283 PHIL.

983

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40243, March 11, 1992

CELESTINO TATEL, PETITIONER, VS. MUNICIPALITY

OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MAYOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; GAVINO V.
GUERRERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS VICE-MAYOR OF
VIRAC, CATANDUANES; JOSE T. BUEBOS, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES;
ANGELES TABLIZO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR
OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATAN­DUANES;
MARIANO ALBERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR
OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES; JULIA A. GARCIA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATAN­DUANES;
AND PEDRO A. GUERRERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COUNCILOR OF VIRAC, CATANDUANES,
RESPONDENTS.

DE CIS ION

NOCON, J.:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court
of First Instance of Catanduanes filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a
businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products
against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal
officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No. 29[1] of the Council,
declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said
municipality a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer
said warehouse to more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of
the said resolution.

It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the
residents of barrio Sta. Elena an March 18, 1966 against the disturbance
caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of
petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to
the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee
was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The
committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads
and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire
within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity
inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a
danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood.

Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac

on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner
a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. [2]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council
of Virac, petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction.

Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was

constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the
construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional,

contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution
and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

The issue then boils down on whether petitioner's warehouse is a nuisance

within the meaning of Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance
No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows:

"1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a

valid permit issued by the municipality of Virac in accordance with
 existing regulations and may not be destroyed or removed from its
present location;

2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid

exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Virac is not
(sic) unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner;

3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the

warehouse is not only in violation of the provisions of the
ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and
properties of the residents of the neighborhood due to accidental
fire and constitutes a public nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and may be
abated;

4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from

the said warehouse all abaca and copra and other inflammable
articles stored therein which are prohibited under the provisions of
Ordinance No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the
time this decision becomes final and that henceforth, the petitioner
is enjoined from storing such prohibited articles in the warehouse.
With costs against petitioner".

Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a

quo:

1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the

Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, is a legitimate and valid
exercise of police power of the Municipal Council, and therefore,
constitutional;

2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from

what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by
using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is
prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of
warehouses.

3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the

municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated
as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted.

We find no merit in the Petition.

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that
municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police
powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects
of their creation. [3] Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause
under the Administrative Code, which reads:

"The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it
by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for
the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein."[4]

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well
established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles
require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.
[5]
Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

As to the petitioner's second assignment of error, the trial court did not give
the ordinance in question a meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No.
13 passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on December 29, 1952, [6] reads:

"AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE

CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A
BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO
WITH NECESSARY DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES
OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT".

Section 1 provides:

"It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to

any person, persons, entity, corporation or merchants, wherein to
keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum, alcohol, crude oil,
 oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the
distance of 200 meters from a block of houses either in the
poblacion or barrios to avoid great losses of properties inclusive
lives by fire accident."

Section 2 provides:[7]

"Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to

remove their said warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal
Council, provided however, that if those warehouses now in
existence should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the
above-described products in Section 1 of this ordinance after a
lapse of time given for the removal of the said warehouses now in
existence, same warehouse shall be exempted from the spirit of
the provision of section 1 of this ordinance, provided further, that
these warehouses now in existence, shall in the future be
converted into non-inflammable products and materials
warehouses."

In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is

the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored
where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block
of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to
avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the
primordial obligation of government.

This was also the observation of the trial court:

"A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest

disregard of the elemental rules of syntax. Experience, however,
will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies in small
towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged
with the drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and
ordinances lack sufficient education and training and are not well
grounded even on the basic and fundamental elements of the
English language commonly used throughout the country in such
matters. Nevertheless, if one scrutinizes the terms of the
ordinance, it is clear that what is prohibited is the construction of
warehouses by any person, entity or corporation wherein copra,
hemp, gasoline and other inflammable products mentioned in
Section 1 may be stored unless at a distance of not less than 200
 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios in
order to avoid loss of property and life due to fire. Under Section
2, existing warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles
were given one year after the approval of the ordinance within
which to remove them but were allowed to remain in operation if
they had ceased to store such prohibited articles.

The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs

from simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the
meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the
construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of
inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block
of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose
of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of
accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation
of any government."[8]

Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or different from
what was provided in the ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose
of the ordinance and what it intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.

As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that

of petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the
municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in
the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim
that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the
law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in
charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for
the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other­ bodegas
mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that
complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the
municipal authorities doing anything about it.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance

have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound
government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody
to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products
in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of
the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there
can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal
government.
As to petitioner's contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we
find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a
nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First
Instance.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs

against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[1]
Annex "A", p. 24, Record on Appeal.
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Velasco vs. Mayor Villegas, G.R. No. 24153, 120 SCRA 568, (1983).

Section 2238, Administrative Code of 1917. This is in consonance with the

[4]

general welfare clause as provided in Section 16, Book I of the Local

Government Code of 1991.
[5]
U.S. vs. Abendan, 24 Phil. 165, (1913).
[6]
Exhibit "1", p. 45, Record on Appeal.
[7]
p. 46, Ibid.
[8]
Annex "F", pp. 85-86, Record on Appeal.