AN EVALUATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF ELECTORAL

CONFLICTS IN ZAMBIA: A CASE STUDY OF LUSAKA CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES.

BY

MAGASU OLIVER

A Dissertation Submitted to the University of Zambia in Partial Fulfilment of the

Requirements for the Award of the Degree of Master of Education in Civic
Education.

The University of Zambia

LUSAKA

2016
 COPYRIGHT DECLARATION

No part of this study may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic,
photocopying or otherwise, without prior permission from the author
(magasuo@yahoo.com), or the University of Zambia.

“© 2016 by Oliver Magasu, All rights reserved.”

i
 AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

I Magasu Oliver solemnly declare that this dissertation is a product of my own work and
that sources of information other than that of my own have been acknowledged. I also
declare that this work has never been previously submitted at this or any other university.

Signed
………………………………………………………………………………………..

Date
……………………………………………………………………………………………

ii
 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This dissertation of Magasu Oliver has been approved for the partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the award of the Degree of Master of Education in Civic Education by
the University of Zambia.

Examiners:

Signature……………………………….. Date………………………

Signature……………………………….. Date………………………

Signature……………………………….. Date……………………...

iii
 ABSTRACT

This study is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the management of electoral conflicts

in Zambia by the Conflict Management Committees (CMCs) in Lusaka. The objectives
of this study were to determine how the Lusaka CMCs managed electoral conflicts; to
assess the capacity of the Lusaka CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts and to
establish strategies of improving the performance of the CMCs in the management of
electoral conflicts. The Frustration-Aggression theory by Dollard and others guided this
study. A qualitative descriptive research design was employed in this study. The study
found that the strategy used by CMCs in resolving electoral conflicts was mediation.
Lack of a legal framework was cited as a major setback in the management of the
phenomena and in the enforcement of the Electoral Act. To this effect, the study has
established strategies of improving the performance of CMCs. The strategies are:
introducing electoral fast track courts, increasing educational awareness activities,
increasing access to CMCs and importantly, strengthen the legal mandate. Based on the
findings, the study recommended to ECZ among other things that a legal framework be
attached to support the operations of CMCs and that political parties should address
electoral violence.

iv
 DEDICATION

This research study is dedicated to the Magasu family and in particular Dad
(Gabriel Magasu) and Mum (Jennipher B.Tembo) for the gift of formal education
and for helping me out to realize my full potential in life, others are my brothers;
Allan, Gabriel (Jnr), Paul, Felix and my sisters; Patriciah, Silvia and Casmir for
the encouragement even when I lost hope. Also my beautiful wife Hilda Mwila
and my children Tinashe, Tapiwa and Tafara for the support throughout this
journey when they needed me most. Not forgetting my nephews Vernon, M.
Kanyungo, Terry Ncimunya and Raphael Nchimunya.

v
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study would not have been a reality without the support and encouragement given to
me by various people and institutions whose contributions I feel strongly indebted to. I
would like to begin by thanking my able Supervisors, Dr. D. Banda and Dr. G. Muleya
whose main interest in my opinion was to see me succeed in academic life. I am also
greatly indebted to my lecturers; Dr. Mweemba, Mr. Kandondo and Dr. Masaiti for their
tireless efforts to make sure that I succeed in academic life.

Special thanks goes to Dad and Mum, Brothers and Sisters, My wife Hilda Mwila and my
Children, my friends Robby Kapesa, Mrs Kangwa and Lubinda Nasilele whose support
and encouragement motivated me to do this study.

Finally, I thank the DEBS office in Kawambwa under the able leadership of Mr Soko, St.
Mary’s School administration in Kawambwa and teachers whose support, co-operation
and to some extent tolerance enabled me to carry out this research.

vi
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

COPYRIGHT DECLARATION...................................................................................... i

AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ....................................................................................... ii

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL .................................................................................. iii

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... iv

DEDICATION .................................................................................................................v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................. vi

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xi

ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS ....................................................................... xiii

CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1

Overview ..........................................................................................................................1

1.1 Background to the Study ............................................................................................1

1.2 Statement of the Problem ...........................................................................................3

1.3 Research Objectives ...................................................................................................3

1.3.1 Main Research Objective.....................................................................................3

1.3.2 Specific Objectives ..............................................................................................3

1.4 Main Research Question ............................................................................................4

1.4.1 Research Questions .................................................................................................4

1.5 Significance of the Study ...........................................................................................4

1.6 Conceptual Framework ..............................................................................................4

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms ................................................................................5

1.8 Organisation of the Dissertation .................................................................................6

Summary ..........................................................................................................................6

vii
CHAPTER TWO ...............................................................................................................7

LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................7

Overview ..........................................................................................................................7

2.1 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................7

2.2 Understanding Electoral Conflict .............................................................................9

2.3 Some Causes of Electoral Conflicts .......................................................................11

2.4 Historical Overview of the Study ...........................................................................17

2.5 Studies on Conflict Management ...........................................................................18

2.5.1 Global Perspective .............................................................................................23

2.5.2 Continental Perspective .....................................................................................24

2.5.3 Zambian Perspective..........................................................................................25

2.6 Researcher’s own Comments ...................................................................................27

Summary ........................................................................................................................28

CHAPTER THREE .........................................................................................................29

METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................................29

Overview ........................................................................................................................29

3.1 Research Design .......................................................................................................29

3.2 Research Site ............................................................................................................29

3.3 Population.................................................................................................................30

3.4 Sampling Procedure .................................................................................................30

3.5 Data Collection Instruments .....................................................................................31

3.6 Data Collection Procedure .......................................................................................31

3.7 Data Analysis ...........................................................................................................32

3.8 Presentation of Data .................................................................................................32

3.9 Validity and Reliability ............................................................................................33

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 3.10 Ethical Considerations............................................................................................33

3.11 Limitations of the Study .........................................................................................34

Summary ........................................................................................................................34

CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................35

PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS .......................................................................35

Overview ........................................................................................................................35

4.1 Management of Electoral Conflicts by Lusaka CMCs.............................................36

4.1.2 The Management of Electoral Conflicts ............................................................39

4.1.3 Experience of electoral violence in Zambia since 2001 ....................................41

4.1.4 Whether CMCs are compromised. ....................................................................42

4.2 The capacity of Lusaka CMCs. ....................................................................................44

4.2.1 Current working framework of CMCs. .............................................................45

4.2.2 Challenges faced by Lusaka Conflict Management Committees ......................46

4.2.3 Some factors accounting for the continued rise of electoral conflict ................49

4.3 Strategies of improving the performance of CMCs .................................................52

Summary ............................................................................................................................55

CHAPTER FIVE .............................................................................................................56

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS...............................................................................56

Overview ........................................................................................................................56

5.1 How the Lusaka CMCs managed electoral conflicts ...............................................56

5.2 The capacity of the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees ..............................59

5.2.1 Perceived factors accounting for the rise in electoral violence in Lusaka.........64

5.3 Strategies for improving the performance of CMCs ................................................67

Summary ........................................................................................................................69

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CHAPTER SIX ................................................................................................................70

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................................70

Overview ........................................................................................................................70

6.1 Conclusions ..............................................................................................................70

6.2 Recommendations ....................................................................................................71

6.3 Suggestion for Future Research ...............................................................................72

Summary ........................................................................................................................73

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................74

x
 LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. 1: Conceptual Framework ....................................................................................5

Figure 4. 2: Current Mechanisms on CMCs ......................................................................45

Figure 4. 3: Identified challenges impacting on CMCs capacities ....................................46

Figure 4. 4: Perceived factors accounting for rise in electoral conflict .............................49

Figure 4. 5: Perceived strategies that could enhance CMCs capacities .............................52

xi
 LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Consent Form .................................................................................................. I

Appendix 2: Interview Guide.............................................................................................. II

Appendix 3: Permission Letter ..........................................................................................III

xii
 ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS

BCP – Basotho Congress Party

CCZ – Christian Council of Zambia

CMCs – Conflict Management Committees

CSOs – Civil Society Organisations

ECZ – Electoral Commission of Zambia

EFZ – Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia

EMB – Election Management Body

EU – European Union

EVER – Election Violence Education and Resolution

EVRA – Election Violence Risk Assessment

FODEP – Foundation for Democratic Process

IFES – International Foundation of Electoral Systems

JCTR – Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflections

MDC – Movement for Democratic Change

MMD – Movement for Multi-party Democracy

PF – Patriotic Front

SADC – Southern Africa Development Community

TIZ – Transparence International Zambia

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UPND – United Party for National Development

ZANU – PF – Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

ZEC – Zambia Episcopal Conference

xiii
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Overview

This chapter presents the background to the study and defines the problem that the study
attempted to address. It states the purpose, objectives and research questions that needed
to be answered. The chapter further reflects on the significance, conceptual framework,
operational definition of terms, organisation of the dissertation and provides the summary
of the chapter.

1.1 Background to the Study

An Electoral Conflict is a disagreement arising from perceived or real abrogation of

electoral legislation, which may affect credibility and integrity of an election (ECZ,
2011). Current studies on elections show that electoral conflicts have become a common
global phenomenon. For instance, out of 57 countries that held elections in 2001, violent
conflicts were witnessed in 14 countries (Fischer, 2002). In the case of Africa, violence
affects between 19 to 25 percent of elections (Bekoe, 2010). Clearly, margins of over
20% depicting the likelihood of a violent election cannot be termed negligible. Some of
the countries that have experienced such incidences of electoral violence globally in the
recent times include Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Bangladesh, Burundi,
Cambodia, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe (IDEA, 2006).

Collier (2009) submitted that there was a widespread belief in elections worldwide but
without corresponding institutions to support them. The non-availability of such
institutions and mechanisms posed a great danger for the eruption of electoral violence.
The Human Rights Watch (2008) reported that electoral conflicts in Zimbabwe had left
people dead, millions displaced and robbed of their opportunities. In Kenya, Dekha
(2012) observed that violent clashes erupted following the disputed elections that saw the
burning of 300 houses and the killing of about 600 000 people. In Ivory Coast, Mark
(2010) argued that threats, protests, violence and human rights violations became eminent

1
following the Gbagbo (former president of Ivory Coast) – Quattara (current president of
Ivory Coast) electoral standoff between 2nd December 2010 and 11th April 2011. Ivorian
forces fired live bullets to disperse protesters in the strongholds of Quattara. In
Zimbabwe, Alao (2012) observed that electoral conflict erupted between the ruling
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) following the 29th March 2008 disputed presidential polls
where about 500 MDC supporters were attacked, 400 were arrested, 10 were killed and
3000 families were displaced for supporting the opposition.

Zambia, like many other states has an Election Management Body (EMB) that has
regulatory powers to determine how elections are run in the country, the Electoral
Commission of Zambia (ECZ). In pursuance of its mandate, in 2006, the ECZ established
Conflict Management Committees (CMCs) to manage and resolve electoral conflicts in a
prudent and timely manner (Electoral Act # 12 of 2006). This move was timely in the
sense that from 2001, Zambia saw a rise in electoral conflicts (EU, 2014). The interim
statement by SADC (2006) recognised the committees as a special ingredient for a
peaceful and participatory electoral process and that it builds confidence and consensus in
the electoral process.

It is about a decade now after the formation of CMCs in Zambia but conflicts are still on
an increase. Essentially, some stakeholders are dissatisfied over the effectiveness of the
CMCs. There is a marked increase in the number of concerns that have been raised as
regards the effectiveness of the CMCs to manage electoral conflicts. Election observers
deployed by various political stakeholders during the 2011 General Elections observed
that occurrences of electoral conflict and violence were widespread in the majority of
other towns apart from Lusaka such as Chingola, Kabwe, Kapiri-Mposhi, Kitwe and
Ndola only that such incidences did not receive adequate media coverage (FODEP,
2012).

An important consideration that made this study viable for undertaking was that a
scholarly evaluation of the effectiveness of CMCs to the electoral process in Zambia and
their resultant impact on the peace of the nation seemed not to have been done. Much of
the information concerning CMCs in Zambia is largely through the media reports as well
2
as Press Statements by election observers. Therefore, research evidence in this case
remained scanty. This implied that there was need for a comprehensive research to be
undertaken to address issues surrounding the effectiveness of CMCs in Zambia to handle
electoral conflicts. It was from this background that a study was undertaken to evaluate
the effectiveness of CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Electoral conflicts have characterized the electoral processes of many emerging

democracies. In Zambia, efforts have been made to address the sprawl of electoral
violence through the establishment of CMCs in all the districts. Despite this effort,
electoral conflict is on the increase and different stakeholders have raised concerns
regarding the effectiveness of the CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts.
Electoral conflicts have resulted to injuries, hatred, damage to property and in some
cases, death. This situation prompted the researcher to carry out a study to evaluate the
effectiveness of the CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 Main Research Objective

To evaluate the effectiveness of the CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts in

Zambia.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

(i) To determine how the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees manage electoral
conflicts.

(ii) To assess the capacity of the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees in the
management of electoral conflicts

(iii)To establish strategies of improving the performance of Conflict Management

Committees in the management of electoral conflicts.

3
1.4 Main Research Question

How effective are the Conflict Management Committees in managing electoral conflicts
in Zambia?

1.4.1 Research Questions

(i) How do the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees (CMCs) manage electoral
conflicts?

(ii) What capacity do the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees have to manage
electoral conflicts?

(iii)What strategies can improve the performance of Conflict Management Committees in

the management of electoral conflicts?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The findings of this study might be useful to Civic Education researchers and other
stakeholders as the findings may provide them with valuable information for promoting
good and responsible citizens through co-existence and tolerance. This study may also
contribute to the body of literature that exists in the field of conflict management.
Furthermore, the findings and recommendations of this study may help the ECZ and
various stakeholders in the management of electoral conflicts in Lusaka district to devise
effective strategies of managing electoral conflicts.

1.6 Conceptual Framework

In this study, it is conceptualized that institutions and mechanisms for managing electoral
conflicts play an important role in a democratic dispensation. Tohbi (2011) contended
that the manner in which such institutions were constituted and operated had a bearing on
their effectiveness. The conceptual framework below has been developed to try and
analyse several aspects that relate to the CMCs’ ability to manage electoral conflicts
effectively. While it was clear that the phenomenon required a multi-stakeholder
approach, the formation of CMCs alone could not guarantee success. Therefore, it
follows that several other interrelated facets of these committees needed to be evaluated.

4
For instance, the members of the CMCs should undergo training in conflict management
tools such as conflict mapping, conflict analysis and management. In so doing, it is hoped
that electoral conflict would be managed effectively thereby contributing to peace and
stability in the nation.

Figure1.1: Conceptual Framework (Source: Field Data)

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

Mandate Challenges Strategies

Effective Management of Electoral Conflicts

Peace and Stability

1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

Conflict – it is a situation which arises when two or more parties pursue incompatible
goals, values, interests or indeed scarce resources which can be attained by one
and not both parties at the same time.

Conflict management – it is the practice of recognising and dealing with disputes in a

rational, balanced and effective way

Electoral conflict - Conflict arising from electoral disagreements aimed at either skewing
the playing ground or indeed to alter the outcomes of an election.

5
Violence – behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage or kill someone
or something.

1.8 Organisation of the Dissertation

This study has been organised and divided into six chapters. The first chapter gives the
introduction to the study. It also presented the background to the study, statement of the
problem, purpose of the study, objectives and research questions, significance of the
study, conceptual framework and operational definition of terms used in this study.
Chapter two presents the theoretical framework which guided this study and the literature
review. Literature was reviewed and gaps were identified. Chapter three presents the
methodology which was used in the collection and analysis of data. The chapter explains
the research design, population, sampling procedure, sampling technique, data collection
instruments, data collection procedure, data analysis, presentation of data, validity and
reliability of data collected, ethical considerations and limitations. Chapter four presents
findings from the study. The chapter gives answers to the research questions. Chapter
five discusses the findings of the study. The discussion is based on the objectives of the
study. Finally, chapter six gives the conclusion of the study and makes recommendations
based on the findings.

Summary

This chapter presented the background to the problem by giving a synopsis of electoral
violence globally and continentally before zeroing down to the Zambian scenario. The
chapter further presented the statement of the problem together with the research purpose,
objectives and questions, significance of the study, operational definition of terms and
organisation of the dissertation. The conceptual framework formed the plan of this study.
The next chapter provides a review of literature on the management of electoral conflicts
for the purpose of positioning the study in the context of knowledge and identifying gaps
in knowledge; hence justifying the need for the study.

6
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

This chapter begins by giving a theoretical framework which guided this study and then,
provides literature on the existence, nature and management of electoral conflicts from
different studies of different countries. Essentially, the chapter presents an understanding
of the concept of electoral conflicts, it highlights some causes of electoral conflicts, gives
a historical overview of the study, discusses the studies on conflict management before
zeroing in to a global perspective of conflict management, a continental perspective of
conflict management and a Zambian perspective of conflict management. While the
review took a wider approach by focusing both on global and continental trends, an
overview of what has been written as regards the management of electoral conflicts in
Zambia by the CMCs formed the core of the discussion.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by the Frustration-Aggression theory also known as the
displacement theory which was proposed by Dollard and others in 1939. This theory was
further developed by Miller, et al in 1941 and Berkowitz in 1969 (Berkowitz, 1989). It
provides a macro approach to conflict and argues that aggression comes as a result of
blocking or frustrating a person’s effort to attain a goal. Furthermore, it is argued that
human beings are predisposed to slide into deep, irrational hostility under certain
definable conditions. Essentially, the Frustration-Aggression theory is an attempt to
explain how and why some people or groups of people become violent or aggressive
during certain situations. This theory has been used for some time to explain violent
behaviour in certain societies.

Human behaviour, although biologically determined, is largely as a result of the influence

of the environment, culture and socialization. Human beings, as goal oriented organisms,
naturally become aggressive when they are prevented from achieving what they desire.
This is what forms the core of the Frustration-Aggression theory. It is established that
7
external stimuli induces frustration which in turn precipitates aggression, and aggressive
action is directed to the source of frustration. An immediate choice especially when
mechanisms put in place to reconcile such grievances seem to be lacking is resorting to
violence. In the political sense, absence of the rule of law and justice, denial of human
rights, lack of political representation for minority groups, ideological positions,
unemployment, poverty and rise in food prices, lack of accountability, poor governance
and weak judicial systems often lead to violence (World Bank, 2011). This is seen as a
violation of human rights and may lead to tension, and eventually aggressive behaviour.

Contextualizing the above theory to electoral conflicts in Zambia, we can argue that
frustrated electoral expectations amongst political players generate stress and violence.
For example, if the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) members feel that the
Heritage Party (HP) is the source of frustration, Heritage Party (HP) members become the
target. As HP members try to retaliate, violence may break out when conflict is not
handled carefully by CMCs. “Politics is a process of conflict where groups compete for
authority and the control of scarce resources, there is necessary tension between interests.
When political systems fail to manage conflicting interests, conflict may express itself
violently (Eisema, 2012: 1).” To this effect, this theory fitted well to the Zambian context
and in this study to explain the root cause of electoral violence and thus, giving direction
on how electoral violence can be managed effectively.

This perspective contributes empirical knowledge and points out critical issues of conflict
management that need attention in terms of effective management of electoral conflicts.
In addition, this theory recognizes that the underlying causes of electoral conflicts need to
be addressed if the phenomenon is to be effectively managed. As such, there is need to
evaluate and assess management strategies that will consequently bring all electoral
stakeholders on board to effectively manage the phenomenon, which is a worthwhile call
for this study.

8
2.2 Understanding Electoral Conflict

According to Coser (2007), conflict refers to some form of friction, disagreement or

discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the
group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group.
Conflicts appear historically inevitable and may be socially desirable if they result in
personal and/or political progress. Conflicts may, perhaps paradoxically, promote and
increase peace and diminish violence if the conflicting parties negotiate in good faith to
reach solutions to problems that are achievable and tolerable, if not ideal (Webel and
Galtung, 2007). It is important to understand that conflict is inevitable in every human
society because people cannot think in the same way. People will always have different
opinions, ideologies and philosophies, and so on. It is therefore wrong to treat those
holding different views as enemies. It is such perceptions that have led to rampant
electoral conflicts on the content and so, it is important for CMCs to educate citizens to
co-exist and tolerate one another if such perceptions are to change. Whether the culprits
of electoral violence in Zambia are advised to co-exist by CMCs is what this study will
establish.

Lisa (2007:227-8) defined electoral conflict as “an activity motivated by an attempt to

affect the results of the elections either by manipulating the electoral procedure and
participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. It might involve voters’ and
candidates’ intimidation, killings, attacks against their property, forceful displacement,
unlawful detentions and rioting.” Fischer (2002) further defined electoral violence as any
random or organised act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail or abuse
political stakeholders in seeking to determine, delay or otherwise influence the electoral
process. According to the United Nations Development Program (2009:4), election-
related violence refers to “acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm
perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral
competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed
to influence the process of elections such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll and
to influence the outcomes in competitive races for political office.” From the definitions
given above, the study agreed with the United Nations Development Programme

9
definition of electoral conflict as it was more elaborate and gave examples of some
situations which were likely to trigger electoral violence. This definition is in line with
this study as it exposes some challenges in the electoral process which require effective
management. Therefore, this study takes into account such challenges as it evaluates the
effectiveness of CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

Electoral violence has a devastating effect on democracy. From the standpoint of

democratic politics, violence and insecurity may influence the results of elections in
many ways. Actors may use threats and coercion to prevent other electorates from
registering to vote and discourage them from exercising their right to vote. Party
candidates may abandon the electoral process due to threats and killings or may act
against measures taken to conduct elections (UNDP, 2009). From a conflict management
point of view, violence has an adverse effect on the society. It will polarize the voting
public along conflict margins and in the worst case could lead to an outbreak of violent
conflict. Electoral violence has specific targets and these include electoral partakers such
as electorates, candidates, election officers, election observers and media groups,
electoral materials such as ballot boxes, campaign stuffs, registration data, polling results,
electoral facilities such as voting and tallying stations and electoral events such as
campaign meetings, demonstrations and voting stations. Radical or fanatic groups may
also get the opportunity to assume state power through violence (ibid). All such conflicts
require particular measures to be put in place. However, conflicts may still be there even
with such measures. This study intends to establish how effective the CMCs in Zambia
have performed.

Unfortunately, it seems the concept of electoral violence and its management is poorly
understood by some electoral stakeholders and is insufficiently interdicted at the national,
regional, continental and at international levels despite policy commitment, legal
instruments, election monitoring and repeated denunciation. In this study, these are some
of the issues which have been taken into account so that the views of all stakeholders are
considered if the CMCs were to be effective in the management of electoral conflicts in
Zambia.

10
2.3 Some Causes of Electoral Conflicts

The causes of electoral conflicts are multiple and complex, and that an election can suffer
both physical and non-physical forms of violence brought about by a whole array of
factors. Some may be related to deep-rooted asymmetries in power or based on identity,
while others may be triggered by poor or structurally weak electoral management
(Rummel, 1985). According to the International Peace Research Institute’s Indices of
Active Conflict (2010), Africa’s current electoral conflicts stem from the fissures of
ethnicity, regionalism and social marginalisation as well as the absence of democracy and
good governance. Whether these are some of the causes of electoral conflicts in Zambia
which need to be addressed by CMCs to effectively manage the phenomenon is what this
study will establish.

While electoral reforms can serve to consolidate the processes of democracy, such
reforms may also have the potential to create conditions for electoral conflicts. For
example, in the Solomon Islands, the International IDEA (2011) argued that an
international electoral reform effort raised expectations of new political dynamics for the
country. However, when the subsequent election using the reformed system returned the
incumbent to office, protesters appeared at the Parliament building and later set a
shopping area ablaze. It is, therefore, clear that the relationship of reform and expectation
is central to whether or not such reforms will result into electoral conflicts. In this regard,
visible but ultimately unsubstantial political or electoral reforms can harm the perceived
legitimacy of a regime and eventually lead to electoral conflicts. This is always the case
when stakeholders are not consulted in decision making process. A call to finding
effective ways of managing electoral conflicts is a cornerstone to each and every
government where this trend is practiced, hence, the purpose of this study.

While election cycles themselves are not the root causes of conflict, they create space for
political activity, and increase the stakes of political competition such that in
unconsolidated democracies, existing tensions may find violent expression. The risk of
violence is particularly high when inappropriate electoral systems are chosen, or when
elections are poorly managed. This is why this study was undertaken to evaluate the
effectiveness of CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia. For example,
11
in Lesotho 1993, a first-past-the-post electoral system produced a lopsided victory for the
previously outlawed Basotho Congress Party (BCP). The BCP won all 65 seats in the
National Assembly, and the previously ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) was denied
representation in parliament despite winning a substantial minority of the vote. The
resulting tensions led to an attempted coup in 1994. Similar tensions after the 1998
elections resulted in public unrest and eventual military intervention by regional powers
(Eiseman 2012). The electoral system in Lesotho has since been changed to a mixed
proportional system and electoral conflicts have since reduced. Proportional
representation systems tend to produce more inclusive outcomes, and may therefore
lower the risk of conflict occurrences. This calls for analysis of electoral violence by
CMCs to determine the root causes of the phenomenon so that appropriate measures are
taken to fight the phenomenon, hence, the purpose of this study to ascertain whether
conflict analysis is done in the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

The potential for electoral conflicts is greatly heightened by lack of or inadequate

electoral dispute mechanisms and institutions. Tohbi (2012) argued that when the
mechanisms are not whole encompassing and that they depict a broad-spectrum lack of
electoral fraud detection and prevention mechanisms, their reliability is questionable.
Furthermore, he added that if systems suffer widespread distrust from the public and
political players, such electoral institutions are likely to lead to electoral conflicts.
Therefore, the link between inadequacy of electoral conflict institutions and the prospect
for electoral conflicts breaking out is so strong. Success to a conflict free election lies in
the mechanisms put in place to address election-related disputes. Hence, this study
focusses on effective management of CMCs taking into account concerns of such matter.

Leleruk et.al (2007) established that ethnicity can be used to serve various purposes in a
democratic dispensation. From a positive standpoint, ethnicity can promote nationhood if
various ethnic groups are bound together. On the other hand, ethnicity and regionalism
can lead to radical divisions and continued conflict and instability. A study conducted in
the Rift region of Kenya by Leleruk et.al (2007) revealed that ethnic animosity amongst
the Samburu, the Pokot, the Marakwet and the Turkana accounted for 13% of the causes
of insecurity. During an election in Africa, it is an open secret that politicians have
12
increasingly thrived on ethnicity and regionalism to ascend to political office. Issues of
who is the real son-of-the land have arisen and in the process ethnic groupings are incited
to rise against each other. Writers such as Reilly (2001) argued that electoral conflict was
more likely to occur in a country with strong ethnic cleavages. He further added that
electoral conflicts had drifted from being purely between groups wishing to take over
government to being tribal or ethnically driven. The voting pattern in Zambia’s
presidential by-election held on 20th January 2015, has shown that politics is based on
regionalism and is indeed, a source of electoral conflict. How this may pose to be a
challenge to CMCs is what this study intends to find out.

Lopez (2000) argued that the appointment process, composition and mandate of the
Election Management Bodies (EMBs) can be considered as part of diverse causes of
electoral conflicts. Perceptions of EMB impartiality influence potential conflict
throughout the electoral cycle. For example, the appointment of the officials to form part
of the EMB by the incumbent makes the public to associate it (EMB) with the ruling
party hence concluding that such a body is ‘toothless’ and ineffective. This is so because
its ability to regulate political behaviour in an election is perceived compromised in
favour of the ruling party. Opposition political parties have used such flaws to negatively
skew the electorates’ view of such bodies. In some instances, violent acts by those that
view the EMB as not being impartial may be targeted at the electoral process. Such issues
of partiality have continued to characterise debate and have since led to violence in most
emerging democracies including Zambia. The challenge remains for all the stakeholders
to pursue reforms to counter public perception about the credibility of the election
process as with regards to EMBs. Whether or not this challenge applies to CMCs in
Zambia, is what this study tries to establish.

According to UNDP (2009), the process of delimiting districts can spark electoral
conflict and violence. In the Niger Delta (Nigeria), some tribes have claimed that the
electoral districts in the region favour others. Protests occurred during the 2003 elections,
with several people reported killed and 1,600 displaced (International IDEA, 2011).
Kandeh (2008) contended that delimitation was in fact an identifiable and potentially
conflictive in Sierra Leone as echoed by the various UN Peace building Commissions to
13
that country. How delimitation may pose to be a challenge to CMCs in Zambia is what
this study will establish.

Most African countries have made the announcement of the polling day a preserve of the
head of state. It is argued that leaving the day to be determined by an individual (in this
case the incumbent head of state) leaves the challengers vulnerable. As was the case with
Zambia in 2011, conflict and pockets of violent acts were recorded in Lusaka and the
Copper belt mainly by cadres from the then opposition PF as the then incumbent Rupiah
Banda delayed to announce the Election Day. Tuccinardi (2011) argued that delays in
announcing the day of the polls had the potential to turn the political anxieties into a
violent situation. This is particularly true when members of the opposition perceive such
delays as a political scheme aimed at disadvantaging them. This reflection of
misunderstandings between the ruling party and the opposition political parties calls for
sustainable measures to effectively address electoral conflicts, of which this study takes
the centre stage in the evaluation of the effectiveness of CMCs in Zambia in managing
electoral conflict.

If election rigging or fraud is let to scarlet, it sparks electoral conflict. According to

Darnolf (2011), electoral fraud or rigging is most likely in the following phases; voter
identification, registration and verification; during political campaigns; Election Day;
during transportation of sensitive electoral materials, and during adjudication and
certification of results. In the current context, Darnolf (2011) suggested that election
rigging or fraud involved some degree of deception (illegal voting and ballot box
stuffing, false claims or denials), Coercion(vote buying, voter intimidation), damage or
destruction (theft or destruction of election materials) and failures or refusals to act
(hours of voting shortened without notice, polling station locations difficult to access,
long lines at polling stations) caused by either EMB officials or representatives of both
the opposition and ruling parties. Other forms of electoral fraud or rigging according to
Tuccinardi (2011) included; preventing voters from filling out ballots, inaccurate
campaign literature, forced withdrawal of opponent(s) through facilitation payments, and
failures of due diligence by election officials. Also critical are vote buying; migratory or
floating voters; voter “assistance” schemes; placing fictitious names on a voter register;
14
marking absentee ballots and impersonating a person other than the voter. How rigging
could be addressed by CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts is what this study
intends to establish.

Voter and candidacy eligibility is a subtle factor that triggered electoral conflict and
violence, and is often the case when a legal framework that defines the ‘electorate’ and
the ‘candidate’ puts in place exclusionary provisions (UNDP, 2009). In most emerging
democracies, politicians had developed strategies to manipulate frameworks that define
candidacy eligibility for a particular election. Such tendencies have sparked conflict that
has either led to apathy or indeed violent reactions from sympathisers of the excluded
candidate. For instance, in 1996, the Chiluba government in Zambia attempted to change
the parentage close in the constitution so as to exclude Dr Kenneth Kaunda from the
presidential race as he was perceived to be a potential threat to the presidency of FTJ. In
fact, it was a scheme which was aimed at stopping him from participating in the polls.
This move fuelled conflict and led to Dr Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP not participating in
the 2006 polls. The fact that politicians may manipulate the electoral frameworks to suit
their selfish agendas leaves much to be desired. This calls for the independence of CMCs
to develop legal provisions that are inclusive in nature so as to effectively manage
electoral conflict. Whether CMCs are independent in Zambia is what this study will
establish.

According to Kitasei (2007), there is unanimity that primary perpetrators of repressive

acts that culminate into electoral conflict mainly appear to be the ruling party cadres with
the assistance of partisan security forces (police). Their targets or victims are usually
opposition politicians, supporters and infrastructure. Electoral conflict perpetrated by the
ruling party is largely a feature in areas where the opposition potentially enjoy massive
support or where the opposition have shown tremendous strength during the current or
previous elections. Motives for repression can include the desire by the ruling party to
skew the playing field; limit opposition political space; prevent opposition candidates
from running for political office; weakening the opposition or a desire to retain power
and stay in office (Alston, 2010). Repression also takes the form of unlawful detentions,
threats, harassment, closure of opposition offices, breaking up of opposition meetings,
15
and denying individuals and opposition political parties the right to freedom of Assembly
and Association. The perpetrators of electoral violence need to be stopped at all cost
whether coming from the ruling or opposition political parties. Stopping the vice requires
effective mechanisms by CMCs to manage it. Hence, the study tries to evaluate the
effectiveness of the available mechanisms in Zambia.

Impunity has also been identified as a driver of electoral conflict and violence in many
countries. The perpetrators especially from the ruling party are hardly brought to justice.
To this effect, if impunity is not checked, it can spark violent electoral conflict especially
if adequate procedures or enforceable sanctions against those who break electoral laws
are missing. A culture of impunity undermines the best efforts to mitigate violence. For
instance, in Kenya’s elections in 1992 and 2007, more than 1000 people died and several
hundred thousand were displaced. On each occasion, commissions were established to
investigate the violence. These commissions have not resulted in punishing the
perpetrators, though many were named. Ethiopia treated the electoral violence following
the 2005 elections as a criminal offence and approximately, 3000 suspected opposition
supporters were arrested and charged with an assortment of crimes (Bekoe: 2010). Yet
other nations have treated incidents of violence as episodic phenomena, leaving them
unaddressed by the government. However, treating electoral violence as a criminal
offence is not likely to end future elections being violent but will even make it to escalate
to even more violent levels because perpetrators may feel their rights are being violated.
It is important to employ a more robust approach to electoral violence so as to resolve the
underlying causes of violence and mal-administration of elections. This study, therefore,
tries to establish how the CMCs in Zambia have handled the perpetrators of electoral
violence.

Mass numbers of unemployed youths roam the streets of the major towns and are
desperate to have ties with political parties for either monetary or material gain. These
youths do not only augment the membership of armed youth gangs but also act as ready
suppliers of electoral conflicts. Due to unresolved grievances over youth unemployment,
high poverty levels, corruption and inequitable distribution of resources, the young
people are ready to be used as tools of violence. Leleruk et.al (2007) explained that most
16
electoral conflicts were as a result of social exclusions especially in societies with
centralised political organisation. Historically, he argued that such conflicts had become
more visible at times of stress or in the wake of an election. Whether the issues raised
here were the causes of electoral conflicts in Zambia, is what this study will establish in
order to ensure effective measures are taken in the management of the vice by CMCs.

Collier (2009) argued that the readily availability of weapons supplied by men and
women in uniform with links to politicians had made electoral conflict and violence
tenser. For example, machetes, axes and slingshots-including firearms were widespread
during some elections especially in Africa. Kimer (2012) established that the 2001
Chawama bloody fracas in Zambia was largely orchestrated by youths armed with
machetes. Kitasei (2007) added that the conflict in the southern part of the Democratic
Republic of Congo had been protracted by the supply of weapons to militia groups in the
area by politicians with Congo origins residing in neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi, Congo
Brazzaville and the Central African Republic. In countries where small and light weapons
were smuggled, guns have been a common feature during the election period. Congo D.R
is a typical example. Due to such weapons, conflict behaviour and attitude is cultivated
such that people were enticed to attack their opponents, hence violence. This is often the
case when electoral laws are not supported by a legal framework. This is why this study
intends to establish whether a legal framework is attached to the mandate of the CMC in
Zambia.

2.4 Historical Overview of the Study

There has been widespread research on the drivers and dynamics of conflict. The most
discussed include ethnicity, regionalism and competition for natural resources. However,
current studies in conflict management have identified elections as an important driver of
conflict. Essentially, elections themselves are a major catalyst for ensuring that there is
democratic change but have also an intrinsically conflicting nature. Therefore, it may be
right to argue that elections on the globe present both challenges and opportunities. On
one hand, elections may spark violent contests and conflagration among political parties,
actors and elites as evidenced in the cases in South Sudan, Ivory Coast in 2000 and 2010,

17
Mozambique in 2004, 2008 and 2013, Kenya in 1992, 1997, 2003 and 2007, Nigeria in
2003, 2007, 2011 and other nations (Small: 2015). In the same vein, elections make
deeply rooted social conflicts more visible and thus have greater potential for sparking
violence. If such violence is sparked by the electoral process or is perceived to have been,
the effects may have devastating implications for human rights and local economies, and
may create an inherent distrust in the credibility of democracy (International IDEA,
2009). This study, therefore, takes such aspects into consideration because an evaluation
of the effectiveness of CMCs in managing electoral conflicts is its focal point.

However, elections have also been used successfully as mechanisms to negotiate political
parties out of conflict and protracted civil war as was the case in South Africa in 1994,
Mozambique in 1994 and Sierra Leon in 2003 (Small: 2015). Here, we can argue that
elections are not supposed to lead to violence and still remain a powerful peace process
and that regular competitive elections institutionalize democratic forms of government
and lead to good governance when properly managed. This is often the case when
mechanisms are put in place to manage election-related violence. This is why this study
intends to establish how effective the CMCs are in managing electoral conflicts.

While elections have helped some countries to manage transitions from war to peace, it
was also clear they have also triggered smaller-scale violence. However, there are still
questions as to whether elections themselves can cause conflict or whether electoral
conflict is primarily the result of structural issues such as unemployment, corruption,
poverty, hate speech and ethnic division triggered by an electoral event. There is
however, no doubt that electoral conflict has the propensity to undermine the credibility
of an election. Tohbi (2011) noted that when electoral conflict is anticipated or indeed
visible, voters stay at home and some candidates withdraw due to widespread fear and
insecurity. Henceforth, the legitimacy of the elections is jeopardised. This gives a call to
undertake this study.

2.5 Studies on Conflict Management

Conflict management is complex and the task of managing electoral conflict becomes
even more intricate in situations where those charged with the responsibility lack the
18
necessary competencies and skills in conflict management. The complex nature of
electoral conflict makes it extremely challenging to first, predict with certainty when,
how and where conflict will occur and secondly, to strategise on mechanisms for its
management. The fact that the management of electoral conflicts is a challenge requires
effective management. Hence, this study to ascertain whether those tasked with the
management of the phenomenon in Zambia through CMCs have the necessary skills and
competencies to manage electoral conflicts.

Conflict Management is an attempt to regulate a conflict by acting to help prevent or end

violence. It seeks to bring about constructive resolutions from which all the parties
involved can benefit and try to stop the violent hostilities as swiftly as possible. The
EMB, or any other body charged with the mandate should develop and encourage
political parties to sign and commit to a code of conduct which binds them to campaign
peacefully, refrain from using inflammatory language and use peaceful and legal means
to challenge results (Kelley, 2012). How this strategy can improve the performance of
CMCs in Zambia is what this study attempts to establish.

To manage electoral violence, Gienath (2008) strongly focused on EMBs, their

independence, transparency and access to resources. Furthermore, he stated that
formalised dialogue between political parties and the electoral body, voter education, the
unity of electoral commission and the participation of all political parties at all the
important stages of the electoral process is relevant for conflict management. Dialogue
with all stakeholders is an important function that would ensure that all the stakeholders
were involved at each stage of the electoral process so as to create trust and faith in the
management of electoral conflicts by EMBs. Impartial and legitimate conflict
management bodies have proven important in addressing the problem of election –
related violence. All such measures are required to be put in place. However, conflict
may still occur even with formalised dialogue among stakeholders. This study intends to
establish how effective the CMCs have performed in Zambia.

A prominent scholar of the subject at hand, Schirch (2004) contended that Conflict
Management involves implementing strategies to limit the negative and increase the

19
positive aspects of conflict at a level equal to or higher than where the conflict is taking
place. Schirch’s submission seems to stem from Sandole (1999) who submitted that
Conflict Management should not be misunderstood to be aiming at eliminating all
conflict or avoiding conflict in totality but largely to minimise its negative impacts. From
the works of Sandole (1999) and Schirch (2004), we can deduce that Conflict
Management is a process that involves various styles which include;

1. Integrating: This involves opening up, creating dialogue, and exploring.

2. Obliging: An aspect that tries to find the same interests of the parties,
while trying to minimize the true feeling of the conflict, to satisfy the
other party.

3. Dominating [confrontation]: This is a coercive way of managing conflict

in which one party forces their own way on the other party concerned.

4. Mediation: It is an attempt to help parties in a disagreement to hear one

another, to minimise the harm that can come from disagreement.

5. Avoiding: This entails ignoring the problem in hopes that it will go away
on its own.

6. Compromising: This is the willingness by one or both parties to the

conflict to make concessions for a mutual agreement (Zartman, 1997).

However, recent policies on electoral violence in many emerging democracies mainly

concentrated on guidelines on how to manage or prevent it without looking at different
management strategies that could be taken up by different actors. Hogland and Jastart
(2010) argued that the management of electoral conflicts needs different strategies that
can be taken up by different actors. They contended that the presence of monitors can be
instrumental in managing electoral violence through naming and shaming mechanisms
and by creating awareness of tensions build up, mediation can be carried out in high -
tension situation to solve an ongoing election-related dispute, the legal framework and
institutional design provides the basis of combating impunity and for creating conditions
20
discouraging violence, law enforcement highlights the deterring function of security
forces and voter-focused strategies emphasise the importance of long-term prevention
through the cultivation of democratic norms and tolerance. The biggest problem that most
young democracies face is implementation of programmes. They have nice policies and
programmes on paper that are never implemented. Lack of political will in most cases
had failed the management strategies of electoral violence in most young democracies.
To make matters worse, it appeared management strategies were rarely evaluated to
determine their effectiveness and hence, this study.

An integrated approach in the management of electoral conflicts requires reframing

elections and conflict by looking at the electoral cycle and conflict cycle. The electoral
cycle allows for an expanded view of all electoral processes and related programming
that incorporates the social and political context before, during and after elections. This
approach extends to such activities as analysing election results, formation of
government, preparation of reforms and procedures for the next set of elections and
supporting education and advocacy activities related to elections and election reforms
(Kammerud, 2012). An electoral cycle perspective helps to create an awareness of the
broad variety of stakeholders that can be perpetrators or targets of electoral violence. In
this respect, the media has an important role to give accurate information about elections.
Where the media becomes a mouthpiece of the government or is simply irresponsible, it
can fuel mistrust in the electoral process and destabilize it. On the other hand, conflict
cycle is a source of common conflict programming responses. This approach helps to
situate visible violence as a part of a longer process. Essentially, electoral conflict has its
roots in each of the cycle and the most efficient responses to the electoral conflict will be
rooted in both cycles.

Most approaches in the management of electoral conflict focus on electoral cycle alone.
This may not be sufficient. An understanding of the connection and overlap between the
conflict cycle and the electoral cycle is critical and will help EMBs to develop strategies
that would address electoral conflict more explicitly, consistently and effectively.
Essentially, electoral conflict can be better understood when placed within conflict cycle,
and better addressed when stakeholders look at what conflict programming would be
21
most relevant. However, it appears the approach in conflict management in Zambia has
not been sufficient enough to address electoral conflict. Hence, this study to establish
how effective CMCs have managed electoral conflicts.

However, a focus on violence around the electoral cycle has the advantage of being better
suited to identifying all instances of electoral violence. According Alston (2010), found
that 11 percent of fatalities occurred on Election Day, with 46 percent occurring in the
pre-election period and 43 percent in the post – election period. These findings illustrated
how a focus on Election Day violence was likely to miss the majority of violent
incidences that occurred in the three months before and after elections.

It was also worth noting that most EMBs pay less attention to conflict analysis and
instead pay much attention to conflict management and prevention, mitigation and
resolution. Conflict cycle demands conflict analysis. This entails that at each stage of the
electoral cycle, different types of analysis can be employed to help understand electoral
conflict dynamics. Conflict analysis should complement legal, political, cultural and
other considerations in the electoral system design. This cause for EMBs to develop and
adopt conflict mapping and reporting tools such as the International Foundation of
Electoral Systems (IFES) initiated Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER)
and Election Violence Risk Assessment (EVRA) approaches (Kammerud, 2012).

Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) brings together Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs) and key stakeholders such as political parties, civic and media
groups, national purveyors of justice, EMBs, the Police and Military authorities to
identify, monitor and mitigate election – related violence. It involves conflict mapping,
conflict monitoring and reporting, advising on and supporting mitigation strategies,
training on conflict management and rapid response, civil society capacity building and
network building. Election Violence Risk Assessment (EVRA) focusses on assessing risk
factors related to electoral violence such as the risk of political violence, the risk of
confessional violence and the risk of electoral violence.

When greater co-ordination is present, conflict risks can be identified earlier and
managed better, or avoided altogether. Conflict analysis can be integrated into risk
22
assessments throughout the electoral cycle, with great benefit to security planning and
stakeholder decision-making process. Since conflict management requires a coordinated
action among stakeholders, communication between the CMCs and stakeholders
themselves is cardinal to its management. Whether CMCs in Zambia have developed or
adopted conflict mapping tools, is what this study will establish.

2.5.1 Global Perspective

In Lebanon, a methodology was designed by IFES and local partners to explicitly support
capacity for risk assessment in the lead-up to the 2009 elections and maintained
throughout the process. The Lebanon Election Violence Risk Assessment (LEVRA)
project was designed in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities
to be an integrated part of the ministry’s risk assessment tools (IFES, 2010). The project
drew upon expert assessments of three types of violence: political, confessional and
electoral. Each constituency was given a risk rating of high, medium or low for each type
of violence experienced. Overall, this approach increased the quality of information
gathered and the amount of co-operation and information sharing between election
officials, security agencies and local government. There was also a distinct decrease in
the number of violent incidents recorded by the LEVRA project following the adoption
of the security plan. Though this model involved constituency-level analysis, however, it
could be easily modified according to resources and needs by scaling up the geographic
level of analysis, simplifying the map and graphics and/or leveraging the resources of
local actors who are already gathering information. At a minimum, indicators could be
developed and shared among local actors, such as security agencies and election officials,
to provide a standard information-gathering process (Kammerud, 2012). This gives a call
to evaluate the effectiveness of CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts in
Zambia.

Essentially, there was need to allocate the necessary resources to the management of
electoral conflicts so that early warning signs could be used as basis for decision making
before the situation became grave. This is what the United Nations (UN) did in the earlier
days of the political conflict in former Yugoslavia. In this case, it appeared highly likely

23
that the conflict would spread to Macedonia, and the UN decided to deploy a force on the
border to act as a buffer. This approach was successful in that particular set of
circumstances and the conflict did not spread to Macedonia (Hansen et.al, 2004).
Whether CMCs are capable to detect the early warning signs of electoral violence likely
to erupt, is what this study will establish.

2.5.2 Continental Perspective

EISA’s intervention in the area of electoral conflict management commenced as early as

1998 when it designed and developed an electoral conflict management programme in
consultation with the Electoral Commissions Forum of the Southern African
Development Community Electoral Commissions Forum (SADC-ECF) and facilitated
workshops in all the SADC countries. Building on this experience, EISA designed a
conflict management model which, in partnership with the relevant Electoral
Management Bodies (EMBs), provided for the identification of a panel of independent
mediators, trusted and regarded by the electorate and political parties as independent and
non-partisan, to assist EMBs in diffusing potential and managing emerging conflict. This
model was first implemented in South Africa in partnership with the South African
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in 1999 and replicated in subsequent South
African elections up to the most recent provincial and national elections, which were held
in April 2009. This model has also been used in other SADC countries, Lesotho in 2002
and the referendum in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005 and
presidential and parliamentary elections there in 2006, for which 3000 mediators were
recruited, trained and deployed. These mediators continue to contribute to resolving
conflict in many SADC countries. Whether the members of CMCs in Zambia are partisan
or not is what this study wants to establish as it evaluates the effectiveness of CMCs in
the management of electoral conflicts.

Dekha (2012) reported that several atrocities and human rights abuses were recorded in
Kenya following the 2006 disputed elections between Mwai Kibaki and Raira Odinga.
While it is permissible to argue that electoral outcomes in Kenya sparked the post-
election violence, we can as well add that the situation was highly exacerbated by ethnic
and regional cleavages of the supporters of the two competing leaders. EISA (2011)
24
posits; for Kenya, the military police, the EMB and the courts handle electoral conflict
and violence. What amuses, however, is that electoral conflict and violence still broke out
regardless of the mentioned structures, mechanisms and institutions. It thus follows that
the establishment of bodies to handle electoral conflict and violence alone cannot
translate into reduction of electoral conflict and violence. However, what has not been
appreciated is the capacity by the said bodies (CMCs) to manage both impending and
existing conflict in Zambia. Hence, this study to establish the effectiveness of CMCs.

2.5.3 Zambian Perspective

The Electoral Act no. 24 of 1996 provides for the composition of an independent
Electoral Commission and its operations. The Electoral Act number 12 of 2006 gives
power to the ECZ to set up Conflict Management Committees to resolve electoral
conflicts. It is in this regard that the ECZ established CMCs at national and district level.
These committees are mandated to manage and resolve electoral conflicts in a prudent
and timely manner, with a view to achieving peaceful elections and mutual resolutions
through mediation of conflicts that arise in the electoral process through the enforcement
of the Electoral Code of Conduct which regulates the media, polling agents, political
parties, monitors, observers and candidates during elections. Whether this is happening,
is what this study will establish.

Furthermore, the CMCs attend to complaints based on alleged bias by electoral officers
and have powers to advise the conflicting parties to report the matter to the police where
a crime has been committed during elections, advise the conflicting parties in an election
conflict and to revoke any accreditation of any election monitor and observer. The
committees may impose punishments that the ECZ determines by statutory instruments
(Code 2006, 17(1). The fact that electoral conflicts have continued raises a lot of
unanswered questions regarding the manner in which CMCs have managed electoral
conflicts in Zambia. Hence, this study to evaluate how the CMCs manage electoral
conflicts in Zambia.

Essentially, Section 6 of the Electoral Code of Conduct (2006) restricts behaviour that
might fuel violence or disrupt the right to freedom of campaigning. These behaviours
25
include among others, bans on violent behaviour or inflammatory speech, the carrying or
display of arms, making false defamatory or inflammatory allegations, disrupting
campaign meetings, defacing campaign materials, vote buying, bribery among others.
The procedure for conflict resolution is that any member of the general public can make a
complaint in writing and addressed to the area Town Clerk/Council Secretary or to the
Electoral Commission of Zambia. The committee chairperson will then convene a
meeting to the dispute within twenty four (24) hours from the date of receipt of the
complaint. The members would choose a lead mediator to spearhead the mediation. Then
the members of the parties to the dispute would be invited to attend the mediation
session. The mediator would then assist the parties to find an agreement solution. The
agreed solution is reduced in writing and signed by all parties. The committees largely
apply the Electoral Code of Conduct when resolving disputes. Any person not satisfied
with the mediation by the District Committee may appeal to the National Committee or to
the Electoral Commission. However, it appears the CMCs are facing serious challenges
and have failed to meet the expectations of some stakeholders as evidenced in the
frequent and intense electoral violence witnessed in Zambia.

Kimer (2012) reported on the infamous violent incidence during the 2001 Chawama by-
election in Lusaka in which political parties orchestrated a bloody violence that sent
dozens of people to the hospital with machete wounds. Other Incidents of electoral
conflict and violence in Lusaka were recorded in Lilanda, Kanyama and at the Civic
Center (Nakatindi hall) as recent as 2011. Furthermore, police in Mufumbwe recorded a
total of six (6) casualties from an incidence of electoral violence in which a UPND cadre
lost his eye after severe beatings and four (4) MMD cadres sustained deep cuts after
being beaten in retaliation. In Rufunsa, one person died while two (2) others were injured
when political rivalry erupted during a Local Government by-election on November 8th,
2012 (Lusaka Times, 2012). Whether the Electoral Code of Conduct is effectively
enforced and adhered to, is what this study wants to establish as it evaluates the
effectiveness of the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia.

Officials from the Jimmy Carter Centre Foundation (2006) who came to monitor
Zambia’s elections in 2006 equally had their own views concerning the capacity of the
26
CMCs of the ECZ. The report by the Carter Centre noted that CMCs had unresolved
disputes with political parties, and that most of the conflicts between political parties
needed effective mechanisms to be managed. This included creating a legal mandate for
CMCs and providing for necessary enforcement mechanisms. They observed that the
absence of a legal framework makes these committees toothless in the sense that
enforcement of the decisions passed was not there. Therefore, this rendered the
committees incapable especially that the committees could not nullify election results,
disqualify the candidature of any person or impose a fine or imprisonment, could not
usurp the role of election officers during elections and could not order the recount of
votes in case of a dispute over election results. Without addressing the foregoing, it was
unlikely that CMCs would be able to manage electoral conflict and violence in Zambia.
This observation gives a call to establish whether a legal framework to the mandate of
CMCs would make them effective in the management of electoral conflicts.

Suffice to state that the foregoing is not a task to be borne entirely by the ECZ alone,
other stakeholders such as political parties, law enforcement agencies, CSOs and the
general populace need to take an active role in a quest for peace before, during and after
elections. There seems to be information gap among political players and stakeholders
and within CMCs as regards to the effective management of electoral conflict. Hence,
this study to establish this information gap and make CMCs effective.

2.6 Researcher’s own Comments

From the review of various literature in this study, it was clear that conflict management
was an essential ingredient in a democratic dispensation. Therefore, the state was
expected to provide an enabling environment for peace building by strengthening all legal
instruments through legislation. The strengthening of legal instruments would enable
CMCs to discharge their function effectively and efficiently. It is important to realise that
every person in the nation needs peace for personal and national development. Leaving
stakeholders out of the conflict management brackets, either as active participants or
beneficiaries, risked plunging the nation into anarchy.

27
However, most scholars engaged in this study like Lopez (2000), Kelly (2012) and others
have only written about the causes of electoral conflicts but little has been written on the
effective way to manage electoral conflicts. This is the gap identified which this study
tried to fill. Thus, giving a call to evaluate the effectiveness of CMCs in the management
of electoral conflicts in Lusaka district.

Summary

This chapter began by giving an understanding of the concept of electoral conflicts before
discussing the causes of electoral conflicts. Furthermore, the chapter gave a historical
overview of the study before zeroing in on the studies on conflict management at global,
continental and Zambian level. What is clear from this study is that electoral conflict is
complex and can be triggered by existing or structural socio-economic cleavages such as
ethnic, hate speech, tribal, regional or class distinctions alongside contextual causes such
as a weak EMBs and inadequate conflict management institutions. The next chapter will
present the methodology to the study.

28
 CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Overview

The main purpose of this chapter was to discuss and describe the general methodology
that was used in this study. It presents the research design, research site, research
instruments, population, sampling procedure, data collection instruments, data collection
procedure, data analysis, presentation of data, validation and reliability, ethical
considerations and limitations of the study.

3.1 Research Design

A research design is a plan of how to conduct a study. It articulates what data is required,
what methods are going to be used to collect and analyse data, and how everything will
answer the research questions (Muzumara, 1998). In this study, a qualitative descriptive
research design was used. A descriptive research refers to research studies that have their
main objective the accurate portrayal of the characteristics of persons, situations or
groups (Hiatt, 1986). This approach is used to describe variables rather than to test a
predicted relationship between variables. The descriptive approach in data collection
gives the ability to collect accurate data on and provide a clear picture of the phenomenon
under study (Hillman, 2005). The essence of a qualitative descriptive research design is
first to state the status quo, then formulating important principles of knowledge and later
provides solutions to the problem. Essentially, this design was appropriate because it
gave an accurate and authentic description of the lessons and experiences of electoral
conflicts in Zambia.

3.2 Research Site

This study was conducted in Lusaka district. This district was purposively selected as a
case site due to the many cases of electoral conflicts that have ended violent over the
recent past largely in constituencies such as Mandevu, Munali, Kanyama, Kabwata,
Chawama and Lusaka Central. Furthermore, it is in this district that the CMCs seem to be
active. Other reasons for selecting Lusaka district are that; the Headquarters of the ECZ,
29
CSOs, political parties and church mother bodies which are a target for this research are
housed.

3.3 Population

Polit and Hungler (1999) defined a study population as the totality of all subjects that
conform to a set of specifications, comprising the entire group of persons that are of
interest to the researcher and to whom the research results can be generalised. In a related
manner, Salant and Dillman (1994) described the population in a study as a group of
experimental data or persons. With the definitions given, the study population was the
Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) secretariat (Legal department), The Lusaka-
based National CMC, The Lusaka district CMC, the Patriotic Front party (PF), the
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy party (MMD), the United Party for National
Development (UPND), Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Transparency
International Zambia (TIZ), Caritas Zambia and the three (3) Church mother bodies
(Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) and
Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC)). Therefore, the two (2) Conflict Management
Committees (1 at national level and another at district level); three (3) major political
parties as ranked on the basis of the results of the 2011 tripartite elections; three (3) Civil
Society Organisations that are involved in issues of democracy and good governance;
three (3) Church mother bodies, One (1) department of the ECZ (the Legal department)
served as valuable study population. Therefore, twelve (12) interviews were conducted.

3.4 Sampling Procedure

Webster (1985) defined a sample as a finite part of a statistical population whose

properties are studied to gain information about the whole population. A sample is a
subset of the population. Sidhu (2012: 253) defines sampling as “the process of selecting
sample from the population.” In this study, purposive sampling technique was used to
identify respondents from the targeted population. According to Kombo and Tromp
(2006), purposive sampling involves targeting a group of people believed to be reliable
for the study. From the researcher’s category of respondents, the ECZ, CSOs, political
parties and members of the Lusaka based CMCs stand out. The ECZ in particular

30
provided useful information on the actual situation on the ground while at the same time
outlined the government’s position on electoral conflict and violence. At least 1
respondent was targeted from each of the organisations, mainly the Public Relations
Officer, Executive Director or any other individual assigned with the responsibility of
speaking on behalf of the organisation. This was to ensure that only information relevant
to the study was collected thereby saving both the researcher’s and respondents’ time.

3.5 Data Collection Instruments

Data collection is the precise, systematic gathering of information relevant to the

research, using methods such as interviews, participant observation, focus group
discussion, narratives and case histories (Hiatt, 1986). Interviews were used to gather
data from the respondents. To maintain originality, the voice recorder was employed in
some cases and content later transcribed so as to identify the critical junctions. Closed
ended questions were employed to get precise answers to the questions. In addition,
unstructured open ended questions were used to encourage elaboration and further
discussion.

Both primary and secondary data was used in this study. Primary data was collected from
data held by various libraries, institutional reports, the internet, media and newspaper
reports were also used with a view to capture recent updates of electoral conflict and
violence in the country. Electronic media articles, journals, research reports, conference
proceedings, magazines and books also constituted an important source of secondary
data. It is important to note that secondary data was mainly a complement to primary data
collected from the field.

3.6 Data Collection Procedure

“… the term data collection refers to gathering specific information aimed at proving or
refuting some facts” (Kombo and Tromp, 2006:99). It involves collection of views on the
attitudes and characters of the people about the phenomenon. Data collection is important
in research as it allows for the dissemination of accurate information based on empirical
evidence of the phenomenon. Data collection is the precise, systematic gathering of

31
information relevant to the research, using methods such as interviews, participant
observation, focus group discussion, narratives and case histories (Hiatt, 1986).

Before undertaking this study, permission was sought from the University of Zambia (see
appendix 3). In this study, information was collected using the structured interview guide.
This was because the study was qualitative and all respondent were required to respond to
similar questions. In order to ensure that the interview guide was appropriate for this
research, a pilot study was conducted by three political parties which included Forum for
Democracy and Development (FDD), United National Independence Party (UNIP) and
National Restoration Party (NAREP). This was done to avoid misunderstandings and
biases. A pilot study helped to test the feasibility of the study techniques and to perfect
the interview guide. During the administration of the interview guide, all responses were
written down. Apart from writing down the responses, the interview was also recorded.

3.7 Data Analysis

According to LeCompte and Schensul (1999), data analysis is the process a researcher
uses to reduce data to a story and its interpretation. Therefore, data analysis is a
mechanism for reducing and organising data to produce findings that require
interpretation. Data from tape recorders, interviews were transcribed having read text
files and listened to the tape recorders thoroughly for a general understanding. Common
themes were then identified and clustered to categorise the data. Relevant information
was labelled and grouped according to category. Furthermore, the data was then reduced
to its essence and representative and most striking quotes were identified. Codes related
to the objectives were identified and a thematic analysis was done. Throughout this
process of categorising pattern, similarities and contrasting viewpoints were highlighted
and critically interpreted on the basis of the theoretical framework.

3.8 Presentation of Data

To present data, charts and graphs were generated using the DEDOOSE software to
generate emerging themes which were interpreted and used for discussion in the light of
the objectives of the study. DEDOOSE is a cross-platform software application for

32
analyzing text, video, and spreadsheet data (analyzing qualitative, quantitative, and mixed
methods research).

3.9 Validity and Reliability

The validity of a research, according to Leedy and Ormrod (2001) refers to whether the
findings of a study are true and certain. ‘True’ in the sense that research findings
accurately reflect the situation, and ‘certain’ in the sense that research findings are
supported by the evidence. To increase the study reliability and validity, the preliminary
research findings were presented to five respondents who include ECZ, three political
parties and one CSO to do a member checking. This checking opened opportunities for
clarifications, feedback and discussion of the conclusion.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

Furrow (2004: 43) defined ethics as ‘a morality or a position of doing what is right both
morally and legally.’ To start with, permission was sort from the University of Zambia to
carry out this study as shown in appendix 3. It is important to protect participants who
willingly present themselves for the purpose of advancing understanding in research.
Therefore, a strict set of guidelines and code of conduct was adopted and adhered to.
Confidentiality was an important aspect in this study and hence, all the names of the
respondents were not mentioned.

The researcher ensured that participant's consent to participate in the research was
voluntary by making them sign a consent form, free of any coercion or promises of
benefits as a result of participation as shown in appendix 1. Since the study was to
evaluate the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia, the researcher ensured that the
participants received a full disclosure of the nature of the study, expected benefits to the
participants and society with an extended opportunity to ask questions, including the fact
that they could choose to withdraw their participation even in the middle of the research.

33
3.11 Limitations of the Study

This study was conducted in Zambia, particularly in Lusaka. As such, the findings from
the Lusaka CMCs may not be generalized to other CMCs across the country. To this
effect, similar studies will need to be conducted in other CMCs outside Lusaka. The main
practical constraint in this study was that it was difficult to collect data from political
parties because at the time of data collection, political parties were busy mobilizing their
parties in readiness for the 2016 General Elections and Referendum.

Summary

This chapter began by identifying and describing the research design for the study and
argued that a qualitative research design would be appropriate because it gives the
researcher the ability to collect accurate data and provide a clear picture of the
phenomenon under study. It went on to discuss the research site, the population of the
study, the sampling procedure, data collection instruments, data collection procedure,
how data was analysed, presentation of data, validating data while taking into account
ethical considerations and finally, limitations of the study. The next chapter presents the
findings of this study.

34
 CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS

Overview

This chapter presents the findings on the evaluation of the management of electoral
conflicts in Lusaka. Interviews were conducted in Lusaka district with 12 key electoral
stakeholders mainly the Secretary Generals and Executive Directors. Qualitative data
from 12 interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis using the DEDOOSE
software to generate emerging themes which were interpreted and used for discussion in
the light of the objectives of the study. DEDOOSE is a cross-platform software
application for analyzing text, video, and spreadsheet data (analyzing qualitative,
quantitative, and mixed methods research). Emerging themes were also reported in
quantitative form through the use of pie charts and graphs. Some excerpts of the
interviews were transcribed verbatim and reported directly in the report. These research
questions were:-

(i) How do the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees manage electoral conflicts?

(ii) What capacity do the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees have to manage
electoral conflicts?

(iii)What strategies can improve the performance of Conflict Management Committees in

the management of electoral conflicts?

Essentially, this chapter is exclusively devoted to the presentation and analysis of data
collected through interviews. Sub-titles will be used to discuss findings from interviews.
Not all the issues reflected in the interview guide have been included in the presentation
but only those issues that strongly relate to the management of electoral conflicts have
been included.

35
4.1 Management of Electoral Conflicts by Lusaka Conflict Management
Committees.

In order to respond to research question one which sought to establish how the Lusaka
Conflict Management Committees manage electoral conflicts in the district, a question
was asked. The research question was: How do the Lusaka Conflict Management
Committees manage electoral conflicts? All the respondents interviewed in this study
acknowledged the fact that the Electoral Act No. 12 grants the Electoral Commission of
Zambia (ECZ) powers to establish CMCs at national and all the districts to manage and
resolve electoral conflicts in a prudent and timely manner, hence, the establishment of
these committees in 2006. Furthermore, the findings established that CMCs had a clear
understanding of their roles and responsibilities, and that they were accountable to the
Electoral Commission of Zambia. From the responses, it was clear that the management
strategy used by CMCs to resolve electoral disputes was mediation. A respondent from
the National Conflict Management explained that:

” CMCs attend to complaints raised regarding the conduct of elections in writing.

Once such complaints have reached the Town Clerk or Council Secretary, the
chairperson of that particular Conflict Management Committee would convene a
meeting to the dispute within 24 hours from the date of receipt. The members of
the committee would choose a lead mediator to spearhead the mediation. The
agreed solution is put in writing and signed by all parties.”

However, one respondent from Caritas Zambia said he did not agree with the strategy of
mediation to resolve electoral disputes because it was not punitive enough to stop the
phenomenon. He explained that;

During mediation, the culprits were merely warned and it was upto the culprits to
adhere to the resolutions of the mediation or not. This to some extent has
contributed to the rise in electoral violence…

36
He further described the whole process of mediation as simply an academic exercise.

4.1.1 The Role and Mandate of CMCs.

In line with how the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees managed electoral
conflicts, a question was asked to determine the role and mandate of Conflict
Management Committees in the electoral process. The question was: What is your
understanding of the role and mandate of Conflict Management Committees in the
electoral process? Essentially, three themes emerged and these were: conflict resolution,
education of the electorates and mediation as shown in figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1; Role and Mandate of CMCs

Mediation, 5
[CATEGORY
NAME], [VALUE]

Education of
Electorates, 2

1. Conflict Resolution

Six (6) of the respondents were able to identify the role of conflict resolution and
appreciated the fact that elections were bound to cause conflict and settlement of these
conflicts was of paramount in the conduct of elections. A respondent from FODEP

37
pointed out that CMCs further provided a platform or forum were conflict resolution was
made possible and said that:

“In the conduct of elections, CMCs play an important role of ensuring that when
disputes arise, they would often find means of bringing the two or more parties
together to negotiate for peaceful resolutions of the disagreements instead of
going to courts.”

Despite the common agreement amongst most of the respondents interviewed on this
theme, other respondents in this interview argued that CMCs had failed to resolve most
of the electoral disputes. A respondent from the Movement for Multi-party Democracy
(MMD) had this to say:

“The fact that CMCs lack a legal framework in their mandate to resolve electoral
disputes entails inefficiency…”

2. Education of the Electorates

Two (2) respondents from the CMCs, one from the national committee and the other
from the district committee, explained that education was one of the cardinal roles CMCs
gave to political parties and the electorates. These respondents observed that during
mediation, political parties were counselled and educated on the electoral code of
conduct. This helped political parties to know and adhere to electoral laws so as to ensure
peace was upheld before, during and after the election period. Furthermore, the
respondents indicated that CMCs played a critical role of ensuring free participation of
the electorates in choosing their leaders.

3. Mediation

Five (5) respondents identified the third theme as mediation of conflicts during elections.
According to a respondent from ECZ, she stated that:

38
 “CMCs address electoral issues that arise through mediation instead of taking the
case to court”

She then explained that CMCs acted as entities that settled or intervened in the process of
resolving conflict through mediation. Furthermore, she explained that mediation was
confidential and that contents were not for publication. She bemoaned lack of
understanding of mediation. Though it appeared this was not the case on the ground as
other respondent expressed contrary views alleging that the committees were not
independent and hence, the more reason the mediation was confidential.

4.1.2 The Management of Electoral Conflicts

From the findings on how the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees managed
electoral conflicts, three themes emerged and these were: Enforcement of the electoral
code of conduct, advocating for co-existence and tolerance and presiding on electoral
disputes.

1. Presiding on Electoral Disputes

According to the responses given by the respondents from the Electoral Commission of
Zambia (ECZ), the committees in Lusaka had successfully mediated on some disputes.
The ECZ observed that CMCs, stakeholders and conflicting parties were brought to the
negotiating table. This enabled a successful resolution of electoral disputes and
reconciliation of the parties. According to ECZ CMC report (2011):

“The Lusaka district CMC received and resolved a total of fourteen (14)
complaints while the National CMC handled five (5) electoral disputes. The main
case related to an objection against the appointment of two presiding officers.
The committee found that the complaints against the two officers had no merits.
However, the officers were redeployed to secure their personal safety. The other
cases related to vote buying, destruction of campaign posters, violence and the
use of public resources during the campaign period. There was an escalation in
cases of assault, arson and malicious damage to property. All matters of criminal
39
 nature were referred to the Zambia Police for further investigation. The District
committee signed three (3) memorandum of understanding with political parties
to ensure that violence at the markets and bus stops was discouraged and
stopped.”

2. Advocating for Co-Existence and Tolerance

Only three (3) out of the twelve (12) respondents interviewed observed that CMCs were
successful in the settlement of some electoral disputes because of the stance they (CMCs)
had taken to advocate for tolerance and co-existence among political parties. These
respondents argued that tolerance for opposing views and that of other opposition
political parties played a leaf role in the settlement of electoral conflict and consequently,
in the management of electoral conflicts. Furthermore, these respondents felt that this was
one of the main ways CMCs had successfully managed some electoral conflicts. One
respondent from Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) cited the Lubasenshi bye-
election where the UPND visited the PF camp as good for Zambia’s democracy and a
sign of co-existence and tolerance. However, other respondents felt that CMCs had failed
to make political parties to co-exist and tolerate each other’s divergent views and hence,
the rise in electoral conflicts.

3. Enforcement of the Electoral Code of Conduct

Officials from both the National and District Conflict Management Committees argued
that the committees had managed to enforce the electoral code of conduct among political
parties but added that more was needed to enable the effective enforcement of the
electoral code of conduct through the provision of a legal framework.

“The CMCs have done their best but still face challenges in the management of
electoral conflicts.”

These respondents felt that the CMCs needed to be empowered and strengthened legally
to be able to handle electoral conflicts firmly and prudently.

40
4.1.3 Experience of electoral violence in Zambia since 2001

When asked about their experience of electoral violence in Zambia since 2001, all the
respondents in this study indicated that elections in Zambia had seen an increase in the
number of incidences of electoral violence. Furthermore, these respondents observed that
the escalating electoral violence sheds doubts on the efficiency and effectiveness of
CMCs. The following were the themes that emerged from the question on the experience
of electoral violence in Zambia since 2001.

1. Multi-Party System

Respondents from CSOs observed that following the move from one Party-System to
Multi-Party System in 2001, the country had seen a record number of political parties
forming in almost all general elections the country had held. Electorates had to choose
candidates from more than four political parties. These respondents argued that due to the
increased competition among political parties, violence was now taking the centre stage
as cadres would want to make money out of politics. This was observed in the many bye-
elections the country had witnessed. Furthermore, the CSOs argued that multi-party
system had brought about classes and divisions among the electorates and in turn,
creating hatred among politicians and cadres.

2. Voting Patterns

Some respondents in this study also highlighted the voting pattern after elections as one
of the factors leading to the rise in electoral violence. One respondent from Caritas
Zambia clearly pointed out that:

“due to the practice of voting on tribal lines, some electorates are victimized for
supporting their candidates of choice leading to divisions among the
electorates.”

Furthermore, CSOs observed that the recent general elections had seen a rise in the use of
tribal slogans that were aimed at influencing voting patterns, which in turn led to

41
labelling of certain groupings. A respondent from Transparency International Zambia
(TIZ) further said that:

“Political parties nowadays are not formed on ideologies but on individual

slogan such as ‘umuntu ni Lungu’ (Lungu is the right person) for the Patriotic
Front (PF), ‘H.H. ni forward’ (moving forward with Hakainde Hichilema) for
the United Party for National Development (UPND). As a result campaigns are
not issue based but on characters”

3. Civic Education.

Respondents from the interviews also observed that the larger population of rural
electorates in Zambia had no basic understanding and knowledge of civic issues and this
made them more vulnerable to corruption and eventually, electoral violence.

4.1.4 Whether CMCs are compromised.

Most of the respondents in this study observed that the composition of the CMCs at
national and district level was very good. Respondents felt that involvement of different
stakeholders such as the police, religious institutions, ACC, Media and political parties
was fair as all major stakeholders were represented. One respondent from the Movement
of Multi-party Democracy (MMD) argued that stakeholders play a critical role in
ensuring peaceful conduct of elections and successful resolution of electoral disputes.
When asked whether the CMCs were compromised, generally, most of the respondents
from the political parties felt that the CMCs were not compromised but what was needed
was to strengthen their mandate.

One respondent from the MMD said:

“… these committees can never be compromised especially that they are a

representative of different stakeholders. The right description would be that they
are toothless.”

42
Another respondent from the United Party for National Development (UPND) also
remarked:

“CMCs have tried their best to manage electoral conflicts but it is not easy when it
involves the ruling party.”

On the contrary, one respondent from a CSO observed that the presence of council
secretaries or town clerks as executive members of CMCs gave a benefit of doubt
whether these committees were compromised or not because these individuals were
politicians by nature and were interested parties. He further explained that there was need
to have members who were well qualified to handle electoral conflicts effectively
because the dynamics of conflict required critical approach. He suggested that people
with knowledge of political science should sit in these committees and not those with
partisan interest. He later observed that CMCs lacked conflict mapping techniques and
further suggested development of effective conflict mapping tools and monitoring
techniques.

Summary of the findings from research question one (1)

The interviews conducted in this study revealed that CMCs were mandated to resolve and
manage electoral conflicts in a prudent and timely manner. The strategy used by CMCs to
resolve and manage electoral conflicts in Zambia was mediation. However, the findings
had also revealed that such a strategy without any backing of a legal framework was a
‘white elephant.’ A ‘white elephant’ in that it lacked enforcement of resolutions passed
and was not punitive enough to punish the perpetrators of the vice and hence, the increase
in frequency and intensity of electoral conflicts. Furthermore, the findings dismiss the
assertion that CMCs were compromised owing to the fact that the composition was a
representative of different stakeholders. The next section reveals the results of the second
objective.

43
4.2 The capacity of Lusaka CMCs.

Apart from determining how the Lusaka CMCs manage electoral conflicts, the second
research question to this study was: What capacity do the Lusaka Conflict Management
Committees have to manage electoral conflicts?

When asked on the capacity of CMCs to carry out their mandate, the CSOs, Faith Based
Organisations and some political parties felt that the committees in Lusaka had
limitations. They observed that limitations mainly bordered on the legal instruments to
effectively carry out their mandate and argued that the committees could not deal with
litigation issues and mainly relied on the judiciary. Furthermore, these respondents
observed that the committees could not deal with root causes of electoral violence and
punish perpetrators of electoral violence. Additionally, the CSOs also felt that the
committees were not proactive in carrying out their mandate rather they were reactive.
These committees did not investigate cases and waited for cases to be reported and that
was when they were called upon to preside over such cases.

44
4.2.1 Current working framework of CMCs.

When the respondents in this study were asked about the current working framework of
the CMCs, three themes emerged as shown in figure 4.2.

Figure 4. 2: Current Mechanisms on CMCs

5
Access to CMCs

Operational Framework

7
Settlement of Inter Party
Conflict

1. CMCs Operational Framework

Seven (7) respondents in this study indicated that the committees (CMCs) were less
likely to prevent electoral conflicts due to the current working framework. These
respondents argued that in most cases these committees were not able to read the tone or
mood of the electorates or candidates that would incite electoral violence as their
mandate limited them towards settlement of electoral disputes rather than ensuring that
the electorates followed the tenants provided for in the Electoral Code of Conduct.

2. Access to CMCs

Two (2) CSOs observed that these committees were at times not accessible to the general
electorates. This view point was expressed owing to the nature these committees were

45
operating in the sense that they were only reconstituted when there was a case/s to
preside on.

3. Settlement of Inter-Party conflicts

Five (5) respondents in this study observed that as a result of the change to Multi-Party
system in 1991, political players had increased. Consequently, conflicts had increased
both inter-party and intra-party. In this regard, these respondents observed that CMCs
were mainly focused on inter- party conflicts as they affected the general environment for
the smooth conduct of elections but not addressing intra-party conflicts which were also a
source of concern with regards to the peace of the nation and democracy. Furthermore,
they added that since CMCs were limited to prevention of inter-party conflicts, this was
an oversight as intra-party conflicts too had a negative effect on the overall performance
of political parties and the general peace.

4.2.2 Challenges faced by Lusaka Conflict Management Committees

When a question was asked on the challenges facing CMCs in the management of
electoral conflicts, the following themes as shown in figure 4.3 emerged.

Figure 4. 3: Identified challenges impacting on CMCs capacities

12

6
5
4
Tally Counts

3
2

Lack of Legal Slow Pace in Vastness of Limited Lack of Lack of

Mandate Justice Districts resources to Capacity Incentives from
Delievery carry out Building ECZ &
educational Activities Stakeholders
campaigns

1. Lack of legal Mandate

All the respondents (12) interviewed in this study agreed that the biggest challenge facing
these committees in addressing electoral violence was lack of a legal mandate to their
46
operations. They observed that in their current framework, they could not deal with
perpetrators of electoral conflicts. The respondents agreed that CMCs had an essential
mandate to carry out but observed that they lacked a legal framework in so far as
enforcement was concerned. One respondent from a CSO remarked:

“It is common sense that when a legal framework is created within which these
CMCs should operate, their ability to enforce the law will be enhanced to an
extent that the would - be perpetrators of violence are more likely to be deterred.
The fact that decisions made by these committees are loosely binding and largely
flouted by political parties, their mandate still has deficiencies”

These respondents also argued that decisions made by the CMCs were not enforced and
were therefore not binding. They explained that in many cases this resulted in their
decisions not being adhered to due. The lapse in legal provision made the decisions of
these committees not to be more resolute in nature.

2. Vastness of districts

Two (2) respondents from the CMCs argued that one CMC against a vast district
compromises their capacity to a greater extent. They argued that Lusaka with over three
million people, thirty-three wards and seven outside constituencies rendered the district
CMC incapacitated. They felt that this was the more reason that the frequency and
complexity of electoral disputes overwhelmed the CMCs in Lusaka.

3. Lack of Capacity Building Activities

While members of the National Committee submitted that they had regular capacity
building trainings, the members of the district committee submitted that training on
conflict management was inadequate. Generally, some respondents (6) observed that the
district committee lacked capacity building activities which delayed consensus when
deliberating on electoral disputes. One respondent from the District Conflict Management
Committee had this to say:

47
 “The only time when this kind of training took place was during inception. Even
this training focused on good mediation rather than skills and expertise in conflict
management.”

4. Lack of incentives from ECZ and the spending Organisations

Four (4) respondents felt that there was lack of motivation in terms of incentives to the
committees. They observed that membership was voluntary. They also argued that they
(members of CMCs) needed to be motivated especially that this task was important to
national development. One respondent from FODEP commented:

“… it is prudent that members were motivated if they were to earnestly discharge

their mandate. This job is more than what our ministers do in parliament
contributing nothing and getting a lot of money at the end of the day.”

5. Limited resources to carry out educational campaigns

Five (5) respondents indicated that CMCs had limited resources to carryout educational
campaigns on electoral violence. A respondent interviewed from the District Conflict
Management Committee indicated that CMCs in Lusaka were faced with challenges of
resource mobilization to enable them carry out awareness campaigns and sensitization on
the electoral code of conduct. He further observed that this limited the number of times
CMCs in Lusaka met with various stakeholders. He said:

“Resources were limited and this affected a number of other areas of operation
whereby not being able to add more sensitization meetings which would
ultimately help in combating violence and facilitate smooth handling of
elections.”

6. Slow pace in justice delivery

Another factor that featured on the challenges the CMCs faced in Lusaka was the slow
pace at which justice was delivered in the court system. Three (3) respondents
interviewed suggested a robust system that would help speed up the rate at which courts
48
handled the election related cases. One respondent from a named political party
remarked:

“There is need for ECZ to introduce fast track courts to deal with electoral cases
expeditiously. For instance, we have had electoral cases where Petauke Central
had no representation for more than a year because of delays in justice delivery.”

4.2.3 Some factors accounting for the continued rise of electoral conflict

From the findings on the capacity of the CMCs to carry out their mandate, all the
respondents felt that apart from the challenges faced by these committees, there was need
to address the perceived factors accounting to the rise of electoral conflicts if the
management of electoral conflicts in Lusaka was to be effective. The following were the
themes that emerged on this matter as shown in figure 4.4.

Figure 4. 4: Perceived factors accounting for rise in electoral conflict

11

8
Tally Counts

6
5

Lack of Tolerance Weak Government Cadre management Structural Causes Weak media
& Co - Existence Structures reforms
among Polictical
Parties

1. Lack of Toleration and Co-Existence among Political Parties

Eleven (11) respondents in this study observed that the current crop of some politicians
were not able to co-exist and in turn this was leading to the rise in electoral violence.
49
They were intolerant to opposing views. It was also observed that due to the limitation in
Civic Education, the electorates were generally intolerant. Some citizens were not able to
accommodate divergent views. The findings further entail a general lack of understanding
of democracy. Respondents felt that the intolerance of divergent views and the lack of
will for political co-existence was fueling electoral violence and was more prominent
among the factors contributing to electoral conflicts.
A respondent from a named CSO remarked:

“Problems of society affect everyone and Civic Education should be seen as one
of the vices that try to solve some of the problems of society.”

2. Weak Government Structures

Eight (8) respondents from the faith based organisations and CSOs observed that there
was a lapse in governance structures and this was contributing to the rise and intensity of
electoral conflicts. A respondent from Caritas Zambia argued that the selective
application of legal instruments such as the Public Order Act (PAO) remains a source of
concern for many players especially during the elections period. He explained that:

“Once government institutions are strengthened, cases of electoral violence would

greatly reduce and this would promote the enforcement of the electoral code of
conduct.”

He further observed that Zambia was multi-party but had a one party mentality in the
sense that those with opposing views were treated as enemies.

3. Cadre Management

Five respondents interviewed bemoaned the rise in ‘cadrelism’ by some political parties
which they said had greatly contributed to the rise in electoral violence. They observed
that political parties used party cadres as tools to fix political opponents using violence.
They also observed that political cadres had more powers than even civil servants. A
respondent from Caritas Zambia had this to say:

50
 “In Zambia today, cadres seem not to be under any leadership of some kind. The
powers that be have sometimes paid a blind eye and disowned their cadres but
this is after the damage has been done. They (cadres) can even break the law with
impunity. Sometimes especially during political party rallies, traffic rules are not
observed by these cadres and at times they even climb on top of vehicles while the
traffic officers look on and this happens mainly with cadres from the ruling party.

With this scenario, these respondents felt that there was need for sensitization and
leadership within political parties.

4. Structural causes

Structural causes such as unemployment and poverty were cited as major contributors to
electoral violence. Six (6) respondents from political parties argued that because of
massive job losses in Zambia, especially in the mining sector, most of the unemployed
populace, especially the youths, were desperate to have ties with political parties for
financial gain. Apart from the financial gain, these youths also acted as ready suppliers of
violence. Furthermore, the respondents observed that some political parties were using
this desperate situation to champion their selfish agenda through violence. One
respondent interviewed from a named political party had this to say:

“These cadres involved in electoral violence now were the ones under the
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) regime. They are just changing
goal posts for financial gain.”

5. Weak Media Reforms

Two (2) respondents in this study observed that the media could spark electoral violence
if the reporting was not objective on electoral issues. They argued that biased media
coverage can heighten tensions which could lead to conflict. They further argued that the
media (both public and private) was not serving its purpose but was seen to champion

51
selfish agendas. Furthermore, they observed that there seemed a lack of a regulatory
framework to control the media and hence, they called for Media Reforms.

Summary of the findings from research question two (2)

In a nutshell, the responses from the interviews conducted in this study revealed that
CMCs in Zambia though an important ingredient in the electoral process, lacked the
capacity to effectively carry out their mandate because of limitations mainly bordering on
the legal instruments to effectively resolve and manage electoral conflicts. The greater
challenges affecting their operations mainly included lack of a legal framework, slow
pace at which justice is delivered in court, vastness of districts, limited resources to carry
out educational campaigns, lack of capacity building activities and lack of incentives
from ECZ and other electoral stakeholders. However, there were other legislative lapses
that were mentioned in the interviews which hampered the effective management of
electoral conflicts in Zambia such as; weak media reforms, selective application of the
POA, Cadre management, lack of tolerance and co-existence among some politicians and
some structural cause such as unemployment and poverty. The next section reveals the
results of the third objective.

4.3 Strategies of improving the performance of CMCs

Apart from ascertaining the capacity of Conflict Management Committees to manage

electoral conflicts, the third research question was: What strategies can improve the
performance of CMCs in the management of electoral conflict? Views from the
respondents in this study were cardinal to answering this research question. From the
interviews conducted in this study, four themes emerged as illustrated in figure 4.5.

Figure 4. 5: Perceived strategies that could enhance CMCs capacities

52
 Need for fast track courts 8

Increased Educational Awareness Activies 9

Increased Access for CMC's 4

Strengthening Legal Framework 12

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Tally Counts

1. Strengthening the legal framework

All the respondents (12) in this study felt that there was need to strengthen the current
legal framework to enable CMCs to effectively operate and carry out their mandate.
These respondents felt that CMCs needed to have powers to prosecute ailing candidates
in order to fully carry out their mandate. One respondent from the ECZ said:

“Submissions have been made by the ECZ so that the law changes to punish
candidates involved in electoral violence but this has not been taken on board.”

2. Increase Access to CMCs

Four (4) respondents from the CSOs felt that CMCs should be more accessible and on the
ground to observe the general conduct of the electorates and politicians before, during
and after elections. These respondents also observed that if CMCs were mobile and
permanent, it could easily help the electorates and politicians in accessing the services
that are core in the successful conduct of elections and as such, electoral conflicts would
easily be dealt with before turning violent. A respondent from FODEP argued that:

“These committees were only reconvened when there were cases to look at.”

53
3. Increase Educational Awareness Activities

In the interviews conducted, it was revealed that CMCs needed to partner more with
CSOs in educating the electorates and politicians on the importance of holding a peaceful
election and the dangers of electoral conflicts. A respondent from ZEC, argued that:

“Politics is about successful reconciliation of different interests and not a deeper

recognition of differences.”

The respondents from political parties also observed that if this role was strengthened,
CMCs could operate more effectively in the handling of electoral conflicts. They argued
that an educated citizenry was important for the peace of the nation and development.

4. Need for the Electoral Fast Track Courts

Eight (8) respondents in this study felt that CMCs should have fast track courts to enable
them handle electoral disputes expeditiously instead of waiting for the judicial courts of
law. They argued that these courts would quickly expose cases of electoral violence and
in turn, prevent the vice. In the same vein, these respondents proposed the need to
promote and protect people that work as ‘whistle blowers’ through legislation. These
measures together with strengthening institutional and individual capacities would see the
effective implementation of CMCs’ mandate.

Summary of the findings from research question number three (3)

The interviews conducted in this study revealed that CMCs were facing serious
challenges and needed effective strategies to improve their performance if they were to
be effective in the management of electoral conflicts. To this effect, the responses from
the interviews revealed that the following strategies were necessary to improve the
performance of CMCs; introduction of fast track courts deal with electoral disputes
expeditiously, increase educational awareness activities, increase access to CMCs and to
strengthen the legal framework for its mandate.

54
Summary
This chapter presented the findings of the study on the evaluation of the management of
electoral conflicts in Zambia by doing a case study of Lusaka Conflict Management
Committees. These findings have been presented in line with the three objectives set out
in Chapter One. The researcher used the thematic approach to present qualitative results.
However, the findings mainly bordered on how the Lusaka CMCs manage electoral
conflicts; the capacity of CMCs to manage electoral conflicts; and the strategies of
improving the performance of CMCs in the management of electoral conflicts. The next
chapter will discuss the findings of this study

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 CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

Overview

This chapter presents the discussion of the findings presented in the previous chapter. It is
organized based on the following subtitles arising from the research objectives: to
determine how the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees manage electoral conflicts:
to assess the capacity of the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees in the
management of electoral conflicts; and to establish strategies of improving the
performance of Conflict Management Committees in the management of electoral
conflicts.

5.1 How the Lusaka CMCs managed electoral conflicts

From the findings presented in this study, it was clear that the Electoral Act No. 12
granted the ECZ powers to establish CMCs. It was also on the basis of such statutory
supremacy that ECZ had established a National Conflict Management Committee based
in Lusaka and several others in all the districts in Zambia. These committees were
established in August 2006 for the sole purpose of resolving and managing electoral
conflicts.

As observed from the findings of this study, the structure and composition of both the
ECZ and CMCs in particular was clear and that functions and responsibilities were
divided as such. Furthermore, it was also observed that the members had a clear
understanding of their roles and responsibilities, and demonstrated a clear commitment to
the vision and mission of the Electoral Commission of Zambia. The chairperson chaired
the meetings while the secretary who was also the District Electoral Officer was the hub
of the administrative wing. Therefore, there was no overlap in terms of responsibilities.
What also stood out from the findings was that the members of the CMCs were
accountable for their actions to ECZ. In view of the discharge of functions on the part of

56
the National Committee, it was clear from the findings that they generally had relevant
skills and competencies.

This study has also established from the findings that CMCs were paramount in resolving
and managing electoral disputes and that the management strategy used by CMCs to
resolve and manage electoral disputes was mediation. Mediation is an attempt to help
parties in a disagreement to hear one another and to minimize the harm that can come
from disagreements (Zartman, 1997). From the findings, the main reason advanced for
this strategy (mediation) by the ECZ was that it brought the two or more parties involved
in the dispute together to negotiate for peace resolutions of the disagreement/s instead of
going to the courts. However, the findings also revealed that there was generally a lack of
understanding of mediation among different stakeholders.

It was also clear from the findings that while the Act empowered the establishment of
these committees, it did not give legal protection and powers to recommend for
prosecution but merely took a mediatory role in helping to resolve electoral conflicts.
Essentially, a respondent from Caritas Zambia argued that:

“I do not agree with the strategy of mediation to resolve and manage electoral
conflicts in Zambia because it was not backed by law and hence, it was simply an
academic exercise.’’

Therefore, we can argue from the findings that the mandate of these committees
technically lacked a legal framework in so far as enforcement was concerned. It was also
possible from the findings to insinuate that lack of a legal framework had made
individuals from political parties to commit electoral violence with impunity. To this
effect, if impunity was not checked, it could spark violent electoral conflicts especially if
adequate procedures or enforceable sanctions against those who break the electoral law
were missing (see Bekoe 2010, in Literature Review Chapter p: 16).

Essentially, the study observed that there were some success reports on the significant
role the CMCs played at both national and district levels in the management of electoral
conflicts. From the findings, respondents in this study indicated with confidence that

57
CMCs were extremely important, relevant and should be maintained. It was also
established from the interviews that CMCs were essential in conflict resolution through
mediation and also, in educating political parties and individuals on the Electoral Code of
Conduct. As mediation took place, the parties to the dispute were reminded and educated
on the Electoral Act. This helped political parties and individuals to know and adhere to
the electoral law. This gesture, in turn, ensured that there was tolerance and co-existence
among different political players in the spirit of togetherness as a unity in diverse. On the
other hand, the findings revealed that the enforcement of the electoral law was really
problematic because of some constitutional challenges. There was, however, pressing
need that CMCs were periodically reviewed and the capacity of the members regularly
built. Overall, there was a call from the findings that these stakeholder committees
needed to be publicised through mass civic education campaigns so that they were owned
and supported by the general public because citizens were both peace and conflict zones.

The findings established that on paper elections in Zambia were classified free and fair
and acceptable by international standards. However, a critical evaluation of what
pertained on the ground brought out several concerns especially with regards to the issues
of voids in institutional structures and legislation that addresses election issues. The
findings brought out several constitutional challenges and to this effect, some
stakeholders have argued that the role of ECZ was not independent because it had no
‘teeth to bite.’ Through mediation, culprits were merely warned without any action that
would deter them and others from committing similar acts or offences.

It was further established from the findings that the move to multi-party system in 2001
had seen a number of political parties forming and this had increased competition among
political players. As a result, no candidate or political party wanted to lose the polls and
so, others (individuals and political parties) were using all the means both legal and
illegal to ascend to power, including violence. It had also been established that the voting
pattern in Zambia was more on tribal lines than ever before and as such, campaigns were
on tribal lines. Those that could not support a particular individual or political party were
seriously victimized. According to Leleruk et al (2007) (in Literature Review Chapter p:
12 – 13), ethnicity and regionalism can lead to radical divisions and continued conflict
58
and instability. Some campaign strategies in Zambia were no longer issue based but on
character assassination. Therefore, these findings showed a lack of understanding of
democracy and lack of Civic Education from some sections of society in Zambia.

This study also found out that the manner in which CMCs were constituted was
essentially basic and largely to the knowledge of many stakeholders. It was also noted
that all registered political parties, CSOs relevant to the electoral process, the local
authority, the Police, ACC and faith based organisations send representatives to sit in
these committees. Therefore, these findings dismissed the allegations that CMCs were
compromised.

5.2 The capacity of the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees

From the findings presented in the assessment of the capacity of CMCs to manage
electoral conflicts, it was established that CMCs were hosted by the ECZ which in itself
was a legal entity established and supported by a statutory instrument No. 52 of 2011 as
well as several Acts of Parliament such as; Cap 13 (The Electoral Act), Cap 14 (The
Referendum Act) and Cap 282 (The Local Government Electoral Act) of the Laws of
Zambia. This study made deduction that CMCs too were therefore a legal entity within
the ECZ. The argument here was that since ECZ was mandated by law to establish these
committees as stipulated in the Electoral Act No. 12 of 2006, they (CMCs) should have
legal mandate. It is also profound to note that the Legal Department of ECZ interpreted
the electoral law to CMCs. This showed that the CMCs had access to legal advice and
services when needed. On the contrary, an important aspect worth noting in this study
was that despite the legal status enjoyed by the CMCs, they did not have powers to
nullify an election, disqualify the candidature of any person and to impose a fine or
imprison. It was in this regard that some stakeholders in this study argued that CMCs had
no legal mandate for the enforcement of the law. It was also right to argue from the
findings that the fact that decisions made by these committees were loosely binding and
largely flouted by political parties, their mandate still had deficiencies and means that
they were not effective enough to manage electoral conflicts.

59
Furthermore, the findings presented in this study revealed that while the ECZ had powers
to constitute these committees, the current way of doing it remains vulnerable to political
manipulation. Allowing political parties to choose whoever they wish to sit in the
committee renders these sittings into merely a political gathering. Consequently, allowing
Town Clerks or Council Secretaries to be District Electoral Officers or Secretaries
rendered their ability inadequate. Therefore, the findings established that there was need
to select individuals with knowledge in political science and conflict resolution to sit in
these committees and not individuals with partisan interests. Fischer (2000) argued that
electoral conflict was complex and could either be planned or spontaneous. Hence, all
those involved in electoral conflict management should improve their ability in
determining an election’s propensity for conflict and violence. This call by Fischer
implied that there was need to set up minimum educational standards for one to be part of
CMC. Essentially, it is theorised that one’s level of education is positively related to
one’s ability to understand and analyse electoral conflict (Kammerud, 2012).

It was further established from the interviews that efficiency, professionalism,

transparency, impartiality and independence were important preconditions to determine
the legitimacy and relevance of CMCs. Where these prerequisites are not operationalized,
Seifu (2012) argues that the risk of political instability and electoral conflicts becomes
high. This study observed that political inclination of the majority of the members of the
CMCs had greatly impacted on the principles of impartiality, independence and
neutrality. It would add value and confidence to enlist a large percentage of non-partisan
individuals as members of CMCs given the significance of the principle of impartiality
and neutrality. As long as cadres flooded these committees, attaining impartiality,
neutrality and independency would remain far-fetched. However, some stakeholders in
this study argued that even if partial members existed on the CMCs, the availability of the
members of Local Authority, CSOs and the security wings neutralized all forms of
interference or compromise.

The findings show that CMCs in Zambia had fairly succeeded in resolving some
conflicts. According to the Conflict Management Report (2011), the district committees
countrywide had resolved a total of three hundred and four (304) complaints while the
60
national committee handled five (5) electoral conflicts but the mere fact that unresolved
conflicts still existed between political parties and CMCs made it unsubstantiated to
argue that they have been very good in the management of electoral conflicts. According
to the Jimmy Carter Foundation (2006):

“… CMCs had unresolved disputes with political parties, and that most conflicts
between political parties needed effective mechanisms to be managed, including
creating a legal mandate for CMCs and providing for necessary enforcement
mechanisms, without addressing the former, it is unlikely that these committees
would be able to effectively manage electoral conflicts …”

From the above observation by the Carter foundation, it can be argued that CMCs in
Zambia mostly lack conflict mapping and monitoring techniques as well as conflict
management skills. There was also a general lack of clear and reliable information on
who has done what, to whom and when in their records. It was important to understand
that when the history of electoral conflicts is established, it helps to identify hotspots that
require high levels of security as a preventive measure. It was also observed that the lack
of confidence in the electoral system seemed to be a recipe for rise of electoral conflicts

It was evident from the interviews conducted in this study that the ECZ staffs were self-
motivated even though the opposite was true with the members of both the national and
district CMCs. While it was understood that CMCs were voluntary institutions, this study
found a close link between lack of incentives for the members of the CMCs and their
dwindling levels of motivation to carry out their mandate. In this case, the respondents in
this study observed that it was prudent that members of the CMCs were motivated if they
were to earnestly discharge their functions and ensure effective management of electoral
conflicts.

The findings revealed that CMCs against a vast district compromised the capacity to
handle electoral conflicts to a greater extent. For instance, Lusaka with over three million
people, thirty-three wards and seven outside constituencies rendered the district
incapacitated. Essentially, this contributed to the frequency and complexity of electoral
disputes as the CMCs were overwhelmed. Therefore, one wondered how effective CMCs
61
would be handling electoral conflicts arising from such a vast district. It was on such
grounds that some stakeholders in this study suggested the need to replicate CMCs at
constituency, ward and branch levels to supplement the works of CMCs at national and
district levels. Such committees would perhaps feed directly into the works of the district
and national CMCs thereby contributing to the effectiveness of these committees.

This study has also established that lack of capacity building workshops and conflict
mapping techniques especially at district level was one of the major challenges facing
CMCs. The inability to quickly arrive to a consensus when handling disputes may be
attributed to the fact that members of these committees did not have the necessary skills
and expertise in conflict mapping, prevention and management. In my view, the quality
of capacity building trainings can go a long way in stumping out critical bottlenecks these
committees encounter. Well trained members of CMCs were more likely to have their
levels of impartiality and independence enhanced. This in turn reduced the extent of
political influence on CMCs and ensures effective management of electoral conflicts.

Another factor that featured most prominent in the findings on the challenges the CMCs
faced in Lusaka to carry out their mandate was the slow pace at which justice was
delivered in the judicial system. Respondents in this study observed that justice delayed
was justice denied. As a result of this situation, the findings in this study had revealed
that there have been instances where some constituencies had no representation in
parliament for a longer time because electoral disputes taken to court for litigation took
too long to be concluded. For instance, Petauke Central Constituency among others had
no representation for more than a year. Therefore, the study established that there was
need for a robust system that would help speed up the rate at which courts handled
election related cases otherwise the process became merely an academic exercise. The
findings suggested the introduction of electoral fast track courts to ensure speedy justice
because the courts would convene immediately a case was reported and brought to an end
situations where culprits even sit in parliament up to the end of their term of office
without their cases being concluded.

62
The findings revealed that CMCs in Lusaka were faced with serious challenges of
resource mobilization to enable them carry out awareness and sensitization campaigns on
the electoral code of conduct. It was discovered in this study that there was no alternative
mechanism for generating own income and that there was little identification and
networking with advocacy actors to address identified policy issues. Furthermore, it was
discovered that these committees had not taken serious community-based advocacy
programmes so as to campaign against electoral conflict. On the other hand, CMCs were
not well publicized. The findings called for appropriate use of avenues such as drama,
music, radio and TV for publicity and peace building.

It was also clear from the findings that the CMCs in Zambia were not able to read the
tone or mood of individuals or groups that would incite electoral violence. This was
because CMCs were limited to the settlement of electoral disputes rather than ensuring
that the electorates and politicians conducted themselves according to the electoral laws
before, during and after elections. It was important that CMCs were able to make
systematic reviews of early warning signs so that the likelihood of an election turning
violent could be ascertained and subsequently, putting preventive measures in place
ahead of time (see Hansen et al (2004 in Literature Review Chapter p. 23 - 24).
Furthermore, the findings established that the committees were only mandated to handle
inter-party electoral disputes and not intra-party conflicts. This was seen as an oversight
in the sense that intra-party conflicts too had the potential to disrupt the general conduct
of elections and hence, cause electoral conflicts.

From the findings, the study has also established that since the inception of Multi- Party
system in Zambia, electoral violence was on the increase and the ECZ seemed to
appreciate the fact that electoral conflicts had several causes that were largely structural
and contextual. In this regard, the respondent suggested that CMCs should work closely
with other stakeholders especially political parties to address some underlying causes of
electoral conflict. In line with this argument, the findings further suggested that CMCs
should be permanent unlike the current situation where these committees were only
reconvened when there was an electoral dispute.

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5.2.1 Perceived factors accounting for the rise in electoral violence in Lusaka

Having assessed the capacity of CMCs to manage electoral violence, the findings further
established other factors which needed to be addressed by political parties and legislators
if the fight against electoral conflicts in Lusaka District was to become a reality and
effective. These factors were: lack of tolerance and co-existence among politicians or
those who have diverse views, revisit the perceived weak governance structures, cadre
management, perceived weak media reforms and fight structural causes of the vice such
as unemployment and poverty.

1. Cadre Management

From the findings, some respondents observed that some political parties were now using
party cadres as tools to fix political opponents using violence and that political cadres had
become more powerful than even civil servants to the extent that they could even lock
civil servant’s offices. Therefore, the study established that there was need for
sensitization and leadership within political parties because the behaviour of some cadres
left much to be desired and needed to be termed. To this effect, this study strongly noted
that democracy should grow and not thinking of serving one’s cadres.

2. Application of the Public Order Act (POA)

This study has also established that the Police selective application of legal instruments
such as the Public Order Act (PAO) remained a source of concern for many stakeholders
especially during the election period. It was for this reason that one respondent observed
that:

“Zambia is a multi-party system but has a one party mentality in the sense that
opposing views were not tolerated”

The selective application of the POA as alleged in this study denied those with opposing
views the freedom of expression and assembly. Also, the citizens were denied access to
information so as to make informed decisions. Although access to information in itself
did not constitute public participation, it was nevertheless a process to achieve citizen
64
participation in public affairs. Enlightening of citizens comes in the form of access to
information. Access to information ensures that all individuals had enough relevant
information in order to understand problems, alternatives and potential solutions.
However, if individuals did not have access to information, it becomes difficult to render
informed opinions and make decisions which affect their lives positively. They will lack
the skills and abilities to influence decisions that affect their lives. Additionally, the
information accessed by citizens should be timely and must be given in common and
appropriate languages that people are accustomed to. Capacity building through civic
education becomes a requirement as well as strategy for effective participation in public
affairs. Lack of informed decisions precipitated electoral violence to a larger extent.

3. Lack of Toleration and Co-existence among Political Parties

From the findings presented on this matter, the conclusion is that the current crop of some
politicians were not able to co-exist and tolerate one another and in turn, this was leading
to the rise in electoral conflicts. This was attributed to the limitation in Civic Education.
Some respondents argued that problems of society affect everyone and Civic Education
should be seen as one of the vices that tried to solve some of the problems of society.
Therefore, there was need for all the citizens to have the knowledge of government and
government structures, and the process that embrace elements of identity, patriotism,
cultural diversity and political literacy. To contribute fully in the affairs of government,
the respondents observed that citizens need to know their rights and duties. Just as one
respondent observed:

“Today, in Zambia, electorates were generally intolerant to divergent views and

as such, were not able to co-exist”

This entails a general lack of understanding of democracy. This intolerance of divergent

views and the lack of will for political co-existence was fueling electoral violence. The-
son-of-the-land syndrome was now more prominent among some politicians and was
dividing the nation. We have also heard of no go areas for some politicians which is

65
indeed sad for the development of democracy in Zambia and a draw back in the fight
against electoral violence.

4. Weak Media Reforms

From the findings, it was clear that the media in Zambia today was a source of concern in
as far as sparking electoral violence was concerned. It has been observed from the
findings that instead of the media doing its role of informing, educating and entertaining,
the media (both public and private) had taken partisan and politics. As noted in the
findings, the reporting was biased and aimed at championing selfish motives aimed at
disadvantaging political opponents. The public media is being used for government
propaganda. They argued that there was no objectivity in the reporting. The media in
Zambia seemed to be abandoning the noble objective of 'serving the people' for the
selfish cause of 'serving self. This showed that the media in Zambia was facing serious
challenges in as far as media ethics were concerned. The media can spark electoral
violence if the reporting was not objective and biased media coverage can heighten
tensions which could lead to conflict. We can conclude from the findings that there was
need for media reforms to make the media more effective and ensure that there was no
political interference. In line with this argument, Kasoma (1995) observed that:

African journalism is a part, is fast becoming an end in itself. Driven by selfish

motives of profit maximisation or political expediency, the African press has
increasingly become the accuser, the jury and the judge all rolled up in one as it
pounces on one victim after another in the name of press freedom and democracy.

5. Structural Causes

This study has further revealed that structural causes such as unemployment and poverty
were among the major contributors to electoral violence. As a result of massive job losses
in Zambia especially in the mining industry, most of the unemployed populace especially
the youths were desperate to have ties with political parties for financial gain. Apart from
the financial gain, these youths also acted as ready suppliers of violence. As a result
political parties were using this desperate situation to fuel violence. The study also

66
established that the many bye-elections Zambia had witnessed in the recent past
contributed to electoral conflicts in the sense that there was stiffer competition in a bye-
election than in a general election. They observed that all the machinery and resources
were piled up in one place and in such a situation anything could happen, as a result some
people took advantage of the situation to make money out of it at the expense of the
peace of the nation.

5.3 Strategies for improving the performance of CMCs

From the findings presented in the previous section, it was clear that the CMCs had
serious challenges in the management of electoral conflicts. Therefore, it was necessary
to come up with strategies that would improve the performance of CMCs to be more
effective. The following were the strategies:

1. Strengthening the Legal Framework

It was established from the findings that if CMCs were to be more effective in the
management of electoral conflicts, there was need to strengthen the legal framework of
their (CMCs) mandate. The strengthening of the legal framework would make sure that
these committees had powers to prosecute ailing candidates and that the decisions made
during mediation were legally binding. This measure would also ensure that the would-be
offenders were deterred from engaging themselves into any activities that would lead to
electoral violence. Essentially, this measure would improve the performance of CMCs
and ensure that cases of electoral conflicts and violence were reduced and consequently,
brought to an end.

2. Introduction of Electoral Fast Track Courts

The findings further revealed that there were uncertainties regarding the pace at which
electoral cases referred to courts for litigation were disposed. The unclear picture over
electoral dispute resolutions indicated ineffectiveness of CMCs. It was for this reason that
the study established that there was need for the introduction of electoral fast track courts
to resolve electoral disputes expeditiously instead of taking those (electoral disputes) to
the judicial courts where these cases might take long to be concluded. This measure

67
would strengthen the capacity of CMCs to resolve electoral cases expeditiously when still
fresh and hence, effectively managing electoral disputes.

3. Increasing Access to CMCs

Organization in the management of electoral conflicts was a pre-requisite for any success
in their operations. In the quest to effectively manage electoral conflicts, the findings of
this study were that there was need to increase access to CMCs. This measure came out
because of the current operations of the CMCs. The argument here was that these
committees were mostly not accessible to the general public because they were only
reconvened when there was an electoral dispute to mediate on. It was further argued in
this study that if these committees were to be permanent or mobile in all the districts,
then they would be in a better position to stop any electoral dispute from turning violent.
This strategy would ensure a focus on violence around the electoral cycle. This has an
advantage of CMCs being better positioned to identify all instances of electoral conflicts
and violence (see Alston, 2012 in Literature Review Chapter p. 22) and hence, effectively
managing electoral conflicts.

4. Increasing Educational Awareness Activities

From the findings, it was established that education was the single most important policy
lever for any government to increase social cohesion. These findings call for the need to
have an enlightened citizenry. To have such citizenry requires massive and appropriate
Civic Education that would fully involve the citizens in governance issues through active
participation. There was a general call from the findings that all the electoral stakeholders
should partner with the CMCs to carry out massive sensitization programmes to educate
the electorates on the importance of holding a peaceful election and the dangers electoral
conflict to development. It was further argued in this study that if citizens were
enlightened, they would be able to critically analyse governance matters and to a larger
extent, avoid engaging themselves into activities that were not democratic such as
electoral violence. If this strategy was fully supported and implemented, it would ensure
effective management of electoral conflicts by CMCs.

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Essentially, the Frustration-Aggression theory used in this study to evaluate the
management of electoral conflicts in Zambia was appropriate and clearly supports the
findings of this study. In this study, it has emerged that electoral conflicts are propagated
by cadres who were frustrated because they felt their efforts to win an election were
blocked. This frustration has resulted into anger and tension, and in turn generated
aggressive behaviour leading to electoral violence. The fact that mechanisms to handle
aggressive behaviour in Zambia through the CMCs seem not to be adequate enough,
electoral conflicts have become the order of the day and are on an increase. Furthermore,
without addressing the underlying causes of electoral conflicts, it would be very difficult
to manage the phenomenon.

Summary

This chapter presented a discussion of the findings of the study by addressing each
research objective. The chapter started by discussing how the Lusaka Conflict
Management Committees managed electoral conflicts. It further evaluated the capacity of
the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees in the management of electoral conflicts.
The last section discussed the strategies of improving the performance of CMCs in the
management of electoral conflicts.The next chapter presents the overall conclusion of the
study. It further provides recommendations and suggestions for further research based the
findings of this research.

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 CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview

This chapter presents the overall conclusion of the findings. The aim of this study was to
evaluate the effectiveness of the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia. The
chapter ends with recommendations and implications for further research.

6.1 Conclusions

This study has shed light on the management of electoral conflicts in Zambia and has
revealed that electoral conflicts had the potential to become chaotic thereby undermining
the integrity and credibility of the electoral process. The following were the three
objectives set in Chapter One that anchored this study; to determine how the Lusaka
Conflict Management Committees manage electoral conflicts; to assess the capacity of
the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees in the management of electoral conflicts;
and to establish strategies of improving the performance of CMCs in the management of
electoral conflicts.

The interviews conducted in this study revealed that CMCs were mandated to resolve and
manage electoral conflicts in a prudent and timely manner. The strategy used by CMCs to
resolve and manage electoral conflicts in Zambia was mediation. However, the findings
had also revealed that such a strategy was not punitive enough to punish the perpetrators
of the vice. Furthermore, the findings dismiss the assertion that CMCs were compromised
owing to the fact that the composition of these committees was a representative of
different stakeholders.

This study established that CMCs in Zambia were desirable but not comprehensive. They
lacked the capacity to effectively carry out their mandate because of limitations mainly
bordering on the legal instruments to effectively resolve and manage electoral conflicts.
From the findings, the greater challenges affecting their operations mainly included lack
of a legal framework, slow pace at which justice is delivered in court, vastness of
70
districts, limited resources to carry out educational campaigns, lack of capacity building
activities and lack of incentives from ECZ and other electoral stakeholders. Also, early
phase or warning signs of electoral conflicts tend to be less recognised by the CMCs.
However, there were other legislative lapses that were mentioned in the interviews which
hampered the effective management of electoral conflicts in Zambia such as; weak media
reforms, selective application of the Public Order Act, Cadre management, lack of
tolerance and co-existence among some politicians and some structural cause such as
unemployment and poverty.

The interviews conducted in this study further revealed that CMCs were facing serious
challenges and needed effective strategies to improve the performance of these
committees if they were to be effective in the management of electoral conflicts. To this
effect, the responses from the interviews identified the following strategies which were
necessary to improving the performance of CMCs; introduction of fast track courts deal
with elector disputes expeditiously, increase educational awareness activities, increase
access to CMCs and to strengthen the legal framework for its mandate.

6.2 Recommendations

On the basis of the findings of this study, recommendations were suggested to the
Electoral Commission of Zambia;

(1) Since the study established that electoral violence was on an increase, laws and
policies that relate to the electoral code of conduct should be explicit and easily
accessible to all members of the public by publishing them in local language.

(2) The fact that this study revealed that some respondents did not agree with the
mediation as the strategy to resolve electoral conflicts, the ECZ should make wider
consultations on the best way to manage electoral conflicts and that competent in-
house capacity building activities must regular and of high quality to ensure effective
management of electoral conflicts.

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(3) Since the study has revealed that early warning signs of electoral violence breaking
out tend to be less detected, the ECZ should invest in development and re-adapting of
conflict mapping and reporting tools such as EVER and EVRA to make CMCs more
effective.

(4) The fact that the study has established that CMCs do not have the powers to
persecute the perpetrators of electoral conflicts, a legal mandate to the functions of
the CMCs was necessary for effective management of electoral conflicts.

(5) Since the findings revealed that in certain instances CMCs were overwhelmed with
work because of vastness of certain districts, therefore, the ECZ should replicate
CMCs at constituency, ward and branch levels to supplement the works of CMCs at
national and district levels to effectively manage electoral conflicts.

(6) Since the study has revealed that in most instances electoral disputes referred for
litigation took long to be concluded, therefore, the Electoral Fast Track Courts
should be established so as to deal with electoral disputes expedite electoral dispute
resolutions and ensure effective management of electoral conflicts.

6.3 Suggestion for Future Research

Since this study focused primarily on evaluating the effectiveness of the management of
electoral conflicts in Lusaka CMCs;

1. There is need in future to assess the measures individual political parties have put
in place to address electoral violence. It is the researcher’s view that such a study
would add to numerous efforts aimed at managing electoral conflicts in Zambia.
2. A study is also inevitable to investigate the extent of intra-party conflict and the
propensity for such conflict turning violent and consequently, disrupting national
peace.

72
Summary

This chapter has presented the conclusion of the study based on the three objectives set
out in Chapter One. Recommendations have also been directed to ECZ as the main
stakeholder involved in the management of electoral conflicts. The recommendations
have been coined from what the study has established. The chapter has finally presented a
suggestion for future research.

73
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 APPENDIX 1: CONSENT FORM
TITLE OF RESEARCH: AN EVALUATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF
ELECTORAL CONFLICTS IN ZAMBIA. A CASE STUDY OF LUSAKA CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES.
This consent form serves to give you an understanding of the purpose of this research and
subsequently the procedure to be followed when undertaking it. Further implications for
your participation are explained. Make sure you read the information sheet carefully, or
that it has been explained to you to your satisfaction.
1. Description
This study is purely an academic education research. The researcher is a University of
Zambia student pursuing a Master of Education in Civic Education. This research is a
major requirement to complete this programme.
2. Purpose
The researcher wishes to evaluate the management of Electoral Conflicts in Zambia.
3. Consent
Participation in this exercise is voluntary, i.e. you do not need to participate if you do not
want.
4. Confidentiality
All the data collected from this research will be treated with high confidentiality.
Participants are assured of anonymity in this research.
5. Rights of Respondents
The rights of the respondents will be protected and respected. Participants are assured
that they shall suffer no harm as a result of participating in this exercise. Participants are
free to ask for clarification at any point of the exercise and to inform the researcher if
they feel uncomfortable about any procedure in the research.

DECLARATION OF CONSENT
I have read through the participant information sheet. I now consent voluntarily to be a
participant in this project.

Participant’s Name… ……………………………………………………………

Signature: …………………………………… Date …………………………….

I
 APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE

AN EVALUATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF ELECTORAL CONFLICTS IN

ZAMBIA. A CASE STUDY OF LUSAKA CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEES.

SECTION A.
Demographic data
1. Name of Organisation Represented: ……………………………………………….
2. Position Held: ………………………………………………………………………
3. Level of Education Attained: ……………………………………………………..

SECTION B
Interview Questions
1. What is your understanding of the role and mandate of Conflict Management Committees
in the electoral process?
2. Could you share your experience in terms of electoral conflicts and violence in Zambia
from 2001 to date?
3. How are the Lusaka Conflict Management Committees managimg electoral conflicts?
4. What can we attribute the alleged compromise of Conflict Management Committees in
Zambia to?
5. Comment as to whether the current mechanisms of CMCs are legally and capable of
managing electoral conflicts.
6. What factors are capable to contributing to the capacity of CMCs in the management of
electoral conflicts?
7. What factors account for the continued rise in the frequency and intensity of electoral
conflict in Zambia even after the formation of CMCs?
8. What strategies can improve the performances of CMCs in the management of electoral
conflicts?
Thank you very much for your participation. May God Bless You

II
APPENDIX 3: PERMISSION LETTER FROM UNZA

III