Vedantasara

OP

SADANANDA

With the Conmeotirif

'* Baiabodhini ' of Apadevi
AND

a Critical English Introductiofl

BY

Prof. K. SUNDARARAMA AIYAR, M.A..

SRIRANGAM:
SRI VANI VILAS PRESS.
19li
Copyright Registered.] [All Rights Reserved.
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 PREFACE.

IHB Ved&ntasara is a clear and concise statement

of the doctrines of advaita whose chief exponent is
the Giant of intellects — Sri vSankara Bhagavatpad&charya.
Though this work is already well known to the Public,
in this edition is published for the first time the com-
mentary called ' Balabodhini ' by Apadeva the great
Mtra^msa scholar who is well known by the famous purva
mlm&msa prakarana , that goes by his name viz.,
Apad6viya. The existence of this rare commentary was
brought to my notice by Brahmasri S. Subrahmanya
S&strigal. of Tanjore to whom I am much indebted not
only for the faultless press copy of the commentary that
he sent me but also for his kindness in going through
the proofs. The value of this edition is further con-
siderably enhanced by the splendid critical English
Introduction so kindly written at my request by my
esteemed friend Professor K. Sundararama Aiyar Avl.,
M.A., of Kumbakonam. In this scholarly Introduction
Professor Sundararama Aiyar, in bis usual vigorous and
thorough-going style, controverts all the arguments
adduced by Dr. Thibaut and Col. Jacob against the system
of Advaita as expounded by Sri Sankara and refutes their
conclusions as absolutely baseless. He thoroughly
removes the misconceptions of the Oriental Scholars
 11

regarding the teachings of Sri Sankara and concludes ^

with the wholesome advice that the bhashyas should
not be read without a proper teacher — a teacher who
has made a patient, thorough, and exhaustive study of
the subject and who knows fully the sampraddya.
The Introduction must be carefully studied to be duly
appreciated and my obligation to the Professor for
having contributed this most valuable piece of literary
discussion in the midst of his multifarious avocations, is
beyond the ken of words. I sincerely trust that this
criticism would go a great way towards helping the
right understanding of the teachings of Sri Sankara by
the Western Savants.
cT. Jf. <J3alasubrahmanyam.
 >

INTRODUCTION.

THE V'edanta-Saka of Sadananda has

long been recognised in India as a valuable
work containing a clear and accurate sum-
mary of the philosophy and religion of the Upa-
nishads as systematised and formulated by Sri
Sankaracharya. As an introduction to its study,
we purpose to deal critically with various mis-
conceptions regarding that religious system
which have been brought into currency by two
European writers, — by Colonel G. A. Jacob who
brought out an edition (Bombay, 1894) of the
Sanskrit Text ^f the Vedanta-Sara (with two
commentaries) and a translation of the same as a
\
olume of Trubner^s Oriental Series (London,
1891 }, and by Dr. Thibaut in his famous Intro-
duction tohis translation of Sankara's Sariraka-
bhashya (Sacred Books of the East Series). The
misconceptions relate to historical and doctrinal
points of great importance for the school of
religious thought against which they are directed,
 11

and this attempt to remove them is made solely

with a view to serve the cause o£ truth.

Two preliminary questions present them-

selves for consideration, — (1) Can w^e claim for
Sankara's Vedantic doctrine the support of a
great and weighty tradition before his time ? (2)
Can we claim for its leading doctrines the
authority of the most ancient Upanishads and
the Sutras of Badarayana?
As regards the first topic, Dr. Thibaut
says: — "Sankara does not, on the whole, impress
one as an author particularly anxious to streng-
then his own case by appeals to ancient
authorities." Of Ramanuja, on the other hand,
he says: — "In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanuja
appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers —
Purvacharyas — who carried on the true tradi-
tions as to the teaching of the Yedanta and the
meaning of the Sutras." We maintain, against
Dr. Thibaut, that Sankara refers in explicit
terms to the Purvacharyas of his own school,
that his references are made so as to convey a
special significance, and that he makes quotations
and otherwise also demonstrates the value he
 Ill

attaches to the teaching given before his time.

At the commencement of his Bhashya on the
Taittiriya-Upanishad, he has the following-
verse: —

" T offer mv constant obeisance to those

Ourus (teachers) who, in former times, have
commented on all the Upanishads by explaining
the words, the sentences, and the proofs."
This verse nnmistakeably refers to the
Purvacharyas of the school to which he belonged.
Again the Sariraka- bhashya contains explicit refe-
rences to, and quotations from, the writings of
Oaudapada whose name was most prominent in
the Advaita school at the time when Sankara en-
tered upon his own work and mission. Take, for
instance, the following passage. '" ar^m ^cfF^riwsr-
^RT^i^^RT^:" ''With reference to this point,
teachers, knowing the established tradition as to
the purport of the V^edanta, have made the
following declaration". The language used by
Sankara in this and other similar references to
Oaudapada has to be carefully noted. Gaudapada
 IV

is spoken of not simply as the knower of the real

purport of the Vedanta, but as the knower of
the established tradition regarding it (sampra-
daya-vid). The doctrine, therefore, propounded
by Sankara is one which in his time had become
recognised as having a venerable antiquity and
as represented by numerous Purvacharyas to
whom, as already stated, he pays his meed of
homage in his Bhashya on the Taittiriya-Upanis-
had. Moreover, in his Gita- Bhashya, Sankara
makes the following statement: — *' ^T^R^T^TRrac
^4^T^^f^ ^^^ ^jq^^R:" "Whatsoever his
mastery of all other branches of knowledge, he
who does not know the sampradaya must be
discarded in the same way as we discard all per-
verse and ignorant people." In his Bhashya on
Prasna-Upanishad, he says; — ^' n% ^^k f|c^r

qf^^JT'^: " "Give up all your egotistic fancies,

and listen to the meaning of the Sruti. Inde-
pendent effort, even if continued for a hundred
years, cannot disclose the true import of the
Sruti to those whose heads are filled with self-
conceit and who foolishly assume that they can
know it for themselves (without the teacher's
aid)." These passages clearly show the value he
attached to established tradition in the interpre-
tation of the true doctrine of the Sruti and how
strongly he condemned the idea of interpreting
it by independent effort.
We now turn to the second preliminary
consideration, " Is the Vedanta doctrine of Sanka-
racharya supported by the most ancient Upanis-
hads and the Sutras of Vyasa?" We are of
opinion that the determination of the dates of
ancient Indian works and personages is at present
in a most chaotic condition. All Western and
some Indian scholars are agreed only in regard-
ing the traditional Indian dates as unreliable and
they differ among themselves widely in regard
to every point in dispute. The (question which
of the Upani^ads are really old and which are
not is incapable of being determined by the
application of any uniform or reliable test. Can
we regard as old those from which passages are
taken up for discussion in the Sutras of Badara-
yana? Then the Kaushitaki, Svetasvatara,
Jabala, and other Upanishads will have to be
regarded as old. Secondly^ if we are to regard
as old those which are commented upon by
 VI

Sankaracharya, then we have to account for the

fact that Indian tradition ascribes to him the
authorship of commentaries on the Svetasvatara
and Nrisimhatapani Upanishads. What becomes,
then, of Dr. Roer's opinion — accepted by Colonel
Jacob — that the Svetasvatara "does not belong
to the series of the more ancient Upanishads' '
and that it was "composed not long before the
time of Sankaracharya " and could not for that
reason be regarded as an old or classical Upanis-
had ? Thirdly^ Colonel Jacob holds that " the
Svetasvatara is said to be the oldest Upanishad
in which the illusory nature of phenomena is
plainly taught, and that tract is evidently post-
Buddhistic." How, then, does he account for
the fact that Ramanujacharya who, as is well
known, denies the doctrine of the illusory nature
of the world, accepts this same Upanishad as of
equal authority with the rest and quotes from it
throughout his work. All Indian schools of
Vedanta are agreed that the Svetasvatara is as
authoritative as any of the other Upanishads and
contains the same teaching. Nor is this the
opinion only of Indian authorities. European
w riters, too, have supported them in this view.
 Vll

For instance, the late A. E. Gough holds that

" the perusal of the Svetasvatara Upanishad will
satisfy the reader that its teaching is the same as
that of the other Upanishads — the teaching that
finds its full and legitimate expression in the
system known as the Vedanta." In India, the
authenticity of an Upanishad is not made to
rest on the determination of its age, but on the
determination of the question whether it does, or
does not, form a part of the tradition preserved
by the Vedic Sakha (the school or succession of
teachers) to which it belongs. Whenever ques-
tions of date are raised, conflict and confusion is
known to be inevitable as scholars rarely agree;
and victory inclines almost always to the side on
which the big battalions are ranged. Questions
like these can* never be determined satisfactorily
by the voice of a majority. The still small voice
behind continues to revolt aginst the decision
thus obtained, and often the whirligig of time is
known to bring its revenges.
Let us now take our stand on what are
universally accepted as the classical Upanishads
and consider some of the opinions expressed by
Dr. Thibaut and Colonel Jacob regarding
 Vlll

Sankara's Vedantic doctrine. Colonel Jacob

says: — -"It may be admitted that if the impossi-
ble task of reconciling the contradictions of the
Upanishads and reducing them to a harmonious
and consistent whole is to be attempted at all,
Sankara's system is about the only one that
could do it. But more than this it would seem

impossible to concede." Dr. Thibaut writes as

follows: — "Sankara's method enables him to
recognise existing differences which other
systematisers are intent on obliterating. And
there has yet to be made a further and even
more important admission in favour of his
system. It is not only more pliable, more cap-
able of amalgamating heterogeneous material
than other systems, but its fundamental doctrines
are manifestly in greater harmony with the
essential teaching of the Upanishads than those
of other Vedantic systems." Sankara's aim was
to formulate and to systematise the teaching of
the Sruti without reading into his doctrine any
sort of un- Vedic tradition, however venerable or
popular. The aim of the Veda is not to put
forth a systematically connected and formulated
view of the facts of the universe, but to explain
 IX

to man his real nature and destiny and to guide

him along the path which leads him to the goal
of life. That is why the Veda is regarded as an
independent source of human knowledge side by
side with sensuous perception and ratiocination.
As Sankara points out: — "l^w ft f%^^^ ^J^
siWF^n^?^^ ^f^q%" " The authoritativeness of
the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it
is independent and direct, just as the light of
the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of
form and colour." We cannot understand the
V^eda in the light of any other authority; on the
other hand, the Veda, as traditionally interpreted,
is the supreme authority in the light of which
we have to test the authority which attaches to
all other sources of spiritual knowledge. Other
authorities have value only in so far as they
accord with the Sruti, and lose all claim for
recoi^nition when thev come into conflict Avith it.
Hence we entirely agree with Dr. Thibaut in
holdinof that the Advaita doctrine of Sankara
marks "a strictly orthodox reaction against all
combinations of non- Vedic elements of belief and
doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads."
We fail to understand how, holding this view,
Dr. Thibaut — and, following him, Colonel Jacob-
could at the same time hold that Sankara has
read certain of his own non-Yedic views into the
Upanishads for the purpose of reducing them to
a system. There is really not a shadow of
justification for this view, as we hope to show
later on when dealing with the detailed criticisms
of Dr. Thibaut on Sankara's interpretations.
His system as a whole, and every detail of it,
rests solely and purely on the authority of the
Sruti, as traditionally interpreted in the school
to which he belongs.
We shall also deal at once in general terms
with the other preliminary question regarding
the exact relation in which Sankara's doctrine
stands to the Sutras of Vyasa. Dr. Thibaut
says: — "The philosophy of Sankara would on
the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the
Upanishads than the Sutras of Badarayana.'^
We shall, at a later stage, have to show that
every doctrine supposed by Dr. Thibaut (and
Colonel Jacob) to be read into the Sutras by
Sankara is to be found in them directly and by
implication. Meanwhile we shall only remark
that no one who knows anything of Indian
 XI

tradition can grant that the Sutras of Badara-

yana were ever accepted by any school of Vedic
thinkers otherwise than as containing the essence
of the doccrine of the Upanishads. In India,
the V^edas have been all in all, and every system
of theistic doctrine and every religious text-book
of every such system have accepted their
authority in toto. The Sutras of Badarayana, in
particular, are intended as a presentation of the
teaching of the Upanishads in a reasoned form
and free from all doubts, imperfections, and in-
consistencies. As Sankaracharya points out,

msn^JTRrf^RJTT'JiFcT^HlTTT " " The Sutras have

merely the purpose of stringing together the
flowers of the ^sentences of the Vedanta. The
sentences of the Vedanta referred to in the Sutra
are discussed by us here- For the realisation of
Brahman is produced by the determination,
consequent on discussion, of the purport of the
sentences of the Vedanta, not by other sources
of knowledge such as inference, &c." The
Sutras owe the authority they command to the
fact that they contain in a convenient, concise,
 Xll

and systematic form the teachings which are

found scattered in the voluminous Upanishadic
literature. It must also be remembered that
they are, to some extent at least, what Mr. A.
E. Gough calls them, — "a minimum of memoria
technica, and nearly unintelligible." Colebrooke
^Iso says: — "Hinting the question or its solution
rather than proposing the one or delivering the
other, they but allude to the subject. Like the
aphorisms of other Indian sciences they must
from the first have been accompanied by the
author's exposition of the meaning, whether
orally taught by him or communicated in
writing." The "allusions" in the Sutras must
be clearly brought out by the expositor. The
supreme function of an Acharya is to teach the
disciples of his school the essence of the doctrine
as contained in the Upanishads, to clear doubtful
points, to expand hints, to connect what is
seemingly unconnected or conflicting and to
contrive to build into the Vedic teaching any
seemingly disjointed fragments which may be
found in the Vedas as transmitted to us. N^o
A^edantin, whatever his school, can be found
willing to admit that the Sutras do not teach the
 XllI

essential tenets of that school, or indifferent to

a proposition of that kind. For Vyasa is really
and essentially the inspirer, systematiser, and
promulgator of all that is best in Hinduism.
Sankara calls him the Vedacharva, the teacher
of the Vedas, and Srikantha — the author of the
Bhashya of the Pasupata school — calls him
" Sarvajna-Sikhamani/' "the highest gem
among the knowers of everything." No Hindu
worth the name can be found prepared or
willing to concede that the finest and ripest
product of his deathless work for humanity can
contain anything to which we cannot accede, or
fail to contain anything which we value as an
essential part of our faith. The idea, therefore,
of some Western Orientalists that there is
a divergence of^ome kind between the teaching
of the llpanishads and the system built up by
Vyasa in the Sutras can find no favour with
Hindu thinkers and teachers.
We next deal with the astounding conclu-
sion arrived at by Dr. Thibaut — a conclusion
which Colonel Jacob regards as "impossible to
resist" — that neither the older Upanishads nor
the Sutras contain any of the essential doctrines
 XIV

of the Advaita system of Sankaracharya. Dr.

Thibaut writes as follows: — "They do not set
forth the distinction of a higher and lower
knowledge of Brahman ; they do not acknowledge
the distinction of Brahman and Isvara in
Sankara's sense; they do not hold the doctrine
of the unrealit}^ of the world; and they do not,
with Sankara, proclaim the absolute identity of
the individual and the highest Self." These large
statements are made with a cocksureness and
emphasis which are astounding when, on the
other side, the great German Sanskritist and
thinker, Dr. Deussen, and the British Orientalist
Mr. A. E. Grough, have held that these doctrines
— all forming the vital parts or corner-stones of
the Advaita- Vada — are taught in both the
Upanishads and the Sutras. It is necessary,
first, to expose the utter shallowness of the argu-
ments on which Dr. Thibaut bases his strange
and startling statements, and then to adduce un-
questionable evidence to show how strong and
solid are the foundations on which Sankara's
system stands. Dr. Thibaut's discussion first
turns upon the import of the Sutras, and then of
the Upanishads. We follow the same order.
 XV

Dr. Thibaut's first arorument in his discus-

sion of the Sutras turns upon a technical question
of some importance. It may be summed up as
follows: — The last three padas of the fourth
Adhyaya refer throughout to one subject only,
viz., the successive steps by which the soul of
him who knows the Lord reaches the world of
Brahma and lives there without returninsr to the
cycle of rebirths. Also, the last sutra of the
last pada of the last Adhyaya — "sRTfm:
5T5^?5nfT%: ^s^Tri^" " ( Of them there is ) no re-
turning according to the Word, No returning,
according to the Word" contains the upasamhara
or conclusion of the whole work and it must be
regarded as describing the lasting condition of
those who have finallv rained freedom from
samsara. This apriori impression Sankara
denies and regards the three padas (with the
exception of two adhikaranas) as describing the
fate of him who has lower knowledo^e. He also
regards the concluding Sutra above quoted as
only describing a stage on the road to mukti, —
a stage belonging to the fictitious samsara and
infinitely below the bliss of liberation. — It is
strange, however, that Dr. Thibaut, after making
 XVI

out what he considered a strong case against

Sankara should at the same time say of his so-
calied apriori impression regarding this conclud-
ing section and sutra that "it could hardly be
appealed to as decisive." We ask, — why does he
put it forward at all as an argument against
Sankara? Dr. Thibaut then proceeds to a detailed
consideration of the two adhikaranas (viz., iv. 2,
12-14, & iv. 4, 1-7) which Sankara, according
to him, detaches from the rest of these last three
padas of the work and regards as describing the
state of him who, before his death, had risen to
the knowledge of the highest or unconditioned
Brahman.
As regards Dr. Thibaut's argument that
the Upasamhara (whether we take the concluding
padas or the concluding sutra) does not refer to
the realisation of the unconditioned Brahman, —
the reply is that the Advaita system attaches
more importance to the Upakrama — the part
which introduces the topic of a section — than to
the upasamhara or conclusion. If the
upasamhara also refers to the same topic, it adds
to the strength of our conviction regarding the
import of the whole section. But when the
 XVll

context (prakarana) of a section is settle*! and

introduced, it settles the import of the entire
section and of every other part of it down to
the close. The whole section is under its
governing influence and has to be understood
so as to conform to the particular context
in view. This is what is known as t^^^i^^riT,
unification of, or mutual conformity between,
different portions of the section.
Where the concluding part so-called can-
not be brought into conformity with the intro-
ductory part and no ekavakyata (unification) is
possible the concluding part ceases to be re-
coo;! lised as such and must be reo^arded as a new
topic altogether. The Advaitin maintains what
the eminent^Vedantic teacher, Appaya Dikshita,
calls ^T^fn^T^*?:, the superior validity of the
context as determined by the introductory part.
The same eminent teacher also delivers himself
as follows in his Siddhantalesa-SanoTaha : —

B
 XVIU

''Where a consistent unity between them is

seen to exist, the upakrama and the upasamhara
(the commencing and concluding portions) must
be regarded as referring to the same topic, — as,
if they refer to different topics, it implies a breach
in the unity of the context. Where, on the other
hand, no unity is seen to exist, the sentence
which refers to a different topic htis its own
special significance, and what has preceded it has
no importance whatever in relation to it."
If we bear these remarks in mind, the fact
that the major portion of the last three padas of
the fourth Adhyaya and the last sutra of the same
do not refer to the Unconditioned Brahman need
not frighten us. As the whole work refers to it,
and as this has been proved in the beginning of
the work, there is no harm if the concluding
parts do not also refer to it. All that is wanted
is to bring the concluding part into consistency
and unity with the context. In the present case,
the concluding padas and the concluding sutra are
known to describe the state of him who has the
knowledge of the lower Brahman (Hiranyagar-
bha) and can be brought into definite relation
with the higher and unconditioned Brahman.
 XIX

For the Jiva who attains to the world of Hirnn-

yagarbha by devout meditation (upasaiia) uhi-
mately attains to the Unconditioned Hrahman
when the Hrahma-Kalpa comes to a close, and he
never again returns to the cycle of rebirths
(samsara). In the world of Hiranyagarbha he is
enabled to enter on rhe enquiry into the higher
Brahman which brings on the goal of final release.
Dr. Thibaut, also, makes a detailed investi-
gation of the two adhikaranas above mentioned
(viz., iv. 2, 12-14 and iv. 4, 1-7) with a view
to showing the untenability of Sankara^s conten-
tion that they describe the state of him who,
before his death, had attained to a knowledtje
of the highest Brahman. With regard to the
first-named adhikarana his objections to Sankara's
treatment are: — (1) There is no indication of a
new topic being introduced. — But Dr. Thibaut
abandons this objection when he immediately
proceeds to state tlint it is "not decisive in itself. *'
So long as we can feel assured that the topic of a
section is different from that of the previous one
and cannot be brought into unity with it, the
mere absence of an '' indication '' to that effect
cannot alter the nature of things and cannot be
 XX

brought forward as an objection to the treatment

of what it is in itself. No one would regard a
horse as a cow simply because it happens to be
fed for the moment in a cowshed and there is
consequently no indication prima facie of its
being kept in a place set apart for feeding a horse
(2) The occurrence ofi^ (hy) and not 3 (/w) in the
text of sutra 13 shows that this sutra is appro-
priately understood as furnishing a reason for the
opinion advanced in the preceding Sutra as em-
bodying a refutation of a j^'^^vious statement. —
This objection is of no importance, — for the
particle hy has not one sense only, that of assign-
ing a reason, but also is used to express the sen^e
of what is well-known (prasiddha). In the pre-
sent case, the latter is appropriate as the Sutra
refers to the denial of the soul's departure as
well-known and undeniable, and hy is added to
show the fact. Moreover, every sutra which
states the siddhanta (the correct opinion) need
not necessarily have a tu included in it. The
addition or omission of a particle cannot alter
the nature and intent of a Sutra otherwise clear

and complete. (3) Dr. Thibaut says: — "The

'some' referred to in the Sutra would on Sanka-
 XXI

ra's interpretation denote the very same persons

to whom the preceding Sutra had referred, viz.,
the followers of the Kanva-sakha (the two Vedic
passages referred to in 12 and 13 being Brih.
Up. iv. 4, 5 and iii. 2, 11 according to the
Kanva recension j; while it is the standing practice
of the Sutras to introduce by means of the
designation 'eke' members of the Vedic sakhas,
teachers, &c., other than those alluded to in the
preceding Sutras *' — To this the reply is that
Sutra 13 is meant to refute the Purvapaksha
stated in Sutra 12. This Purvapaksha refers to
the statement in Madhyandina-sakha, ''jfcT^Tr-
csji'Jrr ^5FT«?[?^ " '' From him the vital spirits do
not depart". This is understood as meaning
that the soul of him who dies passes out of the
body together with the pranas and that, therefore,
the soul and the pranas are not separated from
each other. This statement is brought forward
to ascertain the sense of the statement in the
Kanva-sakha (Brih. Up. iv, 4, 5) "^ ^m smi
^SR^JTI'cT" " Of him the vital spirits do not
depart." The Purvapaksha brings forward the
ablative case ("from him") in the statement of the
Madhyandina-sakha to determine the import of
 XXll

the case "of him" in the statement of the Kanva-

sakha just quoted. The 'eke' of Sutra 13 refers
to the Kanva-sakha (iii, 2, 11) and is therefore
different from the Madhyandina-sakha whose
statement is relied on for establishing the Purva-
paksha. Dr. Thibaut supposes that iii. 2, 11 of
the Kanva-sakha is brought in to refute the
statement of iv, 4, 5 of the same sakha, and
hence his difficulty.

We now take up Dr. Thibaut's discussion

of the second of the two adhikaranas above

referred to, viz., iv, 4, 1-7. Dr. Thibaut's first

remark is: — "The result of this closer considera-
tion of the first set of sutras alleged by Sankara
to concern the higher knowledge of Brahman
entitles us to view with some distrust Sankara's
assertion that another set also — iv, 4, 1-7 — has
to be detached from the general topic of the
fourth adhyaya and to be understood as
depicting the condition of those who have
obtained final absolute release." — As we have
shown above that his entire discussion of San-
kara's interpretation of the first set of Sutras is
altogether unsatisfactory and based on errors of
 XXlll

• all kinds, there is not the least justification for

his assumption ot" an attitude of self-satisfied dis-
trust of Sankara's discussion of the second set of
Sutras. Such a distrust would be to some extent

justifiable if Dr. Thibaut's criticism of Sankara's

interpretation of the first set had been a success,
instead of the total faiture we have shown it to
be. In the light of our demonstration of his
failure, it cannot fail to appear premature. We
shall now proceed to review his discussion of
Sankara's interpretation of this second set of
Sutras. As before, his first criticism is that
** their wording gives no indication whatever of
their having to be separated from what precedes
as well as what follows.'' In replying to Dr.
Thibaut's criticism of Sankara's interpretation of
the first set of sutras, we have, already dealt
with this vague and unmeaning generality as it
deserves, and we content ourselves with referr-
ing the reader to the remarks already made.
His second criticism is that "the last sutra of
the set (7) obliges Sankara to ascribe to his truly
released souls qualities which clearly cannot
belong to them. In the same breath Dr. Thibaut
makes the extraordinary admission that Sankara
 XXIV

states that those qualities belong to them

's^^^H^^jt' "when conditioned by phenomena ".
The latter is the correct statement. So, Dr.
Thibaut's previous statement of Sankara's
position is avowedly erroneous. Sankara makes
no such statement himself. Dr. Thibaut makes
a self-contradictory statement of his own? and
thus he refutes himself, — not Sankara. Dr.
Thibaut erroneously translates " ^^^\^ " as
"Thus also". Really it means, " Even (if it is)
thus," or "though (it is) thus". Interpreted
thus, the Sutra contrasts the attributeless in-
telligence which constitutes the essential nature
of the Self with attributes such as lordly power
which appertain to the limited condition of the
soul previously to the attainment of liberation.
Lastly J Dr. Thibaut fails altogether to com-
prehend the scope of some remarks made by
Sankara's commentator, Govindananda, towards
the close of his explanation of Sankara's
bhashya on this Sutra. He thinks that
Govindananda points to a "difficulty" in
Sankara's interpretation and that " his (Govinda-
nanda's) attempts to get over the difficulty
certainly does not improve matters". The
 XXV

commentator neither mentions a difficulty of the

kind suggested, nor attempts to get over it.
He only takes this opportunity to give his views
on a somewhat connected topic which is neither
here nor elsewhere mentioned or discussed by
Sankara in any o£ his works, but which has
formed the subject of a wide divergence of
opinion among the later exponents and teachers
of the Advaita school, — viz., whether there is
one primeval avidya (universal ignorance) of
which the particular portion forming the limit-
ing adjunct of each Jiva is destroyed by the
Brahma-jnana (Knowledge of Brahman) which
brings release, or there is a different primeval
avidya special to each. Govindananda decides
in favour of the former, and holds that there i"^
no authority for the latter.
Dr. Thibaut before closing the present
topic, remarks as follows: — "In connection with
the two passages discussed, we meet in the
fourth adhyaya with another passage, which
indeed has no bearing on the distinction of apara
and paravidya, but may yet be shortly referred
to in this place as another and altogether un-
 XXVI

doubted instance of Sankara's interpretations not

always agreeing with the text of the Sutras."
The passage referred to consists of Sutras 7-16
of the third pada which contains the view^s of
three teachers Badari, Jaimini, and Badarayana.
Dr. Thibaut admits, though unwillingly, that
Sankara's procedure in detaching from the rest
of the adhikarana the sutras w^hich set forth
Badarayana's view " though not possible, yec
cannot be said to be altogether illegitimate." He
gives no discussion of the subject. He proceeds,
however, 'to remark that, as Badari's view is
mentioned first and Jaimini^s afterwards, the
former is the purvapaksha, and the latter is the
siddhanta and that Sankara is wrono^ in deviatinof
from the rule which regards the concluding
statement (upasamhara) as containing the autho-
ritative doctrine. We have already discussed
this view at length and stated our grounds for
rejecting Dr. Thibaut's estimate of the compara-
tive importance of the upakrama and the upa-
samhara. There is, therefore, no need to repeat
the arguments already advanced.
Dr. Thibaut affirms that even the Upani-
shads do not support w^hat he calls above "the
 XXVll

distinction of apara and paravidya. We shall

fjiiote passages-a few only out of hundreds which
can be quoted — Avhich expressly and unques-
tionably make such a distinction. ''nTffSrTft^
^T^frT cTf^cT^ %^t q^^ffT ; ^T^ r^^ ^^ ^]^^^\^ ^^ %
^^^ri:%?T % f^^^RTri:' " Where there is what seems
a duality, there one sees the other ; where all
has become the Atraan, for this person who is
to see whom ? Who is to know whom f" ^^^
jrr^c^2?fcT JTi^q^^ofiili frT^f|^Rii% ^ ^jitf ; 3T«r ^i^ri^c^-
q?T^T2T^ufi^Rnt^Rn% ^^^qr?^' "Where one sees not
another, hears not another, knows not another,
that is unlimited (bhuma) ; where one sees
another, hears another, knows another, that is
limited (a/pam)," '^i I ^m cf^'icTqi , 3?^ ^^¥\ cT'^T^r'
That which ^is unlimited is immortal ; that
which is limited is mortal/^ 'fScTT^Tll vr ^^\^\
'^ 3 c!ft^l-^^i% ', ' e?^ I ^5T^ 5?THISI% ' "Fear
arises where there is a second." "There is no
second there." " 0 Janaka, you have gained fear-
lessness." Page after page may easily be filled up
with passages contrasting two kinds of existence
and two corresponding kinds of knowledge — one
in which there are seeming differences of all
kinds, and anotlier in which all difference vanishes
 XXVIU

and the One only remains without a second.

The Mundakopanishad (I. 4. 5) expressly and by
name makes the distinction between paravidya
and aparavidya — the distinction of which
Dr. Thibaut denies the existence in the
Upanishads. It may be perhaps contended
that the aparavidya therein referred to is
the purely external or ritualistic section
{karmakanda) of the Hindu religion. But
various upasanas (devout meditations) are also
taught in the karmakanda, and are technically
known as karmangavabaddha-upasana^ devout
meditation fixed on what forms a limb of (\ edic)
ritual. Even the upasanas taught in the Upani-
shads are of the same kind, — purely mental.
So, both kinds of devout meditation — whether
fixed on a limb of Vedic ritual or on the
supreme personal God — form part of the inferior
knowledge spoken of here. Wherever the un-
conditioned Brahman is referred to in the Upa-
nishads, itis the higher knowledge (paravidya),
not the aparavidya (lower knoAvledge) that is
kept in view. The Kenopanishad also contrasts
in express terms the lower knowledge of^ the
Personal God (upasana or bhakti) from the higher
 XXIX

knowledge {vidya proper) of the One Existence

or Reality :— ' ^\^ ^ c^ ftl^ ^^ ^Rf^^^Tf^cT '
" That is Brahman which you know thus, not
this which you thus worship. " This sentence is
repeated again in successive passages in the
context where it occurs so as to impress the
difference between the knowledore of the hiofher
Brahman and the devout meditation on the
lower Brahman on the mind of the disciple.
We maintain also that the same contrast is
brought out in the famous passage of
Chhandogya-Upanishad :— ' ^^ m^^^^^ 3TWI^^-
*i^lf|^i^' " In the beginning, Dear, there was Sat
(Existence, Reality) only — One only without
a second." The variety and multiplicity of the
phenomenal universe subsequent to creation is
here contrasted with the One Reality previously
existing. It is impossible to maintain for a
moment that the Upanishads do not propound —
for they do so in a hundred places in all possible
modes of expression — this distinction between a
hijiher and lower existence and knowledore of
which the latter does not, while the former does,
lead to final release from Samsara.
Dr. Thibaut proceeds :— '' If we have not
 XXX

to discriminate between a higher and lower

knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the
distinction of a higher and a lower Brahman is
likewise not valid. But this is not a point to
be decided at once on the negative evidence of
the fourth Adhyaya, but regarding which the
entire body of the Vedanta- Sutras has to be con-
sulted. And intimately connected with this
— in fact, one with it from a certain point of
view — is the question whether the Sutras afford
any evidence of their author having held the
doctrine of Maya, the principle of illusion by
the association with which the highest Brahman,
in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the
lower Brahman or Isvara." After the state-
ment of the above fairly exhaustive argument
in refutation of Dr. Thibaut's first contention,
we can now certainly maintain that it follows as
an undeniable consequence that the distinction
of a higher and lower Brahman can also be
maintained. We proceed to show that his
further arguments on this head are equally
baseless, and that both the Sutras and the
Upanishads maintain the distinction. Dr.
Thibaut says : — " Placing myself at the point of
 XXXI

view of a Sankara, I am startled at the outset bv

the second sutra of the first adhyaya which
undertakes to mve a definition of Brahman."
And why ? Brahman is defined in this sutra as
'' that whence the origination and soon (i. e. the
sustentation and absorption) of this world pro-
ceed/^ Dr. Thibaut holds that " the highest
Brahman is not properly defined as that from
which the world originates." And again :—
" That from which the world proceeds can by a
Sankara be accepted only as a definition of
Isvara, of Brahman which bv its association
with Maya is enabled to project the false
appearance of this world, and it certainly is as
improbable that the Sutras should open with a
definition of that inferior principle from whose
cognition therfe can accrue no permanent benefit,
as, according to a remark made above, it is un-
likely that they should conclude with a des-
cription ofthe state of those who know the
lower Brahman only and thus are debarred from
obtaining true release." " Furthermore, " in
later Vedantic writings, whose authors were
clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher
absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman
 XXXll

relating to Maya or the world, we meet with

definitions of Brahman of an altogether different
type." Dr. Thibaut mentions two of these
definitions, — " the current definition of Brahman
as Sat-chid-ananda " and the " samvid svayam-
prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought
which, in all time past, or future, neither starts
into being nor perishes."
In reply to these observations, we maintain
that Dr. Thibaut is wrong in saying that the de-
finition contained in the second sutra " can by a
Sankara be accepted only as a definition of Isva-
ra, of Brahman in association with maya." It
is a definition only of the absolute Brahman —
for Brahman, as Sankara states frequently, is
nitya-suddha, nitya-mukta^ always free from
association with maya. It has no positive attri-
butes by which it can be defined. It cannot, in-
deed, be defined, it is anirdesya ; it cannot be
known, agrdhya^ as it is one only without a
second. Whenever we give a definition of any
kind, the object is to produce a theoretical know-
ledge (Paroksha-jnana) of what is defined. A
definition mentions attributes {viseshanas) or
lakshanas (characteristics or differentiating qua-
 XXXlll

lities). In the former case, the purpose is to

exclude objects having attributes different from
those mentioned ; in the latter case, the purpose
is to exclude all other objects and to turn the
attention to the particular object in view. In
the case of Brahman, however, whether we de-
fine by viseshanas or lakshanas — by takin</ tat-
astha Jal'shanas (accidental attributes) as in the
second sutra, or by svarupa lakshanas (essential
characteristics), viz., Sat-chit-ananda — only the
absolute Brahman is taught. For there is in
reality no visishta or qualified Brhman. Dr. Thi-
baut is not justified in saying that the definition
contained in the second sutra " can by a Saiikara
be accepted only as a definition of Isvara," (i.e.)
of Brahman in association with maya, and not of
the pure or absolute Brahman. As the Advaitic
teacher Brahmanandaswami — quoting substanti-
ally Madhusudana Sarasvati — says in his Ratna-
vali, a commentary on the Siddhanta-Bindu: —

''^s^Tf^iq^c^J]^ ' •' All sentences which teach us cha-

racterising attributes, through the knowledge of
what seems to be attributed by the definition,
produce the knowledge of the undifferenced ob-
D
 XXXIV

ject which is only indicated — but not inquinated

— by the attributes mentioned." For example,
when we speak of a house as '' that on which a
crow was or is seen to sit " that serves to
define or indicate the house to us. The
sitting of the crow which serves to
define the house or indicate it to us is
not a characterising attribute which forms an
inseparable part of it. Similarly, the definition
in the second Sutra serves to indicate to us the
absolute Brahman and not Is vara, the Brahman
associated with maya, — for the Brahman, accor-
ding to the Advaitic doctrine, is eternally pure
and devoid of all attributes. Even the definition
of Brahman as Sat-chit-ananda does the same
thing, viz., it indicates the suddha or absolute
Brahman. Moreover, the object of the second
sutra is to describe Brahman as the cause of the
world— as both the operative and material cause
of the world — and not simply as pure and abso-
lute. The first sutra postulates the inquiry into
the absolute Brahman, as only the knowledge of
it can lead to release from Samsara and supreme
Bliss {nisreyasa). The author of the Sutra has
a practical aim in the systematic inquiry upon
 XXXV

which he starts, — viz., to help the inquirer in

his search after the goal of existence. The
second sutra, therefore, has first to define Brah-
man, not by means of its essential characteristics
which place it out of relation with the world —
but by what will, while not incpiinating it (for
that is impossible), bring it into relation with
the world of which the inquirer forms a part.
If Brahman were defined by essential charac-
teristics, ie.,
. by what it is in itself, that would
be entirely unintelligible and unpractical and
calculated to discourage and turn away the in-
quirer. The time for bringing out the essential
characteristics w^ould be when the uniform pur-
port of the entire Sastra has to be declared as
Tat or Brahman, (I. 1. 4), or when the inquiry
into the means (sadhana) of realisation of Brah-
man is finished and the time comes for declaring:
Brahman as the fruit (phala) of such realisation
(Adhyaya IV). To begin with Brahman as what
it is in itself — and without stating any relation
of any kind between it and the inquirer —
is to stultify the purpose with which the Sutra-
kara starts upon the inquiry into Brahman —
Brahma-jijnasa, stated in Sutra 1.
 XXXVl

Finally, we have the express statement in

the Prasna-Upanishad that the syllable Om ex-
presses both the higher and lower Brahman :—
'tTrrl ^m^\^ ^< "^m =^ ^^ ^^^W.' " 0 Satyakama,
this Omkara is both the Higher and lower Brah-
man." In the Mandukya Upanishad, it is
pointed out that the involucrum of the soul in
the stage of sushupti is the beatific vesture or
Ananda-maya-kosha. The individual soul in
this state is styled Prajna, while the universal
soul in the same state, the internal ruler, is called
Isvara. Speaking of this universal ruler, the
Upanishad says: — ' trq ^^^< ^ ^% ^^TS'cT^rrft rr^
^if^: ^^m 5?^T^M#T f| ^^Rt' " He is the lord of
universe, he is the knower of all, he is the inter-
nal ruler, he is the cause of all, from whom all
beings are born and into whom all are dissolved."
We have already had occasion to quote the state-
ment of the Kenopanishad, ' ^^ ^^ c# i¥k ^
2fi^^5qT^% ' "That only is Brahman which you
know, not this which you worship thus." Here
we have the distinction between Brahman as
g7ieya (the object of knowledge) and Isvara as
upasya^ (the object of devout meditation). Innu-
merable other passages may be quoted from the
 xxxvu

Upanishads to show the distinction between

Brahman and Iswara. As for the Sutras, we
have already overthrown Dr. Thibaut's argu-
ments directed a<j:ainst Sankara's reference of
the two adhikaranas of the second and third
padas in the Fourth Adhyaya to the absolute
Brahman. Hence, Dr. Thibaut's contention that
neither the Sutras nor the Upanishads contain
the distinction of the hio-her and lower Brahman
postulated by Sankara falls to the ground. The
distinction exists and is insisted upon everywhere
not only by implication but in express terms ;
and the same is the case also necessarily, with
the knowledo'e of the higher and the lower
Brahman.

Thirdly ^Do the Sutras hold — or do they not

hold — the doctrine of Maya? Here we deem it
necessary to point out that Sankara means by
Maya nothing more than Prakriti or matter. Ma-
j/a, prakriti, avidya, avyakta, avyaJcrita. are all
with him synonymous terms. To Sankara and,
therefore, to all his followers Maya or avidya
(ignorance) is hhava-rupa, positive in its charac-
ter,— not ahhava-rupa, not negative only, for it
 XXXVlll

is vyavaharika-satta^ phenomenal existence. The

relation in which phenomena — matter or maya
or Prakrit! — stand to the "Noumenon, Brah-
man, Atman is similar to that in which
pratibhasika or apparent existence stands to
vyavaharika existence. When we see silver in
place of the mother-of-pearl, silver cannot exist
for us if there is not the substratum of the
mother-of-pearl. Secondly, as soon as the
mother-of-pearl is perceived, the perception of
silver ceases. Similarly, no material world of
phenomena can exist for the perceiver if there is
not the noumenal substratum of the Atman ;
also as soon as the Atman is known, the percep-
tion of the world ceases. As Atman is Chait-
anya-svarupa^ Knowledge in its essential nature,
the phenomenal world which ceases with the
knowledo'e of the Atman is of the nature of
Avidya, ignorance, and positive in its character,
[n relation to the Atman, however, there is no
essential difference between Vyavahara and
Pratibhasa (phenomenal existence and appa-
rent existence). Both cease for him who has
known the Atman, and therefore for him
both are unsubstantial. As between themselves.
 XXXIX

however, there is a good deal of difference, — for

the transiency of Pratibhasa is as the poles apart
from the transiency of Vyavahara. The
transiency of the former is the transiency of
the state of dream ; the transiency of the latter
means the transiency of the finite (which may
endure for {V3ons upon a^ons and then disappear)
in relation to the Infinite vv^hich exists the same
for all eternity. Both Vyavahara and
Pratibhasa are positive in character,— 'for during
the time perception lasts, they exist outside the
mind. They are not the creations of the mind
as with the V'ijnanavadins, Buddhistic idealists.
The Advaitins are realists, for they hold that
only a thing which exists in the external world
can be known by the perceiving mind. That
which does not exist is like the horns of a hare;
it is silnya^ abhava, and so cannot become an
object of perception to the mind of man. Both,
however, are transient. Apparent existence
(Pratibhasa) ceases when its substratum of
Vyavahara is perceived; phenomenal existence
(V^yavahara) ceases when its substratum of the
Atman is perceived — We have given this
lengthy explanation, and even repeated one or
 xl

two ideas again and again, so that we may make

clear what we shall proceed to say. It does not
seem always quite clear to the mind of Dr
Thibaut that — with Sankara — Maya, avidya (ig-
norance), prakriti, avyakta, akasa, &c., are all
synonymous terms. Sankara states this express-
ly in his bhashya on i, 4, 3. " STT^^rfc^^T f| m
^t^^T%: 9T52TTfr^?^f^^T rr^rT^s^Tfj frf%-

•'That causal potentiality fof the world) is of the

nature of ignorance (nescience); it is denoted
by the term undeveloped ... this undeveloped
(principle) is in some places denoted by the term
Akasa... in some places it is denoted by the
term Akshara...in some places it is spoken of as
Maya". Dr Thibaut makes also another mis-
take when he says " Maya constitutes the upa-
dana, the material cause of the world ". This
is no doubt right from the purely Vyavaharic
stand -point, but not from the ultimate and
correct point of view. For, to Sankara, Brahman
is the only ultimate and absolute reality which,
when known, stultifies the rest. So, ultimately.
Brahman must be the updddna or material cause
of both the Non-manifested (or undeveloped)
 xli

Avyakta (or Maya or Avidya, Akasa, &c.) and

of its emanation, the manifested world. ' Hence
the Sutra i. 4, 23. Hence, also, Sankara ex-
plains as follows in his bhashya on that sutra: —
'^qr^R^R'Jr ^ ^^r^gT^'ct^zf (^wtT^R^ ^'' '' Brah-
man is to be acknowledged as the material
cause as well as the operative cause." If these
remarks are borne in mind, we shall easily see
how egregiously Colonel Jacob errs when he
says that " the word Maya is nowhere used by
Sankara as a synonym for avidya, but is express-
ly said to be produced by it,— and that in no
sense whatever does he regard it as the cause of
the world," Further on he says: — "Maya has
without doubt the sense of an illusory appea-
rance, produced and withdrawn at will ; but,
where in the whole range of Vedantic literature
is there anything predicated of avidya.''' No
doubt this is in one sense true, — for the word
mai/a has also another meaning that of an
illusory appearance, as in the state of dream;
But it is also used, as already explained, as
synonymous with avidya, prakriti, avyakta, &c.
and it is in this sense that it is an emanation of
Brahman, and that Brahman is — as above ex-
 xlii

plained by reference to Sutra iv. 2, 3 and the

bhashya on it— the upadana or material cause
(prakriti) of the phenomenal world (avidya). It
must be noted that the word 'prakriti means in
this Sutra only the upadana or material cause, —
while above it has been shown to be also synony-
mous with avidya, avyakta, and maya. Colonel
Jacob says that '' the phrases arft^l^feTrf, 3Tf^r-
^rr, 3Tr%^r^2f^, an^gn^rRii^'T, 3TT%^Rf*TTT, and ont^r-
JT^T^rPTcf literally swarm in the bhashya, while
such compounds as iTRl^feqcT, &c. , are nowhere
to be found. This makes no difference, if the
above explanations are borne, in mind. Sankara,
however, used the word *tt?TT^#?^ in his Dakshina-
murti-stotra which is surely an authentic work
of his, for it is commented upon in his Mana-
soUasa by the famous Vartikakara, Suresvara.
The following passage also of the Bhashya
clearly shows that maya is used as synonymous
with world in a compound: — "T^mcJTJf^g ^^Mo^MT-
?^2T^(^l^r^ m^\^^^\^^ ^ ^^h^^^^^ " "The non-
activity of the Highest self is inherent in his
own nature, and his moving power is inherent in
(or due to association Avith) Maya. " Colonel
Jacob says that later on Maya came to be used
 X liii

as the associate of J iva, and avidya as the asso-

ciate o£ Isvara. This is because Maya, as above
stated, has two senses. Sankara used them in
both senses, and the word must be understood
differently to suit different places. The words
ajnana and avidya are now-a-days used also in
both these senses, as when we speak of mulajnana
and tulajnana (original and partial ajnana),
mulavidya and tulavidyci (original and partial
avidya).

Now, let us proceed to examine Dr. Thi-

baut's arguments for his contention that the
Sutras do not contain the doctrine of Maya, —
that is, they do not support the view that the
world is only phenomenal, not noumenal, exis-
tence, like the Atman. As already explained,
this is what the Advaita doctrine means when it
speaks of the unreality of the world. Dr. Thi-
baut refers to ii. 1, 6 which contains the Vedan-
tin's reply to the Sankhyan objection that the
non-intelligent world cannot spring from an in-
telligent principle. The reply, as the Sutra
states it, is, ''^^rT ^" " But it is seen,'' i.e., it
is a matter of common observation that non-
 xliv

intelligent things are produced from beings

endowed with intelligence ; hair and nails, for
instance, spring from animals, and certain insects
from dung. Dr. Thibaut objects to this reply as
follows :— " An argument of this kind is alto-
gether out of place from the point of view of the
true Sankara. According to the latter, the non-
intelligent world does not spring from Brahman
in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so
far as it is associated with maya. Maya is the
upadana of the material world, and Maya itself
of a non-intelligent nature." This must appear a
manifest blunder to those who have followed us
in our explanation above regarding the ultimate
relation of Maya to Brahman as stated in i. 4-23,
— Maya as an emanation (Vivarta) of Brahman.
Brahman is the vivarta-updddna of Maya. This
is the ultimate doctrine of Advaita. It is only
when we take the manifested world into conside-
ration that the undifferentiated (A vyakta or Maya)
is the upadana of the differentiated and manifest-
ed world. But Brahman itself is upadana of
Maya — just as the mother-of-pearl is the uapdana
of silver. Hence the instances above alleged of
the production of hair and nails from animals are
 X Iv

closely analogous. For in these cases as well as

in the emanation of Maya from Brahman, that
which is non-intelligent springs from that
which is intelligent, and thus the reply to the
Sankhyan objection is an appropriate one. Dr.
Thibaut entirely misses the point by his failure
to understand or remember the explanation given
in i, 4, 2^. — Dr. Thibaut next takes up Sutra 9
following of the same first pada of the same
Adhyaya II, and holds that the illustrative
instances adduced in this Sutra are " singularly
inappropriate if viewed in connection with the
doctrine of Maya. " And why ? In the cases
adduced, viz., things made of clay, golden
ornaments, and the fourfold, complex of organic
beings, thev do not, when re-absorbed into their
original material causes impart to the latter
their individual qualities. According to Dr.
Thibaut, these instances do not apply here, for
he thinks that, " according to Sankara the
world is not merged in Brahman, but the
special forms into which the upadana of the
world, i. e., Maya, had modified itself are
merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to
Brahman is not changed therebv''. But, as
 xlvi

already stated, Brahman is the cause o£ the

world, and in this very sutra Sankara points out-
(and we give his words as rendered by Dr.
Thibaut himself at p. 311 of Vol. I of his
translation of the Brahma-sutra Bhashya): —
" That the identity of cause and effect (of
Brahman and the world) holds good indis-
criminately with regard to all time (not only the
time of re-absorption) is declared in many scriptu-
ral passages; as, for instance, * This everything is
that Self,' ' The Self is all this,' ' The immortal
Brahman is this before,' 'AH this is Brahman! "
Sankara also says: — " The objection that the
effect would impart its qualities to the cause at
the time of re-absorption is formulated too
narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect
being admitted, the same would take place during
the time of subsistence of the effect, previous to
its re -absorption {Op. cit, p. 311). The truth
once more is that Dr. Thibaut forgets that we
are here dealing with the ultimate Vedanta doc-
trine that Brahman is the upadana (or prakriti,
as the Sutra 23 of i. 4 calls it) of Maya or the
world, and that from the stand -point of emana-
tion (vivarta). Sankara goes on to point out: —
 xlvii

'* With regard to the case referred to in the

Sruti'passages, we refute the assertion of the
cause being affected by the effect and its qualities,
by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious
super-impositions of Nescience, and the very
same argumerit holds good with reference to re-
absorption also." Hence we see how appropriate
in this connection is the example adduced by San-
kara: — *' As the magician is not in all three times
affected by the magical illusion (maya) produced
by himself so the highest Self is not affected
by the world-illusion (samsara-maya)." Dr.
Thibaut, strangely enough, says here in a
footnote: — " Sankara's favourite illustration of
the magician producing illusive sights is— signi-
ficantly enough — not known to the Sutras." We
see the appropriateness of the illustration, and
that suffices for our purpose. Just as the
magical illusion springs from the magician,
so the world springs from, — or, rather, is an
emanation of — Brahman, and not from "non-
distinct maj^a" as Dr. Thibaut supposes in the
passage formerly quoted. In the latter case,
Brahman w^ould not be spoken of as the cause of
the world, as in so many of the passages we
 xlviii

have quoted. The doctrine is the same as that

which is enunciated in " ^\^ ^J^^^f^ ari^i^Jr^r-
^^t^^' (Ch. Up. VI. 2,1) "In the biginning
there was Sat only, — One only without a second."
Sankara explains here as follows: — " Is not this
(the universe) Sat (Pure Being) even now, that
it is specified as being so in the beginning? No.
Wherefore,, then the specification? Even now
this is Sat only but differentiated into Names
and Forms — the object of mental perception
appropriate to the word ' This,' and so it is idam
also; while, before creation, it was only the
object of knowledge appropriate to the word
Sat." That is, before creation there was no
object capable of being known as this, and there
was only Sat. — Dr. Thibaut then takes up
the illustration given in Sutras 24 and 25, and
supposes that he has here discovered an objection
to Sankara's doctrine of vivarta-vada and the
production of the world of illusion. In Sutra
24, he considers the illustration of milk turning
curd " strangely chosen ", for the curd is as
real as milk, and not illusive. Sankara is
quite aware of the fact — for he uses the word
" parinama " himself to denote the change
 xlix *

undergone by milk, but he pcjints out that tlie

object of the illustration is to show that, as the
milk turns into curd "by itself" and "without the
aid of extraneous means " — " m^^^ ^T%f|«j^l^
W^JTcTS^T^^ ^l^ ^l^^t^" — so " Brahman al-
though one only, is owing to its manifold
powers able to transform itself, just as milk is,
into manifold effects." "i^^^rf^ ^f^oti ri%^5F-
%#FTTc^Rif^^f|f%5rqR'jr[ff ;jqq?i& " "The One Brah-
man is owing to its various powers, able
to transform itself, just as milk ib,' into
various efiects." Illustrations are bi'oLitrht
in to establish particular points only by
means of analogical reasoning. If agreement is
demanded in every respect, they cease to be
illustrations. Here, the analogy turns only upon
the circumstance of the capability of a thing to
produce manifold effects by itself and without
the co-operation of extraneous auxiliary means.
As regards the illustration given in the next
sutra. Dr. Thibaut again speaks of its referring
to " the real creation of real things." He really
misses the point altogether. For, the illustra-
tion, "Gods and the like," is brought in to meet
the objection that milk cannot be brought for-
E
ward as analogous to Brnhman on tlie ground
that the latter is intelligenr, ^\hile the former is
not Gods, fathers) rishis, the spider, &c., are
adduced as analogous to Brahman in possessing
intelligence and also as possessing the capacity
of creating by their will many and various objects
without extraneous aids. Here a^'ain the objects
compared with each other differ in other respects,
but the atialogy holds in regard to the particular
point in the author's view.

Dr. Thibant then takes up " the latter part

of the fourth pada of the first adhyaya" in order
to show that " the maya doctrine was not present
to the mind of the Sutrakara/' We have already
made more than one reference to this seciion of
the work. Dr. Thibant now refers to it to show

that there is " not a single word in it to indi-

cate, had such been the author's view, that
Brahman is the material cause of the world
through Maya only and that the world is uin-eal.*'
He says further that the term '* parinainjit" in
Sutra 20 denotes '^ that very theory to wjjich the
followers of Sankara are most violently opposed,
viz., the doctrine according to which the world
 li
is not a mere vivarta i.e., an illnsorv mnnifesta-
tion of Brahmjin, but the effect of Brahmnn
under^oint^ a real ch;inge! The use in a single
8Utra of a word which has a particular signi-
ficance in ordinary parlance cannot un<io the
general trend of the entire doctrine as established
by the whole work. As the pure Brahman is
the one real existence recognised in the Sutras
of V3'asa, the word parinama in this Sutra can
have but one me(ining, viz., effectuation in
general, without implying also the reality of the
effect. Hence Govindananda, Sankara's com-
mentator, points out here " ar^r ^ TtVutt^^*^:
^T^Jrnrr^' rT^JF?irTT«iftT f^^^^r^^ ^^^^\mK'^\\*' "In
this Sutra the word parinama is used to mean
the production of an effect in general, for the
vivarta- vada is to be propounded later on in
Sutra ii. 1, 14. — ' rT^^q^^RK'^vnr^s^irY'^q: ' This
Sutra has reference to the statemefit in the

Chhandogya-U[»anishad : — '' ^i^K^vpif f^^l^'^r ^in^4

^^%^f ^^JJ." '' The effect is only a name based
upon speech, — what we call clay is the oidy
reality, (pots &c > being mere name.-)." The Upd-
dana cause which here is Brahmati is the oidy
reality. The use of the word "e^q['* '' Reality "
 Ill

in, reference to the cause implies the unreality

of the effect taken separately and in itself.
The effect ( f^^i^J^) is somewhat like what the
Yogis call Vikalpa: — " 5T5^|!RT3T[m ^^3^^r t%^j^:"
" Vikalpa is that which is of the nature of
knowledge arising from mere verbal enuncia-
tion, with no object corresponding to it."
This is true at least from the point of view of
one who has realised the Absolute Brahman.
For him — and from the ultimate point of view
of the Sruti — the cause (Brahman) is the one
reality, and there is no real effect apart from
the cause. As in later times, though the words
avidya and may a have become restricted in
their significance to the limiting conditions,
respectively, of Isvara and Jiva, the word
maya is still used, as by Sankara, in the sense
of avidya, — so jjarinama can be here understood
as having been used in this Sutra in the
general sense of effectuation (production of an
effect), without implying also its reality, as
pointed out by Govindaiianda.

Dr. Thibaut refers next to iii, 2, 11. He

writes : — " The wording of the Sutras is so
 liii

eminentl}' concise and vague that I find it

impossible to decide which of the two com-
mentators isto be accepted as a trustworthy
guide." We do not, therefore, propose to offer
any remarks here. It is strange, however, that,
having used the strong word "impossible",
Dr. Thibaut should proceed to state with an
emphasis and assurance for which he offers no
justification that " so much is certain that none
of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpreta*
tion proposed by Sankara." It is enough that
Sankara's interpretation is justifiable and not
contradicted by what precedes or follows, or by
the general trend of his Vedic doctrine.

The next reference — and the last made by

Dr. Thibaut in this connection — is to Sutra iii,2.
The word Maya occurs in this Sutra, and is
applied to the illusory perceptions of the dream -
state. Dr. Thibaut remarks that even " if we
accept Sankara's own interpretation " of Maya
as " unsubstantial illusion," — '' the Sutra proves
that Badarayana did not hold the doctrine of
the illusory character of the world, or that, if
after all he did hold the doctrine, he used the
 liv

term ' Maya ' in a sense altoj^ether different

from that in which Sankara employs it. " And
why ? Dr. Thibaut replies — '* That the world
perceived by waking men is Maya even in a
higher sense than the world presented to the
dreaming consciousness is an undoubted fact of
the Sankara N'edanta." Exactly so, and it is to
mark this difference that the Sutrakara uses
the compound word " irr^rRf^iJ^" maya-matram^
not viaya by itself. While the jayrat (waking)
and su<huptl (sleeping) states are maya (illusory)
svapna (dreaming) state is mnyamatra^ emphati-
cally, exceptionally and exclusively illusory.
Neither of" the two alternative opinions stated
by Dr. Thibaut regarding Badarayana's concep-
tion of Maya is correct. It is clear, therefore,
that Badarayana did hold the doctrine of the
illusive character of the world and that he did
use m:«ya in a sense identical with that in which
Sankara employs it. This is made clearer still
when we con>ider the reason assigned by the
Sutnt for calling the state of dream mayamatra,
and not simply maya. That reason is :—
"^i?^^^RriT5?*^cT^f;qc^i?t'' **on account of its
nature not manifesting all the attributes of
 Iv

reality." It does not present the attributes of

occurring in time and place and of remaining un-
falsified subsequently-attributes which are found
to apply to the state of wakefulness. But have
dreams, then, not a particle of reality about them?
The answer is given in the next sutra. That
answer is that dreams have this element of rea-
lity in common with several occurrences of the
waking state, viz., that they are indicative of
the future. This — the Sutrakara goes on to
say — is a fact stated in Sruti and also attested
by experts in the science of dreams. — Thus these
Butras regarding the state of dream clearly prove
that the Mava doctrine, as Sankara has enuncia-
ted it, is held also by the Sutrakara. It must not
be forgotten^ here that, as Dr. Thibaut has
pointed out, this adhikarana is the only one in
which the Sutrakara himself has made use of the
term maya. Our discussion of Dr Thibaut's
views, though protracted, is not unduly so, as it
has brought out clearly the complete coincidence
of views existing between the Sutrakara and the
bhashyakara regarding the illusory character (the
vyavaharlka — not the paramarthika — reality) of
the world.
 Ivi

AVe now take up the fourth and last of the

points stated by Dr. Thibaut — the relation of
the Jiva (individual soul) to Brahman. Do the
Sutras, or do they not, lay down the doctrine
that the Jiva is in reality identical with Brah-
man and appears different only by adhyaroj)a or
the false surmise due to ignorance. Dr. Thibaut
truly remarks that " this question is in fact only
another aspect of the Maya question." Now
that the Maya question is disposed of and the
objections against Sankara's doctrine regarding
it shown to be unfounded, we may regard the
identity of Jiva and Brahman also as proven.
Dr. Thibaut, however, thinks that it " yet
requires a separate treatment." Let us, again,
critically follow his argument.

Dr. Thibaut says : — ''The Sutras in which

the size of the individual soul is discussed

can hardly be understood in Sankara's sense".

The Sutras referred to are contained in

Ad^hy^ya II, Pada 11 (19-32) and form the

thirteenth adhikarana of the Pada, The
question discussed is whether the individual
soul is ami (minute) or vihhu (all- pervading).
 Ivii

Dr. Thibaiit refers us to his Conspectus. He

first finds fault with Sankara for the unusual
length to which he carries (in Sutras 19-2(S) the
preliminary statement of a view finally to be
abandoned in Sutra 29, but in the next breath
he abandons this position when he says : —
" Still it is not altogether impossible that the
purvapaksha should here be treated at greater
length than usual". He then turns to Sutra 29
which contains the siddhanta, and says :— " I
think there can be little doubt that Sankara'&
interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly
forced." And w^iy ? Dr. Thibaut's first argu-
ment is :— '" Nothing in the context warrants
the explanation of the first ''tat'' by buddhi.''-^-
This appears so because, as Dr. Thibaut himself
owns, he translates the Sutra, " leaving out the
non-essential word ' prajnavat '. In truth, this
word contains the illustration and gives us the
needed clue to the meaning of tat^ viz., upadhi.
Just as in the case of Isvara (the conditioned
Brahman) he is meditated upon as an/)/ an
(smaller than a grain of rice or barley), manomaya
(consisting of mind), &c., (Ch. Up. III. 14, 2, 3)
owing to his having the qualities of the limiting
 Iviii
I ...

adjuncts (npadhis), so also in the rase of Jiva

{prajna) the attribute of anutva is ascribed on
account of his being influenced by the quality
of his npadhi, viz., huddhi (mind). Prajna is
also called " %^r^: " he who faces the mind ",
for in is through his chiita{or huddhi) that the soul
returns to the ordinary or waking state from
the state of dream or sleep, and so the chitta or
buddhi is his upadhi and determines his condi-
tion and qualities. It is the illustration —
prajnavat — that determines the meaning of tat
in the Sutra. Dr. Thibaut's difficulty arises
from his attempts to determine the purport of
the sutra after " leaving out the non-essential
word prajnamif\ Nothing is non-essential in a
sutra ; and in this sutra, the illustration —
prajnavat — contains the essential and necessary
clue to its correct interpretation. Dr. Thibaut's
second argument in this connection is equally
flimsy. He says :-" It is more than doubtful
whether on Sankara's own system the qualities
of the buddhi — pleasure and pain, desire and
aversion, &c, — can with any propriety be said to
constitute the essential of the soul even in the
samsara state. The essential of the soul in
 lix

whatever state, according to Sankani*s system

is knowledge or intelligence ; whatever is due to
its association with buddhi is non-essential, or
more strictly, unreal, false" It is no doubt
false, but ihe Jiva does not know it by ex-
perience to be false. Owing to adhyasa or
avidya (ignorance) he has lost the knowledge of
what he is in truth and essence and has identifi-
ed himself with his upadhi, viz., the buddhi,
and even the body &c. Consequently, in the
samsara con lition, the essential quality of the
Atman is closed to him and he becomes, as the
sutra says, identified with the buddhi. — Dr.
Thibaut next turns to sutra 18 of the third
pada which describes the soul as gna- Here
again we are referred to his conspectus where he
remarks : — '* We can iiardly imagine that an
author definitely holding the views of Sankara
should, when propounding tiie important dogma
of the souFs nature use the term gna of which
the most obvious interpretation is 'gnatri., not
gnanam''^ Dr. Thibaut, in the first place, fails to
consider the reason given in the sutra, viz.,
"srer i^i" 'for this very reason.' For what reason?
The answer is,— for the reason mentioned
 Ix

ill the previous Sutra, (which is here referred to

and not explicity stated again, in order to avoid
repetition) — viz., that it is eternal, and not a
product. The gnatri — one who goes through
the act of cognition cannot be eternal, as such act
is absent during sleep. Hence gna cannot be
understood as gnatri^ but Sisjnanam (intelligence).
Moreover, Sruti has declared the abheda (non-
dift'erence or identity) of Jiva and Brahman in
such passages as "cTT^JTr%" '' That art Thou,"^
and in such passages as "^^ |lR«??r'cT ^^ " Brah-
man is Existence, Knowledge and Bliss " de-
clare the nature of Brahman to be jnanam. Fur-
ther more, the Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad
says : — " ?r f| ?|tg[^qR^TqT f^^TcT '' "Never is there
the cessation of the knowledge (intelligence) of
the seer/' i. e., whether there is, or there is not^
the knowledge of the world of phenomena, the
intelligence which is the basis of the possibility
of such knowledge cannot cease. In the Sutra
under discussion, this non-cessation or eternality
of intelligence is the reason assigned for the Jiva
being called gna. Hence gna cannot mean gnatri
(Knower), for the phenomenal knowledge ceases
daily in sleep and so there is then strictly no
 Ixi

knovver (Jna). Hence only jnanam or know-

ledge in its essence remains, and that is the only
sense we can assign to jna in the sutra. Finally^
we have to consider why the Sutrakara uses the
word y'na in the Sutrn. and not jiiatri. In the
u pan ishads there are passages in which the
Atman is called Jnatrl^ and also passages in
which it is spoken oi^i^ jnanam. Now, the Sutra-
kara has to decide for us which is the real and
final meaning. In framing the sutra, he often has
in view the brino^ino^ into our view and suo^ofest-
ing the Purvapaksha tliat has to be considered,
so that the reply thereto may be given. In
other adhikaranas also he has followed this

course, — as, for example, in "^^T ^fn:v"?r:" (I, 8,

14) and " 3TT5T^^*r^TS^"^THTri^ " (I. 1, 12). The wor-
ding of the Sutra is such that in both cases the
purvapaksha is suggested. For, really, the in-
quiry in these adhikaranas does not relate to
whether dahara is Brahman or not, or whether
anandamaya is Brahman or not, — for no such
doubt can possibly arise — but to suggest the
purvapaksha and base upon it the argument to
be put forward for the siddhanta. Similarly, in
the Sutra under discussion, only \i jna is used,
 IXIl

it will siiirgost for refutation the purvjipaksha

th.it atmni miy bo Msserted uliimitely to be
jnairi. The siifra mIso suggests the siddhanta.
For the pnityMysi '^^'^ (Km) has bo'h meanings
namely karta and bhava- The former is exclu-
ded, as alre.idy stated, by the reason assigned in
Sutra, ''a??T ^f '* '' for the same reason." So the
latter is the moaning to be taken. The question
for consideration is whether the Vyakarana
Sastra justifies the usage. The authority we
need is supplied by the Vartika Sutri, "^3f5f ^;";
and '•^" has the meaning of bhava, not karta.
So Dr. Thibaut's objection is futile to the last
degree.

The next sutra taken up for discussion by

Dr. Thibaut is ii, 3, 43. He calls the sutra
important. And why ? " The soul is distinctly
said to be a part (amsa) of Brahmati." But this
cannot dispose of the argument of the entire
work of Badarayana, nor of such passages of the
Upanishads as declare that the Atman is "ft^T^
ftf^^ ^FcT '' " without parts, without activity,
&cV — Sutra 50, " arr^T ir^ ^ ", if strictly in-
terpreted, states the pratibimba-vada, the doctrine
 Ixiii

that the Jiva is but a reflection of BrMhmnn, and

so unreal. No reason can be assigned for
interpreiing the word MS "Ir^PTT*?:'' "fallacious
argument." Dr. Thibaut remarks in this con-
nexion as follows: — "Every Sutra — and Sutra
50 forms no exception — being so obscurely
expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of
various, often totally opposed, iriterpretitions,
the only safe method is to keep in view, in the
case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general
drift and spirit of the whole work" If, so far,
we have succeeded in, overthrowini; Dr. Thi-
baut's arguments against Sankara's interpreta-
tions of the Sutras, it must be admitted that
" the general drift and spirit of the whole work
is in favour of his doctrine. Dr. Thibaut's final
remark is: — "As things stand, this one Sutra
cannot at any rate, be appealed to as proving
that the pratibimbavada which in its turn pre-
supposes the mayavada, is the teaching of the
Sutra.'* We have already, in refuting Dr. Thi-
baut's remarks on Sutra o of iii. 1^, established
the mayavada as the teaching of tlic Sutias, and
60 this Sutra 50 of ii, 3 is a confirmaiion of the
correctness of our view.
 Ixi V

Dr. Thibaut goes on to mention " some

other considerations to be met with here and
there in the Sutras," in order to establish his
conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the
doctrine of the absolute identity of Brahman and
Jiva. We shall take these seriatim. Dr. Thi-
baut first refers to what he calls " the important
Sutra ii, 1, 22, which distinctly enunciates that
the Lord is adhika^ i. e., additional to, or diffe-
rent from, the individual soul, since Scripture
declares the two to be different." A¥e have
already overthrown Dr. Thibaiut's argument to
show that the Sutras do not contain the distinc-
tion between a higher and lower knowledge
of Brahman, and demonstrated that the
distinction between a higher and lower Brah-
man is recognised in the work. So, where
the Sutras refer to the difference between che
individual soul and the supreme soul, the latter
refers to Isvara or Saguna-Brahman, and not
to the pure, undifferenced Atman. The further
remarks made by Dr. Thibaut in this connection
are, therefore, equally without point and fall to
the ground. We have also to state here that
Dr. Thibaut is entirely mistaken in supposing
 Ixv

that Sankara holds that '* the Sutrakara was

anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upani-
shads," or " that the greater part of the work
contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only." We
emphatically deny that there is any justification
for the remarks. Dr. Thibaut himself says :—
" Nowhere among the avowed followers of the
Sankara system is there any tendency to treat
the kernel of their philosophy as something to
be jealously guarded and forbidden.*' If this is
true of the followers of Sankara, it is equally
true of Sankara himself. There is nothinu in
his Bhashya to show that he held that the Sutras
of Vyasa contain only an exoteric doctrine, and
not the Vedanta doctrine in full. In fact, San-
kara states its follows the aim of the Sutras
almost at the very commencement of the work: —

'^^^ I ^^r =^r^*T^: ^^^\ ^^^cfm ^«ir ^^^^\ ^jfiJ:-

^^TtHWrqt R^^f%52TR: " " The study of the Upani-
shads is begun to remove this cause of all evil
(viz., the adhyasa or erroneous notion that the
internal organ is the self and vice versa) and to
attain to the knowledge of the absolute unity of
the self. As this is the purport of all the
 Ixvi

Upanishads, so we shall show it in this Sariraka-

Mirnamsa (or inquiry into the real nature of the
embodied Self)" — the sutras of Vyasa.
Dr. Tliibaut next proceeds to ascertain,
" independently of the sutras ", what is the
teaching of the Upanishads in order to show
that they (like the sutras) do not support the
four doctrines which form the essentials of
Sankara's Vedantic doctrine. But, before com-
mencing this inquiry, he remarks that, '^ even if
it could be shown that all the Upanishads teach
a consistent doctrine, we should not on that
account be entitled to assume that the sutras set
forth the same doctrine, as there were in anicent
India " several essentially differing schools all of
which lay claim to the distinction of being the
true representatives of the teaching of the
Upanishads and the Sutras ". We consider that
Dr. Thibaut does not speak here seriously and
is rather inclined to shirk the responsibility with
which he started when attempting to decide
whether Sankara rightly interpreted the
doctrine of the Sutras. Of course, to the repre-
sentatives ofthe different Vedanta Schools in
 Ixvii

Lndia their own traditions will necessarily

appear all -important. But Dr. Thibaiit who
has of his own accord set himself up as judge
between Sankara and Ramanuja belongs to no
j)articular tradition and is, in fact, an outsider.
Tf he can investigate the true doctrine of the
sutras, as he has set himself to do, in order to
show who is riofht and who is wronor in his in-
terpretation of the sutras as a whole or of parti-
cular parts of the treatise or of even individual
sutras, we cannot understand why he should
shrink from deciding for himself and for others
what is the true teaching of the Upanishads.
Thus only can he settle definitely the teaching
of the sutras for he holds that " the sutras
doubtless aim>at systemarisinii: the teachino-" of
the Upanibhads, and Badara3^ana never identified
himself with any one school, as Dr. Thibaut
seems to hint when he says that " Ramanuja
and the whole series of more ancient commen-
tators on whom he looked as authorities denied
that the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence
by no means impossible that Badarayana should
have done the same." If it had been known
that Badarayana, by his own express declaration
 Ixviii

in the sutras, had identified himself with any

one school or system, it would certainly not
have been regarded as a text- book by others.
The truth is that the Sutras, like the Upanishads,
are recognised as among the common sources of
the Indian religion and are claimed as authorities
equally by all schools of religious thought.

In beginning his inquiry into what he calls

"the important question as to the true teaching of
the Upanishads" he says"It is evident-and the im-
pression so created is only strengthened by a more
careful investigation-that they do not constitute
a systematic whole." Dr. Thibaut's reasons
are: — (1) Not only the different Upanishads,
but even the different sections of one and the
same Upanishad are assigned to different
teachers, and these teachers belong to different
sections of Brahmanical society, some being also
Kshattriyas (2) The period whose mental
activity is represented in the Upanishads was a
creative one, and so the thinkers who Were un-
fettered bytradition could not have propounded
a uniform doctrine. As regards the first of
these points, we have to remark that later on
 Ixix

Dr. Thibaiit himself: grants that there is in the

different Upanishads " an apparent uniformity
of leading conceptions." No doubt he says
immediately after that " there runs throughout
divergence in details, and very often not unim-
portant details/' If these seeming divergences
can be reconciled, uniformity will remain
throu«:hout, and Dr. Thibaut's idea that the
Upanishads do not teach a consistent system of
doctrine will have to be abandoned. For
instance, he thinks that the account of
creation given in Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad
(I, 4, 1) cannot be reconciled with what he
calls the account of creation given in the second
khanda of the sixth adhyaya of the Chhandogya-
(Jpanishad. fie says that the former speaks of
the " arman-purushavidhah, the self in the shape
of a person which is as large as man and woman
together, and then splits into two halves from
which cows, horses asses, goats, &c. are
produced in succession." In the latter, on the
otlier hand, it is said that " in the beginning there
existed nothing but the sat^ ' that which is ' and
that, feeling a desire of being many, ir emitted
out of itself ether, and then all the other
 Ixx

elements in due succession.'' Where the

difficulty lies in reconciling these two accounts
surpasses our comprehension. The self in the
shape of a person has a body, and such a body
can only come into existence after the elements
are created out of which the body of that person
can be fashioned, the body which he is to use
for the subsequent production of various
animals, male and female. So the account in
the Chhandogya-Upanishad gives the earlier
creation which is implied in the coming
into existence of the later functionary (spoken
of in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad as
atman-purushavidhah) who has the duty of
bringing into manifestation the variety of beings
in the world. Dr. Thibaut says of the account
in the Chhandogya passage that "it is fairly
developed Vedanta, although not Vedanta im-
plying the Maya doctrine." Here we have to
state, first, that the five bhutas or material
elements are not omitted in the Brihadaranyaka.
for a reference is made to them as the bodies or
manifestations of Brahman (in III. 1) which are
classified as murta (with fi)rm) and amurta (with-
out form.) Each Upanishad has its own method
 Ixxi

and point of view in approaching the 8ubj(*ct.

The Upanishads sometimes supplement each
other ; at other times they contain matter more
or less similar ; always their aim is the same,
viz., to state the nature of the Infinite as the
supreme goal and destiny of man's life and the
various stages of the road leading to it. There
is nothing in them which cannot be reconciled ;
and it is difficult to understand Thibaut's sneer
when he says that " none but an Indian Com-
mentator would be inclined and sufficiently
courageous to attempt the proof " which will
show that the accounts given in the different
Upanishads can be reconciled. As regards the
particular instance referred to by Dr. Thibaut of
the so-called divergence between the accounts of
creation as -given in the two Upanishads just
mentioned, he says that the identification by
Sankara of the atman puruiihavidhah with Viraj
or Virat-purusha or what he calls one special
form of Isvara is " the ingenious shift of an
orthodox commentator in difficulties and no
more.^' But no one who knows the Vedantic
doctrine as given in the Mandukya-Upanishad
or the Vedantic doctrine of the successive deve-
 Ixxii

lopment of creation from finer to grosser forms

of matter can have any doubt of the correctness
of Sankara's interpretation. The same doctrine
is found both in the earlier and later Upanishads;
and there is no difference of opinion here among
the leading Indian Schools of Yedanta. As
regards Dr. Thibaut's remark that the Chhando-
gya-passage (above referred to) does not "imply
the maya doctrine," we have already had occasion
to show that it does expressly — and not merely
by implication — state the maya doctrine or the
theory that the world of name and form is un-
real, and so there is no need to repeat here what
has been already stated. The reader must also
be aware how we have refuted his entire arofu-
ment against Sankara's doctrine of the unreality
of the world. Finally, Dr. Thibaut's idea that
the (jeriod of the Upanishads was a creative one
and that therefore it could not have given rise
to a uniform doctrine cannot be acceded to. A
purely a jjriori argumentation can have no
validity against a matter of fact. No amount
of mere argumentation can dispose of plain facts.
As Sankara says: — ''^ f| ?SS3"?T^ ^\^" " what
is a matter of direct perceptional experience can-
 Ixxiii

nbt be declared to be contrary to reasoning/*

As a matter of fact the Upanishads have always
been regarded as a consistent system of doctrine.
The Rishis maintained the traditions of the
system. The Sutras of Badarayana are the
treatise in which those traditions are embodied
in a closely reasoned form. We have already
exposed the baselessness of Dr. Thibaut's idea
that Sankara invented a system of Vedanta from
his own inner cogitations. The Upanishads
themselves declare that the doctrine taught by
them has been transmitted through a long
succession of teachers beginning with "Svayam-
bhu Brahma" (Brahma the Self-born) mention-
ed in the Vamsa-brahmana. So it cannot be
right to say that any one discovered or created
the ideas of the V^edanta system by a process of
intuition or inspiration. Especially is it
extremely inappropriate to speak, as Dr.
Thibaut does, of " the methods which the
different commentators employ in systematising
the contents of the Upanishads", — for neither
the methods nor the system can be said
to be their own, when even the seers of
the Upanishads claim to transmit the ancient
 Ixxiv

teaching and even enumerate the names of those

who have maintained the tradition.

Dr. Thibaut next reverts to the question

(already discussed in connection with the
Sutras) concerning the ultimate fate of those
who attained to a knowledge of Brahman and
marshals together a number of passages
(pages cvii and cviii of his Introduction) related to
various vidyas or upasanas which secure to
those who devote themselves to them the world
of Brahman. He goes on to say : — " All these
passages are as clear as can be desired. Fhe
soul of the sage who knows Brahman passes
out by the sushumna, and ascends by the path
of the gods to the world of Brahman there to
remain for ever in some blissful state. But, accor-
ding: to Sankara, all tfiese texts are meant to
set forth the result of a certain inferior know-
ledge only, of the knowledge of the condi-
tioned Brahman. Ev^en in a passage apparently
so entirely incapable of more than one interpre-
tation as Brih-Up-VI-2, 15, the 'True' which
the holy hermits in the forest are said to worship
is not to be the highest Brahman, but only
 Ixxv

Hiranyagarbha ! And why ? Only because tlie

system demands it, the system which teaches
that those who know the highest Brahman
become on their death one with it, without

having to resort to another place". The

remarks made in the preceding paragraph as
well as those made in an earlier stat{e mui?t be
enough to show that the system is older than
Sankara and that he was only an interpreter —
not the originator — of it. In the second place.
Dr. Thil)aut is mistaken in saying that " those
who asceini by the path of the gods to the
world of Brahman go there to remain for ever
in some blissful state. For, in commenting on
Sutra 10 (sutra 9, according to Ramanuja) of
the third pruia of the Fourth Adhyaya,
*' %mm^ cT^^'-^^'Ji ^ffri: q^m>THi^ '' On the passing
into destruction of the effected world of
brahman, the souls go together with its ruler to
what is higher than that world ; for so it is
declared in the Sruti." Both Sankara and

Ramanuja agree in interpreting " ^iq't^^ '' to

mean '' upon the passing into destruction of the
effected world of Brahman." Ramanuja states
distinctly that the world of Brahman referred
 Ixxvi

to is the world of Hiranyagarbha. Sankara

holds the same view, though the fate of the
released souls is with him different from what
it is in the system of Ramanuja. Thirdly^ Dr.
Thibaut's objection to Sankara's interpretation
of the '* True " in Brih. Up. VI. 2, 15 as
Hiranyagarbha is altogether untenable. For,
those who practise this worship are stated
immediately after to ascend by the path of the
o^ods to the world of Brahman. Therefore,
this world of Brahman is also — as stated in
the sutra above referred to, and as both Sankara
and Ramanuja agree, — the place of Hiranya-
garbha. Dr. Thibaut's remarks above quoted
are entirely out of place and seem to show that
he has a very imperfect comprehension of the
subject.
Dr. Thibaut next takes up for comment
Sankara's interpretation of Brih. Up. VI. 4-6,7,
which contrasts the fate of him who has desires
and who consequently enters into a new body
on leaving the old one with the fate of
the sage who is free from all desires. The
import of this passage has beew already discussed
at length in dealing with Dr. Thibaut's criticism
 Ixxvii

of Sankara's interpretation of the Sutras of

VyasH, ii, 2, 12—14. He here says that *'this
interpretation of the purport of the entire
chapter is not impossibly right." But he
proceeds to say that " the purport of the clause
may simply be that the soul and vital spirits do
not go anywhere else, i. e., do not enter a new
body, but are united, somehow or other, with
Brahman, — not as Sankara understands it, "that
his vital spirits do not pass out," i. e., do not
ascend to the world of Brahman. That San-
kara's interpretation is the correct one is demons-
trated bythe circumstance pointed out in iii, 2, ii,
viz., that on attaining to the knowledge of
Brahman, his pranas get dissolved here, —
"3Tt^ ^«?^?ft^?^"— Finally, Dr. Thibaut points
to what he calls " a new difficulty '' in connec-
tion with the slokas quoted in sections 8 and 9.
We have already stated the Advaitic view
regarding y/rrt Parana (con text) as determining the
interpretation of passages in accordance with the
principle of ekavakyata. It is true, therefore, —
as Dr. Thibaut says — that "the slokas have
manifestly to be connected with what is said in
the latter half of (> about the owner of the para
 Ix X villi

vidya." Sankara explains the slokas so as to

make them accord with the context, and we
have to be thankful that he renders us the help
we need, and that he is able to render it. There
is nothing, however, in all this to show either
that there is no consistent doctrine in the
Upanishads or that those who attempt to unfold
that doctrine are making a mistake. Dr.
Thibaut is clearly also mistaken in supposing —
without offering the least justification for it- that
there is in the Upanishads anything like a dis-
tinction between what he calls an '' older notion "
of a wise man going by the path of the gods to
the world of Brahman and a later and, if we
like, more philosophic conception of Brahman
as a man's self for the attainment of which no
motion of any kind is needed on man's part.
In making this supposition, he virtually admits
all that he fought for against Sankara, — i. e., he
admits that the Upanishads teach the distinction
of a lower and higher Brahman and, therefore,
all that follows from it as a consequence.

Dr. Thibaut next discusses the second

Brahmana of the Third Adhyaya of the Brihad-
 Ixxix

aranyaka. He is, in the first place, wrong in

thinkinor that section ii introduces " an alto<jjether
new topic." For, in section 10, the question is
asked, — Is there a mrityu (destroyer) to Mrityu,
the destroyer of all sense-organs (c/rahas) and
their objects {atigrahas) ? Yajnavalkya's answer
is put in highly terse and enigmatic language as
follows :— " Mrityu (death) is Agni (fire) ; he is
overcome by water ; so (hej overcomes Mrityu
(death).'* Sankara explains this passage to
mean that the Supreme Brahman is the destroyer
of the universal destroyer. Death. Death
is like fire which, though it consumes all,
is itself put out by water. The reference
to -fire and water is only brought in by
way of illustrution. The topic of section 10
is therefore the Supreme Brahman, and the
argument is the same as that discussed in the
SuLras of Vyasa, I. 2, 9 with leference to Katha-
Upanishad, I. 2, 25. Thus, Dr. Thibaut's idea
that a new topic is introduced in section 11 has
no foundation. Dr. Thibaut passes on to section
13 where the expression ^^ ayam puru^ha'*
again occurs and insists that it should also refer
to the Supreme Brahman. But it expressly
 Ixxx

relates to the condition of him who has not

attained to the highest knowledge and goes to
other worlds as the effect of his Karma. There-
fore it has to be interpreted differently. Theire
is nothing inappropriate in this, — for we have
already stated that any related topic can be
introduced into a prakarana. What is kno^n
as ekavakyata or unity of aim is not disturbed,
and so no objection can be raised to the dntro-
duction of such related topics. Similar remarks?
apply to Dr. Thibaut's views regarding the 8th
Brahma na. He brings forward, however, , one
objection, viz., that both the Antarya^in
(Brahman as the interior ruler of everything)
spoken of in the 7th Brahmana and the Brah-
man as destitute of qualities spoken of in the
8th Brahmana are characterised at the end of
each of these Brahmanas as " unseen but seeinsf.
unheard but hearing, &c." This objection i&
easily met, — for there is a difference in the mode
of characterisation, and so the characterisation
has to be understood in different senses so as to
suit the nature of the object characterised. In
regard to the Antaryamin,when the characterisa-
tion is over, the conclusion is given as *' t^ ff
 Ixxxi

arrcJTT'rT^irm sTrfrs-^r^rS " i. e., " this atman is your

internal ruler; what is other than that (the Jiva) is
transient " and thus the Jiva and the Antaryam-
in are declared to be different. At the end of
Brahmana 8, on the other hand, when the
characterisation is finished, the conclusion is
as follows :— ' ^cff^f ^^m ^Tl^^ oft^^ sTm^ ' " In
this akshara (Indestructible) akasa (ether) is
woven as warp and woof, " and thus non-differ-
ence is declared between the two. Also, the
internal ruler (antaryamin) is differentiated by
name from the other which is called akshara.
Moreover the word *' OT^ " "then " is used to
indicate the starting of a topic different from the
one treated of in the 7th Brahmana and there-

fore, they do not clearly "aim at describing one

and the same thing." The same thing looked
at fro?n the same point of view cannot be charac-
terised asboth possessing qualities and as devoid
of them. We have, also, already shown that the
Upanishadic literature distinguishes betw^een the
non-differenced or the higher Brahman and
Isvara (Antaryamin) or the lower Brahman, —
take, for instance, the Mandukya-Upanishad.
G
 Ixxxii

Dr. Thibaut now takes up the Chhandogya-

Upanishad, but only to dismiss it after making
a brief remark concerning the Sandilya- Vidya.
That remark is as follows; — " There is no rea-
son whatever for supposing that Sandilya, or
whoever may have been the author of that Vid-
ya, looked upon it as anything else but a state-
ment of the highest truth accessible to man. "
If Sandilya thought that what he knew and
taught was the highest truth accessible to man,
it does not follow that we are precluded from
the search after something higher. The Chhan-
dogya-Upanishad goes on to teach truths which
are contained in texts like " ^t^*TI% ", ^^^ ^ii^^J?-
JT 3TT€igL\ and so on. We have to use our
faculties of reasoning, and see which is the high-
est truth. Moreover, in the Sandilya -Vidya
itself, the text uses the word '' ^J^^l^ " ; and
though we call this upasana itself f devout me-
ditatioby
n ) the name of vidya (knowledge) and
though there are Upanishadic texts which use
the words upasana and vidya as synomymous,
there are other Upanishadic texts — to which we
have already also referred — which distinguish
emphatically between the Brahman which is the
 Ixxxiii

object of upasana and the Brahman which is

the object oi jnana. For example, we have the
text of Kena Upanishad, "^t^ ^ ^ r^T% %^ ^-
^g^l^^ '' '' Know That to be Brahman, not this
which is the object of your worship or medita-
tion. " Thre is not the least justification for
ascribing the distinction between Jnana and upa-
sana or the consequent distinction between jne-
ya-brahman and upas//a-brahman to the ingen-
uity or the system-building porpensity of " San-
kara and his school. "

Dr. Thibaut, before leaving this topic, gives his

view of 'the true philosophy of the Upanishads.'
We have seen already that all his objections to
Sankara's interpretations are totally unsustain-
able and that his work as a critic is done flimsily.
The views of Sankara, therefore, remain un-
touched; and we do not see how Dr. Thibaut
can claim that he has the secret of 'the true phi-
losophy otthe Upanishads.' Still, let us know
what he has to say. After this big flourish of
trumpets, however, the secret he reveals to us is
that "a philosophy of tiie Upanishads cannot
even be spoken of," — and that in the face of
 Ixxxiv

declarations to the contrary made by such men as

Schopenhauer, Deussen, MaxMuUer, and others.
He only repeats his old idea, already torn to
tatters, that the Upanishads contain only "de-
tached philosophic and theoloojical dessertations
ascribed to different authors." In the next breath
however, he holds that they contain "the out-
lines of a philosophy," but that "precision in
details is not to be aimed at." What, then, are
these outlines? Firsi^ "the knowleds^e of Brahman
is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed."
He explains himself as follows: — "When the
mind of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman
is that from which all this world originates, and
m which it rests, he naturally applies to it dis-
tinctive attributes pointing at his relation to the
world; Brahman, then, is called the Self and life
of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord,
and so on. When, on the other hand, he follows
out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself
as the mysterious reality of which the whole
expanse of the world is only an outward
manifestation, then it strikes him that no
idea or term derived from sensible experience
can rightly be applied to it, that nothing
 Ixxxv

more can be predicated of it but that it is

neither this nor that." Dr. Thibaut's statement
may be correct, if the Indian sages were teach-
ing "the outlines of a philosophy" having a
purely speculative significance. But they taught
a religion and the methods for its practical
realisation. As Professor MaxMuller has said
of the Vedanta, — "it is the most sublime phi-
losophy and the most satisfying religion. "
The Hindus seek to realise in practice Brahman
in both aspects. Assuming that such a realisa-
tion is a fact of experience, we are entitled to
hold that there are two different lindf^ of
knowledge of Brahman, and not simply two
different aspects or points of view of one and
the same speculative truth. Dr.Thibaut is mis-
taken in speaking of them as "two aspects of the
cognition of one and the same reality, — one an
experience of Brahman in its relation to the
world, and the other realisation of the Brahman
in itsef and as "one only without a second."
If the difference we have poitited out between a
philosophy and a religion is iniderstood,
Sankara's distinction between a higher and lower
knowledge of Brahman (and hence also the dis-
 Ixxxvi

tinction between a lower conditioned Brahman

and a higher unconditioned Brahman) becomes
unquestionable fact.

Dr. Thibaut next takes up the question

" whether the ITpanishads maintain the Maya
doctrine or not. " He says: — " we may admit
that some passages, notably of the Briha-
daranyaka, contain at any rate the germ of
the later developed Maya doctrine. " A
statement which appears to Dr. Thibaut but
a ''germ" seems to be a full development to
others, as for instance to Mr. A. E. Gough and
Dr. Deussen. At least we have here a kind of
admission from Dr. Thibaut himself which stul-
tifies his emphatic assertion in another place —
already quoted by us at the commencement of
this discussion — that the Upanishads " do not
hold the doctrine of the unreality of the w^orld. "
Dr. Thibaut holds, however, that " that affords
no valid reason for interpreting Maya into other
texts which gives a satisfactory sense without
that doctrine, etc., " and that " this remark app-
lies in the very first place to all the accounts
of the creation of the physical universe. " For
 Ixxxvii

instance, he takes what he calls *' the most im-

portant of those accounts, — viz., the one given
in Chhandogya Upanishad VI. 2, 1. We have
already dealt fully with this passage and shown
that it fully and unmistakeably establishes the
doctrine of the unreality of the world, and we
content ourselves \^ ith referring rhe reader to
our previous remarks.

Dr. Thibaut next takes up passages in the

Katha and Mundaka Upanishads which set forth
the successive emanations of the world from
Avyakta or Avyakrita (the Undeveloped princi-
ple of Matter) and declares his opinion that neither
this Undeveloped material prriniple nor the suc-
cessive stages of the development of the materi-
al world out of it are regarded in the Upanisha-
ds as " unsubstantial " or " as a baseless Illusion
to be destroyed by Knowledge. " It is difficult
to reconcile this view with what he has admitted
regarding the Brihadaranyaka, or with what we
have already proved regarding the Chhandogya
Upanishad. But let as take up the reference
here made by Dr. Thibaut to Katha -Upanishad
I. 3, 10. Dr. Thibaut must not forget the fact
 Ixxxviii

thai Avyakta is declared to be an emanation

from the Purusha in the very next verse (1.3,11).
How can non-intelligent matter develop out of the
intelligent Atman, just in the same way as one
material object from another — as for example? a
pot from a piece of clay? This is impossible and
so it must be due to illusion analogously to the
development of the unreal silver from the real
mother-of-pearl. Moreover, this Upanishad itself
^oes on to declare in express terms that the
world is an illusion and condemns the man who
sees the variety of material phenomena as real.
' ^ 5iTRrr% 1%=^, ^c^: ^ ^ ^rn^m aj |^ ^]^^ q^f^ '
"There is not the least trace of multiplicity here.
From death to death he goes who looks on
this as if it were really manifold." (XL 1, 11). —
Dr.Thibaut's next reference is to Mundaka Upa-
nishad 11. 1, 2. and he says that ''the High
Imperishable which there takes the place of the
" Undeveloped" of the Katha Upanishad is real
and not illusory. There is no need to dwell
any longer on this subject. Still, let us take
Mundaka II. 1,1 & 2, which deal with Brahman
and the origin of the world from it. In the
first verse Brahman is called Satyam or reality.
 Ixxxix

and this implies that all else is unreal. In the

second verse, it is called amurta, without form,
apranah, without life, amanah^ without mind,
&c. It has thus no macerial embodiment of any
kind and no organs of perception or action.
Later on, in ii. 2. 9. it is called Nishkala,
without parts. And yet the world of material
existence is stated to issue out of it. This is
possible only if the material substances which
issue out ot* Brahman are illusory and plienonie-
nal. Moreover, in this same Upanishad, Brahman
is described as " ^^w. T^^lri^' 'beyond darkness"
(ii. 2. 6.). Except Brahman all is darkness. As
Brahman is satya^ reality, this is the reverse,
viz., unreality. Moreover, this Upanishad says
''' \^^\^\^W^\i^'^: ' ''The knowcr of Brahman is
freed from all material objects, having name and
form" (iii. 2. 8). U two objects, before us are
equally real, how can the knoirledge of one free
us from the perception or the existence ot" the
other. The knowledge of one will free us from
the other only if this latter is superposed on it
as the illusory silver is superposed on the mother-
of-pearl. The moment the mother-of-pearl is
known the silver once perceived vanishes. So,
 xc

also, when Brahman is known the illusory

world of matter superposed on it vanishes. If
all we are taught by the Upanishad is to get rid
of the idea that the material world of name and
form has a separate existence, how can the know-
ledge of Brahman make us " free '^ from that
world.

Dr. Thibaut is unable to get over the

passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad
where *' iva ", "as it were " is added to words
denoting material objects and activities to denote
their unreality. " jj^fF^rf^^ ^[rt " " where there
is something else, as it were" "?T5r fft^w^ ^^T%"
" where there is duality, as it were " " 3TRflT
^^TR^'lEr ^Rffr^ " '' The Atman thinks, as it were
moves as it were ". He is driven — forced,
as it were, — to declare as follows: — "T am
readv to admit that not impossibly these
' iva's indicate that the thought of the
writer who employed them was darkly
labouring with a conception akin — although
much less explicit than — the maya of Sankara.^'
But we have said here enough — and more than
enough — to show that the whole trend of Upa-
 XCl

nishadic doctrine is manifestly in favour of the

maya doctrine. We have also previously
demonstrated that the Sutras of Vyasa also ex-
plicitly teach the same doctrine.

Lastly, Dr Thibaut takes up " the relation

of the Jivas, the individual souls, to the highest
Self/' Here he writes: — "We must, I thinky
admit without hesitation, that Sankara's doctrine
faithfully represents the prevailing teaching of
the Upanishads in one important point at least,
viz., that the soul or self of the sage — whatever
its original relation to Brahman mav be-is in the
end completely merged and indistinguishably
lost in the universal Self." He thinks, however,
that originally "it has to be viewed as proceeding
from the latter (Brahman) and somehow forming
a part of it.'' How can the part become the whole,
how one thing can be absorbed into another
which has no parts and no magnitude surpasses
our comprehension. He speaks of the "final ab-
solute identification of the individual self with
the universal Self." This, too, is as impossible as
the "absorption" first mentioned by him, and for
the same reason. The only kind of identification
 XCll

or absorption possible is the getting rid of the

illusory world of name and form when the self
remains the self without the superposition of the
sense of duality or multiplicity due to the ig-
norance of what it is in its essential nature. Dr.
Thibaut has, we fear, failed here as elsewhere to
undestand what he calls "Sankara's doctrine"
or " the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads.^'
Dr. Thibaut finally sums up his views as
foUoAvs : — '' It has been- said before that the
task of reducino^ the teachins^ of the whole of the
Upanishads to a system consistent and free from
contradiction is an intrinsically impossible one.
But the task once given, we are quite ready to
admit that Sankara's system is most probably
the best that can be devised." We have said
enough above to show that the arguments which
he advances for arrivhig at this conclusion are
absolutely untenable, and that Dr. Thibaut has
failed to comprehend the Upanishads and the
Sutras of Vyasa. He is unequal to the task he
has undertaken of comprehending or interpreting
the Upanishadic doctrine. His translation of
Sankara's bhashya is itself full of serious errors.
 xcni

We may point here to one conspicuous instance,

and we refer to it because what is known as
" 5^f*r?sr^ " — the instnnce of the drum brought
in to illustrate the promissory stntement,
" 3TTcRf^ f^rn^ ^^^^i f^srm ^^Ttt " '' When the
Atman is known, all this (variety of the world)
is known " — is very important for the Advaitic
doctrine of the Upanishads. The passage of
the Brihad-aranyaka Upanishad (iv. 5, 6,)
referred to is as follows : — ''^ ?Tqr f^^^Rf^RM^^T

^r ^5^f ^iTcf: '' Dr. Thibaut could easily have

referred to Sankara's bhashya on the Upanishad
or Govindananda's commentary on the Sutra
bhashya. The passage is correctly translated as
follows : — " The special sounds of the drum as
modified (by the nature of the material of which
it is made, the qualities of the beater, &c.) cannot
be distinguished when one does not know the
general and characteristic sound of the drum as
a drum's sound (and not as that of another
instrument). When the general and charac-
teristic sound of the drum is known (to be the
drum's sound, and not that of any other instru-
ment) the special sounds modified as before can
 xciv

be easily distinguished." The general and

characteristic sound of the drum takes the place
of the At man, and the modified and special
rounds take the place of the Atman as seen
through the upadhis or limiting adjuncts. Dr.
Thibaut's translation can only evoke amuse-
ment—: " Now as the sounds of a drum if
beaten cannot be seized externally, but the
sound is seized when the drum is seized or the,
beater of the drum."

We have now closed this lengthy and

detailed examination of Dr. Thibaut's conclusions
regarding the Vedanta doctrine as expounded
by Sankara. Those conclusions are utterly unten-
able and show how mistaken throughout is his
comprehension of the doctrine as revealed in the
Upanishads or exhibited as a system in the
Sutras of Vyasa. Consequently Colonel Jacob's
statement that " it is impossible to resist the
conclusion at which he (Dr. Thibaut) arrives "
falls to the ground. We have also shown the
incorrectness of Colonel Jacob's views regarding
the sense of the word Maya^ and the Vedantic
•doctrine of Maya.
 xcv

In section iii of his Preface to his Bombay

edition of Vedanta- Sara, he makes the followint^
statement regarding the Advaitic school, — a
statement which carries with it its own refuta-
tion—: " On account of the apparent separate
existence of deity and humanity, writers of this
school employ che epithets para, mukhya, and
nirguna to designate pure unassociated Brahma,
and apara, amukhya and saguna to distinguish
that portion of Brahma, which, through
association with avidya, is looked upon as God."
But whoever knows the Advaita doctrine ought
to know that the pure Brahman is amurta
without material form or embodiment and
therefore nishkala, without parts. When Colonel
Jacob speaks of ^Saguna Brahman as a " portion
of Brahma ", he evidently uses language which
is altogether inapplicable and inappropriate to
the topic of which he treats.

Next, Colonel Jacob goes on to speak

of "the extraordinary way in which even San-
kara again and again ignores the distinction pro-
pounded byhimself." This much can be justly
said of Dr. Thibaut that he would never make
 XCVl

the mistake of thinking that Sankara — one of

the mightiest intellects born among men — would
commit such a blunder as Colonel Jacob has the
courage to impute to him. Col. Jacob gives
two instances of what he calls " Sankara's in-
consistencies". His first has reference to
Sutras 11 and 12 of the Sutras of Vyasa [. 1.
As regards Sutra 12 he says : — '' Here the
alternative lay between q^ ^^ and another, and
the latter being finally rejected the former is of
course accepted, as in all similar cases. Therefore
the expression ii ^nm must be used by the Sid-
dhantin as the equivalent of q^ ^^. In i. 1, 11, how-
ever we find that T^^Tlcfrr is only ^^^:, &c." — Col.
Jacob forgets that Sankara uses the word para-
matma to mean both the conditioned Brahman
(Isvara) and the unconditioned Brahman. We
must decide from the context which he has in
view. This remark applies to the other so-called
inconsistencies of Sankara due to the interchange
of terms which are pointed out later on by Col.
Jacob. Secondly, in i. 1, 12, the Paramatma
referred to is Isvara or Saguna- Brahman, for
Sankara first intreprets all the Sutras of the
Adhikarana according to the views of the Vritti-
 XCVll

kara who holds that the Paramatma established

ill the adhikarana is only Is vara and not the
unconditioned IJrahman as Sankara explains
later on in accordance with the interpretation of
his own school. There is thus no inconsistency
whatever in Sankara. Coloael Jacob himself
mentions this immediately after when he quotes

a passage from Sankara's bhashya on

sutra 16.

The truth is that Sankaracharya's works

have to be first learned from the Pandits who
know the traditional interpretations of the
Advaita school. In India no one is allowed to

read the bhashyas privately, — for thereby the

mind can onlv iJ:et filled with all sorts of fancies
and cannot steer clear of the snares and pitfalls
which abound everywhere. In these days, men

are busy with life's multifarious concerns and

are not prepared to spend the time and labour
needed for the task of sitting at the feet of
Pandits and izoing through a course of systema-
tic instruction. Moreover, the old order of
Pandits who are rapidly disappearing and alone
have made a patient, thorough, and exhaustive
H
 XCVlll

study of the subject under rrained teachers are

unwilling to break through the traditions of .the
land and impart their knowledge to foreigners
or even to Indians who are unwilling to observe
the forms of obeisance to the Guru laid down
and in vogue among learners hitherto. Hence,
all sorts of errors prevail and pass current as
established truth from mouth to mouth. The
remedy seems to us to be to maintain the
traditions of Pandit learning at any cost, so
that the truth may not be lost to India, and
through India to the world. The day that India
fails to produce Pandits of the old thorough-
going type will be tlie day on which India will
lose tlie crown of spirituality she has long borne
and cease to be the holy land of our race. The
centre of political and material suprernacv has
shifted from age to age, but throughout the ages
India has successfully and resolutely maintain-
ed a self-determined continuity of tradition and
development in regard to her knowledge of the
soul, its nature and destiny ; and this is what
makes the Western publicist, politician, and
philosopher entertain the hope that some day —
to use the words of a recent writer in the
 XCVIX

British Llaarterly Uevie^ii — " the deep level

thought of the Indian sage.s may do much to
spiritualise the too material life of Europeans."
We shall do well also to remember wliat Pro-
fessor Max Muller has said in words eloquent
with wisdom and full of hopeful auijury for tlie
future : — " Though these old anthropomorphic
ideas, sanctioned by creeds and criticisms, have
been rejected again and again, nothing has been
placed in rheir stead, and they naturally rise up
anew with every new risintr treneration. In
India alone the human mind has soared beyond
this point, at first by guesses and postulates,
such as we find in some of the I'panishads,
afterwards by strict reasoning, such as we find
in the V'edanta Sutras, and still more in the
commentary of Sankara. The Vedauta, whether
we call it a religion or a philosophy, has com-
pletely broken with the effete anthropomorphic
conception of god and of the soul as approach-
ing the throne of god, and has opened vistas
which were unknown to the greatest thinkers of
Europe." We cannot agree to every word, or
even to a good deal, of what is here stated, but
there is also much in it which is calculated to
encourage, and sustain those of us who, in this
season of discouragement and amid many signs
and portents of coming social and moral disrup-
tion, are yet trying to live up to the inspiring
ideals of Vedic wisdom and feel it our o^reat
mission in life to hand on the light of truth
and |*'the loveliness of holiness unimpaired to
those who are to follow us in the holy land and
to generations yet unborn so that Aryavarta
may for ev^er wear the jewelled crown of
spirituality which in days long past Sri Krishna
and Bhagavan Vyasa set on her head.
K. S.
II %<^l-n^K: II
*--

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