Escholarship UC Item 62v5r34h
Escholarship UC Item 62v5r34h
Title
Essays in Financial Development and Economic Growth
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/62v5r34h
Author
Bun, Linh
Publication Date
2018
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
ECONOMICS
by
Linh Bun
March 2018
Tyrus Miller
Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies
Copyright c by
Linh Bun
2018
Table of Contents
List of Figures vi
Abstract ix
Dedication xii
Acknowledgments xiii
iii
1.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
iv
B Heterogeneous Patterns of Financial Development: Implications for Asian
Financial Integration 157
B.1 Appendix I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B.2 Appendix II: Financial Development Index Pillars . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
v
List of Figures
vi
List of Tables
vii
A.9 Panel OLS: Quadratic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
viii
Abstract
by
Linh Bun
along three dimension: financial depth, access and efficiency. We find that for the
country sample analyzed, financial institutions depth and efficiency are compliment.
cations for Asian Financial Integration studies detailed differences in patterns of fi-
nancial development across the major Asian economies, including three of the regions
largest economies (China, Japan and South Korea), to understand how these differ-
ences might affect possibilities for greater regional financial integration. In particular,
the paper argues that heterogeneous patterns of financial development, and not just dif-
gional financial integration efforts, aside from possible political challenges. The paper
ix
provides background on the case for financial openness, Asian experiences with finan-
cial integration, and regional economic responses to external shocks. It also discusses
policy options, including regulatory reform and coordination, and possible risk man-
development.
Chapter 3 (Part II): Structural Changes and Labor Market Frictions ana-
dogenous growth model with sectoral labor adjustment costs. The model generates
mation model with labor market friction, which is new to the literature. Labor market
culture or non-agriculture goods after opening to trade. The calibrated model with labor
market friction generated the hump-shaped labor share in manufacturing for South Ko-
rea.
x
xi
To my wife and my parents.
xii
Acknowledgments
support.
View: I want to sincerely thank both of my advisors, Joshua Aizenman (USC) and
Nirvikar Singh, for their continuous support during this project. This work also bene-
fits greatly from my joint project (Bun and Singh, 2016) with Nirvikar Singh, published
at the International Economic Journal (DOI). I would like to thank the Center of Analyt-
ical Finance (CAFIN) at the University of California, Santa Cruz for generous financial
cations for Asian Financial Integration: I thank Nirvikar Singh for his support and
guidance throughout the process. This chapter is a version of our joint paper presented
in Asia, held at the Centre on Asia and Glottalization, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Nirvikar Singh’s presentation at the conference and valuable comments and suggestions
Chapter 3 (Part II): Structural Changes and Labor Market Frictions: this pa-
per is written during my internship at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). I thank
xiii
my supervisors at the IMF: Nikola Spatafora and Seung Mo Choi for their support dur-
ing my internship, Summer 2013, for me to work on this paper. I also thank George
Bulman, Johanna Francis, Grace Gu, Jon Robinson, Carl Walsh and seminar partic-
ipants at the UCSC Macroeconomics Workshop, UCSC Brown bag for very helpful
comments and discussions. I gratefully acknowledge the World Bank for granting me
xiv
Part I
1
Chapter 1
Multi-dimensional View
1.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis, both in terms of depth and severity, has garnered
much attention to the functioning of the financial system. The analysis of the impact
many controversy both regarding the results as well as the definition of financial devel-
opment. There are many ways to define ”financial development” in the data and one
the percentage share of domestic private credit to GDP and with this definition, the re-
2
sults suggest that financial development has positive impact on growth only up to some
However, the lack of strong results with financial depth suggest the need for us-
finance.1 Quality of finance could be defined broadly as the efficiency of the financial
capital flows can have both negative and positive effects on economic growth through
its interaction with financial development. With large capital inflows, inefficient finan-
cial/banking system can misallocate resources and have harmful effects on long-term
growth, reallocating resources such as labor from productive tradable sector to less pro-
ductive non-tradable sector and resulting in the expansion of low productivity sector at
the expense of productive sector: as in Reis (2013) for the case of developed country
3
1.2 Literature
Quantity and Quality of Finance: Aizenman et al. (2015) analyzes the impact of
financial development on sectoral output growth and they found that the impacts are
deepening in some sectors (results are not robust in some sectors) as well as different
effects between Asia and Latin America. Interestingly, there is Dutch-disease effects
of financial development on the manufacturing sector, i.e. faster growth of the financial
sector hinder growth of the manufacturing sector and this results is elaborated Benigno
and Fornaro (2014b) and Benigno et al. (2015). Furthermore, they suggest the need for
measuring quality of finance (defined broadly as the efficiency of the financial system
In addition, Benigno et al. (2015) examines episodes of large capital inflows follow-
ing the recent literature especially the experiences of the Eurozone economies such as
Spain & Portugal after the introduction of the Euros. There are a few paper on the the-
oretical front linking large capital inflows and slow productivity growth (productivity
level?). The analysis focuses on medium/long-term study and they look at gross capital
flows. However, they abstract from using different measures of financial development.
4
(2014b) analyze the role of financial integration on the finance-growth nexus using
aggregate macroeconomic variables. They find the asymmetric role of financial devel-
opment on economic growth and in particular, at very high level of financial openness
financial development has negative effects on growth. It is important to note that Her-
wartz and Walle (2014b) also emphasizes the different dimensions of financial develop-
ment and for example, measure of financial institutions such as private credit (by banks
and financial institutions) focuses on the role of the intermediaries in providing funds
kets.3 However, they do not analyze the role of sectoral reallocation and its linkage
(competition effects and reallocation effects). However, they did not analyze the link-
ages at the sectoral level. On one level, the impact of financial development on eco-
nomic growth interacts with the level of financial openness and in particular, at a very
high level of financial integration financial development can have negative impact on
growth (Herwartz and Walle, 2014b). However, it is not clear how and which chan-
nels operates in Herwartz and Walle (2014b). There are several channels that financial
opment such as OECD where financial markets play a more prominent role whereas financial institutions
play a more active role in emerging and developing countries (banks are more important).
5
competition and reallocation effects (Bonfiglioli, 2008).
(2016) studies the impact of financial reforms (based on data from Abiad et al. (2010))
on the relationship between finance and growth. Following the literature that points to
the vanishing effect of finance on growth (Arcand et al., 2015a; Rousseau and Wachtel,
2011), which emphasizes the diminishing impact of financial depths on growth dimin-
ishes in recent years, their results show that financial reforms does not change the van-
growth nexus depends on level of banking regulation during recent years of financial
liberalizations. However, they do not analyze whether the impact of financial depth
on economic growth depends on the efficiency of the banking system or level of bank-
ing supervision (i.e. exploring the interaction between financial depth and financial
In addition, Prati et al. (2012) uses unique and extensive financial reform index for
advanced and developing countries. They explore the association between financial
reform and growth. The financial reform index is based on Abiad et al. (2010). The
reform database in Abiad et al. (2010) provides indices between 0 and 1 for: openness
to international trade (real sector): average tariff rates and restrictions on the current
4 Financial reforms: strength of banking supervision, ease of bank entry, absence of distortions in
credit allocation (ease of credit controls), sophistication of securities markets, extent of privatization,
interest rate liberalization and capital account openness.
6
account transactions; product market structural reforms (real sector): agriculture and
banking sector: credit controls, interest rate controls, competition restrictions, degree of
and bonds) markets and external capital account liberalization (financial sector).
the ”vanishing effect” of finance on growth. In particular, they point out that the positive
relationship between finance and growth is weaker in recent years (after 1990). They
confirm their main hypothesis using cross-section, panel and dynamic panel methods.
They further investigate possible explanations: financial crises, recent financial liber-
alization and recent development of the equity market as a possible substitute. The
result indicates that the quality of finance could be an important factor (Rousseau and
Wachtel, 2011) but future research can extend the analysis to investigate whether there
resources between tradable and non-tradable sectors during periods of large capital in-
flows. On the other hand, they ignore the role of domestic bank credit (total credit)
and they do not look at the particular mechanism in which large international capital
flows affect the reallocation process. They analyze capital flows (total: gross or net)
7
and Bezemer (2016) emphasizes international capital flows into non-bank sector as de-
Samarina and Bezemer (2016) does not analyze the impact on output and growth (pro-
ductivity). However, they do not link the declining business sector share of domestic
bank credit (or increasing household sector share) to growth (finance-growth nexus).
improvement on growth. Technology itself may also directly affect financial develop-
ment. Levine (2005) has several remaining qualifications (still plague the literature)
regarding the finance-growth literature: different methodology has its own drawback
and measure of financial development does not match well with theory on the role of
tion of resources.
helps economic growth: external financing. The key methodological contribution is in-
troducing the interaction term between financial development and measure of external
financing dependency. They hypothesize that the coefficient for the interaction term is
positive.5 Recent advancement in theoretical econometrics (panel data), Seo and Shin
5 Positive coefficient for the interaction term suggests that higher level of financial development in-
8
(2016) allows for both endogenous threshold and regressors. It is important to note that
Law and Singh (2014) use similar empirical framework but with only a single endoge-
nous regressor (financial development) and all the remaining covariates are assumed to
Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) found that different financial intermediary development
Financial Cycles: Booms and Contractions: Kannan (2012) studied the impact
external finance à la Rajan and Zingales (1998)). However, clearly, the author only
Also, the linkages between financial sector services and sectoral growth could be
beyond just financing needs (external dependence) as illustrated in Claessens and Laeven
(2003). Moreover, Fisman and Love (2004) analyzes the growth opportunities of sec-
tor (generalized beyond that of Rajan and Zingales (1998)) and their method could be
duces larger impact on growth of sectors relying more on external financial. Hence, financial develop-
ment facilitates growth of sectors through efficient reallocation of resource to sectors need it most.
6 Future work could extend to analyze the impacts of financial cycles on the real sectoral output growth
and potentially, the impacts could be heterogeneous depending on external dependence and growth op-
portunity.
9
extended through time (temporal dimension) to analyze with panel data methodology.
However, they do not look at firm growth and they suggested that looking at firm-level
One strand of literature Claessens and Laeven (2003) linking financial development
and growth that emphasize the equally important role of legal rights (institutions) that
could impact the benefits of firm investment in intangible assets as opposed to tangible
assets as they benefits could be easier to be copied or stole. They follow the strategy of
Rajan and Zingales (1998) in construct measures of firms dependence on intangible (ra-
(2016) and credit growth is important predictors as well as asset prices increases. Fo-
cusing on financial depth (size) as the main measure of financial development could
7 The McKinsey Global Institute report discusses the importance of financial development on eco-
nomic growth (hence, contributing to the literature). However, they also stress the importance of finance
beyond simple size measure (private domestic credit). In particular, they include measure of equity in
their financial development measure as well as distinguishing credit access by sector.
10
miss out on other important aspect of financial development that could affect economic
response to capital flows volatility. One potential candidate is quality of financial insti-
tutions. This could be linked with the literature on the asymmetric affects of financial
of non- liberalizing over liberalizing countries;8 whereas Rajan and Zingales (1998)
utilizes heterogeneity along external financing dependency) and Propensity Scores and
Matching (PSM) to find the effects of financial liberalization Kaminsky and Schmukler
However, they do not analyze the non-linearity of finance-growth nexus and the
sky and Schmukler (2008) not the increasing/decreasing nature of financial openness
Samarina and Bezemer (2016) provides evidence that the non-financial business
sector share of domestic bank credit is smaller for countries with larger international
capital flows into non-bank sector. In short, international capital flows to non-bank
11
between types of international capital flows and share of domestic bank credit (business
and households). The conclusion is along the same line as Lane and McQuade (2014).
However, they do not link the declining non-financial business sector share of domestic
bank credit (or equivalently, increasing household sector share) to growth (finance-
growth nexus).
Samarina and Bezemer (2016) emphasizes international capital flows into non-bank
However, Samarina and Bezemer (2016) does not analyze the impact on output and
growth (productivity). However, they do not link the declining business sector share of
domestic bank credit (or increasing household sector share) to growth (finance-growth
nexus). Davis et al. (2016) focuses on domestic credit as a whole and abstract from the
key role of the types of domestic credit: households and non-financial firms.
1.3 Motivation
is mostly proxied by financial depth using private domestic credit, with the exception
has been used in other literature (Sahay et al., 2015; Svirydzenka, 2016) we think that
9 They also discuss the important role of quality of financial development besides the standard mea-
12
this is the first to apply this view on the analysis of financial development and economic
growth. Broadly speaking, similar to Sahay et al. (2015), we categorize financial de-
velopment (financial institutions and markets) along three dimension as in Table 1.2:
1.4 Data
Detailed data descriptions and sources are presented in appendix Table A.1). The
data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank,
2016) and Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) (Cihak et al., 2012) and
for benchmark comparison purpose, we also provide results with dataset from Arcand
et al. (2015a) (see appendix Table A). For all estimations, we employ panel data for the
period 1960-2015.11 In line with the finance-growth nexus literature, the data used in
[Add more detail data description (complements Table A.1 of appendix A) here]
10 Table 1.2 also provides a nice illustration of multi-dimensional view on financial development.
11 The list of countries along with data on domestic private credit and lending-deposits spreads are
provided in Appendix A (Table A.3 and A.2).
12 System GMM can be employed in a panel data with large cross-section observations, n, but small
number of time periods,t, (large n and small t). In addition, the five-year averaging smooths out business
cycle fluctuations and fits well with medium to long-run analysis
13
1.4.1 Summary
The summary is shown in Table 1.1. The detailed of private credit to GDP ratio
(selected years) is provided in Appendix A.2 and the bank lending-deposits spread rates
We employ estimation strategy using the system GMM estimator, which was pro-
posed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). As is standard in
the finance-growth nexus literature, we use the two-step procedure suggested by Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) with robust standard errors following Windmeijer (2005) finite
14
Table 1.2: Multi-dimensional View of Financial Development
Lending-deposits spread
Non-interest income to total income
Overhead costs to total assets
Return on assets
Return on equity
Source: Sahay et al. (2015) and Svirydzenka (2016)
sample correction.13
1.5.2 Estimation
tween growth and financial depths and in particular, the dynamic panel estimation is
as follows:
0
Growthit = α + βFDi,t−1 + Xi,t−1 γ + µi + ηt + εi,t . (1.1)
0
where: Xi,t−1 is initial (lagged) key control variables (in logarithm) in the literature:
initial income (log of GDP per capita): lgd p pci,t−1 , initial schooling (Barro-Lee)
13 The
estimation is done using xtabond2 routine in STATA (Roodman, 2003, 2009a). For the discus-
sion of too many instruments issue, see Roodman (2009b).
15
such as average years of schooling, ratio of government consumption expenditures to
GDP, inflation rate and ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, FDi,t−1 is lagged measure
of financial institutions depths, domestic private credit PCit , and financial institutions
0
efficiency, bank lending-deposits spreads LDSPREADit , Xi,t−1 is lagged measure of
controls discussed at above, µi is individual fixed effects (dummies): controls for un-
In simplifying the notation, 1.1 above could be rewritten, using 1.5, as follows:
0
+ βFDi,t−1 + Xi,t−1 γ + µi + ηt + εi,t . (1.3)
Hence, we reach the standard dynamic panel estimation equation (1.3). In 1.1,
the dependent variable denotes growth in GDP per capita, which is calculated as the
changes in log of GDP per capita. In this specification, the main variable of interest is
as the ratio of private credit to GDP provided by deposit-taking institutions and other
14 Wooldridge (2010) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) provide further discussion on the fixed effect
model.
16
financial institutions. As in the standard growth and finance literature, 1.1 is a dynamic
0
model with lagged dependent variable as one of the covariates in Xi,t−1 . The covariates
0
Xi,t−1 also includes: initial schooling, general government consumption expenditures
as percentage of GDP, inflation rate and trade (exports plus imports as percentage of
GDP).
1.3. Equation 1.3 includes time-invariant country-specific fixed effect µi (a set of coun-
try dummy variables) and this is included to control for unobserved country-specific
heterogeneous characteristics. This is one of the advantage of using a panel data analy-
sis as oppose to cross-country analysis. The equation also has a set of time fixed effect.
0
Growthit = α + βFDi,t−1 + δFD2i,t−1 + Xi,t−1 γ + µi + ηt + εi,t . (1.4)
0
where: Xi,t−1 is initial (lagged) key control variables (in logarithm) in the literature:
initial income (log of GDP per capita): lgd p pci,t−1 , initial schooling (Barro-Lee)
GDP, inflation rate and ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, FDi,t−1 is lagged measure
of financial institutions depths, domestic private credit PCit , and financial institutions
0
efficiency, bank lending-deposits spreads LDSPREADit , Xi,t−1 is lagged measure of
controls discussed at above, µi is individual fixed effects (dummies): controls for un-
17
observed (omitted) country heterogeneity,15 ηt is time fixed effect (dummies), εit is
disturbances16
The dynamic equation 1.3 comprises of both omitted variable: time-invariant country-
specific fixed effect µi and lagged dependent variable log (GDP Per Capita)i,t−1 . In es-
timating the fixed effect model, we could use first-difference version of 1.3, removing
0
+ β∆FDi,t−1 + ∆Xi,t−1 γ + ∆ηt + ∆εi,t .
0
+ β∆FDi,t−1 + ∆Xi,t−1 γ + ∆ηt + ∆εi,t . (1.6)
15 Wooldridge (2010) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) provide further discussion on the fixed effect
model.
16 Similar to above, Growth is defined as follows:
18
1.5.4 Financial Institutions Depth
will use private domestic credit as a percentage of GDP as our measure of financial
equation:
where PCi,t is the level of financial institutions depth, FDi,t−1 , for country i at time t.
2
Growthi,t = α + β1 PCi,t−1 + β2 PCi,t−1 + γ1 LGDPi,t−1 + γ2 LEDUi,t−1 + γ3 LGCi,t−1
Efficiency (1.9)]): extending the results from non-linear impacts of the finance-growth
19
nexus in 1.9 and the coefficients of interest are β1 and β2 .
Depth
Eff
Growthi,t = α + β1 FIi,t−1 + β2 FIi,t−1 + γ1 LGDPi,t−1 + γ2 LEDUi,t−1 + γ3 LGCi,t−1
Depth Eff Depth Eff
Growthi,t = α + β1 FIi,t−1 + β2 FIi,t−1 + β3 FIi,t−1 × FIi,t−1
+ µi + ηt + εi,t . (1.10)
We will need to interpret the results including the interaction term and there are two
Depth
alternatives focusing on: financial institutions depth, FIit , and financial institution
20
Eff , LGDP
where other control variables, Xi,t−1 , are FIi,t−1 i,t−1 , LEDUi,t−1 , LGCi,t−1 ,
Similarly, for financial institutions efficiency, we have the following estimation with
Depth Depth Eff
Growthi,t = α + β1 FIi,t−1 + β2 + β3 × FIi,t−1 FIi,t−1 + γ1 LGDPi,t−1
+ µi + ηt + εi,t .
Depth
where other control variables, Xi,t−1 , are FIi,t−1 , LGDPi,t−1 , LEDUi,t−1 , LGCi,t−1 ,
1.6 Results
We will need to interpret the results including the interaction term and there are two
Depth
alternatives focusing on: financial depth, FIit , and financial efficiency, FIitEff . In the
21
analysis, we will focus on private domestic credit, PCit , for financial depth and bank
Suppose we fix financial institutions efficiency, FIitEff , to its mean, FI Eff .21 Then,
Depth
Growthi,t = α + β1 + β3 × FI Eff FIi,t−1 + β2 FI Eff + γ1 LGDPi,t−1
+ µi + ηt + εi,t .
The impact of financial institutions depth could either increase or reduce growth
depending on β1 , β3 and FI Eff . The interaction term could also indicate whether finan-
cial institutions depth and efficiency are complement. In particular, from the dynamic
Depth
panel regression (Table 1.5 (all lags) below), the coefficient on FIitEff and FIit (spec-
ification 4) are β1 = −3.871 and β2 = −29.72 respectively and the coefficient on the
interaction terms is β3 = 47.93. Given the positive interaction term (β3 > 0), the result
indicates that financial institutions depth, PCi,t−1 , and efficiency, LDSPREADi,t−1 , are
21 Plugging FI Eff to the following equation:
Eff Depth Eff
Growthi,t = α + β1 + β3 × FIi,t−1 FIi,t−1 + β2 FIi,t−1
+ γ1 LGDPi,t−1 + γ2 LEDUi,t−1 + γ3 LGCi,t−1 + γ4 LOPENi,t−1
+ γ5 LINFLi,t−1 + µi + ηt + εi,t .
22
compliment.
Eff , LGDP
where other control variables, Xi,t−1 , are FIi,t−1 i,t−1 , LEDUi,t−1 , LGCi,t−1 ,
With the interaction term, we are interested in the partial effect in 1.13 and in par-
ticular, the estimated coefficient β3 helps determine whether the effect of financial in-
Eff
stitutions depth on growth depends on efficiency. The benchmark case is when FIi,t−1
Depth
institutions depth, FIi,t−1 , to have growth enhancing role, one possible case is that the
coefficient for depth β1 for depth to have positive net effect on growth. The sign of
estimated coefficients seem to suggested that financial institutions depth and efficiency
22 See Wooldridge (2010), page 67.
23
are complement. The key coefficient of interest is β3 .23
Depth
For example, suppose that FI Eff is 5%, then the partial effect of FIi,t−1 on Growth:
= −1.47.
efficient financial institutions and for example, the bank lending and deposit spread is
∂E(Growthi,t |Xi,t−1 )
zero. The partial effect is then given by Depth = β1 . For the case with the
∂FIi,t−1
interaction term, we allow for the lending-deposit spread to be positive and the partial
∂E(Growthi,t |Xi,t−1 ) Eff .
effect is Depth = β1 + β3 × FIi,t−1
∂FIi,t−1
Eff
Financial Institutions Efficiency: FIi,t−1
From the estimation equation with interaction term between financial institutions
Depth
depth and efficiency (equation 1.10 above), we fix financial institutions depth, FIit ,
to its mean and we have the following effect of financial institutions efficiency on
23 Intuition: β3 > 0 : Larger impacts of financial institution depths on growth for less efficient financial
institution, i.e. larger lending-deposit spread. In particular, the results seem to suggest that for countries
with lower efficiency, financial institution efficiency improves the impact of financial institution depth
on growth.
24
growth.24
Eff
Growthi,t = α + β1 FI Depth + β2 + β3 × FI Depth FIi,t−1
+ γ5 LINFLi,t−1 + µi + ηt + εi,t .
Depth
where other control variables, Xi,t−1 , are FIi,t−1 , LGDPi,t−1 , LEDUi,t−1 , LGCi,t−1 ,
As a benchmark, Table 1.3 provides panel OLS estimates of equation 1.1 using
financial depth, proxy with private credit measure, across four specifications covering
different time span: (1) for time span between 1960 − 1995, (2) for time span between
1960 − 2000, (3) for time span between 1960 − 2005 and (4) for time span between
24 Rewriting the estimation equation with interaction terms between financial institutions depth and
efficiency (equation 1.10 above):
Depth Depth Eff
Growthi,t = α + β1 FIi,t−1 + β2 + β3 × FIi,t−1 FIi,t−1
+ γ1 LGDPi,t−1 + γ2 LEDUi,t−1 + γ3 LGCi,t−1 + γ4 LOPENi,t−1
+ γ5 LINFLi,t−1 + µi + ηt + εi,t .
25
1960 − 2010. The key coefficient for financial depth is positive and significant for
specifications that exclude the recent years. Table 1.3 shows results across two different
Depth
data sources of private credit (financial institutions depth, FIit ).
Controlling for efficiency, the estimated coefficient for private depth (financial in-
stitution depth) from Table 1.3 becomes negative and significant for specification in-
cluding later years. Also, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive.
26
Table 1.3: Panel OLS
27
PCt−1 -0.0264 -0.983 -1.482∗∗ -1.618∗∗∗ 2.163∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗ 0.403 -0.241
(-0.03) (-1.39) (-2.53) (-3.29) (3.29) (2.26) (0.92) (-0.68)
LDSPREADt−1 -0.230∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(-5.92) (-6.01) (-6.32) (-6.40)
PCt−1 × LDSPREADt−1 0.453∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(3.74) (3.75) (3.79) (4.17)
Constant 2.091 3.019∗ 4.705∗∗∗ 3.824∗∗∗ 0.0902 2.815∗∗ 3.189∗∗∗ 1.864∗
(1.08) (1.96) (3.27) (3.01) (0.07) (2.49) (3.04) (1.89)
Time Fixed Effect X X X X X X X X
Period 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010
Observations 273 377 484 576 542 664 793 917
Dependent Variable: GDP % Growth 5 Year
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.6.1.2 Dynamic Panel: System GMM
Private Credit [Arcand et al. (2015a) and World Bank GFDD] (Table A.8)
Table A.8 estimate a linear model with system-GMM for both measures of financial
institutions depth (Arcand et al. (2015a) and World Bank Global Financial Develop-
ment Database).
Table 1.4: System GMM
The results for the estimation with interaction between financial depth and financial
28
efficiency are included in Table 1.5 (two and all lags included). Further results with
different lags are included in the appendix: 2 lags (Table A.4), 3 lags (Table A.5) and 4
29
Table 1.5: System GMM (With Interaction)
30
LDSPREADt−1 -37.71∗∗ -37.47∗∗ -33.79∗∗ -29.02∗∗∗ -35.70∗∗ -35.99∗∗∗ -37.48∗∗∗ -29.72∗∗∗
(-2.30) (-2.24) (-2.25) (-3.13) (-2.37) (-2.83) (-4.01) (-4.45)
PCt−1 × LDSPREADt−1 49.17 43.15 42.31 27.04 72.10∗∗ 57.38∗∗ 58.35∗∗∗ 47.93∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.96) (1.02) (0.82) (2.07) (2.04) (2.77) (3.25)
Constant 0.0888 -0.707 0.738 -1.257 0 0 0 0.410
(0.02) (-0.10) (0.15) (-0.26) (.) (.) (.) (0.16)
Time Fixed Effect X X X X X X X X
Period 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010
Observations 273 377 484 576 273 377 484 576
Sarganp 0.000203 0.0000405 6.11e-08 1.13e-09 0.00000104 0.0000744 0.000000146 8.00e-09
Hansenp 0.219 0.272 0.284 0.381 0.888 0.976 1.000 1
AR1p 0.0145 0.00574 0.00250 0.000175 0.00995 0.00417 0.00223 0.000143
AR2p 0.834 0.260 0.681 0.00862 0.992 0.150 0.552 0.00304
Instruments 48 63 78 93 105 152 206 267
Dependent Variable: GDP % Growth 5 Year
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.6.2 Estimation Model: Quadratic
The standard benchmark panel OLS estimation for quadratic specification is in Ta-
ble 1.6. The results are for two dimensions of financial development separately, finan-
cial institutions depth, PCit , and financial institutions efficiency, LDSPREADit . The
results of system GMM estimation for quadratic case are in Table 1.7. Similarly, the
31
Table 1.6: Panel OLS: Quadratic
32
(3.60) (3.91) (3.66) (3.95)
2
PCt−1 -2.860∗∗ -2.750∗∗∗ -2.474∗∗∗ -2.195∗∗∗
(-2.46) (-3.27) (-3.59) (-4.60)
LDSPREADt−1 -0.307∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(-3.69) (-3.61) (-3.44) (-2.78)
2
LDSPREADt−1 0.00365∗∗ 0.00273∗∗ 0.00205∗ 0.00121
(2.08) (1.97) (1.65) (1.04)
Constant 0.600 3.544∗∗∗ 3.907∗∗∗ 2.674∗∗∗ 4.621∗∗ 4.045∗∗ 5.213∗∗∗ 4.400∗∗∗
(0.44) (3.10) (3.69) (2.70) (2.42) (2.53) (3.61) (3.30)
Time Fixed Effect X X X X X X X X
Period 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010
Observations 542 664 793 917 306 414 523 616
Dependent Variable: GDP % Growth 5 Year
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.7: System GMM: Quadratic
33
2
PCt−1 -2.320 -1.819 -2.586∗∗ -2.231∗∗∗
(-1.34) (-1.41) (-2.45) (-3.01)
LDSPREADt−1 -0.383∗∗ -0.277∗ -0.177 -0.172∗
(-2.10) (-1.92) (-1.44) (-1.69)
2
LDSPREADt−1 0.00760 0.00287 0.000340 0.00217
(1.64) (0.76) (0.10) (0.84)
Constant 8.812∗∗ 7.078∗∗ 6.803∗∗ 4.325 0.340 3.007 5.019 3.683
(2.23) (2.07) (2.11) (1.40) (0.04) (0.54) (1.24) (0.97)
Time Fixed Effect X X X X X X X X
Period 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010
Observations 542 664 793 917 306 414 523 616
Sarganp 0.000000483 1.41e-08 3.16e-14 7.81e-15 2.19e-09 0.000000213 4.90e-11 3.14e-13
Hansenp 0.988 1.000 1.000 1 0.366 0.903 1.000 1.000
AR1p 0.000300 0.0000175 0.0000298 0.00000181 0.0114 0.000138 0.000287 0.00000322
AR2p 0.961 0.416 0.635 0.00748 0.778 0.252 0.584 0.00385
Instruments 147 197 254 318 94 138 189 247
Dependent Variable: GDP % Growth 5 Year
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.7 Conclusion
The main results suggest that financial institutions depth, using measures of domes-
tic private credit as share of GDP (PCit ), and financial institutions efficiency, proxy as
GMM results are sensitive to the choice of lag lengths we believe that this provides an
1.8 Extensions
view, can be extended into several directions. One potential avenue is analyzing the
Table 1.2) and we have been working on this direction with results for measures on
quality plays an underlying role in affecting economic growth through financial in-
34
the impacts of financial openness (liberalization) and financial development on growth
showing mixed results. However, there are few that look at financial development from
multi-dimensional view.
1.9 Appendix
The appendix for this chapter is provided at the end of the dissertation (Appendix
A).
35
Chapter 2
Financial Integration
Written with second coauthor Nirvikar Singh, University of California, Santa Cruz,
(contact)
2.1 Introduction
The rapid post-war rise of Japan to developed country status, followed by economies
such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, began a process of making
36
East (and Southeast) Asia a significant contributor to global economic activity. Even
as Japanese growth slowed, the regional process has been accelerated by the growth
of China, and the creation of regional production networks that include many smaller
economies such as Malaysia and Vietnam in essential ways. These production net-
works have been an important aspect of openness to trade that characterized much of
Strong real growth has not been immune to normal business cycle fluctuations, as
well as to the negative impacts of international financial crises. The Asian financial
crisis of 1997-98 called attention to the differences between openness to trade and
openness to capital, and produced a particular set of policy responses in the region,
nancial crisis of 2007-09 had an unavoidable negative impact on East Asia as well, but
it is arguable that the lessons of 1997-98 permitted the region to be better prepared for
One of the issues brought to the fore by the global crisis was the benefits and costs
of financial openness and financial integration. Openness and integration can cover
37
connotations beyond openness, including harmonization of institutions such as finan-
cial market trading rules, and policy coordination for managing risks and instabilities
that are potentially associated with financial openness. The theoretical justification for
financial openness has been questioned much more than in the case of openness to
trade, but it remains a reality that has to be analyzed and managed. The last decade,
before and after the global financial crisis, has seen continued academic and policy
opment. It has been argued that financial openness and integration are more likely to
have positive outcomes in cases where the economies involved have adequate levels of
concept. For example it can include various kinds of financial market institutions such
as banks and stock markets, but also broader legal and regulatory frameworks that cre-
ate the environment for financial decision-making by firms and households. This paper
is motivated by debates about financial integration and policy coordination in East Asia,
East Asian economies, including three of the largest economies of the region (China,
38
regional financial integration efforts.
The next section briefly reviews arguments for and against financial openness, the
East Asian experience with financial crises and with financial integration, and how
economies in the region have responded to external shocks. It also considers the pos-
levels. A key idea here is that differences in various dimensions of financial develop-
ment can be relevant for financial integration, as well as differences in overall levels of
financial development. Section 4 presents the results of the paper, analyzing levels and
patterns for 14 economies in the region. A key finding is that comparisons of overall
isons of patterns of financial development. This is borne out in a cluster analysis, which
also provides some direct insights on possibilities for future financial integration. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper, offering some possible implications of the analysis for future
The core aspect of financial integration is openness on the capital account, so that in-
ternational capital flows are unrestricted. In practice, a completely open capital account
does not lead to perfect financial integration, in the sense of unified financial markets.
39
An important reason for this imperfection is home bias in investment, reflected in a
positive correlation between domestic savings and investment Feldstein and Horioka
(1980). Investors do not view foreign and domestic assets as perfect substitutes, even
when they have the same objective characteristics. This can be due to regulatory differ-
ences, tax treatment, asymmetries of information, and other kinds of market or institu-
has been liberalization of restrictions on capital flows, allowing large amounts of cap-
ital to move swiftly between different countries. Furthermore, these capital flows now
mainly consist of private capital, rather than official government flows. Large flows
of capital, whether inward or outward, create challenges for the conduct of domestic
macroeconomic policies,4 and these are compounded by the volatility of these flows.
The post-World War II global economy was initially one of fixed exchange rates,
capital controls and monetary policy autonomy. This regime broke down in the 1970s,
and since then, theory and practice have swung back and forth between different policy
4 The main challenge for macroeconomic policy is encapsulated in the idea of the policy trilemma,
or impossible trinity, based on the Mundell-Fleming model of an open economy macroeconomic frame-
work. In the model, it is impossible for a government to simultaneously have monetary policy autonomy
(and hence the ability to control the domestic inflation rate) and a fixed exchange rate when the capital
account is completely unrestricted. Attempts to conduct an independent monetary policy will drive a
wedge between foreign and domestic interest rates, leading to continued capital inflows or outflows (de-
pending on the direction of the interest differential) in the absence of an equilibrating mechanism such as
exchange rate adjustment. Rey (2013) has advanced the proposition that the weight of capital flows in the
context of non-conventional monetary policies (essentially, what is known as QE or Quantitative Easing)
makes exchange rate flexibility insufficient for domestic inflation control unless there are also controls
on international capital flows. The theory and empirics of this view are still being debated. Aizenman
et al. (2013a) have been among the originators of quantitative approaches to measuring policy stances
with respect to the trilemma.
40
combinations. At one stage, the orthodoxy had coalesced on the desirability of flexible
exchange rates and openness of the capital account, the idea being that markets would
equilibrate to allocate resources efficiently around the globe. Few countries adopted this
policy mix, however, instead pursuing various combinations of partial capital controls,
partial exchange rate flexibility and partial monetary autonomy. The latest financial
crisis finally pushed the weight of expert opinion away from full capital account open-
ness.5 One of the most striking examples of this change was the near reversal of the
International Monetary Funds position on capital account liberalization, after the global
financial crisis.
Even before the global financial crisis of 2007-09, there was evidence that full cap-
ital account openness did not have identifiable positive effects on economic perfor-
mance. While the earlier 1997-98 financial crisis was still unfolding, Rodrik (1998)
argued against full capital account convertibility, pointing out that financial markets are
far from the textbook model of perfection, and subject to bubbles, panics and herd be-
havior in general, so that the theoretical case for capital account openness is difficult
evidence in the data that countries without capital controls have grown faster, invested
41
More recently, Obstfeld (2009) offered a similarly cautious assessment, after an ex-
tensive literature review, Financial openness is not a panacea and it could be poison.
The empirical record suggests that its benefits are most likely to be realized when im-
plemented in a phased manner, when external balances and reserve positions are strong,
and when complementing a range of domestic policies and reforms to enhance stability
and growth.8 Addressing the obverse of the issue, Aizenman et al. (2007) found evi-
dence that domestic financial development might be more important for higher growth
than foreign capital. They constructed a self-financing measure, which was positively
correlated with growth, after controlling for the quality of domestic institutions. Even
earlier, Eichengreen (2003) had emphasized the importance of domestic financial devel-
opment, making that case in the context of criticizing the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
designed in 2000 to provide regional swap lines as a means of preserving fixed ex-
Despite the cautions emerging from work such as discussed above, financial integra-
has continued to receive considerable attention. Borensztein and Loungani (2011) used
cross-border equity and bond holdings, as well as equity returns and interest rates,
to argue that Asian (chiefly East Asian) financial integration had increased, but that
Asian economies reacted to the financial crises of 1997-98 and 2007-09, and the impacts of different
policy mixes with respect tot financial openness.
8 There is also evidence that the specific nature of capital flows matters. For example, equity flows
have a positive short-run impact on the host economy Henry (2007); Kose et al. (2009), as does foreign
direct investment Kose et al. (2009).
42
extra-regional connections remained stronger than intra-regional measures of integra-
tion. These results echoed earlier, similar studies Fung et al. (2008) and Garcı́a-Herrero
et al. (2008), with the latter paper providing an explanation of limited Asian financial
integration in terms of low liquidity in the regions financial markets. Another recent
study Lee et al. (2013) found no evidence for increased Asian financial integration after
the global crisis, but an up-to-date survey (Financial Services Institute of Australasia,
2015) suggested that regional financial integration has increased. This is also the con-
clusion of a recent IMF study (International Monetary Funds (IMF) (2015)), which
measures this increase in terms of intraregional financial flows, but nevertheless also
concludes that Home biasis particularly strong in Asia, limiting cross-border financial
Aside from measuring trends in financial integration, various studies have also tried
to estimate the potential costs and benefits. Hoxha et al. (2009) and Hoxha et al. (2013)
analyzed international financial integration, measured as foreign capital flows, and esti-
mated that these flows had had significant positive impacts on consumption and welfare.
Unfortunately, this analysis was performed before the global financial crisis. From a
timated that greater financial integration in Asia would support global rebalancing, and
hence financial stability. Park and Lee (2011) also implicitly assumed benefits from
greater financial integration in emerging Asia, through greater allocative efficiency, but
43
emphasized the need for more effective financial supervisory and regulatory mecha-
the recent focus, post-global-crisis, being on the possibility that too much finance is in-
term for the measure of financial development: Arcand et al. (2015a) provide the most
recent example of this specification. On the other hand, Law and Singh (2014) used an
cial depth, measured as a credit-to-GDP ratio, and the presumed channel of negative
impacts of financial depth on growth is volatility or financial crises Schularick and Tay-
lor (2012).10 Arcand et al. (2015a) used the ratio of total private sector credit to GDP
as the measure of financial depth, but their results are robust to using bank credit or
household credit instead. Law and Singh (2014) used private sector credit, liquid lia-
bilities and domestic credit as three possible measures of financial depth, with similar
results.
Law et al. (2013) examined the possibility that the finance-growth nexus depends
on institutional quality, and find that this is the case, using a threshold model. The insti-
9 Arcand et al. (2015a) also test a piecewise linear model with exogenous thresholds of financial depth.
10 Law and Singh (2014) survey other possible explanations for the negative impact of financial depth
on growth. Cline (2015) argues that all these results are merely a statistical artifact, and claims that the
results are explained by slower growth at higher per capita income levels, but this claim seems to have
been answered effectively by Arcand et al. (2015b).
44
tutional quality measures are generic capturing control of corruption, rule of law and
government effectiveness and not specific to the financial sector. Earlier, Demetriades
and Hook Law (2006) had explored a similar connection between financial depth and
Most relevant to the current context, Herwartz and Walle (2014a) examined the im-
pacts of trade openness and financial openness on the finance-growth linkage. They
found that greater trade openness strengthened this linkage, whereas greater financial
openness eroded it. Their result is interpreted as providing a caution to the Rajan
and Zingales (2003) analysis that openness would promote financial development by
overcoming the resistance of domestic interest groups, since the financial development
other studies, Herwartz and Walle (2014a) measure financial development as financial
Outside this large literature on financial integration and financial development, and
their economic impacts, there has been some attention paid to the issue that financial
development is broader than just financial depth. From 2009-12, the World Economic
Forum (WEF) produced a Financial Development Index with seven components, as the
basis for its annual Financial Development Reports (FDRs), and the approach in that
exercise will be the starting point for the analysis of the current paper. Since 2013, the
45
World Bank has published annual Financial Development Reports, which are quite dif-
ferent from the WEFs documents, being focused on specific themes such as the role of
the State in finance (World Bank (2012)) and financial inclusion (World Bank (2014)).
These FDRs do not have an index of financial development, but they identify and pro-
vide data for four components or dimensions of overall financial development: depth,
Adnan (2011), building on the work of Saci and Holden (2008), constructed an
index of financial development based on data for the banking and insurance sectors,
as well as stock and bond markets. Thirteen variables were used, capturing depth and
efficiency, with more in the former category. However, the index itself was derived
using principal components analysis. No further analysis was performed, beyond the
that captured financial markets as well as financial institutions, and access and effi-
ciency as well as depth. The authors used six indicators, with weights derived from
principal components analysis, to construct the index. They confirmed the non-linear,
sign-changing relationship between finance and growth, earlier found just for financial
depth, but now extended to this broader measure of financial development. However,
their results suggested that the too much finance result is driven by financial deepening
46
Another significant recent paper is by Aizenman et al. (2015), who distinguished
between quantity and quality of financial intermediation, measuring the former by fi-
nancial depth (private bank credit to GDP ratio) and the latter by the lending-deposit
interest rate spread. They examined sectoral growth impacts, and found that quantity
and quality each had positive, negative or non-linear impacts, depending on the sector
and region considered. Their results, unlike Sahay et al. (2015), suggested that even
The approach taken in the current paper also tries to decompose financial develop-
ment into its different aspects, but in a different manner than the Sahay et al. (2015) and
financial development across countries. The methodology and results are described in
terns
The motivation for the analysis in this section and the next is the idea that pos-
development among the countries that are integrating. This is not the only way to think
47
financial development may also be positive in some circumstances: if one country in
a region has strong stock markets, they may serve the whole region better as financial
As first suggested in Kaur and Singh (2014), however, comparing levels of financial
development via a single index misses possible differences across countries in the vari-
ous components of the index. One can compare levels of different components as well,
but this just generates additional information on level differences. Kaur and Singh
ment. The idea in this case is that financial development is inherently multidimensional,
and comparing a vector of indicators of financial development across countries can tell
one something about how similar or different the patterns of financial development are.
To illustrate, we use some of the calculations in Kaur and Singh (2014). They used
indices constructed from the WEF FDR of 2012. In the WEF methodology, the Finan-
cial Development Index (FDIndex) was constructed from seven underlying indicators,
each of which was itself built up from numerous base measures. The seven dimensions
48
bility, financial markets and financial access. Each dimension was scaled from 1 to 7,
and the overall index was an average of these seven numbers. Thus, the FDIndex was
5.10 for Singapore, 5.01 for Australia, 4.90 for Japan and 4.42 for South Korea, provid-
Kaur and Singh (2014) proposed to complement this comparison of levels with a
Calculating a correlation coefficient between these vectors for two countries could then
be a measure of how similar the two vectors were, and therefore a measure of similarity
the mean (the overall FDIndex for that country), so it would not be affected by the
similarity or difference of overall levels. For example, Singapore and Japan had a
correlation coefficient of 0.64, while Australia and Japan, slightly closer in level terms
than Singapore and Japan, had a correlation of 0.54. Korea had a correlation coefficient
of 0.13 with Japan, but a higher correlation of 0.22 with Australia, which was slightly
further away than Japan in level terms. In fact, Korea and China stood out among the 11
from other countries in the group. This idea of comparing patterns as well as levels is
taken further in the analysis of this paper. The data is described next, followed by a
49
2.3.1 Data
The WEF did not publish a FDR after 2012. Instead, we use data from the WEF
index includes a FDIndex as one of its components,12 but it is quite different from
the one used in the FDR. There are eight components, listed in Table 3.1. As in the
FDR, each component is scaled from 1 to 7. Besides being narrower than the index
Table 3.1 rely heavily on survey evaluations, rather than being constructed primarily
from quantitative measures (e.g., the percentage of households with bank accounts for
quality and quantity of financial services, all the components in Table 3.1 are primarily
The GCI data is available from 2006-07 to 2014-15, but the earliest year with all
eight of the components that are listed in Table 3.1 is 2010-11. Henceforth, we refer to
years by their first year. Hence, 2010-11 is termed 2010. Since there is no discernible
trend in the data over the period 2010 to 2014, we report calculations only for the first
12 More specifically, the term used is Financial Market Development, and it is one of 12 pillars of the
GCI.
50
Table 2.1: Components of FDIndex, WEF Global Competitiveness Report.
and last years for which there is complete comparable data, 2010 and 2014.
While the index constructed from the eight components listed in Table 3.1 has a
much narrower scope than the FDR index, the GCI database includes several variables
that are the same as, or close to, those used in the FDR index. We therefore constructed
two additional potential components for the FDIndex, capturing institutional environ-
ment and business environment. The underlying variables for these two additional
components are provided in the Appendix. The GCI data did not provide variables to
cial services, so even with the additional two variables, substantial differences remain
from the FDR index, leading to somewhat different results. These differences do not
affect the validity of the methodology they merely highlight the sensitivity of compar-
51
also constructed four other indices, measuring openness, technological sophistication,
volving these four indices or components of financial development are reported in the
Appendix.
Finally, with respect to the data, we focus on 14 economies from the Asia Pacific, or
East Asia region, and compare financial development across these economies. They are
listed in Table C.1, and include developed as well as emerging economies, with seven
economies in each of those two broad categories. In fact, the variation in per capita
GDP among these countries is substantial, with the richest being 15 times as well-off
as the poorest, even at purchasing power parity. The set includes all eight economies
that were analyzed in the East Asian Miracle study of the World Bank (1993), as well
52
2.3.2 Methodology
We will denote the value of an indicator n for country i by xin . An indicator here
assume that all indicators have already been converted to a common scale (1-7 in the
case of our data). For example, a weighted average of the components will yield an
index defined by
N
xi (w) = ∑ wn xin (1.1)
1
where the weights are assumed to sum to one. The left hand side of this equation
measures the level of financial development for country i, based on the index formula
chosen.
In this case, the Level Distance between country i and country j is simply xi (w) −
x j (w). This number may be positive or negative, of course. When considering regional
financial integration we may be interested in how close a single economy in the region
is to the other economies in the region, in terms of financial development. Note that
we are not measuring integration, but rather financial development as a precursor for
the 13 distance measures. Simply adding up the individual distances and averaging will
cancel out positives and negatives. In order to avoid this, one can use absolute values
53
or squares, prior to summing up. We choose the latter, giving the formula
s
1 2
LDi = ∑ xi (w) − x j (w) (1.2)
13 j6=i
Hence, economies in the region with higher values of this measure are on average
irrelevant, since they disappear into the aggregation. Instead, consider the entire vector
of indicators for economy i, before any aggregation. Denote this by xi = (xi1 , . . . , xiN ).
In terms of the concept of distance, a higher correlation denotes a lower pattern dis-
financial development, their pattern difference would be the lowest possible. This is
incorporated into our formula by subtracting the correlation from 1: the pattern dis-
tance measure therefore ranges from 0 to 2. Note that using the correlation coefficient
removes the simple mean of the components of the vector. If the level index is con-
13 Implicitly, this calculation treats all the components of the index as having equal weights. This is
not an issue in our calculations, since the index we use weights components equally.
54
structed with equal weights, the index is the simple average of the components of the
vector of financial development measures. If we average across all such correlations for
country i, we obtain the average Pattern Distance for country i. Note that the correlation
coefficient does not have the interpretation usually associated with random variables it
is simply a convenient summary measure.14 For this calculation to make sense, all the
components should be on the same scale, which is the case with the GCI data. Also, the
calculation here can be contrasted with the correlations which are part of principal com-
ponents analysis, since those are calculated between vectors of individual components,
so that each countrys value for that component is an element of the ith vector of country
are capturing something quite different than anything associated with principal compo-
nents.
2.4 Results
We begin by reporting the levels of financial development for the 14 countries in the
analysis. The individual country levels are reported in Table C.2, for two years (2010
and 2014) and four different specifications of the financial development index. FDIn-
dex8 is a slight modification of the measure of financial market development that is used
in the GCI report, with equal weights for all eight components, rather than the two-tier
14 In other words, the components of the vector are not draws from a single distribution, since they are
55
weighting scheme used in that report. FDIndex7 removes Legal Rights of Investors
from the index calculation. FDIndex10 adds our measures of business environment and
institutional environment to the original eight components, while FDIndex9 adds these
two to the seven components, excluding legal rights.15 All the sub-components or vari-
ables included in these two additional components used in FDIndex10 and FDIndex9
are listed in tables in the Appendix. Removing the legal rights component reduces the
financial development index levels slightly, on average, but adding the two environment
components does not affect the overall levels. The range of variation of the index lev-
els across countries is not much affected by the differences in choice of components,
The relative and absolute levels of financial development in Table C.2 are not sur-
prising. Overall values of the index are in a tight range, quite far from the extremes
of 1 and 7. There are strong associations between levels of financial development and
GDP per capita, although Korea stands out as a considerable exception on the low side,
while Malaysia has exceptionally high measures of financial development. Japan also
has somewhat of a low score, given its high-income status. We will not go into the con-
tribution of different components of the indices to the variations observed in the levels
in Table C.2. We mainly want to emphasize that the levels are fairly constant over this
short span of time, and especially, that they are not much affected by changes in the
15 The legal rights measure is actually included in the institutional environment component, but is only
56
Figure 2.1: Patterns of Financial Development, Developed Economies, 2014.
Affordability
HKG
JPN
NZL
SGP
TWN
Soundness of banks Access to loans
Venture capital
57
Table 2.3: Financial Development Index Levels.
composition of the index, at least for the four alternatives considered here. However,
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, for FDIndex8 for 2014: Figure 3.1 shows the seven advanced
economies of the region in our sample, and Figure 3.2 shows the other seven.16 As
noted, Korea stands out in the first case, while Malaysia is an outlier in the second
set, though overall, the emerging economies seem to show greater variation in their
We next turn to the measurement of distances between economies of levels and pat-
terns of financial development. Each pair of the 14 economies can be compared in terms
16 We are indebted to our discussant, Siu Fung Yiu, for suggesting construction of these graphs.
58
of each of these measures, which implies 91 numbers for each measure. We report in-
stead the average for each economy, of 13 pairwise distances with the other economies
in the region that are in our set of analysis. Prior to examining these country averages,
regional averages are reported in Table 2.4. For the region as a whole, the first index
suggests that distances in financial development levels did not vary too much across
while similar when averaging across the region, showed considerably greater variation
across economies for FDIndex7 in 2014 versus 2010, as evidenced in the higher range.
Removing the legal rights component from the index had small effects on level dis-
tances, but large impacts on pattern distances the latter were much lower on average
(as a result of higher average correlations), and especially in the lower tail of the re-
environment and institutional environment had small impacts on pattern distances in the
case where the legal rights index was included (FDIndex10), but large impacts when it
was excluded (FDIndex9). However, the pattern distances in the case of FDIndex9 are
lower than in the case of FDIndex8, implying that the differences in measured patterns
of financial development are driven significantly by the single component of legal rights
of investors.
17 In this context, the observations of the International Monetary Funds (IMF) (2015) report are of
interest, Differences in financial regulation between countries are important determinants of financial
integration, as investors may be reluctant to carry out financial transactions with entities in countries
whose regulations and institutions are very different from their own.
59
Figure 2.2: Patterns of Financial Development, Emerging Economies, 2014.
Affordability
CHN
IDN
PHL
THA
VNM
Soundness of banks Access to loans
Venture capital
60
Table 2.4: Regional Summary Statistics.
FDIndex8
FDIndex7
FDIndex10
FDIndex9
61
Table 2.5 through 8 provide economy-level averages for the level and pattern dis-
tances, for each of the four financial development indices. The average level distances
depend on where the economy is in the ranking of levels, with high and low levels of
financial development tending to have higher average distances. However, the average
distance also depends on the overall distribution. Thus, in Table 2.5, Korea has a higher
average level distance than Indonesia, even though its level of financial development
group with relatively low levels of financial development. If we look at average level
distances (again using Table 2.5 to illustrate), Indonesia was similar to several other
economies on this measure (China, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Thailand), but
very much an outlier in its pattern distance, which was much greater than any of the
other economies in the set. This illustrates a key general point, that economies can be
quite different in their specific patterns of financial development. This point is explored
The pattern differences in Table 2.5 are not as large, on the whole, as those measured
in Kaur and Singh (2014), using date from the WEF FDR. This reflects the different
composition of the indices, based on different data and a somewhat different conceptu-
alization of financial development. Significantly, when only one of the components, the
index of legal rights of investors, is removed, the pattern distances almost disappear, as
62
Table 2.5: Level and Pattern Differences FDIndex8
Year 2010
Year 2014
63
Table 2.6: Level and Pattern Differences FDIndex7
Year 2010
Year 2014
64
can be seen in Table 2.6. Even when broader measures of institutional environment and
business environment are included, to bring the index somewhat closer to that calcu-
lated in the FDR, the pattern distances are higher than in the case of the original eight
components, though higher than the narrowest index of seven components (Tables 2.7
and 2.8). In all of these cases, level distances are relatively insensitive to changes in the
index construction, just as was the case for the levels themselves (Table C.2), although
Figures 3.3 through 2.10 are useful in visualizing and summarizing the data in the
tables. Each figure displays the combinations of level distance and pattern distance for
the economies in the regional group. Figures 3.3 and 2.4 present the results for FDIn-
dex8, corresponding to the data in Table 3.1. Clearly, Indonesia is an outlier in 2010, but
its pattern distance changes dramatically in 2014. Figure 2.4, in particular, drives home
the point that there is no obvious relationship between distances in levels of financial
is clearly furthest from other countries in the region on average, in both dimensions,
Hong Kong and Singapore, while having the highest levels of financial development,
and thus the greatest average distances from the other countries, have low levels of av-
erage distance in patterns of financial development. Taiwan and the Philippines, on the
other hand, have low average level distances, but high average pattern distances.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 provide the scatter plot for the data from Table 2.6, where the
65
Table 2.7: Level and pattern differences FDIndex10.
Year 2010
Year 2014
66
Table 2.8: Level and pattern differences FDIndex9.
Year 2010
Year 2014
67
index of legal rights of investors has been removed from the overall index of financial
development. In this case, the pattern distance collapses for most of the countries in the
regional set (except for Cambodia and Vietnam). However, without these two outliers,
there is again no clear relationship between distance in levels and distance in patterns of
financial development. The increase in pattern distance from 2010 to 2014 for Cambo-
dia and Vietnam is noteworthy, in the context of increasing financial flows in the region
The scatter plots for the data in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are presented in Figures 2.7
through 2.10. The results for these measures of financial development, using broader
sets of components, are somewhere in between the earlier two cases (Figures 3.3 and
2.4 versus Figures 2.5 and 2.6), and provide similar visualizations of the central point,
that measuring and comparing patterns of financial development provides different in-
formation than comparing levels of financial development. Figures 2.9 and 2.10, based
on FDIndex9, displays increases in pattern distances for Korea as well as Cambodia and
financial development could have implications for further financial integration in the
region.
It is also helpful to illustrate the variations in level distance and pattern distance
against the actual levels of financial development.18 Since, as noted earlier, these levels
are quite insensitive to the choice of year of components of the index, we only provide
18 We are again indebted to our discussant, Siu Fung Yiu, for suggesting construction of these figures.
68
Figure 2.3: Level and Pattern Distance, FDIndex8, 2010
1.00
0.90
IDN
0.80
0.70
Pattern Distance
0.60
TWN
0.50
0.40
PHL
THA
0.30 KHM
MYS
VNM
SGP
0.20 NZL KOR HKG
JPNCHN AUS
0.10
0.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Level Distance
scatter plots for the case of 8 index components, and the year 2014. Figure 2.11 shows
how average level distances vary with levels for 2014: the pattern mostly reflects the
fact that economies with low or high levels of financial development tend to be fur-
ther away from their regional counterparts on average, as compared to economies with
Figure 2.12 shows how average pattern distances vary with levels, for FDIndex8 in
2014. There is some clustering of average pattern distances for five of the advanced
economies in the region, but the other nine economies have higher average pattern
distances, and there is no relationship between the pattern distances and the overall
69
Figure 2.4:4:Level
Figure Leveland
andPattern
PatternDistance, FDIndex8,
Distance, FDindex82014
2014
0.5
0.45 TWN
PHL VNM
0.35 CHN
MYS
Pattern Distance
THA
0.3 KOR
0.25
0.1
0.05
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Level Distance
levels of financial development for these economies. This reinforces the basic idea that
collapsing different dimensions of financial development into a single index can hide
and patterns of financial development emerges among subgroups of the set of 14 coun-
tries.19 This is particularly pertinent for thinking about financial integration, although
depend on the specifics of each: in some cases, specialization in aspects of finance may
19 Once more, we are indebted to our discussant, Siu Fung Yiu, for suggesting that we conduct a cluster
analysis.
70
Figure 2.5: Level and Pattern Distance, FDIndex7, 2010
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
Pattern Distance
0.3
0.25
0.2
KHM
0.15
IDN TWN
NZL
0.1 VNM
JPN
CHN AUS SGP
KOR
HKG
THAPHL
MYS
0.05
0
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
Level Distance
support integration, whereas in other dimensions, integration may best occur when fi-
Our application of clustering analysis uses bilateral differences in levels and pat-
terns of financial development, rather than trade intensity or FDI intensity, which have
been used in previous applications.20 Otherwise, the procedure is the same: at the first
step, the two economies that are closest in distance are combined into a cluster, and this
cluster is treated as a single observation (with averaged values) for the second step. At
the next stage, either another economy is added to this cluster, or a second cluster is
20 For cluster analysis based on trade intensity, see Huang et al. (2006); for analysis based on FDI
71
Figure 2.6:6:Level
Figure Leveland
andPattern Distance,
Pattern FDIndex7,
Distance, 2014
FDIndex7
2014
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
Pattern Distance
0.3 KHM
0.25 VNM
0.2
0.15
TWN
CHN
0.1 IDN KOR
JPN
AUS MYS
THA NZLSGPHKG
PHL
0.05
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Level Distance
formed, and so on. The sequence of steps is shown in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, for levels
as one would expect, with economies with high, medium and low levels of financial de-
velopment tending to be assigned to the same clusters (Table 2.9). The initial exceptions
to these clusters lining up with per capita incomes are the outliers, Korea and Malaysia.
The initial clusters tend to emerge in the middle and lower end of the distribution of
levels of financial development, with the most financially developed economies, Hong
Kong and Singapore, being clustered only in the seventh step of the process. At the end,
72
Figure 2.7: Level and Pattern Distance, FDIndex10, 2010
0.9 IDN
0.8
0.7
Pattern Distance
TWN
0.6
0.5
PHL
THA
0.4 MYS
KOR KHM
VNM
NZL
SGP
0.3 JPN HKG
CHN AUS
0.2
0.1
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Level Distance
the final two clusters are quite heterogeneous, in per capita incomes as well as levels of
financial development. Of course, the entire exercise can be very sensitive to the choice
21 For
example, we discovered that the clustering was quite sensitive to the way in which the original
measure of investor legal rights was converted to the 1-7 scale.
73
Figure 2.8: Level and Pattern Distance, FDIndex10, 2014
0.9
0.8
0.7
Pattern Distance
0.6
TWN VNM
0.5 PHL
IDN KOR
KHM
0.4 CHNMYS
THA
0.3 JPN AUS NZL
SGP
HKG
0.2
0.1
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Level Distance
0.5
0.45
0.4 IDN
0.35
Pattern Distance
0.3 KOR
0.25 NZL
TWN
KHM
0.2
JPN PHL SGP
MYS AUS
0.15 THA
CHN VNM
HKG
0.1
0.05
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Level Distance
74
Figure 2.10: Level and Pattern Distance, FDIndex9, 2014
0.50
0.45
KOR
0.40
0.35 KHM
Pattern Distance
VNM
0.30
0.25 IDN
CHN MYS
0.20 TWN
PHL
THA
JPN NZL
0.15 AUS SGP
HKG
0.10
0.05
0.00
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Level Distance
75
Table 2.9: Clustering based on Levels of Financial Development
AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS AUS
KHM KHM KHM
CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN CP CP CP CPITh CPITh CPITh
HKG HKG HKG HKG HKG HKG HKG HS HS
IDN IDN IDN IDN IDN IDN ITh ITh
JPN JPN JTw JTw JTw JTw JTw JTw JTw JTw JTwA JTwACPITh JTwACPIThMNHS
KOR KoV KoV KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh KoVKh
MYS MYS MYS MYS MN MN MN MN MN MNHS MNHS MNHS
NZL NZL NZL NZL
PHL PHL PHL PHL PHL
SGP SGP SGP SGP SGP SGP SGP
76
TWN TWN
THA THA THA THA THA THA
VNM
In the case of patterns of financial development (Table 2.10), the manner in which
clustering proceeds is quite different. The first three steps involve a clustering of Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong. However, similarity of patterns of
financial development creates clusters that are quite different from those involving sim-
ilarity of levels, so that Korea and Malaysia are clustered,22 and Taiwan is added at step
nine to a cluster of economies with lower per capita incomes and lower financial devel-
opment measures. Japan, however, ends up in the higher income cluster, but the final
two clusters of economies with similar patterns of financial development are somewhat
0.5
0.45
0.4
KOR HKG
0.35 VNM
KHM SGP
Level Distance
NZL
0.3
MYS
0.25 CHN AUS
0.2 PHL TWN
IDNTHA
JPN
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00
Level
22 Vietnam, which is initially clustered with Korea in the levels analysis, later gets added to this cluster
based on patterns. Sahay et al. (2015) also discuss the comparison of South Korea and Vietnam, where
both countries have similar private credit but differ strongly along the financial access dimension.
77
Figure 2.12: Level and Pattern Distance, FDIndex8, 2014
0.5
0.35 CHN
MYS
Pattern Distance
THA
0.3 KOR
0.25 SGP
0.2 JPN AUS HKG
NZL
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00
Level
78
Table 2.10: Clustering based on Patterns of Financial Development
AUS AN ANS ANSH ANSH ANSH ANSH ANSH ANSH ANSH ANSHJ ANSHJKoMV ANSHJKoMVKh
KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM KHM
CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN CHN
HKG HKG HKG
IDN IDN IDN IDN IP IP IPTh IPTh IPThC IPThCTw IPThCTw IPThCTw IPThCTw
JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN
KOR KOR KOR KOR KOR KoM KoM KoMV KoMV KoMV KoMV
MYS MYS MYS MYS MYS
NZL
PHL PHL PHL PHL
SGP SGP
TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN
79
THA THA THA THA THA THA
VNM VNM VNM VNM VNM VNM VNM
2.5 Conclusion
Even after the global financial crisis, which included financial contagion across
East Asia or the Asia Pacific region. Recent empirical analyses suggest that financial
integration within the region has been increasing, but still remains below what might
assertions of too much or too little financial integration have to be very tentative.
The literature on financial integration does make references to the need for adequate
levels of financial development, especially in the case of financial market regulation, but
typically does not go further in empirically associating financial integration and finan-
cial development. On the other hand, there is a large literature on financial development
and its impacts, especially on economic growth. This literature has tended to measure
et al. (2015) and Sahay et al. (2015), there have been attempts to differentiate between
In this paper we have argued that even a sophisticated index is limited because it
80
alternative, we have proposed and constructed a measure of differences in patterns of
in levels of financial development. Note that our measure is only operative in capturing
the distance between two economies, as opposed to an index (or vector) that measures
versus those that capture quality. This would refine the idea of measuring patterns of
For 14 economies of the Asia Pacific region, we have calculated differences in lev-
els and patterns of financial development for different years and different vectors of
countries can be constructed through cluster analysis, and how the clustering differed
when based on patterns versus levels of financial development. We suggest that these
kinds of calculations can be a useful preliminary tool for assessing prospects for ben-
eficial financial integration among a given set of economies. In particular, since the
tutions, as well as regulatory and governance institutions, focusing on patterns and sub-
81
tial regulatory reform and coordination, and possible regional risk management policies
and institutions, both as precursors to, and aspects of, financial integration. Develop-
ing these linkages analytically might contribute to regional policy efforts to develop
bond markets in various regional member economies (e.g., Lim and Lim (2012)), and
to assess the balance between bank and non-bank financing channels, for example.
2.6 Appendix
The appendix for this chapter is provided at the end of the dissertation (Appendix
B).
82
Part II
83
Chapter 3
Frictions
Written with Seung Mo Choi, International Monetary Fund (contact), and Nikola
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
Stiglitz (1996) points out the experience of growth miracles in East Asian economies
such as South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. In these economies, periods of high out-
put growth coincide with structural changes (i.e. labor reallocation from agriculture to
84
manufacturing and services sectors) led by export growth. This is a unique feature that
is not observed in other economies. Other models in the literature calibrate exogenous
productivity growth model and they abstract from features of endogenous growth model
growth during the growth miracle periods. Also, some models do not explicitly feature
tradable sector and have limited insight on the patterns of structural changes for many
growth miracles. In addition, these models assume frictionless labor market, which ab-
stracts from many sectoral labor reallocation costs that exist in these economies (Artuc
This paper analyzes a simple model of a small economy with agriculture, manufac-
turing and services sectors to study how trade opening and labor market frictions affects
structural transformation and output growth.2 Recent key empirical results presented by
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) provided important empirical underpinning of the results
of our model. In addition, Melitz and Trefler (2012) provides evident that incentive to
innovate is likely to increase in the present of trade and this links well will key features
The model is based on Matsuyama (1992) model of international trade and Choi
et al. (2014). The economy produces three types of goods: agricultural, manufacturing
1 With the exception of Cai (2015).
2 Papageorgiou and Spatafora (2012) also emphasize a broad connection among trade, structural trans-
85
and services good and they are produced with labor in respective sector and a fixed
input. We assume that manufacturing goods are tradable whereas services goods are
novel feature of the model that is new to the literature. In particular, the economy-wide
tion (labor reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and services sectors) or re-
duces structural changes. In the case of the former, the economy exports non-agriculture
goods and for the latter case, the economy exports agricultural goods instead. Also,
tensify their aggregate productivity growth even more.3 Moreover, with international
trade, the economy specializes and exports either agriculture, manufacturing or ser-
vices goods depending on: (i) relative productivity between agriculture, manufactur-
ing and services sectors, (ii) international relative prices between agriculture and non-
agriculture goods (manufacturing and services) and (iii) trade policy. In addition, if
higher value of marginal product then labor reallocates to those sectors to equalize the
3 This feature of the endogenous growth model with dynamic learning-by-doing in manufacturing
sector (engine of growth) is akin to that in Alberola and Benigno (2017) and Benigno and Fornaro
(2014b).
86
value of marginal product across all three sectors and frictions such as labor market
3.1.2 Literature
There is a large empirical literature, Sachs et al. (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999),
Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), and Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013), on the relationship
between international trade and real GDP growth provides positive evidence. And, on
theoretical front, several models were established to analyze how international trade
affect real GDP growth. However, the theoretical literature abstracts from endogenous
growth models setup, which could be important quantitatively. In particular, there are
few theoretical models with endogenous growth that connect the nexus between struc-
Cai (2015) also models labor market friction (sectoral labor wedge) in model of
structural transformation and studies the role of relative sectoral productivity and la-
bor market distortions in accounting for structural transformation in the U.S., Brazil,
India and Mexico between 1960 and 2005. The paper finds that sectoral productiv-
ity growth plays more important role in the evolution of structural changes than labor
market frictions, using counterfactual on the model calibrated to match the data on em-
ployment and value-added shares in the data. In particular, the decline in agriculture
productivity contributes most to the reduction in that sector employment share. Similar
87
to Cai (2015), our model also introduces sectoral labor market friction to the literature
on structural changes. However, they do not take into account the role of international
trade and sectoral labor market distortions and productivity growth are assumed to be
independent.
Alberola and Benigno (2017) and Benigno and Fornaro (2014b) focuses on en-
of growth. Ventura (1997) also studies the patterns of structural changes in miracle
economies during their fast growth periods with international trade. As a result, the
model in this paper could be viewed as alternative to that of Ventura (1997). How-
ever, Ventura (1997), as with others in the literature, abstract from endogenous growth
tor as engine of growth. Capital accumulation plays a more important role as engine of
Lucas (2009) links trade, growth and structural changes in a model where aggregate
the output gap with the leader economy. In particular, knowledge externalities is con-
centrated in urban setting (non-agriculture sector) and economies with higher share of
(2009).
Even though this paper is closed related to Cai (2015) and Alberola and Benigno
88
(2017), the theoretical model is based on Matsuyama (1992), Lewis (1954) and Choi
et al. (2014). Matsuyama (1992) model could be as an extension of Lewis (1954) with
a macroeconomic level focusing on total output and employment while Lewis (1954)
analyzes the patterns of structural changes at the micro level. However, Matsuyama
(1992) focus on theoretical aspect. This paper can be viewed as a quantitative extension
Duarte and Restuccia (2010) investigate the role of sectoral labor productivity to
explain structural transformation. Restuccia et al. (2008) study the relationships among
sectoral productivity differences, labor market frictions, and the sectoral shares of em-
ployment. Also, Dolores Guilló et al. (2011) also provide a model of structural trans-
formation. All of them share some features with this paper, such as structural transfor-
mation and labor market frictions. However, they do not explicitly focus on the role of
and Rogerson (2014) presents the case for labor market frictions between sectors in
developing countries.4 There are some micro-data evidence of labor market frictions
(between sectors) in developing countries (Artuc et al. (2013) and Artuc et al. (2015)).
Song et al. (2011), part of the literature on global imbalance trying to explain the
growing reserves in trade trade surplus countries, focuses on the role of financial market
4 There is tradition in the literature that argues for the role of labor market frictions and Gollin (2014)
89
imperfection in explaining the accumulation of international reserves in China. Their
this paper, they emphasize friction in the financial market as opposed to the labor market
and international trade. Teignier (2018) also studies the link between structural changes
3.1.3 Contribution
share, a robust empirical findings that also holds in terms of value added. The main
frictions, we could study the impact of international trade and labor market distortions
rating labor market friction into an open economy à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Caliendo and Parro (2015). Using this theoretical framework, we could analyze the
service sectors) on the dynamics of the economy. In their model, Choi et al. (2014)
obtain closed-form solutions for many variables, which facilitates the understanding of
the main mechanism. Hence, the growth accounting can easily separate the contribution
of labor composition effect (i.e., moving from the less productive agricultural sector to
90
the more productive non-agricultural sector) from the contribution of learning by doing
if any, such as international knowledge transfer. We are not able to obtain closed-form
analytical solutions and we instead rely on numerical method in solving the model.
Section 4 discusses the construction of the sectoral international relative prices (be-
tween agriculture, manufacturing and services). Section 5 extends the model to open
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Production
There is a continuum of identical villages. One village has each of the following
is allocated to the A firm. The M firm’s goods production uses linear technology with
91
mt share labor unit in manufacturing:
YtM = Mt mt ,
where YtM is the output in units of M goods, and Mt is the country-wide productivity
Mt+1 − Mt = µM mt Mt ,
Mt+1 − Mt
= µM mt
Mt
Since an individual firm is small, its production decision does not affect the evolu-
92
The services sector, S, firm’s production function7 is
YtS = St st S ,
φ
where YtS is the output in units of S goods, and St is the country-wide productivity
St+1 − St = µS st St ,
St+1 − St
= µS st
St
YtA = AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ ,
where YtA is the output in units of agriculture goods. Here, A is a constant which cap-
7 Alternative S Sector Production Function: Possibly to account for spillover from M sector to S
sector, the use of intermediate inputs.
93
tures cross-country differences in fertilities, etc... Also, country-wide manufacturing
productivity, Mt , affects output in agriculture and in particular, Mtθ reflects the knowl-
parameter of the size of such transfer.8 This is to consider the fact that the growth of
per- capita GDP had been slower until the Industrial Revolution and the well-known
ptM M ptS S
πt = YtA + Y + A Yt .
ptA t pt
ptM ptS φS
πt = AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ + (M m
t t ) + St st .
ptA ptA
We introduce quadratic sectoral labor adjustment costs to the model and the instan-
improvement of the manufacturing sector used as intermediate goods for agriculture production. A
parameter φ determines the curvature of A-good production, where a condition 0 < φ < 1 is imposed to
reflect decreasing marginal products due to fixed amount of lands, etcetera.
10 The main role of quadratic sectoral labor adjustment cost is to help generate the hump-shape in
manufacturing sector.
94
ptM ptS φS 1
πt = AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ + (M m
t t ) + St st − κ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 )2 Mtθ .
ptA ptA 2
where κ is the quadratic labor adjustment costs parameter for labor reallocation in
and out of agriculture. The sectoral labor adjustment costs is proportional to agriculture
ptM ptS
t AM θ (1 − m − s )φ + (M m ) + φ
∞
1 t t t ptA t t St st S + ...
ptA
Max ∑ .
{mt ,st } t=0 1 + r
... − 21 κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 )2
ptM
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = Mt − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ...
ptA
1
... + κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) .
1+r t
The FOCs holds that the marginal product of labor ”benefits” in the A sector is equal
the marginal product of labor ”benefits” in the M sector net the marginal cost of labor
force adjustment in the M sector. The key implication is that due to the existence of
labor adjustment cost κ firms will smooth labor force fluctuation (adjustment).
95
With respect to services employment share, st :
ptS φ −1
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = A
φS St st S − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ...
pt
1
... + κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) .
1+r t
3.2.2 Preferences
ufacturing and services goods CtA ,CtM ,CtS respectively and solves the following maxi-
mization problem subject to total income ptAYtA + ptMYtM + ptSYtS given prices of agri-
∞
−ρt A M S
max ∑e U Ct ,Ct ,Ct
{CtA >γA ,CtM >0,CtS >0} t=0
We model the consumer utility as log utility with subsistence consumptions in agri-
culture and services sector. Preference is non-homothetic due to the existence of sub-
96
sistent consumption goods in agriculture and services.
U CtA ,CtM ,CtS = βA log(CtA − γA ) + βM log(CtM ) + βS log(CtS + γS )
where CtA , CtM , CtS are consumption in agriculture, manufacturing and services, γA
∞ h i
−ρt A M S
max ∑ e βA log(Ct − γA ) + β M log(Ct ) + βS log(Ct + γS ) ,
{CtA >γA ,CtM >0,CtS >0} t=0
Here, CtM is the consumption of good M, CtS is the consumption of good S, and
CtA is the consumption of good A. In addition, γA and γS are the subsistence levels of
A consumption and S consumption. That is, the consumer first purchases γA units of
βS ) of the remaining budget to consume S goods and as income increases, the consumer
97
Subsistence Consumption in Services Sector: We model the subsistence con-
sumption in the services sector γS as in Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and, as income
increases, more resources will be put into the services sector production as demand in-
ptA CtA − γA
ptMCtM pS (CS + γS )
= = t t . (3.1)
βM βA βS
sumption. That is, the consumer first purchases γA units of good A, and allocates
budget to consume S goods and as income increases, the consumer will allocate more
resources into S sector consumption. If the solution to this equation satisfies CtS < 0,
CtS = 0.11
11 As it becomes clear later, the levels of γA and γS affect the features of structural transformation in
a closed economy, but not in a small open economy. This is because the structural transformation in a
small open economy solely depends on its comparative advantage.
98
3.3 Quantitative Analysis: Closed Economy
A closed economy requires CtM = YtM ,CtS = YtS and CtA = YtA .
CtM = YtM = Mt mt .
CtS = YtS = St st S .
φ
Given the country-wide productivity, Mt and St , the above equations, becomes a system
pS ptA
of four equations with four unknowns: mt , st , pMt and ptM
. This system is rewritten here
t
for convenience:
99
ptM
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = Mt − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ... (3.2)
ptA
1
... + κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) .
1+r t
ptS φ −1
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = A
φS St st S − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ... (3.3)
pt
1
... + κMtθ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) .
1 + r
M pA AM θ (1 − m − s )φ − γ
pt (Mt mt ) t t t t A
= . (3.4)
βM βA
φ
ptM (Mt mt ) ptS (St st S + γS )
= . (3.5)
βM βS
In solving the system of equations (3.2-3.5) above, we combine equation 3.2 and 3.3
φ −1
ptM φS St st S
to get ptS
= Mt and from combining equation 3.4 and 3.5, we have the following:
" #
βM 1 1 γS
mt = st + . (3.6)
β S φS φS St stφS −1
this help generate the hump-shaped in the manufacturing sector. In particular, increases
in employment share of the services sector initially increase labor share of the manu-
facturing sector but decrease labor share of M sector later on. With φS = 1, then we
have
βM St st + γS
mt = .
βS St
100
Relationship between st and mt :
" #
dmt βM 1 1 − φS γS
= + .
dst βS φS φS St stφS
ptM βM AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ − γA
Mt = .
ptA βA mt
ptM
Using the expression for M,
ptA t
we have:
βM AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ − γA
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 − = ...
βA mt
1
... = κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) . (3.7)
1+r t
φ
βM St st S + γS
mt = . (3.8)
βS φS St stφS −1
101
a function of the calibrated parameters.
In order to solve the model, we will use the following simplifying approximation to
This paper will focus on the long-run trend in labor reallocation across sectors in
particular, sectoral employment shares (A, M & S) fluctuate slowly around the trend.12
3.3.2.1 Production
The detailed explanation and discussion of the closed economy calibration.13 One
of the main feature of the model is the role of endogenous growth model with learning-
by-doing in agriculture and services sector and they are captured in {µM , µS }. From the
12 Note: we will need to check on the structural break in the WDI data on sectoral employment share
as some countries have significant and visible breaks in the labor shares time-series and hence, the
approximation will not likely hold. For example, for South Korea, in 2009, there is jumps in the WDI
data on manufacturing and services employment shares.
13 For detailed explanation and discussion of the closed economy calibration, please see the attached
Appendix B.
102
M sector, we have the following ratio:
T
YTM /mT
= ∏ (1 + µM mt ) .
Y0M /m0 t=0
Given the data on real value-added growth rates (normalized by respective employ-
ment shares) and employment shares mt for M sector, we get the learning-by-doing
φ T
YTS /sTS
φ
= ∏ (1 + µS st ) .
Y0S /s0S t=0
Given the data on real value-added growth rates (normalized by respective employ-
ment shares) and employment shares st for S sector, we get the learning-by-doing pa-
YTA
log − φ log aaT0
Y0A
θ= M .
YT
log Y M − log mmT0
0
We use the sectoral real value added annual growth rates of each sector A, M and S
14 Similarto Duarte and Restuccia (2010), we assume that the growth rate of real value- added (nor-
malized by respective labor share) are good approximation to the changes in ”quantities”.
103
data from the World Bank WDI for k ∈ {A, M, S}:
RealVAtk
k
= 1 + gtk .
RealVAt−1
Initial Period Normalization: with Y1A = 1,Y1M = 1 and Y1S = 1, we get YTM ,YTM
and YTS using the sectoral real value added annual growth rates.
3.3.2.2 Preferences
YtA pM Y M
φ = tA t − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ...
at pt mt
1
... + κMtθ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) .
1+r
ptM
γA = AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ − βA Mt mt . (3.9)
ptA
104
Given the calibrated parameters {A, φ, βA , βM = 1, βS }, we will match the agricul-
ture subsistence consumption γA with the following: we first calibrate discount factor
βA and then we calibrate to match the data of the initial period employment shares for
ity for agriculture (AM0θ ) and manufacturing (M0 .) and the initial period relative price
M
p
between manufacturing and agriculture p0A .
0
ptM φ
γS = S
βS Mt mt − St st S . (3.10)
pt
with the following: we first calibrate discount factor βS and using the initial period
employment shares in agriculture and services (m0 , s0 ) and initial period manufactur-
ing and services productivity (M0 , S0 ) as well as initial period relative price between
M
p
manufacturing and services p0S .
0
105
Using the firms FOCs above, we have the expression for βS with βM = 1, we have
φ φ
St st S − S0 s0S
βS = . (3.11)
pM
φ −1
φS St st S mt − p0S M0 m0
0
With φS = 1,
St st − S0 s0
βS = .
pM
St mt − 0
M m
pS0 0 0
We will use initial and end period data on sectoral employment shares and produc-
pM
0
γS = βS M0 m0 − S0 s0 .
pS0
Similarly for βA :
φ φ
AMtθ at − AM0θ a0
βA = . (3.12)
DA
Where
pM
mt − 0A M0 m0 + ...
φ−1
DA = φAMtθ at
p0
106
1
... + κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) mt − κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) mt .
1+r t
With approximation,
φ φ
AMtθ at − AM0θ a0
βA = .
pM
φ−1 r
φAMtθ at mt + 1+r κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) mt − p0A M0 m0
0
φ pM
0
γA = AM0θ a0 − βA M0 m0 .
pA0
For our quantitative analysis, we will focus on South Korea which is one of the
growth miracle economies illustrated in Stiglitz (1996) and shows hump-shape man-
ufacturing employment shares (middle left panel of Figure 3.1) and the parameters
107
Figure 3.1: Closed Economy Model Simulation: Sectoral Employment Share
(i) Data: Agriculture Employment Share (ii) Model: Agriculture Employment Share
0.25 0.25
0.2 0.2
0.15 0.15
0.1 0.1
0.05 0.05
0 0
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
(iii) Data: Manufacturing Employment Share (iv) Model: Manufacturing Employment Share
0.4 0.35
0.35
0.3
0.25 0.3
0.2
0.15
0.1 0.25
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
(v) Data: Services Employment Share (vi) Model: Services Employment Share
0.8
0.7 0.65
0.6
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.5
0.4 0.45
0.3 0.4
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
108
Table 3.1: Calibrations for South Korea
A unique currency is used in all economies. Assume a small open economy. As-
sume S goods are non-tradable. From the consumer FOCs above, we have:
pA CA − γA
ptMCtM
= t t
βM βA
ptS (CtS + γS )
= .
βS
109
The open economy equilibrium condition for non-tradable services sector, we have
CtS = YtS = St st S .
φ
ptA CtA − γA
ptMCtM
= .
βM βA
φ
pS (St st S + γS )
= t .
βS
Using the balanced trade condition, for tradable sectors in order to close out the
ptA Yt −Ct + ptM YtM −CtM = 0.
A A
βA S βM S
ptA AMtθ at − ptA γA − M
φ φS φS
p (St st + γS ) + pt Mt mt − p (St st + γS ) = 0.
βS t βS t
The trade balance condition will give us a relationship between mt and st given
the parameters and the relative prices. Given the productivity, Mt and St , the above
pS ptA
equations, becomes a system of four equations with four unknowns: mt , st , pMt and ptM
.
t
110
ptM
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = Mt − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ... (3.13)
ptA
1
... + κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) ,
1+r t
ptS φ −1
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = A
φS St st S − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ... (3.14)
pt
1
... + κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) ,
1+r t
pA CtA − γA
φ
ptMCtM ptS (St st S + γS )
= t = , (3.15)
βM βA βS
ptA Yt −Ct + ptM YtM −CtM = 0.
A A
(3.16)
φ −1
ptM φS St st S
= .
ptS Mt
βA + βM ptS h φS i pM
AMtθ (1 − mt φ
− st ) = γA + A
St st + γS − tA Mt mt .
βS pt pt
φ
Using CtM = YtM − XtM , YtM = Mt mt , and YtS = St st S we have as follows:
15 Similar with the literature, specifically Hsieh and Klenow (2007), relative prices is derived from the
111
We have
φ
XtM βM St st S + γS
mt = + .
Mt βS φS St stφS −1
ptM βM AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ − γA
Mt = .
ptA βA mt
ptM
Plugging in the expression for M,
ptA t
we have:
ptM
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = A
Mt − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ...
pt
1
... + κM θ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) ,
1+r t
ptM r
φAMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ−1 = Mt − κM θ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) . (3.17)
ptA 1+r t
112
From the balanced trade condition, we have another relationship between mt and st
βA + βM ptS φS ptM
AMtθ (1 − mt − st )φ = γA + (S s
t t + γ S ) − Mt mt . (3.18)
βS ptA ptA
We have two equations with two unknowns {mt , st }. As a result, we have a non-
parameters.
for µM and µS is the same as in the closed economy. From the M sector, we have the
following ratio:
113
T
YTM /mT
= ∏ (1 + µM mt ) .
Y0M /m0 t=0
Given the data on real value-added growth rates (normalized by respective employ-
ment shares) and employment shares mt for M sector, we get the learning-by-doing
parameters for M sector µM 16 . Similarly, from the S sector, we have the following ratio:
φ T
YTS /sTS
φ
= ∏ (1 + µS st ) .
Y0S /s0S t=0
Given the data on real value-added growth rates (normalized by respective employ-
ment shares) and employment shares st for S sector, we get the learning-by-doing pa-
YTA
aT
log − φ log
Y0A a0
θ= . (3.19)
YM
log YTM − log mmT0
0
We use the sectoral real value added annual growth rates of each sector A, M and S data
RealVAtk
k
= 1 + gtk
RealVAt−1
16 Similar to Duarte and Restuccia (2010), we assume that the growth rate of real value-added (nor-
malized by respective labor share) are good approximation to the changes in ”quantities”.
17 Similar to footnote description on µ above.
M
114
where k ∈ {A, M, S}
Initial Period Normalization: with Y1A = 1,Y1M = 1 and Y1S = 1, we get YTM ,YTM
and YTS using the sectoral real value added annual growth rates.
Labor Adjustment Costs and Interest Rate {κ, r}: from the FOCs, we have:
YtA pM Y M
φ = tA t − κMtθ (mt + st − mt−1 − st−1 ) + ...
at pt mt
1
... + κMtθ (mt+1 + st+1 − mt − st ) (3.20)
1+r
Trade Balance Condition: using the trade balance equations, we have as follows:
ptA Yt −Ct + ptM YtM −CtM = 0.
A A
Sectoral Net Exports Xti : from the data, we define sectoral net exports Xti for
i ∈ {A, M} as follows:
115
Hence, the value of sectoral net exports are as follows:
World Bank WDI Data for Net Exports Xti : we will use imports and exports
data on (as % of Merchandise imports and exports): agriculture raw materials, food
and manufactures and in order to get the value of imports and exports, we will need the
value of: merchandise imports (current US$) and merchandise exports (current US$)
and agriculture (agriculture raw materials and food/trade balance condition require-
ment) from the data above. We have the sectoral net exports as a percentage of GDP as
pti Xti
xti = .
ptAYtA + ptMYtM + ptSYtS
XtM
xtM = S . (3.21)
ptA A M + pt Y S
M
pt
Yt +Yt pt t
M
XtA
xtA = M S . (3.22)
YtA + pptA YtM + ppAt YtS
t t
116
We will also impose trade balance condition on xtA once we have xtM . In particular,
xtA = −xtM .
ptA A ptS S
XtM = xtM M
Y +Yt + M Yt .
ptM t pt
Ah
ptS h φS i
M pt
i
M θ φ
Xt = xt AMt at + Mt mt + M St st .
ptM pt
t=T
Using the data on sectoral real value added growth rates gtA , gtM , gtS
t=2
(initial pe-
riod sectoral value added normalization to 1), we calculate all the sequence of sectoral
t=T
real value added YtA ,YtM ,YtS t=1 .
n A Mo
p p
Relative Prices pMt , ptS : for the relative price between agriculture and manu-
t t
A
p
facturing, we calculate and aggregate pMt from the detailed level of the World Bank
t
ptM
international price (ICP 2005 edition) and ptS
is calibrated using the first-order condi-
φ −1
ptM φS St st S
tion: ptS
= Mt .
βM S
ptM XtM = ptM Mt mt −
φ
pt (St st S + γS ).
βS
117
βS ptM
Mt mt − XtM − St st S .
φ
γS = S
βM pt
Set
βM = 1.
ptM
γS = S βS Mt mt − XtM − St st S .
φ
(3.23)
pt
h i pM
γA = AMtθ at − XtA − tA βA Mt mt − XtM .
φ
(3.24)
pt
we calibrate the subsistence consumption parameters γA using (3.24). Given the cal-
sumption using: calibrated discount factor βA , initial period employment shares for
culture and manufacturing X0A , X0M , initial period sectoral productivity for agriculture
and manufacturing AM0θ , M0 and initial period relative price between manufacturing
M
p
and agriculture p0A .
0
118
sistence consumption parameters γS using (3.23). Given the calibrated parameters
lowing:
pM
• Initial period relative price between manufacturing and services 0
pS0
.
Discount Factors {βA , βM = 1, βS }: we will use equations (3.23) and (3.24) above
to calibrate the discount factors. Solving for βS , we will use initial and end period data
φ φ
ST sTS − S0 s0S
βS = . (3.25)
XM pM
h i
φ −1
φS ST sTS mT − MTT − p0S M0 m0 − X0M
0
pM
0
βS M0 m0 − X0M − S0 s0S .
φ
γS = S
(3.26)
p0
119
Solving for βA , with the simplifying approximation,
We will use initial and end period data on sectoral employment shares and produc-
h i pM
γA = Y0A − X0A − 0A βA Y0M − X0M .
(3.28)
p0
The sectoral relative prices are constructed based on the detail level data from the
International Comparison Program (ICP) 2005.18 Figure 3.2 displays the relative price
of manufacturing to services sector against PPP real GDP per capita (in natural log
18 Thediscussion on the construction of sectoral relative prices (World Bank ICP) is based on: Kural-
bayeva and Stefanski (2013), Adamopoulos (2009), The World Bank International Comparison Program
Handbook (World Bank (2005)), Buera et al. (2011) and Deaton and Hestor (2010).
120
term) and Figure 3.3 plots relative price of manufacturing to agriculture sector over
3.6 Conclusion
121
Figure 3.3: Sectoral Relative Prices (Manufacturing/Agriculture) and Income
122
sector to a standard three-sector structural transformation model with labor market fric-
tion, which is new to the literature. Labor market friction plays an important role in
ployment. In our model, opening to trade can accelerate or decrease structural trans-
3.7 Extensions
For future work, we plan to apply the model in the context of income distribution
labor market frictions (barriers to labor movement across sectors) and international
trade. We hypothesize that opening to trade could increase or decrease income in-
model and it may also be generated by the supply side McCalman (2018). In addition,
the model’s key feature is the dynamic productivity growth in manufacturing sector via
learning-by-doing and international trade could have implication for aggregate growth
19 For
sectoral wages (compensations) data, we plan to utilize data from the IPUMS International of
Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota as well as EU KLEMS at the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre.
123
depending on weather trade expands or depress the dynamic engine of growth sector.
3.8 Appendix
The appendix for this chapter is provided at the end of the dissertation (Appendix
C).
124
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142
Appendix A
Multi-dimensional View
A.1 Appendix
143
Table A.1 – (Continued from previous page)
Variables Descriptions and Sources
The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a
share of GDP. Domestic money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial
PC institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits. Code: Private
credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)(GFDD.DI.01). Source: GFDD (Cihak
et al., 2012)
Difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Lending rate is the rate charged
by banks on loans to the private sector and deposit interest rate is the rate of-
LDSPREAD
fered by commercial banks on three-month deposits. Code: Bank lending-deposit
spread(GFDD.EI.02). Source: GFDD (Cihak et al., 2012)
Average years of total schooling of males and females, 25+, total is the average years
of education completed among people over age 25. Code: Barro-Lee: Average years
LEDU
of total schooling, age 25+, total(BAR.SCHL.25UP) (analyses use log of the variable).
Source: WDI (World Bank, 2016)
General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP: includes
all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense
LGC
and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of govern-
ment capital formation. Code: General government final consumption expenditure (%
of GDP) (analyses use log of the variable). Source: WDI (World Bank, 2016)
Trade openness: sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share
LOPEN of GDP (analyses use log of the variable). Code: Trade (% of GDP). Source: WDI
(World Bank, 2016)
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and ser-
vices that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres
formula is generally used (analyses use log of the variable). Code: Inflation, consumer
LINFL prices (annual %)(FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG). Following Arcand et al. (2015a), we drop all
observations for which inflation is less than 10% and observations with negative infla-
tion values are
set to zero. Also, we apply
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
√
LINFL = log INFL + INFL2 + 1 . Source: WDI (World Bank, 2016)
Table A.2: Credit to the Private Sector Over GDP (Selected Years)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
Afghanistan 0.03 0.06 Albania 0.04 0.06 0.38
(Continued on next page)
144
Table A.2 – (Continued from previous page)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
Algeria 0.55 0.26 0.09 0.15 American Samoa
Andorra Angola 0.03 0.19
Antigua and Barbuda 0.36 0.48 0.63 0.73 Argentina 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.12
Armenia 0.21 0.07 0.36 Aruba 0.40 0.48 0.60
Australia 0.25 0.59 0.87 1.29 Austria 0.72 0.88 0.90 0.94
Azerbaijan 0.06 0.06 0.20 Bahamas, The 0.40 0.53 0.57 0.81
Bahrain 0.38 0.49 0.50 0.97 Bangladesh 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.39
Barbados 0.36 0.45 0.54 Belarus 0.18 0.08 0.27
Belgium 0.27 0.56 0.66 0.55 Belize 0.31 0.37 0.56 0.58
Benin 0.29 0.14 0.12 0.23 Bermuda
Bhutan 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.48 Bolivia 0.12 0.32 0.51 0.41
Bosnia and 0.33 0.52 Botswana 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.28
Herzegovina
Brazil 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.67 Brunei Darussalam 0.62 0.34
Bulgaria 0.60 0.18 0.69 Burkina Faso 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.20
Burundi 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.18 Cambodia 0.03 0.06 0.35
Cameroon 0.27 0.19 0.08 0.13 Canada 0.75 0.92 1.47
Cape Verde 0.03 0.08 0.39 0.62 Cayman Islands
Central African 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.11 Chad 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.05
Republic
Channel Islands Chile 0.50 0.50 0.68 0.99
China 0.76 1.09 1.26 Colombia 0.30 0.24 0.22 0.45
Comoros 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.20 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
Congo, Rep. 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.08 Costa Rica 0.20 0.12 0.26 0.47
Cote d’Ivoire 0.47 0.33 0.14 0.17 Croatia 0.25 0.38 0.69
Cuba Curacao
Cyprus 0.56 1.04 1.57 2.47 Czech Republic 0.69 0.35 0.49
Denmark 0.23 0.41 1.29 1.87 Djibouti 0.43 0.26 0.30
Dominica 0.32 0.48 0.46 0.54 Dominican Republic 0.29 0.18 0.28 0.22
Ecuador 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.25 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.21 0.22 0.52 0.28
El Salvador 0.28 0.23 0.76 1.02 Equatorial Guinea 0.17 0.03 0.09
Eritrea 0.25 0.14 Estonia 0.11 0.41 0.78
Ethiopia 0.15 0.15 0.21 Faroe Islands
Fiji 0.21 0.36 0.37 0.71 Finland 0.47 0.85 0.55 0.90
France 0.69 0.92 0.76 0.95 French Polynesia
Gabon 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.10 Gambia, The 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.15
Georgia 0.07 0.34 Germany 0.83 0.91 1.11 0.84
Ghana 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.14 Greece 0.40 0.31 0.50 1.16
Greenland Grenada 0.32 0.49 0.59 0.79
Guam Guatemala 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.27
Guinea 0.04 0.03 0.06 Guinea-Bissau 0.03 0.02 0.09
Guyana 0.25 0.20 0.58 0.39 Haiti 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15
Honduras 0.29 0.26 0.35 0.50 Hong Kong SAR, 1.35 1.48 1.93
China
Hungary 0.16 0.35 0.34 0.53 Iceland 0.28 0.44 1.03 1.33
(Continued on next page)
145
Table A.2 – (Continued from previous page)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
India 0.22 0.23 0.29 0.48 Indonesia 0.11 0.43 0.19 0.30
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.50 Iraq 0.06
Ireland 0.45 0.44 0.81 1.18 Isle of Man
Israel 0.45 0.54 0.77 0.75 Italy 0.50 0.57 0.64 0.92
Jamaica 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.27 Japan 1.24 1.73 1.89 1.79
Jordan 0.52 0.65 0.72 0.69 Kazakhstan 0.16 0.16 0.36
Kenya 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.32 Kiribati
Korea, Dem. Rep. Korea, Rep. 0.47 0.51 0.82 1.04
Kosovo 0.05 0.34 Kuwait 0.63 0.30 0.57 0.65
Kyrgyz Republic 0.04 0.13 Lao PDR 0.04 0.07 0.19
Latvia 0.14 0.28 0.72 Lebanon 1.34 0.45 0.79 0.83
Lesotho 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.16 Liberia 0.04 0.15
Libya 0.19 0.13 Liechtenstein
Lithuania 0.14 0.17 0.48 Luxembourg 1.16 1.10 0.76 0.91
Macao SAR, China 0.58 0.69 0.60 0.55 Macedonia, FYR 0.37 0.17 0.46
Madagascar 0.19 0.15 0.08 0.11 Malawi 0.18 0.11 0.05 0.13
Malaysia 0.57 0.86 1.19 1.08 Maldives 0.15 0.10 0.18 0.43
Mali 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.20 Malta 0.35 0.82 1.05 1.12
Marshall Islands Mauritania 0.27 0.32 0.27
Mauritius 0.21 0.35 0.58 0.93 Mexico 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.26
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0.24 0.20 Moldova 0.04 0.15 0.36
Monaco Mongolia 0.08 0.13 0.46
Montenegro 0.10 0.58 Morocco 0.16 0.21 0.46 0.68
Mozambique 0.13 0.12 0.24 Myanmar 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10
Namibia 0.29 0.42 0.46 Nepal 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.53
Netherlands 0.62 0.81 1.14 1.16 New Caledonia
New Zealand 0.18 0.76 1.03 1.39 Nicaragua 0.39 0.24 0.23 0.27
Niger 0.17 0.11 0.05 0.13 Nigeria 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.13
Northern Mariana Norway 0.49 0.74 0.80
Islands
Oman 0.14 0.21 0.37 0.41 Pakistan 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.17
Palau Panama 0.48 0.45 0.86 0.69
Papua New Guinea 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.30 Paraguay 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.38
Peru 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.27 Philippines 0.41 0.25 0.35 0.32
Poland 0.55 0.18 0.27 0.50 Portugal 0.63 0.49 1.15 1.51
Puerto Rico Qatar 0.27 0.39
Romania 0.45 0.50 0.09 0.43 Russian Federation 0.06 0.16 0.46
Rwanda 0.05 0.06 0.09 Samoa 0.07 0.15 0.32 0.64
San Marino Sao Tome and 0.07 0.32
Principe
Saudi Arabia 0.34 0.53 0.53 0.51 Senegal 0.33 0.25 0.18 0.28
Serbia 0.22 0.46 Seychelles 0.16 0.10 0.26 0.23
Sierra Leone 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 Singapore 0.84 0.87 1.08 1.11
Sint Maarten (Dutch Slovak Republic 0.49 0.38 0.46
part)
(Continued on next page)
146
Table A.2 – (Continued from previous page)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
Slovenia 0.24 0.37 0.77 Solomon Islands 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.29
Somalia South Africa 0.57 0.82 1.23 1.45
South Sudan 0.02 Spain 0.72 0.77 0.97 1.56
Sri Lanka 0.18 0.11 0.27 0.27 St. Kitts and Nevis 0.43 0.63 0.54 0.64
St. Lucia 0.41 0.51 0.72 1.08 St. Martin (French
part)
St. Vincent and the 0.37 0.40 0.50 0.52 Sudan 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.10
Grenadines
Suriname 0.32 0.28 0.11 0.25 Swaziland 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.21
Sweden 0.78 1.15 0.82 1.26 Switzerland 1.06 1.46 1.43 1.63
Syrian Arab 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.20 Tajikistan 0.11 0.15
Republic
Tanzania 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.15 Thailand 0.44 0.91 1.02 1.31
Timor-Leste 0.06 0.12 Togo 0.25 0.24 0.14 0.27
Tonga 0.15 0.29 0.40 0.34 Trinidad and Tobago 0.33 0.41 0.36 0.37
Tunisia 0.45 0.58 0.66 0.71 Turkey 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.54
Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos
Islands
Tuvalu Uganda 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.15
Ukraine 0.01 0.15 0.71 United Arab 0.27 0.41 0.36 0.64
Emirates
United Kingdom 0.31 1.00 1.26 1.68 United States 0.90 1.16 1.66 1.74
Uruguay 0.41 0.21 0.48 0.23 Uzbekistan
Vanuatu 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.66 Venezuela, RB 0.56 0.21 0.10 0.20
Vietnam 0.14 0.40 0.95 Virgin Islands (U.S.)
West Bank and Gaza 0.22 0.25 Yemen, Rep. 0.04 0.05 0.06
Zambia 0.05 0.06 0.14 Zimbabwe 0.13 0.23 0.18
Table A.3: Bank Lending and Deposit Rate Spreads (Selected Years)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
Afghanistan Albania 0.03 0.09 0.06
Algeria 0.04 0.03 0.06 American Samoa
Andorra Angola 0.59 0.12
Antigua and Barbuda 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 Argentina 0.02 0.08 0.03
Armenia 0.13 0.08 Aruba 0.05 0.07 0.07
Australia 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 Austria
Azerbaijan 0.08 0.08 Bahamas, The 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03
Bahrain 0.06 0.07 0.05 Bangladesh 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03
Barbados 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 Belarus 0.33 0.13 0.00
Belgium 0.08 0.06 0.05 Belize 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07
Benin 0.08 0.09 Bermuda
(Continued on next page)
147
Table A.3 – (Continued from previous page)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
Bhutan 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 Bolivia 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.09
Bosnia and 0.09 0.04 Botswana 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.07
Herzegovina
Brazil 0.42 0.27 Brunei Darussalam 0.04 0.05
Bulgaria 0.32 0.07 0.07 Burkina Faso 0.08 0.09
Burundi 0.08 Cambodia
Cameroon 0.06 0.10 0.14 Canada 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02
Cape Verde 0.06 0.08 0.07 Cayman Islands
Central African 0.05 0.09 0.14 Chad 0.06 0.10 0.14
Republic
Channel Islands Chile 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.04
China 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 Colombia 0.10 0.07 0.07
Comoros 0.07 0.09 0.09 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.24
Congo, Rep. 0.04 0.09 0.14 Costa Rica 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.12
Cote d’Ivoire 0.08 0.09 Croatia 0.16 0.09 0.08
Cuba Curacao
Cyprus 0.03 0.03 0.03 Czech Republic 0.07 0.04 0.04
Denmark 0.05 0.05 0.05 Djibouti 0.05 0.09 0.10
Dominica 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 Dominican Republic 0.14 0.10 0.08
Ecuador 0.11 0.08 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05
El Salvador 0.02 0.04 0.05 Equatorial Guinea 0.10 0.14
Eritrea Estonia 0.13 0.04 0.05
Ethiopia 0.03 0.04 Faroe Islands
Fiji 0.04 0.06 0.04 Finland 0.01 0.05 0.03
France 0.05 0.05 0.04 French Polynesia
Gabon 0.05 0.09 0.14 Gambia, The 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.14
Georgia 0.17 0.04 Germany 0.05 0.06 0.07
Ghana 0.07 Greece 0.06 0.09 0.05
Greenland Grenada 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07
Guam Guatemala 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.08
Guinea 0.03 0.12 Guinea-Bissau 0.26
Guyana 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.12 Haiti 0.19 0.11
Honduras 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.09 Hong Kong SAR, 0.04 0.04 0.05
China
Hungary 0.07 0.03 0.03 Iceland 0.05 0.06 0.07
India Indonesia 0.04 0.05 0.05
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.05 0.00 Iraq
Ireland 0.04 0.06 0.04 Isle of Man
Israel 0.53 0.09 0.04 0.03 Italy 0.06 0.08 0.05
Jamaica 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.14 Japan 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Jordan 0.03 0.06 0.05 Kazakhstan
Kenya 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.09 Kiribati
Korea, Dem. Rep. Korea, Rep. 0.02 0.02 0.02
Kosovo Kuwait 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
Kyrgyz Republic 0.23 0.17 Lao PDR 0.09 0.22 0.20
(Continued on next page)
148
Table A.3 – (Continued from previous page)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
Latvia 0.38 0.05 0.06 Lebanon 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.02
Lesotho 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.07 Liberia 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.10
Libya 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 Liechtenstein
Lithuania 0.09 0.06 0.04 Luxembourg 0.03 0.02
Macao SAR, China 0.04 0.05 0.05 Macedonia, FYR 0.42 0.08 0.03
Madagascar 0.06 0.12 0.45 Malawi 0.08 0.07 0.22 0.24
Malaysia 0.03 0.04 0.02 Maldives 0.06 0.07
Mali 0.08 0.09 Malta 0.03 0.04 0.02
Marshall Islands Mauritania 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.10
Mauritius 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.02 Mexico 0.03 0.06 0.03
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0.13 0.14 Moldova 0.08 0.06
Monaco Mongolia 0.20 0.20 0.07
Montenegro Morocco 0.01 0.01 0.08
Mozambique 0.10 0.06 Myanmar 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05
Namibia 0.09 0.07 0.04 Nepal 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Netherlands 0.06 0.08 0.01 New Caledonia
New Zealand 0.02 0.02 Nicaragua 0.08 0.09 0.11
Niger 0.08 0.09 Nigeria 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.09
Northern Mariana Norway 0.09 0.04 0.02
Islands
Oman 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 Pakistan 0.06 0.06
Palau Panama 0.04 0.05 0.05
Papua New Guinea 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.10 Paraguay 0.10 0.20 0.17
Peru 0.62 0.19 0.16 Philippines 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Poland 0.09 0.05 Portugal 0.02 0.07
Puerto Rico Qatar 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Romania 0.33 0.17 0.06 Russian Federation 0.12 0.04
Rwanda 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.10 Samoa 0.07 0.07
San Marino Sao Tome and 0.03 0.20 0.14
Principe
Saudi Arabia Senegal 0.08 0.09
Serbia 0.18 0.08 Seychelles 0.06 0.06 0.09
Sierra Leone 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.12 Singapore 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
Sint Maarten (Dutch Slovak Republic 0.06 0.05
part)
Slovenia 0.23 0.05 Solomon Islands 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.11
Somalia South Africa 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03
South Sudan 0.11 Spain 0.03 0.04 0.02
Sri Lanka 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 St. Kitts and Nevis 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05
St. Lucia 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.07 St. Martin (French
part)
St. Vincent and the 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 Sudan
Grenadines
Suriname 0.05 0.13 0.05 Swaziland 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06
Sweden 0.05 0.07 0.03 Switzerland 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
(Continued on next page)
149
Table A.3 – (Continued from previous page)
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 Country 1980 1990 2000 2010
Syrian Arab 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 Tajikistan 0.12 0.16
Republic
Tanzania 0.08 0.13 0.07 Thailand 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05
Timor-Leste 0.15 0.11 Togo 0.08 0.09
Tonga 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 Trinidad and Tobago 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.06
Tunisia 0.04 Turkey
Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos
Islands
Tuvalu Uganda 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.11
Ukraine 0.39 0.17 0.06 United Arab 0.02 0.04
Emirates
United Kingdom 0.02 0.02 United States
Uruguay 0.28 0.31 0.07 Uzbekistan
Vanuatu 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.04 Venezuela, RB 0.08 0.07 0.02
Vietnam 0.10 0.04 0.03 Virgin Islands (U.S.)
West Bank and Gaza Yemen, Rep. 0.05 0.06
Zambia 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.07 Zimbabwe
150
Table A.4: System GMM: 2nd and 3rd Lag (With Interaction)
151
Table A.5: System GMM: 3rd Lag (With Interaction)
152
Table A.6: System GMM: 4th Lag (With Interaction)
153
Table A.7: Panel OLS (Comparison with Arcand et al. (2015a) Dataset)
154
(-0.36) (-0.86) (-1.58) (-1.41) (-2.28) (-2.78) (-3.88) (-4.04)
PCt−1 1.663∗∗∗ 0.902∗ 0.119 -0.440
(2.72) (1.86) (0.29) (-1.31)
PCt−1 2.163∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗ 0.403 -0.241
(3.29) (2.26) (0.92) (-0.68)
Constant 3.464∗∗∗ 3.137∗∗∗ 3.224∗∗∗ 1.490 0.0902 2.815∗∗ 3.189∗∗∗ 1.864∗
(2.84) (2.90) (3.23) (1.59) (0.07) (2.49) (3.04) (1.89)
Time Fixed Effect X X X X X X X X
Period 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010
Observations 549 675 798 917 542 664 793 917
Dependent Variable: GDP % Growth 5 Year
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.8: System GMM (Comparison with Arcand et al. (2015a) Dataset)
155
PCt−1 4.272∗∗∗ 2.542∗∗ 0.477 -1.102
(2.58) (2.23) (0.57) (-1.13)
Constant 2.956 2.257 0.264 -1.292 9.100∗∗ 7.476∗∗ 6.308∗ 0.157
(0.90) (0.71) (0.09) (-0.40) (2.17) (2.11) (1.81) (0.04)
Time Fixed Effect X X X X X X X X
Period 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010 1960-1995 1960-2000 1960-2005 1960-2010
Observations 549 675 798 917 542 664 793 917
Sarganp 0.00000794 0.000000540 4.94e-13 2.89e-15 0.000000134 3.70e-09 6.20e-17 1.29e-18
Hansenp 0.978 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.839 0.995 1.000 1.000
AR1p 0.000171 0.00000913 0.000000608 8.28e-08 0.000349 0.0000204 0.0000288 0.00000242
AR2p 0.657 0.265 0.385 0.0879 0.978 0.432 0.619 0.00819
Instruments 127 170 219 274 127 170 219 274
Dependent Variable: GDP % Growth 5 Year
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.9: Panel OLS: Quadratic
156
Appendix B
Financial Integration
B.1 Appendix I
157
Table B.1: Institutional Environment
158
Table B.2: Business Environment
159
Table B.3: Additional Components and Variables
Category Component
160
Table B.4: Level and Pattern Differences FDIndex14
Year 2010
Year 2014
161
Table B.5: Level and Pattern Differences FDIndex13
Year 2010
Year 2014
162
B.2 Appendix II: Financial Development Index Pillars
163
Table B.7: Financial Development Index: Category
Alternative Specification I
Category Indicator Score
164
Table B.8: Financial Development Index: Category
Alternative Specification II
Category Indicator Score
165
Appendix C
Frictions
C.1 Appendix I
Relative Prices (ICP) 2005: There is a large literature on sectoral relative prices
calculation.1 The international comparison program (ICP) 2005 provides detailed in-
formations on:
• Expenditures at the basic headings in local currency for all countries in the sam-
1 The notes is based on Kuralbayeva and Stefanski (2013), and Adamopoulos (2009): The Interna-
tional Comparison Program Handbook (2005). Other papers in the literature that utilize the disaggre-
gated ICP data: Buera et al. (2011) and Deaton and Hestor (2010).
166
ple.
• PPP at the basic headings level (129 basic headings) for all countries in the sam-
ple..
• Respective exchange rate (per US dollars) for all countries in the sample.
Hence, the expenditures is converted to in terms of US dollars. The base country is the
US. The ICP data also gives us the detailed expenditure data in PPP exchange rate at
Calculating the Sectoral PPP Exchange Rates from the ICP 2005: for each
sector j ∈ {A, M & S}, we match each basic headings n = 1, ..., N j in the ICP(2005)
data with the corresponding sector j where N j is the number of basic headings level
in the respective sector j and N is the total number of basic headings level in the ICP
NA + NM + NS = N.
The Geary-Khamis Aggregation Method: we will follow the literature and use
167
aggregation method is that it preserves the additive property and hence, we calculate
the share of component of GDP or sectoral PPP exchange rates for the sectoral relative
neous equations.
K " #
qin pin
πn = ∑ . (C.1)
i=1 ∑K k
k=1 qn Pij
{A, M & S} We think of πn as the weighted average ”international” prices for each
qin
basic headings n with K qk as the corresponding weight. where:
∑k=1 n
Eni
qin = . (C.2)
pin
i ∑N i i
n=1 pn qn
P = N
. (C.3)
∑ πn qin
n=1
for country i = 1, ..., K in the sample and basic heading level n = 1, ..., N in sector
j ∈ {A, M & S}
all expenditures at the basic headings within the sector. qin or qkn is the ”notional”
quantities and is calculated using the detailed ICP data and they are defined as the ratio
168
of expenditure in US dollars and PPP at the basic headings n for country i. pin is the
PPP exchange rate for basic headings level n of country i (it is given in the ICP (2005)
data). Pij is the PPP exchange rate for sector j ∈ {A, M & S} of country i (relative to
the base country US (2005)). Pi is the GDP PPP exchange rate for country i (relative
Since we are interested in the relative price of Agriculture, Manufacturing and Ser-
vices we will need to aggregate the ICP basic headings level data to match our three-
Sectoral Level
• PPP Exchange Rate: Pij for sector j ∈ {A, M & S} of country i = 1, ..., K in the
sample
169
• PPP Exchange Rate: pin for basic headings n = 1, ..., N of country i = 1, ..., K in
the sample
Levels Symbols
Basic Headings Level
PPP Exchange Rate pin
Expenditure in Local Currency Eni
”Real” Expenditure (deflated using pin ) qin
International Prices πn
Sectoral Level
PPP Exchange Rate Pij
Aggregate GDP Level
PPP Exchange Rate Pi −
2. Calculating the Basic Headings Real Expenditure qin (deflated using basic head-
170
3. The Geary-Khamis Aggregation Method
K
i i
qn pn
πn = ∑ K Pi .
(C.5)
i=1
∑ qkn
k=1
Intuition:
for country i = 1, ..., K in the sample and basic heading level n = 1, ..., N
Intuition:
171
(a) Once we obtain the solution for the international prices πn , we get the ag-
(b) With the solution for the international prices πn , we also get the sectoral
PPP exchange rate Pij in sector j ∈ {A, M & S} for country i = 1, ..., K
1, ..., K in the sample, we divide the basic headings level to match our three-
NA + NM + NS = N.
Using the international prices πn calculated above, we get the sectoral PPP ex-
change rate for each sector (Agriculture, Manufacturing and Services) j ∈ {A, M & S}
Nj
as the ratio of respective sectoral expenditure in local currency ∑n=1 pin qin and
N
!
j
sectoral expenditures in international prices ∑ πnqin
n=1
172
Nj
∑n=1 pin qin
Pij = Nj
.
∑n=1 πn qin
The Sectoral Relative Prices: we define the sectoral relative prices for country
i PAi
SectPA/M = i . (C.7)
PM
i PSi
SectPS/M = i
. (C.8)
PM
ditures in local currency using the nominal exchange rate provided by the ICP data.
Intuition: we derive the implicit relative price level from the ratio of nominal ex-
domestic currency using the nominal exchange rate provided in the ICP data.
on
• Expenditures at the basic headings in local currency for all countries in the sam-
ple.
173
• PPP at the basic headings level (129 basic headings) for all countries in the sam-
ple..
• Respective exchange rate (Per US dollars) for all countries in the sample.
bayeva and Stefanski (2013) (Table 9) in aggregating and matching the basic headings
with the three-sector environment (Agriculture ”A”, Manufacturing ”M” and Services
”S”). The base country is the US. The ICP data also gives us the detailed expendi-
ture data in PPP exchange rate at disaggregated level (129 sectors) . We will define the
following:
Sectors Symbols
Nominal expenditures in US dollars E ij
Expenditures in PPP exchange rate E i,PPP
j
relative price calculated from the ICP (2005) are based on producer prices of expen-
diture data. It is not the basic price level that consumers pay and hence, it potentially
174
C.2 Appendix II
& Explanation)
We will use data from two main database: the World Bank World Development
Indicator (WDI) data and the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC) 10-
Sector dataset. The ranges for the data for South Korea: the initial period 0 is 1980 and
For Korea, the World Bank WDI data on sectoral employment shares cover the
1979 − 2010 period and the World Bank WDI data on sectoral (constant 2005 US$) real
value added covers the 1970 − 2011 period (the sectoral value added data is truncated
to match the shorter time series for sectoral employment shares). For GGDC 10-Sector
Production Parameters: φ, φS , θ, µM , µS
literature Caselli and Coleman II (2001) as in Choi et al. (2014), we assume φ = 0.81
and this implies that 19% of A production belongs to the owners of fixed inputs (such
as lands).
175
Manufacturing Technology Spillover to Agriculture {θ}: The technology spillover
from the Manufacturing sector to the Agriculture sector (such as the use of imported
intermediate goods) is governed by the spillover parameter θ. The calibrated value for
θ is similar to that in Choi et al. (2014). In calculating θ, we use the ratio of initial and
aT 1−mT −sT mT
last period Agriculture and Manufacturing labor shares a0 = 1−m0 −s0 and m0 , which
are taken from the data and the initial period is 0 and the last period is T . Given the
time series sectoral real value added in A and M (in constant 2005 US$) for Korea, we
calculate the annual growth rates of sectoral real value added adjusted for population
growth rates. Normalizing the initial period A and M real value added to 1, Y0A = 1 and
Y0M = 1, the last period sectoral real value added YTA and YTM are calculated using the
annual growth rates recovered from the data with Y0A = 1 and Y0M = 1. In particular, we
YTA
1−m −s
log −φ log 1−mT −sT
Y0A 0 0
derive the spillover parameter θ as follows: θ =
YTM
mT
and we have
log M −log m
Y0 0
that θ = 0.7158.2
normalizing the initial period Y0M to 1, we find the last period YTM using the M sector
2 Note:
alternatively, we also calibrate the parameter using the Groningen Growth and Development
Center (GGDC) 10-Sector database.
176
real annual growth rates. An implicit assumption is that the growth rates of Manu-
facturing real value added (indices in constant 2005 US$) is a good approximation
the sequence of sectoral productivity for M that will be put into the model using data
on sectoral real value added per worker is similar to those in the literature Duarte and
normalizing the initial period Y0S to 1, we get the last period YTS using the S sector real
annual growth rates. An implicit assumption is that the growth rates of Services real
value added (indices in constant 2005US$) is a good approximation for the changes in
productivity for S that will be put into the model using data on sectoral real value added
per worker is similar to that of Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and µS = 0.0530.
Preference Parameters:
{r, κ, βA , βM = 1, βS , γA , γM = 0, γS }
• Sectoral labor adjustment cost {κ}: The empirical literature3 estimates for the
3 Empirical literature on sectoral labor adjustment costs in Artuc et al. (2013), Porto and Hoekman
177
sectoral labor adjustment costs κ = 5.
• The rate of interest {r}: The rate of interest r is taken to be 2% and hence,
r = 0.02.
βM to 1), we will make use of two equations for the subsistence parameters for A sector
γA and S sector γS by evaluating at the initial period data below, (the two expressions
φ pM
0
γA = AM0θ a0 − βA M0 m0 .
pA0
pM
0
γS = βS M0 m0 − S0 s0 .
pS0
and S sector γS with initial period data on the sectoral employment shares {a0 , m0 , s0 },
n M Mo
p p
the relative productivity for A, M and S as well as the relative prices p0A , p0S , we
0 0
follow the method similar to that of Duarte and Restuccia (2010) for their simple two
sectors model. Once we calibrated βA and βS , the subsistence parameters for A sector
γA and S sector γS is calculated by simply plugging in the two equations above. Using
the firm FOC, we derive the two expressions for calibrating βA and βS as follows:
(2010) and Artuc and McLaren (2009)
178
1 St st +γS
Agriculture {βA }: we will solve for the expression for βA using mt = βS St and
φ pM
γA = AM0θ a0 − 0
β M m .
pA0 A 0 0
Using the expression:
φ φ
AMTθ aT − AM0θ a0
βA = .
pM
φ−1 r
φAMTθ aT mT + 1+r κMTθ (mT + sT − mT −1 − sT −1 ) mT − p0A M0 m0
0
We get the A sector discount factor parameter βA using the initial period data on the
pM
sectoral employment shares {a0 , m0 }, the relative prices 0
pA0
, relative productivity for
A, M sector as well as the last period data on sectoral employment shares {aT , mT , sT }.
φ−1
pM
0 pM
0 φAM0θ a0
The initial period relative price pA0
is implied by the model using pA0
= M0 +
r θ
1+r κM0 (m0 +s0 −m−1 −s−1 )
M0 , from the firms FOC and initial period data {a0 , m0 , s0 }. With
calibrated {r = 0.02, κ = 5}, we get βA = 0.0473. Note: we simplify the equation using
1 St st +γS
Services {βS }: we will solve for the expression for βS using mt = βS St and
pM ST sT −S0 s0
γS = 0
β M m − S0 s0 .
pS0 S 0 0
Using the expression βS = pM
, we get the S sec-
ST mT − 0 M m
0 0
pS0
tor sector discount factor parameter βS using the initial period data on the sectoral
pM
employment shares {m0 , s0 }, the relative prices 0
pA0
, relative productivity for M and S
sector as well as the penultimate and last period data on sectoral employment shares
pM
{mT , mT −1 , sT , sT −1 }. In calculating the initial period relative price 0
pS0
, from the firm
φ −1
pM
0 φS S0 s0S
FOC, we use pS0
= M0 , which is the inverse of relative productivity between M
and S evaluated using the initial period data. Plugging in, we get βS = 8.9993.
179
The subsistence consumption{γA , γM = 0, γS }: given the calibrated parameters
brated as follows:
Agriculture {γA }: following Duarte and Restuccia (2010), we calibrate the Agri-
culture sector subsistence consumption parameter γA to match the initial period data
pM
on Agriculture and Manufacturing employment share {a0 , m0 }, and relative price 0
pA0
pM
and A, M productivity AM0θ , M0 . Similarly, the initial period relative price 0
pA0
is
ptM
calculated as above. Moreover, for time t, the relative price between M and A ptA
=
φ−1 r θ
φAMtθ at 1+r κMt (mt +st −mt−1 −st−1 )
Mt + Mt , is equal to the inverse of relative productivity M
and A plus sectoral labor adjustment costs. Given the calibrated parameters {βA , r, κ},
φ pM
we get γA using γA = AM0θ a0 − 0
β M m ,
pA0 A 0 0
and γA = 0.9071.
sumption parameter γS to match the initial period data on Manufacturing and Services
pM
employment share m0 and s0 , and relative price p0S and M and S productivity M0 and S0 .
0
φ −1
ptM φS St st S
Moreover, for time t, the relative price between M and S ptS
= Mt , is equal to the
inverse of relative productivity M and S. Similarly, we derive the initial period relative
pM
0
price pS0
, from the firm FOC, using initial period data as above. Given the calibrated
pM
βS , we get γS using γS = 0
β M m − S0 s0 ,
pS0 S 0 0
and γS = 1.5086.
180