Judicial Interpretation
Judicial Interpretation
As mentioned earlier, the Administrative Tribunals Act was passed in 1985 under article
323A and section 28 of this Act provided for the exclusion of jurisdiction of all courts except
that of the SupremeCourt under Article 136. 1 This fuelled a sudden spurt in the number of
cases that challenged the validity of the said legislation as well as that of the 42 nd Amendment
that introduced Articles 323A and 323B in to the constitution. Some of the prominent case in
this regard is discussed below.
S.P.Sampath Kumar v. Union of India2- This is the first and perhaps the most important
case in this period that attracted judicial scrutiny in this area. The Constitution Bench
in Sampath kumar was called upon to decide on the main issue whether Section 28 of the Act
was unconstitutional as it excludes judicial review, which was contended as part of the basic
structure of the constitution3. The Supreme Court accepted without doubt that judicial; review
is part of the basic structure. However, the Court went on to observe that the creation of
alternate institutional mechanisms which were as effective as the High Courts would not be
violative of the basic structure. The administrative Tribunals under the Act were recognized
as effective substitutes of the High Courts. This proved to be a shot in the arm of the
proponents of tribunalisation. However the Apex Court came down heavily on the procedure
for appointing the Chairman of the Tribunal. Section 6(1) (c) of the Act allowed a person
who held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or an equivalent post become the
Chairman, this provision was held to be unconstitutional as it allowed bureaucrats to hold
Judicial positions. The Chairman should be a retiring or retired Chief Justice of a High Court
Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh4- It was held in this case that Article 371 D(5) of
the constitution, which was inserted by the Constitution (32 nd Amendment) Act,1973, was
unconstitutional and void. This provision had enabled the Government of Andhra Pradesh to
modify or nullify any order of the Administrative tribunal of that state. It was pointed out that
such a provision was violative of the basic structure as it made the tribunal not as effective as
the High Court when it comes to judicial review. Here the Court seems to be strictly adhering
1
Joshi, K. C., Legal Status of Tribunals, IBR, Vol. 25 (2), 1998
2
AIR 1987 SC 386.
3
During the pendency of the case, the Government gave an assurance to the Court that the Act would be
amended so that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 was not excluded. The Act was
consequently amended after the decision.
4
(1987) I SCC 386.
to the directive in Sampath Kumar’s case that the administrative tribunals should be effective
substitutes to the High Court.
J.B.Chopra v. Union of India5-It was held that since the Administrative tribunals are meant
to be substitutes of High Courts, their power of judicial review extended to power as to
decide on the constitutionality of service rules.
However, soon we see a reversal of trend leading to a lot of confusion.
In M.B.Majumdar v. Union of India,6 the Supreme Court refused to extend the service
conditions and other benefits enjoyed by ordinary High Court judges to the members of these
Tribunals. Three years later, in R.K.Jain v. Union of India7, the Supreme Court opined that
these Tribunals could not be effective substitutes of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227.
We also find very clear expression of dissatisfaction of the apex court regarding the
functioning and effectiveness of Administrative Tribunals especially with regard to their
power of judicial review.
Sakinala Harinath v. State of Andhra Pradesh8- In this case, the Andhra Pradesh High
Court dropped a bomb shell by expressing serious doubts about the wisdom of the learned
Judges in Sampath Kumar’s case. The Full Bench ruled that the ruling in the above case
equating Administrative Tribunals to the High Courts with respect to their jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 was inconsistent with the apex court’s ruling in cases like Kesavanda
Bharati v. State of Kerala9 and Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain10. It was pointed out that the
constitutional courts could only exercise the power of judicial review. Since the logic of
alternative institutional mechanism propounded in Sampath Kumar’s case does not fit in to
this scheme, it is constitutionally impermissible. As a result both Articles 323A(d) and
section 28 of the Act were struck down as unconstitutional.
The judicial green signal given for tribunalisation in Sampath Kumar can be seen to be
slowly fading because of the subsequent decisions. The confusion created by these
conflicting decisions ushered in the need for taking a second look at S.P. Sampath
Kumar’s case. This opportunity arrived when a three judge bench of the Supreme Court in L.
Chandrakumar v. Union of India11 decided to refer the matter to a larger bench. This
5
(1987) I SCC 422
6
(1990) 4 SCC 501.
7
(1993) 4 SCC 119
8
1993 (2) An. W.R.484 (FB).
9
(1973) 4 SCC 225
10
AIR 1975 SC 2291
11
AIR 1995 SC 1151
eventually led to the famous ruling of the Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court on L.
Chandrakumar v. Union of India12, which is now the law of the land.
12
AIR 1997 SC 1125