OCTOBER 2024 | VOLUME 30

AFRICA’S PULSE
AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES SHAPING AFRICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE

A
B C
TRANSFORMING
EDUCATION
FOR INCLUSIVE
GROWTH

THIS REPORT WAS PRODUCED BY THE OFFICE OF

THE CHIEF ECONOMIST FOR THE AFRICA REGION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report was produced by the Office of the Chief Economist for the Africa Region under
the overall guidance of Victoria Kwakwa and Ousmane Diagana. The team for this edition of
Africa’s Pulse was led by Andrew L. Dabalen and Cesar Calderon. The core team included
Megumi Kubota, Vijdan Korman, Heidi Kaila, Nicholas Woolley, Sena Kimm Gnangnon, Simeon
Koffi, and Ayan Qu.
Valuable contributions to the report were provided by Dawit Mekonnen, Dominik Peschel,
Muazu Ibrahim, and Tessy Vasquez Baos (section 1).
The special focus section of this volume on education was drafted by Ali Ansari, Dmitry
Chugunov, Martin Elias De Simone, Modibo Sidibe, Samer Al-Samarrai, and Tihtina Zenebe
Gebre. Their efforts, along with the overall guidance and support provided by Meskerem
Mulatu, Muna Salih Meky, Scherezad Joya Monami Latif, and Waly Wane, enriched this section.
The report was peer-reviewed by Dominik Peschel (section 1) and Halsey Rogers (section 2).
Specific comments and suggestions were received from Aneesa Arur, Flore de Préneuf, Chadi
Bou Habib, Gloria Aitalohi Joseph-Raji, Wilfried A. Kouame, Mark LaPrairie, Jean Nahrae
Lee, Dumisani Sihle Ngwenya, Ephrem Niyongabo, Albert Pijuan Sala, and Fulbert Tchana
Tchana. Thomas Sean O’Brien and Roberta Malee Bassett provided valuable comments and
suggestions for the special focus (section 2).
Communications, media relations, and stakeholder engagement were led by Flore de Préneuf
with the External and Corporate Relations team, including Caitlin Berczik, Patricia Riehn
Berg, Kimberly Bumgarner, Elodie Castel, Christelle Chapoy, Georgette Dwomoh-Appiah,
Marie Duffour, Artem Kolesnikov, Pabsy Mariano, Johanna Martinsson, Samuel Owusu Baafi,
Laure de Petiville, Aude Rabault, and Lavinia Thoriso Engelbrecht. Beatrice Berman, Abrah
Desiree Brahima, Kenneth Omondi, and Rose-Claire Pakabomba provided production, internal
promotion, and logistical support.
The report was edited by Sandra Gain. The online and print publication was produced by Bill
Pragluski, and the cover design was by Rajesh Sharma.
 OCTOBER 2024 | VOLUME 30

AFRICA’S PULSE
AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES SHAPING AFRICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE

A
TRANSFORMING EDUCATION
FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH

B C
TRANSFORMING
EDUCATION
FOR INCLUSIVE
GROWTH
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Section 1: Recent Developments and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1.1 Growth Outlook in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1.2 The Global Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1.3 Sub-Saharan Africa’s Macroeconomic Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

1.4 Risks to the Outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Section 2: Transforming Education for Inclusive Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Objective 1: Building a Strong Foundation by Ensuring That All Children Acquire

Basic Skills. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Objective 2: Equipping Youth and the Workforce with Skills Relevant

to the Evolving Labor Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Smart Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Improving Sector Spending Efficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Section 3: Policy Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

3.1 Maintaining a Sound Macroeconomic Policy Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

3.2 Investing in People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Appendix A: Macroeconomic Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Appendix B: Country Classifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > i
 List of Boxes
1.1 Regional Engines of Growth Reemerging: Intraregional Trade Rebounds . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.2 Africa’s Climate Crisis: Economic and Human Costs on the Rise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.1 The Impact of Conflict on Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 Examples of Impactful and Cost-Effective Approaches
to Improve Foundational Learning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3 Making Schools Resilient to Shocks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4 Secondary TVET Expansion: A Window for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5 From Digital Gap to Digital Leap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

List of Figures
1.1 Real Income per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Purchasing Managers’ Index in Sub-Saharan African Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Contribution to GDP Growth Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Expenditure Approach, 2019–25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5 Contribution to GDP Growth Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Sectoral Output Approach, 2019–25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.6 Growth Forecasts for the AFE Subregion, 2023–26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.7 Growth Forecasts for the AFW Subregion, 2023–26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.8 Growth per Capita across Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2016–19 versus 2022–25. . . . . 16
1.9 Purchasing Managers’ Index, 2022–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.10 Difference in US Government Bond Yields, 2019–24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.11 China’s GDP Growth, 2021–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.12 Core Inflation, 2019–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.13 Commodity Market Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.14 Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2020–26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.15 Inflation Rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, December 2019–June 2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.16 Headline Inflation, Food Inflation, and Exchange Rates across Groups
of Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2021–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.17 International and Domestic Food Inflation, 2021–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.18 Currencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023 and 2024. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.19 Reserve Coverage Ratio in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2019 and 2024. . . . . . . . . . 26
1.20 Central Bank Policy Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023–2024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.21 Fiscal Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.22 Primary Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.23 Fiscal Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2014–26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

ii > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 1.24 Changes in the Fiscal Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2015–26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.25 Sub-Saharan Africa Top Six Bilateral Creditors, 2006–22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.26 Sub-Saharan African Countries’ Sovereign Bond Redemptions, 2023–30. . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.27 LIC-DSF: Debt Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2012–24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.28 Gross Financing Needs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2012–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.29 Public Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2006–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.30 Debt Service Burden Indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2006–24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.31 External Risk of Debt Distress in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2006–24. . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.32 Current Account Balances in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.33 Changes in the Current Account, Savings, and Investment
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2015–26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B1.1.1 Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Regional Economic Communities, 2021–23. . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.1 Learning-Adjusted Years of Schooling and GDP per Capita in Sub-Saharan Africa. . . . . . 47
2.2 Population in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Age Group, 1950–2050. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3 Student Enrollment Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Level of Education, 1970–2024 . . . . 52
2.4 Learning Poverty Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.5 Primary School Completion Rates in Selected Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
2000 and 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.6 Shares of Youth and Upper Secondary School Students Enrolled in
Vocational Education Programs, 2000 and 2019. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.7 Gross Enrollment Ratio in Tertiary Education, 1972–2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.8 Government Spending on Education and Total Spending on
Public Education per Capita, by Region, 2011–22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.9 Government Revenue and Spending on Education in Sub-Saharan African Countries . . . 73
2.10 Inefficiencies and Inequalities in Spending on Education in Sub-Saharan Africa. . . . . . . 75

Map
B2.1.1 Episodes of Violence in and around Schools in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023. . . . . . . . . . . 53

List of Tables
A.1 Real GDP Growth, at Constant Market Prices and Consumer Price Index . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.2 General Government Balance and General Government Debt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
B.1 Western and Central Africa Country Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
B.2 Eastern and Southern Africa Country Classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > iii
iv > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Executive Summary
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa remains stuck in low gear

u Economic activity in the region is projected to grow by 3 percent in 2024, from 2.4 percent
in 2023, and to accelerate to 4 percent in 2025–26. The growth forecast for the region in
2024 has been downgraded by 0.4 percentage point compared to the forecast in the April
2024 volume of Africa’s Pulse. The downgrade is partly explained by the collapse of economic
activity in Sudan caused by the armed conflict, which has destroyed physical and human
capital as well as state capacity, with adverse impacts on food security and greater forced
displacement. Excluding Sudan, the region is expected to grow at 3.5 percent in 2024.
u The growth recovery in the region is driven primarily by private consumption and investment.
Private consumption is set to increase in 2024 as declining inflation raises the purchasing
power of African households. Expectations of monetary policy rate cuts are boosting business
sentiment and, thus, fostering investment. Expectations of further policy rate cuts in large
global economies as well as in Africa may further stimulate investment growth in 2025.
Government consumption will contribute modestly in 2024–25 as measures to boost revenue
collection and address high debt service costs are implemented.
u In per capita terms, the region has barely grown, in contrast to the experiences of other
regions. Real income per capita in 2024 is about 2 percent below its level in 2019. At an annual
per capita growth rate of 0.5 percent in 2022–24, growth has been insufficient to reduce
extreme poverty. The rate of extreme poverty decreased by 0.5 percentage point in the same
period, to 36.5 percent of people living on less than US$2.15 per day in 2024. The number of
poor people increased from 448 million in 2022 to 464 million in 2024.

Cooling inflation and well-anchored expectations will shore up the case

for policy rate cuts
u Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to decline from 7.1 percent in 2023 to 4.8 percent
in 2024 and 4.6 percent in 2025–26. Stabilization of commodity prices this year after the
decline from their highs in 2022, the alleviation of supply chain disruptions, the effects of
tightened monetary and fiscal policies, as well as stabilizing currencies explain the decline of
inflation in the region. The slowdown of inflation appears to be broad-based across the region.
About 70 percent of the countries are set to register lower inflation in 2024, compared to the
previous year. This proportion will reach nearly 80 percent in 2025. However, in three-quarters
of the countries in the region, inflation rates are expected to be higher than they were during
the pre-pandemic period.
u The dynamics of disinflation in Sub-Saharan Africa distinguish two groups of countries—
namely, low- and high-inflation countries. Most countries exhibit low and declining inflation
rates, while about 30 percent of the countries have a high rate of inflation that has already
peaked or is still increasing. In the low-inflation countries, headline and food inflation started
a protracted decline in early 2023, gradually converging to target bands this year. This
disinflation has come along with stronger currencies. In the high-inflation countries, headline
and food inflation peaked and stabilized at two-digit rates, while their currencies have
weakened markedly since mid-2023.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 1
 u The era of high interest rates is gradually winding down across African countries in 2024, after
most central banks in the region increased their main interest rates in a synchronized manner
during 2022 and the first half of 2023. However, the path of interest rate cuts across African
monetary authorities is varied. Countries with low inflation may steer toward policy rate cuts
if inflationary pressures continue easing and inflationary expectations remain well-anchored.
By end-August 2024, some countries had already started reducing interest rates, and more
countries in the region will join this group as inflation rates near their targets. A pause in
monetary policy tightening is recommended for countries where inflation has peaked but
remains above target. For those where inflation is still rising, maintaining higher interest rates
for longer or increasing policy rates might be warranted.

Declining global inflation and firming global activity are supporting growth
in the region, but prospects remain uncertain
u After several years of adverse shocks, the global economy is stabilizing. Growth in the United
States remained resilient in the first half of this year as inflation settled closer to target, and
the Federal Reserve has already started to cut interest rates. Reduced inflationary pressures
and decelerating wage increases should contribute to further lowering inflation and creating
space for a more accommodative monetary policy. In contrast, growth in China is projected
to slow this year, as an increase in industrial activity and goods exports is offset by weaker
consumption. Global inflation continues to decline but at a slower pace than in the initial
phase of disinflation after the pandemic. This is partly attributed to the fact that services
inflation remains elevated in advanced economies. Policy uncertainty will rise around major
elections in the final quarter of this year—particularly around the elections in the United
States in November.

An elevated debt burden is undercutting progress in fiscal consolidation

u Fiscal balances continue to improve across countries, although at a decelerating pace, as
governments aim to cut expenditure and raise revenues. Some successful efforts include
improving administrative oversight of spending programs, eliminating “ghost workers” from
payrolls, implementing tax reforms (including administration and compliance improvements),
streamlining government incentives and value-added tax exemptions, reforming subsidies
(especially fuel subsidies), and reprioritizing public spending toward programs with high
growth and job multipliers.
u The median fiscal deficit in the region is expected to decline from 3.9 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2023 to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2024 and 2.9 percent of GDP in
2025–26. About 29 countries in the region are expected to improve their fiscal balances this
year. However, among these good performers, only 10 countries will have a deficit below
3 percent of GDP or a surplus in the government’s accounts. Moreover, mounting interest
payments are undercutting the benefits of fiscal consolidation. Government efforts to balance
revenues and expenditures—as reflected in the narrowing of primary deficits—are thwarted
by high and rising (net) interest payments by the general governments. These (net) payments
are expected to increase from 3 percent of GDP in 2024 to 3.4 percent of GDP in 2025–26.
u Total debt service in the region has increased steadily due to greater interest payments arising
from a shift from concessional financing to market financing. Additionally, there has been a

2 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 surge in public debt over the past decade. General government gross debt in Sub-Saharan
Africa is projected to remain high and stable at around 58 percent of GDP in 2024. The region
is expected to pay interest on public external debt service of about US$19 billion, with nearly
80 percent of these payments owed to private creditors and non–Paris Club governments.
u The high debt burden of African governments is leading to painful trade-offs. It is curtailing
the fiscal space to invest in development priorities—such as human capital, energy, and
transportation—and it is raising their vulnerability to shocks—particularly for countries with
access to global capital markets and other non-concessional financing sources. As a result, the
risk of external debt distress in Sub-Saharan Africa remains high: 53 percent of International
Development Association–eligible countries in the region are at high risk of or already in debt
distress. Some countries in the region have returned to capital markets after the pandemic;
however, their issuances have been placed at a higher cost than in the pre-pandemic period.

Conflict and climate change are holding back the region’s growth
prospects
u Rising violent conflict and suppression are weighing on business sentiment, delaying
private sector investment decisions, and rendering commitment to business contracts such
as hiring and purchasing agreements more difficult. The devastating war in Sudan has led
to a collapse in health systems, with the United Nations International Food Security Phase
Classification estimating that 8.5 million people are acutely malnourished and 755,000 are in
famine conditions. Conflict and violence are disrupting access to food in many countries, thus
underscoring concerns around food security.
u The high cost of living, corruption, and, more broadly, weak governance have triggered
protests and palpable anger among the youth in Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda—unrest that
could spread throughout the region. The discontent and lack of trust in the government
reflect the population’s perception that state institutions are unable to foster inclusive and
sustained growth and narrow structural inequalities. In this context, the region needs more
reforms for a working economy. Fiscal policies that tackle inequality are critical—particularly
for defining a fiscal compact that emphasizes both spending efficiency and equity. Leveling
the playing field for the disadvantaged will also involve policies that enhance their productive
capacity and provide an environment that nurtures the creation and growth of (formal) firms.
u Extreme weather events have buffeted swaths of the African continent in recent years and
are expected to continue as global climate change takes hold. The worst floods in decades
in Central and Western Africa, multi-year droughts and floods in Eastern Africa, and the rising
impact of cyclones in Southern Africa continue to weigh on economic activity. In the first half
of 2024, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe declared national disasters due to severe
droughts. Overall, climate change amplifies the impacts of conflict and global shocks on
agricultural yields, food production, and trade, thus raising food security problems. In 2023,
more than one in five people faced hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa, and more than 70 percent
of the population was unable to afford a healthy diet.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 3
 Growing urgency to accelerate growth: The roles of macroeconomic
stability and education
u The region’s growth performance has been inadequate to reduce extreme poverty and boost
prosperity. GDP per capita is expected to grow by 0.5 percent in 2024 and 1.4 percent in 2025.
This projected increase still places the region’s living standards in 2025 below their level in
2014. There is growing urgency to jumpstart growth from its low-growth trap environment
over the past 10 years. Getting the basics right means that fiscal policies need to be geared
to support smart investments for growth, lift the poor and disadvantaged, and increase
spending efficiency. Policies that provide an enabling investment environment are also
critical. Integrating principles of competition, contestability, and innovation into sectoral and
economywide regulation is essential to foster the stability and growth of firms. Investments
in energy, transport networks, and telecommunications can accelerate inclusive growth
by removing productivity constraints, reducing the cost of delivered goods, facilitating the
movements of people and products, and increasing competitiveness. Investments in people
are also key to boosting productivity and ensuring a prosperous future in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Transforming the demographic transition into a dividend is conditional on having a
well-trained and healthy workforce and improving foundational learning for all children—
particularly those at the lower end of the income distribution.
u This volume of Africa’s Pulse highlights the roles of macroeconomic stability and human
capital in elevating the prospects of inclusive growth in the region. As economic growth
can ease debt service pressures, ensuring that public investments in essential infrastructure
(energy, transport, and water) and human capital (education and health) meet their targets,
deliver services, win trust between citizens and governments, and contribute to growth
will be crucial. Considering budgetary constraints and development needs, policies aimed
at transparency and accountability can improve the efficiency of spending, prudent
management and resolution, and macroeconomic stability, and potentially lower debt
service costs. Fiscal consolidation can minimize impacts on economic growth and public
services through close consultation with key stakeholders while encouraging public scrutiny
and debate. The credibility of fiscal policy makers will hinge on the disclosure and quality of
medium-term fiscal plans, debt management strategies, and borrowing plans. In addition to
increasing their efficiency, the financing of public investments will require increasing domestic
resource mobilization, attracting foreign investments, and access to concessional financing.
u Designing a growth strategy is critical for boosting productivity and creating jobs. One
of the main pillars of such a strategy is to boost the quality of education to position Sub-
Saharan Africa to leverage megatrends such as demographic transition, advances in digital
technologies, and the global shift to a green economy. Transformation of the education
system is needed to establish competitiveness in each of these areas on the global market.
This transformation relies on providing a solid foundation of basic competencies for all
children and equipping the workforce with skills relevant to an evolving global economy.

Delivering quality education for Africa’s future

u Africa stands poised to harness the transformative power of education to drive long-term
economic growth and lift up its citizens. The region can build on successful experiences
around the world to seize this opportunity. In earlier decades, countries such as the Republic
of Korea transformed their educational performance and ramped up national income and

4 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 prosperity. Africa is now embarking on a similar journey, having made significant strides in
expanding access to education. Right now, the opportunity is even greater than ever—the
children of today will be a part of Africa’s future workforce, which is expected to double by
2050. Thus, the region is at an important junction where not investing in education today will
be detrimental to economic development for decades.
u Smarter, bigger investment in education is fundamental to improving the region’s human capital
development. Sub-Saharan Africa’s Human Capital Index (HCI) currently stands at 0.40, indicating
that the future productivity of a child born today is only 40 percent of their potential under
optimal health and education conditions. Delivering universal basic education that ensures full
learning could double the region’s HCI to 0.80 and double GDP per capita. This corresponds to
roughly 1.4 percentage points of additional annual economic growth over the next 50 years.
u Moreover, the human capital benefits from education also extend to better health outcomes.
Education improves child survival rates and health outcomes, with the benefits extending
across generations as children of educated parents tend to be healthier. This creates a virtuous
cycle where healthier children are better prepared to learn. Evidence from Sub-Saharan
Africa shows that each additional year of schooling reduces the fertility rate by 0.26 birth,
decreases the chance of maternal death by 20 percent, increases survival of children to age
5 by 50 percent, and reduces the probability of child marriage for girls by an average of 7.5
percentage points.
u Africa’s education systems are now serving around 60 million more children than 20 years
ago—the fastest expansion the continent has ever seen. The introduction of reforms such
as free primary education across the region has played a crucial role in boosting enrollment
rates. But the task is not complete: millions of children are still out of school and educational
demand continues to increase with population growth. Approximately one-third of children in
Sub-Saharan Africa drop out before completing primary school due to factors such as poverty
and inadequate school facilities. Early marriage and childbearing also lead to dropping out,
even at the primary level, especially among girls.
u To achieve universal education by 2030, education systems need to be expanded urgently: an
additional 170 million children and adolescents, including about 100 million children currently
out of school, need to be brought into classrooms, which requires constructing 9 million new
classrooms and training and deploying 11 million additional teachers.
u The gains in enrollment have not translated into learning across the continent. Despite some
countries’ improvements in learning outcomes, almost nine in ten children in Sub-Saharan
Africa are unable to read and comprehend a simple text by age 10, compared to an average
of 70 percent in other low- and middle-income countries. These early learning deficits trigger
a cascade of adverse effects throughout a child’s educational journey—persistent learning
delays, frequent grade repetition, and early dropout. Combined with limited access to
secondary and post-secondary education and training, a significant majority of African youth
leave the education system not having obtained foundational literacy and numeracy skills,
and other skills relevant for the labor market.
u Looking ahead, to transform the region’s education systems, bold reforms and investments are
needed around two broad, interconnected objectives. The first is building a solid foundation
by ensuring that all children acquire basic skills. The second is equipping youth and the
workforce with skills that are relevant to the evolving labor market.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 5
 Getting off on the right foot—ensuring that all children get a solid skills
foundation
u There needs to be a paradigm shift to move beyond universal enrollment in basic education
toward universal learning. To meet the challenge, countries must start investing early in
the lifecycle to ensure that children have the best start for lifelong learning. This requires
expanding access to high-quality early childhood development interventions. Currently, seven
in ten children in Sub-Saharan Africa are not benefiting from pre-primary education, and as a
result, many children start primary schooling unprepared to learn. Holistic investments in early
childhood development, through a multisectoral framework that combines interventions
in education, nutrition, health, and social protection, will be essential to accelerate Africa’s
human capital development.
u African countries must keep a relentless focus on foundational learning, and this will require
delivering quality, fit-for-purpose teaching. Cost-effective interventions such as structured
pedagogy, targeted teaching by learning level, teaching in children’s home language, along
with regular measurement of learning can spur rapid improvements in foundational skills.
The focus should be on ensuring high-quality student-teacher interaction in the classroom to
obtain better learning outcomes, which will require rigorous monitoring of results.
u Teachers are instrumental in determining the quality of education, and teacher salaries make
up over 90 percent of the recurrent costs in most education systems. To improve learning
outcomes, systemic long-term reforms are imperative in teacher workforce management.
Such reforms can include shifting toward rigorous, merit-based recruitment; better pay and
incentives to work in hard-to-reach places; high-quality training and ongoing support for
teachers; and regular performance assessments linked to teachers’ career progression. Such
reforms require strong and sustained political commitment and broad-based support from
a wide range of stakeholders, including teachers, parents, and communities. To be impactful,
the reforms should be centered around the goal of improving learning.
u Sub-Saharan African countries must continue their efforts to expand access, to ensure that
all current and future generations of children enroll and stay in school. Increased investment
in infrastructure will be needed to create more spaces that provide decent learning
environments. This requires careful, data-driven planning as countries must weigh the trade-
offs between the high costs of reducing class sizes and the need to provide other essential
elements of quality teaching and learning, such as robust teacher training, ongoing coaching
and support, and strategic technology integration. In the near term, simply informing parents
and students about the quality of local schools, funding for education, and the higher
earnings associated with education can increase enrollment rates in a cost-effective way.

Equipping youth and the workforce with skills relevant to an evolving

global economy
u Improving equitable access to, and the quality of, skills development will be crucial for Africa
to prepare and equip its vast and growing youth population to be productive and drive
growth. Sub-Saharan Africa’s skills development landscape can improve notably by pivoting
toward demand-driven approaches to enhance relevance and labor market responsiveness.
The shift to demand-driven skills training can help to address a paradox: the region needs

6 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 these skills to modernize but lacks the industries to drive skill demand and, thereby,
investment. This creates a mismatch between youth aspirations for high-skilled, formal jobs
and the prevalence of low-productivity, informal work—a key source of youth dissatisfaction
and disconnection. The share of youth not in education, employment, or training is high,
estimated at 21.9 percent in 2023.
u Countries must continue to expand opportunities for quality skills development
opportunities, tailoring program modalities to the varied profiles of their youth and workforce.
Deliberate effort needs to be made to empower female youth to engage in fields that have
been historically male-dominated. Skills development strategies must be selective and
geared toward emerging and rapidly growing sectors, including digital and green industries.
To achieve this, strong partnerships must be built between skills development programs
and industry for better alignment of curriculum and training provisions with the evolving
demands of labor markets. Regular data collection and monitoring are needed, to track skill
supply and demand and respond quickly to mismatches. Countries do not need to do it all
alone; instead, they can build on national strengths to exploit comparative advantages and
collaborate with partner countries across the region to equip their national workforces with
the necessary skills.

Investing smartly
u Amid growing fiscal constraints, ensuring the allocation of sufficient resources to implement
the reforms outlined in this volume will require a sustained commitment from governments
and other education stakeholders. Government education spending as a share of GDP in
Sub-Saharan Africa is relatively modest at around 4 percent—and well below the target of
approaching 7 percent to meet national goals and tackle the learning crisis. Real spending
per child has leveled off since 2011 at around $225 per school-age child, well below the next
lowest region (South Asia, at $446). Spending needs to be put on a sustained upward path
over the coming years to accelerate progress in education. Current fiscal pressures present
tough choices for policy makers, but the economic returns to productive investment in
education are high—and unlock the potential to create a virtuous cycle where better learning
stimulates growth and in turn creates space for right-sizing education spending.
u To improve learning outcomes and sustain confidence in higher budgetary allocations,
education systems must demonstrate much more efficient use of resources—delivering
more for each dollar spent. Assessments of planned World Bank–supported investments
suggest that reforms of teacher management can improve teacher effectiveness and reduce
absenteeism, delivering estimated savings equivalent to 25 percent of the teacher salary
bill. Savings can also be made on other inputs—in Mozambique, for example, reforms
have cut the costs of textbooks by more than 50 percent. Rigorous monitoring systems are
needed to accompany the scaling up of cost-effective interventions to ensure that learning
outcomes indeed improve as intended. Finally, adopting shared procurement standards and
collaborating across countries can lead to increased potential to generate further savings
and economies of scale in infrastructure, teaching and learning materials provision, and
technology deployment.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 7
8 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Section 1. Recent Developments and Outlook
1.1: GROWTH OUTLOOK IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Economic activity recovers in 2024, barely reaching pre-pandemic levels
Growth of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa is set to rebound from 2.4 percent in 2023
to 3.0 percent in 2024, and firm at an average of 4 percent in 2025–26. As inflation cools for
most countries in the region due to tight monetary and fiscal policies, improvements in private
consumption and investment appear to be driving the rebound in 2024. Resilient growth in
the United States, global trade recovery, and a gradual easing of global financial conditions—
particularly in the second half of this year—are also supporting growth in the region.

Growth per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa is set to accelerate to 0.5 percent in 2024 and average
1.5 percent in 2025–26. The recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic has been sluggish so far and
lags that of other major regions in the world. Regional forecasts of income per capita suggest
that Sub-Saharan Africa will be able to surpass its pre-pandemic level in 2026—but the region’s
real income per capita in 2026 is expected to be only 2 percent above that of 2019. In contrast,
the standard of living of East Asia and the Pacific as well as South Asia in 2026 is projected to be
about 30 percent above its level in 2019 (figure 1.1).

There is a growing sense

FIGURE 1.1: Real Income per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26
of urgency to jumpstart 135
growth after the region’s 130
poor performance 125
since the 2014–15
120 EAP
collapse of international
Index, 2019=100

115 SA
commodity prices. Getting
110
macroeconomic policies LAC
105
right is critical. This
involves implementing 100
SSA
fiscal policies that support 95

growth-enhancing public 90
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f
investments, lift the
Sources: Global Economic Prospects, June 2024; World Bank projections.
poor and disadvantaged, Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; EAP = East Asia and the Pacific; LAC = Latin America and the
Caribbean; SA = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
and boost spending
efficiency. Reforming the
fiscal compact and reducing the debt burden are paramount, requiring greater transparency,
credibility, discipline, and accountability of fiscal policy makers. Public disclosure of medium-
term fiscal frameworks (including an assessment of announced tax and expenditure measures),
debt management strategies, and borrowing plans is critical. Achieving sustained and inclusive
growth will require fiscal policies that put a premium on efficiency and equity. Progressive
taxation (including effective collection of property taxes) and provision of public services
(particularly spending on education and health for the disadvantaged) are among the different
choices to achieve efficient and equitable outcomes.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 9
 Accelerating growth in the region also requires policies that provide an enabling investment
environment. The integration of competition, contestability and innovation principles into
sectoral and economywide regulation is essential to foster the stability and growth of firms.
Infrastructure costs and poor quality represent a significant barrier to entry for many potential
firms. Hence, investments in energy, transport networks, and telecommunications can
accelerate inclusive growth by removing productivity constraints, reducing the cost of delivered
goods, facilitating the movements of people and goods, and increasing competitiveness.

Investing in people is also crucial to boost productivity and ensure future prosperity in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Transforming the demographic transition into a dividend will require a
transformation of the education system, which hinges upon: (1) providing a strong foundation
of basic competencies for all children (such as literacy, numeracy, and critical thinking), and (2)
equipping the workforce with skills and technological proficiency to meet the demands of a
rapidly evolving global economy (section 2 of this volume). Innovative financing solutions and
prioritizing the most cost-effective interventions to finance education are critical to transform
this sector. Hence, most countries in the region will need to redouble efforts in mobilizing
resources for education and increase the efficiency of such spending.

Although it is set to rebound in 2024, business activity indicators suggest

that the recovery remains lukewarm
High-frequency indicators show that on aggregate, activity in manufacturing and services
expanded in the region during the first quarter of this year. However, the positive momentum
in business activity fizzled and declined during June and July—although it slightly recovered
in August (figure 1.2). The S&P Global South Africa Purchasing Managers’ Index remained
below the 50-point mark, thus indicating a modest drop in the private sector’s performance in
June and July. The underperformance is attributed to falling output and new business due to
weaker sales and rising supply-side pressures. This resulted from congestion in domestic and
international ports, which also upset delivery schedules. However, falling inflationary pressures
and a gradual normalization of electricity supply are helping to stabilize demand and activity. In
the second quarter of 2024, South Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 0.4 percent on a
quarterly basis following stagnation in the first quarter. Easing inflationary pressures drove the
increase in private and public consumption (1.4 and 1 percent quarter-on-quarter, respectively).
Reduced policy uncertainty, a sharp decline in power cuts, and expectations of further
monetary policy rate cuts would create momentum in economic activity over the next quarters.

In Nigeria, the Stanbic IBTC Bank’s Purchasing Managers’ Index fell below the 50-mark threshold
in July 2024, indicating a contraction in private sector business activity—and this downswing
continued in August 2024. Lower customer demand (as well as a reduction in new orders)
appears to have driven this result. Input costs continue to surge, while output price increases
are slowing. Private business conditions remained broadly stagnant in July. GDP growth

10 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
picked up in Nigeria in the
FIGURE 1.2: Purchasing Managers’ Index in Sub-Saharan African Countries
second quarter of 2024 (3
a. Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022–24 (GDP-weighted)
percent year-on-year) as 56
oil production increased
by 15.6 percent year-on- 54
year to 1.41 million barrels
52
per day. The non-oil sector
grew only 2.8 percent 50

Average PMI
year-on-year. Headline
48
inflation peaked in June,
but it may pick up again 46
from September as the
government’s move toward 44
market-based pricing of
42
gasoline, which began in
2022.01
2022.02
2022.03
2022.04
2022.05
2022.06
2022.07
2022.08
2022.09
2022.10
2022.11
2022.12
2023.01
2023.02
2023.03
2023.04
2023.05
2023.06
2023.07
2023.08
2023.09
2023.10
2023.11
2023.12
2024.01
2024.02
2024.03
2024.04
2024.05
2024.06
2024.07
2024.08
May 2023 with an initial
tripling of gasoline prices,
b. Selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2024
saw a further 40-45 percent
increase in gasoline prices Contraction Expansion
in September 2024.1 In
Kenya, business sentiment Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
improved in August Nigeria
2024 as the impact of South Africa
recent anti-government Kenya
protests started to Ghana
subside. As businesses Uganda
began operating more
Mozambique
normally, output increased
Zambia
moderately, and new
orders recovered slightly. Sources: Haver Analytics; Bloomberg Analytical Services.
After the June and July Note: Panel a plots the GDP-weighted average of the composite S&P Global PMIs for the seven
countries with data availability. The green and orange bars indicate the distance to the 50-point
protests, the government benchmark that distinguishes contraction from expansion. Panel b plots the evolution of the composite
PMI across countries in the region. Red (green) colors denote contraction (expansion). Darker (lighter)
withdrew proposals to shades of the color denote that the contraction or expansion is larger (modest). GDP = gross domestic
product; PMI = Purchasing Managers’ Index.
increase taxes.

After bottoming out in 2023, growth is set to recover in 2024

Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to accelerate from 2.4 percent in 2023 to 3 percent in
2024, and further to an average rate of 4 percent in 2025–26. Globally, resilient growth in large
economies—particularly in the United States—during the first half of this year, a recovery in
global trade, stabilization of commodity prices from their highs at the outbreak of the war in
Ukraine, and the gradual easing of global and domestic financial conditions expected in the
second half of this year are driving the recovery of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
convergence of inflation to targets in most countries in the region and a greater commitment

1 A more stable naira, supported by foreign exchange reforms and improved reserves, would also help to lower import costs and ease inflationary pressures.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 11
 to macroeconomic stability and transparency will continue boosting private consumption and
enhancing investor sentiment.

The growth forecasts for the region in 2023 and 2024 have been downgraded by 0.2 and 0.4
percentage point, respectively, from the projections in the April 2024 volume of Africa’s Pulse.
The 2024 growth estimates have been downgraded for about half the countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa (23 of 47). Large countries continue dragging down growth in the region, most notably
Sudan. Growth projections for Sudan point to a collapse of economic activity of 20 percent in
2023 and 15 percent in 2024 as a result of the economic impact of the country’s catastrophic
war.2 Growth in the region appears to be stronger if Sudan is excluded: economic activity in
Sub-Saharan Africa is set to grow by 3.5 percent in 2024—a downgrade of 0.1 percentage point
from the previous volume
FIGURE 1.3: Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022–24
of Africa’s Pulse (figure 1.3).
5
2022 2023e 2024f
From the expenditure side,
the recovery in economic
4
3.4 3.5 activity this year is mostly
explained by a pickup
GDP growth (%)

3 3.0
in private consumption
2
and investment. Private
consumption is set to
1 accelerate in 2024 as
inflationary pressures ease
0 in the majority of countries
Sub-Saharan Africa SSA excluding Angola, SSA excluding Sudan
Nigeria, and South Africa in the region, thus
Source: World Bank projections. boosting the purchasing
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic product; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
power of households. The
contribution of investment
has also increased as countries in the region are creating room for current and future policy
rate cuts. As inflationary pressures continue receding and expectations remain well-anchored,
central banks in advanced countries and in the region will have a more accommodative
monetary policy stance, thus boosting private consumption and investment throughout the
next year. Government consumption is expected to contribute modestly in 2024–25, as fiscal
policy makers continue putting forth measures to boost revenue collection and address high
debt service costs (figure 1.4). From the production side, more than half of the rebound in
economic activity is attributed to an increase in services, as tourism continues to recover and
investments in key infrastructure projects—including transportation, communications, and
(renewable) energy—facilitate the delivery of services.

The modest contribution of agriculture in 2023–24 is attributed not only to the structural
challenges the sector faces, but also climate shocks that continue buffeting countries in the
region (figure 1.5).

2 The armed conflict that broke out in Sudan in April 2023 has severely damaged economic activity and education and health facilities and nearly brought services to a halt
in the commerce, financial, and information and communications sectors. Along with the erosion of state capacity, problems of food security and forced displacement
have heightened.

12 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 FIGURE 1.4: Contribution to GDP Growth in Sub-Saharan FIGURE 1.5: Contribution to GDP Growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Expenditure Approach, 2019–25 Africa: Sectoral Output Approach, 2019–25

Government consumption Private consumption Net exports Agriculture Industry

Real GDP growth Gross fixed investment Services Real GDP growth
5 5

4 4

3 3
1.3 2.3
Percentage points

Percentage points
2 2
1.3 1.9
1.1 1.6
1 1.7 1
1.0
0.7
0 0

-1 -1

-2 -2

-3 -3
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f

Source: World Bank projections (World Bank Macro-Fiscal Model).

Note: Change in inventories and statistical discrepancy are not displayed in figure 1.4. Net taxes are not presented in figure 1.5. e = estimate; f = forecast;
GDP = gross domestic product.

The pace of the recovery is expected to differ across subregions in 2024

There is wide heterogeneity in the strength of economic recovery across countries in the
region. Growth is expected to accelerate in nearly 60 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries
(27 of 47) in 2024. The median growth acceleration for these 27 countries is 0.5 percentage
point, with some countries’ economic growth speeding up at a faster pace—including Niger
(3.6 percentage points) and Angola (2.2 percentage points). However, the recovery remains
tepid, and most countries in the region are still unable to grow at a faster pace than they did
in 2000–19. About six in 10 countries in the region are growing this year at a rate that is slower
than the average in 2000–19. For these underperforming countries, growth in 2024 is about
2 percentage points lower relative to that in the first two decades of this century—and in six
countries, growth is more than 3 percentage points lower.

Economic activity in the Eastern and Southern Africa (AFE) subregion is set to pick up from 1.7
percent in 2023 to 2.2 percent in 2024 and further accelerate to 3.9 percent in 2025–26. Angola
and South Africa continue dragging down the subregion’s economic performance. Excluding
Angola and South Africa, the AFE subregion is expected to grow by 2.6 percent in 2024 and
5.3 percent in 2025–26 (figure 1.6). The East African Community was the best performer in the
subregion, with a growth rate of 4.7 percent in 2024 and an expected rate of 5.7 percent in
2025–26. Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda were the largest contributors to the East African
Community’s growth performance.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 13
 FIGURE 1.6: Growth Forecasts for the AFE Subregion, 2023–26 (percent)

7
2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f

5
GDP growth (%)

0
AFE excl. South Africa AFE excl. Angola Non-resource-rich countries Mineral and metal exporters EAC
and South Africa

Source: World Bank projections (World Bank Macro-Fiscal Model).

Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; AFE = Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC = East African Community; GDP = gross domestic product.

South Africa’s economic activity is expected to rebound from a growth rate of 0.7 percent in
2023 to 1.1 percent in 2024 and 1.6 percent in 2025–26. Improvements in the provision of
electricity and reforms in the transportation sector should support faster growth. Headline
inflation is expected to remain within the middle point of the target band (4.5), thus providing
room for the South African Reserve Bank to reduce policy rates further.3 As inflationary
expectations remain well anchored within the target band, household consumption will
continue to increase, and it is projected to accelerate from a growth rate of 0.8 percent in 2024
to 1.6 percent in 2025–26. Investment growth is 0.9 percent in 2024 and expected to increase to
4.3 percent in 2025–26 as interest rates are lowered and aggregate demand increases.

In Angola, growth is projected to accelerate from 1 percent in 2023 to 3.2 percent in 2024.
Alleviating bottlenecks in oil production—such as maintenance shutdowns of major oil fields—
has supported the increase in economic activity. However, growth prospects for 2025–26
are still limited by the slow implementation of structural reforms that would foster economic
diversification. Consumer inflation is expected to peak in 2024, with inflationary pressures
gradually declining in 2025–26, thanks to tightened monetary policy and fiscal consolidation.
Finally, Kenya is projected to grow by 5 percent in 2024 and 5.1 percent in 2025–26. Better
macroeconomic conditions, as reflected by lower inflation and a more stable shilling, are
supporting private consumption and investment. Liquidity pressures exposed Kenya to greater
macro-financial volatility as the country had to secure funding to finance higher fiscal deficits
and bond redemptions. From the sectoral output perspective, the recoveries in agriculture and
tourism are supporting economic activity.

3 On September 19, 2024, the South African Reserve Bank cut its repo rate by 25 basis points for the first time in four years.

14 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
In the Western and Central Africa (AFW) subregion, economic activity is projected to increase
from 3.3 percent in 2023 to 3.9 percent in 2024 and further accelerate to 4.2 percent in 2025–26.
Excluding Nigeria, the AFW subregion is projected to grow at a faster pace—that is, 4.8 percent
in 2024 and 5.1 percent in 2025–26 (figure 1.7). The West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) is projected to grow at 5.7 percent in 2024 and 6.2 percent in 2025–26. Strong growth
in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger is supporting WAEMU’s performance.

Economic growth in Nigeria is projected at 3.3 percent in 2024 and 3.6 percent in 2025–26
as macroeconomic and fiscal reforms gradually start yielding results. Inflation peaked in June
2024 (at 34.2 percent year-on-year) and decelerated to 33.4 percent in July and further to 32.2
percent in August. While the inflationary effects of a weakened naira in the first months of
this year and the removal of the gasoline subsidy in the second half of 2023 appeared to be
gradually subsiding, a further increase in gasoline prices by 40-45 percent in September may
reverse the disinflationary trend. The consolidation of macroeconomic reforms should support
higher growth in the country in 2025. On the back of strong private consumption and capital
deepening, growth in Côte d’Ivoire is expected to be 6.5 percent in 2024 and remain firm at 6.6
percent in 2026. Infrastructure investment—especially in the digital and transport sectors—
along with the exploitation of recent oil discoveries and prudent macroeconomic policies
should improve investor confidence and enhance growth prospects.

FIGURE 1.7: Growth Forecasts for the AFW Subregion, 2023–26 (percent)
7
2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f

5
GDP growth (%)

0
AFW excl. Nigeria Mineral and Non-resource-rich Oil resource-rich countries WAEMU CEMAC
metal exporters countries
Source: World Bank projections (World Bank Macro-Fiscal Model).
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; AFW = Western and Central Africa; CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; GDP = gross
domestic product; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 15
 There are some bright spots in Sub-Saharan Africa despite the tepid
recovery in 2024
In 2024, the real GDP growth of 27 countries in the region is expected to accelerate, and eight
of these countries are posting growth greater than 5 percent—notably, Côte d’Ivoire (6.5
percent), Uganda (6 percent), and Tanzania (5.4 percent), among others. A closer look at the
past 10 years merits asking whether growth prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa have improved. If
so, how many countries in the region have surpassed their pre-pandemic levels of growth of
real GDP per capita? Figure 1.8 compares the pace of growth per capita prior to the pandemic
(2016–19) vis-à-vis the post-pandemic period (2022–25) across Sub-Saharan African countries.

Nearly 40 percent of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (19 of 47) registered positive growth
per capita in 2016–19 and 2022–25 and are outperforming their pre-pandemic performance.
Ten of these countries have annual average growth rates per capita that exceed 3 percent per
year in 2022–25—notably, Benin, Kenya, Mauritania, Mauritius, and Rwanda among others.
Structural reforms and
FIGURE 1.8: Growth per Capita across Sub-Saharan African Countries,
public investments in
2016–19 versus 2022–25f infrastructure are among
the main drivers of their
8
CPV improved performance.
6 MUS
RWA Other countries saw their
MRT
SEN income per capita grow
GDP growth per capita, 2022–25 (% per year)

4 COD BEN ETH

LBR ZWE TGO
NERKEN CIV
GMB GIN
NAM ZMB SWZUGASLE
GNB TZA in both periods, but their
NGA GAB2 MOZ COM MDG BWA GHA
LSO ZAF CMR MLIERI BFA SYC post-pandemic growth is
COG TCD 0 not as fast as that of the
-2 BDI
-10 -8 -6
AGO
-4 0
MWI 2 STP 4 6 8
-2 CAF period prior to COVID-19.
GNQ About a quarter of the
-4
countries in the region (11
-6 of 47) share this feature.
SSD
-8 Two countries in this
group still display high
-10
SDN per capita growth (above
-12 3.5 percent per year) in
GDP growth per capita, 2016–19 (% per year) 2022–25—namely, Côte
Source: World Bank projections (World Bank Macro-Fiscal Model). d’Ivoire and Ethiopia. In
Note: The red line is a 45⁰ line. Countries above this line and with positive growth in 2022–25 are
outperforming their pre-pandemic growth (2016–19). For a list of country codes, go to https://www. other countries, growth per
iso.org/obp/ui/#search. f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic product.
capita is decelerating by
more than 2 percentage
points in 2022–25 (Ghana and Guinea). Finally, growth per capita in the largest countries in the
region—Nigeria and South Africa—remains below 1 percent per year, despite showing a slight
improvement compared to the pre-pandemic period (figure 1.8).

16 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
1.2: THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
The global economy is supported by firming activity in major economies
The global economy is stabilizing, following several years of overlapping negative shocks.
Global growth is projected to be 2.6 percent this year, holding steady for the first time in three
years. It is expected to
reach a faster pace in 2024 FIGURE 1.9: Purchasing Managers’ Index, 2022–24
than previously expected
due to the continued 56

solid expansion of the US Services

54
economy. High-frequency
indicators show that 52
Composite
despite elevated financing
costs and heightened 50

geopolitical tensions, global

48 Index, 50+ = expansion
activity firmed in the first Manufacturing

eight months of 2024 46

Mar-22

Mar-23

Mar-24
Nov-22

Nov-23
Jul-22

Jul-23

Jul-24
(figure 1.9).

Aggregate growth in Source: Haver Analytics.

Note: The last observation is August 2024.
advanced economies is
projected to remain at FIGURE 1.10: Difference in US Government Bond Yields, 2019–24
1.5 percent in 2024, with
2.0
divergence in activity
1.5
among key economies.
Weak activity in the euro 1.0
Percentage points

area and Japan, largely 0.5

due to continued feeble 0.0
domestic demand, will be
-0.5
accompanied by resilient
growth in the United -1.0

States. Activity is firming -1.5

2019-08

2020-01

2020-06

2020-11

2021-04

2021-09

2022-02

2022-08

2023-01

2023-06

2023-11

2024-04
2024-09

as inflation stabilizes and

the monetary hiking cycle Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
is near its end. However, Note: The values are 10-year US Treasury constant maturity minus two-year US Treasury
constant maturity.
the near-term outlook for
monetary policy still differs
among advanced economies. Monetary policy easing in the United States—given resilient
activity and above-target inflation—has started later than in the euro area, where rates were cut
in mid-2024 and the impacts of past supply shocks on inflation continue to fade. Expectations
of rate cuts are rising as the excess yield of shorter-term US Treasuries over longer-term ones has
disappeared (figure 1.10). In 2025, the contrast in growth performance across major economies
is expected to become less stark given a projected slowdown in the United States and firming
growth in the euro area.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 17
 Growth in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) is forecast to edge down from
4.2 percent in 2023 to 4 percent in 2024 and remain broadly stable over 2025–26, near estimates
of EMDE potential growth for the 2020s. Excluding China, EMDE growth is projected to edge up
to 3.5 percent this year and then firm to an average of 3.9 percent in 2025–26. The contribution
of domestic demand to growth in EMDEs is expected to soften this year relative to 2023,
before firming over 2025–26. The weaker contribution this year largely reflects idiosyncratic
developments in some of the largest EMDEs, while in many EMDEs domestic demand is forecast
to improve, supported by receding inflation, easing financial conditions, and a cyclical rebound
in trade, reflecting firming demand from some advanced economies. Nevertheless, significant
challenges persist in vulnerable economies, including in low-income countries (LICs) and those
facing elevated levels of conflict and violence.

In China, growth softened in the first half of 2024 and is projected to slow for the year as a
whole, as an expected uptick in goods exports and industrial activity supported by the global
trade recovery is offset by weaker consumption (figure 1.11). Investment will remain subdued.
Declining real estate investment has weighed on overall investment growth as the downturn
in the property sector—now in its third year—continues, with falling property prices. Growth is
projected to decline further in 2025 as slowing productivity growth and investment as well as
mounting public and private debt weigh on activity. With the population falling for the second
consecutive year in 2023, and amid a low and declining fertility rate, demographic headwinds
are expected to intensify, dragging potential growth lower.

Global trade growth is

FIGURE 1.11: China’s GDP Growth, 2021–24 projected to pick up this
9 year—an improvement
8 from last year—but remain
7 below the average rates
6 observed in the two
Percent

5 decades preceding the

4 pandemic. The forecast
3
entails a pickup in the
2
growth of goods trade after
1
a sluggish start to the year,
0
supported by a rebound
2021-Q2

2021-Q3

2021-Q4

2022-Q1

2022-Q2

2022-Q3

2022-Q4

2023-Q1

2023-Q2

2023-Q3

2023-Q4

2024-Q1

2024-Q2

in global goods demand

Source: Haver Analytics. as inventory restocking
Note: The values are year-on-year changes. GDP = gross domestic product.
resumes in the United
States and the euro area,
and as demand from China remains steady. Meanwhile, services trade growth is expected to
stabilize near its pre-pandemic pace. Trade growth is expected to firm to 3.4 percent in 2025,
in tandem with a pickup in growth in the euro area and EMDEs excluding China and remain
steady in 2026.

18 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Global inflation has continued to decline, yet it remains above target in most advanced
economies. Core inflation has remained stubbornly high in many economies, supported by
rapid growth of the prices of services (figure 1.12). The initial phase of disinflation after the
pandemic was underpinned by falling energy prices as well as waning supply chain pressures.
Recently, the pace of consumer price disinflation has slowed, reflecting a partial rebound
in energy prices, along with a notable slowdown in the rate of decline of core inflation. In
advanced economies,
disinflation in consumer FIGURE 1.12: Core Inflation, 2019–24
goods prices appears
9
to have bottomed
8
out, while inflation in Global
7
consumer services prices EMDEs
6
remains elevated. Over
5
Percent

the remainder of 2024,

4 AEs
continued tight monetary
3
policy stances and slowing
2
wage increases should help 1
to reduce inflation further. 0
Jul-19
Oct-19
Jan-20
Apr-20
Jul-20
Oct-20
Jan-21
Apr-21
Jul-21
Oct-21
Jan-22
Apr-22
Jul-22
Oct-22
Jan-23
Apr-23
Jul-23
Oct-23
Jan-24
Apr-24
Jul-24
Government bond yields
are well above pre-
Sources: Haver Analytics; World Bank.
pandemic levels and, Note: Year-on-year change. The values are medians. The sample includes at least 75 economies.
AEs = advanced economies; EMDEs = emerging markets and developing economies.
absent large negative
shocks to growth, are likely
to remain so for some time given persistently above-target inflation and tight labor markets.
Most advanced economy central banks continue to emphasize that the pace of easing will
be cautious, reflecting persistent inflationary pressures—and, in the case of the United States,
robust economic activity.

Commodity prices have increased moderately in 2024

After a sharp decline between mid-2022 and mid-2023, commodity price swings were less
pronounced in the second half of last year. Year-to-date aggregate commodity prices have risen
slightly in 2024 (2.3 percent) against a backdrop of tight supply conditions and signs of firmer
industrial activity. Oil prices have fluctuated this year, trending substantially higher in April in
the context of escalating tensions in the Middle East, but subsequently pulling back. Metal
prices, excluding those of precious metals, are projected to stay well above pre-pandemic levels
as weaker demand for metals associated with lower real estate investment in China is likely to
be counterbalanced by firming global industrial demand and metal-intensive clean energy
investments.

The World Bank’s total commodity price index declined by 3 percent year-on-year in August,
putting a stop to four consecutive months of annualized increases. Energy prices, which
make up two-thirds of the total commodity price index, dropped by 5 percent year-on-year
in August 2024, contributing to the overall decrease in commodity prices. However, energy
prices (crude oil, natural gas, and coal) have been volatile due to geopolitical concerns, OPEC+

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 19
 oil production cuts, and
FIGURE 1.13: Commodity Market Developments
ongoing/expected interest
a. World Bank commodity price indexes, 2020–24 rate cuts by central banks,
400 which support prices, while
Energy
350 slowing global economic
Fertilizers
300 Food activity and strong supply
Index, 2019=100

250 Metals and minerals from non-OPEC+ countries

200
are easing the pressure
on prices. South African
150
coal prices have increased
100
by 9 percent year-on-
50
year, while Australian coal
0 prices decreased by 4.5
Jan-20
Mar-20
May-20
Jul-20
Sep-20
Nov-20
Jan-21
Mar-21
May-21
Jul-21
Sep-21
Nov-21
Jan-22
Mar-22
May-22
Jul-22
Sep-22
Nov-22
Jan-23
Mar-23
May-23
Jul-23
Sep-23
Nov-23
Jan-24
Mar-24
May-24
Jul-24
percent in August (year-
on-year). Natural gas
b. Monthly prices of coffee, cocoa, and tea, 2020–24 prices in Europe rose by 11
12 percent in August (year-
Coffee Arabica on-year), while US natural
10
Tea Mombasa gas prices dropped by 23
Coffee Robusta
US$ per kilogram

8 percent. Fertilizer prices

Cocoa
6 have continued to decline
from their highs in the
4
second quarter of 2022,
2 although at a slower pace
in recent months. Year-to-
0
date, fertilizer prices are
Jan-20

Jun-20

Nov-20

Apr-21

Sep-21

Feb-22

Jul-22

Dec-22

May-23

Oct-23

Mar-24

Aug-24

about one-fourth lower

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank; International Coffee Organization; International Cocoa compared to the same
Organization; International Tea Committee.
Note: Both panels show monthly data. The last observation is August 2024.
period last year (figure
1.13, panel a).4

Agricultural prices increased by about 2 percent in August 2024 (year-on-year). The increase
was mainly due to historically high prices of cocoa and coffee. Cocoa prices in August 2024
were nearly double those in the same month in 2023 due to adverse weather and plant disease
(black pod rot) in major cocoa-growing regions in Western Africa.5 Meanwhile, the prices of
Arabica and Robusta coffee increased by 33 and 68 percent, respectively, in the second quarter
of 2024 (figure 1.13, panel b). In the first eight months of 2024, Robusta coffee prices were 59
percent higher than the same period in 2023, while Arabica coffee saw a 10 percent increase.

4 On a monthly basis, fertilizer prices increased by 9 and 2 percent in June and July 2024, respectively. The increase in the price of natural gas, a key input in fertilizer
production, resulted in higher fertilizer prices.
5 Improved weather conditions are contributing to the slowdown in the price spike—with cocoa prices declining by 14 percent in July.

20 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Food commodity prices in August 2024 were 9 percent lower than in the same period last year,
with a 15 percent decline in the price of grains and a 12 percent decline in the price of oils and
meals, partially offset by a 1 percent increase in prices in other food groups, including sugar
and meat. Rice prices had been increasing since mid-2023, and the upward trend in Thai rice
prices (the Asian benchmark) was stopped by a 7 percent decline in August (year-on-year). Yet,
average rice prices in the first eight months of 2024 remained 18 percent higher than during
the same period in 2023.

The World Bank’s metals and minerals price index rose by 4 percent in August 2024 (year-on-
year), but the year-to-date average prices remained unchanged from the same period last year.
The prices of aluminum, tin, and zinc saw double-digit year-on-year increases in August 2024,
while copper prices increased by 7 percent and iron ore prices declined by 9 percent. Supply
constraints—such as the ban on Russian-origin metals, export restrictions on tin in Myanmar,
licensing delays in Indonesia that affected the country’s tin and nickel production and exports,
and disruptions in copper production in South America—increased the prices of base metals.
Weakness in China’s real estate sector affected the demand for iron ore. Overall, concerns about
demand from China partly explain the drop in the prices of all base metals in June and July (on
a monthly basis). Year-to-date, the prices of precious metals are 16 percent higher than they
were in the same period last year, reflecting continued geopolitical tensions that increased the
demand for safe-haven assets such as gold. The year-to-date prices of gold and silver increased
by 15 and 13 percent, respectively, while platinum prices dropped by 4 percent.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 21
 1.3: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’S MACROECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
Headline inflation is converging to target for most countries in the region
The median rate of inflation in the region is expected to be 4.8 percent in 2024, down from 7.1
percent in 2023, and it is predicted to decline further to 4.6 percent in 2025 and 4.5 percent in
2026 (figure 1.14). Declining inflation in the region can be attributed to the effects of monetary
tightening and fiscal consolidation across countries as well as the steady decline in commodity
prices from their highs
FIGURE 1.14: Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2020–26 (percent) in 2022. The path of
convergence to inflation
Sub-Saharan Africa Oil exporting countries
Mineral and metal exporters Non-resource-rich countries targets will continue across
10 African countries although
9 at different speeds, and it
8
may hit some bumps along
7
6
the road if upside risks to
Percent

5 inflation materialize. The

4 slowdown in inflation rates
3 appears to be broad-based:
2 about 70 percent of the
1 countries in the region are
0
2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f expected to have lower
inflation in 2024 (compared
FIGURE 1.15: Inflation Rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, December 2019–June 2024 to the previous year), and
(percent, year-on-year)
this proportion will increase
20
to 80 percent in 2025. Yet,
18 inflation rates are expected
16 to be higher than they
14 were in the pre-pandemic
12 period for about 70 percent
of Sub-Saharan African
Percent

10
8
countries. Additionally,
inflation among metal
6
exporters is expected at
4
8 percent in 2024 and 6.4
2 percent in 2025, while that
0 of oil exporters is set at 6.5
2019.12

2020.06

2020.12

2021.06

2021.12

2022.06

2022.12

2023.06

2023.12

2024.06

percent in 2024 and 3.3

percent in 2025.
Sources: World Bank projections; Haver Analytics; International Financial Statistics, International
Monetary Fund. High-frequency data
Note: In figure 1.14, inflation is measured by the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index
using the World Bank Macro-Fiscal Model database. Figure 1.15 plots the year-on-year evolution of suggest that central banks
monthly inflation across African countries from December 2019 to June 2024. The fluctuation band
of inflation is defined by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution across SSA countries. in Sub-Saharan Africa have
Sub-Saharan African countries. e = estimate; f = forecast.
made significant progress

22 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
in the fight against inflation. From its highest median rate of 9.9 percent year-on-year in
October 2022, inflation decelerated sharply to 4.6 percent by June 2024 (figure 1.15).6 However,
the variability of inflation rates across countries remains high—with an interquartile range of
about 12 percentage points this year.7 This implies that some countries still face high inflation
rates (double-digit rates) and the deceleration of inflation varies across countries in the region.

By June 2024, about 70 percent of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (30 of 43) had inflation rates
that were low and declining, while the inflation rate for 13 countries (30 percent) was still high.
Nominal exchange rates appear to have stabilized by the end of June 2024, although at different
levels across these two groups of countries. Factors driving inflation include both external shocks
(global supply chain disruptions) and internal shocks (such as macroeconomic imbalances, fragility,
and debt hangover, among others). These shocks not only create inflationary pressures, but also
jeopardize the stability of exchange rates.8 At the same time, food inflation remains high and slightly
volatile, while currencies have weakened sharply among countries with high inflation.

Figure 1.16 shows the

FIGURE 1.16: Headline Inflation, Food Inflation, and Exchange Rates across
monthly evolution of food
Groups of Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2021–24
and headline inflation
Food high/increasing Headline high/increasing Exchange rate H/I (rhs)
(year-on-year percentage Food low/declining Headline low/declining Exchange rate L/D (rhs)
change) as well as the 35 190
monthly average nominal
30 170
exchange rates9 from
January 2021 to June 2024 25 150

Exchange rate index

for the groups of countries
Inflation (%)

20 130
with declining inflation10 as
well as for those with high 15 110

or rising inflation.11 During 10 90

this period, supply chain
5 70
problems as a result of the
war in Ukraine accelerated 0 50
2021.01
2021.03
2021.05
2021.07
2021.09
2021.11
2022.01
2022.03
2022.05
2022.07
2022.09
2022.11
2023.01
2023.03
2023.05
2023.07
2023.09
2023.11
2024.01
2024.03
2024.05

inflation from the second

quarter of 2022. Disruptions
in the production of Sources: Haver Analytics, International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; World Bank
Food Security Report.
agricultural goods due to Note: The exchange rate index is computed so that increases (declines) in the index represent
depreciations (appreciations). H/I = the group of countries with high and/or increasing headline
domestic conflicts and inflation; L/D = the group of countries with low and declining headline inflation.

extreme weather events

(droughts in Eastern Africa and the Sahel as well as floods in Southern Africa) also contributed
to accelerating inflation in 2022, reaching peak levels in the first quarter of 2023. The nominal
exchange rates for the two groups of countries remained stable until February 2022 for the low-
inflation countries and May 2022 for the high-inflation countries. Currencies for the two groups

6 This calculation was made for 43 countries in the region with available monthly information.
7 The interquartile range is defined as the difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the data. Figure 1.15 shows the dispersion of year-on-year inflation across
countries each month.
8 Weakening currencies led to inflation and, at the same time, higher inflation propelled further weakening as the demand for hard currency increased.
9 For example, the nominal exchange rate indexes depicted in figure 1.16 signal that an increase (decrease) of the index implies a depreciation (appreciation) of the currency.
10 Countries with low and declining inflation are those with single-digit inflation rates and inflation declining in the first half of 2024.
11 Countries with high and increasing inflation are defined as those with two-digit headline inflation rates and/or inflation increasing for more than four straight months
during 2024.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 23
 weakened because of inflationary pressures arising from global geopolitical conflict. The exchange
rates of low-inflation countries depreciated until fall 2022 and then started gradually appreciating.
The currencies of high-inflation economies depreciated further.

After reaching their peaks in early 2023, food and headline inflation began cooling—although
the pace of disinflation varied markedly across countries. In low-inflation countries, inflation
increased at a slower pace than in high-inflation countries throughout 2022, while headline
and food inflation started to decline gradually and protractedly in January 2023. This group—
which accounts for 70 percent of the countries in the region—is stabilizing (headline and
food) inflation at rates closer to their targets. The disinflation among low-inflation countries has
also been accompanied by a strengthening of their currencies. For the group of high-inflation
countries, headline and food inflation appear to have peaked and stabilized at higher levels.12

Food price inflation is gradually slowing down in most Sub-Saharan African

countries
Since reaching highs in March 2022, international food prices cumulatively dropped 25 percent
by July 2024. However, they still remain about 27 percent higher than in 2019. So far this year,
international food prices have increased by a modest 1.3 percent. The increase has been driven
by higher year-to-date
increases in the prices of
FIGURE 1.17: International and Domestic Food Inflation, 2021–24
meat, dairy, and oils and
25 50
mitigated by reductions
International (rhs)
40 in the prices of cereals
International Food Inflation (%)

20 and sugar. Furthermore,

Domestic food inflation (%)

30
domestic food inflation has
20
15 been decelerating across
Domestic
10 African countries. After
10 0 reaching a median rate of
-10
15 percent year-on-year
5 in November 2022, food
-20
inflation gradually slowed
0 -30 down to a single-digit rate
2021.01
2021.03
2021.05
2021.07
2021.09
2021.11
2022.01
2022.03
2022.05
2022.07
2022.09
2022.11
2023.01
2023.03
2023.05
2023.07
2023.09
2023.11
2024.01
2024.03
2024.05

in July 2023 (9.9 percent).

Sources: Haver Analytics; International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; Food and
By June 2024, food inflation
Agriculture Organization food price indexes. in Sub-Saharan Africa hit
Note: The figure depicts the year-on-year evolution of monthly food inflation across Sub-Saharan
African countries and in global markets from January 2021 to June 2024. The green solid line depicts 5.4 percent—which was
the median year-on-year domestic food inflation across countries in the region. The fluctuation band of
inflation is defined by the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution across countries in the region. higher than the Consumer
Price Index in the same
month (4.1 percent). However, the dispersion of inflation rates across countries is still high as
the average interquartile range for this year is 14 percentage points (figure 1.17).

Despite the slowdown from their peak in late 2022, current food prices are still higher compared
to the pre-COVID-19 levels in the region. In 2023, a vast majority of countries in the region

12 Headline and food inflation have stabilized but remained at high levels since their peaks in the second half of 2023.

24 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
recorded two-digit food inflation. From monthly inflation data, the average rate of food inflation
for the representative country in the region was about 10 percent in 2023, while the averages
for the low-inflation (bottom quartile) and high-inflation (top quartile) groups reached 8.8 and
29.1 percent (year-on-year), respectively. By June 2024, (median) food inflation decelerated to 5.4
percent, with low- and high-inflation countries in Sub-Saharan Africa hitting 4.2 and 25.6 percent,
respectively. Adverse weather events disrupting food supplies (for instance, floods in Eastern
Africa, droughts in Southern Africa, as well as hot and dry weather in Western Africa), the high
cost of food imports in local currencies (as a result of exchange rate depreciation), and elevated
logistics costs abroad (higher shipping costs) and at home (high cost of transportation and
elevated price of fertilizers) still explain the food inflation dynamics among countries in the region
with high headline inflation. In conclusion, domestic food prices have decelerated at a slower
pace than international food prices, food inflation remains higher than headline inflation, and food
prices remain stubbornly elevated among countries with high headline inflation.

African currencies appear to be stabilizing, with some exceptions

Tighter financial conditions and a strong dollar as well as foreign exchange market reforms
resulted in the weakening of most currencies in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2023. The Angolan
kwanza, Malawian kwacha, Nigerian naira, South Sudanese pound, and Zambian kwacha were
the worst performing currencies in the region that year. More broadly, the weakening of most
African currencies resulted from foreign exchange shortages as export proceeds were subdued
and international debt payments increased.13
By end-August 2024, the Ethiopian birr, Nigerian naira, and South Sudanese pound were among
the worst performers in the region (figure 1.18). The Nigerian naira continued losing value, with
a year-to-date depreciation of about 43 percent as of end-August. Surges in demand for US
dollars in the parallel market, driven by financial institutions, money managers, and nonfinancial
end-users, combined with limited dollar inflows and slow foreign exchange disbursements to
currency exchange bureaus by the central bank explain the weakening of the naira. By end-
July 2024, the Central Bank of Ethiopia pledged to operate a market-based exchange rate
with limited forex intervention going forward. The Ethiopian birr dropped approximately 30
percent after the announcement, and it is likely to have inflationary effects. The decision has
been followed by financing from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Additionally, the government will step up talks with creditors to restructure its debt.

In contrast, some currencies that weakened in 2023 have stabilized or strengthened this
year. The Kenyan shilling is the best performing currency in Sub-Saharan Africa this year: it
appreciated by 21 percent year-to-date by end-August 2024. The South African rand and
currencies pegged to it have strengthened by 3.1 percent so far this year, after losing value in
the past year. Despite the fact that most currencies are stabilizing, exchange rate pressures and
shortages of foreign exchange remain a concern for African policy makers. From a sample of 30
countries and two currency unions (the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
and WAEMU), more than one-third of the countries in the region are set to have less than three
months of imports in international reserves by end-2024 (figure 1.19).14

13 The depreciation of the naira has followed the progressive liberalization of the official exchange rate since June 2023.
14 Since the year prior to the pandemic, the import coverage ratio has decreased in nearly three-quarters of the countries and monetary unions so far.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 25
 FIGURE 1.18: Currencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023 and 2024 (year-to-date percentage variation)

30
2023 2024 (YTD %)
20

10

0
Percent change

-10

-20

-30

-40

-50

-60

-70
South Sudan

Sudan
Nigeria
Angola

Zambia

Kenya
Liberia
Ghana
Rwanda

Tanzania

Namibia
South Africa

Botswana
Ethiopia

Uganda
Somalia

Guinea
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Malawi

Burundi

Eswatini
Lesotho
Gambia, The

Seychelles

Mozambique
Mauritius

São Tomé and Príncipe

Cabo Verde
CFA franc
Madagascar
FIGURE 1.19: Reserve Coverage Ratio in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2019 and 2024 (months of imports)

18

2019 2024
15
Total Reserves (months of imports)

12

0
Mauritius
Angola
Botswana
Cabo Verde
South Africa
Comoros
Nigeria
Kenya
SSA
Tanzania
WAEMU
Mozambique
Madagascar
Seychelles
Namibia
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Lesotho
Gambia, The
CEMAC
Ghana
Uganda
Eswatini
São Tomé and Príncipe
Malawi
Zambia
Ethiopia
Liberia
Guinea
Burundi
Congo, Dem. Rep.
South Sudan
Zimbabwe

Sources: Haver Analytics; International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.

Note: The YTD variation in the exchange rate for 2024 is computed as the cumulative percentage change in the exchange rate (in US$ per local currency)
from December 31, 2023, to August 30, 2024. CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; WAEMU =
West African Economic and Monetary Union; YTD = year-to-date.

26 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Heterogeneous monetary policy responses as the inflation outlook varies
across countries
There are differences in the speed of convergence to inflation targets across countries in the region.
High-frequency data suggest that the inflation rate of about seven in 10 Sub-Saharan African
countries is stabilizing at single-digit levels, while the remainder still have an inflation rate that is far
from the target and, in a few cases, has still not peaked. As a result, the monetary policy stance across
countries in the region has
evolved from a synchronized FIGURE 1.20: Central Bank Policy Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023–2024
policy tightening (in 2022
Country Current Month of Months Last change YTD Change
and the first half of 2023) rate (%) last change on hold (pp) (pp)
to differentiated monetary Angola 19.5 May-24 4 0.50 1.5
policy responses this Botswana 1.9 Aug-24 0 -0.25 -0.5
Eswatini 7.25 Sep-24 0 -0.25 -0.25
year, varying according Gambia, The 17 Aug-23 12 2.00 0.00
to a country’s position, Ghana 29 Jan-24 7 -1.00 -1.00
business cycle phase, or Kenya 12.75 Aug-24 1 -0.25 0.25
desired speed of reversion Lesotho 7.75 May-23 15 0.25 0.00
Madagascar 11.5 Aug-24 1 0.50 0.50
to inflation targets. In this Malawi 26 Feb-24 7 2.00 2.00
context, some central banks Mauritius 4 Sep-24 0 -0.50 -0.50
have cut rates, while others Mozambique 14.25 Jul-24 1 -0.75 -3.00
Namibia 7.5 Aug-24 1 -0.25 -0.25
have hit a pause or are
Nigeria 26.75 Jul-24 1 0.50 8.00
continuing their cycle of rate Rwanda 6.5 Aug-24 0 -0.50 -1.00
hikes in 2024 (figure 1.20). South Africa 8 Sep-24 0 -0.25 -0.25
Tanzania 6 Apr-24 5 0.50 1.00
During the second half of Uganda 10 Aug-24 1 -0.25 0.50
this year, African central Zambia 13.5 May-24 4 1.00 2.50
WAEMU 3.5 Dec-23 9 0.25 0.00
banks are deciding whether CEMAC 5 Mar-23 17 0.50 0.00
to join the wave of global Sources: Central banks; Office of the Chief Economist of the Africa region, World Bank.
easing or maintain a Note: Information on the current rate as of September 20, 2024. The value for WAEMU refers to the
minimum bid rate set by the Central Bank of West African States. The value for CEMAC refers to the
monetary tightening stance. tender interest rate set by the Bank of Central African States. CEMAC = Economic and Monetary
Community of Central Africa; pp = percentage points; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary
They are closely monitoring Union; YTD = year to date.

inflation and currency

trends and will act with caution given the likely domestic and global upside risks of inflation.
In August 2024, the monetary authorities in Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, and Uganda kicked
off their monetary easing cycle. In the cases of Kenya and Uganda, the monetary authority cut
policy rates by 25 basis points as inflation fell back to target and their currencies remained stable
or strengthened, thanks to stronger exports and remittances. The South African Reserve Bank
lowered its policy rate by 25 basis points as inflation expectations are gradually anchoring around
the middle of the target band. The Bank of Mozambique became the first in the region to cut its
main policy rate: the monetary policy rate has declined by 300 basis points so far this year—as a
result of reductions of 75 basis points in four consecutive monetary policy meetings. The pace and
magnitude of adjustments for these central banks will depend on inflation expectations and the
calibration of risks and uncertainty to the medium-term inflationary outlook.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 27
 A pause in monetary policy tightening continues in Eswatini, Lesotho, and Zambia, as well as
in member countries of the Bank of Central African States and the Central Bank of West African
States. These central banks are so far keeping interest rates higher to anchor inflation expectations
properly and secure a smoother path to their inflation targets. With an improving inflation outlook
and stabilizing currencies, some of these countries are likely to put an end to their hiking cycle
and start reducing monetary policy rates. However, price stickiness and the need to anchor
expectations and restore the ability to achieve targets may delay benchmark rate cuts.

Central banks in countries that still have double-digit inflation and weakened domestic currencies
(such as Angola, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) will keep monetary policy rates higher for longer and, in
fewer cases, they may increase their policy rates—particularly in countries where inflation rates still
have not peaked. Broadly, currency weakness, slow fiscal adjustment, and cost pressures are among
the factors driving these countries to keep a tighter stance for a longer period. For instance, Ethiopia,
Ghana, and Nigeria are among the worst performing in Africa this year, and their currencies continue
weakening while demand for foreign exchange remains pressing. Measures to mitigate social unrest
associated with the high cost of living in Angola (doubling of the minimum wage) and Nigeria
(partially reinstating fuel subsidies) are putting pressure on their public finances.15

The fight against inflation is still not over in Africa. Central banks need to continue monitoring
inflation drivers, assess the likelihood of upside risks to inflation—for instance, arising from a
rebound in commodity prices, fiscal loosening, or weaker currencies—and ensure that the rate
of inflation is firmly on the path back to target bands. Central bank credibility is critical to anchor
inflation expectations against future (domestic or external) shocks, and coordination with fiscal
authorities to improve the inflation outlook is also a must.

Fiscal balances are improving at a sluggish pace

Fiscal balances continue to improve across countries in the region, thanks to expenditure-
cutting and revenue-raising policies, although the pace is decelerating. Amid restricted fiscal
space and limited access to external borrowing, most Sub-Saharan African governments are
engaged in fiscal consolidation to achieve public sector sustainability. Some successful efforts
include improving administrative oversight of spending programs, eliminating “ghost workers”
from payrolls, implementing tax administration and compliance measures and tax rate reforms,
streamlining government incentives and value-added tax exemptions, reforming subsidies, and
reprioritizing public spending toward programs with high growth and job multipliers.

The median fiscal deficit in the region is projected to decline from 3.9 percent of GDP in 2023
to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2024. It is set to drop further to 2.9 percent of GDP in 2025–26. Fiscal
balances for the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries (29 of 47) are expected to improve
this year. Ten of the countries with improved fiscal accounts in 2024 will have a narrower deficit
(less than 3 percent of GDP) or shift into a surplus.16 Overall, the reduction of fiscal imbalances
is still sluggish as the number of countries with large deficits (exceeding 3 percentage points of
GDP) has dropped modestly, from a peak of 34 in 2022 to 27 in 2024.

15 Further action was taken to reduce the subsidy in Nigeria on September 3, 2024 when gasoline prices were increased by 40-45 percent.
16 For this group of 10 countries, the (median) deficit is projected to narrow from 3.1 percent in 2023 to 1.9 percent in 2024. The (median) fiscal deficit for the remaining 20
countries is expected to narrow from 4.8 percent in 2023 to 3.6 percent in 2024.

28 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Fiscal deficits among non-resource abundant countries are expected to decrease by 0.6
percentage point of GDP to 3.6 percent in 2024. Among resource abundant countries, the
evolution of fiscal balances appears to have diverged since 2022. For instance, the fiscal surplus
in oil abundant countries shifted from a surplus of 3.3 percent of GDP in 2022 to a deficit of 0.2
percent of GDP in 2024—as international oil prices declined from their highs in mid-2022 but
remain volatile and fluctuating around US$80 per barrel in 2024. In contrast, the fiscal deficit in
metal exporting countries is expected to drop from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2023 to 3.3 percent of
GDP in 2024 (figure 1.21).

The improvement in overall fiscal balances in the region is mainly driven by a narrowing of
primary balances. Overall, efforts across the region to address fiscal imbalances have been
substantial: after deploying
government spending
FIGURE 1.21: Fiscal Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26
and forgoing revenues (% of GDP, median)
during the pandemic, Sub-Saharan Africa Oil exporting countries
Sub-Saharan Africa’s overall Mineral and metal exporters Non-resource-rich countries
deficit declined from 6.3 4
3
percent of GDP in 2020 to 2
4 percent of GDP in 2024, a 1
cumulative decline of more 0
Percent of GDP

than 2 percentage points of -1

-2
GDP. Moreover, the primary
-3
deficit narrowed from 3.6 -4
percent of GDP in 2020 to -5
1 percent of GDP in 2024, -6
and this narrowing seems -7
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f
to be widespread. Of 47
countries with available FIGURE 1.22: Primary Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26
data in the region, the (% of GDP, median)

number of countries with Sub-Saharan Africa Oil exporting countries

narrow primary deficits Mineral and metal exporters Non-resource-rich countries
increased from a trough of 8

22 in 2022 to 38 in 2024. 6
While primary deficits 4
among non-resource-rich
Percent of GDP

2
countries narrowed from
3.9 percent of GDP in 2022 0
to 1.7 percent of GDP in -2
2024, the primary surplus -4
of oil abundant countries
-6
declined by 4.8 percentage 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f
points of GDP over the
Source: World Bank projections.
same period to 1.9 percent Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic product.

of GDP in 2024 (figure 1.22).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 29
 In contrast, total debt service in the region has steadily increased due to liquidity pressures
arising from greater interest payments (as a result of a shift from concessional financing
to market financing), together with an increase in public debt levels over the past decade.
The decrease in primary deficits was partially offset by an increase in net interest payments
by the government, from 2.7 percent of GDP in 2020 to 3 percent of GDP in 2024. These
payments are expected to increase even further to an average of 3.4 percent of GDP in
2025–26 (figure 1.23).

The improvement in the

FIGURE 1.23: Fiscal Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2014–26 (% of GDP,
weighted average)
fiscal balance documented
above was mainly
Primary balance Net interest payments Overall fiscal balance
1 driven by increases in
government revenues and
0
to a lesser extent by cuts in
-1 government spending. The
-2 improvement in the fiscal
Percent of GDP

balance for the region from

-3
2020 to 2024 was explained
-4 by a cumulative increase
-5 of 1.5 percentage points
of GDP in government
-6
revenues and a decline
-7 in government spending
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024e 2025f 2026f
of 0.8 percentage point
FIGURE 1.24: Changes in the Fiscal Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2015–26
(figure 1.24). About three
(percentage points of GDP, weighted average) in four countries in the
region experienced a
2 Revenues Expenditures Fiscal balance
narrowing of fiscal deficits
from 2020 to 2024, and
1 this improvement was
Percentage points of GDP

attributed to a cumulative
0 increase in tax revenues of
1.1 percent of GDP and a
-1
reduction in government
spending of 1.4 percent.
For the remaining countries
-2
(12 of 44), the fiscal balance
widened slightly as a result
-3 of increases in government
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024e 2025f 2026f
spending (0.7 percent
Sources: World Bank projections; Haver Analytics; International Financial Statistics, International
Monetary Fund. of GDP) that exceeded
Note: In figure 1.24, positive (negative) values for the blue columns indicate increases (decreases)
in government revenues including grants. Positive (negative) values for the green columns indicate increases in government
decreases (increases) in government expenditures. e = estimate; f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic
product. revenues (0.4 percent
of GDP).

30 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Government debt remains high and riskier, and some progress has been
made in debt restructuring
Over the past decades, external public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt in Sub-Saharan
Africa has been increasing, and it has more than quadrupled since 2006. In 2022, the total
external PPG debt reached US$462 billion, compared to US$108 billion in 2006.17
The changing creditor landscape. Rising external debt mirrors the changes in the composition
of external debt creditors. Multilateral financing has increased over a protracted period among
LICs in the region. Their share of multilateral financing in PPG external debt has increased since
2015 and has remained above 50 percent since 2019. Overall, the share of multilateral debt in
external PPG debt for LICs increased by 12 percentage points between 2015 and 2022 and only
5 percentage points for middle-income countries (MICs) over the same period.
The share of external financing from the bilateral Paris Club creditors decreased in Sub-Saharan
Africa, while the share from bilateral non–Paris Club creditors increased slightly. In 2006, bilateral
Paris Club creditors accounted for 22 percent of external debt in Sub-Saharan African countries,
which decreased to 5 percent by 2022. In contrast, the share of bilateral non–Paris Club creditors
increased from 15 to 16 percent during the same period. On the back of the changing creditor
landscape is a significant concentration of holdings by a few major creditors. Before the global
financial crisis,18 Sub-Saharan Africa’s top six bilateral creditors were France, China, the United States,
Japan, Saudi Arabia, and
Kuwait. However, by the
FIGURE 1.25: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Top Six Bilateral Creditors, 2006–22
end of 2022, the creditor
composition changed, with 25
China—a non–Paris Club
member—leading as the
Share of PPG external debt stock (%)

20
most significant official
bilateral creditor to SSA, with 15
its debt stock increasing
from 3 percent in 2006 to 12 10
percent in 2022 (figure 1.25).
The debt burden increased 5

as countries resorted more

to market financing. Bond 0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
financing has increased as China France Japan Kuwait Saudi Arabia United States
a source for Sub-Saharan Source: Based on International Debt Statistics, World Bank, December 2023.

African MICs’ external PPG Note: PPG = public and publicly guaranteed.

debt, leveraging their access

to capital markets. The
share of bonds in the total external PPG debt of MICs increased by 13 percentage points between
2006 and 2022. Since 2007, 17 countries in the region have issued Eurobonds to private creditors.
After a two-year hiatus from international markets, four countries (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and

17 External PPG debt has continued increasing, but annual growth rates have been subdued post-pandemic, with external PPG debt increasing by 7 percent in 2020, 3
percent in 2021, and 1 percent in 2022. Across subregions, debt accumulation in AFW increased at a faster pace during the post-pandemic period. Between 2019 and
2022, external PPG debt in AFW increased by 32 percent, while for the same period, external debt increased by only 3 percent in AFE.
18 Considering 2007 as the year of reference.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 31
 Senegal) resumed issuance of sovereign bonds in early 2024, with some of these issuances to buy
back and refinance Eurobonds and commercial loans falling due.19 However, the issuance came at
a higher price tag as a result of higher global interest rates rather than bigger country risk spreads.
For instance, the coupon of the new Eurobond issued by Kenya in February is 9.75 percent,
compared to the 6.875
FIGURE 1.26: Sub-Saharan African Countries’ Sovereign Bond Redemptions, percent for the Eurobond
2023–30
maturing in 2024.20
6
Eurobond redemptions
5
remain high in 2024 and
4 are expected to increase
US$, billions

in 2025. In 2024, eight

3
countries in Sub-Saharan
2 Africa are expected to
amortize their sovereign
1
bonds with a cumulative
0 value of US$4.5 billion
2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
(figure 1.26). Three
Angola Benin Congo, Rep. Ethiopia Gabon Ghana countries in AFE had the
Côte d'Ivoire Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Cameroon Kenya
largest sovereign bond
South Africa Rwanda Senegal Seychelles Zambia
redemptions, with a total
Sources: Bloomberg Analytics; World Bank.
share of 90 percent of the
bonds issued in 2014—
namely, Kenya (US$2 billion), Ethiopia (US$1 billion), and Zambia (US$1 billion). The region will
continue its high bond redemptions in 2025, with cumulative bond capitalization of US$5.2
billion. Angola and Nigeria account for more than 50 percent of the redemptions.

Overall, bond redemptions are projected to increase steeply in the region in 2024–25, reflecting
redemptions of Eurobonds, before decreasing in 2026. The higher redemptions in 2024 and
2025 are expected to drive up governments’ financing needs, in a context of higher market
rates, as they potentially account for a significant proportion of government revenues in some
Sub-Saharan African countries. The restructuring of external debt in Ethiopia, Ghana, and
Zambia is expected to result in lower payments as bond exchanges are finalized.

Greater reliance on domestic bonds amid restricted access to global capital markets. In parallel,
Sub-Saharan African countries have increased their reliance on domestic debt markets, whose
continued development enabled countries to finance larger deficits despite the low tax base in
the region.21 Based on the World Bank-IMF LIC Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) database,
the median public domestic debt-to-GDP in Sub-Saharan African countries increased from 8
percent in 2012 to 22 percent in 2022 (figure 1.27). From 2012 to 2021, public domestic debt-
to-GDP in LICs rose by around 15 percentage points to 23 percent, while for lower-middle-
income countries (LMICs) it increased by 10 percentage points and reached 19 percent in

19 In June 2024, Senegal became the fourth Sub-Saharan African country to enter the Eurobond market this year. The government raised US$750 million at a coupon rate of
7.75 percent and maturing in 2031.
20 Kenya’s bond issuance of US$1.5 billion in February 2024 represented a 75 percent buyback of the 2014 US$2 billion.
21 Over 2010–21, on average, 60 percent of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had a ratio of tax revenues to GDP below 15 percent, according to Government Finance
Statistics (IMF).

32 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
2021. The COVID-19
FIGURE 1.27: LIC-DSF: Debt Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2012–24
pandemic accelerated the
accumulation of public 700 PPG external debt, nom 25
Domestic public debt, nom
domestic debt at a much 600 Domestic debt-to-GDP (median,rhs)
faster pace given countries’ 20
500
need for greater financial

Percent of GDP
resources to protect people 15

US$, billions
400
and jobs. However, since
300 10
2023, the median public
domestic debt-to-GDP 200
5
among countries in Sub- 100
Saharan Africa using the
0 0
LIC-DSF has stabilized, and
2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024
it is projected to reach 20
percent of GDP in LICs and Source: Based on the World Bank–International Monetary Fund LIC-DSF database as of end-May 2024.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; LIC-DSF = Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability
17 percent of GDP in LMICs Framework; PPG = public and publicly guaranteed.

in 2024.

Government financing needs remain high. Public gross financing needs (GFNs) are expected to remain
higher than in the pre-pandemic era. Financing needs for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa increased
sharply after the COVID-19 pandemic until 2022, as countries ramped up resources to support
economic recovery. The higher energy and food prices further amplified government financing
needs. For LICs in Sub-Saharan Africa, the average GFN was almost 13 percent of GDP by the end
of 2022, with 11 countries (Benin, Burundi, The Gambia, Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda, São Tomé
and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Togo, and Zambia) having GFNs exceeding 14 percent of
GDP, a level consistent with a higher probability of distress in countries using the LIC-DSF. GFNs in
LICs in Sub-Saharan Africa
decreased to an average
FIGURE 1.28: Gross Financing Needs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2012–24
of 10 percent in 2023,
14
and this is projected to
Primary deficit
be broadly stable in 2024 12
Gross financing needs
as government finance 10
Percent of GDP

pressure eases and primary 8

deficits taper (figure 1.28).
6
Government debt is 4
stabilizing at high levels.
2
Public debt in Sub-Saharan
0
Africa was four times higher 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
in 2023 compared to 2006, Source: Based on the World Bank–International Monetary Fund Low-Income Country Debt
reflecting external and Sustainability Framework database as of end-June 2024.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
domestic debt stabilizing
at elevated levels and
high GFNs. The average nominal level of debt in 2006–19 was around US$565 billion, and the
current nominal public debt at end-2023 stood at US$1.25 trillion. It is expected to drop slightly

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 33
 to US$1.18 trillion at end-2024 (figure 1.29).22 Since 2013, accommodative global financial
conditions and a search for yield have facilitated larger volumes of financing to countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the collapse in oil prices in 2014–16 led to exchange
rate depreciations and wider primary deficits that pushed public debt upward. During the
pandemic and post-
pandemic recovery period,
FIGURE 1.29: Public Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2006–24
debt levels increased
1.4 80
Public debt (AFE) to respond to higher
1.2 Public debt (AFW) 70 financing needs. However,
Public debt-to-GDP (median (rhs)
1.0
60 the context has changed
50 after the COVID-19 crisis, as
US$, trillions

0.8

Percent of GDP
40
persistent global inflation
0.6 and tighter monetary
30
0.4
policies have led to higher
20 (domestic and external)
0.2 10 borrowing costs for
0.0 0 countries in Sub-Saharan
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Africa and put pressure
Sources: Based on World Economic Outlook April 2024.
on exchange rates. The
Note: The data are for 46 countries. AFE = Eastern and Southern Africa; AFW = Western and Central
Africa; GDP = gross domestic product. median total public debt-
to-GDP in Sub-Saharan
Africa increased from 37
percent in 2006 to 52 percent in 2019, before the COVID-19 shock, and further increased to 57
percent in 2023. In 2023, the median debt-to-GDP ratio for LICs in Sub-Saharan Africa reached
57 percent, while it reached 64 percent for MICs.

Debt burden remains high. Sub-Saharan Africa’s total debt service levels have increased steadily
since 2006, adversely affecting fiscal space and increasing vulnerability to shocks, especially for
countries that have gained access to the international bond market and other non-concessional
financing sources.23 Total annual debt service increased by US$31 billion between 2006 and
2022. Additionally, the expiration of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative—which suspended
and rescheduled debt service due during 2020–21—along with high global interest rates
led to a large increase in debt service in 2023, amounting to US$51 billion, resulting in a total
cumulative increase of US$82 billion.24 The highest increase was in AFE countries, where total
debt service in 2006–22 increased by US$81 billion. The ratios of total debt service to exports
and debt service to revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa are 32 and 49 percent, respectively, for 2023,
and estimated to adjust downward in 2024 to 22 and 34 percent, respectively (figure 1.30).25

As a result, external debt distress risks in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased since 2015. The risk
of external debt distress in the region has surged as the share of countries at high risk of or in

22 The analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa in this volume excludes Somalia and Sudan, which qualified for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
Somalia reached the Completion Point and received debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and other associated debt relief initiatives in December 2023. Sudan reached the
HIPC Initiative Decision Point in 2021 and is expected to receive debt relief following the solution of the country’s ongoing internal conflict. The narrative for public debt in
Sub-Saharan Africa relies on data from the World Economic Outlook published in April 2024.
23 By end-2022, the share of debt service paid by the region to China and private creditors amounted to 77 percent of total PPG external debt service.
24 The data for total debt service, exports, and revenues come from the World Economic Outlook updated as of April 2024.
25 Total debt service for Sub-Saharan Africa decreased between 2023 and 2024, mainly because of a projected reduction in South Africa’s total debt service. Additionally,
both revenues and exports were expected to increase, on average, between 2023 and 2024.

34 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
debt distress in the LIC-DSF
FIGURE 1.30: Debt Service Burden Indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2006–24
increased from 27 percent
in 2015 to 53 percent in 50
2024.26 Since 2021, no 45 Debt service to exports
country in Sub-Saharan 40 Debt service to revenues

Africa has been classified 35

as low risk, and the share 30

Percent
of countries at high risk or 25
in debt distress reached 20
a peak of 61 percent in 15
2021 (figure 1.31). Recently, 10
the risk of debt distress 5
has improved in a few 0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
countries due to debt relief.
During 2023, Mauritania’s Sources: Based on World Economic Outlook April 2024.
Note: The data are for 46 countries.
and Somalia’s risk of debt
distress improved to FIGURE 1.31: External Risk of Debt Distress in Sub-Saharan African Countries,
“moderate,” from “high” 2006–24
and “in debt distress,” In debt distress High Moderate Low
respectively. In contrast, 100
Ghana was downgraded
to “in debt distress” in May
Share of active LIC-DSF countries

80
2023 in the context of the
ongoing debt restructuring. 60

Progress in debt 40
restructuring. With the
aim to restore debt 20
sustainability and rebuild
fiscal space, several 0
countries in Sub-Saharan
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024

Africa are implementing

Source: Based on the World Bank–International Monetary Fund LIC-DSF database as of end-May 2024.
comprehensive debt Note: LIC-DSF = Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability Framework.

restructurings in the
context of the Common
Framework and beyond. Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia have applied for external debt
treatments under the Common Framework. Restructuring agreements were reached with
official bilateral creditors in all the countries except Ethiopia, where negotiations were
delayed due to the country’s internal conflict. Negotiations with official and private creditors
continue, with a few countries reaching agreement. Chad reached an agreement with all its
main creditors in November 2022. The Government of Zambia agreed on a state-contingent
debt treatment with its official creditors in October 2023, and concluded a bond exchange in
June 2024. Negotiations with other private creditors are being finalized. The Government of

26 Based on the risk assessment of 38 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, using the LIC-DSF as of end-May 2024.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 35
 Ghana also concluded negotiations with its official creditors in June 2024 and has reached
a preliminary deal with bondholders.27 Progress on debt restructuring negotiations in these
countries allowed the IMF to conclude financing programs and the World Bank to provide
large positive net flows at highly concessional or grant terms.

Beyond the Common Framework, Malawi outlined a strategy to restructure its external debt
and restore debt sustainability in July 2022. The authorities are negotiating with commercial
and official bilateral creditors and have recently reached an agreement with China—a
major bilateral creditor—for a restructured amount of US$206 million (1.6 percent of 2023
GDP) to reduce the country’s debt service needs. In December 2023, Somalia received a
US$4.5 billion debt relief package from its creditors, including the World Bank, as a result
of the country’s Completion Point under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative. The debt relief package aims to support the country’s economic recovery and
ensure debt sustainability.

A stable current account balance for the region masks wide variation
across countries
Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to improve its overall external balance by 0.5 percentage
point of GDP over the next three years. The median current account deficit for the region
is projected to decrease slightly from 4.5 percent of GDP in 2023 to 4.3 percent in 2024.
However, the behavior of
FIGURE 1.32: Current Account Balances in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2019–26
the current account varies
(% of GDP) among different groups
Sub-Saharan Africa Oil exporting countries of countries (figure 1.32).
Mineral and metal exporters Non-resource-rich countries On the one hand, net oil-
6
exporting countries may
4 experience weakened
2 current account positions
due to anticipated easing
0
Percent of GDP

in oil prices, declining

-2 production (the Republic
-4 of Congo), and instability
-6
(Chad and South Sudan).
On the other hand, net
-8
exporters of metals and
-10
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f minerals are likely to
benefit from increased
Source: World Bank projections.
Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic product.
prices, leading to
improvements in their

27 Ghana concluded a domestic debt exchange in 2023 that achieved 95 percent participation and critically helped to reduce refinancing needs.

36 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
current account positions despite starting—on average—from a wider current account deficit
(7.4 percent of GDP in 2023). For example, Zambia is expected to see improvements in the
current account of nearly 1.9 percentage points of GDP due partly to higher metal prices and
favorable mining conditions, increased grants and remittances, and a drop in imports—spurred
by their higher cost under a depreciating exchange rate. Similarly, favorable copper prices offset
falling prices of other metals, particularly cobalt, and boosted export earnings, which helped to
improve the Democratic Republic of Congo’s external position.

Non-resource-rich countries face more challenges with high current account deficits, with
several countries having double-digit deficits in 2024. For instance, Mozambique’s deficit is
projected to worsen, potentially reaching 29 percent of GDP by 2026, while other countries, like
Burundi, Malawi, Namibia, and Rwanda, are also expected to have double-digit deficits. These
deficits contribute to exchange rate instability, as seen in Malawi, where the deficit is expected
to reach 18.7 percent of GDP in 2024, putting pressure on international reserves. In Rwanda, the
current account deficit is projected to remain large in 2024 due to increased imports required
for the post-flood reconstruction and the large airport construction project. On the positive
side, Kenya is forecasted to
maintain a deficit between FIGURE 1.33: Changes in the Current Account, Savings, and Investment in
4.0 and 4.1 percent of GDP, Sub-Saharan Africa, 2015–26 (% of GDP)
with potential increases in Change in savings (+, increase)
exports and foreign direct 4 Change in investment (-, increase)
investment due to ongoing Change in CAB (+, improved)
trade agreements and 3

improving global financial 2

conditions. Similarly,
Percent of GDP

Tanzania’s current account 1

deficit is narrowing due to 0

favorable terms of trade.
-1
Decomposing the current
-2
account according to the
savings-investment gap -3
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024e 2025f 2026f
approach reveals that
national savings have Source: World Bank projections.
Note: CAB = current account balance; e = estimate; f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic product.
significantly influenced
the current account
performance in recent years, except during 2018–19 when increases in investment led to
current account deterioration. In 2024, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to have, on
average, an improved current account position due to strong increases in national savings that
more than offset the increase in investment levels. Overall, fluctuations in national savings play
a more important role in influencing the current account, especially for countries experiencing
expanding current account deficits (figure 1.33).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 37
 1.4: RISKS TO THE OUTLOOK
Risks to Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth outlook are still tilted to the downside. Heightened geopo-
litical tensions could hurt global economic activity; in particular, a conflict-related disruption to
global oil supply could push oil prices markedly higher and undermine the disinflation process.
Elevated trade policy uncertainty and proliferating trade restrictions could weigh on trade
prospects and economic activity. Moreover, if further delays in the disinflation process emerge,
policy rate cuts may be postponed. Furthermore, weaker-than-expected growth in China—
triggered, for instance, by a more prolonged and deeper property sector downturn—could
have notable negative spillovers, particularly for African commodity exporters. Severe climate
change–related natural disasters could result in considerable losses of lives, livelihoods, and
output. However, upside risks to the near-term growth outlook in the region are also possible if
inflation comes down faster than expected, thanks to productivity gains. The green transition is
an opportunity in the medium term to achieve universal energy access through the lower cost
of renewable energy.

Downside risks
An uncertain global environment
A downward scenario of modest US growth, business activity in Europe failing to take off, and
softer economic activity in China may drag growth in the region. US growth may decelerate
in 2025 if uncertainty associated with the political transition, fiscal policies, and trade policies
continues. Efforts to limit further expansion of fiscal deficits and government debt may
also weigh on US economic activity. In Europe, economic activity may not recover as fast
as anticipated as labor markets remain tight, inflation is above target in some countries in
that region, and lower productivity associated with structural bottlenecks persists. A growth
slowdown in China as a result of subdued aggregate demand and a protracted slump in
property markets may adversely affect consumer confidence. Investment growth will remain
modest in China—especially if policies to restructure real estate markets are not put in place.
Under this scenario, the demand for and prices of Sub-Saharan Africa’s commodity exports
could decline—particularly metals and minerals.

A slowdown in the global disinflation process. Growth prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa would also
be clouded by a slower-than-expected convergence of inflation toward targets in advanced
economies. Sticky prices of services and wages may reduce the pace of inflation deceleration
and could delay achieving price stability—particularly if stubborn inflation data heighten
short-term inflation expectations. In this context, central banks may feel compelled to keep
policy rates higher for an even longer period. A prolonged US dollar appreciation as a result of
interest rate differentials could disrupt capital flows and impede monetary policy easing, which
could adversely impact growth. Furthermore, a renewed focus on fiscal prudence in advanced
economies could have similarly contractionary impacts on the region if bilateral and multilateral
lending programs were to be affected.

Global asset market volatility. Renewed volatility in global markets could potentially destabilize
the economic recovery in the region. Reduced risk appetite can lead to higher spreads amid
high debt and refinancing needs in Sub-Saharan Africa. While international markets have

38 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
calmed compared to the previous year, underlying concerns remain around energy markets in
Europe, property markets in Asia, and equity markets in the United States. Moreover, although
governments in the region have taken steps to improve economic resilience to global demand
fluctuations, the potential for further support is diminished by high debt costs and reduced
fiscal space.

Geopolitical risks, political transitions, and policy uncertainty

Ongoing geopolitical risks, arising from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, continue
to create uncertainty and potential threats to global economic activity. Further escalation of
these regional conflicts could reignite fears around global supply chains and lead to spikes
in international food and energy prices. As such, food and energy security remain a concern
for Africa, with the potential for costly price interventions (subsidies and tariff waivers, among
others) limited by reduced fiscal space in many parts of the region. The increasing geoeconomic
fragmentation exacerbated by these conflicts may have disruptive effects on global trade—
potentially limiting destinations for African exports and intermediate input sources. It could also
heighten inflationary pressures by elevating the cost of imported goods along the supply chain.
Trade tariffs, alongside a scaling up of industrial policies worldwide, can generate damaging
cross‐border spillovers, as well as trigger retaliation, resulting in a costly race to the bottom
among countries. Given the slow recovery of and uncertainty surrounding global trade, African
countries may resort to more intraregional trade (box 1.1).

Political transitions have been commonplace this year. Six of the world’s 10 most populous
nations and the European Union have already held elections this year, with only two of the most
populated nations remaining. The United States is a key source of global uncertainty as the
home of the largest international financial sector and the largest reserve currency. Meanwhile,
there are difficult negotiations around debt sustainability across the Africa region, in which
collaboration among creditors and mutual concessions can be essential. A reduction in political
uncertainty could potentially lead to a boost in economic activity if political events evolve in a
promising way.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, uncertainty around political transitions also remains a serious concern.
Political violence and suppression can severely hamper economic activity, impeding investment
decisions in the private sector and making other contract commitments more difficult, such as
hiring and purchasing agreements. Displaced populations are particularly vulnerable to these
evolving circumstances, further underscoring concerns around food and energy security in the
region. So far this year, the region has seen relatively peaceful elections in 10 countries,28 with
six more scheduled before the end of the year.29 However, safe constitutional transition was
threatened in Senegal, where the election was delayed and subsequently held quickly to ensure
adherence to the constitution, and Togo, where the election followed controversial changes to
the constitution. In this context, the war in Sudan highlights the potential for violent conflict
and acts as a potentially destabilizing event for its neighbors.30

28 Botswana, Chad, the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Togo.
29 Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Namibia, Somaliland, and South Sudan.
30 Despite rising violent conflict, the region has not seen a rapid buildup in military expenditure compared to other regions. Sub-Saharan Africa’s military spending (adjusted
for inflation) increased by only 8 percent between 2018 and 2023. Military spending increased by more than 1 percentage point of GDP in six countries—namely, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Liberia, Mali, South Sudan, and Togo. The data are from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (https://milex.sipri.org/sipri).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 39
 Political uncertainty can lead to inconsistent policies in the region. Failure to deepen structural
reforms may also hold back growth in the region—for instance, policy makers in South Africa
need to maintain momentum for much needed reforms in energy and transportation. Monetary
and fiscal reforms that are not accompanied with mitigation measures for the disadvantaged
may impair achieving key priorities. The high cost of living, mistrust of the government, and
the perception of economic and social exclusion triggered protests in Kenya, Nigeria, and
Uganda—unrest that could spread throughout the region. Additionally, the exit of Burkina Faso,
Mali, and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States to form the Alliance of
Sahel States may undermine previous commitments to regional integration. Similarly, the need
for policy credibility and stability is highlighted by the recent social tensions in Kenya, where the
attempt to establish fiscal credibility was undermined by the lack of political capital necessary
to see those policies through, leading to large policy swings that further undermined growth
and stability. Finally, the civil war in Sudan is having devastating consequences on human lives
and livelihoods as well as damaging physical infrastructure, with possible contagion effects and
negative spillovers within the region.

Climate risks
The risks posed by climate change are starting to materialize on a regular basis (box 1.2).
While some expected climate costs are included in the projections in this volume, significant
uncertainty remains around the impact of extreme weather events caused by climate change,
and the potential costs of extreme heat and damage to infrastructure from floods are especially
problematic in the region. Recent years have seen multiple abnormal weather events, including
massive floods in West and Central Africa; extreme heat in the Sahel in April this year, with a
high of 48.5 degrees Celsius in Keyes, Mali; and multi-year droughts and flooding in Eastern
Africa. In Southern Africa, the impact of cyclones has increased, notably with Cyclone Freddy
causing more than 1,400 deaths and exacerbating a cholera outbreak in Malawi in 2023.

Along with the direct impact of climate events, significant uncertainty remains in the region
around the impact of a global transition to renewable energy and the green economy. Prices for
many critical minerals supplied by Africa related to this transition remain depressed on global
markets, while the risk of stranded oil reserves remains a concern for a handful of countries
in the region. Moreover, the region’s resource management and taxation capacity remain
depressed, with many of the extraction operations owned and operated by foreign entities.
While there are large potential benefits to the region from an export market in renewable
energy and green finance, these upside risks have yet to materialize at the magnitudes
necessary to alter growth prospects.

Food security
Aside from climate change, conflict and low productivity are weighing on agricultural yields,
food production, and trade—thus raising concern about food security. As of 2023, more
than one in five people faced hunger, more than three in five people experienced moderate
or severe food insecurity, and more than 70 percent of the population was unable to afford
a healthy diet in Sub-Saharan Africa.31 While prevalent, food insecurity is particularly acute

31 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO (2024).

40 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
(classified as Integrated Food Security Phase 4 or above) in conflict-affected areas, including in
Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan.32 As a main driver of
hunger, conflict displaces people, disrupts agricultural production, and blocks access to imports,
further exacerbating calamity and instability.

Outside conflict areas, countries in the region are experiencing varying levels of food
insecurity—thus reflecting food production that is unable to meet the growing demand.
Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced persistent trade deficits in food crops over the past
20 years, and the import bill has increased from US$8.6 billion in 2000 to US$ 57.9 billion
in 2022. In addition to conflict, stagnating productivity growth, weak market institutions,
insufficient infrastructure, and climate shocks all hamper agricultural output. Climate shocks,
in particular, have increasingly become a threat to agricultural production. After Southeast
Africa experienced the longest tropical cyclone on record in 2023, the region endured one of
the strongest droughts in Southern Africa and deadly flash floods in Eastern Africa fueled by El
Niño earlier in 2024, and it is likely to experience reverse weather patterns as a result of La Niña
in the final quarter of the year.

Upside risks
Acceleration on the path to global disinflation. Global disinflation could proceed at a faster pace
than currently envisioned, aided by stronger productivity growth. For instance, this could be
driven by the rapid adoption of new technologies, enabling advanced economies to extend
recent gains and EMDEs to recoup post-pandemic productivity losses. Faster global disinflation
would allow central banks to lower policy rates more than assumed, thereby supporting
growth.33 Another upside risk is that US growth could be higher than expected on account of
continued strong labor supply dynamics, underpinned by rising labor force participation and
elevated absorption of working-age migrants.

Transition to renewable energy and green technologies. Africa is endowed with abundant renewable
resources, from solar energy in the Sahara Desert; to wind energy across coastal regions; to
hydropower along the Nile, Congo, and Zambezi Rivers; to geothermal energy around the
Rift Valley region. The costs of converting these renewable resources into energy have sharply
declined thanks to the green transition—notably, the levelized cost of solar photovoltaic
technology was reduced by nearly 90 percent from 2010 to 2022, to a level lower than that of
fossil fuels like coal.34 Renewable energy also offers off-grid solutions to rural and remote areas.
Meanwhile, the green transition increases demand for various metal and mineral resources found
in the region, driving mining and associated activities. Some African countries have made progress
toward adding more value to their mineral resources, such as developing battery manufacturing
in South Africa and processing copper and cobalt in Zambia and the Democratic Republic
of Congo, with mixed results but great potential for further tapping the value from mineral
resources. For a region that lags in achieving universal energy access, the green transition offers
opportunities to leapfrog polluting energy and build a sustainable energy system.

32 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/ipc-mapping-tool/.

33 A quick resolution to any of the global conflicts mentioned and a peaceful election process in the remaining elections across the globe could contribute to already easing
inflation and boost global export demand.
34 IRENA (2023); Lazard (2021).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 41
 BOX 1.1: Regional Engines of Growth Reemerging: Intraregional Trade Rebounds

Global trade, which barely grew in 2023 (0.2 percent), will have a lasting effect on Sub-Saharan African
economies. While global trade is projected to improve this year, its growth is expected to be well
below its average before the pandemic. In this context, intraregional trade and domestic growth
are becoming more crucial in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, intraregional trade in the region faces
challenges due to poor logistics, weak economic management, and political instability.a Additionally,
recent adverse developments, such as geoeconomic fragmentation, climate shocks, and conflicts in
Ukraine and the Middle East, have impacted African trade. Specifically, increased shipping costs, partly
due to disruptions in port activity and attacks on commercial vessels, have affected the region’s trade.

Boosting intra-African trade is crucial for promoting economic growth and development in Africa.
Intraregional trade could stimulate growth through higher total factor productivity growth. Doubling
intraregional trade could accelerate growth by 0.6 percentage point annually.b The African Continental
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which became operational in January 2021, is projected to raise income by 7
percent by 2035, increase foreign direct investment inflows, and lift 40 million people out of extreme
poverty.c Recent evidence suggests that intraregional trade in Africa has picked up pace (with growth
of 10.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023).

In recent years, intraregional trade in Sub-Saharan Africa has been driven by the expansion of trade
within regional economic communities (RECs), rather than inter-REC trade. Intra-REC trade growth
recovered faster than trade with the rest of the region and the rest of the world. Intra-REC trade growth
in the Economic Community of Central African States recovered faster than intra–Sub-Saharan Africa
trade in the fourth quarter of 2023 (22 percent year-on-year versus 2 percent, respectively), while
growth of trade with the rest of the world remained stagnant (figure B1.1.1, panel a). In the Southern
African Development Community, intra-REC and intra–Sub-Saharan Africa trade recovered in tandem
in the fourth quarter of 2023 at an annualized rate of about 5 percent (figure B1.1.1, panel b). Similarly,
in the Economic Community of West African States, intra-REC and intra–Sub-Saharan Africa trade grew
at an annualized rate of 20 percent, while trade with the rest of the world grew at a meager 1 percent
(figure B1.1.1, panel c). Finally, in the East African Community, intra-REC and intra–Sub-Saharan Africa
trade remained resilient, with the latter growing faster than the former in 2023, partly reflecting strong
trade links with leading regional trading partner South Africa (figure B1.1.1, panel d). Overall, trade
patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa—within RECs or with non-REC Sub-Saharan African trading partners—
reveal that intraregional trade held up or recovered faster than the region’s trade with the rest of the
world, which is reassuring for the stability of the African trade outlook.

Several African export success stories have been identified over the past decades, from quality coffee
and handicraft exports from Rwanda, to roasted coffee from Uganda, to electricity exports from
Ethiopia or Mozambique.d These export surges and the emergence of new export products from
Africa have been attributed to factors such as upgrading product quality, identifying new areas of
comparative advantage, further liberalizing regional trade, and obtaining exposure to new technologies
and markets. The potential of the AfCFTA to boost intra-African trade significantly through product
upgrades offers a promising future for African trade, providing hope and optimism for the continent’s
economic development.

42 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 FIGURE B1.1.1: Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa’s Regional Economic Communities, 2021–23
(year-on-year percentage change)

a. Economic Community of Central African States b. Southern African Development Community

100 30
80 25
60 20
15
40
10
20
5
0
0
-20 -5
-40 -10
-60 -15
2021.Q4 2022.Q1 2022.Q2 2022.Q3 2022.Q4 2023.Q1 2023.Q2 2023.Q3 2023.Q4 2021.Q4 2022.Q1 2022.Q2 2022.Q3 2022.Q4 2023.Q1 2023.Q2 2023.Q3 2023.Q4

c. Economic Community of West African States d. East African Community

50 30
40 25
30 20
20 15
10 10
0 5
-10 0
-20 -5
-30 -10
2021.Q4 2022.Q1 2022.Q2 2022.Q3 2022.Q4 2023.Q1 2023.Q2 2023.Q3 2023.Q4 2021.Q4 2022.Q1 2022.Q2 2022.Q3 2022.Q4 2023.Q1 2023.Q2 2023.Q3 2023.Q4

Trade with RoW Intra-REC Intra-regional trade

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.

Note: Trade is the sum of export and import values in current US dollars. The figure depicts year-on-year changes in trade. REC = regional economic
community; RoW = rest of the world.

a. Olney (2022).
b. Calderon, Cantú, and Zeufack (2020).
c. Echandi, Maliszewska, and Steenbergen (2022); World Bank (2020a).
d. Easterly and Reshef (2016).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 43
 BOX 1.2: Africa’s Climate Crisis: Economic and Human Costs on the Rise

Soaring global temperatures due to greenhouse gas emissions are disrupting economic activity,
with intensifying wildfires, droughts, floods, coral bleaching, and rising sea levels causing substantial
damage to the global economy. A 1 degree Celsius (°C) rise in global temperature is projected to cause
a staggering 12 percent decline in world gross domestic product (GDP), primarily due to the escalating
frequency and severity of extreme weather events.a Africa’s Western and Eastern regions are anticipated
to bear the brunt of global warming, with economic losses in the hardest hit areas potentially reaching
between 11.2 and 26.6 percent of GDP over the long term.b

Africa is experiencing devastating weather events, affecting millions of people and resulting in significant
loss of life. By 2030, climate change is expected to increase death rates by 60 to 80 percent in Africa,
largely due to malaria and diarrhea. Although Asia saw the most extreme weather events from 2000
to 2019, six of the top 10 most affected countries were in Africa. In 2022, Ethiopia faced famine and
drought affecting 8 million people, while Uganda saw 2,500 deaths. Kenya, Mozambique, and South
Africa accounted for about 75 percent of Africa’s floods between 2000 and 2019. Nigeria’s worst floods
in a decade killed more than 600 people, and landslides and floods in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal
and Eastern Cape provinces in April 2022 killed 459 people and displaced 40,000. Six major storms in
Southern Africa, including in Madagascar and Mozambique, resulted in at least 890 deaths. Additionally,
floods in Chad impacted around 2 million people in August and October 2022.c

Rising temperatures threaten crop yields and fuel malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa. A 1°C increase
in temperature in the region is projected to reduce crop yields by 5 to 17 percent by 2050, especially
affecting staple foods. Maize, which accounts for 40 percent of the region’s cereal production and 30
percent of its calorie intake, is particularly vulnerable. Global warming of 1.5°C to 4°C could lead to maize
yield reductions of 9 to 41 percent in Western Africa.d This impact is compounded by El Niño, leaving
fertile soils arid and disrupting the production of key staples, such as maize, from Angola to Zimbabwe.
In Malawi, the harvests of around 2 million farming families have been severely affected, impacting
nearly half of the country’s population of 20 million. Ethiopia experienced 50 to 90 percent crop failure
due to El Niño–induced droughts and floods, while rural Zambia saw a 20 percent decrease in maize
yield during such events. This agricultural crisis is fueling malnutrition, with more than 45 million children
in Eastern and Southern Africa at risk of health issues, displacement, and educational setbacks.e

Industrial productivity and employment face significant risks from climate change, especially in warmer
regions. A 1°C increase above the typical wet-bulb temperature in the hottest zones can result in a
productivity decline of over 20 percent, which is concerning for poorer African nations, many of which
are in these hotter regions.f Additionally, the International Labour Organization predicts that by 2030,
with a global temperature increase of 1.5°C and current labor trends, 2.2 percent of total working hours
worldwide will be lost due to high temperatures—a loss equivalent to 80 million full-time jobs. Southern
Asia and Western Africa are expected to be the most affected, losing 5.3 and 4.8 percent of working
hours, respectively, which translates into around 43 million and 9 million full-time jobs.

44 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Africa’s hydropower potential faces a significant decline due to climate change, with profound
implications for the continent’s electricity supply. According to the International Energy Agency,
average hydropower capacity is projected to decrease by over 4 percent between 2020 and 2099,
compared to the 2010–19 baseline, or a loss of approximately 130 terawatt-hours annually by the end of
the century—equivalent to Africa’s entire hydropower generation in 2017. This decline will exacerbate
the continent’s already precarious electricity access, as hydropower currently constitutes a substantial
portion of Africa’s power generation. The increasing unpredictability of hydropower generation will
further jeopardize electricity reliability, especially in countries that are heavily reliant on this source, such
as Mozambique and Zambia. Finally, the warming climate in Sub-Saharan Africa—the hottest region in
the world—will increase electricity demand. A 1°C increase in temperature is estimated to increase the
region’s electricity demand by 6.7 percent on average—thus exacerbating already high energy deficits.g

To address the climate crisis in Africa, substantial investments in both mitigation and adaptation
strategies are imperative. While the estimated cost of fully implementing Africa’s climate action plans
by 2030 is a daunting US$2.8 trillion, with a mere US$300 billion secured thus far, the urgency of the
situation demands immediate action.h The international community must work together to bridge this
funding gap. This will require collaborative efforts to mobilize resources and support climate-resilient
infrastructure, sustainable agriculture, renewable energy sources, and early warning systems.

a. Bilal and Känzig (2024).

b. Philip (2024).
c. Enos et al. (2023).
d. Ekpa et al. (2019).
e. UNICEF (2023).
f. Kassa and Woldemichael (2024).
g. Yao (2021).
h. WEF (2023a).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 45
Section 2: Transforming Education for Inclusive Growth
Education­—a Driving Force for Africa’s Prosperity
Education can play a transformative role in unlocking the untapped potential of Africa’s
population and dramatically improve the fortunes of communities and economies. Currently,
Sub-Saharan Africa’s Human Capital Index (HCI) stands at 0.40—meaning that children born
today are expected to achieve only 40 percent of their potential productivity under optimal
health and education conditions.1 Enhancing education is vital for improving this index:
universal basic education that ensures full learning could double the region’s HCI to 0.80 and
double gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. This corresponds to roughly 1.4 percentage
points of additional annual economic growth over the next 50 years.

There are numerous examples across the globe where education has been a transformative
force for improving economic circumstances. The “East Asian miracle”—the remarkable
economic growth experienced by countries in East Asia since the mid-1960s—serves as a
case in point. The success
of these countries was
FIGURE 2.1: Learning-Adjusted Years of Schooling and GDP per Capita in
driven by a combination Sub-Saharan Africa
of policies that promoted 11
outward-oriented, labor- 10 SYC
Learning–adjusted years of schooling, circa 2020

intensive growth, backed 9 MUS

by robust educational 8
KEN
and human capital 7 ZWE
LSO
strategies and investment. 6 TGO BEN GHA GAB
The result was high and BDI MWI GMB CMRCOG NAM ZAF
ZMB
COM
5 SLEBFA GIN SEN NGA
sustained economic MDG TZA CIV BWA
4 COD MOZ ETH UGASDN MRT SWZ
AGO
growth, improved quality TCD
RWA
3
of life, and more equitable CAF
NER MLI
2
income distribution. 2 LBR
1
Within Sub-Saharan
2.25 2.75 3.25 3.75 4.25
Africa, there are emerging Log GDP per capita, 2022 (constant 2015 US$)
success stories as well.
Source: Calculations using data from the World Development Indicators and the Human Capital
Kenya is making strides in Project of the World Bank.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. For a list of country codes, go to https://www.iso.org/obp/
reforming its education ui/#search.

systems, which, combined

with sustained investment, is showing results. In terms of learning-adjusted years of schooling
(LAYS), a measure that combines access and learning, Kenya performs above expectations for its
income level (figure 2.1).

1 The HCI quantifies the potential productivity of a country’s future workforce based on the health and educational outcomes of children born today. The HCI ranges from
0 to 1, with 1 representing the maximum potential reached. It is calculated using five key indicators across three main pillars: survival, health, and education. The index
aims to measure how much economic potential a country loses due to inadequate investment in education and health. For example, an HCI score of 0.7 indicates that the
future workforce’s productivity will be 70 percent of what it could be if it had received complete education and good health (Kraay 2018).
2 Birdsall et al. (1993).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 47
 Education—A Key Factor for Unlocking the Potential of the
Demographic Dividend
Building quality education systems is strategically fundamental for leveraging the ongoing
historic demographic transition. With more than 500 million children between ages 0 and
14 years, Sub-Saharan Africa’s working-age population is predicted to double by 2050 (figure
2.2). This “youth bulge” presents a unique opportunity for accelerated economic growth and
poverty reduction, as a larger working-age population can stimulate economic activity and
increase income levels, thus harnessing the demographic dividend.3 If the region continues
to make economic progress, the demographic dividend could contribute 11 to 15 percent of
GDP growth by 2030. This would help to reduce poverty by 40 million to 60 million people.4
However, a demographic dividend is not automatic; it will only materialize if the youth find
productive employment. In this regard, education plays a pivotal role in ensuring that young
people acquire the skills necessary to be productive and competitive in the global labor
market.5

Whether meaningful
FIGURE 2.2: Population in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Age Group, 1950–2050
economic and social
1,000 dividends can be realized
900 depends on countries’
800 ability to transform their
700 education systems. The
region must prepare
Millions of people

600
500 for a growing student
400 0-14 population, particularly
25-64
300 15-24 at the secondary level,
200 while considering multiple
100 trade-offs. Currently
0 education systems across
1950

1959

1968

1977

1986

1995

2004

2013

2022

2031

2040

2050

the continent are grappling

Source: Calculations using the UN Population Division’s Medium Scenario.
with serious access,
quality, and relevance
challenges. If current trends
persist, by 2050, an alarming 39 million 10-year-olds in Sub-Saharan Africa will be unable to
read and comprehend a simple story—an increase of 11 million from the cohort of 10-year-
old children today. By 2030, an estimated 170 million children will enter the region’s school
systems. To achieve Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, Sub-Saharan African countries
must absorb these additional children and adolescents, as well as out-of-school children.
This will require training and deploying an additional 11 million teachers and constructing 9

3 Reductions in child mortality, followed by decreases in fertility rates, create a “bulge” generation and a phase when a country has many working-age individuals and fewer
dependents (Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck 2015). This large workforce can stimulate economic growth, assuming there are sufficient job opportunities. Smaller family sizes
allow both families and governments to allocate more resources to health and education for each child and enable more women to join the labor force. If the economic
environment is supportive and this large, educated workforce secures well-paying jobs, the initial benefit is an increase in family and national income. Additionally, with
longer lifespans, this higher-earning generation will save for retirement. These savings and investments can lead to further productivity improvements, resulting in a
second dividend (Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck 2015).
4 Ahmed et al. (2016).
5 Education plays a crucial role on the supply side of addressing this issue, by equipping youth with the skills necessary to secure productive employment. Equally
important is the demand side, which involves creating an environment where sufficient job opportunities exist. While this section focuses on the supply side, the
demand-side considerations have been discussed in previous volumes of Africa’s Pulse (World Bank, 2017b, 2022b).

48 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
million new classrooms.6 The expansion is expected to be particularly rapid at the secondary
level, partly driven by increased primary enrollment. As countries plan investments to expand
their education systems, they must balance trade-offs in infrastructure expansion, curriculum
offerings, and financing approaches.

Currently, Africa’s workforce is the least skilled globally, which poses a significant barrier to
long-term economic growth. Extensive research shows that improvements in education are
positively associated with economic growth.7 Indeed, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the countries
with the highest GDP per capita also have relatively high levels of skills (figure 2.1).8 Learning
beyond schooling is also strongly correlated with improved earnings, more equitable income
distribution, and long-term economic growth.9 The benefits of education may be even more
pronounced in the region than elsewhere. While one additional year of education increases
earnings by 10 percent globally, this figure is higher in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 12.4 percent.
Notably, the returns are higher for women (14.5 percent in the region), with education serving
as a potent lever for gender equity. Moreover, the returns are highest (21 percent) for those with
tertiary education.10

The human capital benefits from education extend to better health outcomes. Education
improves child survival and health, with the benefits extending across generations, as children
of educated parents tend to be healthier. This creates a virtuous cycle where healthier children
are better prepared to learn. Each additional year of schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa reduces
the fertility rate by 0.26 birth,11 decreases the chance of maternal death by 20 percent, increases
survival to age 5 of students’ children by 50 percent,12 and reduces the probability of child
marriage for girls by an average of 7.5 percentage points.13 Educated women are more likely to
use contraception and play a more significant role in family fertility decisions.14 Fertility decline,
in turn, has a strong effect on education by allowing for fewer, healthier, better nourished, and
better educated children, accelerating progress toward a demographic dividend.15

Education as a Strategy to Future-Proof Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic

and Social Development
Responding to megatrends, including conflict, climate change, and rapid and disruptive digital
advancements, requires robust education strategies and investments. Conflict and climate
change are two of the region’s most pressing issues. Education fosters social cohesion and
reduces drivers of violence, conflict, and fragility, helping to build social capital in parts of the
region where the social fabric is often strained.16 An additional year of schooling lowers the
likelihood of voluntary recruitment into extremist organizations by 13 percent.17 Moreover,

6 Chugunov (2024).
7 Hanushek and Woessmann (2010); Krueger and Lindahl (2002).
8 LAYS measures both the quality and quantity of schooling. It is calculated by multiplying expected years of school by the ratio of harmonized test scores to the maximum
test score. That is, for countries below the best performer (Singapore or similar), the years of schooling are adjusted downward to reflect learning relative to the level of
learning in Singapore (using the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study harmonized and standardized test scores) (Filmer et al. 2020).
9 World Bank (2018); Hanushek and Woessmann (2008).
10 Montenegro and Patrinos (2014).
11 Lam, Sedlacek, and Duryea (2016).
12 Osili and Long (2008).
13 UNESCO (2024b); Giacobino et al. (2024).
14 Becker, Murphy, and Spenkuch (2013).
15 Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck (2015).
16 De Simone and Mosuro (2022).
17 UNDP (2023).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 49
 education is vital for the region’s effective response to climate change. Educational attainment
is the strongest global predictor of climate change awareness, and it is positively associated
with stronger support for environmental protection policies.18 This is essential for Sub-Saharan
Africa, where 20 of the 30 countries most vulnerable to climate change are located.19 Lastly, the
rapid advancement of digital technologies along with the growing push toward greener and
more sustainable economies are shaping the global economy and consequently labor markets.
The push for digital and green transitions is opening many opportunities for job creation and
economic development. With the right investments in education and skills, countries can
position their youth to take advantage of these emerging opportunities, and potentially place
Sub-Saharan Africa at the forefront of sustainable economic growth.

A significant share of youth currently does not have the skills needed to be productive, and
one in five youth is not in education, employment, or training. Simply put, the current pace of
improvement is insufficient to position Africa’s children and youth to thrive in the twenty-first
century. There is a pressing need to address current educational deficiencies, which have left
millions underequipped to be productive and earn a decent living. Investments in foundational
skills will be needed, coupled with investment in higher-order skills for youth. Moreover,
concerted effort is required to tackle persistent inequalities, particularly those affecting girls and
women, whose full participation is crucial for realizing the region’s human capital potential.20

There is recognition across the African continent of the importance of education in driving
economic and social transformation. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 demonstrates this
recognition by setting as a priority “well-educated citizens and a skills revolution underpinned
by science, technology, and innovation for a knowledge society that is broad-based, where no
child misses school due to poverty or any form of discrimination” (African Union 2015, Aspiration
1 of 7, “A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development”).
The African Union’s declaration of 2024 as the “Year of Education” further testifies to this
commitment.21

Looking forward, countries will need to make strategic choices and better and bolder
investments to tackle the many challenges they face in their education and skills agenda.
Efforts and investments to transform the region’s education systems can be organized around
two key objectives: (1) building a strong foundation by ensuring that all children acquire basic
skills, and (2) equipping youth and the workforce with market-relevant skills to be productive
and competitive in an evolving global economy. These two objectives should not be viewed
as separate or disparate endeavors. Instead, they form a continuum of skills development
and, more broadly, human capital development. Achieving the second priority—developing
an educated and skilled workforce—is fundamentally dependent on accomplishing the first,

18 Lee et al. (2015); World Bank (2024b); Angrist et al. (2023); Chankrajang and Muttarak (2017).
19 ND-GAIN (2024); World Bank (2023d).
20 Savchenko et al. (2022); GEEAP (2023).
21 https://au.int/en/theme/2024/educate-african-fit-21st-century.

50 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
as foundational skills lay the groundwork for higher-order skill acquisition. However, these
objectives are not strictly sequential; countries cannot delay investing in skills development
while waiting for foundational skills to be built at lower education levels. The region’s current
youth population—those soon to leave school or already in the workforce—must be equipped
with relevant skills, often including both foundational and higher-order competencies. An
increasingly educated and skilled population will create a virtuous cycle of improved education
for future generations. Crucially, efforts across both objectives must maintain a strong focus on
addressing inequalities and ensuring inclusivity.

Implementing reforms and interventions under these objectives will require navigating
increasingly constrained fiscal environments. This necessitates a sustained commitment from
governments and education stakeholders to allocate sufficient resources, while focusing
more strongly on results and efficiency. To justify and maintain higher budgetary allocations,
education systems must demonstrate more efficient use of resources—delivering more for each
dollar spent. Governments will face difficult trade-offs, balancing enormous demands against
limited resources and capacity. Decisions and choices on what, how, when, and where to invest
will have to be made strategically, driven by data and evidence.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 51
 OBJECTIVE 1: BUILDING A STRONG FOUNDATION BY
ENSURING THAT ALL CHILDREN ACQUIRE BASIC SKILLS
Sub-Saharan Africa’s basic education systems need a paradigm shift to ensure not only universal
enrollment, but also universal learning. Over the past six decades, Sub-Saharan African countries
have made considerable progress in expanding basic education for millions of their citizens.
Enrollment has increased in almost all levels of education, with primary education showing the
most remarkable gains (figure 2.3). From 2000 to 2020, primary education net enrollment ratios
rose significantly across most countries: in Ethiopia, increasing from 67 to 96 percent; in Nigeria,
from 69 to 87 percent; and the regional average climbing from about 50 to over 80 percent.22
There has also been progress in narrowing gender gaps—with more girls in school than ever. The
primary enrollment gender parity index increased from 0.85 in 2000 to 0.97 in 2022.23 These gains
are attributable to the bold policy reforms that countries have taken, notably the introduction of
free and universal primary education along with the rapid expansion of school systems.

FIGURE 2.3: Student Enrollment Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Level of Education, 1970–2024

a. Student enrollment (millions) b. Net enrollment rate (percent)

200 100
180
160 80
Primary Primary
140
120 60
100 Secondary
80 40
60 Secondary
40 Pre-primary 20
20
0 0
1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012 2018 2024 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012 2018 2024

Source: Calculations using data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

However, the journey toward universal enrollment and improved educational attainment
remains an unfinished and urgent agenda for Sub-Saharan Africa. One in five children between
ages 6 and 11 and one in three adolescents between ages 12 and 14 are out of school. In
aggregate, an estimated 42 million primary-age children are not in school. Primary school–age
girls are slightly more likely to be out of school, with 20 percent of girls being out of school
compared to 19 percent of boys. This gender gap widens in adolescence, with 33 percent of
lower secondary school–age girls being out of school, compared to 31 percent of boys, and 48
percent of girls being out of school in the upper secondary age group, compared to 44 percent
of boys. The regional averages also mask significant disparities across countries. Being out of
school is much more common in conflict-affected countries than elsewhere. For example, in
Chad, the share of out-of-school children is estimated at 50 percent, with girls more likely to be

22 UIS (2024).
23 UIS (2024). The Gender Parity Index (GPI) indicates parity between girls and boys. A GPI of less than 1 suggests that girls are more disadvantaged than boys in learning
opportunities, and a GPI of greater than 1 suggests the opposite.

52 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
out of school (55 percent) compared to boys (44 percent).24 Indeed, seven in 10 out-of-school
children in the region live in conflict-affected countries (box 2.1).

Moving forward, an urgent and concerted effort is needed to extend educational opportunities,
especially to the most marginalized children, and ensure that all children stay in school and
get a solid skills foundation. To meet these challenges, countries can hone their policy and
programmatic efforts toward three priorities: ensuring that children have the best start for
lifelong learning through expanded access to quality early childhood development, delivering
fit-for-purpose teaching with a relentless focus on foundational learning, and promoting
education completion while expanding access to meet current and future demands. While
the scale and urgency of the challenge may seem daunting, there are promising models and
lessons from across the continent and other regions of the world to build upon.

BOX 2.1: The Impact of Conflict on Education

Sub-Saharan Africa is significantly impacted by fragility, conflict, and violence. Presently, 20

countries in the region are classified as experiencing violent conflict or high levels of fragility.
According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, between 2018 and 2023, the region
witnessed more than 88,583 violent incidents and more than 177,935 fatalities.a Such conflicts and
acts of violence severely disrupt educational services, with schools often being attacked or used
for military purposes. In 2023 alone, at least 1,183 episodes of violence in and around educational
facilities were registered in the region, including explosions, battles, and violence against civilians
(map B2.1.1). Additionally, conflict and violence have caused a major forced displacement crisis.
As of 2023, more than 44 million
people in Sub-Saharan Africa were MAP B2.1.1: Episodes of Violence in and around Schools in
displaced, marking a 15 percent Sub-Saharan Africa, 2023
EPISODES OF VIOLENCE IN AND AROUND SCHOOLS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 2023
increase since 2021, with the
majority (60 percent) being internally
IBRD 48367 | SEPTEMBER 2024
displaced persons. Africa accounts This map was produced by the Cartography
Unit of the World Bank Group. The boundaries,

for three-quarters of all new internal colors, denominations and any other
information shown on this map do not imply,
on the part of the World Bank Group, any

displacements globally.b In these judgment on the legal status of any territory,

or any endorsement or acceptance of such
boundaries.

contexts, the provision of public

services in general, and educational
services in particular, is challenging.
Ensuring safety in and around
schools, including by making a
NUMBER OF FATALTIES
commitment to it by signing the
Safe Schools Declaration and 10
200
providing alternative delivery 600
services—pop-up classrooms, EVENT, NO FATALITY
community centers, and learning
circles—when regular classroom
education is not possible, constitutes
a key priority for areas severely
affected by conflict and violence.
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
a. ACLED (2023). Note: The size of each circle represents greater or fewer number of fatalities.
b. UNHCR (2023).

24 UNESCO (2024c).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 53
 Reform Area 1.1. Start Early to Ensure that Children Have the Best
Start for Lifelong learning
Early childhood is a critical period in the lifecycle when opportunities for impactful investments
in human development are the greatest. Investments in early childhood development (ECD)
lay the foundation for lifelong learning and long-term productivity.25 ECD investments are
cost-effective, with earlier investments yielding higher returns.26,27 ECD interventions are
also instrumental in promoting equity and leveling the playing field for socio-economically
disadvantaged children. This is particularly true for children born to teenage mothers as access
to quality ECD can help to break the intergenerational cycle of deprivation by supporting
the children’s human capital development as well as enhancing the educational outcomes
of teenage mothers—for example, by enabling them to return to school.28 Conversely, the
opportunity cost of not investing in ECD is high, with inadequate investment leading to lifelong
deficits that are, in many cases, irreversible and contribute to widening inequalities.

Sub-Saharan African countries can close gaps in their human capital development by
prioritizing investments in high-quality ECD. A significant share of children in the region are
not developmentally on track and, consequently, are at risk of falling behind in long-term
learning and human capital development. In 23 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with available
information on the Early Childhood Development Index,29 for example, on average only 60
percent of children ages 24-59 months were developmentally on track,30 with the share of
children who are developmentally on track ranging from 36 percent in the Central African
Republic to 73 percent in Guinea-Bissau and Lesotho.31 Closing this critical gap will require
improving access to quality ECD service. Some countries in the region are making some
progress in expanding access to ECD. Cabo Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Nigeria, and
Zimbabwe have significantly increased access, for example, by prioritizing one year of pre-
school education.32 The regional gross enrollment ratio (GER) at the pre-primary level doubled
between 2000 and 2020, from 14 to 28 percent.33 However, an estimated seven in 10 children in
the Africa region are still not benefiting from pre-primary education. The quality of pre-primary
education is also a concern due to the outdated curriculum, high share of unqualified teachers,
and limited availability of teaching and learning materials, among other things. Both insufficient
and inefficient investments in ECD pose barriers to addressing the access and quality issues in
ECD. Most countries allocate less than the recommended 10 percent of education budgets to
the ECD/pre-primary level, while fragmented service provision across multiple ministries and
government levels hinders effective resource targeting, implementation coordination, and
accountability.

25 ECD refers to the process of child development from conception until 8 years of age, understanding that the earliest years are critical in terms of brain development.
According to WHO (2020), ECD is “the process of cognitive, physical, language, temperament, socioemotional and motor development of children.”
26 Devercelli et al. (2017); Garcia et al. (2016); Heckman (2008); WHO (2020).
27 The early childhood period comprises multiple distinct stages. It begins with prenatal development, spanning from conception to birth, then progresses through infancy
and toddlerhood, with particular emphasis on the crucial first 1,000 days of life (from conception to the child’s second birthday). This is followed by the pre-school and
pre-primary years, typically extending from age 3 until the child enters primary school. Although these are not precise phases, they offer useful categories (UNICEF 2017).
28 Naudeau and Hasan (2016).
29 The Early Childhood Development Index is derived from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and consists of 10 items divided into four domains: physical, learning/
cognition, social-emotional, and literacy-numeracy.
30 Being developmentally on track means that children are meeting age-appropriate milestones across key domains of physical health, cognitive abilities, social-emotional
skills, and early literacy and numeracy, as measured by the Early Childhood Development Index.
31 UNESCO (2023a).
32 UNESCO (2023a).
33 UIS (2024).

54 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Coherent ECD policies linked with robust multi-sectoral institutional arrangements are
a critical step to maximizing the efficacy of investments. Such an approach can improve
service provision, for example, by combining services for education, health, nutrition, and
social protection into a cohesive, child-centered delivery framework that can better meet
children’s multifaceted needs.34 In addition, effective regulatory and quality assurance systems
are needed to bring a stronger focus and accountability for results. In many countries, ECD
centers, pre-schools, and numerous other types of educational institutions are not always
formally registered; basic data on the type and quality of services are rarely collected; and their
impact on child development is not captured. By strengthening monitoring and evaluation
of the subsector, for example, by including ECD centers and pre-school in regular education
management information systems and measuring children’s developmental outcomes regularly,
countries can put a strong focus on improving outcomes, starting with existing investments.
But these actions are only part of the solution.

Expanding access to quality ECD will ultimately require more financing. Beyond working toward
a gradual increase in allocations to the subsector within education sector budgets, countries
can bring more investment through effective collaboration with a wide range of partners:
faith-based organizations, nongovernmental organizations, communities, and private pre-
primary schools and ECD providers. In conflict zones, in particular, collaboration with nonstate
providers becomes particularly essential.35 Rwanda is deploying several forms of ECD, such
as home-based and community-based early childhood education centers, to expand access
within limited fiscal space. If well-executed, these investments will prepare Sub-Saharan Africa’s
children for a smooth and timely transition to primary education and position them well for
lifelong learning.

Reform Area 1.2. Keep a Relentless Focus on Early-Grade Literacy and

Numeracy
Sub-Saharan Africa faces a foundational skills crisis, driven by the combination of the out-of-
school challenge and low levels of learning among those in school. Learning poverty, defined as
the inability of children to read and understand a simple text by the end of primary education
(at approximately age 10), affects 89 percent of children in Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 2.4). In
contrast, the average learning poverty rate in low- and middle-income countries is around 70
percent, which shows that the challenge is worse in Africa than in any other part of the world.36
However, there is a lot that is unknown about learning levels in the region because of significant
data gaps on learning and the drivers of learning. Merely 14 African countries, representing just
15 percent of the continent’s school-age population, have at least two data points on minimum
learning proficiency to allow comparison over time.37 The solutions need to be context specific,
but there are some common priority issues, some of which are highlighted below, that require
urgent attention.

34 Naudeau and Hasan (2016).

35 UNICEF (2021).
36 World Bank (2022b).
37 UNESCO (2022).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 55
 A significant majority of
FIGURE 2.4: Learning Poverty Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022
children who are attending
Zambia school in the region are
Lesotho not acquiring core literacy
Congo, Dem. Rep. and numeracy skills that
Burundi form the building blocks
Madagascar for all future learning and
Mauritania
higher-order skills.38 By the
Chad
end of primary education,
Mali
Niger
only 11 percent of students
Ethiopia in the region achieve the
Comoros minimum proficiency level
Guinea in mathematics, and only 30
South Africa percent do so in reading.39
Uganda These early learning
Togo deficits trigger a cascade of
Côte d'Ivoire
adverse effects throughout
Kenya
a student’s educational
Burkina Faso
journey. The foundational
Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
learning gaps from primary
Senegal education complicate the
Benin teaching and learning
Botswana process at the secondary
Mauritius level, creating a complex
Gabon challenge of addressing
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 foundational skill gaps
Learning poverty rate (%) while teaching advanced
Source: World Bank 2023f. content in science,
Note: The figure shows the percentage of children at the end of primary age who score below
minimum reading proficiency, adjusted for out-of-school children. The data are from 2022 or the technology, engineering,
latest year available.
and mathematics (STEM)
and other subjects.40
Students often face frequent grade repetition—a significant source of inefficiency in education
systems, which also puts them at a higher risk of dropping out before completing their basic
education.41

Setting ambitious yet achievable learning targets is a key step for countries to tackle the
learning crisis meaningfully, and this requires measuring learning outcomes rigorously, regularly,
and reliably. A concrete learning target is essential to move from a general recognition of the
learning crisis to a tangible learning improvement goal toward which the whole of education
systems and the whole of government and society can work. Establishing and strengthening
different types of learning assessments is a necessary investment, without which countries

38 WEF (2023b); World Bank (2018, 2019b).

39 UNESCO (2024a).
40 UNESCO (2024c).
41 World Bank (2021a).

56 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
will be flying blind. National assessments must be strengthened as they are crucial for
identifying systemwide achievements and challenges, informing policy reforms, and designing
interventions. They will provide early warnings to the system if quality declines, enabling policy
makers to act quickly and reverse course. Formative classroom assessments generate real-
time feedback, helping teachers to adjust to student needs. To benchmark performance and
facilitate regional collaboration on common issues, countries can participate in regional and
international assessments.

More needs to be done to improve teachers’ effectiveness in the classroom. Teachers currently
face significant gaps in their content knowledge and pedagogical skills. In content knowledge,
for example, the share of teachers achieving basic proficiency is only 0.3 percent in Madagascar,
6.2 percent in Ethiopia, 8.9 percent in Sierra Leone, 9.3 percent in Gabon, and 19.2 percent
in Edo State in Nigeria (Global Education Policy Dashboard).42 Teacher absenteeism is high,
indicative of low teacher motivation and weak monitoring and accountability systems. Data
collected through unannounced visits to schools in seven Sub‐Saharan African countries
showed that more than 20 percent of teachers were absent on any given school day.43 This is
a significant source of inefficiency for education systems and a big tax on instruction time that
is crucially needed for learning to happen. In most countries, teacher promotion and career
progression is not linked with performance and often it is driven by tenure. In many countries,
there are disparities in teacher allocation, such that rural and hard-to-reach schools often face
severe shortages of qualified teachers, even in countries where there is a reasonable total
supply of teachers.44 In the face of these numerous challenges, a combination of strategies that
will provide immediate support to teachers with broader systemic reforms will be needed.

As an immediate strategy, countries can focus on ensuring adequate amounts of effective

instruction—honing foundational literacy and numeracy instruction by supporting teachers.
There are cost-effective approaches that have shown promising results in rapidly improving
foundational learning (box 2.2). Supporting teachers with structured pedagogy and tailoring
instruction to learning levels are particularly effective. Structured pedagogy, which combines
lesson plans, learning materials, ongoing coaching, classroom observations, and mentoring, has
been effective in contexts where teachers have low capacity. Tailoring instruction to children’s
learning levels, which entails teacher training and coaching in conducting simple assessments
to check for understanding, grouping students by ability rather than age, and using level-
appropriate activities and materials to address learning gaps, has been effective in contexts
where ability levels are disparate within classrooms.45 To ensure that teachers are effective in
the classroom, it is crucial that instruction in the early grades is conducted in the child’s home
language. Children who begin their education in their home language tend to develop better
cognitive skills and earn more over time.46 Yet, an estimated 80 percent of children in Sub-
Saharan Africa are not being taught in the language they speak and understand best.47 It is

42 World Bank (2024c). For this indicator, teachers are considered proficient if they score 80 percent or higher on the teachers’ assessment of primary-level content. Indicator
“Percent of teachers proficient in the subjects they teach” (https://www.educationpolicydashboard.org/).
43 World Bank (2024c).
44 Bashir et al. (2018); Beteille and Evans (2022).
45 Angrist et al. (2020); Banerjee et al. (2016); World Bank (2023e).
46 Piper, Schroeder, and Trudell (2016); World Bank (2021b).
47 World Bank (2021b).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 57
 important to implement evidence-based policies on language of instruction—starting with
children’s home languages—and align curricula with appropriate scope and sequence and
language transition to promote early reading.

BOX 2.2: Examples of Impactful and Cost-Effective Approaches to Improve Foundational Learning

Structured pedagogy and targeted instruction are cost-effective approaches to improve learning
at scale. The Global Education Evidence Advisory Panel identifies these as “smart buys.”
Structured pedagogy has affordably boosted educational outcomes in several countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, including Kenya, Liberia, and South Africa, particularly in basic reading and numeracy
skills. In Kenya, the Tusome program, a US Agency for International Development–Ministry of
Education partnership, has shown significant impacts through enhanced classroom instruction,
improved learning materials, expanded support and supervision, and collaboration with key literacy
actors. Students have made substantial gains in English and Kiswahili reading proficiency.
Targeted instruction approaches show promise in improving learning outcomes, especially in diverse
learning contexts. The Teaching at the Right Level model, developed by Pratham, exemplifies this
approach. It assesses children’s skills and groups them for instruction based on their current learning
levels. Regular assessments are conducted as a method to understand children’s levels and ensure
that they master the content before moving to another level. It is being implemented in several Sub-
Saharan African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia.
Technology integration can enhance the impact and cost-effectiveness of structured pedagogy
and targeted instruction. For example, Edo State in Nigeria uses tablets to track and customize
teacher support in real-time, leveraging technology to implement structured pedagogy effectively.
As countries adopt any of these interventions which have proven effective in other contexts, it is
crucial to avoid the pitfall of scaling without impact. The focus should not be on replicating and
scaling the innovation itself, but on scaling for impact, putting student outcomes at the center of
it. This requires careful contextualization and ongoing generation of data and evidence to monitor
results rigorously.
Source: Adapted from GEEAP (2023).

To deepen, scale, and sustain learning improvements, however, systemic reforms, particularly
reforms aimed at enhancing the quality of the teaching workforce, are crucial. The targeted
interventions discussed above, aimed at classroom instruction, must be anchored within
systemic reforms that enhance the quality of the teaching workforce and support teachers’
well-being.48 Such reforms can focus on making the teaching profession more attractive by
ensuring that teachers are well paid and given clear career pathways. Career progression should
be linked with performance assessments, backed by continuous professional development, and
not solely based on tenure. To enhance the effectiveness of teacher training and professional
development, practical, hands-on experience and modeling of good teaching practices should
be integrated into both initial (pre-service) and in-service programs.49 Finally, specific incentives
might be needed to attract qualified teachers to underserved schools.

48 World Bank (2023e); Beteille and Evans (2022).

49 World Bank (2023g). The shortage of STEM teachers is particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only around 30 percent of the region’s short-cycle tertiary enrollment is in STEM subjects
(25 percent of female enrollment and 34 percent of male enrollment). According to an estimate produced for the 2023 Global Education Monitoring Report (https://www.unesco.org/
gem-report/en/technology), Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where the small number of STEM graduates is insufficient to provide an adequate number of STEM teachers to meet
the needs to achieve SDG 4 by 2030, even if every STEM graduate could be recruited into teaching (UNESCO 2023b). STEM teachers are in short supply (https://world-education-blog.
org/2024/07/29/stem-teachers-are-in-short-supply/#:~:text=According%20to%20an%20estimate%20produced,could%20be%20recruited%20into%20teaching).

58 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Such reforms will require strong and sustained political commitment; broad-based support from
a wide range of stakeholders, including teachers unions, and in most cases, increased financing.
However, considering that teachers represent the single most important factor determining
the quality of education and the biggest line item in all education sector budgets, tackling
systemic issues in teacher development and management cannot be ignored or deferred.
There are countries in the region that are already implementing bold reforms from which
other countries can learn. Kenya has implemented major education sector reforms seeking to
improve educational quality, including a shift to a competency-based curriculum and reforms
in professional teacher development, textbook policy, and local-level management practices.
These changes are yielding results and positioning Kenya as one of the top performers in
the region. Rwanda has recently taken bold steps to enhance teacher management and
development by improving recruitment, deployment, and transfer processes for transparency;
significantly increasing teacher salaries; and implementing teacher performance contracts.

Reform area 1.3. Keeping children in school to completion

Ensuring that all children enroll and stay in school to complete their primary and secondary
education is essential for equipping them with the foundational skills needed for long-term
success. Education systems and schools are inherently shaped by the social and economic
environments in which they operate. In many Sub-Saharan African countries, social and
economic challenges, in addition to systemic issues within the education sector, impact
educational outcomes, including school attendance and completion rates. Improving school
completion will require identifying and addressing both demand- and supply-side barriers to
school attendance, especially for the most marginalized children—those in rural areas, from
poor backgrounds, and girls. This is particularly crucial at the secondary level, where enrollment
and completion rates are the lowest.

A key driver of the out-of-school challenge in the region is the high dropout rate, with a large
share of children leaving school early before they complete their primary and secondary
education. Countries are making strides toward improved completion of primary and secondary
education, but the progress has been uneven. The average primary school completion rate in
Sub-Saharan Africa stands at about 71 percent, compared to the global average of 91 percent.50
Some countries lag significantly compared to the regional average. In Chad, the primary school
completion rate is only 44 percent, and in Somalia, it is 38 percent.51 There are also countries
that have significantly reduced their dropout rates, leading to improved school completion
rates (figure 2.5). Rwanda saw its primary school completion rate rise from 21 percent in 2000 to
nearly 88 percent by 2021. Ghana’s primary school completion rate rose from 65 to 92 percent
between 2000 and 2022, and Kenya’s increased from 62 to 85 percent between 2002 and 2018.

50 UIS (2024).
51 UNICEF (2022).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 59
 FIGURE 2.5: Primary School Completion Rates in Selected Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000 and 2022

Primary completion rates (percent)

120
Circa 2000 Circa 2022
100

80

60

40

20

0
Malawi

Eswatini

Ghana

Kenya

Gambia, The

Sub-Saharan Africa

Cameroon

Tanzania

Mauritania

Côte d’Ivoire

Congo, Dem. Rep.

Senegal

Burundi

Burkina Faso

Chad

Ethiopia

Rwanda

Niger

Mozambique
Source: Calculations using data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

The access gap is more pronounced at the secondary level—the region’s average secondary
school GER stands at 45 percent—far short of the SDG target for universal secondary
education by 2030. Girls have a lower enrollment rate than boys, with a secondary school
GER of 42 percent for girls compared to 47 percent for boys. Significant inequities in access to
secondary education and completion also exist across the region, with eight countries having
GERs below 25 percent. Low-income countries and countries that are experiencing ongoing
conflict, including the Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, and Sudan, have some of the
lowest secondary education enrollment rates in the region, and girls in these countries are
at a particular disadvantage.52 There is also a high level of inequity across income groups and
geographic areas, such that children from wealthier families and from urban areas are most
likely to access and complete secondary education, a reality that is true even in more stable
upper-middle-income countries. Ultimately, to improve educational attainment and ensure
meaningful learning for all will require extending educational opportunities, including at the
secondary school level, to the region’s most marginalized children.

Addressing social and cultural norms that negatively impact school attendance, especially for
girls, is crucial. Harmful gender norms and outdated roles continue to devalue girls’ education,
leading to their removal from school when households face economic challenges. Early
marriage significantly contributes to high dropout rates, particularly in secondary education.
In the Central African Republic, Chad, and Niger, over 60 percent of girls marry before age 18,
causing early school dropout.53 Both girls and boys face high rates of gender-based violence
(GBV) within and outside school, affecting their attendance, development, and well-being. For
girls, GBV is a major driver of adolescent pregnancy, further leading to dropout. To address these
issues, behavioral interventions involving communities can effectively shift norms discouraging

52 UIS (2024).
53 UNICEF (2022).

60 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
enrollment. Gender sensitization initiatives, legal protections against child marriage, and policies
supporting teenage mothers’ education can catalyze changes in societal views. Integrating
community involvement with broader policy measures can tackle deep-rooted barriers to girls’
education. Safe spaces offering sexual and reproductive health education, life skills training,
and mentoring have shown promise in reducing adolescent pregnancy, improving school
completion, and enhancing girls’ agency.54

Poverty remains a critical binding barrier to access to education and completion, with over
60 percent of adolescents from the poorest quintile of households being out of school.55
Poor households are forced to prioritize first-order needs, such as food and shelter, over
educational expenses, such as school fees, uniforms, materials, and transportation. Children
from poor households are also often required to work, often at the expense of their education,
to contribute to household income (for example, by working outside the home) or undertake
household chores (for example, girls providing childcare for younger siblings). Moreover,
poor households are also more vulnerable to missing school following a significant financial
shock (box 2.3). Targeted economic interventions are needed to unlock the impact of poverty
on school attendance, and countries in the region are already taking action to reduce the
economic burden of school by abolishing primary school fees and, increasingly, secondary
school fees. Complementary targeted economic support, such as cash transfers, stipends, and
assistance for transportation, has been shown to be impactful in improving school enrollment
and completion among the poorest households.56 In some cases, where such programs do not
exist, this will require establishing them by working with other social welfare ministries and
partners. In many cases where such programs exist, it is a matter of improving their targeting
and efficiency.57

In terms of infrastructure development, countries must weigh options between aiming for
smaller class sizes with the financing implications of expansive infrastructure development and
higher teacher salary costs. While smaller classes are often thought to improve educational
quality, the evidence is mixed. Data from the 2018 Programme for International Student
Assessment show that high-performing East Asian systems achieve excellent learning outcomes
with larger classes (for example, Viet Nam and China average 42 students per class, compared
to the 26 in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries).
Currently, many African countries have much larger classes than East Asian and OECD countries,
and some still use double shifting to accommodate their students.58 The need for system
expansion is clear, but the approach is crucial. Governments must weigh the opportunity costs
of smaller classes against other quality-enhancing investments like improved teacher training,
ongoing coaching, and technology integration to support students effectively, even in larger
classes. School location decisions should be data driven to build optimized networks that
maximize equitable access. Infrastructure development approaches should be reviewed for
effectiveness and efficiency. Regional examples of cost-effective construction, like Rwanda’s

54 Bentaouet Kattan, Khan, and Merchant (2023); Evans et al. (2024); Evans and Yuan (2022); World Bank (2024b, forthcoming b).
55 UNESCO (2021a).
56 Blimpo, Gajigo, and Pugatch (2016); Brudevold-Newman (2017); Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2021); Masuda and Yamauchi (2019).
57 For example, countries in Southern Africa, such as Eswatini, Lesotho, and South Africa, have social assistance programs aimed at supporting the school attendance of
orphans and vulnerable children. However, studies show a significant gap in the targeting of these programs. In the case of Lesotho, for example, a study found that only
28 percent of beneficiaries were from the bottom wealth quintile, an issue the government is trying to fix by revamping the social registry systems.
58 OECD (2019).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 61
 homegrown approach and Tanzania’s decentralized model, can provide lessons on ways to
enhance efficiency, accountability, and community ownership.

As countries expand secondary education systems, they face trade-offs in terms of the
objectives they aim to pursue and consequently the types of curricula they offer in lower and
upper secondary schools. Currently, many secondary education systems still focus on preparing
students for tertiary education, which is accessible only to a small elite. Even as post-secondary
education and training expands, for some time, secondary education will remain the terminal
education level for most youth due to current low provision of post-school education and
training.59 Therefore, secondary education must meet the diverse needs of students, providing
a well-rounded education that prepares them for higher education, further skills development
and training, or the workforce.60 Sub-Saharan African countries are seeking better ways to align
their secondary education systems to the economic and social realities of their context, for
example, integrating vocational subjects into the curriculum and more recently by shifting
toward competency-based curricula.61 To avoid increased enrollment without improved
learning outcomes, countries must accelerate these efforts. The focus should be on integrating
twenty-first century competencies and skills into secondary education that offers multiple
pathways to productivity and further education and training.62

BOX 2.3: Making Schools Resilient to Shocks

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerabilities of education systems globally, and Sub-
Saharan Africa faced severe learning disruptions due to prolonged school closures. Natural
disasters, health emergencies, and economic shocks continue to challenge the region’s human
capital development. For example, in 2023, cyclone-induced flooding in Malawi and Mozambique
destroyed thousands of classrooms, while droughts in the Horn of Africa forced an estimated 2.7
million children to abandon their studies. Comprehensive strategies are needed to enhance the
resilience of education systems for swift crisis response and recovery.a
A multi-pronged approach to building resilient education systems includes upgrading
infrastructure to withstand extreme weather events, developing proactive strategies for
educational continuity during disruptions, and prioritizing disaster readiness planning. The
Roadmap for Safer and Resilient Schools offers guidance for governments in designing
intervention strategies and investment plans.b Plans should leverage both basic and advanced
technologies to mitigate impacts on vulnerable children. Sub-Saharan Africa needs agile, resilient,
and adaptive human development systems with clear cross-sectoral collaboration mechanisms.c
a. UNICEF (2022).
b. World Bank (2020c). The Roadmap for Safer and Resilient Schools is a step-by-step guide intended to provide support to governments of developing
countries exposed to natural hazards. It focuses on the design of intervention strategies and investment plans to make schools safer and more resilient
at scale. The scope of the guide encompasses the recovery and reconstruction of school facilities affected by disasters. (https://gpss.worldbank.org/en/
roadmaps/roadmap-safer-and-resilient-schools-rsrs)
c. Schady et al. (2023).

59 Kerr and Baxter (2020).

60 Bregman and Stallmeister (2002); Bregman and Bryner (2003); World Bank (2008).
61 Bregman and Stallmeister (2002); Abu-Ghaida et al. (2005).
62 Abu-Ghaida et al. (2005).

62 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
OBJECTIVE 2: EQUIPPING YOUTH AND THE WORKFORCE
WITH SKILLS RELEVANT TO THE EVOLVING LABOR MARKET
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the imperative to equip youth with skills that are relevant for the labor
market has never been more pressing. At the macro level, Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic and
social development depends on the quality and quantity of the skills of its youth and workforce.
Countries across the region have set ambitious goals for economic growth and poverty
reduction, goals that are achievable only by fully utilizing their human capital potential. In this
regard, the educational and human capital investments countries make early in the lifecycle—
that is, in early childhood and basic education—must be complemented with investments in
relevant and higher-order skills. Megatrends such as digitalization, automation, and adaptation
to climate change, which are reshaping the nature of work dramatically, are adding to the
urgency of the skills development agenda. These trends present both opportunities and
challenges. Countries’ effectiveness in developing and utilizing skills will determine their ability
to navigate challenges while capitalizing on emerging economic and social opportunities.63

Currently, the region’s economic growth is hampered by a skills deficit. The situation is made
worse by the migration of highly skilled professionals to countries with higher earnings
potential.64 The lack of decent economic opportunities is a critical concern for youth in the
region and a top development agenda for governments. The share of youth not in education,
employment, or training is high at about 21.9 percent, and even much higher for female youth,
at 27 percent compared to 16.9 percent for male youth.65 The region’s youth unemployment
rate is estimated at 8.9 percent, lower than the world average of 12.8 percent—most African
youth cannot afford not to work. However, there is significant variation within the region. The
youth unemployment rate is high at 47.5 percent in Southern Africa, compared to 7.2 percent in
Eastern Africa and 5.2 percent in Western Africa.

Youth in the region are primarily engaged in low-productivity informal work, with informal
employment accounting for about 95 percent of employment among youth ages 15-24.
Many informal workers lack the necessary skills to enhance their productivity and advance
economically.66 This creates a significant mismatch between young people’s aspirations for high-
skilled, formal jobs and the reality of limited good job opportunities in the formal sector.67 This
unmet expectation for gainful employment, contrasted with the prevalent reality of unstable,
low-paying work, is a key source of youth dissatisfaction. It has likely contributed to civil unrest in
the region, including the wave of protests that swept across many countries in 2024.

The region is facing a paradox: workers lack the skills required to improve productivity and
global competitiveness, while not enough quality jobs are available to give workers an incentive
and the opportunity to build their skills. The skill composition of jobs in Sub-Saharan Africa has
hardly changed since the early 1990s despite rising educational attainment in the population.68
This may be partly due to the lack of firm growth necessary for specialization within a company,

63 World Bank (2019b).

64 World Bank (2020c, 2023b, forthcoming a).
65 World Bank (2024a).
66 Choi, Dutz, and Usman (2019); World Bank (2020c).
67 AUC and OECD (2024); Behrman, Almeida, and Robalino (2012).
68 Morsy and Musaka (2021).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 63
 often associated with wage employment.69 The region severely lacks this type of firm growth,
with firms heavily skewed toward own-account workers and firms with fewer than five people.70
Both at the country level and at the firm level, a clear correlation exists between the proportion
of firms with five or more employees and the share of the labor force with a job matched to
their skill level.71 Sub-Saharan Africa needs advanced skills to modernize and attract investment
but lacks the industries and firms to drive skill demand.

Breaking this paradox necessitates broad economic reforms to create more and better
economic opportunities, with skills development as a core part of the solution. Enhancing
the access, quality, and relevance of skills development is crucial to seizing emerging
economic opportunities and attracting new investments in the region’s economies. The skills
development landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa is complex. Across the region, skills development
is offered through a variety of providers, including secondary and post-secondary technical
and vocational education and training (TVET), tertiary education (universities, colleges, and
higher technical training institutions), numerous non-formal training programs, and integration
of vocational subjects into basic and secondary education. In most countries, provision is
fragmented across many ministries and agencies, often lacking a clear overarching policy and
strategy for coordination and alignment. There is also a significant data and information gap in
the effectiveness of types of educational institutions. Countries can direct their policy reforms
and investments toward two directly linked fronts: expanding equitable access and improving
quality and labor market relevance.

Reform area 2.1. Expand equitable access to skills development

A key priority in Sub-Saharan Africa’s skills agenda is expanding access, but it must be done
with serious intentionality to respond to the demands of the labor market and with a focus on
equity. While participation has improved, the pace lags behind progress in basic education,
and access remains low and inequitable. Enrollment in TVET has increased significantly in
absolute terms, but TVET still accounts for a very small share of enrollment: less than 2 percent
of enrollment of youth ages 15-24 in the region participate in TVET, compared to the global
average of 6.7 percent. High dropout rates in lower levels of education partly contribute, as
most TVET programs require completion of at least basic education. However, even among
school completers, TVET accounts for a small share of enrollment. At the upper secondary
level, for example, only 13.2 percent of students in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 were enrolled
in vocational programs—one of the lowest figures in the world (figure 2.6). Furthermore, TVET
often attracts students with lower academic performance, as many are discouraged by its
perceived low value and uncertainties about its returns.72

Sub-Saharan Africa also has the lowest rate of participation in tertiary education globally. The
global average tertiary GER is 38 percent, and Sub-Saharan Africa’s average is only 9.4 percent
(figure 2.7). There is significant variation across countries—for instance, tertiary GER is 25
percent in South Africa, 23 percent in Botswana, and 20 percent in Ghana, compared to 12

69 Bandiera et al. (2022).

70 Castro et al. (forthcoming).
71 Castro et al. (forthcoming) for the country level and Bandiera et al. (2022) for the individual level.
72 World Bank, UNESCO, and ILO (2023).

64 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 FIGURE 2.6: Shares of Youth and Upper Secondary School Students Enrolled in Vocational Education Programs,
2000 and 2019
a. Share of 15-24-year-olds enrolled b. Share of all students in upper secondary education
in vocational education enrolled in vocational programs

Europe & Central Asia Europe & Central Asia

East Asia & Pacific
High income
Upper-middle income
Upper-middle income
High income
Latin America & Caribbean Middle East & North Africa
East Asia & Pacific Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa Middle income
Low & middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Low income Lower-middle income
South Asia South Asia

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 10 20 30 40 50
Percent Percent
2018/19 2000
Source: Analysis using data from World Development Indicators, World Bank (https://liveprod.worldbank.org/en/indicator/se-sec-enrl-vo-zs).

percent in Nigeria, 5 percent in Niger, and 4 percent in Chad.73 Although there has been some
progress over time in expanding access, the pace has been slower than in other regions. For
example, the region has trailed behind South Asia since the early 2000s, although a few decades
earlier, the difference
was much smaller FIGURE 2.7: Gross Enrollment Ratio in Tertiary Education, 1972–2020

(figure 2.7). 100

90
Countries need to North America
exercise rigorous 80
OECD members
selectivity when 70 Europe & Central Asia

choosing the types 60

Latin America & Caribbean
Percent

of skills to develop 50
East Asia & Pacific
and expand. A crucial 40 Middle East & North Africa
balance must be struck World
30
between investing South Asia
20
in broadly applicable
10 Sub-Saharan Africa
skills versus investing
in advanced technical 0
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020

and STEM skills relevant

to the high-growth Source: Analysis using data from World Development Indicators, World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SE.TER.ENRR).
sector—countries will Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

need both. Investments

73 Nalumenya et al. (2023); World Bank (2024a).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 65
 in broadly applicable skills—including foundational skills, which many youth and adults are
lacking in the region—will be crucial to support the large numbers of informal workers to
improve their productivity and earnings. Countries’ access expansion strategies must consider
the diversity of their youth profile—school dropouts, primary and secondary school completers,
and graduates of TVET or tertiary education who are unemployed (box 2.4). Varied pathways for
skills development, including formal and non-formal training and ongoing work-based learning,
will be needed to meet this diverse demand.74 At the same time, countries cannot afford to
neglect investing in advanced skills, which are crucial for accelerated economic growth and
competitiveness. Building STEM skills will underpin the development of technology-intensive
value chains (which are crucial for economic diversification and modernization) and tap into
new industries like green and digital industries. This necessitates expanding access to tertiary
education, from the currently low base of less than 10 percent.75

BOX 2.4: Secondary TVET Expansion: A Window for Reform

Demographic shifts and improved lower education completion rates could dramatically increase
secondary technical and vocational education and training (TVET) enrollment in low-income
countries over the next two decades. Many Sub-Saharan African governments are prioritizing
secondary TVET expansion. For instance, several countries anticipate a fourfold to tenfold increase
in the number of TVET students. However, expanding a system that is often perceived as inferior
and misaligned with labor market needs carries risks. This challenge is intensified by global
megatrends affecting both skills demand and economic opportunities.
The growing interest in expanding secondary TVET presents an opportunity for reform. Sub-
Saharan Africa can draw lessons from regional and global experiences, particularly from
Bangladesh, Brazil, El Salvador, Mongolia, and Mozambique. A recent joint report by the World
Bank, ILO, and UNESCO identified three areas of transformation that countries should seek:
1. From striving for recognition to striving for excellence:
• Focus on both enterprises and learners as the main clients and become more responsive
to their needs.
• Foster a portfolio of skills by prioritizing foundational skills both at entry into TVET and within
TVET programs and by imparting the technical skills demanded by the relevant labor market.
• Promote an integrated ecosystem with flexible pathways between TVET and general
education, hands-on approaches including work-based learning, and quality inputs.
2. From a focus on inputs to a focus on end results:
• Get the balance right between autonomy and accountability of TVET providers.
3. From decisions based on conjecture to decisions based on evidence:
• Reduce the information gaps of learners, enterprises, TVET providers, communities, and policy
makers by collecting and publicizing data on TVET returns, skills needs, and provider inputs
and practices.
Source: Adapted from World Bank, UNESCO, and ILO (2023).

74 Arias, Evans, and Santos (2019); World Bank, UNESCO, and ILO (2023).
75 Arias, Evans, and Santos (2019); Arnhold and Bassett (2021); World Bank (2009).

66 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
An integral part of the skills access agenda should be improving equity across gender, rural-
urban, and socioeconomic groups. Equity is a key issue in skills development, with significant
disparities across gender, rural-urban, and socioeconomic status.76 On average, women
have significantly lower access to skills development opportunities. For example, in tertiary
education, the female GER is around 8 percent, compared to the male GER of 10. The gap is
even wider in some countries. For example, the female tertiary GER is 3 percent compared to 6
percent for male youth in Chad and Niger. The figures are 8 versus 13 percent in Ethiopia, and
10 versus 12 percent in Nigeria.77 Conversely, in several Southern African countries, including
Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa, women currently have higher enrollment rates in post-
secondary education and training than men. However, even in these countries, women have
lower levels of participation in traditionally male-dominated STEM fields.78,79 Furthermore, even
in countries where access has improved, there is significant inequality across geographic and
income groups, with youth from the lowest income quintiles and rural areas being grossly
underrepresented.

On gender, skills development initiatives can be used to lower barriers that limit women’s
participation in certain sectors, such as in STEM fields and fast-growing industries. These efforts
can include creating apprenticeships and internships for women in male-dominated sectors,
providing information on sector-specific earnings, and mentorship programs that connect
female students and recent graduates with successful women in various industries. Training
programs should be designed to accommodate women’s unique challenges, such as balancing
family responsibilities with training by offering flexible learning options and support services.80
On equity, more needs to be done to reach rural youth, the majority of whom are engaged in
subsistence farming.

Expanding access equitably will come with a substantial cost, including developing
infrastructure and equipment, training and employing the required teaching and training
workforce, and providing tailored support to underserved groups. Even with increased
efficiency, more investment is needed to raise access from its current low level, and public
funding alone will not meet the demand. Countries must build partnerships. Strengthening
public-private partnerships and fostering private provision of skills training will be crucial. In
most Sub-Saharan African countries, private provision of TVET and tertiary education is growing;
countries can leverage this to expand access. However, it is essential to implement mechanisms
that will ensure that privately provided training meets skills qualification frameworks and
maintains quality standards.

76 Savchenko et al. (2022); GEEAP (2023); World Bank (2024).

77 World Bank (2024a).
78 Gebre and Dulvy (2023); Welmond and Gregory (2021); UNESCO (2015).
79 For example, women are a minority among tertiary graduates in engineering in several countries, making up just 28.5 percent of all engineering graduates in South
Africa, 27.5 percent in Lesotho, and 15.5 percent in Eswatini (UNESCO 2015). These statistics are from 2013 or the closest year, from UNESCO Institute for Statistics, and are
indicative of a challenge that remains prevalent across most countries.
80 Gassier et al. (2022); ILO (2020); World Bank (2024b).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 67
 Regional partnerships for skills development can address diverse training and growing skills
needs by leveraging collective strengths. The region has not seen the rapid urbanization generally
associated with agglomeration effects, including the development of manufacturing, specialized
skills, and establishment of trade networks.81 To bridge this gap, countries can build on national
strengths to exploit comparative advantages and collaborate with partner countries across
the region to equip their workforces with the necessary skills. This could be achieved through
a pan-African initiative modeled after the African Schools of Excellence. By identifying areas of
expertise and resource strengths, countries can establish centers of excellence for specific sectors.
This specialization would allow for the development and expansion of high-quality training
programs and the sharing of best practices in a cost-effective manner. Furthermore, initiatives like
the African Continental Qualifications Framework would ensure that skills are recognized across
borders, facilitating labor mobility and promoting regional economic integration.

Reform area 2.2. Ensure that skills development programs are relevant
and responsive
Skills development programs suffer from low quality and relevance and weak linkage to labor
markets.82 Most African countries rank poorly in terms of educational quality, particularly
in areas that are crucial for moving up the economic value chain, such as technical and
vocational skills.83 Outdated curricula and training programs fail to equip students with the
skills and competencies required in rapidly evolving labor markets.84 With the small budgets
of skills development programs, especially in TVET, the curriculum options are often limited
to theoretically oriented, classroom-based courses, which offer dismal exposure to hands-on
training and experience.85 Uncompetitive salaries drive qualified professionals away, leaving
positions to less qualified or motivated individuals, further compromising training quality.86
As a result, only 30 percent of TVET trainers have work experience in companies related to the
sectors in which they teach.87

The access expansion effort must be linked with improving the quality and relevance of skills
development programs. Promising initiatives to improve the relevance of skills development
programs center on private sector engagement, spanning curriculum reforms, training delivery,
and support for better labor market transition. At the program development stage, private
sector involvement is essential to ensure that program designs are relevant to labor markets.
Botswana, Kenya, and Mauritius, for example, have established curriculum advisory boards
consisting of faculty, public sector officials, and private sector stakeholders to ensure that
skills programs are aligned with the labor market.88 At the program delivery stage, an effective
partnership with the private sector will enable skills development programs to draw high-
quality instructors and assessors among private professionals and industry experts. Moreover,
private sector engagement can improve skills development programs through practical

81 Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath (2016); Krugman and Venables (1996).

82 ILO (2020); UNESCO (2021c).
83 WEF (2017); AUC and OECD (2024).
84 AfDB (2020, 2022); OECD (2018); Arias, Evans, and Santos (2019).
85 Behrman, Almeida, and Robalino (2012).
86 World Bank, UNESCO, and ILO (2023).
87 ILO (2024).
88 Arias, Evans, and Santos (2019).

68 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
instruction, apprenticeships, and internships.89 Benin, Ghana, and Kenya have combined
apprenticeship programs with formal training centers, with alternating phases of theoretical
and practical training in Benin.

Attention to global trends, particularly the digital and green transitions, can help to ensure
that skills development programs are responsive and forward-looking. As the continent’s
digitalization advances, the demand for basic and intermediate digital skills is growing fast (box
2.5). The increasing mainstreaming of artificial intelligence (AI) in all aspects of work and life is
further reshaping and accelerating the demand for digital skills, implying an expected demand
for skills in these areas. Demand for green skills for a sustainable and resource-efficient economy
is also growing as the world adapts to the consequences of climate change. Building green
skills will be crucial both to advance the region’s own climate resilience agenda and to emerge
as a skills supplier to green industries across the globe.90 Across both priority areas, effective
response necessitates national skills strategies that dovetail with emerging high-potential
sectors on an ongoing basis (box 2.5).

BOX 2.5: From Digital Gap to Digital Leap

The demand for digital skills is increasing rapidly, and Sub-Saharan Africa is no exception. A recent
study encompassing five African nations—Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and
Rwanda—projects that there will be a significant surge in demand for digital skills over the coming
decade. Jobs that previously did not require digital proficiency will increasingly do so.a By 2030,
digital skills will be required for 50-55 percent of jobs in Kenya, reflecting its active information and
communications technology sector and start-up ecosystem. Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Rwanda are
expected to see 35-45 percent of jobs demanding digital competencies, while in Mozambique, 20-
25 percent of jobs will require such skills. Overall, in Sub-Saharan Africa, more than 230 million jobs
will require digital skills by 2030.
Currently, Sub-Saharan Africa faces a severe digital skills shortage. In 2022, African countries scored
low on the Digital Skills Gap Index—of the world’s 20 countries with the weakest digital skills, 12
were in Africa.b Only 50 percent of countries in Africa have “computer” skills as part of their school
curriculum, compared to 85 percent of countries globally,c and only 11 percent of Africa’s tertiary
education graduates have formal digital training.d
The digital divide across gender, urban-rural, and socioeconomic status is another feature of the
region’s digital landscape. Only about 40 percent of the region’s population has internet access,
compared to the global average of 66 percent, and most of the access is concentrated in urban
areas and affluent households.e Furthermore, the region has one of the widest digital gender gaps
globally. For example, in terms of internet use—women are 37 percent less likely than men to use
mobile internet.

89 AfDB (2022); World Bank, UNESCO, and ILO (2023).

90 GCA (2021).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 69
 Addressing the digital skills gap and preparing for an increasingly digitalized world requires the
following:
· Developing country-specific digital skills frameworks, policies, and assessment systems, drawing
from global frameworks
· Reforming digital skills education in technical and vocational education and training and tertiary
education, including new programs to respond to emerging technologies such as artificial
intelligence; integrating digital skills across all levels and disciplines; and targeting interventions
to bridge the gender gap
· Enhancing online learning and digital tool integration into teaching and learning processes,
including leveraging artificial intelligence for personalized learning
· Improving affordable high-speed broadband connectivity in educational networks and institutions
· Building staff capacity and digitalizing processes in relevant ministries and education authorities.
Sources: Recommendations drawn from the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030) (https://au.int/sites/default/files/
documents/38507-doc-dts-english.pdf) and the World Bank Digital Economy for Africa initiative (https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/0a4174d7003
0f27cc66099e862b3ba79-0200022021/original/DSCAP-MethodGuidebook-Part1.pdf).

a. IFC and World Bank (2021).

b. BCG (2022).
c. IFC and World Bank (2019).
d. BCG (2022).
e. BCG (2022).

A focus on data-driven and evidence-based policies and reforms will require a country-specific
approach. This requires enhancing data generation and utilization, including bolstering labor
market information systems (LMIS). By conducting more frequent labor market surveys and
cultivating private sector partnerships, countries can gain accurate insights into skill dynamics.
Stronger data systems will facilitate the integration of effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
mechanisms to ensure that the skills programs remain aligned with evolving market needs.
Tracking graduates’ career trajectories and evaluating the efficacy of various training components
may require institutional shifts to align the motivations of educational and training institutions
with results indicators. Furthermore, the efforts to build skills, including foundational and higher-
order skills, need to be complemented with a broader approach that improves productivity and
competitiveness. Fostering private sector–driven growth and job creation in the region will be
essential to absorb the increased supply of the variedly skilled workforce.91 For this, a multifaceted
approach to tackle issues around access to infrastructure,92 competition in input and output
sectors,93 access to regional markets,94 regulatory alignment and removal of non-tariff barriers,95
and access to finance96 should take advantage of a growing array of regional best practices.

Thus, there is an urgent need to shift education and skills development systems from supply-
driven, exclusive, and elite-serving models toward demand-responsive, labor market–oriented,
and equitably accessible approaches. Achieving such fundamental changes will require
significant political commitment and increased investment. Nevertheless, it presents an
opportunity to reposition the region’s education and skills systems to better equip individuals
and economies to transform challenges into opportunities.

91 Filmer and Fox (2014); World Bank (2017a, 2023a).

92 Mensah (2023).
93 Purfield et al. (2016); World Bank Group Cartel Database.
94 Growth Lab at Harvard University (2019); Lederman and Maloney (2007).
95 AUC and World Bank (2020).
96 Kempis et al. (2023).

70 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
SMART INVESTMENT
In the context of limited public resources, introducing critical reforms will require innovative
financing solutions and prioritizing the most cost-effective interventions to finance the
education sector. Most countries will need to mobilize significantly more resources for
education and spend these funds more effectively. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest per
capita public spending on education in the world, and traditional sources of financing are
unlikely to be sufficient in the medium term to meet national education goals in the current
economic context. Even with increased spending, efficient and equitable utilization of funds
will be paramount to maximizing their impact. This will require strengthening the capacity
of the institutions responsible for managing resources and ensuring that well-functioning
oversight and monitoring systems are in place. Finally, innovative financing mechanisms and
engagements with key stakeholders can potentially leverage other sources of financing.

Spending Levels Are Inadequate to Meet the Education Challenge

in Africa
Over the past 10 years, African countries have steadily increased their spending on education.
Between 2012 and 2021, the region’s total spending on education grew from US$90 billion
to US$115 billion, equivalent to an increase of 29 percent in real terms. Over that period,
governments contributed 68 percent of total spending, households contributed 28 percent,
and development assistance contributed approximately 5 percent.

However, a large and growing spending gap is emerging between Sub-Saharan Africa and
other regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, increases in spending have been driven by the effects of
economic growth on government revenues rather than as a result of increases in the overall
size of the government sector or greater prioritization of education in government budgets.
Government spending on education as a share of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa is relatively low
and has not changed significantly over recent years. Only South Asia devotes a lower share of
its GDP to education, although its growth rate is much higher, at approximately 78 percent
between 2012 and 2021 (figure 2.8, panel a). Translating shares of national income into real
spending per child shows that spending has stagnated, and the gap between Sub-Saharan
Africa and other regions has widened (figure 2.8, panel b). For example, in 2011–12, low-income
and lower-middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia spent around US$225
per school-age child. However, over the following 10 years, countries in South Asia doubled
their spending to US$466, while spending in Sub-Saharan Africa increased only marginally to
US$234.

Moreover, current spending levels are not enough to meet national and global education
goals. On average, low-income and lower-middle-income African countries will need to devote
approximately 7 percent of GDP to government spending on education to meet their goals and
tackle the learning crisis by 2030.97 This level of investment in education represents a massive
increase compared to the 4 percent of GDP that countries in the region currently allocate. Such

97 UNESCO (2024c).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 71
 a shortfall in education
FIGURE 2.8: Government Spending on Education and Total Spending on
Public Education per Capita, by Region, 2011–22 spending leads to vast
inequalities in learning
6
a. Government spending on education experiences across regions.
By age 18, a girl growing up
today in Sub-Saharan Africa
will have attended school
5
for 8 years, compared to
Percent of GDP

LACAB EAP
MENA
ECA
13 years in a high-income
country. Over that time,
4 SSA
the government in Sub-
SAR Saharan Africa will have
spent about US$1,900 on
3 educating her, and almost
2011-12 2013-14 2015-16 2017-18 2019-20 2021-22
all that money will be spent
b. Total spending on public education per child on salaries. In contrast,
1,200
a government in a high-
ECA income country will have
1,000
LAC
spent about US$117,000,
or 60 times as much, with
Constant 2021 US dollars

800
EAP a significant proportion
600 MENA spent on learning resources
SAR
to support teachers and
400 learners in addition to
paying teachers. It is
200 SSA
perhaps not surprising then
that in Sub-Saharan Africa,
0
2011-12 2013-14 2015-16 2017-18 2019-20 2021-22 only 10 percent of 10-year-
olds are able to read a
Sources: Based on data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics database; World Development
Indicators, World Bank. simple text, compared to
Note: Only low- and middle-income countries are included. EAP = East Asia and the Pacific; ECA =
Europe and Central Asia; GDP = gross domestic product; LACAB = Latin America and the Caribbean;
91 percent in high-income
MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
countries.

Finding the Funds to Move the Needle on Education Outcomes

Despite the low levels of spending, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to allocate a similar
share of their government budgets to education as countries in other regions. For example,
low-income and lower-middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa devoted 15.4 percent of
their budgets to education, compared to 14.8 percent for similar countries outside the region.
While some countries have the potential to mobilize more resources for education by giving it
greater priority during their budget negotiations, the more binding problem is the lack of public
resources in general (figure 2.9).

72 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
 FIGURE 2.9: Government Revenue and Spending on Education in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2022

a. Government revenue b. Spending on education

Lesotho Sierra Leone

Congo, Rep. Ethiopia
South Sudan Senegal
Mozambique Burkina Faso
São Tomé and Príncipe
Mauritania Burundi
Rwanda Congo, Dem. Rep.
Eswatini Mozambique
Angola Benin
Burundi Kenya
Cabo Verde Mali
Burkina Faso Congo, Rep.
Liberia São Tomé and Príncipe
Zambia
Mali Togo
Senegal Cabo Verde
SSA average Eswatini
Sierra Leone Côte d'Ivoire
Chad Zimbabwe
Togo Gambia, The
Gambia, The
Malawi SSA average
Kenya Chad
Congo, Dem. Rep. Madagascar
Zimbabwe Cameroon
Cameroon Tanzania
Ghana Lesotho
Sudan Zambia
Guinea-Bissau
Tanzania Rwanda
Côte d'Ivoire Ghana
Niger Niger
Benin Guinea
Comoros Liberia
Uganda Comoros
Guinea Central African Republic
Central African Republic
Madagascar Mauritania
Nigeria Uganda
Ethiopia South Sudan
Somalia Angola
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Percent of GDP Percent of government spending

Sources: World Economic Outlook database, International Monetary Fund; UNESCO Institute for Statistics database.
Note: Only low- and middle-income countries are included. GDP = gross domestic product; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

The largest increases in government spending on education in Sub-Saharan Africa have

been driven by economic growth over the past 20 years. Government taxes and other
revenues generally increase in absolute terms as economic activity increases. These increases
in government revenues accounted for around 60 percent of the increases in government
education spending over the past 20 years. Between 1998 and 2017, economic growth
was responsible for two-thirds of the increase in government education spending in low-
income and lower-middle-income countries. This highlights the importance of favorable
macroeconomic conditions and healthy economic growth to closing financing gaps and
accelerating progress in the education sector.98

98 Al-Samarrai, Cerdan-Infantes, and Lehe (2019).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 73
 Nonetheless, the scope for further education funding exists through improved domestic
revenue mobilization. Where countries are already benefiting from debt relief, there is an
opportunity to direct resources to investment in critical development goals, including
education. Past debt relief initiatives have taken this approach by forgiving some portion of a
country’s current debt and using the savings from reduced debt servicing costs for other uses,
with some promising results. For example, the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative required participating countries to make
commitments to improving educational outcomes, leading to a significant improvement in
primary school attendance.99

Given the required resources and the challenging macroeconomic context (as discussed in
section 1 of this volume), it is crucial to explore innovative approaches. Local earmarked taxes,
such as levies on property values or payroll, can direct money from a community into local
education, with the added benefit of scrutiny from the local population on the successful
use of the funds. Twenty-two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa utilize levies to finance skills
development.100 For resource-rich countries, dedicated education trust funds can be effective
uses of windfall revenues from temporary price increases, and local content policies for mining
operators have also been used to finance local education programs. For example, the Ghana
Education Trust Fund and similar mechanisms in Nigeria earmark a proportion of oil revenues or
corporate profits for education. These funds can be combined with pooled financing facilities
to combine contributions from government and philanthropic sources and funding from the
private sector.101 Further scope also exists for the use of social impact bonds to fund education
projects, with the added benefit of some conditional financing that can potentially incentivize
efficiency and effectiveness.102 The Ghana Education Outcomes Project is one example, with the
aim of improving the literacy and numeracy outcomes of 70,000 out-of-school children.

In 2021, households contributed about a quarter of all funding for education spending in
Africa, equivalent to 1 to 2 percent of GDP. At the basic education level, the trend has been
to move away from charging fees and community contributions, given that they have been a
substantial barrier to universalizing access. By 2023, about half of all countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa had abolished fees at the lower secondary level, and about a third had also done so
at the upper secondary level.103 Subsidized student financing schemes in tertiary education,
including student loan schemes, are prevalent in many countries. These programs can be
especially effective when they ensure access for poor and marginalized students, competitive
interest rates, appropriate targeting or means testing, adequate repayment periods, efficient
program administration, low levels of loan forgiveness, and partial financing from private capital
markets.104 Although private sector education is well-established in the region, it may not
be enough to ensure that children reach their learning goals and should not be viewed as a
substitute to ensure universal learning.105

99 Ferry, de Talancé, and Niño-Zarazúa (2022).

100 World Bank (2023b).
101 World Bank (2023b).
102 Patrinos and Tanaka (2024).
103 Gruijters, Abango, and Casely-Hayford (2023).
104 Johnstone (2015).
105 Crawfurd et al. (2023).

74 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
IMPROVING SECTOR SPENDING EFFICIENCY
Even where governments can increase their investment in education, it is crucial to use funding for
education in better and more effective ways. Education systems must address workforce deficits
in foundational skills while investing in twenty-first century competencies. This trade-off reflects
a need to balance efficiency with equity—focusing on high-growth sectors while uplifting the
most vulnerable through broader employment potential and inclusivity.106 By applying policies
that have been successfully implemented elsewhere, countries can make the system expansion
arising from the abolition of school fees more affordable while ensuring that the quality of
education does not decline. These policies include improving the utilization of teachers by
reducing absenteeism and
adjusting pupil-teacher
FIGURE 2.10: Inefficiencies and Inequalities in Spending on Education in
ratios between schools.107 Sub-Saharan Africa
However, implementing
a. LAYS versus spending per capita, 2021–23
these interventions at 10
scale and across the entire 9
MUS
education system requires KEN
8
tackling longstanding
7
challenges that prevent
LSO
LAYS

governments from getting 6 TGO BEN GHA GAB NAM

GMB ZAF
the most from their BDI COM CMR COG BWA
5 ZMB
MDG GIN SLETZA CIVSEN
spending on education. COD UGA MOZ ETHBFA
MRT AGO
SWZ
4 RWA
The range in ability to 3
CAF TCD NER MLI
translate government 2 LBR
10 100 1000
spending into educational
Government education spending per-capita (US$), 2021–23
outcomes speaks to the
potential for efficiency b. Per capita spending and poverty in Uganda, 2016
4
Subnational spending on education per capita (z-score)

gains from improved

management. For example, 3
although Chad and
2
Madagascar spend similar
amounts on education per 1

child, Chad achieves only 0

2.8 LAYS, while Madagascar
-1
achieves 4.7 LAYS (figure
2.10, panel a). While some -2
factors are related to -3
characteristics of service -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Multidimensional Poverty Index (z-score)
delivery that are difficult to
change, many education Sources: For panel a, calculations using data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics database and
World Bank 2020c. For panel b, Manuel et al. 2019.
systems suffer from weak Note: For a list of country codes, go to https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search. LAYS = learning-
adjusted years of schooling.
decision-making over

106 Arias, Evans, and Santos (2019); AUC and OECD (2024).
107 Angrist et al. (2020).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 75
 the use of education funding, limited transparency and accountability, and, more generally,
suboptimal resource allocation.

Scarce resources for education are often not allocated according to need, and it is common for
government funding levels to vary widely across different parts of the country. For example, in
Uganda, the highest-spending district spent almost five times as much as the lowest-spending
district (figure 2.10, panel b). Moreover, these spending differences are strongly correlated with
the level of poverty: children living in poorer parts of the country receive less government
funding for their education than children in wealthier parts.108 In low-income countries, 40
percent of total government spending goes to the education of the wealthiest 20 percent of
the population, while the poorest 20 percent receive only 10 percent.109

A critical constraint to more effective spending is weak teacher management systems. Teacher
salaries make up over 90 percent of the recurrent costs of the provision of education, making
teacher performance central to efforts to improve the efficiency of education spending. In
many countries, weak teacher deployment systems are the main cause of spending inequalities,
with stronger teachers concentrated in urban and wealthier districts. Given high levels of
teacher absenteeism, the following actions are essential: improving teacher motivation, by
reviewing pay and career development opportunities; reducing unauthorized absences; and
strengthening accountability systems for teacher performance, such as pay for performance.110
Tackling weak teacher deployment systems by using a clear and transparent allocation
formula and developing strategies for retaining teachers in remote or disadvantaged schools
can go a long way toward improving spending efficiency. For example, in Tanzania, financial
incentives targeted at local governments to equalize student-teacher ratios within their schools
significantly improved teacher distribution. In Malawi, a more data-driven and rules-based
approach to teacher deployment coupled with incentives is helping the staffing of schools in
remote and disadvantaged areas.111

The limited funds available for education infrastructure require innovative solutions to stretch
their efficacy as far as possible. Infrastructure costs can be lowered by increasing the use of
double shifts and year-round schooling to reduce the number of new classrooms needed,
limiting the construction of teachers’ houses to the most remote areas, and optimizing school
infrastructure by reducing administrative offices and using shared or mobile laboratories. In
Zambia, these measures could save up to 6 billion kwachas (or 8 percent of the annual tax
revenue in 2021) annually by 2035, helping to close the financing gap and support near-
universal access to education, although a small gap is likely to remain under certain scenarios.

Strengthening the link between financing and results also has the potential to improve the
effectiveness of education spending. Teacher pay-for-performance can be effective, but only
when it is combined with complementary inputs, like textbooks, as experienced in a teacher
pay-for-performance scheme in rural Uganda.112 Similarly, performance-based school grants
have shown some positive results when combined with other interventions, like capacity
building, or when funds are spent on inputs that directly affect learning outcomes. The Gambia,
Senegal, and Sierra Leone have started to link some elements of school funding to performance.

108 Manuel et al. (2019).

109 UNICEF (2020).
110 Breeding, Béteille, and Evans (2021); Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011).
111 World Bank (2023e).
112 Gilligan et al. (2018).

76 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Section 3: Policy Recommendations
The recovery of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-pandemic era remains
tepid, as income per capita in the region this year is barely set to return to that of 2019. There
is urgency to foster economic growth by (1) strengthening economic resilience and reducing
harmful volatility, and (2) investing in key areas for long-term growth, especially in essential
infrastructure (energy, transport, and water) and human capital (education and health). These
two priorities will involve implementing policies in the following areas.

3.1: MAINTAINING A SOUND MACROECONOMIC

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Central banks will need to maintain a firm grip on inflation to enhance monetary policy
credibility, while allowing more accommodation over the next two years. Fiscal policy makers
will need to consolidate public sector accounts while finding space to fund priority and viable
public investment and social programs. They also need to address the high cost of debt service
and ensure debt sustainability. Debt management practices that emphasize transparency
(dissemination and publication of debt statistics and debt management reports) and borrowing
more on concessional or less onerous terms are critical.

Monetary policy should ensure that inflationary expectations remain anchored and achieve
price stability. By July 2024, nearly 70 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries were already
exhibiting signs of easing inflationary pressures.1 In these countries, the inflation rate is already
in single digits or within its target bands. This achievement has already helped to support the
modest recovery in the region. Monitoring incoming data as well as reassessing the inflationary
outlook and expectations are critical to avoiding a premature cut in monetary policy rates.
For this group of countries, central banks are considering putting a pause on monetary policy
hiking or gradually easing to a more neutral stance of monetary policy. The latter will depend
on inflation expectations remaining well anchored and policy makers ensuring that inflation is
on a clear path to converge to or remain within the target. As inflation continues easing, these
countries will have space to reduce monetary policy rates—thus fostering private investment
and alleviating the output effects of fiscal consolidation. For countries with inflation rates
exhibiting double-digits or continuing to rise significantly above target rates, maintaining a
monetary tightening stance is warranted to boost confidence in the central bank and steer
inflation on a downward path.2 The immediate priority of these central banks is to anchor
inflationary expectations and achieve price stability.

Across all countries, government spending policies will need to mitigate the cost of living for
vulnerable segments of the population. Moreover, governments across the region need to
continue improving institutional safeguards to prevent monetary financing of government
deficits, which can be extremely detrimental to price stability and monetary policy efficacy.
Finally, monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policy actions should be responsive to each
other, refraining from conflicting objectives. This is critical for countries that are (1) shifting
from fixed exchange rates and exchange controls toward a more market-determined

1 This calculation was made using monthly information on Consumer Price Indexes for 43 countries in the region.
2 This is the case for 30 percent of the sample of 43 Sub-Saharan African countries with data available on monthly inflation.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 77
 exchange rate (such as Ethiopia and Nigeria), or (2) using measures of fiscal consolidation that
might raise inflation temporarily—say, winding down or removing energy subsidies (Angola
and Nigeria).

Fiscal policy and debt management should focus on addressing the high cost of debt service and
create more fiscal space for essential public investments. One of the most effective ways to lower
the cost of sovereign debt is by enhancing transparency in fiscal policy and debt management.3
Achieving fiscal sustainability while investing in infrastructure and human capital requires the
support of clear, credible, and transparent medium-term fiscal strategies. Many African countries
have established medium-term fiscal frameworks designed to anchor fiscal policies, minimize
fiscal risks, and avoid slippages.4 However, the expected benefits of these frameworks have yet
to materialize fully across Sub-Saharan African countries.5 Setting an explicit debt target that
balances development goals with debt sustainability can help the government to ensure long-
term fiscal health while still maintaining the flexibility to invest in critical areas—particularly
education.6 For instance, Kenya’s shift to a debt anchor of 55 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) in present value terms in June 2023 is an example of such a forward-looking policy.

African countries need credible fiscal compacts. Addressing fiscal and debt sustainability risks
through improved domestic resource mobilization and greater spending efficiency is vital for
ensuring that (high-quality) public investments, especially in infrastructure and education,
meet their growth targets, deliver services, and win trust between citizens and governments.
Governments need to adopt transparent and accountable spending practices, ensuring that
public projects are subject to independent reviews and cost-benefit analyses to eradicate
wasteful expenditures, such as regressive fuel subsidies and spending leakages. Revenue
reforms, including digital tax systems and the reduction of tax exemptions, can significantly
bolster public resources for education, as shown in successful cases in The Gambia, Mauritania,
Rwanda, and Uganda.7 Reform success rests on high-level political commitment and buy-in
from key stakeholders, including credible and transparent communication about the long-term
benefits and distributional consequences of the reform as well as the cost of inaction.

While improved economic growth can alleviate fiscal pressures, further fiscal consolidation
measures will be necessary for many countries to maintain sustainable debt levels. This
consolidation must be carefully managed to minimize the adverse impacts on public services—
such as health and education. International Monetary Fund estimates point to an average
reduction of the government’s budget deficit of 2-3 percent of GDP over the next five years, and
some governments may require a larger adjustment and/or debt restructuring to achieve fiscal
sustainability.8 Ensuring that fiscal consolidation is aligned with development priorities will be
critical to foster and sustain inclusive growth.

3 Bastida, Guillamón, and Benito (2017); Choi and Hashimoto (2018); Kubota and Zeufack (2020).
4 These include Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
5 Allen et al. (2017).
6 Recent estimates show that an appropriate medium-term debt anchor for Sub-Saharan Africa could be 55 percent of gross domestic product (Comelli et al. 2023).
7 Jung (2023) identifies 12 episodes of successful revenue reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa during the post–global financial crisis period (2010–21). These episodes were
defined as tax revenue increases that exceeded 2.5 percentage points of GDP over a five-year period (Jung 2023).
8 During 2020–25, the median budget deficit in the region is expected to drop by about 2 percentage points of GDP. So far, the median budget deficit reduction in the
region has been about 1.3 percentage points of GDP from 2000 to 2024. During this period, 16 countries experienced a reduction in 2020–24 that exceeded 4 percentage
points of GDP—of which only six of these countries are expected to turn deficits into surpluses or lower the budget deficit below 2 percentage points of GDP. In
contrast, about 30 percent of the countries in the region are expected to have budget deficit reductions of less than 1 percentage point of GDP or increasing deficits.
Fiscal adjustment will be sharper over the next five years for these countries—while some within this group will additionally require debt restructuring to achieve fiscal
sustainability.

78 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
African governments need to make a further push on debt transparency. Debt transparency is
critical for borrowing governments and their citizens. Governments need to provide reliable and
timely data on debt statistics, debt management strategies, borrowing plans, and contingent
liabilities to citizens and creditors. This transparency improves the pricing of debt instruments,
enhances the credibility of sovereign borrowers, and helps to attract foreign direct investment.
Through reducing uncertainty and establishing credibility, debt transparency contributes
to reduced borrowing costs, improved credit ratings, and higher foreign direct investment
inflows.9 Despite recent improvements in debt reporting across the region, governments need
to make more progress in the disclosure of debt management documents and practices as well
as contingent liabilities—including government guarantees, information on collateralization,
and debt-related contingent liabilities. According to the World Bank’s Debt Reporting Heat Map,
42 percent of International Development Association–eligible countries in the region had full
coverage in the publication of debt management strategies and annual borrowing plans in
2023, while only 5 percent disclosed information on contingent liabilities.10

3.2: INVESTING IN PEOPLE

The benefits for Africa from improving educational and skills outcomes are enormous.
Individuals, families, and communities can forge a healthier, more productive future. Economies
will be in a better position to respond to megatrends such as demographic shifts, digital and
disruptive technologies, and climate change, among others, and seize opportunities arising
from them. Accelerating inclusive growth would require a transformation of the education
system, with a focus on two interrelated objectives: (1) building a strong foundation by ensuring
that all children acquire basic skills, and (2) equipping the workforce, including the youth, with
skills relevant to an evolving global economy.

A paradigm shift is needed to go beyond the successes toward universal enrollment in basic
education to deliver universal learning. That starts with support for early childhood development
(ECD)—with holistic multisectoral interventions combining education, nutrition, health, and
social protection services. Access to ECD must also be expanded from its current low base.
Some of this can be usefully delivered by communities, faith-based organizations, and other
agencies—where the role of the state can focus on ensuring a coherent policy environment
and implementing effective quality assurance mechanisms.

Improving teaching is central to better learning and it is noteworthy from a resource

perspective given that teacher salaries make up as much as 90 percent of the recurrent costs
of education provision. Cost-effective interventions, such as structured pedagogy, targeted
teaching by learning level, and teaching in children’s home language, can lead to rapid
improvements in foundational learning. Meeting literacy and numeracy targets will require
clear learning goals and accountability systems. Such interventions must be backed by systemic
reforms of teacher development and management. Competitive and more transparent
recruitment provides the chance to improve the teaching workforce over time. High-quality and
ongoing training will help teachers to upgrade their capacity. Better career development, such

9 Arbatli and Escolano (2015); Cicatiello et al. (2021); Kubota and Zeufack (2000).
10 Among International Development Association–eligible African countries, Burkina Faso is the only one that has achieved the full disclosure rating for all nine dimensions
of the World Bank’s Debt Transparency Heat Map (https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2022/07/10/why-one-african-country-opted-for-full-disclosure-on-debt).

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 79
 as merit-based promotions linked with regular performance assessments, will help to address
pervasive issues such as absenteeism and motivate teachers.

Sustained efforts to expand access to education are crucial to ensure that all current and future
generations enroll and remain in school. This necessitates increased investment in infrastructure
to create more high-quality learning environments. However, careful, data-driven planning is
essential. Countries must balance the substantial costs of reducing class sizes against other
critical elements of quality education, such as robust teacher training, ongoing coaching and
support, and strategic technology integration. Supply-side investments must be complemented
with targeted demand-side interventions, such as cash transfers and stipends, along with efforts
to change harmful social and gender norms. These interventions aim to alleviate the impact of
poverty and societal barriers on school attendance, especially for girls.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s skills development landscape must pivot toward demand-driven approaches
to enhance relevance and labor market responsiveness. Demand-driven approaches in skills
development necessitate integrating education and skills development strategies with
wider industry and private sector development plans. This will foster better alignment of
curriculum and training provisions with the evolving demands of labor markets. Access to skills
development opportunities must expand, and it needs to include support for youth to pursue
entrepreneurship and self-employment options, recognizing that many newly trained workers in
Sub-Saharan Africa may choose or need to create their own economic opportunities. Particular
attention should be given to supporting women in this transition, addressing gender-specific
barriers they may face in entering and advancing in the workforce, especially in historically male-
dominated fields. Collaborations within the region can build on national strengths to exploit
comparative advantages, support developing high-quality training programs and sharing best
practices across the continent, and expand access in a cost-effective manner. There are examples
to build on, including the African Centers of Excellence. Furthermore, initiatives like the African
Continental Qualifications Framework would ensure that skills are recognized and valued across
borders, facilitating labor mobility and promoting regional economic integration.

Demand-driven skills development also implies ensuring that skilled jobs are available and
accessible in the region. In many cases, this will require significant changes in the business
environment, where the number of medium-size firms that can afford skilled labor is limited
by market distortions such as monopolies and entry barriers.11 Indeed, a higher proportion of
firms with five or more employees is correlated at the country level with lower levels of skills
mismatch.12 The lack of medium-size firms can constrain occupational diversity, limiting the
potential benefits to labor productivity from specialization, as a larger scale of production
makes increasing the division of labor profitable, provides the economies of scale necessary
for technical training, and allows for complementary investments, including in advanced
technologies.13 Addressing barriers to entry for private sector employers will require a strong
competition policy, access to credit, and access to quality infrastructure (especially energy and
transport), among other factors.14

11 Refer also to Hopenhayn (2014).

12 Castro et al. (forthcoming).
13 Begazzo, Blimpo, and Dutz (2023, chapter 2).
14 Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011); Mensah (2023).

80 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
As African policy makers and practitioners take on these challenges, there are cross-cutting
opportunities that they can seize to maximize impact. First, they can turn Africa’s digital gap
into a “digital leap.” Reforming digital skills instruction in higher education and technical and
vocational education and training can prepare young people to access modern occupations.
Appropriate integration of technology in classrooms can help teachers to deliver better lessons
to their students. Supporting e-learning can help to keep students, including those unable to
attend school, perhaps due to neighborhood insecurity, engaged in education.

A second opportunity is to unleash the untapped human capital potential of women by

ensuring that girls and female youth are equitably benefiting from educational opportunities.
In the Sub-Saharan Africa region, women are much less likely than men to be in the labor force
and engage in paid work, and when they work, they are often excluded from the formal sector,
particularly jobs in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). These exclusions
start early, with girls facing low secondary school completion rates and lower participation
in STEM subjects in secondary and post-secondary education and training. Countries must
support girls and young women to access education and training opportunities and help them
to transition from the classroom into productive employment. There are notable examples
where the growing recruitment of female teachers—including into STEM subjects, and in
positions where they can act as role models for their students—is delivering better educational
opportunities. Practical measures in schools—such as safe water and washrooms for young girls
and training for teachers to address harmful biases—play a role in keeping female students in
education and setting them up for productive roles in the workplace.

A third opportunity lies in adopting specific, distinct interventions in fragile, conflict, and
violence-affected locations. For example, special measures to ensure safety in and around
schools, including by making a commitment to it by signing the Safe Schools Declaration, can
be very impactful. Practical steps can include providing alternative delivery services—pop-up
classrooms, community centers, and learning circles—when regular classroom education is not
possible. Within schools and their communities, education itself can foster social cohesion and
reduce the drivers of violence, conflict, and fragility, helping to build social capital in countries
where the social fabric is strained.

There is an unavoidable funding challenge, and so innovative approaches to mobilizing

additional funding without worsening countries’ debt situations will be necessary. An
educational push can complement domestic revenue mobilization efforts, including earmarking
taxes, leveraging debt forgiveness windfalls, and engaging in debt swaps for educational
attainment. Local communities, private sector partners, and regional governments all represent
potentially lucrative partnerships for allocating finances to the education sector in an efficient
manner. Each of these groups is incentivized to contribute to education through the potential
benefits they would realize from a strong education system. Moreover, such partnerships can
offer nonfinancial benefits for educational attainment, providing complementary efforts and
holding schools accountable.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 81
Appendix A: Macroeconomic Tables
TABLE A.1: Real GDP Growth, at Constant Market Prices (%) and Consumer Price Index (annual change)

Real GDP growth, at constant market prices (%) Consumer Price Index, annual change (%)
2010-19 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2010-19 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f
Angola 2.2 -5.6 1.2 3.0 1.0 3.2 2.9 17.0 22.3 25.8 21.4 13.6 27.4 16.1
Benin 4.8 3.8 7.2 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.4 1.3 3.0 1.7 1.4 2.8 1.4 1.3
Botswana 4.7 -8.7 11.8 5.6 2.7 1.0 5.3 4.8 1.9 6.7 12.2 5.1 3.0 4.5
Burkina Faso 6.0 1.9 6.9 1.5 3.0 3.7 3.9 0.2 1.9 3.9 14.1 0.7 3.4 2.5
Burundi 2.2 0.3 3.1 1.8 2.7 2.2 3.5 7.0 7.5 8.3 18.8 27.1 22.8 20.4
Cabo Verde 2.9 -20.8 7.0 17.4 5.1 5.2 4.9 1.2 0.6 1.9 7.9 3.7 1.6 2.0
Cameroon 4.5 0.2 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.7 4.0 1.9 2.5 2.5 6.3 7.4 4.7 3.5
Central African Republic -0.2 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.1 4.5 0.9 4.3 5.6 3.0 1.5 2.3
Chad 3.4 -1.6 -1.2 2.8 4.2 3.0 2.1 1.5 3.5 1.0 5.8 4.1 6.5 3.2
Comoros 3.1 -0.2 2.1 2.8 3.0 3.5 4.0 1.7 0.8 0.0 12.4 8.5 3.3 1.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6.2 1.7 6.2 8.9 8.4 4.9 5.0 12.9 11.4 9.0 9.3 19.9 17.2 8.8
Congo, Rep. 1.3 -6.3 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.1 3.5 2.3 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.3 3.8 3.0
Côte d'Ivoire 7.5 0.7 7.1 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.4 1.4 2.4 4.2 5.2 4.4 3.6 3.0
Equatorial Guinea -3.3 -4.8 0.9 3.7 -5.7 4.7 -4.4 3.0 4.8 -0.1 4.9 2.4 2.9 3.3
Eritrea 5.2 -0.5 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 5.6 6.6 7.4 6.4 5.1 5.2
Eswatini 2.7 -1.6 10.7 0.5 4.8 4.6 3.5 5.7 3.9 3.7 4.8 5.0 4.4 5.4
Ethiopia 9.8 6.1 6.3 6.4 7.2 6.1 6.5 13.5 19.9 20.2 33.7 32.6 27.0 29.9
Gabon 4.1 -1.8 1.5 3.1 2.4 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.1 4.3 3.7 2.4 2.3
Gambia, The 2.9 0.6 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.1 5.9 7.4 11.5 16.9 14.4 9.8
Ghana 6.7 0.5 5.1 3.8 2.9 4.0 4.2 11.8 10.4 10.0 31.5 40.3 23.2 11.5
Guinea 6.1 4.7 5.6 4.0 6.7 5.3 6.0 11.8 10.6 12.6 10.5 7.8 8.3 7.9
Guinea-Bissau 4.1 1.5 6.2 4.2 5.2 5.0 5.0 1.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 7.2 3.5 2.0
Kenya 5.0 -0.3 7.6 4.9 5.6 5.0 5.1 7.1 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.7 5.0 5.0
Lesotho 1.6 -7.5 1.9 1.3 0.9 2.5 2.3 4.9 5.0 6.0 8.3 6.4 6.4 5.4
Liberia 3.1 -3.0 5.0 4.8 4.7 5.3 5.7 12.0 17.4 7.8 7.6 10.1 7.7 6.0
Madagascar 3.0 -7.1 5.7 4.0 3.8 4.5 4.6 7.3 4.2 5.8 8.2 9.9 7.4 7.1
Malawi 4.4 0.8 2.8 0.9 1.6 1.8 4.2 16.1 8.6 9.3 20.9 28.7 33.6 27.3
Mali 4.4 -1.2 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.0 0.3 0.5 4.0 9.7 2.1 1.2 2.0
Mauritania 4.1 -0.4 0.7 6.8 6.5 6.5 7.8 2.0 2.4 3.6 9.6 4.9 2.7 2.0
Mauritius 3.8 -14.5 3.3 8.9 7.0 5.6 4.4 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.8 7.0 4.2 3.5
Mozambique 5.7 -1.2 2.4 4.4 5.4 4.0 4.0 7.8 3.1 6.4 10.3 7.1 3.1 2.8
Namibia 3.1 -8.1 3.6 5.3 4.2 3.1 3.7 5.2 2.2 3.6 6.1 5.9 4.6 4.5
Niger 6.2 3.6 1.4 11.5 2.0 5.7 8.5 0.7 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.7 8.5 6.7
Nigeria 3.6 -1.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.3 3.5 11.8 13.2 17.0 18.8 24.7 31.7 23.5
Rwanda 7.2 -3.4 10.9 8.2 8.2 7.6 7.8 3.7 7.7 1.1 12.1 15.4 6.8 5.0
São Tomé and Príncipe 3.4 2.6 1.9 0.2 0.4 1.1 3.3 8.5 9.9 8.2 18.0 21.1 16.1 12.0
Seychelles 6.1 -11.7 0.6 14.9 3.2 3.7 4.1 2.7 1.2 9.8 2.7 -1.1 1.2 2.3
Sierra Leone 5.2 -1.3 5.9 5.3 5.7 4.3 4.7 9.7 13.5 11.8 27.0 46.7 30.5 20.0
South Africa 1.7 -6.2 5.0 1.9 0.7 1.1 1.5 5.2 3.3 4.5 6.9 6.0 4.8 4.5
South Sudan -5.8 9.5 -5.1 -2.3 -1.3 -7.8 -11.4 83.7 33.3 43.1 22.0 18.0 35.0 47.0
Sudan -0.9 -3.6 -1.9 -1.0 -20.1 -15.1 1.3 32.1 163.3 359.7 164.2 65.8 180.2 89.4
Tanzania 6.3 2.0 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.4 5.8 7.1 3.3 3.7 4.3 3.8 3.2 3.4
Togo 5.4 2.0 6.0 5.8 6.4 5.3 5.4 1.4 1.8 4.5 7.5 5.3 3.5 3.0
Uganda 5.4 3.0 3.4 4.7 5.3 6.0 6.2 6.2 2.3 2.5 3.7 8.8 3.2 4.6
Zambia 4.9 -2.8 6.2 5.2 5.4 2.0 6.1 8.8 15.7 22.0 11.0 10.9 15.0 12.1
Zimbabwe 6.1 -7.8 8.5 6.1 5.3 2.0 6.2 62.0 581.0 94.1 160.2 257.0 6.0 8.4
Source: World Bank staff estimates. Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic product.

A F R I C A’ S P U L S E > 83
TABLE A.2: General Government Balance (% of GDP) and General Government Debt (% of GDP)

General government balance (% of GDP) General government debt (% of GDP)

2010–19 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2010–19 2020 2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f
Angola -1.2 -2.8 -0.4 3.3 -1.1 0.5 0.0 49.7 139.5 87.9 69.5 88.8 72.0 64.6
Benin -1.8 -4.7 -5.7 -5.5 -4.1 -3.7 -3.0 30.1 46.1 50.3 54.2 54.5 54.1 52.6
Botswana -1.4 -9.5 0.0 0.0 -3.2 -6.0 -1.6 22.3 24.6 22.4 20.6 22.7 24.5 22.7
Burkina Faso -3.2 -5.0 -7.5 -10.3 -6.5 -5.9 -5.3 30.8 43.8 55.4 56.4 53.4 54.2 54.8
Burundi -5.0 -6.6 -4.6 -10.7 -9.0 -7.1 -5.7 41.2 66.0 66.6 68.4 72.4 70.6 68.4
Cabo Verde -5.5 -9.3 -7.3 -3.9 -0.3 -2.7 -2.4 98.4 145.6 146.8 122.8 112.2 107.1 102.4
Cameroon -2.8 -3.1 -2.9 -1.1 -0.8 -0.8 -1.0 28.1 46.0 48.1 45.3 44.6 42.2 39.2
Central African Republic -1.3 -3.7 -6.0 -5.3 -3.5 -2.8 -3.5 44.6 44.4 48.5 51.1 57.7 58.3 57.9
Chad -1.4 1.7 -2.5 5.1 -3.5 -0.2 -2.2 39.6 49.9 55.9 42.3 38.5 41.4 41.8
Comoros 0.9 -0.5 -2.8 -4.0 -1.7 -2.7 -2.5 19.4 26.1 29.8 33.4 38.0 39.1 38.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.4 -3.3 -1.9 -0.5 -1.6 -2.2 -1.0 20.2 25.2 24.4 23.1 22.8 21.7 20.1
Congo, Rep. 2.7 -2.2 1.2 7.9 3.6 2.8 1.9 57.4 103.5 92.1 86.6 96.0 94.7 89.3
Côte d'Ivoire -2.2 -5.4 -4.8 -6.7 -5.2 -4.0 -3.0 33.7 48.1 51.4 57.9 59.8 59.8 59.9
Equatorial Guinea -5.0 -1.7 2.6 11.6 2.6 3.4 1.5 23.7 49.4 43.0 35.0 36.6 35.3 34.3
Eritrea -1.9 -6.5 -5.8 -5.6 -4.8 -4.0 -3.8 242.7 260.6 241.7 239.8 219.4 210.6 193.8
Eswatini -4.5 -4.6 -4.6 -6.5 -2.1 -2.0 -2.2 18.9 39.6 37.9 42.2 41.0 39.7 38.7
Ethiopia -2.5 -2.9 -2.5 -4.2 -2.7 -1.8 -2.5 51.5 56.5 56.6 54.4 42.7 36.3 32.5
Gabon 0.2 -2.1 -1.9 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2 -6.0 40.1 78.3 68.5 57.0 72.1 71.5 77.3
Gambia, The -4.3 -2.2 -4.8 -5.0 -3.7 -2.6 -0.5 67.6 85.9 83.9 83.4 75.6 69.3 64.3
Ghana -4.8 -14.7 -11.4 -11.0 -3.5 -4.2 -3.8 46.6 74.4 76.7 88.7 86.1 82.4 79.4
Guinea -3.1 -3.2 -1.8 -0.9 -1.8 -3.0 -2.6 42.6 47.4 42.4 40.1 41.8 42.1 40.9
Guinea-Bissau -2.6 -9.6 -5.9 -6.1 -8.1 -4.4 -3.4 57.4 77.7 79.0 80.8 79.3 77.5 74.7
Kenya -6.0 -7.6 -7.3 -5.9 -5.6 -5.0 -3.8 46.8 66.0 68.1 69.9 68.7 65.1 63.3
Lesotho -1.2 11.4 -4.7 -5.7 6.1 5.2 5.8 39.7 50.1 57.8 57.7 55.8 59.9 59.7
Liberia -3.0 -3.7 -2.4 -5.6 -7.1 -3.6 -3.2 25.1 55.8 53.2 53.4 55.7 59.9 59.5
Madagascar -1.6 -4.0 -2.8 -5.5 -4.1 -3.8 -3.8 36.8 51.9 51.9 53.9 55.6 55.5 55.8
Malawi -2.9 -7.5 -8.4 -10.3 -10.2 -7.7 -9.9 33.2 53.5 67.2 75.5 90.3 85.4 83.2
Mali -2.7 -5.4 -4.9 -4.8 -3.9 -3.5 -3.3 30.9 46.9 50.4 51.8 55.9 57.0 57.2
Mauritania -0.1 2.2 2.3 -3.8 -2.4 -1.5 -1.0 50.2 56.5 52.4 48.5 47.2 44.9 45.0
Mauritius -2.9 -11.4 -9.4 -5.2 -5.2 -5.6 -5.4 59.6 80.4 88.0 80.9 78.5 79.1 76.4
Mozambique -3.7 -7.7 -4.5 -4.1 -4.3 -2.4 -1.1 74.4 119.3 104.4 96.8 93.9 97.5 98.7
Namibia -5.9 -9.4 -8.5 -5.3 -3.6 -4.3 -4.9 38.9 68.5 72.7 70.5 70.1 69.0 68.1
Niger -2.8 -3.3 -3.4 -6.8 -5.4 -4.4 -3.9 27.9 45.0 51.3 51.7 54.7 53.3 51.3
Nigeria -2.9 -5.2 -6.6 -4.6 -5.3 -4.3 -4.5 18.0 36.1 38.8 40.3 49.1 51.1 49.9
Rwanda -4.1 -9.5 -8.4 -6.3 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 35.5 72.4 74.4 69.9 73.0 76.0 75.1
São Tomé and Príncipe -6.9 -3.7 -4.7 -4.6 0.1 -2.0 0.1 87.7 79.3 77.8 68.8 49.0 43.6 38.7
Seychelles 0.9 -16.4 -5.8 -1.4 -1.2 -1.4 -0.9 65.9 80.2 73.6 61.1 58.4 61.0 60.6
Sierra Leone -3.1 -3.5 -3.9 -5.3 -4.9 -3.2 -2.2 31.2 47.4 48.6 53.5 46.2 43.1 41.5
South Africa -3.6 -9.9 -4.6 -3.6 -5.8 -5.8 -5.9 43.5 70.1 67.6 70.5 74.1 74.7 76.8
South Sudan -3.1 -9.8 -6.8 -5.9 1.8 -3.1 -7.1 34.9 40.7 57.6 56.9 40.3 43.3 52.3
Sudan -5.3 -5.9 -0.3 -1.7 -3.8 -3.2 -3.5 113.8 281.4 215.6 183.6 167.3 146.5 147.4
Tanzania -3.0 -1.8 -5.3 -3.7 -4.1 -3.4 -3.3 34.6 36.7 39.6 42.5 44.6 48.4 48.2
Togo -3.6 -7.0 -4.7 -8.3 -6.6 -6.1 -3.0 46.8 62.1 64.8 67.1 67.3 68.0 66.4
Uganda -3.8 -7.1 -9.5 -7.4 -5.0 -4.8 -5.7 28.1 40.4 49.6 50.7 48.3 50.5 52.1
Zambia -5.5 -13.8 -8.1 -7.8 -6.5 -6.1 -2.8 50.0 150.3 112.1 110.9 133.4 107.5 88.5
Zimbabwe -2.1 1.4 -2.2 0.1 -14.0 -2.9 -1.7 38.7 51.2 58.4 100.5 96.6 87.2 77.0
Source: World Bank staff estimates. Note: e = estimate; f = forecast; GDP = gross domestic product. Projections for Zambia are from Article IV IMF Staff Report.

84 > A F R I C A’ S P U L S E
Appendix B: Country Classifications
TABLE B.1: Western and Central Africa Country Classification

Resource-rich countries
Non-resource-rich countries
Oil Metals & minerals
Chad Guinea Benin Gambia, The
Equatorial Guinea Liberia Burkina Faso Ghana
Gabon Mauritania Cabo Verde Guinea-Bissau
Nigeria Niger Cameroon Mali
Congo, Rep. Sierra Leone Central African Republic Senegal
Côte d’Ivoire Togo

Note: Since July 2020, for operational purposes, the World Bank Africa Region has been split into two subregions—Western and Central Africa and Eastern and
Southern Africa. The analysis in this report reflects this setup. Resource-rich countries are those with rents from natural resources (excluding forests) that exceed
10 percent of gross domestic product. The words “resource-rich countries” and “resource-abundant countries” have been used interchangeably throughout
the document.

TABLE B.2: Eastern and Southern Africa Country Classification

Resource-rich countries
Non-resource-rich countries
Oil Metals & minerals
Angola Botswana Burundi Mozambique
South Sudan Congo, Dem. Rep. Comoros Rwanda
Namibia Eritrea São Tomé and Príncipe
South Africa Eswatini Seychelles
Zambia Ethiopia Somalia
Kenya Sudan
Lesotho Tanzania
Madagascar Uganda
Malawi Zimbabwe
Mauritius

Note: Since July 2020, for operational purposes, the World Bank Africa Region has been split into two subregions—Western and Central Africa and Eastern and
Southern Africa. The analysis in this report reflects this setup. Resource-rich countries are those with rents from natural resources (excluding forests) that exceed
10 percent of gross domestic product. The words “resource-rich countries” and “resource-abundant countries” have been used interchangeably throughout
the document.

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 THIS REPORT WAS PRODUCED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST FOR THE AFRICA REGION

https://www.worldbank.org/africaspulse