Report No.

2024-20

A Performance Audit of

Utah’s Election
System
Strengthening Election Integrity

Office of the Legislative

Auditor General
Report to the UTAH LEGISLATURE
Audit Subcommittee
President J. Stuart Adams, Co-Chair Speaker Mike Schultz, Co-Chair
President of the Senate Speaker of the House

Senator Evan J. Vickers Representative Jefferson Moss

Senate Majority Leader House Majority Leader

Senator Luz Escamilla Representative Angela Romero

Senate Minority Leader House Minority Leader

Audit Staff
Kade R. Minchey, Auditor General, CIA,
CFE

Jesse Martinson, Manager, CIA

Jake Dinsdale, Audit Supervisor, CIA

Morgan Hagey, Audit Staff

Clint Yingling, Audit Staff

Office of the Legislative Auditor General

 Office of the Legislative
Auditor General
Kade R. Minchey, Legislative Auditor General

W315 House Building State Capitol Complex | Salt Lake City, UT 84114 | Phone: 801.538.1033

Audit Subcommittee of the Legislative Management Committee

President J. Stuart Adams, Co-Chair | Speaker Mike Schultz, Co-Chair
Senator Evan J. Vickers | Representative Jefferson Moss
Senator Luz Escamilla | Representative Angela Romero

December 9, 2024

TO: THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Transmitted herewith is our report:

“A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System” [Report #2024-20].

An audit summary is found at the front of the report. The scope and objectives of the audit
are included in the audit summary. In addition, each chapter has a corresponding chapter
summary found at its beginning.

Utah Code 13-12-15.3(2) requires the Office of the Legislative Auditor General to designate
an audited entity’s chief executive officer (CEO). Therefore, the designated CEO for the
Office of the Lieutenant Governor is Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson. Deidre
Henderson has been notified that she must comply with the audit response and reporting
requirements as outlined in this section of Utah Code.

We will be happy to meet with appropriate legislative committees, individual legislators,

and other state officials to discuss any item contained in the report in order to facilitate the
implementation of the recommendations.

Sincerely,

Kade R. Minchey, CIA, CFE

Auditor General

kminchey@le.utah.gov
Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1 Post-Election Audits Must be Better Executed to Support Utah’s Election
Integrity ..................................................................................................................5
1.1 Several County Clerks Neglected Core Ballot Audit Tests in Their Post-Election Audits ..... 5
1.2 Election Equipment Can Limit Clerks’ Ability to Identify Audited Ballots ........................... 9
1.3 Several County Clerks Did Not Comply with Requirements
Related to Individuals Acting as Post-Election Auditors ............................................................ 9
1.4 There Is a Lack of Clarity and Compliance Around How Clerks
Must Attest to the Results of Their Post-Election Audits .......................................................... 13
Chapter 2 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor Can Improve Its Oversight of
Utah’s Voter Rolls ................................................................................................. 17
2.1 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor Has Not Ensured Deceased Voters Are Removed
from Voter Rolls .........................................................................................................................18
2.2 The LG’s Office Can Better Utilize New Staff to Monitor and Analyze Voter Records ....... 20
2.3 Additional Analysis of the Voter Rolls Is Needed .............................................................. 25
Chapter 3 Improvements in Tracking, Control, and Accounting of Ballots Can
Improve Confidence in Election Integrity ............................................................ 29
3.1 Some Counties Do Not Organize Ballots into Batches Immediately, Which Increases the
Chance of Misprocessing Ballots............................................................................................... 30
3.2 Insufficient Camera Monitoring in a Quarter of Counties Poses Risk to Ballot Processing
Security....................................................................................................................................... 31
3.3 Some Counties Did Not Properly Reconcile Ballot Custody Records in the June 2024
Primary Election ....................................................................................................................... 35
3.4 Counties Should Document Ballot Intake To Control and Account for Incoming Ballots 36
Chapter 4 There Are Still Opportunities for Additional Improvement of Certain
Elections Systems and Practices ........................................................................... 41
4.1 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor Could Clarify Administrative Rule for Clearer
Signature Verification Training Standards ................................................................................ 41
4.2 Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program was Not Implemented ................................................ 44
Complete List of Audit Recommendations ............................................................ 47
Appendix A Status of All Recommendations From A Performance Audit of
Utah's Election System and Controls ................................................................... 57
Status of All Recommendations from A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System and
Controls (2022-17) .................................................................................................................... 58
Agency Response Plan .......................................................................................... 71
 AUDIT SUMMARY
REPORT 2024-20 | DECEMBER 2024

Office of the Legislative Auditor General | Kade R. Minchey, Auditor General

PERFORMANCE UTAH’S ELECTION SYSTEM

AUDIT
KEY FINDINGS
AUDIT REQUEST
In 2023, the Legislature passed 1.1 Several county clerks neglected core ballot audit tests in their post-
election audits.
House Bill 269 which requires
the Office of the Legislative 1.2 Election equipment can limit clerks’ ability to identify audited
Auditor General to audit the ballots.
state’s election system and
2.1 The LG’s Office has not ensured deceased voters are removed from
controls every two years. voter rolls.
Although this report primarily
focused on the June Primary 2.2 The LG’s Office can better use new staff to monitor and analyze
voter records.
Election, observing election
processes in 20 out of 29 3.1 County clerks could improve their chain of custody processes by
counties, we also had auditors batching ballots immediately.
in every county during the 4.1 The LG’s Office should establish standards for signature verification
2024 November General and study potential improvements to signature quality.
Election.

RECOMMENDATIONS
BACKGROUND
1.1 As election officials, Utah’s county clerks should learn and
In 2022, our office released A
execute all post-election audit process requirements and
Performance Audit of Utah’s
procedures.
Election System and Controls RECOMMENDATION:
DTS should
1.2 As required by statute, the director ensure it within
of elections strives tothe
reach the
which led to 22 performance metrics for critical incidents
recommendations to the Office of the Lieutenant Governorthat
should create
heavily impact agencies’ business.
Legislature and to the administrative rules to establish requirements and procedures
Lieutenant Governor’s office for post-election audits.
(LG’s Office) for process
2.1 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should compare the
improvements. This audit
records of deceased individuals from the Office of Vital
includes a follow-up on
Records and Statistics to the state’s official voter list—at least
recommendations from that
90 days prior to each primary and general election—to ensure
report and an expanded
deceased voters have been removed from the voter list.
review of the LG’s oversight
responsibilities and county 3.2 Any counties in which all ballot processing areas are not
clerks’ processes and controls. adequately monitored as required in statute should apply for
federal election grant funding to purchase the equipment
needed to comply with statute.

Summary continues on back >>

 AUDIT SUMMARY
CONTINUED

REPORT
SUMMARY
Several Clerks Neglected Core Ballot The Office of the Lieutenant
Audit Tests in Their Post-Election Governor Can Improve Its Oversight
Audit of Utah’s Voter Rolls
We observed post-election audits in all 29 In our analysis of the voter registration
county clerks’ offices over the course of three database, we identified over 1,400 deceased
different elections and found that the clerks voters that should have been removed from the
varied widely in the faithful executive of post- voter registration system. At the time of our
election audit procedures. In several cases, we review, nearly 700 of those voters active and
observed that clerks did not audit ballot details would have received a ballot. We checked all
that are critical to the correct function and matches for voting activity and found that two
reliability of Utah’s post-election audit process. of the matched voters cast ballots in the
November 2023 election.
As of writing this report, the LG’s Office
significantly changed the intent and procedures
of Utah’s post-election audit process for the
2024 November General Election to include a
hand count of ballots compared to the election
results.

The LG’s Office has not Utilized New Staff to Monitor and Analyze Voter Records
In 2023, the Legislature appropriated funding to the LG’s Office to hire a data analyst to more regularly review
voter records. This position appears to have never fulfilled that purpose, which we believe contributed directly
to the problems with deceased voters detailed already. In addition to the problems with deceased voters, we
found other problems with voter records and instances where three individuals likely voted twice in a single
election.
R M E
P L M
U C A c

P T
E

L O ISTA C C
O
ISTA

U State voter
registration
system
 Introduction
In 2022, our office released A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and
Controls.1 It contained twenty-two recommendations, including
recommendations to the Legislature to consider clarifying the Lieutenant
Governor’s role in various elections processes. The audit also had several
recommendations for the Office of the Lieutenant Governor (LG’s Office),
including standardizing the use of voter maintenance tools and creating rules for
clerks to reconcile key ballot statistics.
All Stakeholders Have Worked to Strengthen
Utah’s Election System and Controls
Since our 2022
Since our 2022 report was released, the Legislature drafted report was
and passed multiple significant bills in response to our released, the
recommendations. These changes to statute have further Legislature has
passed multiple
strengthened Utah’s elections in clear and tangible ways. This significant bills in
report seeks to highlight and provide more information about response to our
some of these changes. recommendations.

In addition to the Legislature’s work, the LG’s Office has worked to improve
election processes, both in response to our audit work and in response to new
challenges and opportunities. The LG’s Office has created clearer guidelines,
standards, and training materials. The LG’s Office has also exercised its new
oversight powers to correct some counties who have fallen short of the excellence
citizens expect of our election processes. In turn, most clerks have adapted their
election processes to comply with new requirements.

For our part, our audit team has spent significant time examining and testing key
election operations in clerks’ offices across the state. For example, our office had
at least one auditor in every county on election day in November 2024. We have
also conducted audit work for this report during the November 2023, March
2024, and June 2024 elections. During these extensive observations and tests, we
found clerks striving to run timely and accurate elections. Although there are
opportunities for improvement, which are detailed throughout this report, we
have seen improvement in multiple counties and on multiple fronts. While we
did not find significant fraud in Utah’s election system, the recommendations
and findings in this report are needed to ensure continued election integrity.

1A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and Controls (Report 2022-17). Office of the
Legislative Auditor General.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 1

 This Report Is a Combination of New Audit Work and
Follow-Up Work on Our 2022 Recommendations
In the 2023 General Legislative Session, the
Our audit team has Legislature passed House Bill 269 granting authority
assessed various
elements of Utah’s to our office to conduct election-focused audits in
election system every even numbered year. With the additional
and controls authorization of the Legislative Audit Subcommittee,
during our state’s
2024 elections. our audit team has assessed various elements of
Utah’s system and controls during our state’s 2024
elections. We also worked to follow up on the recommendations from the 2022
audit report to ensure that changes to Utah’s election system have been effective.

This 2024 report contains four chapters and an appendix. The first three chapters
contain our findings and recommendations related to current challenges in our
election system as identified during 2024 audit work. Chapter 4 delves deeper
into opportunities for further
improvement related to the
2022 recommendations.
Appendix A provides an
update on the implementation
status of all twenty-two
recommendations from 2022,
a summary of which is shown
in the bar chart here.

We are confident that moving forward, the continued efforts of the Legislature,
the LG’s Office, county officials, and election employees will ensure that Utah’s
elections continue to improve and to be secure.

2 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 CHAPTER 1 Summary
Post-Election Audits Must be Better
Executed to Support Utah’s Election Integrity

BACKGROUND
We observed post-election audits in all 29 county clerks’ offices over the course of three different elections.
The clerks varied widely in the faithful execution of post-election audit procedures. In several cases, we
observed that clerks did not audit ballot details that are critical to the correct function and reliability of
Utah’s post-election audit process. If these audits are done incorrectly, election officials and citizens cannot
rely on their conclusions.

RECOMMENDATION 1.1
FINDING 1.1 As election officials, Utah’s county clerks should learn and execute
Several County Clerks all post-election audit process requirements and procedures.
Neglected Core Ballot Audit
Tests in Their Post-Election RECOMMENDATION 1.2
Audits As required by statute, the director of elections within the Office of
the Lieutenant Governor should create Administrative Rules to
establish requirements and procedures for post-election audits.

RECOMMENDATION 1.3
FINDING 1.2
When the Office of the Lieutenant Governor creates Administrative
Election Equipment Can Limit
Rules for post-election audits, the requirements and procedures
Clerks’ Ability to Identify
should clearly account for the equipment limitations in smaller
Audited Ballots
counties.

3
 RECOMMENDATION 1.4
In the Administrative Rule governing post-election audits, the
FINDING 1.3 director of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant
Several County Clerks Did Not Governor should clarify the swearing-in requirement and
Comply with Requirements procedure.
Related to Individuals Acting
RECOMMENDATION 1.5
as Post-Election Auditors
County clerks should ensure that individuals from outside
their offices participate in post-election audits as required in
statute and other applicable standards.

FINDING 1.4
RECOMMENDATION 1.6
There Is a Lack of Clarity and
In the Administrative Rule governing post-election audits, the
Compliance Around How
director of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant Governor
Clerks Must Attest to the
should create clearer requirements for how clerks should attest to
Results of Their Post-Election
post-election audits.
Audits

CONCLUSION

In response to software problems during the June 2024 primary election, the Office of the Lieutenant
Governor (LG’s Office) significantly changed the intent and procedures for Utah’s post-election audits for
the November 2024 election. Although our review focused on the post-election audit methods that were in
place prior to November 2024, the deficiencies noted in this chapter should spur clerks to more faithfully
execute their duties. In turn, the LG’s Office—in its oversight and enforcement role—should help ensure
that clerks are auditing elections correctly.

4
 Chapter 1
Post-Election Audits Must be Better
Executed to Support Utah’s Election Integrity
We observed post-election audits in all 29 county clerks’ offices over the course
of three different elections. The clerks varied widely in the faithful execution of
post-election audit procedures. In several cases, we observed that clerks did not
audit ballot details that are critical to the correct function and reliability of Utah’s
post-election audit process. If these audits are not done correctly, election
officials and citizens cannot rely on their conclusions.

In response to software problems during the June 2024 primary election, the
Office of the Lieutenant Governor (LG’s Office) significantly changed the intent
and procedures for Utah’s post-election audits for the
Although our audit November 2024 election. Although our review
focused on post- focused on the audit methods that were in place prior
election audit to November 2024, the deficiencies noted in this
methods in place
before the chapter should spur clerks to more faithfully
November 2024 understand and execute their important election audit
election, our
duties. In addition, the LG’s Office should better
findings should
still inform the fulfill their oversight role by creating Administrative
new audit process. Rules for enforcing and training on audit
requirements.

1.1 Several County Clerks Neglected Core Ballot Audit Tests

in Their Post-Election Audits
The stated purpose of Utah’s former post-election ballot audit was “to ensure
that the scanners have accurately counted the ballots.” This was done by
comparing three key pieces of ballot information as shown here.2

2Current guidance and requirements for post-election audits should be in Administrative Rule but
are currently found in the Utah Elections Handbook from the Office of the Lieutenant Governor.
This is discussed later in this chapter.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 5

 Utah s former post election allot audit as designed
to sho that these three elements match

aper allot Scanned allot Image Indi idual

Cast ote ecord

The most important post-election audit test in the prior audit method was to
ensure that the paper ballots and their associated individual cast vote records
(individual CVR) match perfectly. Paper ballots are the authoritative record of
each voter’s choices, directly filled out by the voters
themselves. The individual CVR is the digital record showing Election audit
how election equipment interpreted ballot markings and conclusions are
only reliable if
recorded each voter’s choices when their ballot was scanned. clerks follow the
The aggregated CVR data is used for official results proper audit
tabulation. requirements.

A post-election audit that demonstrates that paper ballots and individual CVR
data match perfectly provides assurance that election equipment functioned
properly and votes were recorded and counted correctly.3 This is especially true
when post-election audits are considered together with the results of the
statutorily required pre-election logic and accuracy (L&A) testing. It is therefore
concerning that across all 29 of Utah’s counties, we found that 9 clerks neglected
to examine paper ballots and 13 did not review the individual CVR during their
audits.4

3 The old post-election audit method directly tested whether election equipment interpreted
ballots correctly. The new method improves on this by directly testing whether election
equipment interpreted and counted ballots correctly. This is done by hand counting the audited
ballots and verifying that the paper vote totals match the associated vote totals generated from
the CVR data.
4 To cover all 29 counties, we observed post-election audits during the November 2023, March

2024, and June 2024 elections. Five counties committed both errors and appear on both lists.

6 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 Cler s ll Cler s Cler s
did not examine re ie ed scanned did not examine
paper allots allot images indi idual cast ote
records

The review of physical, paper ballots during a post-election audit is a critical step
because there are rare times when election equipment optical scanners pick up
markings—like document folds or accidental marks made by voters—in ways
that can cause an erroneous cast vote record. This possibility must be checked
and validated as part of a post-election audit.

Clerks who didn’t examine paper ballots neglected to do so because their election
equipment and software does not easily sort the ballots into batches. This is an
ongoing challenge and both clerks and the LG’s Office have worked to correct it,
but we still have concerns. This topic is discussed later in this chapter.

More concerning than that were the cases in which

Several county
clerks did not counties did not validate the individual CVR
validate the information for their audited ballots. Indeed, this was
individual CVR
the single most critical step in the former post-election
information for
audited ballots. audit process and a failure to correlate the audited
Neglecting to do so ballots to the individual CVR details represents a
represents a
fundamental failure of audit procedures.
fundamental
failure of audit
We found that some clerks simply have not devoted
procedures.
the time necessary to learn the post-election audit
requirements issued by the LG’s Office. As election officials, clerks have a
statutory duty to learn and comply with all election requirements.5 At just over
three pages long, studying and following post-election audit requirements is a
critical task that is within reach of all of Utah’s election officials. To assist clerks
in their understanding of post-election audit purposes and procedures, we also
believe that the new audit requirements issued by the LG’s Office should more
clearly and prominently articulate the purpose of Utah’s post-election audits and
clearly connect that purpose to key audit steps.

5 Utah Code 20A-1-106(2)

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 7

 RECOMMENDATION 1.1

As election officials, Utah’s county clerks should learn and execute all post-election
audit process requirements and procedures.

Administrative Rules are Needed to

Guide Post-Election Audits
A law passed in 2023 requires the director of elections within LG’s Office to make
rules to establish requirements and procedures for post-election audits.6 As of the
time of this audit, an Administrative Rule to govern post-election audits has not
yet been created.

Since that law became effective in May 2023, the LG’s Office Though statute
requires it, the
has worked to refine and strengthen post-election procedures LG’s Office has not
in its policy, which clerks are required to follow.7 This has yet made
included working through some technical challenges and Administrative
Rules to govern
troubleshooting new procedures.8 They also significantly post-election
changed the core audit requirements for the 2024 General audits.
Election.

Although it’s clear that the LG’s Office has worked to improve post-election
audits in its policy, we believe making rules is imperative because the statute
requires it. Doing so will also properly elevate these critical requirements to the
more prominent legal level at which the Legislature envisioned them. The rules
can then be amended as understanding matures and post-election procedures
evolve.

RECOMMENDATION 1.2

As required by statute, the director of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant
Governor should create Administrative Rules to establish requirements and
procedures for post-election audits.

6 Utah Code 20A-1-108(1)(a) was enacted by House Bill 448 in the 2023 Legislative General
Session and requires the creation of the Administrative Rules for any audits described in election
code. Utah Code 20A-4-104(1)(f)(ii) requires the completion of a post-election audit as a condition
of using automatic ballot tabulating equipment.
7 Utah Code 20A-1-106(2)

8 These will be discussed in detail in Finding 1.2.

8 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 1.2 Election Equipment Can Limit Cler s’
Ability to Identify Audited Ballots
We observed other additional factors limiting the accuracy of audits in some
parts of the state. Specifically, due to the way some election equipment scanners
process ballots, certain county clerks have not been able to accurately identify the
ballots selected for audit.

When counties use smaller ballot scanners, the digital records generated when
scanning ballots are not stored in batches and all of the ballot data is randomized
when results are combined on the main election
It is not yet clear computer. Therefore, when paper batches/ballots are
how these randomly selected for audit, it can be impossible to
equipment
find the corresponding digital records needed to test
limitations will
impact the new and validate election results. Accordingly, we
post-election audit observed clerks who could not and did not audit the
process.
correct ballot batches—selected at random by the
LG’s Office—during their post-election audits.

The LG’s Office has already directed county clerks to print serial numbers on
ballots to improve the accuracy of post-election auditing. In counties with
smaller ballot scanners, doing this helps accurately reconcile each audited paper
ballot to the correct digital records. With financial support from the LG’s Office,
these smaller counties have already purchased new scanners that can do this.

It is not yet clear how these equipment limitations will impact the new post-
election audit process in November 2024. We have been monitoring the
implementation of the new audit process in multiple counties and will report on
any additional findings and recommendations in a forthcoming audit report.

RECOMMENDATION 1.3

When the Office of the Lieutenant Governor creates Administrative Rules for post-
election audits, the requirements and procedures should clearly account for the
equipment limitations in smaller counties.

1.3 Several County Clerks Did Not Comply with Requirements

Related to Individuals Acting as Post-Election Auditors
In addition to the ballot-related requirements already discussed, the post-election
audit policy also sets requirements for the individuals participating as post-
election auditors.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 9

 or the post election audit cler s must

S ear In ecruit one auditor from

uditors outside the cler s office

Following these requirements can boost confidence in Utah’s election integrity

because it requires outsiders to independently validate the work of clerks and
their election staff. This independent validation is arguably the core purpose of
post-election audits. Without auditors from outside the clerk’s office to oversee
and assist with the process, election officials run the risk of auditing their own
work thus undermining confidence in audit results and, by extension, election
results.

As we observed post-election audits throughout the state, we found several

instances where clerks did not comply with these requirements.

Cler s Cler s
did not s ear in did not ha e an
election auditors election auditor
from outside the
cler s office

Most Clerks Did Not Swear in

Election Auditors as Required
The requirement to swear in election auditors mirrors language in statute
requiring all people processing ballots to swear or affirm that they will faithfully
perform their duties.9 The oath typically administered is the oath of office found

9 Utah Code 20A-4-104(2)(c)

10 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

in the Utah Constitution.10 As with other post-election audit requirements, this is
meant to strengthen confidence in both the audit process and any conclusions
drawn from audit tests.

The primary cause of noncompliance with the swearing-in The LG’s Office
requirement appeared to be confusion about its application. should clarify post-
The LG’s Office audit policy makes it clear that post-election election audit
requirements by
auditors must be sworn in. Clerks’ election staff are typically explicitly outlining
already sworn in as election workers and the policy does not who must be
sworn in, when,
make it clear whether they must be sworn in again as part of
and how.
the audit.

Additionally, clerks who recruit an outside person to act as an auditor typically

ask another county employee who, if they are an elected official, have also
already sworn an oath of office. To address this confusion, the LG’s Office should
clarify the post-election audit procedures by explicitly outlining who must be
sworn in, when, and how.

RECOMMENDATION 1.4

In the Administrative Rule governing post-election audits, the director of elections

within the Office of the Lieutenant Governor should clarify the swearing-in
requirement and procedure.

Several Clerks Did Not Have Outside

Auditors Assisting as Required
As we affirmed in our 2022 election audit report, independence is critical in any
audit setting.11 Government audit standards consider independence to be a
mandatory requirement because without it, auditors are unable to be truly
objective and impartial in their judgements and conclusions.12 In the context of

10 Utah Constitution Article IV, Section 10

11 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and Controls (2022-17). See recommendation 5.1
from that report.
12 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Government Auditing Standards. See

3.18 and 3.19.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 11

 elections, independent auditing honors the public trust and improves confidence
in the accuracy and integrity of election results.

In response to our 2022 audit recommendation, the

Legislature enacted statute prohibiting an individual
In response to our
2022 audit, the from auditing their own work during a post-election
Legislature audit.13 This principle is reflected in the post-election
enacted statute audit policy from the LG’s Office. It states that “only
prohibiting an
individual from one individual per duo [of auditors] can be a full-time
auditing their own employee of the clerk’s office.”
work during a
post-election We observed 8 county clerks who did not have an
audit.
election auditor from outside the clerk’s office assist
with their post-election audit. Failure to comply with
this requirement undermines the independence of the audit
process. We observed one post-election audit in which a single Counties must
staff person from the clerk’s office conducted the audit comply with the
procedures without any other assistance or member of the requirement to
involve
public present. Without someone present who can independent
independently vet election work, the county would be just as auditors or risk
well off not doing an audit at all. undermining their
audit conclusions.
The cause of the noncompliance we observed seemed to be a
simple lack of knowledge about the requirements. As we have already
recommended, it is the responsibility of county clerks, as election officers, to
understand and execute proper post-election audit procedures. In one case
where the clerk was informed about the requirement to have an outside auditor,
they were able to quickly and easily find help from another county office.

Clerks are required by statute and post-election audit policy to include external
individuals in their audits to maintain independence and public trust in their
audit findings. Without this independence, election workers audit their own
work and thereby undermine confidence in audit conclusions. Clerks must honor
the requirements for independence in their post-election audits so the public can
take greater confidence in election results.

13 Utah Code 20a-1-108(1)(b)

12 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 RECOMMENDATION 1.5

County clerks should ensure that individuals from outside their offices participate
in post-election audits as required in statute and other applicable standards.

1.4 There Is a Lack of Clarity and Compliance Around How

Clerks Must Attest to the Results of Their Post-Election
Audits
The post-election audit policy requires that “individuals who performed the
audit shall sign an affidavit that identifies the number of
ballots/machines/signatures that were audited and lists all exceptions that were
found.” It is important to complete this requirement correctly to promote
accountability by documenting that the audit occurred, who performed the audit
tests, and that the tests were done correctly. If auditors find any problems with
election returns, this is also the official record of those issues.

We found that there is confusion over what this requirement means and how to
comply. At the conclusion of post-election audits, clerks across the state filled out
a form titled “Canvass – Audit Certification Report” that was created by the LG’s
Office. This form does not contain or refer to an affidavit. It also has just one
signature line for the county clerk. Some county clerks or election directors
simply had all audit participants sign the form in the blank space below the
clerk’s signature in an apparent attempt to comply with the audit requirement.
The LG’s Office reported that the intent is for clerks to create their own forms to
comply with the affidavit requirement. While we have observed some clerks
doing just that, others continue to use the form from the LG’s Office and nothing
else.

We recommend that the LG’s Office determine the best way for clerks to attest to
the results of their post-election audits and either redesign the audit requirement
or the audit certification report to eliminate the confusion outlined here.

RECOMMENDATION 1.6

In the Administrative Rule governing post-election audits, the director of elections

within the Office of the Lieutenant Governor should create clearer requirements for
how clerks should attest to post-election audits.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 13

14 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
 CHAPTER 2 Summary
The Office of the Lieutenant Governor Can
Improve Its Oversight of Utah’s Voter Rolls

BACKGROUND
Utah Code requires that the LG’s Office ensure deceased voters are removed from voter rolls and that they
regularly monitor the statewide voter registration system to ensure that each county clerk complies with the
voter list maintenance requirements in statute and rule. These are crucial tasks to maintain an accurate voter
list.

RECOMMENDATION 2.1
FINDING 2.1 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should compare the
The Office of the Lieutenant records of deceased individuals from the Office of Vital
Governor Has Not Ensured Deceased Records and Statistics to the state’s official voter list—at least
90 days prior to each primary and general election—to
Voters Are Removed from Voter Rolls
ensure deceased voters have been removed from the voter
list.

RECOMMENDATION 2.2
The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should better use its
data analyst position to do regular, proactive analysis of
FINDING 2.2
Utah’s voter list to find and correct any problems and
The LG’s Office Can Better Utilize improve election integrity.
New Staff to Monitor and Analyze
RECOMMENDATION 2.3
Voter Records
The Legislature should consider requiring the Office of the
Lieutenant Governor to regularly and proactively analyze the
voter registration list in support of the office’s oversight of
voter list maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION 2.4
FINDING 2.3
The Legislature should consider requiring in statue
Additional Analysis of the
additional processes or automated risk assessments to flag
Voter Rolls Is Needed
potential issues within voter rolls.

CONCLUSION
Despite process changes, the LG’s Office is still not ensuring that deceased voters are being removed as
required. In addition, the LG’s Office has not utilized a new FTE dedicated to monitoring and analyzing voter
lists to catch errors and work with counties to remedy them. We believe that not making full use of that data
analyst position contributed to the problems discussed in this chapter.

15
16
 Chapter 2
The Office of the Lieutenant Governor
Can Impro e Its O ersight of Utah’s oter olls
Utah can improve voter roll maintenance. Maintaining voter records is an
essential part of election integrity and is a varied and ongoing task. County
clerks must regularly update records as people move, change their names, enter
prison, die, and otherwise update personal information and preferences. County
clerks do this on a regular basis, but we found in our 2022 audit that some
inaccuracies were not being corrected.14

To help ensure that the maintenance of Utah’s voter list is adequate, the
Legislature enacted statute in 2023 to strengthen the Office of the Lieutenant
Governor’s (LG’s Office) oversight role for voter list maintenance.15 In addition,
the Legislature funded a new data analyst position in the LG’s Office to regularly
monitor the voter registration system (also known as VISTA). This new position
has not been used to its full potential. While the LG’s Office has made
improvements in response to the new requirements, it can continue to improve
its oversight of Utah’s voter rolls.

Specifically, our analysis of voter registration data found:

• Deceased voters who have not been removed as required by statute

• Potential duplicate voters

We believe the
• Identical driver license numbers used by multiple voters factors we
observed both
Of particular concern, we identified voters who appeared to during this audit
and in 2022 point
cast ballots inappropriately in each of these areas of analysis.
to a need for
While county clerks are ultimately responsible to directly input proactive
and maintain voter records, we believe the factors we observed oversight and
analysis of voter
both during this audit and in 2022 point to a need for proactive
records y the LG’s
oversight and analysis of voter records by the LG’s Office. Office.

14 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and Controls (Report 2022-17). Office of the
Legislative Auditor General.
15 See Utah Code 20A-2, part 5. The bulk of relevant language was enacted via House Bill 448

during the 2023 Legislative General Session.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 17

 2.1 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor Has Not Ensured
Deceased Voters Are Removed from Voter Rolls
Our comparison of death records with the voter registration list found over 1,400
individuals in Utah’s voters rolls who are likely deceased. Statute requires that—
90 days prior to each primary and general election—the LG’s Office must
“compare the [death certificate] information the lieutenant governor has received
[from the Office of Vital Records and Statistics] with the official register of voters
to ensure that all deceased voters have been removed from the
official register.”16 Although the LG’s Office has improved its lthough the LG’s
Office has
oversight over the removal of deceased voters, the results of
improved its
our analysis show that there is more work to be done. Some oversight over the
deceased voters remain active on voter rolls, allowing ballots removal of
deceased voters,
to be sent to their last residence and increasing the risk of
the results of our
ineligible votes being cast, similar to our 2022 audit finding. analysis show that
there is more work
To test whether deceased voters have been removed from to be done.
VISTA we compared death certificate data from the Utah
Office of Vital Records and Statistics (Office of Vital Records) to the official voter
register in VISTA. Of the over 44,000 death records from the past two years, we
found over 1,400 voters who likely should have been removed but were not.17
Figure 1.1 shows how long some of these likely matches of deceased voters have
remained in the voter registration system.

16Utah Code 20A-2-505(7)

17The death certificate data covered all 44,000 records generated from July 2022 through June
2024. To find potential matches, we compared the first name, last name, and date of birth of all
death records in our data set against all voters on the VISTA voter registration list as of July 29,
2024. Although we believe most matches are valid, this method may result in some false matches
that require additional verification.

18 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 Figure 2.1 Over 400 Likely Deceased Voters Have Been in the Voter Rolls for Over a
Year. This figure shows how long voters have remained on the voter rolls since their date of
death. For example, the number 12 means that those individuals date of death was 12 months
previous.

Months on Voter Rolls A ter ate o eath

Source: Auditor generated

Although the number of potential matches of deceased voters is small compared

to Utah’s over 2 million registered voters, it still represents a significant lapse in
fulfilling an explicit voter list maintenance requirement. It is especially
concerning in light of our office’s previous recommendation that the LG’s office
“monitor and ensure that the names of deceased voters are removed from the
voter rolls…”

Of the 1,400 likely matches, nearly 700 of them are

marked as “active” voters. If deceased voters remain
Two of the in active status, the clerk will mail a ballot to their
deceased voters
cast ballots in the address, which can increase the risk of voter fraud.
November 2023 We checked all matches for voting activity and found
election.
that two of the matched voters cast ballots in the
November 2023 election.

The LG’s Office has reported there have been issues in the past with the weekly
file not properly loading into VISTA. There are three time periods (i.e., at months
5, 11, and 12) when death certificate data may not have been uploaded to VISTA
as required. This highlights the need for the LG’s Office to better fulfill its
statutory role to compare death records to the voter list to help ensure that
deceased voters are appropriately and timely removed.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 19

 New Voter List Maintenance Oversight Processes Do Not Accomplish What
Statute Requires. In response to multiple recommendations from our 2022 audit
intended to improve voter list maintenance, the LG’s Office requires county
clerks to certify monthly that they have complied with a list of maintenance
processes. One of the processes is the removal of deceased
voters within five days of receiving notice of their death.18 Deceased records
are still found
In addition, the LG’s Office began to proactively review within voter rolls
VISTA to ensure that clerks have processed their queues of despite the LG’s
deceased voters. However, simply checking that the Office new
processes.
records were processed does not actually ensure that the
deceased voters have been removed. As described in
statute, the LG’s Office must create a process to compare information from the
Office of Vital Records with the state voter registration list. If problems are
identified, they must then work with county clerks to ensure any potential
matches are properly reviewed. While the new process is an improvement,
records from recent months show that it is not sufficient. It is concerning we
have found the same issue in back-to-back audits, two years apart.

The LG’s Office reports, in response to these findings, they will work with DTS
weekly to verify the data is loaded into VISTA. The LG’s Office will also begin to
independently analyze death records from the Office of Vital Records to ensure
the individuals reported as deceased have been removed from the voter list prior
to elections.

RECOMMENDATION 2.1

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should compare the records of deceased
individuals from the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to the state’s official
voter list—at least 90 days prior to each primary and general election—to ensure
deceased voters have been removed from the voter list.

. The LG’s Office Can Better Utilize New Staff to Monitor

and Analyze Voter Records
In 2023, the Legislature appropriated funding to the LG’s Office to hire a data
analyst to more regularly review voter records. This position appears to have not
been used to its full potential. We believe that a staff position dedicated to the

18 See Utah Code 20A-2-504(3)

20 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

regular analysis of Utah’s voter rolls would directly address the findings
described in this chapter.

In addition to the problems with deceased voters, we found other problems with
voter records. The LG’s Office should prioritize regular monitoring of the official
voter list as required by statute. In addition, we believe that data analysis will
allow the LG’s Office to better detect fraud and other voter registration issues.
Our Analysis of Voter Records
Found Additional Problems
In addition to our work to analyze death certificates, our office searched for other
voter registration anomalies. In doing so, we found few instances—in addition to
the two potential instances identified with deceased voters—of individuals
voting multiple times in a single election.
We found over 300
potential duplicate One test was designed to find instances where
records within the individuals had mistakenly been issued two voter
voter records,
identification (voter ID) numbers. This is particularly
some of which
appeared to vote concerning because an individual with two active voter
twice in past ID numbers could potentially vote twice in a single
elections.
election.

Although VISTA has built-in tools to identify duplicate voters, the records we
found suggest additional analysis is needed. During the 2022 audit, we found
similar concerns and recommended that additional statewide monitoring could
help remedy errors in the voter registration system.

Examples of Voters Casting Multiple Ballots in Single Elections Need to be

Addressed. Some of the individuals who potentially have two voter ID numbers
appear to have voted twice in different elections in the last two years. It is
imperative that clerks work to maintain accurate voter records to prevent errors.
We also believe it is critical for the LG’s Office to provide the active oversight
over voter registration problems discussed in the remainder of this section.

We also tested whether any voters inappropriately shared driver license (DL)
numbers.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 21

 Again, the sum of these errors represents only a small portion of the total
number of active voters, but ensuring that records like these are found, flagged,
and resolved is nevertheless a crucial part of maintaining an accurate voter list.19
An accurate voter list is essential to ensuring that only those who can
legitimately vote cast a vote. Questions about the voter roll can lead to reduced
public confidence in the election process. Any number of duplicates introduces
the risk that individuals will be able to vote twice because ballots are issued for
all voters with active voter IDs.
Improvement in Voter Rolls Oversight Is Needed
In response to our audit in 2022 the Legislature funded multiple positions at the
LG’s Office to improve election oversight and election integrity. We found the
LG’s Office has made several improvements. Unfortunately, the position to
oversee voter rolls has been underutilized resulting in voter roll errors. Accurate
voter rolls are essential to election integrity.

Our office recommended in 2022 that the Legislature consider clarifying the
oversight role of the LG’s Office with regards to voter registration. We
recommended that that this could include, “authority for regular analysis of
voter records.”

In response, the Legislature passed House Bill 448 (HB448) during the 2023
Legislative General Session. That bill created a new
requirement for the LG’s Office to, “regularly monitor the The data analyst
[statewide voter registration] system to ensure that each position funded by
the Legislature in
county clerk complies with the [voter list maintenance] 2023 has been
requirements [in statute and rule].” 20 This is in addition underutilized,
leading to missed
opportunities to
clean voter rolls.

19 That is, we found just over 200 instances where a single DL number was shared across multiple
voter. Along with other voter registration analyses, we will continue to explore these particular
records and, if appropriate, report additional findings and recommendations in our next election
audit report due for release in the first half of 2025.
20 Utah Code 20A-2-502(1)(c)

22 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

to the LG’s Office’s duty to oversee and manage all voter registration activities in
the state.21

In that same session, the Legislature appropriated funding to the LG’s Office to
hire three additional staff members to handle some of the new requirements
created by HB448. The LG’s Office then hired these staff members to, among
other duties, manage statewide election training, oversee and support voter
registration, and perform ongoing data analysis of Utah’s voter rolls. The person
in charge of voter registration oversight has since completed multiple voter
registration audits. The LG’s Office reports that these audits have uncovered
problems and resulted in educational opportunities for clerks and generally
improved the state’s voter list. It appears the statewide training and voter
registration positions are performing the functions for which they were funded.
We believe these efforts are helping to improve voter rolls and consistency across
counties. However, the data analyst position has been underutilized resulting in
voter roll errors. This is concerning because accurate voter rolls are essential to
election integrity.

The data analyst position, intended to review voter registration data in ways that
would have presumably identified the deceased, registered voters, has not
performed the functions for which it was funded.

The LG’s Office Should Implement a Plan to Utilize their Data Analyst
Position to do Systemic Analysis of Voter Rolls. The LG’s Office reports that
the FTE intended to perform data analysis of the VISTA system, performed other
duties instead. We believe that not making full use of that data analyst position
contributed to the problems discussed in this chapter.

It makes sense that the data analyst position within the LG’s Office can and
should play a critical role in the office’s statutory duty to oversee, manage, and
regularly monitor all voter registration activities in the state.22 Our audit tests
were done by extracting voter data from VISTA and using data analysis software
to test and match records. The data analyst should be conducting similar tests.
Although VISTA has built-in tools to flag potential duplicates, it is not built to do
wide-scale analysis similar to our audit tests.

Regular monitoring of voter rolls is key to ensuring proper voter list

maintenance. The following figure provides an overview of how voter list
maintenance and monitoring should be occurring.

21 Utah Code UCA 20A-2-300.6

22 Utah Code UCA 20A-2-300.6; 20A-2-502(1)(c)

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 23

 egular onitoring to Ensure
roper oter List aintenance
Utah Code

roacti e data Training and

analysis of oter list Enforcement

LG s Office IST County Cler s

Operate and
maintain IST
oter registration
and oter list
Upload state data maintenance

Source: Auditor Generated

Regular monitoring of voter rolls will allow the LG’s office to better manage and
improve all voter registration activities. Data analysis is a key aspect of
monitoring and will help the LG’s office to better detect fraud, voter registration
abuse, and system issues, and use this information to improve reliability. While
we recognize that the LG’s Office is utilizing their voter registration specialist to
perform reviews of voter records, we believe this approach falls short of the
oversight role envisioned in statute and what the legislature funded in the data
analyst position. Regular analysis of both the voter registration list and the
clerks’ management of it can inform the creation of additional training from the
LG’s Office for clerks and election workers.

With the findings in this chapter in mind, we recommend that the LG’s Office
work proactively with county clerks to remove deceased and duplicate voters.
This can be done by ensuring that the duties of the data analyst position are
properly aligned with those needs and ensuring the requirements in statute for
voter maintenance are being met. However, the LG’s Office can prioritize
systemic analysis of the voter list, which would identify widespread issues. The
LG’s Office must establish processes and analysis to “regularly monitor the
system to ensure that each county clerk complies” with relevant rules as
instructed by statute.

RECOMMENDATION 2.2

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should better use its data analyst position to
do regular, proactive analysis of Utah’s voter list to find and correct any problems
and improve election integrity.

24 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 RECOMMENDATION 2.3

The Legislature should consider requiring the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to
regularly and proactively analyze the voter registration list in support of the
office’s oversight of voter list maintenance.

2.3 Additional Analysis of the

Voter Rolls Is Needed
This audit is part of a series of election related audits our office is conducting on
the election system. The findings in this report show that additional analysis of
the voter rolls is needed. Voter roll accuracy is an essential function of the
integrity of our election system. We will conduct additional tests on the voter
rolls during an additional audit that is currently underway and scheduled to be
released in 2025. These tests will focus on potential data sources and tests that
can be done to further improve the accuracy and reliability of voter rolls.

In addition to our continued testing, we recommend that the Legislature

consider requiring, in statute, automated testing of the voter rolls that looks for
anomalies and assists county clerks in voter roll maintenance and the LG’s Office
in voter roll oversight.

RECOMMENDATION 2.4

The Legislature should consider requiring in statue additional processes or

automated risk assessments to flag potential issues within voter rolls.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 25

26 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
 CHAPTER 3 Summary
Improvements in Tracking, Control, and Accounting
of Ballots Can Improve Confidence in Election
Integrity

BACKGROUND
The audit team visited 20 out of 29 counties during the 2024 June Primary Election to observe counties’ chain
of custody
chain processes.
of custody This chapter
processes. outlines
This chapter the importance
outlines of chain
the importance of custody
of chain in election
of custody processes,
in election processes,
emphasizing batching ballots, video surveillance, reconciliation, and accounting for ballots. While our focus
during the election was on the entire process, we report on four areas that need the most improvement.

FINDING 3.1 RECOMMENDATION 3.1

Some Counties Do Not Organize
County clerks should follow statute and batch
Ballots into Batches Immediately
immediately after collecting ballots.
Which Increases the Chance of
Misprocessing Ballots

RECOMMENDATION 3.2
Any counties in which all ballot processing areas are
not adequately monitored should apply to the Office
of the Lieutenant Governor for election funding to
purchase the equipment needed to comply with
statute.
RECOMMENDATION 3.3
FINDING 3.2
The Legislature should consider whether the
Insufficient Camera Monitoring in a
Quarter of Counties Poses Risk to wording in Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g) should be
Ballot Processing Security amended to better guide ballot video monitoring
practices.
RECOMMENDATION 3.4
The state election director within the Office of the
Lieutenant Governor should amend the chain of
custody of Administrative Rule to bring the
monitoring requirement in line with statute.

27
 RECOMMENDATION 3.5
The Legislature should consider creating a single,
centralized code section that outlines public reporting
requirements for election data, allowing other
relevant sections to reference this consolidated
provision for clarity and consistency.
FINDING 3.3
Some Counties Did Not Properly
Reconcile Ballot Custody Records RECOMMENDATION 3.6
in the June 2024 Primary Election All county clerks should ensure that they understand
and follow the ballot reconciliation process in Utah
Code 20A-4-109.

RECOMMENDATION 3.7
The Office of Lieutenant Governor should explore all
options within its legal powers to help ensure that
clerks understand and follow ballot reconciliation
requirements in statute.

RECOMMENDATION 3.8
FINDING 3.4
County clerks should ensure that they adhere to all
Counties Should Document
. requirements in statute and rule regarding ballot
Ballot Intake to Control and
Account for Incoming Ballots pickup and intake.

CONCLUSION
In our observations, the deficiencies in chain of custody procedures during the 2024 June Primary Election
highlight the need for stricter adherence to statutory requirements by county clerks. Addressing these issues
will help to improve compliance with the law and strengthen Utah’s election process.

8
28
 Chapter 3
Improvements in Tracking, Control, and
Accounting of Ballots Can Improve Confidence
in Election Integrity
“Chain of custody” in the election context refers to the processes used to track
the movement and control of ballots and other key election assets (e.g.,
equipment, storage containers, personnel, etc.). The Office of
the Lieutenant Governor (LG’s Office) found “an In its report, the
unprecedented lack of controls [and] widespread violations of LG’s Office citied
Cache County’s
Utah election law” when reviewing Cache County’s election
poor chain of
operations following the 2023 Municipal General Election. In custody as “the
the report they issued, they said that the county’s poor ballot single most
troubling aspect of
chain of custody practices were “the single most troubling
the review.”
aspect of the review.” We recognize the work the LG’s Office
has done to identify issues in counties that could negatively impact elections and
the public’s confidence in the election process.

We visited 20 out of 29 counties during the June 2024 Primary Election. While we
fortunately did not find evidence of widespread chain of custody problems, this
chapter presents four areas counties should improve upon:

• Establishing batches of ballots immediately after the county has collected

them

• Ensuring that cameras are covering the entire ballot processing area

• Properly reconciling ballots daily

• Documenting ballot intake to control and account for incoming ballots

If election assets are not controlled as required in law and rule, it can create
opportunities for election worker error and manipulation (i.e., insider threats). In
2024 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a report warning about
insider threats they believed could materialize during the 2024 election cycle.23
Because robust chain of custody practices are a key safeguard against these
threats, and in light of the Cache County report, we observed chain of custody

23This report, titled 2024 U.S. Federal Elections: The Insider Threat, was created in coordination with
the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 29

 practices in most Utah counties to help ensure that this risk is being adequately
addressed.

3.1 Some Counties Do Not Organize Ballots into Batches

Immediately, Which Increases the Chance of Misprocessing
Ballots
During the 2024 June Primary Election, we observed multiple counties not
following certain chain of custody practices related to how ballots are batched for
processing.24

First, we observed batch formation practices in 20 counties and found that 6 did
not batch ballots immediately upon receipt. This is despite Utah law, which
requires that election officials immediately count and divide ballots into batches
for processing.25 Batching ballots is a critical step that allows for greater control
and accountability as election workers process election returns. Grouping
incoming ballots into batches also facilitates the post-election audit.

The primary reason some clerks do not batch immediately is because they prefer
perfectly uniform batches. In contrast, a county that batches ballots immediately
then proceed with signature verification. While doing so, they often challenge
the signatures on a small number of ballots from each batch and pull them aside
for additional signature verification. Assuming they began with batches of 50,
setting these ballots aside may leave one batch with 48 ballots and the next with
49 and the next with 47, etc.26

24 A batch is a group of paper ballots gathered as a group for tabulation and auditing.
25 This requirement was enacted in House Bill 448 during the 2023 Legislative General Session in
response to our 2022 audit, A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and Controls. (Report
#2022-17) See Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1(4).
26 If batch logs are properly maintained, and each ballot can be traced back to its original batch,

setting ballots aside for further signature verification or signature curing is a common and
acceptable practice.

30 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

Counties that do not batch ballots immediately flip the
signature verification and batching processes, preferring to do Batching ballots
immediately helps
signature verification first. By reviewing signatures before election staff track
batching, they can remove the ballot envelopes with the total number
challenged signatures and maintain a perfectly uniform list of of ballots in each
stack throughout
batches with 50 ballots each. It is the challenge of tracking the process.
those challenged ballot envelopes that makes this process
problematic.

In the counties that do not batch immediately, this gap in accountability can
make it possible for ballots to be misplaced or lost without detection. Delays in
batching can weaken accountability, exposing the election process to
unnecessary vulnerabilities that could erode public trust. To mitigate this issue,
batching immediately helps election staff track the total number of ballots in each
stack and can track that throughout the process.

RECOMMENDATION 3.1

County clerks should follow statute and batch immediately after collecting ballots.

3.2 Insufficient Camera Monitoring in a Quarter of Counties

Poses Risk to Ballot Processing Security
Video surveillance of the ballot processing area is one way to identify insider
threats or malicious actors. Counties that lack this video surveillance can make it
more difficult for law enforcement to identify and prosecute
malicious actors tampering with the election process. A law The Cache County
ttorney’s Office
was enacted in 2023 that requires election officials to “ensure used video footage
that…each part of the processing of all ballots is monitored by as part of its
recorded video, without audio.” This requirement has
27 investigation into
election crimes.
already proven its value as a safeguard of election integrity. In
2024, the Cache County Attorney’s Office used such video footage as it
investigated and charged an individual suspected of acting corruptly as a poll
worker. It is imperative that all election officials comply with this requirement to
monitor ballot processing.

27 Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1(5)(g)

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 31

 e o ser ed fi e
counties that did not
ha e ade uate ideo
monitoring of allot
processing

During our observations of election operations in 20 counties during the June

2024 Primary Election, there were five counties that did not have adequate video
monitoring of ballot processing. Three of the counties had at least one camera but
were not monitoring critical portions of ballot processing, like ballot intake,
signature verification, or ballot scanning. These counties should correct these
deficiencies as quickly as possible to ensure that their election processes are
monitored as required in law. The other two counties had
cameras that monitored nearly all ballot processing and The Lt. Go ernor’s
simply needed minor adjustments to fully capture all ballot Office has election
funding to help
processing areas. counties purchase
camera equipment
The clerks we spoke with explained that they did not realize to comply with
that the camera angle was not covering the entire processing statute.
area. One clerk thought the cameras in her processing room
were working, but it turned out they were not recording anything. Had
something happened in that county without footage from the ballot processing
area, public confidence in elections could be negatively impacted. Until the clerks
install adequate camera coverage, they are not following election law put in
place by the Legislature. For counties without adequate camera coverage, the
LG’s Office has election funding that has been set aside to help counties purchase
needed equipment.

RECOMMENDATION 3.2

Any counties in which all ballot processing areas are not adequately monitored
should apply to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor for election funding to
purchase the equipment needed to comply with statute.

32 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

The Legislature May Wish to Clarify Whether Active Ballots Must be
Video Monitored Between Processing Steps
There is inconsistency between statute and rule—and inconsistency in clerks’
interpretation of these requirements—that raises the question
of whether ballots must be video monitored between “Processed” is
defined to include
processing steps. all steps taken
from the receipt of
As cited previously, statute requires all ballot processing to be the ballot to the
video monitored. In that same section, “processed” is defined storage of the
to include all steps taken from the receipt of the ballot to the ballot after
processing is
storage of the ballot after processing is complete.28 The LG’s complete.
Office election policy affirms this, stating that, “Ballots in a
processing center should always be secured and monitored,” (emphasis added).
In contrast, the relevant Administrative Rule says, “An election official shall
ensure that active ballots in a processing center are secured or monitored,”
(emphasis added).29 Using “or” in this rule implies that active ballots do not need
to be monitored if they are secured.

During the 2024 primary election, we observed that multiple clerks use a walk-in
vault, closet or other storage space to hold active ballots between key processing
steps.30 For example, incoming ballots are sorted into batches of 50 and placed in
a tote or tray in the vault to await signature verification. When election staff have
time to verify signatures, they retrieve the next pending batch from the vault and
do so. After signature verification, staff returns the batch of ballots to the vault to
be placed in the next process tote/tray and so on until final ballot tabulation and
storage.

There are some clerks who use cameras to monitor these

work-in-process vault spaces and others who do not. Because
There are some
the law emphasizes that “processing” is to be video
clerks who use
monitored, one clerk questioned whether the ballots in the cameras to
vault should be under surveillance because—by their monitor these
work-in-process
thinking—no active processing is happening in that space. We
vault spaces and
observed some key differences in this regard: others who do not.

28 Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1(1)(b) and (5)(g)

29 Administrative Rule R623-8-6(2). The creation of this rule was required by Utah Code 20A-3a-
404, which was enacted by House Bill 313 in the 2022 Legislative General Session.
30 Whether a literal vault, a locked closet, or another secured area, many clerks refer to this space

as “the vault.” We will do the same here.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 33

 • Some clerks have a camera monitoring their vaults or other spaces where
work-in-process ballots are stored.

• Some of the clerks who do not have a camera monitoring inside their vault
have a camera pointed at the entrance so they can monitor access to the
space.

• Instead of vaults, some clerks use portable cages with padlocks to secure
work-in-process ballots. These are placed in view of a camera.

• One clerk lacked a camera in the vault but placed ballots in the vault
inside a cage with a padlock so that ballots could be secured between
processing steps.

It is important to note that in some counties, ballots may sit in

these vault spaces for days awaiting the next scheduled ballot In light of the
processing time. In addition to election-related needs, the different standards
and
vaults typically serve multiple purposes and staff from clerks’ interpretations
offices frequently enter the space in their normal course of cited here, the
duties. We observed employees entering vaults alone during Legislature may
wish to amend
our visits in multiple counties, which not only raises questions statute to clarify
about video monitoring, but about whether one person alone its preferred
should have direct access to active ballots.31 standard for ballot
monitoring.
In light of the different standards and interpretations cited
here, the Legislature may wish to amend statute to clarify its preferred standard
for ballot monitoring. This could include full video monitoring of vault spaces, a
provision that secured ballots need not be monitored, or simply maintaining the
current statute unaltered. The state election director should amend Administrative
Rule to conform to the statutory standard.

RECOMMENDATION 3.3

The Legislature should consider whether the current wording in Utah Code 20A-3a-
401.1(5)(g) should be amended to better guide ballot video monitoring practices.

31See the section of this chapter that deals with control and management of ballots to ensure
election integrity.

34 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 RECOMMENDATION 3.4

The state election director within the Office of the Lieutenant Governor should
amend the chain of custody of Administrative Rule to bring the monitoring
requirement in line with statute.

3.3 Some Counties Did Not Properly Reconcile Ballot Custody

Records in the June 2024 Primary Election
To increase the accountability and transparency of ballots, the Legislature
created a ballot record reconciliation process in statute in 2023.32 This was in
response to significant discrepancies between ballot totals and voter credit data
that we detailed in our 2022 audit report.

During the June 2024 primary election, we observed this new

reconciliation process in 13 counties and found 3 that were not Failure to properly
track and reconcile
doing it according to the requirements in law. This is ballots and voter
concerning because failure to properly track and reconcile records
ballot and voter records undermines confidence that all undermines
confidence that all
voters’ ballots were accounted for and processed correctly. oters’ allots
Some of the clerks we spoke with were unaware of the daily were accounted
for and processed
reconciliation requirement and assumed we were asking
correctly.
about the ballot statistics report that they post online which is
a separate public reporting requirement. There are three separate code sections
that require clerks to track and report the data on their website.33 It would be
beneficial to consolidate all the reporting requirements into a single code section
to create more clarity about the transparent reporting of election data.

RECOMMENDATION 3.5

The Legislature should consider creating a single, centralized code section that
outlines public reporting requirements for election data, allowing other relevant
sections to reference this consolidated provision for clarity and consistency.

32 Utah Code 20A-4-109. See House Bill 448 from the 2023 Legislative General Session. The
reconciliation language here was clarified in Senate Bill 37 during the 2024 Legislative General
Session.
33 Utah Code sections 20A-4-202(2), 20A-3a-405, 20A-4-109, require clerks to collect and publicly

report election data at certain intervals during the election. Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1(3) also
requires election officials to track certain ballot statistics.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 35

 Clerks are election officers and have an obligation to understand and follow
statute in their execution of their election-related duties.34 Additionally, the LG’s
Office has a legal obligation to oversee elections and enforce known
noncompliance.35 Statute and the LG’s Office election policy define how
reconciliation should work and the LG’s Office reports that they have provided
extensive training on this topic. Given the critical nature of ballot reconciliation,
the LG’s Office should explore whether noncompliance is widespread enough to
merit a training module similar to their signature verification training.36 Given
the concerns documented here, and some outstanding questions related to the
voter registration data used as the basis for reconciliation, we continued our
review of this reconciliation during the November 2024 General Election and will
report any further findings and recommendations as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION 3.6

All county clerks should ensure that they understand and follow the ballot
reconciliation process in Utah Code 20A-4-109.

RECOMMENDATION 3.7

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should explore all options within its legal
powers to help ensure that clerks understand and follow ballot reconciliation
requirements in statute.

3.4 Counties Should Document Ballot Intake

To Control and Account for Incoming Ballots
A key control in the chain of custody process is the documentation of ballots
collected from drop boxes or the post office. Upon delivery to the processing
center, an election official is also required to count and log the number of ballots
received. This process ensures consistency between the number of ballots
collected and those received at the processing center, preventing discrepancies.
Administrative Rule mandates that both logs record the number of ballots, the

34 Utah Code 20A-1-102(23) and 20A-1-106

35 Utah Code 20A-1-105
36 Under Utah Code 20A-1-107(3)(b) and (6) the LG’s Office formalized a signature verification

training module for anyone to complete before they are allowed to verify signatures.

36 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

individuals handling them, their pick-up location, and the drop box's security
seal number.37

However, three out of twenty counties did not track the security seal serial
number when they retrieved ballots, and four out of twenty counties did not
verify and record the seal numbers when the ballots arrived in the office. We
spoke with some of the clerks that did not use seals and they were unaware of
the requirement to document the numbered seals used on ballot pickup bags.

Once ballots entered the clerks’ offices for processing, we observed two out of
twenty counties that did not maintain logs of ballot batches as required in
statute.38 Although they used other means to track some of the same elements,
their methods did not appear to satisfy the full legal requirement.

It is important that election workers properly document the required elements,

including the number of ballots collected and delivered to ensure proper
accountability and transparency.

RECOMMENDATION 3.8

County clerks should ensure that they adhere to all requirements in statute and rule
regarding ballot pickup and intake.

37 These security seals are pre-numbered, tamper evident seals placed on the bags or containers
used to transport ballots. They are used to prevent individuals from tampering with ballots while
they are in transit. See Administrative Rule R623-8-5.
38 Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1(5)(d)

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 37

38 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
 CHAPTER 4 Summary
There Are Still Opportunities for Additional
Improvement of Certain Elections Systems and
Practices

BACKGROUND
In 2022 our office made recommendations to the Legislature and the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to
improve statute and rule for signature verification criteria, quality, and training. We also recommended in
2022 that a risk-limiting audit pilot program be considered.

FINDING 4.1 RECOMMENDATION 4.1

The Office of the Lieutenant The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should
Governor Could Clarify fulfil the statutory requirement to establish
Administrative Rule for Clearer criteria and processes in Administrative Rule
Signature Verification Training for poll workers to use in determining if a
Standards signature is reasonably consistent with the
signature on file for the voter.

RECOMMENDATION 4.2
The Legislature should consider amending
Utah Code 20A-1-108(5) to renew the
Efforts have Begun to Study Potential
requirement for the study of options to
Improvements in Signature Quality
improve election-related signature quality,
including a target date for completion and a
requirement that the LG’s office report back on
the process.

FINDING 4.2
Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program
No Recommendation
was Not Implemented

CONCLUSION
While a great deal of work has been done in the areas of signature verification and post-election
audit practices, there are still areas of improvement. These include amending and clarifying
Administrative Rule for signature verification, amending Utah Code to continue to work toward
signature quality improvements, and considering policy options to strengthen post-election audits.

39
40
 Chapter 4
There Are Still Opportunities for Additional
Improvement of Certain Elections Systems and
Practices
This chapter will focus specifically on the recommendations regarding signature
verification and risk-limiting audits from our 2022 audit.39 We are encouraged by
the efforts that have been made in the last two years to implement many of the
recommendations. However, these 2022 recommendations are still “in process,”
and we offer further recommendations for continued security in our elections
system.

The current Administrative Rule governing aspects of signature verification does

not meet the intention of the recently passed statute. Additionally, more work
can be done to improve the integrity and accuracy of the election process
through better voter signature quality and post-election audits. In response to
our 2022 recommendations, the Legislature passed statute requiring the Office of
the Lieutenant Governor (LG’s Office) to work toward improvements in both
signature verification and risk-limiting audits.40 In response, the LG’s Office
created Administrative Rule regarding signature verification criteria and training.

4.1 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor Could Clarify

Administrative Rule for Clearer Signature Verification
Training Standards
The ballot signature verification changes the LG’s Office made to Administrative
Rule do not fully address the new requirements made in Utah Code.
Additionally, statute tasked the Utah Driver License Division and LG’s Office
with studying ways to improve signature quality. While some changes have been
made in both areas there is room for continued improvement.

39 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and Controls (Report #2022-17). Office of the
Legislative Auditor General.
40 House Bill 448, 2023 Legislative General Session

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 41

 Statute and Rule Changes have Occurred
Regarding Signature Verification Trainings
Our 2022 Audit41 made this recommendation:

We found that statute lacked clear legal standards for signature verification
related to ballots returned by mail or ballot box. In 2023, the Legislature modified
the process election workers must follow to include a
standard that signatures on ballot return envelopes be The Legislature
“reasonably consistent” with voters’ comparison signatures modified the
process election
held in the voter registration system.42
workers must
follow to include a
This section of statute was further amended to require the
standard that
director of elections within the LG’s Office to create signatures be
Administrative Rule to “establish criteria and processes for use “reasona ly
consistent” ith
by poll workers in determining if a signature is reasonably
oters’ comparison
consistent with the signature on file for the voter…” While signatures held in
the LG’s Office subsequently created rules43 in response to the voter
registration
this requirement, the rules do not include the signature
system.
verification criteria and processes required in statute.44 The
LG’s Office should therefore amend their Administrative Rule
to comply with statute and better guide signature verification across the state.

41 Recommendation 4.1 from the 2022 Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and Controls
42 Utah Code 20A-3a-401
43 Administrative Rule R623-11

44 It should be noted that in Administrative Rule R623-11 the statute is incorrectly cited as Utah

Code 20A-3a-401(9). That section of code was moved from (9) to (11) in 2024, and Administrative
Rule does not reflect this. We believe this to be an oversight of the Lieutenant Governor’s Office
thus we have attributed the intended statute to 20A-3a-401(11).

42 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

Our office’s recent audit of the signature verification process arrived at a very
similar finding and recommendation.45

RECOMMENDATION 4.1

The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should fulfil the statutory requirement to
establish criteria and processes in Administrative Rule for poll workers to use in
determining if a signature is reasonably consistent with the signature on file for the
voter.

Efforts have Begun to Study Potential

Improvements in Signature Quality
The Legislature required the Driver License Division (DLD), in cooperation with
the LG’s Office, to perform a study to determine how to improve the quality of
signatures. Our office also recommended46 that:

In November 2023, the DLD submitted a brief report to the Government

Operations Interim Committee explaining that the study was still in process.

The DLD reported to us that they encountered technological limits on new

signature capture devices they were evaluating and have not concluded their
work on the topic.

To ensure that the highest quality signatures are available for comparison, we
recommend that the Legislature amend statute to require a report on the results

45 A Performance Audit of the Signature Verification Process (Report #2024-16). Office of the
Legislative Auditor General. See recommendation 1.3 on p. 10 of that report.
46 Recommendation 4.4 from 2022 Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and Controls (Report

#2022-17). Office of the Legislative Auditor General.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 43

 of this study. We also recommend that the Legislature set a target date for
completion and require the LG’s office to report back on the process.

RECOMMENDATION 4.2

The Legislature should consider amending Utah Code 20A-1-108(5) to renew the
requirement for the study of options to improve election-related signature quality,
including a target date for completion and a requirement that the LG’s office report
back on the process.

4.2 Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot

Program was Not Implemented
In 2022, we wrote about efforts around the country to apply statistical sampling
methods to post-election auditing. Collectively, these methods are known as risk-
limiting audits (RLA). Seeing several states pursue RLA methods through legal
mandates and pilot programs, we made the following recommendation:

Rather than implement a pilot program, the Legislature enacted a new section of
statute.47 The new statute took a step toward implementing RLA practices by
requiring a study on how to improve post-election audits, including evaluating
different risk-limiting audit methods and other confirmation methods.

The LG’s Office contracted with three professors from

The LG’s Office Utah universities to complete this study, which
contracted with
three professors included a discussion about different risk-limiting
from Utah audit methods and recommendations for how to
universities to proceed with a pilot program if the Legislature so
complete the study
of risk-limiting desired. As required in statute, the study was
audits. presented to the Government Operations Interim
Committee in November 2023. The professors then

47 Utah Code 20A-1-108

44 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

continued their work with a survey to determine whether implementing RLA
methods in Utah would increase voter confidence. Currently, the results of that
survey are not yet publicly available for review, and a pilot program was not
implemented.
Election Audit Methods Continue to Evolve,
Both Around the Country and in Utah
The goal of any post-election audit should be to strengthen confidence in the
integrity of election processes and the accuracy of election outcomes. As noted in
Chapter 1 of this report, Utah’s current post-election audit practices have room
for improvement and were just changed by the LG’s Office for the 2024 General
Election. In the former process, paper ballots were compared to digital records
from election machines to ensure that ballots were read correctly. As we reported
in 2022, this practice does not directly confirm that votes were correctly counted
by election machines.

In the new post-election audit process, clerks now hand count randomly selected
batches of paper ballots and compare the results to the
machine subtotals for the audited batches. Given our concerns Due to the
in 2022, this is an improvement. Due to the importance of importance of
post-election
post-election audits in ensuring election integrity, we will audits in ensuring
continue to monitor the implementation of the new audit election integrity,
process in multiple counties and will report on any additional we will continue to
monitor the
findings and recommendations in a forthcoming audit report. implementation of
the new audit
Nationwide, states and local jurisdictions continue to process in multiple
implement and adapt RLA techniques for their post-election counties.
audits. States like Colorado, Washington, Kentucky, and
others are now using different applications of RLA methods. Experts in this field
emphasize that each RLA approach is built by stakeholders to reflect their
unique goals, laws, and any potential system constraints.48
Additional Audit Work is Needed to Bring the Best Information
About Post-Election Auditing to the Legislature
In light of the post-election audit shortcomings detailed in Chapter 1—and the
significant evolution in post-election audit methods across the country—we
believe it would be wise to continue to investigate post-election audit methods
for potential implementation in Utah. We have already performed additional

48For example, for locations where election officials cannot maintain distinct batches of paper
ballots, certain post-election audit methods are simply not possible because it is highly
impractical—if not impossible—to find and audit a specific sample of ballots or batches.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 45

 work to track the successes and pitfalls of RLA in other states, but the recent
changes to Utah’s post-election audits and the pending research from the
university professors have left us needing more information. At the time of
writing, we are still working to understand key elements and constraints of
Utah’s election system as they relate to what may be possible in the future. We
have also engaged with national experts who have helped other states to
improve their post-election audit practices.

Regardless of the improvements to auditing methods policymakers may choose,

experts emphasize the value of a careful, gradual approach to help identify and
overcome obstacles. We will continue to explore a wide range of policy options
in this space and report additional information as appropriate in a forthcoming
audit report in 2025.

46 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

Complete List of Audit
Recommendations

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 47

48 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
 Complete List of Audit Recommendations
This report made the following recommendations. The numbering convention assigned to each
recommendation consists of its chapter followed by a period and recommendation number
within that chapter.

Recommendation 1.1
We recommend that as election officials, Utah’s county clerks learn and execute all post-election
audit process requirements and procedures

Recommendation 1.2
We recommend that, as required by statute, the director of elections within the Office of the
Lieutenant Governor should create Administrative Rules to establish requirements and
procedures for post-election audits.

Recommendation 1.3
We recommend that when the Office of the Lieutenant Governor should create Administrative
Rules for post-election audits, the requirements and procedures should clearly account for the
equipment limitations in smaller counties.

Recommendation 1.4
We recommend that the director of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant Governor clarify
the swearing-in requirements and procedures in the Administrative Rule governing post-
election audits.

Recommendation 1.5
We recommend that the county clerks ensure that individuals from outside their office
participate in post-election audits as required in statute and other applicable standards.

Recommendation 1.6
We recommend that the director of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant Governor create
clearer requirements for how clerks should attest to post-election audits in the Administrative
Rule governing post-election audits.

Recommendation 2.1
We recommend that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor compare the records of deceased
individuals from the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to the state’s official voter list—at least
90 days prior to each primary and general election—to ensure deceased voters have been
removed from the voter list.

Recommendation 2.2
We recommend that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor better use its data analyst position to
do regular, proactive analysis of Utah’s voter list to find and correct any problems and improve
election integrity.

Recommendation 2.3
We recommend that the Legislature consider requiring the Office of the Lieutenant Governor to

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 49

 regularly and proactively analyze the voter registration list in support of the office’s oversight of
voter list maintenance.

Recommendation 2.4
We recommend that the Legislature consider requiring in statue additional processes or
automated risk assessments to flag potential issues within voter rolls.

Recommendation 3.1
We recommend that the county clerks follow the statute and batch immediately after collecting
ballots.

Recommendation 3.2
We recommend that the counties in which all ballot processing areas are not adequately
monitored apply to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor for election funding to purchase the
equipment needed to comply with statute.

Recommendation 3.3
We recommend that the Legislature consider whether the wording in Utah Code 20A-3a-
401.1(5)(g) should be amended to better guide ballot video monitoring practices.

Recommendation 3.4
We recommend that the state election director within the Office of the Lieutenant Governor
amend the chain of custody requirement in Administrative Rule to bring the monitoring
requirement in line with statute.

Recommendation 3.5
We recommend that the Legislature consider creating a single, centralized code section that
outlines public reporting requirements for election data, allowing other relevant sections to
reference this consolidated provision for clarity and consistency.

Recommendation 3.6
We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they understand and follow the ballot
reconciliation process in Utah Code 20A-4-109.

Recommendation 3.7
We recommend that the Office of Lieutenant Governor explore all options within its legal
powers to help ensure that clerks understand and follow ballots reconciliation requirements in
statute.

Recommendation 3.8
We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they adhere to all the requirements in statute
and rule regarding ballot pickup and intake.

50 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

Recommendation 4.1
We recommend that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor fulfil the statutory requirement to
establish criteria and processes in Administrative Rule for poll workers to use in determining if
a signature is reasonably consistent with the signature on file for the voter.

Recommendation 4.2
We recommend that the Legislature consider amending Utah Code 20A-1-108(5) to renew the
requirement for the study of options to improve election-related signature quality, including a
target date for completion and a requirement that the LG’s office report back on the process.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 51

52 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
Appendix

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 53

54 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
A. Status of All Recommendations From
A Performance Audit of Utah's Election
System and Controls

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 55

56 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
 Appendix A

Status of All Recommendations From

A Performance Audit of Utah's Election
System and Controls
In 2022, our office released A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System and
Controls (Report #2022-17). It contained twenty-two recommendations, including
recommendations to the Legislature to consider clarifying the Lieutenant
Governor’s role in various elections processes. The audit also had several
recommendations for the Office of the Lieutenant Governor (LG’s Office),
including standardizing the use of voter maintenance tools and creating rules for
clerks to reconcile key ballot statistics.

In the 2023 Legislative General Session, the Legislature passed House Bill 448,
which made multiple changes to Utah’s election system in direct response to our
audit report’s findings and recommendations. That year the Legislature also
passed House Bill 269, granting authority to our office to conduct election-
focused audits in every even numbered year.49

The topics we covered in the 2022 Audit, and follow up here are:

• Chapter 1: Utah’s Election Controls Mitigate the Risk of Fraud as Long as They
Are Used Properly

• Chapter 2: Utah’s Voter Registration Process Is Strong but Can Be Improved

with Additional Oversight

• Chapter 3: Consistent Chain-of-Custody Practices Are Needed to Accurately

and Transparently Account for All Ballots

• Chapter 4: Standards, Training, and Audits Could Improve Election Signature

Verification

• Chapter 5: The Legislature Should Consider New Options for Post-Election

Audits

• Chapter 6: Oversight and Enforcement Roles In Election Code Could Be

Clarified

49 House Bill 448 and House Bill 269 are the bills referenced in the remainder of this appendix.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 57

 All twenty-two recommendations from the 2022 audit have been addressed to
varying degrees. We found that many of the recommendations have been fully
implemented.50

This audit has addressed many of the “in process” recommendations throughout
the chapters. Therefore, this appendix outlines all twenty-two recommendations
from 2022, and where applicable, references the chapters of this audit for more
information.

Status of All Recommendations from A Performance Audit of

Utah's Election System and Controls (2022-17)

Our 2022 audit found problems with the way county clerks were maintaining the
state’s voter registration list. In response, the Legislature tasked the LG’s Office
with creating clearer maintenance standards and providing oversight to help
ensure that clerks adhere to those maintenance standards.51

To accomplish clearer voter list maintenance standards, the LG’s Office created a
list of maintenance steps and processes county clerks must follow and requires
that each clerk’s office self-certify compliance each month. However, as Chapter
2 of this report details, we found that some maintenance tools may not be
working as intended. Given the requirement in law that the LG’s Office
“regularly monitor the system to ensure that each county clerk complies with the
[maintenance] requirements,” we consider this recommendation to be “In
process” and have made further recommendations in Chapter 2.

50 There are two 2022 recommendations in Chapter 4 and one in Chapter 6 for which the LG’s
Office reported in 2023 that these recommendations were “In process.” We have designated the
recommendations here as “Implemented” due to work done in the interim.
51 These requirements were part of House Bill 448 in the 2023 Legislative General Session. See

Utah Code 20A-2-502 and 503.

58 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

In 2023, the Legislature responded directly to this recommendation by amending
Utah Code.52 These amendments increased the voter registration oversight
responsibility of the LGs’ Office and funded a full-time staff position to fulfill
these new duties.

Since that staff person was hired, the LG’s Office has completed three quarterly
voter registration audits thus far in 2023-2024. The LG’s Office reports that the
audits assess a sample of new registrations in each county, scaling the sample
according to county size. As reported by the LG’s Office, these audits only assess
new registrations added in that quarter for compliance with certain criteria like:

52 Utah Code 20A-2-502 and 503

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 59

 The staff person then chooses from a list of other criteria they’ve selected to audit
each quarter. Any negative findings are then used to determine what support or
training clerks need with regard to voter registration maintenance.

In 2024 Quarter 2 audit, statewide there were “two percent findings” meaning
two percent of the audited new voter registrations had a mistake or an issue that
needed to be corrected. Over the course of the three audits, the percentage of
findings improved. The findings were nine percent, four percent, and two
percent.

We performed additional audit work in this area to explore the ways in which
the processes in place for removing deceased voters can be improved.
Recognizing the efforts made by the LG’s Office and considering the
shortcomings we identified, we consider this recommendation to be “In Process.”

Our findings and further recommendations are found in Chapter 2.

The LG’s Office reports that three new positions were funded with
appropriations made in HB448. These positions cover work in training, voter
registration, and election systems. We consider this recommendation
implemented.

60 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

In response to this recommendation, the Legislature enacted Utah Code to lay
out the process that counties are to use for ballot reconciliation.53 This language
was further clarified in Senate Bill 37 during the 2024 Legislative General
Session. In Chapter 3 of this report, we describe this year’s observations of
counties in which we saw certain counties falling short of the legal requirements
in their reconciliation processes. In response, we have recommended that the
LG’s Office explore options to help clerks understand and comply with this
important new requirement.

To facilitate the new reconciliation process (see Recommendation 3.1

immediately above), the LG’s Office created a special report that overcomes the
data limitations we identified in 2022. The report is automatically generated and
delivered to all 29 clerks every 30 minutes during an election. It provides a
reliable basis upon which clerks can reconcile the ballot statistics named in
statute. That said, we observed that certain clerks did not reconcile their election
statistics as required. Thus, in Chapter 3 of this report, recommendations are
given to improve the process statewide.

53 Utah Code 20A-4-109

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 61

 The Legislature amended Utah Code54 to state that “upon receiving ballots cast
by voters, the election officer shall ensure that poll workers immediately count
the number of ballots received and divide the ballots into batches.” We discuss
the improvements made and recommendations for continued improvement to
ballot batching in Chapter 3 of this report.

In our 2022 report, we noted that consistent chain-of-custody practices are

needed to ensure accurate and transparent accounting for all ballots. We audited
ballot chain-of-custody practices across the state in detail during this audit. Our
findings and recommendations are detailed in Chapter 2 of this audit.

54 Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1(4)

62 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

In 2023, the Legislature modified Utah Code to include a standard that
signatures on ballot return envelopes be “reasonably consistent” with voters’
comparison signatures held in the voter registration system.55 More information
is found in Chapter 4 of this report.

As recommended, the Legislature granted rulemaking authority regarding

criteria and processes for signature verification to the director of elections within
the LG’s Office in Utah Code.56 This authority includes power to set criteria and
processes for signature verification as well as for related training and
certification requirements.

rated

55 Utah Code 20A-3a-401

56 Utah Code 20A-3a-401

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 63

 These areas are covered in Chapter 4 of this report.

The Legislature enacted Utah Code to require regular signature verification

audits.57 The Legislature also enacted statute to permit—but not require—the
LG’s Office to make Administrative Rules to establish specific requirements or
procedures related to the statutorily required signature audits.58 No
Administrative Rules have yet been created; election officials follow the process
and requirements for regular signature audits provided in existing statute.59

57 Utah Code 20A-3a-402.5

58 Utah Code 20A-3a-401.1
59 Utah Code 20A-3a-402.5

64 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

This recommendation was based on language in statute, which stated, “An
election officer may not count the ballot of an individual whom the election
officer contacts… unless… the election officer receives a signed affidavit from the
individual… or is otherwise able to establish contact with the individual to confirm the
individual’s identity…” [emphasis added].

In 2023, the portion emphasized above was removed. Instead, statute now states
that the only way to verify a person’s identity is to “[require]the individual to
provide at least two types of personal identifying information for the
individual…”60 In addition to the two forms of ID, a signed affidavit is required,
thus, removing the opportunity to cure over the phone. That said, clerks can and
should still consider the phone as a viable option to inform voters about the need
to cure their ballot.

In 2023, the Legislature passed statute giving the Office of the Legislative
Auditor General the task to perform a comprehensive audit of the state’s election
system in each even-numbered year.61 This statute also expands upon our office’s
legal authority, clarifying auditors’ full access to all election processes and
records necessary to assess election operations.

In addition to the biennial legislative audit of elections, the Legislature also

enacted a new section of statute related to post-election audits.62 Under this new
section, the Legislature included explicit language regarding post-election audit
independence, stating, “An election officer shall ensure that, when an audit is
conducted of work done during ballot processing, the individual who performs
the audit does not audit the individual’s own work.” The Utah Elections
Handbook lays out the process for post-election audits, which is similar to a draft
policy from the LG’s office.

60 Utah Code 20A-3a-401

61 This bill enacted Utah Code 36-12-15.2.
62 Utah Code 20A-1-108

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 65

 In Chapter 1 of this audit, we report findings from our review of post-election
audit practices in all 29 counties. Although the statute is now clear in its
requirement for independence in post-election auditing, we observed counties
that were not in compliance. We therefore made a new, locally focused
recommendation (see Recommendation 1.5 in this, 2024 report) for clerks to
ensure they preserve the independence that is so vital to valid audit conclusions.

As mentioned in response to recommendation 5.1, the Legislature enacted a new

section of statute63 governing post-election audits. This new law requires the
LG’s Office to study methods to improve post-election audits, including
evaluating different risk-limiting audit methods and other confirmation
methods.

The LG’s Office contracted with three professors from Utah universities to
complete this study. The contract included a discussion about different risk-
limiting audit methods and recommendations for how to proceed with a pilot
program if the Legislature so desired. As required in statute, the study was
presented to the Government Operations Interim Committee in November 2023.

63 Utah Code 20A-1-108

66 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

We noted in the 2022 audit that the role of the Lieutenant Governor as the
general supervisory authority over all elections was ambiguous and we
recommended clarity to help ensure weaknesses in election controls did not
continue.

In response to our findings and recommendations, the Legislature enacted a new

section of statute.64 In direct response to this recommendation, the new statutory
language clarified the Lieutenant Governor’s (LG) election-related duties and
authority, giving the LG the power to enforce compliance with all legal
requirements relating to elections. This statute also explicitly gives the LG full
access to election records, meetings, and staff as necessary to fulfill these new
duties.

The LG’s Office exercised the new oversight and enforcement authority created
in statute when it identified significant compliance and performance deficiencies
in Cache County’s election processes. The LG’s Office completed a
comprehensive review of election processes in Cache and issued 31
recommendations to the Cache County clerk to correct what it called, “an
unprecedented lack of controls, widespread violations of Utah election law and

64 Utah Code 20A-1-105

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 67

 administrative, [and] a pointed disregard for policy and practices established by
[the LG’s Office].” 65

Our audit suggested that training could help ensure that clerks were both
understanding and implementing best practices. Utah Code gives the Lieutenant
Governor the responsibility to oversee training.66 Codified in 2023, it includes
language that requires election officers to complete the trainings designed by the
LG’s Office. In partnership with Weber State University, the LG’s Office has
created a required training for election officers to provide ”the skills needed to
carry free, fair, and secure elections into the future…”.

65 A Review of Cache County Elections, Office of the Lieutenant Governor

66 Utah Code 20A-1-107

68 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

The Legislature appropriated money to the LG’s Office to fund a full-time
position to train election officers. The LG’s Office also released a new election
handbook in May 2024. In its own words, the handbook was created “to ensure
elections are administered fairly and securely in the state of Utah. This handbook
outlines Utah Code and policies that counties must adhere to, while also
including various tips to promote election integrity across the state.”

Topics covered in the handbook include elections steps from redistricting all the
way through to canvass and retention.

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 69

70 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
Agency Response Plan

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 71

72 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System
 ‭S‬‭TATE‬ ‭OF‬ ‭U‬‭TAH‬
‭O‭F‬ FICE‬‭OF THE‬ ‭L‭I‬EUTENANT‬ ‭G‬‭OVERNOR

‭D‬‭EIDRE‬‭M. H‬‭ENDERSON‬
‭L‭I‬EUTENANT‬ ‭G‬‭OVERNOR

‭December 2, 2024‬

‭ uditor General Kade Minchey‬

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‭Office of the Legislative Auditor General‬

‭Dear Mr. Minchey,‬

‭ he past few years have been a period of rapid evolution for Utah’s election systems. In‬
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‭addition to implementing numerous statutory changes, my office has initiated substantial‬
‭operational improvements in our efforts to faithfully discharge our constitutional and statutory‬
‭duties. Safeguarding the voting rights of Utah citizens is an honor and responsibility that my staff‬
‭and I treasure.‬

‭ s you mentioned to me during your first audit of Utah’s election systems in 2022,‬
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‭performance audits are not designed to point out what we are doing right. In that light, I would‬
‭like to share some of the proactive steps my office has taken to ensure that state law is being‬
‭followed and our election systems are robust, secure, and accessible to the voters.‬

I‭ n 2021 we created an election processes and procedures training program for counties as‬
‭well as a manual outlining best practices. Last year we gratefully received funding from the‬
‭legislature to formalize the program with the hiring of a training coordinator. These trainings‬
‭provide a bi-weekly forum for election officials to review statutory obligations, discuss election‬
‭procedures, and ask and answer questions. The feedback from county clerks and their staff has‬
‭been overwhelmingly positive, especially given that many clerks are in their first term of office‬
‭and many of their employees are new to their roles. This is the first time in Utah history that the‬
‭Office of the Lieutenant Governor has offered any such training.‬

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 73

 ‭ rior to the passage of HB 448, my office established the Olene Walker Vote Certification‬
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‭program in partnership with county clerks and Weber State University. The program allows‬
‭election officials to complete 10 classes taught by subject matter experts over a three-year period.‬
‭These classes are designed to provide a general overview of the state’s election laws and help‬
‭officials develop needed skills to be successful in the state’s elections sphere. In recognition of‬
‭the positive impact the program has had on the state’s election officers, HB 448 appropriated‬
‭funding and made certification mandatory for clerks and their senior staff members.‬

‭ o provide further support, my office also established a county liaison program, assigning‬
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‭each of our election coordinators to oversee specific counties. Coordinators serve as first contacts‬
‭for county election officials, are responsible for quarterly visits, provide training, and support‬
‭county clerks as they fulfill their election-related duties. Our office motto is, “You can’t govern‬
‭from Capitol Hill.” Getting out of the office and into the counties has been invaluable for my‬
‭small staff to build relationships and rapport with each of their counties, as well as provide‬
‭needed oversight.‬

‭ e have also made improvements to the state’s voter registration rolls. In addition to‬
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‭completing statutory audit requirements, my office also implemented quarterly voter registration‬
‭audits - far above what is required by law. These audits have provided opportunities for training‬
‭and correction to clerks as they maintain the voter registration database in their respective‬
‭counties and significantly increased the accuracy of the voter registration database.‬

‭ y office has used our statutory oversight authority to enforce compliance with Utah’s‬
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‭election code. For example, we conducted a sweeping review of the former Cache County‬
‭Clerk’s handling of the 2023 Primary and General Elections. The report, “A Review of Cache‬
‭County Elections,” exposed some concerning administrative practices and eventually led to the‬
‭resignation of one official and the prosecution of another. Additionally, my office completed a‬
‭report on Utah County’s 2024 Primary Election, and published the report titled, “Utah County‬
‭2024 Primary Election Review,” a few months ago.‬

‭ t my request, the Attorney General’s Office launched an investigation into a former‬

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‭Juab County Clerk after the current clerk discovered and reported discrepancies and alleged‬
‭violations of Utah election law. This investigation led to charges which are now pending in the‬
‭courts. Lastly, in a concerted effort to enforce the statutory requirements of the signature‬
‭gathering process, my office uncovered potential fraud and referred the information to the‬
‭Attorney General’s Office for investigation. As a result, 13 individuals were charged for alleged‬
‭fraud and/or forgeries related to candidate nomination petitions. Two of those individuals have‬
‭already pleaded guilty.‬

74 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

 ‭ dditionally, in the past two years we have been the subject of five audits and 20‬
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‭lawsuits, sixteen of which have been related to election issues such as ballot access, initiative‬
‭process, petition signatures, GRAMA requests, and election contests. Thus far, the courts have‬
‭upheld my office’s actions in every instance.‬

‭ y staff and I take our oversight role seriously and will continue to ensure that Utah’s‬
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‭election laws are being followed. Given the tumultuous nature of elections, increased public‬
‭scrutiny of those who administer them, and extensive changes to our election systems in recent‬
‭years, I am continually inspired by the dedication and professionalism demonstrated by the vast‬
‭majority of Utah’s election officials. These are not easy times to administer elections, and I‬
‭applaud them for the work that they do.‬

‭ he successes outlined above represent only a fraction of what we have done over the‬
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‭past four years to tangibly improve and strengthen Utah elections. My office remains committed‬
‭to the continued improvement and success of the state’s system of elections and the county clerks‬
‭who administer them. We look forward to working with various stakeholders to discuss potential‬
‭legislative changes and the steps needed to implement the appropriate recommendations made in‬
‭this report.‬

‭Sincerely,‬

‭Deidre M. Henderson‬

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 75

 ‭Recommendation Responses:‬

‭ ecommendation 1.1:‬‭We recommend that the Utah’s county‬‭clerks learn and execute all post-election‬
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‭audit process requirements and procedures.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭This recommendation is to clerks. Copies‬‭of the audit policy have been made available to‬
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‭every county clerk. Prior to each election, training is provided to the county clerks and the individuals in‬
‭their offices who oversee post-election audits. Between the 2024 Primary and General Elections, audit‬
‭training was held twice in person and online. Additional contact was made with each county clerk’s office‬
‭to explain the post-election audit process and answer questions.‬

‭ ecommendation 1.2:‬‭We recommend that the director‬‭of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant‬
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‭Governor create Administrative Rules to establish requirements and procedures for post-election audits.‬

‭ ho:‬‭Ryan Cowley - Director of Elections‬

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‭What:‬‭In the interest of identifying effective post-election‬‭audit procedures, the Office of the Lieutenant‬
‭Governor has created policies for clerks to follow as they conduct their post-election audits. Based on the‬
‭feedback provided by clerks and other relevant stakeholders, this office has continued to refine those‬
‭policies with the eventual objective of creating an effective administrative rule. Given the significant time‬
‭it takes to both create and change administrative rules, this office thought it prudent to identify and test‬
‭best practices as policies prior to implementing them as an administrative rule. Furthermore, we‬
‭strengthened our audit policy to require hand count audits between the June Primary and the Presidential‬
‭Election. Policy from the lieutenant governor carries the force of law (Utah Code 20A-1-106(2)). Initially‬
‭utilizing policies rather than administrative rule has allowed us to quickly make needed changes and‬
‭accommodate small and large counties.‬
‭How:‬‭With the 2024 election now complete, the Office‬‭of the Lieutenant Governor will solicit feedback‬
‭from county clerks regarding the post-election audit procedures and make additional changes as needed.‬
‭Once both clerks and this office feel that the policy has been properly tested, we will begin the process of‬
‭creating an administrative rule.‬
‭Documentation:‬‭The administrative rule will be posted‬‭on the state’s administrative rule website.‬
‭Timetable/When:‬‭The Office of the Lieutenant Governor‬‭anticipates this will be completed by the end of‬
‭2025.‬

‭ ecommendation 1.3:‬‭We recommend that when the Office‬‭of the Lieutenant Governor creates‬
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‭Administrative Rules for post-election audits, the requirements and procedures should clearly account for‬
‭the equipment limitations in smaller counties.‬

‭ ho:‬‭Ryan Cowley - Director of Elections‬

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‭What/How:‬‭The current audit policy accounts for all‬‭types of equipment. This will be reflected in the‬
‭administrative rule referred to in Recommendation 1.2. The post-election audit policy analyzed in this‬
‭report was changed before this legislative audit was complete. Additionally, we provided funding to‬
‭smaller counties for the purchase of equipment and supplies necessary to comply with the updated audit‬
‭requirements.‬

70 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

76
‭ ecommendation 1.4:‬‭We recommend that the director of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant‬
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‭Governor clarify the swearing-in requirements and procedures in the Administrative Rule governing‬
‭post-election audits.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭The current audit policy states, “Before‬‭beginning the audit, the county clerk, or their‬
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‭designee, shall swear in any individual who is participating in the audit.” The Office of the Lieutenant‬
‭Governor will clarify the swearing in requirement in its post election audit policies and administrative‬
‭rule(s). We will also consider specific directions regarding employees who have previously been sworn‬
‭in. This will be reflected in the administrative rule referred to in Recommendation 1.2.‬

‭ ecommendation 1.5:‬‭We recommend that the county clerks‬‭ensure that individuals from outside their‬
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‭office participate in post-election audits as required in statute and other applicable standards.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭This recommendation is to the county clerks.‬‭The current audit policy requires, “At least two‬
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‭auditors must be present at all times and only one individual per duo can be a full-time employee of the‬
‭clerk’s, or clerk/auditor’s office when the offices are combined.”‬

‭ ecommendation 1.6:‬‭We recommend that the director‬‭of elections within the Office of the Lieutenant‬
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‭Governor create clearer requirements for how clerks should attest to post-election audits in the‬
‭Administrative Rule governing post-election audits.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭The current iteration of the post-election‬‭audit policy is just over three pages and requires the‬
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‭following: “After the audit, the individuals who performed the audit shall sign an affidavit that identifies‬
‭the number of ballots/machines/signatures that were audited and lists all exceptions that were found.”‬
‭Each person involved in the audit should sign an affidavit that identifies what they audited and explain‬
‭any discrepancies found. This same language can be added to the rule referred to in Recommendation 1.2‬
‭once it is written.‬

‭ ecommendation 2.1:‬‭We recommend that the Office of‬‭the Lieutenant Governor compare the records of‬
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‭deceased individuals from the Office of Vital Records and Statistics to the state’s official voter list—at‬
‭least 90 days prior to each primary and general election—to ensure deceased voters have been removed‬
‭from the voter list.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭We agree with this recommendation. As this‬‭was a finding in the 2022 legislative audit, our‬
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‭office has made a concerted effort to comply with the requirements outlined in statute. Using the tools that‬
‭were available to us, we feel that we have complied with this recommendation. Neither the Office of the‬
‭Lieutenant Governor nor the county clerks want deceased individuals to be on the state’s voter rolls or for‬
‭another individual to attempt to vote in their behalf. This has highlighted shortcomings in the processes‬
‭related to deceased voters which we will work to improve. However, additional context is necessary to‬
‭understand why we feel we have complied and what steps we will take to prevent similar issues going‬
‭forward.‬

‭ he process by which information for deceased individuals is sent to county clerks for review is as‬
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‭follows: the Division of Vital Records (DVR) prepares a list of decedents that is sent to the Department of‬
‭Technology Services (DTS). DTS then uploads this list to the state’s voter registration system (VRS). The‬

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 77

 ‭ nce uploaded, those records are made available to county clerks. Using the information provided, clerks‬
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‭review the list to determine if the individual is registered to vote in their county. Assuming the person is‬
‭registered and the personal information matches, the clerks then remove the deceased individual from the‬
‭voter rolls.‬

‭1. S ‭ everal potential failure points create the possibility of data gaps in the current system. If DVR
‭fails to provide the list to DTS, the list is not available for clerks to review. If DTS fails to upload
‭the list to the state’s VRS, the list is not available for clerks to review. To prevent this from
‭occurring, our office will implement regular checks with both DVR and DTS to ensure that files
‭have been properly transmitted, received, and loaded into the VRS in a timely fashion. Based on
‭our own internal analysis, occasionally files were either not sent by the DVR or properly loaded
‭into the VRS by DTS. The State Registrar in DVS is statutorily required to provide a list of all
‭deceased individuals within five business days of issuing a death certification (see Utah Code
‭26B-8-114(11). Regular checks will ensure that these gaps are closed.
‭2. ‭At least 120 days prior to each election, we should be given a complete list of all deceased
‭individuals from the DVR from the date the list was last requested by our office. It is worth
‭noting that this list was initially denied to us over privacy and NDA concerns, but readily
‭available to the auditors for the purpose of this audit. We ask that the legislature mandate that this
‭list be provided to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor by the DVR no later than 120 days
‭before each election or upon request. This list will then be compared to the state’s voter
‭registration database to ensure that all deceased voters have been removed. The Office of the
‭Lieutenant Governor does not perform voter registrations or removals. Any deceased individuals
‭found on this list will be provided to the appropriate county clerk for additional review and
‭removal.
‭3. ‭The Office of the Lieutenant Governor will create a training module for voter list maintenance.
‭This module will be required for all clerks and their staff who perform those functions. This
‭training will cover removing deceased voters, how to utilize secondary sources such as obituaries,
‭and will supplement the guidance, training, and instructions currently provided by our office.
‭4. ‭The failure points described above led to potentially two deceased voters casting ballots in the
‭2023 General Election. One of the two deceased voters was never loaded into the VRS. The
‭information for the second deceased voter had been provided to the county clerk who determined
‭that the data for that individual did not match the voter registration record.

‭ nce we became aware of the 1,400 potential deceased voters in late September, we took immediate‬
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‭action to ensure they were reviewed by the county clerks before the General Election. This meant sending‬
‭the entire list of potential matches to each respective county clerk. Our office also reviewed over 450 of‬
‭the active records, and provided detailed information to each clerk including notes on secondary sources‬
‭such as obituaries.‬

78 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

‭ ecommendation 2.2:‬‭We recommend that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor better use its data‬
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‭analyst position to do regular, proactive analysis of Utah’s voter list to find and correct any problems and‬
‭improve election integrity.‬

‭ ho:‬‭Ryan Cowley - Director of Elections‬

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‭What:‬‭While this legislative audit has uncovered some gaps that will help us improve, we respectfully‬
‭disagree with the claim that we have not properly utilized staff to regularly and proactively monitor and‬
‭ensure voter list maintenance. Prior to and in response to the legislative audit conducted in 2022, our‬
‭office has gone to great lengths to improve the accuracy of the state’s voter rolls. Some of our efforts‬
‭include:‬

‭
● ‭ uarterly registration audits for every county (see description below).
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‭● ‭Registration training for all clerks. This office has also provided on-site training for new or
‭struggling clerks and their staff.
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● ‭Implementing monthly voter list maintenance certifications posted on vote.utah.gov.
‭● ‭Regularly checking duplicate and deceased queues for counties to ensure they are being promptly
‭and properly processed.
‭
● ‭Checking deceased queues prior to each election to ensure clerks have removed deceased voters.
‭● ‭Improved ERIC processes and verification.
‭● ‭Providing monthly USPS National Change of Address (NCOA) lists to clerks. Previously, this
‭was done only once per year, if at all.
‭
● ‭Precinct mapping checks to ensure voters are placed into the correct voting precinct.
‭● ‭Alternative address cleanup to ensure ballots are being mailed accurately.
‭● ‭Regular checks during the election to ensure that the old ballot of a voter who has moved is
‭spoiled and that the voter receives the proper ballot for their new precinct.

‭ his work has been performed by the data analyst and/or other staff. These staff members perform other‬
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‭analyses on the state’s VRS as well.‬

‭ nsuring the state’s VRS database is current and clean was a priority for this office and the county clerks‬
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‭prior to the 2022 audit and this audit, and continues to be a priority moving forward. Clerks spend a‬
‭considerable amount of time proactively cleansing the voter rolls. More importantly, our office has made‬
‭a concerted effort and focus on ensuring new and recent registrations are performed correctly. One such‬
‭example is a quarterly registration audit.‬

‭ tate law mandates an annual voter registration audit with a biennial report to the legislature. We have‬
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‭elected to do an additional quarterly audit on a random sample of registrations from each county. During‬
‭these quarterly audits, the Office of the Lieutenant Governor teams up with clerks and their staff to audit a‬
‭county other than their own. During these audits, they check for duplicate registrations, deceased voters,‬
‭voter eligibility, proper voter registration documentation, verification of voter addresses, ID verification,‬
‭voter privacy status, voter signatures on file, correct date of birth, and correct party affiliation.‬

‭ uarterly registration‬‭audits are designed to ensure voter registrations are properly completed by clerks‬
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‭and that all required registration data and documentation is properly recorded in the VRS. These audits‬

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 79

 h‭ ave been demonstrably successful. The following chart is from our internal quarterly audits which‬
‭review a number of data points from voter registration records. It shows a steady decline in findings - a‬
‭strong indicator that the voter list is getting better with each passing audit and training provided by our‬
‭office.‬

‭ astly, this legislative audit found that there are 300 potential registration duplicates in the state’s VRS.‬
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‭While having ZERO duplicate registrations is our goal, context is helpful. There are 2,073,844 registered‬
‭voters in Utah, making the voter rolls 99.9855% free from duplicates. This office will continue to review‬
‭the state’s VRS to ensure that all duplicates are removed.‬

‭ ow:‬‭In addition to the quarterly registration audits,‬‭the Office of the Lieutenant Governor will enhance‬
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‭its review processes and make appropriate changes to comply with this audit’s interpretation of the law.‬
‭Documentation:‬‭Clerks are required to certify their voter registration maintenance to the Office of the‬
‭Lieutenant Governor. This is then posted on‬‭vote.utah.gov‬‭. The Office of the Lieutenant Governor will‬
‭post a certification that the review has been completed 90 days prior to each election.‬
‭Timetable/When:‬‭The Office of the Lieutenant Governor‬‭will enhance its review process for each‬
‭election going forward.‬

‭ ecommendation 2.3:‬‭We recommend that the Legislature consider requiring the Office of the Lieutenant‬
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‭Governor to regularly and proactively analyze the voter registration list in support of the office’s‬
‭oversight of voter list maintenance.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭See response to 2.1 and 2.2. If the Legislature determines additional legislation is necessary,‬
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‭our office will, of course, comply.‬

80 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

‭ ecommendation 2.4:‬‭We recommend that the Legislature consider requiring in statute additional‬
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‭processes or automated risk assessments to flag potential issues within voter rolls.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭See response to 2.1 and 2.2. If the Legislature determines additional legislation is necessary,‬
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‭our office will, of course, comply.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.1:‬‭We recommend that the county clerks‬‭follow the statute and batch immediately‬
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‭after collecting ballots.‬

‭Response:‬‭This is a recommendation to clerks. Training‬‭has been created and distributed.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.2:‬‭We recommend that any counties in which all ballot processing areas are not‬
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‭adequately monitored apply to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor for election funding to purchase the‬
‭equipment needed to comply with statute.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭This is a recommendation to clerks. Each‬‭clerk who has requested money for this has received‬
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‭it.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.3:‬‭We recommend that the Legislature consider whether the wording in Utah Code‬
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‭20A-3a-401.1(5)(g) should be amended to better guide ballot video monitoring practices.‬

‭Response:‬‭This is a recommendation to the Legislature.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.4:‬‭We recommend that the state election‬‭director within the Office of the Lieutenant‬
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‭Governor amend the chain of custody requirement in Administrative Rule to bring the monitoring‬
‭requirement in line with statute.‬

‭ ho:‬‭Ryan Cowley - Director of Elections‬

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‭What:‬‭The administrative rule will be updated to bring‬‭the monitoring requirement in line with statute.‬
‭How:‬‭N/A.‬
‭Documentation:‬‭The administrative rule will be posted‬‭on the state’s administrative rule website.‬
‭Timetable/When:‬‭The Office of the Lieutenant Governor‬‭anticipates this will be completed before the‬
‭2025 Municipal Primary Election.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.5:‬‭We recommend that the Legislature‬‭consider creating a single, centralized code‬
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‭section that outlines public reporting requirements for election data, allowing other relevant sections to‬
‭reference this consolidated provision for clarity and consistency.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭This is a recommendation to the Legislature. We agree that reporting requirements are‬

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‭onerous, need to be simplified and put into a consolidated section of code.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.6:‬‭We recommend that the county clerks ensure that they understand and follow the‬
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‭ballot reconciliation process in Utah Code 20A-4-109.‬

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 81

 ‭ esponse:‬‭This is a recommendation to the clerks. The Office of the Lieutenant Governor included‬
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‭clarification to the reconciliation statute which was passed in SB37 during the 2024 General Legislative‬
‭Session. Multiple training sessions have been provided on this process.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.7:‬‭We recommend that the Office of Lieutenant Governor explore all options within‬
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‭its legal powers to help ensure that clerks understand and follow ballot reconciliation requirements in‬
‭statute.‬

‭ ho:‬‭Ryan Cowley - Director of Elections‬

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‭What:‬‭The Office of the Lieutenant Governor is in‬‭compliance with this recommendation. In three‬
‭instances the lieutenant governor has exercised her oversight authority to ensure county clerks comply‬
‭with this statutory mandate. This includes the review done of Cache County elections (2023), a letter to‬
‭the Utah County Clerk (2023), and a report issued to the Utah County Clerk (2024).‬

‭ dditionally, this office requires each county to provide us with a standardized canvass statistics report‬
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‭along with their canvass materials. For this report, county clerks are required to reconcile the number of‬
‭vote histories against the number of ballots counted. They must also account for any differences. These‬
‭county reports are available on‬‭www.vote.utah.gov‬‭.‬‭The Office of the Lieutenant Governor will continue‬
‭to monitor these reports and counties’ efforts to reconcile. As in the past, we will address concerns‬
‭through training and directly with clerks as warranted.‬
‭How:‬‭N/A.‬
‭Documentation:‬‭N/A.‬
‭Timetable/When:‬‭The Office of the Lieutenant Governor‬‭will continue to monitor compliance moving‬
‭forward and take action as needed.‬

‭ ecommendation 3.8:‬‭We recommend that the county clerks‬‭ensure that they adhere to all the‬
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‭requirements in statute and rule regarding ballot pickup and intake.‬

‭Response:‬‭This is a recommendation to the clerks.‬‭Training has been provided.‬

‭ ecommendation 4.1:‬‭We recommend that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor fulfil the statutory‬
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‭requirement to establish criteria and processes in Administrative Rule for poll workers to use in‬
‭determining if a signature is reasonably consistent with the signature on file for the voter.‬

‭ esponse:‬‭This recommendation is duplicative of recommendation‬‭1.3 from “A Performance Audit of the‬

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‭Signature Verification Process” conducted by OLAG earlier this year:‬

‭ Recommendation 1.3 The Office of the Lieutenant Governor should further clarify what‬
“
‭“substantially similar” and “reasonably consistent” mean in the context of signature‬
‭verification.”‬‭https://olag.utleg.gov/olag-doc/2024-16_RPT.pdf‬

‭ his criterion is part of statutorily required training for each individual performing signature verification‬
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‭and can be clarified even further as outlined in our response to the signature verification process audit.‬

82 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System

‭ ecommendation 4.2:‬‭We recommend that the Legislature consider amending Utah Code 20A-1-108(5)‬
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‭to renew the requirement for the study of options to improve election-related signature quality, including a‬
‭target date for completion and a requirement that the LG’s office report back on the process.‬

‭Response:‬‭This is a recommendation to the Legislature.‬

Office of the Legislative Auditor General 83

74 A Performance Audit of Utah’s Election System