of proper adjudication of the issue involved in the

present case The same are as follows:-

a. True copy of the Death Certificate of the Vibhakar

Ramashanker Bhatt, is annexed herewith and marked as

ANNEXURE P-10 (Pages 573).

b. True copy of the Partnership Deed dated 05.03.2024, is

annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-11 (Pages

574-585).

c. True copy of the DPSL Agreement dated 08.06.2024, is

annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-12 (Pages

586-601).

3. In view of the above, the Petitioner humbly prays this Hon’ble Court
to:
 567
a. Allow the present application and permit the Petitioner to bring on

record the additional documents; and/or

b. And pass or grant any other or further order or relief as may be

deemed fit in the interest of justice.

AND FOR THIS KINDNESS, THE PETITIONER SHALL, AS IN DUTY

BOUND, EVER PRAY.

FILED BY:-

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER
Date: 17.09.2024
568 ANNEXURE P-10

//TRUE COPY//
569 ANNEXURE P-11
 570

while
conducts
Surat
 571

The
motor
business
 572

The

percentage
 573

calculating

the

(v)
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581 ANNEXURE P-12
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
 599
FIR DETAILS
1. FIR No. N/A

2. Date of Lodgment of FIR/Complaint N/A

3. Date of Occurrence N/A

4. Police Station address with State N/A

5. Date of filing of charge sheet/Challan N/A

6. Whether tried by the Court of Magistrate N/A

7. Whether tried by the Court of Sessions N/A

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

Advocate for the Petitioner
 600
SECTION – III

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:-

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt ...Petitioner

VERSUS

The State of Gujarat & Ors. ...Respondents

INDEX OF DOCUMENTS

Sl. Particulars Copies Court

No. Fees
1. Synopsis and list of dates

2. Impugned order

3. SLP with Affidavit

4. Annexure P-1 to P-10

5. Application for Exemption from filing Official Translations of

Annexure P1, P2 and P4.

6. Application for Condonation of Delay in filing SLP.

7. Application for permission to bring on record Additional

Documents.

8. Vakalatnama

-
TOTAL RS.

FILED ON: 16.09.2024 FILED BY:-

TARUNA SINGH GOHIL

ADVOCATE, SUPREME COURT
B-4/8, GROUND FLOOR, SAFDARJUNG
ENCLAVE, NEW DELHI 110029
M) 9810284931/Code No. 2509
SURENDRA SINGH 8826534801
IC 4099
 601

Mehul Vibhakar Bhatt

05th

17.09.