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Telecom Law

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158 views13 pages

Telecom Law

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aneeta.felix
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Bharti Airtel Ltd vs Reliance Industries Ltd

Facts:
- Bharti Airtel filed a complaint against Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL) and its subsidiary
Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd (RJIL) alleging violations of competition laws under Sections 3 and
4 of the Competition Act, 2002.
- The allegations included that RJIL was using its dominant position to offer predatory
pricing, supported financially by RIL.
- Bharti Airtel contended that RJIL’s strategy of offering services at zero cost was intended to
eliminate competition, supported by RIL's resources, which they argued constituted abuse of
dominant position and anti-competitive practices.

Issue:

- Whether RJIL and RIL’s actions constituted abuse of dominant position and whether their
pricing strategy was predatory, violating Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

Rule:
- Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002: Prohibits anti-competitive agreements that have the
potential to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India.

- Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002: Prohibits the abuse of dominant position by any
enterprise.

Application:

- The Competition Commission of India (CCI) evaluated whether RJIL held a dominant
position in the telecom market, considering factors such as market share, economic power,
and the dependency of consumers on the company.
- The CCI determined that while RJIL had a significant market share, it did not have a
dominant position because the market had multiple competitors and consumers were not
dependent solely on RJIL.
- Regarding the claim of predatory pricing, CCI concluded that the services offered by RJIL
for free could not be classified as anti-competitive without evidence that the pricing was
intended to eliminate competition. Furthermore, RJIL was a new entrant in the market, and its
pricing strategy was seen as penetration pricing rather than predatory pricing.

Conclusion:

- The CCI dismissed Bharti Airtel's complaint, ruling that RJIL’s actions were legitimate
competitive practices and did not amount to abuse of dominant position or predatory pricing.
The complaint was not upheld under Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

This case illustrates the complexities in distinguishing between competitive and anti-
competitive practices, particularly in dynamic markets like telecommunications. The decision
underscores the importance of considering a variety of factors beyond market share when
assessing dominance and the intent behind pricing strategies.
RENO v. ACLU

FIRAC Analysis: Case on the 1996 Communications Decency Act

Facts:

- The 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA) criminalized the intentional transmission of
"obscene or indecent" messages and prohibited the transmission of material deemed
"offensive" by community standards if it depicted sexual or excretory activities or organs.
- Twenty plaintiffs, including the ACLU, challenged the CDA on First Amendment grounds,
arguing that it imposed unconstitutional restrictions on free speech.
- The district court issued injunctions against enforcing the challenged provisions, leading the
government to appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue:
- Whether the provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violated the First
Amendment by imposing overly broad restrictions on free speech.

Rule:
- The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, including the transmission of content
over the Internet. Any restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored and cannot broadly
suppress speech that is protected.

Application:
- The Supreme Court found that the CDA's provisions were vaguely worded, failing to
adequately define "indecent" or "patently offensive" material. This vagueness created a risk
of criminalizing legitimate, non-pornographic content with educational or social value.

- The Court rejected the government's argument that the CDA was necessary to protect
minors, noting that the Internet was not as invasive as other media like radio or television and
that the provisions placed an unnecessary burden on protected speech.

- The Court also found that the Act’s defenses, such as site coding and age verification, were
insufficient to protect free speech and could impose prohibitive costs on non-commercial
sites.

Conclusion:
- The U.S. Supreme Court held that the provisions of the CDA were unconstitutional because
they imposed an overly broad and vague restriction on free speech. The Act failed to meet the
requirement of narrow tailoring necessary to justify restrictions on First Amendment rights,
leading the Court to affirm the district court's ruling against the CDA.

Objectives of the National Telecom Policy, 1994


The main objectives of the 1994 Policy[1]were:
• Telecommunication to be accessible to all (telephone on demand)
• Universal service (access to basic telecom services for all at a reasonable and
affordable price)
• ‘world standard’ quality of service
• Better customer services through efficient complaint redressal systems and
dispute resolution mechanisms.
• Growth in manufacturing and export of telecom equipment.
• Protect the defence and security interest of India.
The target of the National Telecom Policy, 1994 was further revised due to rapid economic
growth. The revised targets were:
• Telephone to be available on demand by 1997.
• All villages in India should have access to basic telephone services by 1997.
• In urban area, a PCO should be provided for every 500 persons by 1997.
• To make available value added services and to raise telecom services in India to
international standard within the 8th Five year Plan (1992-1997), preferably by
1996.

New Telecom Policy, 1999


The New Telecom Policy, 1999 was formulated on the basis of the report of
Group on Telecommunication. The Government, constituted a high level Group
on Telecommunication (GoT) to review the existing telecom policy i.e., the
National Telecom Policy, 1994. The main reason for a new telecom policy was
that the goals of the National Telecom policy, 1994 were not achieved within the
stipulated time period and on the other hand there was immense growth in
information and communication technology, this led to the need for a change in
the telecom policy.

Objectives
The objectives of the New Telecom Policy, 1999 were:

• Access to affordable and effective means of telecommunication for all citizens.


Strike a balance between universal services to all uncovered areas and high level
services.
• Encourage development of telecommunication facilities in remote, hilly and
tribal areas of the country.
• Formation of a modern and efficient telecommunication system based on
convergence of IT, media, telecom and consumer electronics to propel India into
becoming an IT superpower.
• To alter PCO’s, wherever justified into Public Tele-info Centres having
multimedia capability like ISDN services, remote database access, government
and community information systems etc.
• Strive to transform in a time bound manner a competitive telecommunication
system in both rural and urban areas.
• Achieve efficiency and transparency in spectrum management. Protect the
defence & security interests of the country. Enable Indian Telecom Companies
to become truly global players.
• Encourage research and development efforts in the country.

Targets of the New Telecom Policy, 1999


• Access to telephone on demand by the year 2002 and sustain it thereafter to
achieve a tele density of 7 by the year 2005 and 15 by the year 2015.
• Encourage development of affordable telecommunication system in rural areas
and making rural communication mandatory for all fixed service providers
• Provide reliable transmission media in all rural areas and increase the rural tele-
density from the current level of 0.4 to 4.0 in 2010.
• Make available internet access to all district headquarters by the year 2000.
• Access to high speed internet and multimedia capabilities using ISDN to all
towns with a population over 2 lakh by the year 2002.

Telecom Policy of 1994 vs 1999

1994 1999
Focus Emphasized privatization and Focused on establishing a robust
liberalization of the telecom regulatory framework and
sector. promoting competition.

Licensing Introduced licensing for private Shifted to a revenue-sharing


operators in basic services. model for licensing fees instead of
upfront payments.
Service Aimed at increasing basic Prioritized expanding cellular and
Coverage telephone services. internet services nationwide.

Technology Focused on wired telephony Encouraged the adoption of


infrastructure. wireless and digital technologies.

Market Allowed private sector entry Encouraged greater competition


Structure but with limited competition. and entry of multiple players.

Regulation Regulation was minimal and Strengthened the role of the


government-controlled. Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India (TRAI).
Role of TDSAT in Dispute Resolution

Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) was established under
Section 14 of the TRAI Act by the government in 2000. This tribunal is specifically
empowered to adjudicate disputes and hear appeals concerning the telecom sector. Here’s
how TDSAT operates in managing disputes:

Jurisdiction of TDSAT:

Adjudication of Disputes: TDSAT has the jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute between a
licensor (the government) and a licensee (telecom service provider), between two or more
service providers, and between service providers and consumers.

Hearing Appeals: TDSAT also hears appeals against any direction, decision, or order made
by TRAI.

Dispute Management by TDSAT:

Resolution of Interconnection Disputes: TDSAT handles disputes related to interconnection


agreements between service providers, which are common in the telecom sector. These
disputes often involve issues such as the terms of interconnection, charges, and the quality of
interconnection services.

Licensing Disputes: TDSAT adjudicates disputes concerning the terms and conditions of
telecom licenses, including the renewal and cancellation of licenses, compliance with license
terms, and penalties for violations.

Tariff Disputes: While TRAI sets the tariffs for telecom services, disputes regarding the
interpretation and application of tariff orders or the correctness of tariffs charged by service
providers are adjudicated by TDSAT.

Relevant Provisions:

Section 11 of the TRAI Act, 1997:

Section 11(1)(a): Empowers TRAI to make recommendations on the need and timing for the
introduction of new service providers and on the terms and conditions of licenses, which can
prevent disputes related to licensing.

Section 11(1)(b): Mandates TRAI to ensure compliance with license terms, regulate tariffs,
and monitor the quality of service, indirectly managing disputes by enforcing regulations and
standards.

Section 14 of the TRAI Act, 1997:

Establishes TDSAT to adjudicate disputes and hear appeals regarding telecom matters,
removing direct dispute resolution from TRAI’s responsibilities and focusing on a specialized
judicial body to handle conflicts in the telecom sector.
Section 14A to 14N of the TRAI Act, 1997:
Section 14A: Establishes the TDSAT, defines its composition, and outlines its powers and
functions.

Section 14B: Specifies that TDSAT has the authority to adjudicate any dispute between a
licensor and a licensee, between two or more service providers, and between service
providers and consumers.

Section 14C: Details the appellate jurisdiction of TDSAT, allowing it to hear and dispose of
appeals against any direction, decision, or order made by TRAI.

Conclusion:

While TRAI itself does not directly adjudicate disputes in the telecom sector, it plays a
crucial role in managing disputes through its regulatory functions, policy recommendations,
and consumer protection measures. TDSAT is the primary judicial body responsible for
resolving disputes in the telecom sector, ensuring a fair and efficient resolution of conflicts.
The division of responsibilities between TRAI and TDSAT allows for specialized and
effective regulation and dispute management in India’s telecom industry.

TRAI

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was established under the Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, to regulate the telecommunications sector in India.

Its primary objectives are to ensure transparency, promote competition, protect consumer
interests, and encourage technological innovation within the telecom industry. Here are the
functions, powers, and duties of TRAI with relevant provisions from the TRAI Act, 1997:

Functions/Duties of TRAI

Under Section 11 of the TRAI Act, 1997, TRAI is entrusted with a wide range of functions:

1. Regulation of Telecom Services (Section 11(1)(b)):

- Ensuring Compliance: Ensuring compliance with terms and conditions of the license by
service providers.

- Tariff Regulation: Fixing tariffs for telecom services provided within India and between
India and foreign countries. This includes reviewing tariffs to ensure they are fair and
reasonable, considering the consumer interest and the financial viability of the service
providers.

- Interconnection Regulations: Facilitating interconnection and ensuring the seamless


connectivity of all telecom networks and services. TRAI sets the framework for
interconnection agreements between service providers, ensuring that these agreements do not
adversely affect consumers or competition.
- Quality of Service (QoS): Laying down the standards of quality of service to be provided
by service providers, ensuring that consumers get good quality services. This includes setting
benchmarks for various parameters like call drop rates, voice clarity, data speeds, etc.

- Promotion of Efficiency: Promoting efficiency in the operation of telecommunications


services to facilitate competition and encourage growth within the sector.

2. Consumer Protection (Section 11(1)(b)(ii)):

- Advisory Role: Advising the Central Government on the need and timing for the
introduction of new services and on matters relating to the technological development of the
telecom industry.

- Consumer Grievances: Handling complaints and grievances from consumers regarding


telecom services and ensuring that service providers adhere to regulatory standards.

- Monitoring Compliance: Monitoring the performance of service providers, including their


adherence to QoS standards and consumer protection measures, and taking corrective actions
when necessary.

3. Promotion of Competition (Section 11(1)(b)(iv)):

- Market Entry and Exit: Making recommendations regarding the terms and conditions for
the entry of new players into the telecom market, as well as policies on mergers and
acquisitions in the telecom sector.

- Spectrum Management: Recommending measures to optimize the use of spectrum,


including spectrum sharing, trading, and pricing policies.
- Encouraging Investment: Creating a conducive environment for investment in the telecom
sector by ensuring regulatory stability and transparency.

4. Facilitation of Technological Innovation (Section 11(1)(b)(v)):

- Promotion of New Technologies: Encouraging the introduction and proliferation of new


technologies and services in the telecom sector to enhance user experience and drive industry
growth.
- Research and Development: Promoting research and development activities in the field of
telecommunications to foster innovation and enhance India’s technological capabilities.

5. Advisory Functions (Section 11(1)(a)):

- Policy Recommendations: Advising the Central Government on policy matters related to


telecom services, including the need for amendments to existing laws or the introduction of
new policies to address emerging challenges in the sector.

- Public Consultations: Conducting public consultations to gather inputs from various


stakeholders, including industry players, consumer groups, and experts, to inform its
recommendations to the government and ensure inclusive policy-making.

Powers of TRAI
1. Issuing Regulations and Directions (Section 36):

- TRAI has the power to issue regulations and directions to telecom service providers to
ensure compliance with the TRAI Act and other applicable laws. These regulations can cover
a wide range of issues, including tariffs, interconnection agreements, quality of service, and
consumer protection measures.

2. Conducting Investigations (Section 12):

- TRAI has the authority to conduct investigations into the affairs of any service provider if
there are grounds to believe that the provider is not complying with the terms and conditions
of its license or TRAI’s regulations. It can summon individuals, demand documents, and
require the attendance of witnesses during such investigations.

3. Levying Penalties (Section 20):

- TRAI can impose financial penalties on service providers who violate the terms and
conditions of their licenses or fail to comply with TRAI’s regulations and directions. These
penalties can be substantial, depending on the nature and severity of the violation.

4. Dispute Resolution (Section 14):

- TRAI was initially empowered to adjudicate disputes between service providers and
between service providers and consumers. However, with the establishment of the Telecom
Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) in 2000, TRAI’s dispute resolution
powers were transferred to TDSAT. TRAI now plays a more limited role in dispute
resolution, focusing on regulatory functions.

5. Monitoring and Enforcing Compliance (Section 11(1)(b)(vii)):

- TRAI has the power to monitor service providers’ compliance with its regulations and
directions, including conducting inspections and audits of service providers’ operations. It
can take enforcement actions, including imposing penalties or recommending license
suspension or cancellation, if service providers fail to comply with regulatory requirements.

Reliance Jio used a penetration pricing strategy to enter the Indian telecom
market by offering free services to rapidly attract a large customer base. Upon
its launch in 2016, Jio provided free unlimited 4G data and free voice calls
under its "Welcome Offer," which lasted until December 31, 2016. This
strategy was designed to disrupt the market by making high-quality data
services accessible to a wide audience at no cost, compelling users to switch to
Jio from other providers. By leveraging its advanced 4G VoLTE technology and
providing free services, Jio quickly amassed millions of subscribers, forcing
competitors to respond to the new market dynamics. This aggressive pricing
approach, known as "Disruptive Market Penetration," allowed Jio to establish
a dominant presence in a highly competitive market.
Reliance Jio used a penetration pricing strategy to disrupt and enter the Indian telecom
market effectively. Here's how:

1. Free Services: Jio launched its services with the "Welcome Offer" in 2016, providing free
unlimited 4G data and voice calls for several months. This strategy attracted a massive
number of users quickly, allowing Jio to penetrate a mature and competitive market.

2. Leveraging VoLTE Technology: Jio's use of VoLTE (Voice over Long-Term Evolution)
technology allowed it to offer HD voice calls over its 4G network, differentiating it from
competitors who used older circuit-switching technology. By not charging for data used in
voice calls, Jio effectively made voice calls free, which was a significant advantage.

3. Market Disruption: The aggressive pricing, especially offering data and voice services at
no cost initially, created a disruption in the market. This strategy forced competitors to
reassess their pricing models, while Jio rapidly built a substantial customer base.

4. Addressing Barriers: Jio faced significant challenges, including call drops due to network
congestion and resistance from established players who allegedly created hurdles. Despite
these issues, Jio encouraged users to take advantage of free data services while the call drop
issues were resolved, maintaining its customer base.

5. Dual SIM Strategy: Understanding that most Indian mobile users had dual-SIM phones, Jio
suggested using its free data services on one SIM while retaining the original operator for
voice calls, ensuring continued usage despite network issues.

6. Massive Subscriber Growth: The "Power of Free" approach enabled Jio to achieve rapid
subscriber growth, breaking records with over 16 million subscribers in just 26 days. This
aggressive penetration pricing helped Jio establish a dominant position in the market, leading
to sustained growth and eventually, profitability.

By offering services at such a low or zero cost initially, Jio managed to enter the market,
attract millions of users, and eventually force a market-wide shift in pricing and service
delivery models.

History of the Telecom Sector in India

The telecom sector in India has evolved significantly over the decades, transforming from a
state-controlled monopoly to a competitive, liberalized market. Here’s a brief overview:

1. Early Beginnings (1850s-1980s):


- The telecom journey in India began with the introduction of the telegraph in 1851 by the
British East India Company. Telephone services were introduced in 1881 in Calcutta.
- Post-independence, the telecom sector was controlled by the government, with the
Department of Telecommunications (DoT) managing all aspects of telephony. The sector was
characterized by a lack of competition and slow growth.

2. Liberalization and Reforms (1990s):


- The economic reforms of 1991 marked the beginning of liberalization in the telecom
sector. The National Telecom Policy of 1994 was a turning point, opening the sector to
private players and introducing competition in basic services and mobile telephony.
- The New Telecom Policy of 1999 further accelerated growth by shifting from fixed
license fees to a revenue-sharing model and establishing the Telecom Regulatory Authority
of India (TRAI) as the regulatory body.

3. Mobile Revolution (2000s):


- The 2000s saw explosive growth in mobile telephony, with the introduction of 2G
services and the entry of multiple private operators. Mobile phones became accessible to the
masses, leading to a sharp increase in teledensity.
- The launch of 3G services in 2009 and 4G services in 2012 further expanded the telecom
landscape, enhancing data connectivity and internet access.

4. Digital Era (2010s-Present):


- The entry of Reliance Jio in 2016 with its disruptive pricing strategy marked a new era in
the telecom sector, leading to a data revolution and further price wars.
- The government’s push for Digital India and the advent of 5G technology are shaping the
future of the telecom sector, focusing on digital connectivity, innovation, and services.

5. Current Landscape:
- The Indian telecom sector is one of the largest in the world, with millions of subscribers
and a highly competitive market. It has become a crucial enabler of economic growth, digital
services, and connectivity across the country.

The history of the telecom sector in India reflects its transformation from a slow-moving,
government-controlled entity to a dynamic and rapidly evolving industry that plays a vital
role in the country’s digital and economic landscape.

Short Note on Jurisdictional Conflicts Between CCI and TRAI – READ PDF

Overview:
The article discusses the jurisdictional conflicts between the Competition Commission of
India (CCI) and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI). It evaluates the legal
framework governing these conflicts and suggests ways to strengthen it.

the specific conflict of jurisdiction between CCI and TRAI. The Competition Act of 2002
empowers CCI to foster and maintain competitive practices in the Indian marketplace.
Meanwhile, the TRAI Act of 1997 mandates TRAI to create an environment conducive to
telecommunications sector growth, including promoting competition and operational
efficiency.

While both bodies aim to foster fair competition, their distinct mandates and methodologies
can lead to jurisdictional contentions. For example, TRAI might moderate tariffs to ensure
consumer affordability, while CCI could view such adjustments as potential predatory pricing
that obstructs market entry for new service providers.
1. Jurisdictional Overlap:

CCI regulates competition across all sectors, including telecom, while TRAI is a sector-
specific regulator. The overlap in their functions leads to conflicts, particularly in
competition-related matters.

2. Legislative Framework:

Sections 21 and 21A of the Competition Act, 2002, provide a consultation mechanism for
resolving disputes between CCI and sectoral regulators like TRAI. However, this mechanism
is discretionary and often ineffective, leading to conflicts and judicial intervention.

3. Bharti Airtel Case:

The Supreme Court’s decision in *CCI v. Bharti Airtel (2018)* introduced the "sequencing
approach," where CCI’s jurisdiction is delayed until TRAI concludes its proceedings. This
has led to concerns about delays and limitations on CCI’s powers.

4. Challenges:

The current framework lacks clarity, particularly in defining jurisdictional facts and the
timing of CCI’s involvement, leading to potential misuse and prolonged litigation.

5. Proposed Solution:

The article suggests a clear demarcation of roles by vesting exclusive powers of competition
regulation in CCI, similar to the EU model. Sectoral regulators like TRAI would focus solely
on their regulatory duties, while assisting CCI on competition matters within their sectors.

**Conclusion**:
The article emphasizes the need for legislative reform to clarify the roles of CCI and TRAI,
reduce jurisdictional conflicts, and ensure efficient regulation of competition in the telecom
sector.

Abuse of Dominant Position in the Indian Telecom Sector

In the Indian telecom sector, the concept of "abuse of dominant position" is governed by the
Competition Act, 2002, which prohibits any entity from misusing its market dominance to
stifle competition or harm consumers. Here’s a brief overview:

1. Definition of Dominance:
- A dominant position is defined as a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the
relevant market that enables it to operate independently of competitive forces or affect
competitors or consumers unfairly.

2. Regulatory Oversight:
- The Competition Commission of India (CCI) is responsible for investigating and
regulating instances of abuse of dominant position. It assesses factors like market share, size,
resources, and consumer dependence to determine dominance.

3. Examples of Abuse:
- Abuse can take various forms, including predatory pricing, refusal to deal, limiting
production or services, and unfair pricing. In the telecom sector, a dominant player could
potentially engage in these practices to eliminate competition.

4. Past Instances:

In the past, there have been allegations of abuse of dominance in the Indian telecom sector,
particularly in cases involving large operators using aggressive pricing strategies to
outcompete smaller players. For example, Reliance Jio's pricing strategies were scrutinized,
but the CCI ruled that Jio was not dominant when it launched and its pricing was not
predatory.

5. Current Scenario:

While the telecom market in India is highly competitive, with a few major players, there is a
constant watch for any anti-competitive behavior. The sector's dynamic nature and regulatory
framework make it challenging for any single player to sustain a dominant position without
scrutiny.

6. Conclusion:

While the Indian telecom sector has seen competition concerns, the regulatory environment,
including the role of CCI, helps prevent and address abuse of dominant position. Ongoing
vigilance is necessary to ensure that competition remains fair and that no entity misuses its
market power.

The CCI plays a crucial role in ensuring that dominant players in the telecom sector do not
engage in practices that could harm competition or consumer interests.

History of the internet:

1960s: The concept of a computer network emerged, leading to the development of


ARPANET by the US Department of Defense.

1970s: ARPANET expanded, and protocols like TCP/IP were developed to allow different
networks to communicate.

1980s: The National Science Foundation created NSFNET, connecting academic institutions.
The term "Internet" came into use.

1989: Tim Berners-Lee proposed the World Wide Web, a system for sharing information
over the Internet.
1990s: The Web became publicly available, leading to rapid growth in Internet usage. Web
browsers like Mosaic and Netscape Navigator were released.

2000s: Broadband connections became common, enabling faster speeds. Social media
platforms emerged.

2010s-present: Mobile internet usage surged with smartphones. Cloud computing, IoT, and
advanced web applications continue to shape the Internet's evolution.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has several important functions related to the
telecom sector in India.

1. Promoting competition: The CCI works to ensure fair competition in the telecom market,
preventing monopolistic practices and abuse of dominant positions.

2. Regulating mergers and acquisitions: It reviews and approves mergers, acquisitions, and
partnerships between telecom companies to prevent the formation of entities that could
unfairly dominate the market.

3. Investigating anti-competitive practices: The CCI investigates complaints of anti-


competitive behavior, such as price fixing, market allocation, or exclusive dealing
arrangements among telecom operators.

4. Imposing penalties: If violations are found, the CCI can impose fines and penalties on
companies engaging in anti-competitive practices.

5. Market studies: The CCI conducts research and analysis of the telecom sector to identify
potential competition issues and recommend policy changes.

6. Advocacy: It advises the government on competition-related matters in the telecom sector


and promotes awareness of competition law among industry stakeholders.

7. Ensuring consumer welfare: By maintaining a competitive environment, the CCI aims to


ensure that consumers benefit from better services, lower prices, and more choices in the
telecom market.

8. Overseeing spectrum allocation: While not directly responsible for spectrum allocation, the
CCI ensures that the process doesn't lead to unfair advantages for certain players.

9. Addressing predatory pricing: The CCI investigates and takes action against predatory
pricing practices that could harm competition in the long run.

Would you like me to elaborate on any of these functions or provide examples of CCI's
actions in the telecom sector?

AGR – READ FROM SITE

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