NAME: FAIZA SAMEEN

ROLL NO: 23079716007

COLLEGE: SRI VENKATESWARA COLLEGE
SUB: STRATEGIES OF IMPERIAL CONTROL, 1850s to 1920s
TOPIC: HOW WAS BENGAL ARMY REBUILT IN THE POST 1857
PERIOD? DISCUSS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PEEL
COMMISSION, EDEN COMMISSION AND THE TENURE OF
FRIEDRICK ROBERTS AS COOMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
After the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the British made significant
changes to their military strategy, regarding the employment of
sepoys in the British Indian Army. The events of rebellion
involved a large number of sepoys mutinying against British
rule, exposed vulnerabilities in British system.
From 1760s the Bengal Army began to enlist those groups who
had served in the Muslim armies, the Rajputs and Brahmins
from Bihar and Awadh. By 1857 about three quarters of the
Bengal Native Infantry were high caste men from Awadh. High
caste men were taller and looked more like a warrior. Earlier
the Bengal army had sepoys from Bihar, Oudh and Agra. The
European officer of Bengal army was accused of being half-
hindoo and were accused of paying more attention to caste and
status in recruitment . Henry Lawrence writing in the Calcutta
Review in 1840s has pointed out that there is too much of
clanship in the army and there is need to recruit sepoys from
other places too.
The mutiny began in early 1857 with discontent over the
introduction of greased cartridges, which were against
Hinduism and Islam. The rebellion broke out in 1857 at Meerut.
Punjab and Bombay however not much affected. The mutiny
was quelled down after great loss. To study the mutiny Peel
Commission was appointed. Although it was not instructed to
examine the role of caste but it came to know caste and
structure of Indian society would be central problem.
The Peel Commission eventually recommended that the native
army should be composed of different nationalities and castes
mixed promiscuously through each regiment. They did not
specify which caste should be enlisted nor did they specify any
region. The structure of Bengal Army as it emerged from
military confusion was ‘purely accidental’ remarked Lord
Rippon in 1881. The British had simply enlisted men who were
prepared to fight for them and excluded those whose loyalty
was suspected. However it was felt that mixing up of all races
would end their distinctiveness and they would assimilate and
the policy of divide and rule will not be effective. They wanted
to keep the hindus and muslims against each other and have
little sympathy for each other.
For this reason the class company system gradually replaced
the general mixture. In class company regiment each company
was drawn from a different community. Class company
regiments preserved antagonism of caste and religion.
Therefore were less likely to mutiny against the british power.
The Eden Commission was appointed to re-examine the
problems of army with the principle object of divide divide et
impera. The Eden commission of 1879 recommended
eventually converting most mixed regiments to the class
company formula. By 1833 the general mixture had been
abolished in the Bengal Army and in 1895 all the Madras
infantry were reorganised along class company lines. Eden
commission permitted the Bengal Army to maintain their pure
caste regiments. Both the Peel Commission in 1859 and the
Eden Commission in 1879 based their recommendation only on
the basis that just internal security was required.
In a class company regiment, each company was drawn from a
different community while a regiment might have mixed
composition. The term class be applied to ‘race’, jati, locality,
religion, ethnic groups. Class company regiments preserved
antagonisms of caste and religion and less likely to mutiny as a
body. There were problems with the new class company
system. It heightened friction between different castes and
religion.
The shift in recruitment to the so called martial or war like
races and classes continued. They considered that races were
arranged hierarchically. Some communities in India were
identified as sharing Aryan characteristics and hence being
racially superior. Their language being somewhat similar to
latin and Greek. The people had martial characteristics and
hence were superior to others. However the term was not just
used till the Raj but it’s often used today.
Lord Roberts of Kandahar who served as commander-in- chief
of the Indian army can be credited with the introduction of so
called martial races. Robert’s view was much based on making
Indian army much efficient to meet the Russian threats. In his
view the best available material came from the northwest
quarter of India and that the army should be recruited from this
area. He believed that certain classes were much better as he
considered south India had peace in recent times resulting that
the military strength died in them. And same goes with the
army of Bengal and Bombay.
The martial race recruiting strategy dramatically changed the
composition of the Indian Army. From 1882 the number of units
raised in Madras, Bombay and Hindustan steadily declined,
while the number of those recruited in Nepal and the Punjab
increased. In 1882 eight of the 40 Madras infantry battalions
were disbanded. The units raised were mostly Sikh and Gurkha.
The britishers tried to incorporate the Mapillas of South India,
as they had precolonial tradition of military activity, their low
level of literacy will also be beneficial for them and dislike
towards hindus. These all points were helpful for Britishers.
However due to their long struggle against agrarian
oppression, the Mappilas had developed an antilord and anti
british mentality., fostered by traditional Islamic intellectuals.
The attempt to incorporate Coorgs also failed, they too
appeared as an ideal martial race. They claimed their descent
from Kshatriyas and their general orientation was also martial.
Then a Coorg battalion was raised in 1901. The commissioner
of the province thought that the people would join this as there
was not much employment. However the britishers had
overestimated and it was seen that the people were more
home loving from whom it was difficult to have recruits. The
patrilineal joint family further discouraged them. The british
experience with the Mapillas and Coorgs shows the imperial
recruiting strategies alone cannot explain the shape of the
Indian Army.
 The failure to find martial race in south India confirmed the
northward drift. By January 1904 nearly 57 percent of the
Indian Army came from Punjab, Nepal or the Frontiers. The
martial race strategy thus made the Indian army depend on a
very narrow range of communities for it’s soldiers . the fighting
ability and loyalty of many classes were first determined and
later an ancestry was discovered. The races which remained fit
to bear arms were those of the Ksatriya varna and their
descendants. Rajputs thus qualified and hence many other
classes too.
The martial race discourse inverted negative colonial images
of barbaric otherness. The martial races served as an example
of masculine as well as military excellence. Every sipahi carried
the burden of history and characteristics of his community as
set out in recruitment books. The standard format was a brief
historical of the ‘class’ followed by a listing sub-divison and
their geographical distribution, and description of customs and
religious practices. The recruiting handbooks are full of
references to the ‘manly independence’ of the favoured recruits
usually contrasted with the weakness and effeminacy of those
who were excluded. The image of manliness however can be
coexisted with homosexuality. However it was said that they
lacked intellectual ability. However it suited the British official
that their Indian soldier were stupid as it made them feel safer.
This also reflected the sense of superiority, this helped to run
and sustain the empire. The illiteracy of sepoys was also a
policy of Britishers their recruitment was mostly from remote
areas where people were not acquainted with Westen
Education. These were their political strategy as they knew it
would be easy to establish authority on people from remote
areas and these people won’t rebel against the government.
They found the people from the cities more threatening and
hence recruited very less people from the cities. By 20 th century
the growing adherence of this class towards nationality made
the Britishers unwilling to select them. Physical vigour was also
corelated with the climate of the region. They thought that heat
combined with natural abundance had drained the people of
southern and eastern India of all military ardour. The
inhabitants of dry and cold country were seen as manly while
Bengals moist climate was seen as effeminate. Martial race
theory was not only a discursive aspect of domination. This
required detailed knowledge of Indian society. A group might
well be a martial race but some of it’s might be deemed more
martial than others. Martial race theory enumerated Indian
society in what were held to be it’s smallest meaningful social
components each of which had an official collective identity.
Several handbooks claimed about the racial division that there
are two claimants of land one of Aryan lineage and other darks
skinned people of lower caste. Britishers favoured white
skinned people associating them as their cousin. The Aryan
race theory neatly confirmed Bengal Army prejudice against
the short ,dark skinned often low caste soldiers of Madras but it
does not explain the preference for Gurkhas with their yellow
brown skin. The Aryan element of the martial race theory was
closely associated with notions of racial and ritual purity.
Britishers always favoured those who followed restrictive
marriage practice as they felt intermixing will lead to
degeneration. The British saw martial race that was as
exclusive as themselves.
Omissi challenges the idea that the martial races were
inherently predisposed to military service. The concept was a
British colonial invention, a way to categorize and simplify the
complex social and ethnic dynamics of India. The British
identified certain groups as martial based on their physique and
psychological traits while certain groups were considered non
martial. Omissi critices this racial and cultural reductionism
arguing that martial race theory was not a reflection of any
innate martial qualities but justification of military recruitment.
Omissi also situates the idea of martial races within broader
social and political dynamics of the time. The British needed to
create a differentiated system for recruitment to the army
which often meant exploiting social, ethnic and regional
divisions. By identifying certain groups as martial, the British
not only encouraged militarization of these community but also
fostered tension and division among different community. The
manipulation of identity served British interests in maintaining
control over the colonial subjects.
While the British might have framed the martial race theory as
a form of recognition and promotion of certain communities,
Omissi also notes the exploitative nature of this process. These
martial races were often over represented in the Britsh Indian
army, leading to their increased militarization and involvement
in colonial wars. In the long term this created dependency on
military service, sometimes at the expense of other forms of
economic or social development for these communities.
Omissi’s work highlights how recruitment strategy contributed
to the underdevelopment of regiments outside the army’s
purview.
Omissi’s critique extends to the lasting impact of the martial
race concept in post-colonial India. The legacy of the army’s
preferential treatment of certain communities has had long
term social and political consequences. For instance, groups
like the Sikhs and Punjabis, who were heavily recruited into the
army, have retained a distinct martial identity, while those
communities labelled non-martial often faced social and
economic marginalization. Omissi’s work invites readers to
consider how these divisions were not just a product of
colonialism, but also how they continue to shape Indian society
and politics in the post independence period.
Finally, Omissi’s work critiques the broader British military
strategy that underpinned the martial race theory. The British
used Indian soldiers as a cheap and effective way to maintain
their empire, often sending them into wars far from home, such
as World War 1 and World War 2. Omissi points out that this
strategy mot only disregarded the welfare of Indian soldiers but
also treated them as expanded labor, often without proper
recognition of their sacrifices.
David Omissi’s critique of the martial race theory is
multifaceted. He highlights its constructed nature, it’s role in
dividing Indian society, its exploitative effects on certain
communities, and its long lasting social consequences. Omissi
urges scholars and readers to view the martial race theory not
as a reflection of any inherent qualities of the groups involved,
but as part of the broader machinery of colonial control and
military exploitation.
Conclusion
Therefore we witness how the pattern of military recruitment
changed with time. Firstly it recruited whoever was willing to
serve , by the late nineteenth century recruitment pattern
turned out to be more selective and the composition of three
presidency army began to diverge where we see the Bengal
army came to depend entirely on high caste Brahmins and
Rajputs from the Indian state of Awadh.
The mutiny totally transformed the composition of military
forces in north India. The Punjab was the main British base as
they were willing to serve the army against their old Hindustani
enemies in the mutinous Bengal Army. After the mutiny
Britishers disbanded the group which had mutinied. And most
of the army elites believed in divide and rule policy and found it
right to keep the Indian army separated in the water-tight
compartment. The recruitment pattern however began to
change as Russian empire expanded eastwards it seemed that
the Indian army had to fight first class troops. So lord Robert
abandoned the policy of balance. Recruitment of people from
south india lessened as people came to believe that people
from south india are not capable of fighting. The martial race
strategy was also driven by sheer prejudice. By 1914 about
three quarters of the Indian infantry came from Punjab, Nepal,
or Noerth west frontier. A large body of colonial writing also
articulated the martial race policy. It boosted officers’ morale
by suggesting that they commanded the perfect combination of
men who presumed war like qualities. They also liked to believe
that their sepoys were stupid and this made them feel safer
and made their leadership more necessary. At some point,
martial race policy became linked to explicit racism: the british
liked to imagine that their prefered soldiers were of Aryan
origin and thus their racial cousins.
There were dissenters within the imperial establishment among
the ranks of those who were excluded by martial race strategy.
And the Indian nationalist saw the entire policy as an affront to
Indians in general and themselves in particular. The bias in
recruiting policy made the army potentially vulnerable to
political unrest in the recruiting grounds, although in the events
no major problems of discipline occurred. But the shape of
Indian army was not simply the product of British policy as we
saw in the case of Mappilas and Coorgs . British policy might
explain the exclusion of a community from the army but it
cannot by itself explain the inclusion. Not only did the British
chose soldiers but also soldiers chose the British.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Omissi, David (1994) The Sepoy and the Raj
2. Cohen, Stephen P (1990) The Indian Army
3. Farooqui, Amar Divide and Rule Race, Military Recruitment
and society in Late Nineteenth century Colonial India
4. Rand, Gavin (2013) Reconstructing the Imperial Military
after the Rebellion