Principle of Natural Justice
Principle of Natural Justice
Today, the bulk of decisions relating to personal or property rights of the people come not
from the courts, but from administrative agencies exercising judicial power. The
administrative agencies are given wide discretionary powers for adjudication which
necessitates that initial conferment of discretionary power on them should not result in
arbitrariness and capricious or whimsical exercise of power, otherwise it will thwart the very
aim for which administrative bodies are empowered. There are many checks on the
administrative bodies to keep them within bounds, one of which is the observation of
Principles of Natural Justice. It is now well settled that principles of Natural Justice are
applicable to almost the whole range of administrative powers.
Principles of natural justice is an expression used for describing the criteria of fairness of
decision making by administrative authority, it represents the basis irreducible procedural
standard with which administrators are required to comply with.
Rules of Natural Justice have kept pace with the growth of civilization. It serves as a measure
of the level of civilization and Rule of law prevailing in the community. Natural Justice is a
concept of common law and is a common law counterpart of American due process of law.
Natural Justice is higher procedural principles developed by judges. It meant many things to
many writers, lawyers and systems of law. It is used inter- changeably with Divine law, jus
gentium and the common law of the nations.
Man has always looked to God against the excesses of organized power. The law of God or
divine law, to which all temporal law must confirm in the origin of the concept of natural
justice. It is the higher law of nature or natural law, where or under which different species
live together. It implies fairness, reasonableness, equity and equality. It is a flexible, pragmatic
and relative concept. Natural Justice’s content change according to situations and do not
apply in the same manner to totally different situations. They are immutable and can be
adopted, modified and excluded by statute, rules or Constitution except where such exclusion
is not charged with the vice of unreasonableness and consequential vividness.
Natural justice is a facet of secular law which by its spiritual touch enlivens legislation,
administration and adjudication to make fairness a creed of life. Applying its many colors and
forms, it protects the people from acts of authority except when valid law excludes it. It is
not a mystic treatment of Judge made law, but a base of healthy
government. From the days of Adam and Kautilya, the rule of law has had this stamp of
Natural Justice, which makes it social justice.
Natural Justice has a very wide general application in the numerous areas of discretionary
administrative power. It is always possible to require them to be exercised in fair manner.
In its broadest sense natural justice may mean simply, the natural sense of what is right and
wrong and even in the technical sense it is now equated with fairness. It has been said that
romantic word “natural” adds nothing except perhaps hint of nostalgia and that justice is far
from being a natural concept the close one goes to a state of nature, the less justice does he
find.
According to Lord Widgney, “the principles of natural justice were those fundamental
rules, the breach of which will prevent justice from being seen to be done.”
The term natural justice expresses the close relationship between the common law and moral
principles; and where natural justice is inapplicable, the fairness must be observed, so that the
vast power vested in the state or its authority is not misguided by extraneous or irrelevant
considerations.
CONTOURS OF NATURAL JUSTICE:
Natural Justice is an expression of English Common Law and involves a procedural
requirement of fairness. The doctrine of natural justice was initially applied to the “courts” in
respect of judicial functions and from the sphere it was extended to statutory authorities or
tribunals exercising “quasi- judicial” functions and afterwards to any administrative
authority—determining the functions of civil rights or obligations.
The concept of natural justice was developed and followed in ancient worlds of Greeks,
Romans and Indians. It was an indispensable doctrine, to be observed while delivering justice
by the kings. Its development continued through Medieval period, until upto 19th century,
when it suffered setback after the development of positivism in Europe and America, which
continued even after second world war.
The 20th century, was a period of revival of Natural Justice. A turning point came in 1963
with the decision of the House of Lords in Ridge v Baldwin . This marked an important
change of judicial policy, indicating that natural justice was resorted to favour and would be
applied on a wide basis. The dimensions of natural justice will alter as per the present
conditions and there will be “fair play in action” the citizen’s right to have his case properly
heard, before he suffers in some way under official rod.
English common law recognizes two principles of Natural Justice:
A. Nemo debet essee Judex in propria causa:
(No man shall be a judge in his own cause, or the deciding authority must not be partial; and
should be without bias)
B. Audi alteram partem:
(Hear the other side, or both the sides must be heard, or no man should be condemned unheard,
or that there must be fairness on the part of deciding authority.)
However, with the changing times, another dimension was added, which emerged as the third
dimension of natural justice.
C. Reasoned Decisions/ Speaking Orders
(Give reasons for the decision or the order must speak for itself.)
In England, in the 19th Century, the phrase come to be applied by the superior courts in
controlling the decisions of courts of summary jurisdiction and it was stressed that any court
of justice or judicial tribunal, whatever might be the procedure prescribed for it, must observe
these minimum safeguards for justice, failing which its decision would lose their judicial
character.
In United States, the expression “Natural Justice” as such, is not so frequently heard of; for, it
is not necessary to rely on common law, when “due process” is guaranteed by Constitution
whenever an individual ‘life’, liberty or property, is to be taken by stateaction. Due process is
a vague and undefined expression, the implication of which is not finally settled. The
Supreme Court has evolved two fold meanings to the dimensions of due process, i.e.,
substantive and procedural. The principles of natural justice were considered to be implied in
the procedural aspect of due process.
In India, the requirement to comply with the principles of natural justice has been deduced
from Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Thus, both in England and India, it has been held that there is no universal or uniformstandard
of natural justice applicable to all cases coming within the purview of the doctrine. The rules
of natural justice are not embodied rules and they cannot be imprisoned within the strait
jacket or of a rigid formula. The contents and the requirement of natural justice vary with the
varying constitution of different quasi- judicial bodies and their functions.
A. Nemo debet essee Judex in propria cause (Rule Against Bias):
One of the essential elements of judicial process is that an administrative authority acting in a
quasi-judicial manner should be impartial, fair and free from bias. Rule against bias is the
first principle of natural justice.
“Bias” generally implies “anything which tends or may be regarded as tending to cause such as
person to decide a case otherwise than on evidence.
In R.V. Great Nestue Rly Co. , Lord Cranworth laid down:
“A Judge ought to be and is supposed to be indifferent between the parties. He has or is
supposed to have no bias inducing him to learn to the one side rather than to the other. In
ordinary cases, it is just ground of exception to a judge that he is not indifferent and the fact that
he himself is a party or interested as a party affords the strongest proof that he cannot be
indifferent.”
In G. Sarna v University of Lucknow , the Supreme Court of India point out:
“One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that in case of quasi-judicial
proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be
one without bias, by which is meant an operative prejudice whether conscious or unconscious
towards one side or other in the dispute.”
This principle is based on three premises:
(a) No man shall be judge in his own case (Nemo judex in causa sua):
(b) Justice should not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to
have been done and;
(c) Judges like Caeser’s wife should be above suspicion.
The basic point which emerges out is that a judge must be impartial and must decide the case
objectively on the basis of the evidence on record. A person cannot take an objective decision
in a case in which he has an interest for that case.
The rule that “no one should be a judge in his case” is a wide application and means that a
judge or quasi judicial should not only be party but must not have an interest in the case
regarding the content of the dispute that has to be settled.
TYPES OF BIAS:
Bias may be:- (1)Pecuniary Bias; (2)Personal Bias, (3)Subject-matter Bias, and (4)Judicial
obstinacy
(1) PECUNIARY BIAS:
Any Financial interest, however small may be, would vitiate administrative action. Thus the
least pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the litigation will disqualify any person from
acting as a Judge, even though it is not proved that the decision i.e. in any way affected.
In Dr. Bonham’s case , Dr. Bonham, a doctor of Cambridge University was fined by the
College of Physicians for practicing in the city of London without the license of the
college. The statute, under which the college acted, provided that the fine should go half to
the king and half to the college. The claim was disallowed by Coke, C.J. as the college had a
financial interest in its own judgment and was a judge in its own cause.
In R. v. Hendon , the court struck down the resolution of a local authority sanctioning a
development scheme, on the ground that one of the councilors who had applied forpermission
to make the development as an estate agent, took part in the meeting where the resolution as
passed.
Dimes v. Grant Junction Canal , a public limited company filed a case against a land owner
in a matter largely involving the interest of the company. The Lord Chancellor who was a
shareholder in the company heard the case and gave to the company the relief it sought. His
decision was quashed by the House of Lords because of the pecuniary interest of Lord
Chancellor in the company. Lord Campbell in his opinion emphasized that while none could
suppose that the Lord Chancellor was at all influenced by his interest in the concern, it was
very important that the maxim, “no manis to be judge in his own cause” is to be held sacred.
Indian courts also invariable followed the decisions in Dimes case and other English cases.
In Vassailliadas v. Vassailliadas , referring to Dimes case, Privy Council observed: “The
simplest type of bias, is where the Judge is shown to have pecuniary interest inthe results of
the proceedings, there it will be held at once that he is disqualified, howsoever small the
interest and howsoever clear it may be that his mind could beaffected”.
In Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector of Thane , Chief Justice Gajendragadkar reconstituted
the Bench on objection being taken on behalf of the interventions in the court on the ground
that the Chief Justice, who was a member of the Bench, was alsoa member of the Co-operative
Society for which the disputed land had been acquired.In Mahapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa ,
some of the members of the committee set up for selecting books for educational institutions
were themselves authors whose books were to be considered for selection. It was held by the
Supreme Court that the possibility of bias could not be ruled out. Madon, J. observed: “It is
not the actual bias in favour of the author member that is material, but the possibility of such
bias.”
(2) Personal Bias:
A Judge may have a personal bias towards a party owing to relationship and the like or may
be personally hostile to a party as a result of events happening either before
or during the trial. Whenever there is any allegation of personal bias, the question thatneeds to
be satisfied is ‘is there in the mind of the litigant a reasonable apprehension that he would not
get a fair trial.”
Though it is open to the party aggrieved to adduce evidence to show that the tribunal has
actually shown bias in favour of the other party, the reviewing court will interfere as soon as
it is established that there was “real likelihood of bias”
There should be a substantial probability of bias as illustrated in R.v. Reid, where it was laid
down that although any pecuniary interest, however small in the subject matter disqualifies a
justice from acting in a judicial inquiry, the mere possibility of bias in favour of one of the
parties does not ipso facto void the justice’s decisions. In order to have that effect the bias
must be shown at least to be real.
There are several causes, leading to personal bias. The principle would come into operation
whenever, there is real likelihood of bias. Some grounds of personal bias may be mentioned
as under:
(a) Personal Friendship; (b)Personal Hostility (c)Family relationship
(d)Professional or employment relationship (e)Employer and employee (f)Having
acted as a witness against the party aggrieved in the same inquiry
In Cottle v. Cottle , the Chairman of the bench was a friend of the wife’s family, who had
initiated matrimonial proceedings against her husband. The wife had told the husband that the
Chairman would decide the case in her favour. The Divisional Court ordered rehearing of the
case.
In R.v. Handley , magistrate was held to be disqualified from hearing a case filed against an
accused, who had beaten up the Magistrate.
In Ladies of Sacred Heart of Jesus v. Armstrong , the Chairman was the husband of an
executive office of a body which was a party before the Tribunal. The decision was set aside
on that ground.
In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon , the court held that Mr. Lannon was
disqualified from sitting as Chairman of a Rent Assessment Committee, because his father
was a tenant who had a case pending against that company, even though, it was
acknowledged that there was no actual bias and no want of good faith on the part of Mr.
Lannon. It was held that whether there was a real ‘likelihood’ of bias or not in a situation
should be ascertained with reference to right minded persons. The question of bias is thus to
be decided by the court not on the ground whether in the mind of the court, there was “real
likelihood” or bias or not but by applying the yardstick as to what
a reasonable man would think about the matter, whether he would suspect bias” in the
circumstances. Even when the court feel that there is no real likelihood of bias in the
circumstances of the case, the court may still quash a decision if right minded people would
suspect bias on the part of the adjudicator.
In India, the courts have also applied the same test as has been down in England in Lannon.
As in Manak Lal v. Prem Chand , a complaint alleging professional misconduct was filed
against Manak Lal, an advocate of Rajasthan High Court, by Prem Chand. The Bar Council
Tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the High court to enquire into the alleged
misconduct of Manak Lal, consisted of the Chairman and two other members. The Chairman
had earlier represented Prem Chand in a case. He was, however, a senior advocate and was
once the Advocate General of the Rajasthan High Court. The Supreme Court had no
hesitation in assuming that the Chairman had no personal contact with his client and did not
remember that he had appeared on his behalf in certain proceedings. The court was thus
satisfied there was no “real likelihood on bias” but still it held that the Chairman was
disqualified on the ground that “justice not only be done to litigating public, because actual
proof of prejudice was not necessary; reasonable ground from assuming the possibility of bias
was sufficient. The court emphasized that a judge should be able to act judicially, objectively
and without any bias.
In Mineral Development Limited v. State of Bihar , the Petitioner Company was ownedby Raja
Kamkashaya Narain Singh, who was lessee for 99 years of 3026 villages, situated in Bihar,
for purpose of exploiting mica. The Minister of Revenue acting under Bihar Mica Act
cancelled his license. The owner of the company, the Raja, had opposed the Minister in
general election of 1952 and the minister had filed a criminal case under section 500, IPC
against him and the case was transferred to a Magistratein Delhi. The act of cancellation by the
minister was held to be quasi-judicial act. Since the personal rivalry between the owner of the
company and the minister concerned was established, the cancellation order became vitiated
in law.
Strong personal hostility towards a party disqualifies a Judge or administrative authority from
adjudicating a dispute if it gives rise to a real likelihood of bias. As in Menglass Tea Estate v.
Workmen , a Manager himself conducted an inquiry againsta workman for the allegation that
he had beaten up the manager. It was held that theinquiry was vitiated.
In APSRTC, Hyderbad v. Satya Narain Transport (P) Ltd., Guntur , the order of
nationalization of Road Transport passed by the Minister under section 68-D(2) MotorVehicle
Act, 1939, was challenged by one of the petitioners, before the High Court onthe ground tat it
was actuated by personal bias and, therefore, vitiated in law. The pleataken by the owner of the
respondent company in the present appeal, was that the Minister had asked him to persuade
his five friends to vote for the minister in the education of A.P. Congress Committee and that
he told the Minister about his failure to persuade them so. He was told by the Minister that the
consequences of his failure would be unpalatable to him. It is this angry frame of mind that
the minister heard the objections against the order passed by him, and therefore, he was
disqualified from dealing with scheme under section 61-C(2) of the Act.
The cases involving rule against bias extends beyond courts of law. It must be remembered
that no one can act in judicial capacity if his previous conduct gives ground for believing that
he cannot act with an open mind. The board principle which is universally accepted is that a
person trying a cause even in quasi-judicial proceedings must only act fairly and must be able
to act above suspicion of unfairness.One of the most important pronouncement on this point is
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India
. In this case the petitioners were candidates for the selection of some posts in the Indian
Forest Services. A special selection board was constituted under regulation 4 of the Indian
Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulation, 1966 passed under rule 3 of the Indian Forest
Services (Recruitment) Rules 1966. One member of the board was himself a candidate for the
selection. Though he did not take part in deliberations of board at the time of his own
selection, he had taken part throughout while making selections of other candidates including
his rival candidates. The petitioner contented that the selection list prepared by such board
under Regulation 5 is vitiated and final recommendations made by the Union Public Service
Commission on its basis must also be vitiated, as there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The
Court upheld the contention of the petitioner and observed:
“Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was
required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the
application of the rules of Natural Justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If
the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice there is no
reason why these rules should be made inapplicable to
administrative inquiries. Arriving at just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial inquiries as
well administrative inquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have more
for coaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry.”
In Kirti Deshmankar v. Union of India , the petitioner challenged the admission of a
candidate to the post –graduate medical course in Gynecology on the ground that her mother-
in-law participated in the entire deliberations of the admission committee and that of the
council, also to which the petitioner made a representation for cancellation of admission, but it
was rejected. The admission was held to be vitiated on account of its being of apprehended
bias.
In Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram Higher Secondary School
, the petitioner who was the principal of the school, was placed under suspension by the
Managing Committee of the said school and a charge sheet containing 12 chargeswas issued to
him. The school authorities appointed an Inquiry Committee consisting of three members of
which one member appeared as a witness in support of charge No.12 on behalf of the
management in the inquiry proceedings. The petitioner raised an objection for the inclusion of
the said member in the Inquiry Committee but that was over ruled by the Committee. The
Inquiry Committee found that the petitioner guilty on some charges including the said charge
no.12. The Managing Committee proposed to dismiss the petitioner from service on the basis
of the report of the Inquiry Committee percolates throughout inquiry proceedings. It was held
to be case of blatant violation of the rule against bias, the first cardinal principle of natural
justice.
In State of West Bengal v. Shivanand Pathak and others , the Supreme Court observed that
neither appeal can lie nor the appeal could be dismissed by the same judge, who had earlier
given the decision on some case. If the Judge do so, then he would be exhibitive on his bias in
his own favour to satisfy his egoistic judicial obstinacyand violates the rule of natural justice.
(3) Bias as subject matter (Official bias):-
Third type of bias is subject matter bias, which arises due to a general interest of the judge or
adjudicator in the subject matter. For this bias to operate, the adjudicating authority must
have a direct connection or interest with the subject matter. A mere general interest in the
general object to be pursued would not disqualify a judge from deciding the matter. An
adjudicator may have association as a member or otherwise in a private body, which may be
a party’ to dispute. Generally, these do not operate
as disqualification unless the adjudicator has intimately, identified himself with the issue in
question. As in an early English case R.v. Deal Justice ex-parte Curling a magistrate was a
subscriber to the Royal Society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. As he had no control
over any prosecution by the society, he was not disqualified from trying a charge of cruelty to
a horse brought by the society.
According to Griffith and Street “only rarely will this bias invalidate proceedings” .
Adjudication is part and parcel of Administrative bodies and they cannot be always supposed
to be neutral.
Administrators naturally have an interest, however remote in the matters concerning their
departments, and if some bias results from this remote connection, this can be tolerated. This
type of bias can be classified into four categories:
(a) Bias arising from partiality (b)Departmental Bias
(c)Prior utterances and pre-judgment of issue; and (d)Acting under dictation.
A judge may be disqualified if there is direct connection between the adjudicating authority
and issue in controversy. In State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh , a departmental inquiry was
held against Mohammed Nooh, a constable, by his superior officer. One of the witnesses
against Mohd Nooh turned hostile; and the officer left the inquiry and after giving evidence
against Nooh, resumed to complete enquiry and passed the order of dismissal. It was held that
the rules of natural justice were completely discarded and all commons of fair play were
grievously violated.
A mere “official” policy bias may not necessarily be held to disqualify an official from acting
as an adjudicator.
In Gullapalli Nageshwara Rao v. APSRTC (Gullapalli-1), the petitioners were carrying on
motor transport published a scheme for nationalization of motor transport in the state and
invited objections. The objections filed by the petitioners were received and heard by the
secretary and thereafter the scheme was approved by the Chief Minister. The Supreme Court
upheld the contention of the petitioners that the official who heard the objections was in
substance one of the parties to the dispute and hence the principles of natural justice were
violated.
But in Gullapalli-II , the Supreme Court qualified the application of the doctrine of the
official bias. Here the hearing was given by the Minister and not by the Secretary. The court
held the proceedings were not vitiated as the Secretary was a part of the department but the
Minister was only primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to the
department.
In Kondala Rao v. A.P. Transport Corp , the Minister of Transport head objections against
the scheme of nationalization of certain bus routes. The Minister a few days earlier had
presided over a meeting of the officials where the scheme of nationalization was decided. The
petitioner challenged the hearing on ground that the minister had a predetermined mind and
hence the hearing was vitiated in law. The court rejected theargument of policy bias and held
that if the authority concerned acts judicially in approving or modifying the scheme, the
approval or modification is not open to challenge. It was only a policy decision in the official
meeting and did not involve a pre- determination of the issue. The court observed:-
“It is true that the government on whom the duty to decide the dispute rests, in substantially a
part to the dispute but if the government or the authority to whom the power is delegated acts
judicially in approving or modifying the scheme, the approval or modification is not open to
challenge on the presumption of bias”
(4)Judicial obstinacy
There may also be a judicial bias, i.e. bias on account of judicial obstinacy.
In State of W.B. v. Shivananda Pathak, a writ of mandamus was sought by the petitioner
directing the government to promote him. A Single Judge allowed the petition ordering the
authorities to promote the petitioner "forthwith". But the order was set aside by the Division
Bench. After two years, a fresh petition was filed for payment of salary and other benefits in
the terms of the judgment of the Single Judge (which was reserved in appeal). It was
dismissed by the Single Judge. The order was challenged in appeal which was heard by a
Division Bench to which one Member was a judge who had allowed the earlier petition. The
appeal was allowed and certain reliefs were granted. The State approached the
Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order, the Supreme Court described
the case of a new form of bias (judicial obstinacy). It said that it a judgment of a judge is set
aside by a superior court, the judge must submit to that judgment. He cannot rewrite
overruled judgment in the same or in collateral proceedings. The judgment of the higher court
binds not only to the parties to the proceedings but also to the judge who had rendered it.
Recently, in A.U. Kureshi v. High Court of Gujarat, one of the judges of the High Court
considered the so-called misconduct of a member of subordinate judiciary on administrative
side (disciplinary committee). He then decided the petition filed by the delinquent officer on
judicial side. It was held that there was reasonable apprehension of bias.
Test: Real likelihood of bias
A pecuniary interest, however small it may be, disqualifies a person acting as a judge. Other
interests, however, do not stand on the same footing. Here the test is whether there is a real
likelihood of bias in the judge.
Prof. De Smith's says, a "real likelihood" of bias means at least sub stantial possibility of bias.
Vaugham Williams LJs rightly says that the court will have to judge the matter "as a
reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business".
In the words of Lord Hewart CJ the answer to the question whether there was a real
likelihood of bias "depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to
be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an
improper interference with the course of justice". As Lord Denning says, "The reason is plain
enough. Justice mun be rooted in confidence: and confidence is destroyed when right-minded
people go away thinking the judge was biased".
The same principle is accepted in India. In Manak Lal, a complain was filed by A against B,
an advocate for an alleged act of misconduct. A disciplinary committee was appointed to
make an enquiry into the allegations made against B. The Chairman had earlier represented A
in a case. The Supreme Court held that the enquiry was vitiated even if it were assumed that
the Chairman had no personal contact with his client and did not remember that he had
appeared on his behalf at any time in the past.
The court laid down the test in the following words:
In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment the test always is
and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member
of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal.
Audi alteram partem means “hear the other side”. The fundamental requirement of fair
procedure is to hear the both sides. This is more for reaching of the principles of natural justice,
as it embraces every question of fair procedure or due process and its implications can be
worked out in great detail. It is also broad enough to include the rule against bias, since a fair
hearing must be an unbiased hearing.
The rule of audi alteram partem is not confined to the conduct of strictly legal tribunals, but is
applicable to every tribunal or body of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon
matter involving civil consequences to individuals.
The concept of fair hearing originated from the very ancient times. It is as old as humanity.
Judicial declaration that a judicial tribunal “ought not to” or “must not condemn anyone
unheard” or “behind his back” have always been common. The objection to decide against a
party, not heard was an objection to jurisdiction.
It is a rule founded upon the first principles of natural justice, older than written Constitutions
that a citizen shall not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without an opportunity to be
heard, in defense of his rights and the constitutional provisos, that no person shall be deprived
of these rights without due process of law.
Ingredients of Hearing:-
Hearing has the following elements: