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Chapter 3. Industrial Hygiene
Industry and society are continuing to focus on reducing personnel and environmental damage
resulting from accidents. Many of the results in this area are due to civic concern and ethics,
sometimes manifested in laws and regulations. In this chapter we describe the relationship between
laws and regulations as an introduction to industrial hygiene.
Industrial hygiene is a science devoted to the identification, evaluation, and control of occupational
conditions that cause sickness and injury. Industrial hygienists are also responsible for selecting and
using instrumentation to monitor the workplace during the identification and control phases of
industrial hygiene projects.
Typical projects involving industrial hygiene are monitoring toxic airborne vapor concentrations,
reducing toxic airborne vapors through the use of ventilation, selecting proper personal protective
equipment to prevent worker exposure, developing procedures for the handling of hazardous
materials, and monitoring and reducing noise, heat, radiation, and other physical factors to ensure that
workers are not exposed to harmful levels.
The four phases in any industrial hygiene project are anticipation, identification, evaluation, and
control:
+ Anticipation: expectation of the presence of workplace hazards and worker exposures
+ Identification: determination of the presence of workplace exposures
+ Evaluation: determination of the magnitude of the exposure
+ Control: application of appropriate technology to reduce workplace exposures to acceptable
levels
In chemical plants and laboratories the industrial hygienist works closely with safety professionals as
an integral part of a safety and loss prevention program. After identifying and evaluating the hazards,
the industrial hygienist makes recommendations relevant to control techniques. The industrial
hygienist, safety professionals, and plant operations personnel work together to ensure that the control
measures are applied and maintained. It has been clearly demonstrated that toxic chemicals can be
handled safely when principles of industrial hygiene are appropriately applied.
3-1. Government Regulations
Laws and Regulations
Laws and regulations are major tools for protecting people and the environment. Congress is
responsible for passing laws that govern the United States. To put these laws into effect, Congress
authorizes certain government organizations, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to create and enforce regulations.
Creating a Law
A law is created with a three-step process:
Step 1. A member of Congress proposes a bill. A bill is a document that, if approved, becomes a
law.
Step 2. If both houses of Congress approve the bill, it is sent to the president, who has the optionto either approve it or veto it. If approved, it becomes a law that is called an act.
Step 3. The complete text of the law is published in the United States Code (USC).! The code is
the official record of all federal laws.
Creating a Regulation
After the law is official, how is it put into practice? Laws often do not include the details for
compliance. For example, the USC requires the appropriate respirator protection, but it does not
specify the detailed types or limitations of respirators. To make the laws work on a day-to-day level,
Congress authorizes governmental organizations, including the EPA, OSHA, and DHS, to create
regulations and/or standards.
Regulations set specific rules about what is legal and what is not legal. For example, a regulation
relevant to the Clean Air Act will specify levels of specific toxic chemicals that are safe, quantities
of the toxic chemicals that are legally emitted into the air, and what penalties are given if the legal
limits are exceeded. After the regulation is in effect, the EPA has the responsibility (1) to help
citizens comply with the law and (2) to enforce the regulation.
The process for creating a regulation and/or standard has two steps:
Step 1. The authorized organization or agency decides when a regulation is needed. The
organization then researches, develops, and proposes a regulation. The proposal is listed in
the Federal Register (FR) so that the public can evaluate it and send comments to the
organization. These comments are used to revise the regulation.
Step 2. After a regulation is rewritten, it is posted in the Federal Register as a final rule, and it is
simultaneously codified by publishing it in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
In 1970 the U.S. Congress enacted a health and safety law that continues to have a significant impact
on the practices of industrial hygiene in the chemical industry: the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (OSHAct). To appreciate the significance of the OSHAct, it is helpful to review regulations
and practices? before 1970.
Before 1936 regulations concerning occupational health were poorly administered by state and local
governmental agencies. During this era, staffs and funds were too small to carry out effective
programs. In 1936 the federal government enacted the Walsh-Healy Act to establish federal safety
and health standards for activities relating to federal contracts. This 1936 act also initiated significant
research related to the cause, recognition, and control of occupational disease. The concepts
promulgated by the Walsh-Healy Act, although not adequate by today’s standards, were the
forerunners of our current occupational health and safety regulations.
Between 1936 and 1970 a number of states enacted their own safety and health regulations. Although
some progress was made, these regulations were never sufficiently supported to carry out a
satisfactory program. This produced relatively inconsistent and ineffective results.
The OSHAct of 1970 was developed to solve these problems and to give a nationally consistent
program with the funding necessary to manage it effectively. This act defined clear procedures for
establishing regulations, conducting investigations for compliance, and developing and maintaining
safety and health records.
As a result of the OSHAct, sufficient funding was committed to create and support the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which manages and administers the government’ sresponsibilities specified in the OSHAct, and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH), which conducts research and technical assis improving the
protection and maintenance of workers” health. Examples of NIOSH responsibilities include (1)
measuring health effects of exposure in the work environment, (2) developing criteria for handling
toxic materials, (3) establishing safe levels of exposure, and (4) training professionals for
administering the programs of the act.
NIOSH develops data and information regarding hazards, and OSHA uses these data to promulgate
standards. Some laws and regulations particularly relevant to the chemical industry are shown in
Table 3-1. As illustrated in this table, the distinction between laws (USC) and regulations (CFR) is
global versus detail.
Table 3-1. A Few Laws from the United States Code (USC) and Regulations from the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR)
Number Description
20 USC 651 Occupational Salety and Health Act (1970)
42 USC 7401 Clean Air Act (1970)
33 USC 1251 Clean Water Act (1977)
42 USC 7401 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990)
15 USC 2601 Toxic Substances Control Act II (1992)
42 USC 300f Safe Drinking Water Act Amendment (1995)
40 CFR 280.20 Underground Storage Tank Leak Tests (1988)
40 CFR 370.30 Annual Toxic Release Report, SARA 313 (1989)
29 CER 1910.120 ‘Training, Hazardous Materials Technician, HAZMAT (1989)
29 CFR 1910.1450, Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals in Laboratories (1990)
40 CFR 370.20 Annual Inventory of Hazardous Chemicals. SARA 311 (1991)
29 CER 1910.19 Process Safety Management (1992)
40 CFR 68.65 Risk Management Program (1996)
29 CFR 1910.134 Respirator Program (1998)
42 USC 7401 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels
Regulatory Act (1999)
49 USC 40101 Transportation and Security Act (2001)
6 USC 101 Homeland Security Act (2002)
42 USC 301 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (2002)
42 USC 13201 Energy Policy Act (2005)
29 CFR 1910 Subpart $_ Electrical Standard (2007)
6 CFR27 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) (2007)
The OSHAct makes employers responsible for providing safe and healthy working conditions for
their employees. OSHA is authorized, however, to conduct inspections, and when violations of the
safety and health standards are found, they can issue citations and financial penalties. Highlights of
OSHA enforcement rights are illustrated in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2. Highlights of OSHA’s Right of EnforcementEmployers must admit OSHA compliance officers
advance notice. A search warrant may be requi
nto their plant sites for safety inspections with no
d to show probable cause.
OSHAS right of inspection includes safety and health records.
Criminal penalties be invoked,
s finding conditions of imminent dai
+ may request plant shutdowns.
The implications, interpretations, and applications of the OSHAct will continue to develop as
standards are promulgated. Especially within the chemical industry, these standards will continue to
create an environment for improving process designs and process conditions relevant to the safety
and health of workers and the surrounding communities.
Government regulation will continue to be a significant part of the practice of chemical process
safety. Since the OSHAct was signed into law, substantial new legislation controlling the workplace
and community environment has been enacted. Table 3-3 provides a summary of relevant safety
legislation. Table 3-4 summarizes the important parts of the current OSHAct.
Table 3-3. Federal Legislation Relevant to Chemical Process Safety*Date Abbreviation Act
1899 RHA River and Harbor Act
1906 FDCA Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
1947 FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
1952 DCA Dangerous Cargo Act
1952 FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act
1953 FFA Flammable Fabrics Act
1954 AEA Atomic Energy Act
1956 FWA Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956
1960) FHSA :deral Hazardous Substances Labeling Act
1965 SWDA Solid Waste Disposal Act
1966 MNMSA Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act
1969 NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
1969 CMHSA Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
1970 CAA Clean Air Act
1970) PPPA Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970,
1970 wol Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970
1970 RSA Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.
1970 RRA Resource Recor Act of 1970
1970 OSHA Occupational Salety and Health Act
1972 NCA Noise Control Act of 1972
1972 FEPCA Federal Environmental Pollution Control Act
1972 HMTA Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
1972 CPSA Consumer Product Safety Act
1972 MPRSA Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuary Act of 1972
1972 CWA Clean Water Act
1972 -ZMA, Coastal Zone Management Act
1973 ESA Endangered Species Act of 1973
1974 SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act
1974 TSA Transportation Safety Act of 1974
1974 ESECA, Ener,
upply and Environmental Coordination Act1976
1976
1977
1977
1978
1978
1980,
1984
1086,
1986,
1986
1986,
1987
1990,
1990
1990)
1992
1992
1993
1904
1996
1996
1996,
1996,
1996
1999
2001
2002
2005
2007
TSCA
RCRA
FMSHA.
SMCRA
UMTCA
PTSA
CERCLA
HSWA
AHERA
SARA
EPCRA
TSCA
WOA
OPA
CAAA
PPA
TSCA-II
NEPA
HMTAA
SDWA
FOPA
EPCRA
FEDCA
FIFRA
TSA
HAS
CFATS
Toxic Substances Control Act
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act
Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act
Port and Tanker Safety Act
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (Superfund)
Havardous and Solid Waste Amendments
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
Toxic Substances Control Act
Water Quality Act
Oi Pollution Act of 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990
Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Abatement Act
Federal Facility Compliance Act
National Environmental Policy Act
Havardous Materials Transportation Act Amendments
Sale Drinking Water Act Amendment
Food Quality Protection Act
Emergeney Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Community Safety Information, Site Security and
Fuels Regulatory Act
‘Transportation and Security Act
Homeland Security Act
Energy Policy Act
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
4 Information from the EPA and OSHA web sites: www.epa.gov and www.osha.gov.
Table 3-4. Parts of the OSHAct Relevant to Chemical Engineering Practice.Part Title
1910.95 Occupational noise exposure
1910.97 Non-ionizing radiation
1910 Subpart H Hazardous materials
1910,106 Flammable and combustible liquids
1910.110 Storage and handling of liquefied petroleum gases
1910.19 Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals
1910,120 Hazardous waste operations and emergency response
1910 Subpart 1 Personal protective equipment
190.133 Eye and face protection
1910,134 Respiratory protection
1910,135 Head protection
1910.136 Foot protection
1910138 Hand protection
1910 Subpart L Fire protection
1910 Subpart N Materials handling and storage
1910 Subpart O Machinery and machine guarding
1910 Subpart P Hand and portable tools and other hand equipment
1910 Subpart Welding, cutting and braving,
1910 Subpart S Electrical
1910 Subpart Z Toxic and hazardous substances—this includes regulations for
specific chemicals
19101200 Hazard communication
1910.1450 Occupational exposure to hazardous chemicals i tori
4 These are all part of 29 CRF 1910. See wwww.osha.gov for details,
OSHA: Process Safety Management
On February 24, 1992, OSHA published the final rule “Process Safety Management of Highly
Hazardous Chemicals.” This standard is performance oriented; that is, it sets general requirements for
the management of hazardous chemicals. Process safety management (PSM) was developed after the
Bhopal accident (1984), to prevent similar accidents. It is recognized by industry and the government
as an excellent regulation that will reduce the number and magnitude of accidents—if it is understood
and practiced as intended.
The PSM standard has 14 major sections: employee participation, process safety information,
process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, contractors, pre-startup safety review,
mechanical integrity, hot work permits, management of change, incident investigations, emergency
planning and response, audits, and trade secrets. A brief description of each section is given in what
follows.
Employee participation requires active employee participation in all the major elements of PSM.
Employers must develop and document a plan of action to specify this participation.
Process safety information is compiled and made available to all employees to facilitate the
understanding and identification of hazards. This information includes block flow diagrams or
process flow diagrams, process chemistry, and process limitations, such as temperatures, pressures,
flows, and compositions. Consequences of process deviations are also required, This process safetyinformation is needed before training, process hazards analysis, management of change, and accident
investigations.
Process hazard analysis (PHA) must be performed by a team of experts, including engineers,
chemists, operators, industrial hygienists, and other appropriate and experienced specialists. The
PHA needs to include a method that fits the complexity of the process, a hazards and operability
(HAZOP) study for a complex process, and for less complex processes a less rigorous process, such
as what-if scenarios, checklists, failure mode and effects analysis, or fault trees.
Employers must ensure that the recommendations from the PHA are acted on ina timely manner.
Every PSM process needs an updated PHA at least every five years after the initial analysis is
completed.
Operating procedures that facilitate the safe operation of the plant must be documented. These
instructions must be clearly written and consistent with the process safety information. They need to
cover, at a minimum, initial startup, normal operations, temporary operations, emergency shutdown,
emergency operations, normal shutdown, startup after normal and emergency shutdowns, operating
limits and consequences of deviations, safety and health considerations, hazardous properties of the
chemicals, exposure precautions, engineering and administrative controls, quality control
specifications for all chemicals, special or unique hazards, and safety control systems and functions.
Safe work practices also need to be documented, such as hot work, lockout/tagout, and confined
space. These operating procedures are updated frequently, with the frequency being set by the
operating personnel.
Aneftective training program helps employees understand the hazards associated with the tasks they
perform. Maintenance and operations personnel receive initial training and refresher training.
Operators need to understand the hazards associated with every task, including emergency shutdowns,
startups, and normal operations. Refresher training is given every three years and more often if
necessary; the operators decide on the frequency of the refresher training.
Contractors are trained to perform their tasks safely to the same extent as employees. Even when
selecting contractors, the employees need to consider the contractors’ safety performance in addition
to their skills.
A pre-startup safety review is a special safety review that is conducted after a modification to the
process or operating conditions has been made and before the startup. In this review a team of
reviewers ensures that (1) the system is constructed in accordance with the design specifications, (2)
the safety, maintenance, operating, and emergency procedures are in place, (3) the appropriate
training is completed, and (4) the recommendations from the PHA are implemented or resolved.
The mechanical integrity section of the PSM standard ensures that the equipment, piping, relief
systems, controls, and alarms are mechanically sound and operational. The requirements include (1)
written procedures to maintain functioning systems, (2) training regarding preventive maintenance, (3)
periodic inspections and testing based on vendor recommendations, (4) a process to correct
deficiencies, and (5) a process to ensure that all equipment and spare parts are suitable.
The PSM standard ascertains that a system is in place to prepare and issue hot work permits before
conducting hot work activities (welding, grinding, or using spark-producing equipment). The permit
requires dates authorized for hot work, the equipment involved in the work, a system to maintain and
document certification, identification of openings where sparks may drop, the types and numbers of
fire extinguishers, identification of fire watches, an inspection before the work, authorizationsignatures, identification of flammable materials in the area, verification that the surrounding area is
not explosive, verification that combustible materials are removed or covered appropriately,
identification and closure of open vessels or duets, and verification that welded walls are not
flammable.
Under the management of change section of the PSM standard employees are required to develop
and implement documented procedures to manage changes in the process chemistry, process
equipment, and operating procedures. Before a change occurs (except for replacement-in-kind), it
must be reviewed to ascertain that it will not affect the safety of the operation. After the change has
been made, all the affected employees are trained, and a pre-startup review is conducted.
The PSM standard mandates incident investigation. Employers must investigate all incidents that
have or could have resulted in a major release or accident within 48 hours of the event. The
regulation requires an investigation team composed of people, including operators, who are
knowledgeable about the system. Afler the investigation, the employers are required to appropriately
use the investigation recommendations.
The intent of the PSM element for emergency planning and response is to require employers to
respond effectively to the release of highly hazardous chemicals. Although the regulation requires this
activity for companies with more than 10 employees, this element should be part of a program for
even the smallest organizations that handle hazardous chemicals.
Under the audits section of the PSM standard employers are required to certify that they have
evaluated their compliance with the standard at least every three years. The recommendations from
the audit must be followed. The audit reports need to be retained as long as the process exists.
The trade secrets section of the PSM standard ensures that all contractors are given all the
information relevant to operating in the plant safely. Some personnel may need to sign secrecy
agreements before they receive this information.
EPA: Risk Management Plan
On June 20, 1996, the EPA published the Risk Management Plan (RMP) as a final rule. This
regulation is also a response to the Bhopal accident. It is recognized by industry and the government
as an excellent regulation that will reduce the number and magnitude of accidents—if it is understood
and practiced as intended.
‘The RMP regulation is aimed at decreasing the number and magnitude of accidental releases of toxic
and flammable substances. Although the RMP is similar to the PSM regulation in many respects, the
RMP is designed to protect off-site people and the environment, whereas PSM is designed to protect
on-site people. The RMP is required for plant sites that use more than a specified threshold quantity
of regulated highly hazardous chemicals. The RMP is a site responsibility (the site may have several
processes), whereas PSM covers every covered process on the site.
The RMP has the following elements:
+ Hazard assessment
+ Prevention program
+ Emergency response program
+ Documentation that is maintained on the site and submitted to federal, state, and local authorities.
This information is also shared with the local community.The RMP document is updated when the process or chemistry changes or when a governmental audit
requests an update. The first three parts of the regulation are described briefly in the following
paragraphs. The fourth part, documentation, is self-explanatory.
Hazard assessment is a consequence analysis for a range of potential hazardous chemical releases,
including the history of such releases at the facility. The releases must include the worst-case
scenario and the more likely but significant accident release scenarios. A risk matrix can be used to
characterize the worst-case and more likely scenarios
The EPA requires the following consequence analyses: (1) A single worst-case release scenario is
analyzed for all covered flammable materials on the site, and only one flammable substance is
analyzed for other more likely scenarios; and (2) a single worst-case release scenario is analyzed for
all toxic substances on the site, and more likely releases are analyzed for each toxic substance
covered by the rule.
The worst-case scenario is based on releasing the entire contents of a vessel or piping system ina 10-
minute period under worst-case meteorological conditions (F stability and 1.5 n/s wind speed).
Passive mitigation measures (for example, dikes) can be used in the calculation process; therefore the
release rate for liquid spills corresponds to the evaporation rate.
Alternative release cases for toxic substances cover scenarios with toxic concentrations beyond the
fenceline. Alternative cases for flammable substances cover scenarios that may cause substantial
damage off-site and on-site. The release scenarios that have a potential to reach the public are of the
greatest concern. Those with no off-site potential damage are not required to be reported.
Dispersion model calculations are normally used to estimate downwind concentrations; these
concentrations are the basis for determining the consequences resulting from toxicity, fires, and/or
explosions. For those not interested in using dispersion models, the standard includes lookup tables
for all the listed substances to help a facility determine the impact distances for specific release
scenarios.
The RMP requires only an analysis of the consequence and not the probability. Therefore the results
are not a true determination of risk, because risk is composed of both consequence and probability. A
more detailed description of the required consequence analyses can be found elsewhere
The second requirement of the RMP is a prevention program. The prevention program has 11
elements, compared to the 14 elements of the PSM standard. As shown in Table 3-5, many of these
elements are duplicated. Fortunately, the EPA made a deliberate attempt to retain the same
requirements wherever possible, although differences exist because the EPA and OSHA have
different responsibilities. The first column in Table 3-5 lists each element of the PSM program, and
the second column shows the corresponding element of the prevention program (some elements have
no equivalence).
Table 3-5. Comparison of the PSM and RMP Prevention ProgramsPSM program (OSHA) RMP (EPA)
Process safety information Process safety information
Process hazards analysis Hazard evaluation
Operating procedures Standard operating procedures
Employee participation (No equivalence)
Training Training
Contractors (No equivalence)
Pre-startup review Pre-startup review
Mechanical integrity Maintenance
Hot work permit (No equivalence)
Management of change Management of change
Incident investigations Accident investigations
mergeney response
Safety audits
(No equivalence)
Risk assessment
The emergency response program delineates the steps to be taken by the facility’s employees in
response to accidental releases of hazardous materials. It also establishes procedures for notifying the
local community and the appropriate emergency response agencies. Training is for all employees on
the topics relevant to emergency response. The requirements include drills to test the plan and to
evaluate its effectiveness, and the plan must be revised based on the findings of these drills.
The plan must be coordinated with local emergency response plans developed by Local Emergency
Planning Committees (LEPCs) and local emergency response agencies. As with similar OSHA
regulations, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Spill Prevention Control
under the Clean Water Act, the emergency response plan must be maintained at the facility and must
include descriptions of all mitigating systems.
DHS: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)
In 2006 Congress passed a law requiring the U.S. Department of Homeland Secuity (DHS) to
establish risk-based performance standards for the security of chemical facilities. Subsequently, on
April 9, 2007, DHS issued an interim rule called the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
(CFATS). The details are provided in the Code of Federal Regulations 6 CFR 27. This rule applies
to any facility that manufactures, uses, stores, distributes, or otherwise possesses certain chemicals at
or above a specified quantity.
Chemical plants contain assets, which include any person, environment, facility, material,
information, business reputation, or activity that has a positive value for the company. The asset that
is of the most concern with respect to chemical plants is the quantity of hazardous materials. A threat
is any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause the loss of, or damage to, an asset.
A vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an adversary to gain access to an asset. An
adversary is any group, organization, or government that conducts, intends to conduct, or has the
capability to conduct activities detrimental to critical assets4,
Table 3-6 identifies some of the security issues of concern to chemical plants. The purpose of the
CFATS rule is to identify to DHS all chemical facilities that are high-risk with respect to terrorismand to ensure that these facilities have an effective security risk management plan.
Table 3-6. Security Issues of Concern to Chemical Plants
Security issue Example terrorist objective
Intentional loss of containment Release of chemicals to the atmosphere, resulting in toxic
exposure, fire, or explosion. This
public, to workers, and to the environment. The chemical
plant can also be damaged or destroyed, causing direct
or indirect economic damage.
sults in harm to the
Theft of chemicals Use of the chemicals as primary or secondary* improvised
weapons against a third party.
Contamination or spoilage Immediate or delayed harm to people or the environment,
ofa product or proc ‘or to cause economic injury.
De
adation of the asset Mechanical or physical damage or cyber disruption. This
causes severe direct or indirect economic damages.
Acquisition of chemicals under Purcl
fals
2 of chemicals through normal purchasing channels by
pretense misrepresentation of purpose, Use of the chemicals as primary
or secondary" improvised weapons against a third party.
“A supporting or auxiliary weapo
Adapted from David A. Moore, “Security,” pp, 23-104 to 23-109,
The rule works as follows. The rule 6 CFR 27 includes Appendix A, which is a list of chemicals and
threshold quantities. Ifa facility has these chemicals in quantities that exceed the threshold, they are
required to complete a Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) Top Screen. The CSAT Top
Screen is done on-line. DHS evaluates the Top Screen and makes a preliminary classification
whether the facility poses a high risk. DHS ranks high-risk facilities into four tiers, 1 through 4, with
tier 1 having the highest risk. All preliminarily tiered chemical facilities must subsequently conduct a
Sccurity Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) and submit it to DHS.
A security vulnerability assessment (SVA) is a process used to identify security issues arising from
the facility’s activities, ranging from intentional release of chemicals, sabotage, to theft or diversion
of chemicals that can be used as, or converted into, weapons. The SVA identifies these security
issues and also allows the facility to estimate the likelihood of the facility’s vulnerabilities being
successfully exploited. DHS evaluates the SVA and assigns a final tier ranking to the facility.
with the purpose of supporting or supplementing the primary weapon.
Chemical facilities in all four tiers are required to develop and implement a Site Security Plan (SSP)
that meets criteria published in the risk-based performance standards. DHS conducts inspections
and/or audits at ticred facilities, with the highest-risk facilities being inspected more frequently. The
SSP must detail physical, procedural, and cyber measures that the site takes to reduce or eliminate the
vulnerabilities.
Security strategies for chemical facilities usually involve the following countermeasures for each
security threat: deterrence, detection, delay, response, and awareness.
Deterrence prevents or discourages security breaches by means of fear or doubt. Security guards,
lighting, and barriers are examples of deterrence countermeasures.
Cameras, monitoring, and intrusion alarms detect an adversary attempting to commit a security event.They may also provide the identity of the adversary, real-time observation, and possibly aid in
apprehension of the adversary.
The countermeasure of delay is designed to slow the progress of an adversary either coming into or
out of a restricted area. Delay may provide the time required to interdict the attack or to apprehend
the adversary.
Response includes both facility response capability and the demonstrated capability of off-site
responders, such as police and fire fighters. Response is not limited to armed interdiction by police
and/or security personnel but also includes all the traditional hazardous materials response capability
normally associated with safety and environmental stewardship. On-site response capabilities
include fire fighting, security, medical response, spill containment, and the capability to quickly
reduce inventory, to name a few.
Awareness includes knowledge of your customers and the purpose of their purchase. This security
strategy is designed mostly to prevent acquisition of chemicals under false pretense but can also
identify inquiries from adversaries posing as customers in order to obtain information about your
facility, raw materials, intermediates, or products.
3-2. Industrial Hygiene: Anticipation and Identification
One of the major responsibilities of the industrial hygienist is to anticipate, identify, and solve
potential health problems within plants. Chemical process technology, however, is so complex that
this task requires the concerted efforts of industrial hygienists, process designers, operators,
laboratory personnel, and management. The industrial hygienist helps the effectiveness of the overall
program by working with these plant personnel. For these reasons industrial hygiene (particularly
identification) must be a part of the education process of chemists, engineers, and managers.
Many hazardous chemicals are handled safely on a daily basis within chemical plants. To achieve
this operating success, all potential hazards must be identified and controlled. When toxic and/or
flammable chemicals are handled, the potentially hazardous conditions may be numerous — in large
plants there may be thousands. To be safe under these conditions requires discipline, skill, concern,
and attention to detail.
The identification step requires a thorough study of the chemical process, operating conditions, and
operating procedures. The sources of information include process design descriptions, operating
instructions, safety reviews, equipment vendor descriptions, information from chemical suppliers,
and information from operating personnel. The quality of this identification step is often a function of
the number of resources used and the quality of the questions asked. The different resources may have
different operating and technical emphases unique to pieces of equipment or specific chemicals. In
this identification step it is often necessary to collate and integrate the available information to
identify new potential problems resulting from the combined effects of multiple exposures.
During the identification step, the potential hazards and methods of contact are identified and
recorded, As illustrated in Table 3-7, the potential hazards are numerous, especially because the
listed hazards can also act in combination. This list of potential hazards together with the required
data for hazard identification (see Table 3-8) is commonly used during the identification step of
industrial hygiene projects.
Table 3-7. Identification of Potential Hazards*Potential hazards
Liquids Noise
Vapors Radiation
‘Temperature
Mechanical
Entry mode of toxicants
Inhalation Ingestion
Body absorption (skin or eyes) Injection
Potential damage
Lungs
Ears
Nervous system
Kidneys Reproductive organs
Circulatory system Other organs
2 OlishifSki, Fundamentals of Industrial Hygiene, pp. 24-26.
Table 3-8, Data Useful for Health Identification
‘Threshold limit values (TLVs)
Odor threshold for vapors
Physical state
Vapor pressure of liquids
Sensitivity of chemical to temperature or impact
Rates and heats of reaction
Hazardous by-prodt
Reactivity with other chemicals
Flammable and explosive concentrations of chemie:
dusts, and vapors
Noise levels of equipment
‘Types and degree of radiation
Table 3-9 is a list of odor thresholds for various chemicals. This is one approach to identify the
presence of chemical vapors in the workplace. Individuals vary greatly with respect to odor detection
so great variability in this is expected, Also, some chemicals, like methyl ethyl ketone, anesthetize the
olfactory organs with continued exposure, reducing the ability to detect the odor. In many cases the
odor threshold is below the threshold limit value (TLV). For instance, chlorine has an odor threshold
of 0.05 ppm while the TLV is 0.5 ppm (Appendix G). In this case the odor is noticed at a
concentration well below the TLV. For some chemicals the reverse case is true. For instance,
ethylene oxide has an odor threshold of 851 ppm while the TLV is 1 ppm. In this case once the odor
is detected, the exposure limit has been greatly exceeded.
Table 3-9. Odor Thresholds for Various Chemicals*