STRATEGY

NATO Defense College

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Rome | Italy
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How to write
a strategy

Christopher M. Schnaubelt
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 ISSN: 3006-5380 (print)
ISSN: 3006-5399 (online)

NATO Defense College – Insight

Series editor: Florence Gaub

Copy-editing: Mary Di Martino
The cover image “Napoleon in a The NATO Defense College applies
space suit” was designed by Andreas the Creative Common Licence
Loff using different Artificial “Attribution-NonCommercial-
The NATO Defense College was Intelligence programmes. NoDerivs” (CC-BY-NC-ND).
established in 1951 in Paris based
on General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Insight 3/2024 Limited copies of this NDC
suggestion that the Alliance needed The Strategy Series publication are available and may be
an institution that could “develop obtained directly from
individuals both on the military Nota Bene:
and on the civilian side who will The views expressed in this NDC NATO Defense College,
have a thorough grasp of the many Insight are the responsibility of the Research Division,
complicated factors which are author(s) and do not necessarily Via Giorgio Pelosi 1, 00143
involved in creating an adequate reflect the opinions of the NATO Rome, Italy
defense posture for the North Defense College, the North Atlantic m.dimartino@ndc.nato.int
Atlantic Treaty Area.” In 1967, it Treaty Organization, or any of
moved to Rome, where it has been the institutions represented by the Printed and bound by
located since. contributor(s). lightskyconsulting.com
Contents
About the author . . . . . . . . 6 Appendix A: a few key
concepts in military
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . .8 Appendix B: examples . . . . 48

Annotated bibliography/
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 recommended readings . . . 51
What to do if tasked to
write a strategy?

2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
What is strategy?

3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A sample of approaches
to teaching strategy

4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Considerations when
writing a strategy

5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Context and strategy

6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The comprehensive approach

7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Strategy and Multi-
Domain Operations

8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Steps to write a strategy

9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Some concluding thoughts
 About the author

Christopher M. Schnaubelt,
Ph.D., is the Dean of the NATO
Defense College.

The author would like to thank Mr

Allen Burch, Dr Joseph Collins, Dr
Alexander Crowther, Dr Florence
Gaub, Dr Rich Hooker, Col/Dr
Eric De Landmeter, Dr Guillaume
Lasconjarias, BGen Rene’ Leitgen,
Dr Andrew Monaghan, LGEN
Max A.L.T. Nielsen, Dr Brooke
Smith-Windsor, Dr Katherine
Underwood, and LTG(R)/Dr Rick
Waddell for helpful comments on
earlier versions of this monograph.
The librarians of the NATO Defense
College provided valuable assistance
with the bibliography.
The views expressed are the
responsibility of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the opinions
of NATO, NDC or the U.S.
Government.
About the author

6 How to write a strategy 

 • Monitor strategy

Summary implementation
and effect; revise
as necessary: assess
whether the strategy is being
properly implemented, is pro-
ducing the expected effects,
and progressing adequately

W
towards the desired ends. If
riting a strategy is difficult • Frame the prob- not, revise the strategy or the
because the purpose is to lem(s) and opportu- plans and/or activities that
change the behavior of nities: determine what is implement the strategy.
humans. The most common con- the question or problem to
text for strategy is in the sphere of be solved. Questions should
military activities: how to apply force address internal context for
in a manner that breaks the will of the strategy development
an enemy, causing that enemy to stop process as well as the external
fighting. However, strategy can also be problem context.
useful at less intense levels of con-
flict such as crisis management and • Draft proposed
stability operations. Indeed, strategy ends: envision what is to
can be used for peaceful but compet- be accomplished.
itive purposes such as government
tax policy or corporate marketing of • Determine the ways
consumer products. and means: compare
This paper expresses strategy as the contemporary problem
a formula: frame with the vision of
what should be achieved,
Strategy = Ends + Ways + ascertain the set of resources
Means + Risk that are currently available
(or can reasonably be made
wherein Ends are the objectives available within the necessary
or the “what” the strategy intends to time frame), and identify how
accomplish; Ways are the strategic these resources can be ap-
concepts/courses of action or the plied to produce the desired
“how” that describes the methods of end state.
applying the means to attain the ends;
and Means are the resources. Risk is • Consider risk: assess
the degree to which the Ends exceed whether the ends, ways, and
the Ways + Means. means are in sustainable
The following steps should be balance. The degree to which
used to write a strategy. They may the perceived cost of Ways +
be performed in a different order. Means exceeds the perceived
In most cases, some of the steps value of the Ends is Risk.
will be repeated during the develop-
ment process: • Reframe the prob-
lem: consider the likely
• Estimate the devel- evolution of the situation in
opment timeline: light of proposed actions.
determine the deadlines for
writing the strategy. • Finalize the state-
ment of Ends,
• Develop under- Means, and Ways:
standing: gather in- write the strategy using the
formation and relate it to steps in this list as an outline.
Summary

conditions and actors.

How to write a strategy 7

 operation may vary greatly, business-

Introduction es, non-governmental organizations,

and government bodies concerned
with capacity development or purely
domestic policy issues should also
find useful the framework and process
presented here.3 To illustrate the wide
variety of circumstances in which

“ T
strategy can be useful, this paper
“The nineteenth- he quote at top implies that includes examples from the fields of
century Italian the requirement for strategy business and domestic policy as well
poet, Gabriele exceeds the supply of people as war. It also includes brief discus-
D’Annunzio (1863- who have been trained to be strate- sions of other approaches to devel-
1938), wrote the gists. Thus, this paper is a “how to” oping strategy to present the reader
guide intended to fill the need for a with potential alternatives. Extensive
much quoted line,
relatively brief overview of strategy footnotes and an annotated bibliog-
‘happy is the land and provide a template for its de- raphy provide the reader with recom-
that needs no velopment. mendations for additional study.
heroes.’ He might The most common context for
have written, to strategy is in the sphere of military ac-
the same effect, tivities: how to apply force in a man-
‘happy is the ner that breaks the will of an enemy,
land that needs causing that enemy to stop fighting.
no strategists.’ But it is not just military organiza-
Unfortunately, tions that can benefit from strategic
competence. As NATO implements
the polities that
its concept for Multi-Domain Oper-
need no such ations,2 which will be described later,
strategists are the need for strategic planning will
rare. Despite increase not only for military officers
the richness but also for civilian experts from
of demand the diplomatic, informational, and
for strategic economic spheres as well as other
performance, sources of non-military power who
the supply of must combine their efforts to achieve
excellence, common defense and security goals
more effectively.
or even just
Indeed, strategy can be used for
competence, peaceful but competitive purposes
more often than such as government tax policy or cor-
not is lacking.” porate marketing of consumer prod-
ucts. Although their desired outcomes,
-- Colin S. Gray1 available resources, and methods of
Introduction

1 The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 136.
2 See NATO Allied Command Transformation, “Multi-Domain Operations in NATO – Explained,” webpage dated October 5, 2023: https://www.act.nato.int/
article/mdo-in-nato-explained/ (accessed January 11, 2024).
3 Masters of Business Administration degree programs often include courses on strategy. Large for-profit firms that provide strategy consulting services
to businesses and governments include McKinsey & and Company and Deloitte. For example, see https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/what-is-business-
strategy, https://www.mckinsey.com/, and https://www2.deloitte.com/tr/en/pages/strategy-operations/solutions/strategy-consulting.html. (accessed
October 31, 2023)

8 How to write a strategy 

1

What to do if
tasked to write
a strategy?

T his paper approaches developing a strategy as a

problem-solving process. Readers who began this
paper at the summary have already seen the list
of steps for writing a strategy and may find them suffi-
Source: Jack D. Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade, 3rd ed., Fort
Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2009, p. 5, https://
apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA550354.pdf (accessed December 15, 2023).
cient. However, developing an effective strategy requires
knowing something about strategy.4
Therefore, this paper is more than just a checklist of
steps for writing a strategy. It provides a set of cognitive 6. A brief analysis of the relationship between the
tools to give a burgeoning strategist enough help to “fill comprehensive approach and NATO’s emerging
in the blanks” and complete the recommended steps if concept for Multi-Domain Operations.
told to write a strategy. The remainder is organized thus: 7. A step-by-step description of how to write a strategy.
8. Some concluding thoughts to wrap up the preceding
1. A brief review of the definitional problems of discussions.
strategy and a formula that will help the reader to 9. An appendix describing some of the key concepts in
understand the requirement if told to write a strategy. military strategy.
2. An overview of some approaches to teaching strategy 10. An appendix with three examples of strategies.
that will provide an appreciation of the requirements 11. An annotated bibliography to provide recommended
1 What to do if tasked to write a strategy?
for developing expertise. reading for readers interested in additional study on
3. A discussion of key considerations when writing this topic.
a strategy.
4. A discussion of the role of context.
5. An overview of the comprehensive approach, to help
frame the challenges of attaining a unified approach to
addressing significant problems.

4 For those deeply interested in the subject of strategy, this article will present an amuse bouche. One may reasonably ask: “how much knowledge is
enough?” The logical response is: “how much time do you have?” As may be seen in some later examples, a thorough education regarding strategy
typically involves extensive study.

How to write a strategy 11

 2

What is strategy?
“ Strategy without tactics is the
slowest route to victory. Tactics
without strategy is the noise
before defeat. To conquer the
enemy without resorting to
war is the most desirable. The
highest form of generalship is to
conquer the enemy by strategy.

A good starting point for the strategic novice is

to determine what she or he is being asked to
develop. There are numerous definitions of
strategy,5 as well as a surprisingly large number of works
-- Sun Tsu

on strategy that do not provide an explicit definition

but either expect readers to infer its meaning from the The question “what is strategy?” is not merely seman-
discussion or assume they are already familiar with the tic, but for purposes of this paper it is sufficient to treat
term. Within the security literature, there is also consid- “strategy” and “grand strategy” as synonymous and to
erable debate on levels of strategy; some authors identify provide a handful of definitions as examples. (Several of
distinctions between related concepts such as “strate- the works listed in the bibliography explore the issue in
gy,” “theater strategy,” “national strategy,” and “grand depth for those who are interested in further detail.)
strategy.” Colin S. Gray differentiates “strategy” – which he
One might add “total strategy” to this list. General argues is a permanent theoretical construct with an
André Beaufre, known as “the father of contemporary unchanging nature – from “strategies” – which change in
French strategic thought and required reading at French character (versus nature) and must be adaptive to contex-
military schools,” argued that “the only good strategy… tual elements such as geography, technology, and spe-
is total.” By “total strategy,” Beaufre meant that politics cific adversaries.7 Such a hypothesis is outside the scope
must drive military action with strategies developed by of this monograph, which does not attempt to make
politicians rather than military officers.6 this theory-based distinction. It instead focuses on the
practical application of how to write a strategy.8 Accord-
ingly, the approach here is that the function of writing a
strategy may be performed at multiple levels with differ-
ent strategies nested within one another.
The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines strat-
egy as “the science and art of employing the political,
economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation
or group of nations to afford the maximum support to
2 What is strategy?

5 For a summary of the definitional problem, see J. Boone Bartholomees, “A Survey of the Theory of Strategy” in The U.S. Army War College Guide to
National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (editor), Strategic Studies Institute, June 2012, pp. 13-44.
Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12116.5 (accessed September 6, 2023).
6 Michael Shurkin, “Grand Strategy is Total: French Gen, André Beaufre on War in the Nuclear Age,” War on the Rocks, October 8, 2020, https://
warontherocks.com/2020/10/grand-strategy-is-total-french-gen-andre-beaufre-on-war-in-the-nuclear-age/ (accessed October 10, 2023)
7 The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Op. Cit.), pp. 15-19.
8 Some amount of theory, however, is necessary to inform practice and create understanding of process.

12 How to write a strategy 

adopted policies in peace or war.”9 According to business Strategy is a statement that unambiguously16 defines
professors Gerry Johnson and Kevan Scholes, “Strat- the ends that are to be achieved, the means that will
egy is the direction and scope of an organisation over the be employed to achieve those ends, and the ways in
long-term: which achieves advantage for the organisation which those means will be used.
through its configuration of resources within a challenging
environment, to meet the needs of markets and to fulfil stake- This can also be expressed as a formula: Strategy =
holder expectations.”10 Ends + Ways + Means + Risk, wherein ends are the ob-
One of the most succinct definitions is offered by J. jectives or the “what” the strategy intends to accomplish;
Boone Bartholomees, Jr., who calls it “simply a problem ways are the strategic concepts/courses of action or the
solving process.”11 Somewhat more expansive, accord- “how” that describes the methods of applying the means
ing to Shawn Brimley: “Strategy is the art of connecting to attain the ends; and means are the resources. Risk is
aspirations with prudent plans and finite resources.”12 the extent to which the Ends exceed the Ways + Means,
One of the most brilliant strategists of the Cold War era, therefore the formula can also be expressed as Ends =
Bernard Brodie, wrote that “Strategy is ‘how to do it’ Ways + Means + Risk.
study, a guide to accomplishing something and doing it In a security context, means are typically elements
efficiently.”13 of national power such as diplomatic, informational,
Along similar lines, John Lewis Gaddis tells us that military, and economic assets that will be used to attain
“[strategy] is the calculated relationship of means to large the ends. In other contexts, these might be institutional
ends.” Expanding upon this concept, he writes: capacity building programs, capital, education, technical
expertise, advertising, or many other assets available to
“It’s about how one uses whatever one has to get international organizations, non-governmental organ-
wherever it is one wants to go. Our knowledge of it izations, development agencies, or businesses. Ways in
derives chiefly from the realm of war and statecraft, a military strategy might include conducting combat
because the fighting of wars and the management operations, forming alliances, developing the capacity
of states have demanded the calculation of relation- of partner militaries through the provision of training,
ships between means and ends for a longer stretch equipment, and advice; conducting cyber operations, or a
of time than any other documented areas of collec- myriad of other ways to use resources.
tive human activity… But [strategy] need not apply Expressing strategy as a formula, however, does not
only to war and statecraft: it’s potentially applicable mean that it is a simple exercise or can be written auto-
to any endeavor in which means must be deployed in matically. As will be seen below, the crux of the matter
pursuit of important ends.”14 is determining the specifics to fill in the parts of the
formula. To illustrate the need for human involvement –
Each of the preceding definitions has both value and at least this point in time regarding the development of
limitations.15 Nevertheless, I propose the following artificial intelligence (AI), I posed the following query to
working definition based upon the model developed by ChatGPT on January 8, 2024: “What should be NATO’s
Arthur Lykke: strategy for Russia?” The result is pasted below.17
One of the challenges of contemporary AI is that it
must draw from existing data sets. Thus, the “strategy”
suggested above seems to be a compilation of public
statements by NATO officials. It does not present new

9 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy (accessed September 6, 2023).

10 Gerry Johnson et al., Exploring Corporate Strategy: Text and Cases, (London: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2006).
11 “A Survey of the Theory of Strategy” (Op. Cit.), pp. 13-43.
12 “Crafting Strategy in an Age of Transition,” Parameters (Winter 2008-09), pp. 27-42: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol38/iss4/2/
(accessed September 6, 2023).
13 War and Politics, London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1973, p. 452.
14 “What is Grand Strategy” (Op. Cit.), p. 7. Gaddis uses the term “grand strategy” rather than “strategy,” but a discussion regarding the potential
distinction between the two is not necessary for the purposes of this monograph.
15 For a negative example, consider the Tupamoro terrorist group that was eventually defeated by the government of Uruguay in the 1970s: when asked
2 What is strategy?

to explain his group’s strategy, a leader replied: “I cannot give you a detailed strategy. However, one can give some general strategic principles by the
day, month, and year as one encounters them” (Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods. New
York: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1990), pp. 11-12.
16 There may be instances where an ambiguous statement of the desired ends may be useful for rhetorical purposes or as a negotiating tactic, but it is
difficult to identify cases where this has been successful in the context of a democracy or in an alliance of democratic states such as NATO. Perhaps
there is no theoretical reason a strategy must be written (in Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, listed in the bibliography, Edward Luttwak infers
ancient Roman strategy from their behavior rather than anything they wrote as such), but in our era it is necessary for practical reasons – especially
during multi-agency efforts such as a comprehensive approach where it is necessary to reduce the risks from partners having different and potentially
conflicting goals.
17 Text generated by ChatGPT, January 8, 2024, OpenAI, https://chat.openai.com/chat.

How to write a strategy 13

 and innovative ideas, much less explicit and actionable
recommendations on what NATO is – or should be –
trying to achieve, what resources it should apply, and how
to apply those resources18
2 What is strategy?

18 “Engaging in diplomatic talks when possible” might seem like a “way” but is a cliché that can be applied to virtually any security situation and thus of
little practical use. To strive for efficiency and effectiveness is a common but similarly vapid recommendation.

14 How to write a strategy 

 3

A sample of
approaches to “ War is not an affair of chance.
A great deal of knowledge,
study and meditation is
teaching strategy necessary to conduct it well.

-- Frederick the Great: Instructions for His Generals, 1747

France. The French Professional Military Education

system is not very different from those to be found in the
United States or in the United Kingdom. Based on a strict

T
selection process, it aims at providing future leaders with
he concept of something called strategy dates the mandatory knowledge to operate in a future contested
back thousands of years.19 However, Lorenzo environment, both at an operational and geopolitical level.
Ruiz argues that teaching strategy as an element At the level of senior colonel, a class of approximately
of military education is a Prussian creation that was one twenty officers earmarked for future key positions are se-
of the reforms resulting from a “humiliating” defeat by lected to attend the Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires (Cen-
Napoleon at the battle of Jena-Auerstedt – a loss that tre for High Military Studies). As part of this program,
occurred despite Prussia having a force nearly twice the they also attend the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Na-
size of the French.20 tionale (Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence
When considering the approach to developing strategy or IHEDN). The IHEDN is a public institution with an
that is presented in this paper, readers might logically interagency dimension, placed under the supervision of
wonder how strategy is taught elsewhere. A complete the French Prime Minister’s Office. Since its foundation in
survey of professional military education on strategy 1936, it has been entrusted with the responsibility to con-
within all NATO members and elsewhere is beyond the tribute to a better understanding of defence-related issues
scope of this paper. However, the range of such efforts and to the development of strategic thinking.
might be illustrated with five examples: two nations that Each year, IHEDN gathers for its senior course more
require the completion of substantial formal education in than 280 course members selected from across gov-
3 A sample of approaches to teaching strategy

strategy prior to selection as a general or flag officer, and ernment entities and the private sector. This part time
three nations that do not.21 course – ranging between 40 and 50 days according to
the chosen electives – is based on a broad diversity of
profiles and sectors, including military officers, govern-
ment officials, members of Parliament, industrial man-
agers and civil society members, IHEDN has adopted
a very specific methodology to develop critical thinking
and a better knowledge of strategy, in all its forms. From

19 For example, see Eliot Cohen, “Strategy in antiquity,” Britannica undated webpage, https://www.britannica.com/topic/strategy-military/Strategy-in-
antiquity (accessed November 2, 2023).
20 “The Roots of Modern Military Education,” The Strategy Bridge, July 17, 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/7/17/the-roots-of-modern-
military-education (accessed October 9, 2023).
21 In statistics terminology, this is a convenience sample. The information was gathered through NDC faculty and staff members from the relevant
nations.

16 How to write a strategy 

grand strategy, its linkages with both the military and ory of War and Strategy” and “National Security Policy”
diplomatic instruments, their subordination to identified that exceed 600 pages.24 Those who specialize in strat-
political goals, to specific approaches through the lenses egy – “Strategic Plans & Policies” officers – U.S. Army
of actors, the program aims to help course members to officers in the Functional Area-59 career field25 – must
better understand the essence of strategy as a dialectic. complete substantial additional requirements in mid-career
The senior course is divided into five Majeures all having that include an intensive fourteen week graduate level
their specificities: Defense Policy, Armament and De- course called the Basic Strategic Art Program and when
fense Economy, Maritime Strategies, Cyber, and Defense attending the U.S. Army War College are expected to also
and Economic Sovereignty. This year-long course aims enroll in the Advanced Strategic Art Program.
to develop knowledge of why Defense and Security are Naturally, the other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces
important to France amongst influential civilian govern- have similar institutions, and the National War College is
ment officials, future policy makers and industrial leaders, an inter-service program. These U.S. military institutions
as well as public opinion influencers. are collectively known as the “Senior Service Colleges.”
In addition, at a moment where strategic thinking is The other government organization whose primary role
more needed than ever, all Ecole militaire-based doctrine, is carrying out U.S. national security policy, the Depart-
education and training centers have deployed a common ment of State, has no equivalent professional education
initiative called ACADEM (Académie de defense de l’Ecole mil- program of its own but sends a limited number of career
itaire). It aims at empowering stakeholders, future leaders, diplomats to attend one of the military Senior Ser-
and thinkers by creating an enduring hub between aca- vice Colleges.
demics and practitioners while maximizing synergies with The intended audience for the courses taught at Yale by
techniques such as wargaming. Professor Gaddis et al are students at one of America’s
most elite universities, some of whom will presumably
The United States. The 2009 syllabus for the go on to be influential civilian government officials and
two-semester course at Yale University on Grand Strategy policy makers.26 Indeed, civilians who understand strategy
taught by Professors John Lewis Gaddis, Charles Hill, might have become increasingly in demand if the goals
Paul Kennedy, Walter Russell Mead, and Paul Solman of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, as evinced
requires a summer research project with international in the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
travel as well as dozens of books with thousands of pages Review, came to be realized. The 2010 QDDR presented
of readings in the Spring semester alone. Even with this a vision of “Leading through Civilian Power” with Chiefs
reading load, Gaddis states that the students are only of Mission (ambassadors) performing as “CEOs of a
“superficially” exposed to classic works such as those by multi-agency effort.” The QDDR noted that one of the
Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli.22 key steps that must be accomplished in order to realize
U.S. military officers are typically selected to attend a its goals is to: “…develop a high-level strategic planning
war college as lieutenant colonels (or commanders for process, strategies for regional and functional bureaus,
naval officers) through a competitive process.23 Graduates and Integrated Country Strategies that bring together all
of the U.S. Army War College are military professionals country-level planning for diplomacy, development, and
who are expected to be familiar with the development of broader foreign assistance into a single, overarching strat-
strategy and the major strategic theories although they are egy.” However, the concept of a QDDR did not survive
not expert strategists themselves. Even the considerable into the next U.S. presidential administration.27
reading load for a typical U.S. Army War College student
is merely an “introduction to strategy.” The 2014 reading
list for students at the U.S. Army War College, for exam-
ple, included two volumes of collected articles on “The-

3 A sample of approaches to teaching strategy

22 John Lewis Gaddis, “What is Grand Strategy,” lecture at Duke University, February 26, 2009, https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/
grandstrategypaper.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023). This is not meant to suggest that either the U.S. Army or Yale programs are the ideal models
for teaching strategy, but to give an idea of the amount of study that certain programs feel are required to become thoroughly familiar with the
topic. Additionally, these examples should help balance the risk that the brief outline for developing strategy that is presented here inadvertently
oversimplifies what is actually an extremely complex and difficult endeavor in terms of content if not process.
23 For a complete review of the U.S. Professional Military Education system, see Charles A. Goldman, et al., Intellectual Firepower: A Review of Professional
Military Education in the U.S. Department of Defense, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2024. Available for free download at: https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1600/RRA1694-1/RAND_RRA1694-1.pdf (accessed January 8, 2024).
24 See https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12116 and https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12023 (accessed September 6, 2023).
25 See https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2023/02/28/1fd5abfc/fa-59-strategist-da-pam-600-3-as-of-1-apr-20.pdf (accessed December 15, 2023).
26 For a short list of academic programs on strategy see Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs, The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy, Oxford Handbooks
Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 15.
27 It is unclear what – if anything – the Department of State had done in practical terms to develop the proposed strategy development capabilities within
its diplomatic corps. It was initially hoped that the QDDR would persuade the U.S. Congress to provide additional funding for these efforts. The political
reality, however, is that bringing this vision to fruition would have required making the development of strategic planning capacity a Secretary of State-
level priority and shifting the funds from other programs and/or taking better advantage of the extant professional military education programs in the
Department of Defense – or better yet, establishment of a U.S. Government interagency education program on strategy, perhaps similar to the French
IHEDN, which includes parliamentarians and other civilians.

How to write a strategy 17

 in a very generic way. A select few at colonel-level can be
Germany. After their first leadership positions, Ger- sent to foreign War- and Defence Colleges (such as USA,
man officers attend the Field Officer Basic Course at the UK, FRA and NDC). There is no specific career path for
Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, which includes strategists. But like Germany, one can say that critical and
elements of strategic thinking. strategic thinking is an element of progressive PME.
Those staff officers selected to attend the National

“
General/Admiral Staff Officer Course (about 20%) at the
Bundeswehr Command and Staff College (Führungsakad- Strategy formation is
emie / Hamburg) receive education in strategic thinking not typically taught in
as part of their leadership training and qualification. In undergraduate business
appointments at the OF4/5 level, selected officers partic- school. It is only uniformly
ipate in national and partner-countries’ courses, such as offered in graduate business
those in the UK, France, or the U.S. War College. A key
schools and unfortunately, is
component of strategic training includes further educa-
tion during leadership assignments. Training focused only a priority in very few. Those
on strategy is not mandatory and opportunities for such with keen interest can access
education are limited. the foundational elements of
The German professional military development in- strategy development while
cludes strategic thinking as an element of professional pursuing their MBA, but most
training and education programs progressively throughout will acquire the skill on the job
an officer’s career, and not as a separate training focused at the director level and with
solely on strategy. the help of an experienced
mentor. NielsenIQ, a leading
Denmark. Professional military education of Danish consumer research firm used
officers is standardized, taught by military institutions, and
covers only military-specific skills until officers reach the the director level/experienced
rank of captain.28 To become promoted to major, officers mentor model to create their
must be selected for advanced education and complete a pan-Africa strategy. They
master’s degree. The majority obtain a Master of Military constrained the strategy to
Studies degree from the Danish Defense College. How- geography, scope of offering
ever, some attend civilian universities and receive master’s and level of profitability
degrees in technical subjects related to their military career leading to tactics that led the
field, such as computer science or engineering. The Master firm to concentrate in Nigeria,
of Military Science curriculum includes a module on strat- South Africa, and Kenya with
egy but there are no specific career tracks for strategists.
a product focus on syndicated
The Danish Defense College strategy module consists of
two weeks of in-person lectures/discussions and three consumer buying behavior
self-study periods each lasting three or four weeks. and custom product research
but only where profitability
The Netherlands. The topics of strategy, strategic levels could reach a demanding
thinking and strategy making are mostly dealt with in the level. Steve Mathesen, the
Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) that is respon- current Chief Strategy Officer
sible for primary level PME (Military Academy, Naval at NielsenIQ mentored this
Academy), second level (Joint Staff Course) and the third strategy development in what is
3 A sample of approaches to teaching strategy

level Top Level Defence Course. Service institutes may typical for a successful strategy
add to that. Cadet officers at the NLDA who follow the
formation and implementation
Military Sciences Study bachelor degree (roughly one third
of all cadets) are introduced to strategy through the Mil- effort in the private sector.
itary Strategy Studies programme. Mid-level officers se-
lected for the Netherlands Joint Staff Course will receive a --Allen Burch
strategy module while some others may be sent to equiva- Former Managing Director for Africa,
lent foreign Staff Colleges (USA, UK, DEU, BEL, FRA). The Nielsen Company
At the level of Colonel, the Top Level Defence course (email to author)
brings together military and civilian officials. Its focus is
political-military/civilian-military and strategy is dealt with

28 “OF-2” in NATO parlance.

18 How to write a strategy 

4

Considerations
gress of a war or other armed conflict. Yet the same dy-
namic nature applies in highly cooperative situations such

when writing as those involving domestic populations whose behavior

a government intends to influence through public policy.

a strategy People will change their behavior in reaction to tax policy,

urban planning regulations, gas taxes, or health care laws
even if promulgated by a government they perceive to be
entirely legitimate.
Sometimes the intent of such policies is purely to raise
revenue or reduce costs, but intentionally or not, they will
virtually always have an impact upon behavior – and not
necessarily the impact that was intended.
Thus, implementing a peaceful, domestic political or

D
governmental strategy also involves reaction as well as
espite being summarized above as a formula, action. What does this example have to do with strategy?
developing strategy is an intellectual process that It illustrates that human beings will respond to chang-
primarily entails art rather than science.29 This es in their situation in ways that are often difficult to
characteristic obtains because the conditions that pro- anticipate. A good strategy must take into consideration
duced the need for a strategy will always be dynamic and this dynamic.31
interactive. As John Collins has put it, “[strategy] is not
a game that states can play by themselves.”30 The pur-
pose of strategy is to shape behavior; the group or actor

“
whose behavior is the object will react in often unexpect-
ed ways as the strategy is implemented. In reaction to the much higher
accident rates among 16- and 17-
year old drivers, in the past few

“
decades many American states
have implemented stringent
“If you don’t have a
new educational prerequisites
strategy, you’re part of
before issuing licenses to people
someone else’s strategy.”
in this age group. However, an 4 Considerations when writing a strategy

-- Alvin Toffler unintended consequence is

that many youths are waiting
until age 18 to get their driver’s
This holds true even if the situation is not purely com- license so they can avoid these
petitive. In a security context, the requirement for strate- requirements; the accident
gy is generated by a thinking, adaptive adversary who will rate among 18-year olds has
react and change its own strategy according to the pro-

29 For this reason, there is an emerging view that strategy should be “designed” rather than “developed” or “planned” but there is no need to debate this
interesting question within the scope of this particular monograph.
30 Quoted in Colin S. Gray, Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2009, 2, https://press.
armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1612&context=monographs (accessed September 6, 2023).
31 In other words, are the Ways likely achieve the desired Ends if provided sufficient Means?

How to write a strategy 19

 subsequently skyrocketed. Again, if even peaceful attempts by democratic gov-
It may well be that the new ernments face challenges with domestic policy intended
laws merely increased the to cause changes in hard to predict human behavior,
average age of drivers who have imagine the difficulty of trying to anticipate the outcome
accidents without reducing the of the use of force against another nation or violent
non-state actors.
net number of traffic accidents.
As will be described further in the process recom-
mended below, developing strategy is usually an iterative
-- USA Today, activity. Very rarely, if ever, can a strategy in pursuit of
“Youth driver’s licenses have drawback,” important ends be developed, tasked for implementa-
September 14, 2011, p. 3A tion, and then be placed on a high shelf and forgotten
in the expectation that it will be autonomously carried
out to fruition. Yet, there is a tension between the need
Understanding the motivations, culture, and beliefs for a strategy to be forward looking and far reaching and
of adversary individuals and groups can reduce the risk the requirement to track its implementation and adjust
of unintended consequences within the security sphere, when needed.
but because they are collectives of human beings, the

“
behavior of states is also frequently unpredictable. As
an example, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNa- 1. You are hereby designated
mara’s failure to dissuade North Vietnam from attacking as Supreme Allied Commander
South Vietnam through a quasi-scientific and formulaic of the forces placed under
application of graduated military force (calculated by his your orders for operations
subordinates consisting of the “Best and the Brightest”32 for liberation of Europe from
from America’s top universities) seems to illustrate this
Germans. Your title will be
assertion. How else to explain America’s defeat by a state
that possessed only a tiny fraction of U.S. military and Supreme Commander Allied
economic power? Expeditionary Force.
For this reason, it is critical that developers of a strat-

“
egy consider the second- and third-order effects (i.e. the
action-reaction cycle of thinking human beings) that their 2. Task. You will enter the
implementation of ways and means will produce. It may continent of Europe and, in
be trite but is nonetheless true that in armed conflict “the conjunction with the other
enemy gets a vote.” United Nations, undertake
Equally true in terms of domestic policy, citizens will operations aimed at the heart
react to strategies that intend to raise revenue or shape
of Germany and the destruction
behavior with changes to their work and spending habits
as well as voting at the ballot box and/or “with their of her armed forces. The date
feet” by moving to another jurisdiction. Recognizing for entering the Continent is
this dynamic, several American states currently have the month of May, 1944. After
active campaigns that try to lure businesses from states adequate channel ports have
with higher taxes and regulatory costs by advertising a been secured, exploitation
supposedly more advantageous business and economic will be directed towards
climate.33 Similarly, even within the European Union securing an area that will
member states establish their own tax policies.34 Dif- facilitate both ground and air
ferences in corporate income tax rates can make some operations against the enemy.
nations more attractive to business compared to others.
4 Considerations when writing a strategy

Ireland has benefited from competitive tax rates that have

resulted in a three-fold increase in corporate tax revenues From the directive to
due to investments from U.S. companies seeking more General Eisenhower, February 12, 1944
competitive rates.35

32 See David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (London: Penguin Books, 1983). Available at: https://archive.org/details/bestbrightest00halb_0/
(accessed October 9, 2023).
33 And, successful businesses are well aware that consumers can choose the products of competitors.
34 Sean Bray, “Corporate Income Tax Rates in Europe,” February 22, 2022, https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/eu/corporate-tax-rates-europe-2022/
(accessed October 9, 2023).
35 Paul Hannon, “This Country Won the Global Tax Game, and Is Swimming in Money,” Wall Street Journal October 10, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/
economy/global/this-country-won-the-global-tax-game-and-is-swimming-in-money-57c3c70?st=dmlms9ba6zoa93q&reflink=desktopwebshare_
permalink (accessed October 11, 2023).

20 How to write a strategy 

 On the one hand, a good strategy is usually big, bold,
and at a high conceptual level so that it does not require
constant tweaking and reformulation. A typical time
frame will encompass years rather than days. Creating the
means may take a long time before they can be employed,
especially in a security context when they entail recruit-
ing, training, and educating personnel, creating doctrine,
or building aircraft, ships, and missile systems or other
resources that require long lead times to produce.36
Advanced technological tools may give a nation a great
advantage, but as MacGregor Knox has written, “…
machines need an inordinate time for their development,
tend by their nature towards specialization, and require
time-consuming adjustment to fit into integrated “weap-
ons systems” needed to crush or counter the ‘systems’ of
potential enemies.”37 Thus, a good strategy will usually
have an enduring quality. This is especially true when
subordinate organizations must develop detailed plans to
execute the strategy. Changing a strategy too frequently
will disrupt its implementation.

4 Considerations when writing a strategy

36 For example, American planning sorely underestimated the amount of time that would be needed to create effective and reliable national security
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
37 “Conclusion: Continuity and Revolution in the Making of Strategy” in William Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy:
Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 641.

How to write a strategy 21

 5

Context and Well-

Structured
Medium-
Structured
Ill-Structured
“Wicked Problem”

strategy
“Puzzle” “Structurally
Complex
Problem”

Problem The problem Professionals Professionals will have diffi-

Structuring is self-evident. easily agree on culty agreeing on problem
Structuring is its structure. structure and will have to
trivial. agree on a shared starting
hypothesis.

Solution There is only There may be Professionals will disagree

Development one right solu- more than one on:
tion. It may “right” answer. • How the problem can be
be difficult to Professionals solved.
find. may disagree on • The most desirable end

D
the best solu- state.
tion. Desired • Whether it can be attained.
end state can be
evelop Understanding is the second – and prob- agreed.
ably most complicated – step in the process of Execution of Success Success requires Success requires learning
writing a strategy. The strategist gathers infor- Solution requires learn- learning to per- to perfect technique, adjust
ing to perfect fect technique solution, and refine problem
mation on current conditions, the key actors involved, technique. and adjust framing.
and relates the parts of the system to one another. If this solution.

step is done poorly, the rest of the strategy is likely to Adaptive No adaptive Adaptive itera- Adaptive iteration is
Iteration iteration tion is required required both to refine prob-
fall apart. required. to find the best lem structure and to find the
Situations that require a strategy, such as those involv- solution. best solution.

ing a comprehensive approach, will often be “wicked

39
problems” that experience systemic shifts in unpredict- Types of problems and solution strategies
able ways due to the inputs that flow from execution of
the strategy.38 The actions that result from implementing
a strategy (or sometimes merely from the object of the
strategy becoming cognizant of the strategy – as in the As the problem, situation, or threat evolves or reacts, the
case of declaratory nuclear policy) can cause the problem means necessary and/or ways they are employed will usu-
set to change such that the desired ends are not realized ally need to be adjusted to fit these changes. Additionally,
and the ways and/or means are no longer the most ap- as the costs of executing the strategy become clearer, the
propriate for the evolved situation. desired ends might be reconceived.
During the Korean War, for example, the U.S. and
its United Nations Command allies shifted the desired
end several times as the perceived costs of achieving
it changed.40
5 Context and strategy

38 For an overview on wicked problems, see “Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective,” Australian Public Service Commission, 2007, https://
library.nzfvc.org.nz/cgi-bin/koha/opac-detail.pl?biblionumber=5347 (accessed September 6, 2023). From Figure 1-1, U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet
525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, January 28, 2008, p. 9, https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/p525-5-500.pdf
(accessed September 6, 2023).
39 From Figure 1-1, U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, January 28, 2008, p. 9, https://
indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/p525-5-500.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).
40 This is, of course, a very simplified summary of events. For in-depth studies, see Roy E. Appleman, South to the Nakton, North to the Yalu and Walter
G. Hermes, Truce Tent and the Fighting Front. Washington, DC.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1992. Available for free download at: https://
history.army.mil/books/korea/20-2-1/toc.htm and https://history.army.mil/books/korea/truce/fm.htm (accessed September 6, 2023).

22 How to write a strategy 

 Initially, the goal was merely a return to the status quo
ante bellum and restoring the independence of the Repub-
lic of Korea (South Korea). In the wake of MacArthur’s
spectacular advance to the Yalu River, the goal changed
to completely defeating the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (North Korea). However, following the Chinese
intervention and the rout of MacArthur’s over-extended
forces, the desired end shifted back to maintaining the
independence of South Korea and restoration of the
pre-war boundaries.41 Arguably, this is an example of
successfully shifting the ends in the face of unanticipated
costs – in other words, bringing the ends into balance
with the ways + means – whereas the U.S. defeats in the
Vietnam War and Afghanistan were due to a failure to
align the ends with ways and a level of means that would
be acceptable to the American public.
As Colin Gray argues, strategy is developed within a
context of “political, social-cultural, economic, techno-
logical, military, geographical (geopolitical and geostra-
tegic), and historical” factors.42 This is illustrated by the
figure above, to which I have added human individuals as
a significant factor.
This context impacts the development of strategy in
multiple aspects. It will determine who is chosen to de-
Source: The Strategy Bridge, Colin S. Gray.
velop the strategy in question, determine the stakeholders
the strategist(s) must report to, and defines the problem
set – to include existing and potential influences upon
the behavior of the actor the strategy is going to target. action for its own sake.43 Yet paradoxically, the desire
It will also determine what ways are acceptable to the to “feel good” about “doing something” may be among
individuals who must approve as well as those who must the motivations of strategists and policy makers. Fur-
carry out the strategy, and what will ultimately be “work- thermore, the International Relations Theory literature
able” solutions to the problems the strategy is intended contains robust debates concerning instances of policy
to address. makers apparently implementing foreign policy decisions
These factors will have different relative weights in for purposes of domestic politics.44 This observation
different situations. Identifying their nature and how suggests another factor making it more complex to assess
they interact with each other is a key aspect of devel- how an adversary might respond to the implementation
oping “understanding” of the situation, which is dis- of a strategy.
cussed below. It is extremely unlikely that a democratically elected
It is also important to note that strategy, as conceived leader will publicly admit taking military action overseas
in this monograph, is purposive rather than expressive. primarily for the purpose of increasing his popularity
Strategy is developed with the intention of achieving at home.45 Even domestic policy decisions are almost
specific outcomes, described as “ends” within the de- always framed in terms of improving the “public good”
velopment process described later. It is not about taking rather than courting a particular political constituen-

41 Interestingly, the North Koreans were also surprised by the U.S. intervention following their initial invasion of the South. The U.S. Secretary of State
had previously declared in public that the Korean Peninsula was not within the U.S. sphere of interests.
42 The Strategy Bridge, 38-39. Although repeatedly recognizing their importance throughout the book, Gray explicitly chooses not to include the human
individual among the factors (which he terms as “contexts” in the plural, but I prefer a construct that proposes a set of “factors” that collectively form a
single context in which a particular strategy is developed). In my opinion, individuals can make such an important difference they must be included in
any model of strategy. For example, I have argued that General David Petraeus (and Ambassador Ryan Crocker) personally played such a significant
5 Context and strategy

role in designing and implementing the 2007 “surge” in Iraq that virtually any other commanding general would not have achieved the same level of
success. (See my online debate with Gian Gentile in the comments section below the article by Peter Feaver at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-
right-to-be-right-civil-military-relations-and-the-iraq-surge-decision. Accessed September 6, 2023.)
43 Although in some cultures, “honor” may be an end in itself.
44 The 1997 film “Wag the Dog” was based on this premise. Non-fictional examples abound. The brilliant book by H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty:
Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1997) describes in detail how domestic
political considerations deeply affected national security policy – and military advice – resulting in U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam. More recently,
see Ben Smith, “The domestic politics of Libya, in France” at: http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0311/The_domestic_politics_of_Libya_in_Frnace.
html (accessed September 6, 2023).
45 Daniel Shultz argues that Putin’s latest war on Ukraine is primarily aimed at control of the Russian populace. See “Who controls the past controls the
future: How Russia uses history for cognitive warfare,” Outlook No. 4, NATO Defense College, December 2023, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.
php?icode=1901 (accessed December 15, 2023).

How to write a strategy 23

 cy. Yet if a strategy seeks conflicting goals (some of acts upon inputs and influences outputs and outcomes
which may be hidden), it risks internal incoherence. Or rather than an overarching, holistic construct directed
if it must compete with other strategies that purport to towards achieving specific ends.
advance the interests of the same or overlapping groups
of stakeholders, at least some of the desired outcomes
will probably go awry. This holds especially true for the
strategies of a political-military alliance like NATO.
The literature on security strategy focuses primarily
on the nature of the adversary, but the internal factors
in which the developers of strategy must operate – their
own varying biases and potentially conflicting interests
of their stakeholders – also form an important part of
the context. As Carl Builder persuasively argued using the
U.S. Army as an example, institutional interests or “per-
sonalities” can strongly influence their input to national
strategy.46 In The Art of War, Sun Tzu asserted it was
vital not only to know your enemies but also yourself. An
understanding of the range of interests and the areas of
overlap and potential dissonance within an alliance or co-
alition effort is necessary to design a strategy that can be
implemented in pursuit of the collective ends.47 Even the
embassy/mission in a single country can have conflicting
interests. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne give as
an example: “The desire of an agricultural attaché to dis-
pose of the United States’ surplus grain might not easily
be reconciled with the endeavors of the representative
of [the U.S. Agency for International Development] to
promote local self-sufficiency in food production.”48
Open systems model of capacity development
During counterinsurgency and stability operations,
Source: David Wilson, Promoting Institutional and Organisational
differences between goals and methods preferred by mil- Development: A Guide, Department for International Development,
itary units compared to those of non-governmental or- March 2003, Figure 4, p. 2. Available at: https://nsagm.weebly.com/
uploads/1/2/0/3/12030125/institutional_development_sourcebook_
ganizations can be particularly problematic. For example, dfid_2003.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).
many humanitarian actors place a premium on neutrality
and will attempt to serve the entire population equally
without making judgments regarding any of the sides in a
conflict. Conversely, military activities in such operations This view is not necessarily in conflict with the ap-
are usually intended to defeat a certain enemy or enable proach taken in this monograph if one recognizes there
the victory of a particular side in a conflict. Such incon- can be strategies within strategies. In the above model,
gruities must be identified and mitigated. strategy inside the circle should be viewed as that of
International development guides and handbooks, the organizations or institutions that are targeted for
including several by the United Nations Development developmental capacity-building intervention. Outside
Programme, World Bank, and UK’s Department for actors like International Organizations (e.g. UN Devel-
International Development (DFID) repeatedly state the opment Programme, World Bank), Non-Governmental
need for effective strategy and list strategy as an impor- Organizations (e.g. Oxfam International, Médecins Sans
tant factor in organizational assessments yet never clearly Frontières), or aid agencies of national governments
define the term.49 Furthermore, as seen in the chart be- such as the UK Department for International Devel-
low, they tend to view strategy as part of the context that opment (DFID) and the U.S. Agency for International
5 Context and strategy

46 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
47 Military action by alliances and coalitions seem to be at particular risk for a divergence of interests that can inhibit a creating a sound collective
strategy.
48 The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration (New York: Routledge, 2011, second edition), 219.
49 DFID provides a circular definition: “How the organisation implements its mission and vision via a clear stakeholder focused strategy, supported
by relevant policies, plans, objectives, targets and processes.” See David Wilson and Lindsay Beaton, Promoting Institutional & Organisational
Development: A Source Book of Tools and Techniques, London, Department for International Development, 2003, 40. Available at: https://gsdrc.
org/document-library/promoting-institutional-and-organisational-development-a-source-book-of-tools-and-techniques/ (accessed September 6,
2023). Also, The LogFrame Handbook: A Logical Framework Approach to Project Cycle Management. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2005, 7.
Available at: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/783001468134383368/the-logframe-handbook-
a-logical-framework-approach-to-project-cycle-management (accessed September 6, 2023) and Capacity Assessment Methodology: Users Guide. UN
Development Programme, April 2022 at https://cnxus.org/resource/capacity-assessment-methodology-users-guide/ (accessed September 6, 2023).

24 How to write a strategy 

Development (USAID), should have a higher-level or
over-arching strategy represented by the square that bor-
ders this model.
A weakness of the development literature, however, is
that it generally fails to understand strategy as a broad,
holistic process for analyzing the environment and apply-
ing resources to produce the desired outcomes on mul-
tiple levels. On one level, a fundamental aim of capacity
building should be to improve the ability of the nation
or organization being assisted to develop its own strategy
and achieve the ends that it desires. At a higher level, the
interveners must develop and implement a strategy for
applying their resources and achieving their development
goals.50 Despite the centrality of strategy to development
efforts, guidance on how to develop strategy is usually
nonexistent or consists of unrealistically linear or simplis-
tic circular models.51

5 Context and strategy

50 Although, one certainly hopes that the desired ends of the intervening actors and those of the recipient have a great deal of commonality.
51 Phrases like “designing intervention” often seem to be a direct substitute for “developing strategy” within the development literature, yet advice on
how to design an intervention is just as flawed.

How to write a strategy 25

 6

The comprehensive According to U.S. doctrine: “Joint commanders strive

to achieve a comprehensive approach (see adjacent

approach figure) with mission partners through continuous dia-

logue with higher authorities, translation of this dialogue,
subsequent development of desired conditions and
favorable outcomes, and issuance of guidance and intent
to subordinates to achieve unity of effort with mission
partners.”55
One of the factors that make implementation of a
comprehensive approach so challenging is lack of univer-
sal argot, planning techniques, and processes for devel-

“C
oping strategy. Because military leaders lean heavily on a
omprehensive approach” is a term of art body of guidance called “doctrine,” they have a great deal
that refers to activities where military and of commonality in these areas. Military organizations
civilian organizations must work together typically have standardized routines for developing plans
to achieve common and/or interrelated goals, usually in and strategies. NATO, for example, has publications that
relation to crisis management.52 NATO announced the delineate agreed upon terms and definitions and describe
concept at Riga in 2006. The summit declaration stated: how to plan, execute, and provide logistic support to
“Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates allied joint operations. 56
that today’s challenges require a comprehensive ap-
proach by the international community involving a wide
spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully
respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all
actors, and provides precedents for this approach.” 53
Typical examples include counterinsurgency and sta-
bility operations where the military is needed to provide
security for civilian organizations to improve governance,
economic development, rule of law, etc., while progress
in these areas reinforces security gains and over time
should eliminate the need for military intervention. Addi-
tionally, in many cases military units must perform what
would normally be considered “civilian” activities due to
a shortage of civilian expertise and a high level of threat
to civilian personnel.54
6 The comprehensive approach

52 See “A ‘comprehensive approach’ to crises,” webpage dated 17 April 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm (accessed December
15, 2023). Riga Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on
29 November 2006, https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed December 18, 2023).
53 Riga Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29
November 2006, https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed December 18, 2023).
54 See James G. Stavridis, “The Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011), https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/
prism_2-2/Prism_65-76_Stavridis.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).
55 Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7, Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Design and Planning, First Edition, July 2013 (approved
for public release; distribution is unlimited): https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/fp/design_and_planning_fp.pdf (accessed December
15, 2024).
56 Allied Administrative Publication-6 is the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions can be found at: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/
Other_Pubs/aap6.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).

26 How to write a strategy 

“ In 2008 [sic], NATO established
the Comprehensive Approach
in order to facilitate better
synchronization and
coordination with other
international organizations such
as the European Union and the
United Nations, and sharing
coordination of civilian communications strategies
and military activities in with other international actors
Afghanistan. In 2017, the as appropriate. Much of the
Comprehensive Approach work being conducted under
work plan was updated to the Comprehensive Approach
enhance NATO’s civil-military framework was arguably
coordination for crisis targeted toward NATO’s more
management operations, and operational-level activities.
to help NATO allies better
integrate civilian advice and -- Kathleen J. McInnis and Clementine G. Starling,
The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0:
perspectives into broader
How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political
defense and military planning.
Warfare, The Atlantic Council, June 2021.
Other activities under the
Comprehensive Approach
framework include sharing Although it is common to speak of things categorically
lessons learned, promoting as “civilian” versus “military,” there is no single “civilian”
civil-military training, mode of planning or developing strategy that is nearly
as systemic, homogeneous and coherent as that of the

6 The comprehensive approach

Source: Source: Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7, Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Design and Planning, First Edition,
July 2013 (approved for public release; distribution is unlimited): https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/fp/design_and_planning_fp.pdf
(accessed December 15, 2024).

How to write a strategy 27

 Source: Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “The Challenge to Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach,” in Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach
in Semi-Permissive Environments, Forum Paper 9, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy, June 2009, 51, http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.
php?icode=79 (accessed September 6, 2023).

“military.”57 Many civilian organizations lack a standard in a comprehensive approach rarely have a hierarchical
planning framework. Even those that have one tend to organization that parallels that of the military. Proposing
vary significantly from the methods used by other civilian a standard hierarchy of plans, therefore, is not likely to
organizations.58 be useful.
A strategy may also be nested within another strategy or
strategies. Furthermore, it is often difficult to distinguish
between a “strategy” and a “plan.” The U.S. military
and many other NATO members recognize a doctrinal
hierarchy of planning, wherein political and/or strategic
planning guidance leads to strategy to regional and/or
campaign plans, to supporting plans and orders devel-
6 The comprehensive approach

oped by subordinate echelons (sometimes more than

one level of strategies at the national then regional level).
However, as the figure above illustrates, civilian partners

57 Civilian organizations often use the terms “strategy” and “planning” interchangeably. In military terminology, however, development of strategy is a
qualitatively different activity that takes place at the highest echelons while planning is conducted at the operational and tactical levels. For an analysis
of the differences at the operational level, see Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art,” PRISM vol. 1 no. 1,
pp. 37-50: https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_1-1/5_Prism_37-50_Schnaubelt.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).
58 See Andy Tamas, Warriors and Nation Builders: Development and the Military in Afghanistan (Kingston, Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press,
2006), xii-xiii and 81-110.

28 How to write a strategy 

“ “A comprehensive approach
cannot be meaningfully
employed if the relevant actors
(ranging from headquarter-level
to boots-on-the ground level)
lack a common understanding
of method, goal and intention.
Until today, there has been no
such common understanding.
Experiences with nation-
building programs in the last
decades have led to critique
on the very possibilities of
achieving such ideals.”

-- Marenne Jansen and Eric-Hans Kramer

“The Future of the Comprehensive Approach as a Strategy for
Intervention” in Eric-Hans Kramer and Tine Molendijk (ed.),
Violence in Extreme Conditions: Ethical Challenges in Military
Practices, Eric-Hans Kramer and Tine Molendijk, Editors
Springer Open Access, 2023.

The challenges of implementing a Comprehensive

Approach at the tactical and operational levels – or “on
the ground” if one prefers – makes it imperative that the
development of strategies for such efforts include all rel-
evant stakeholders and result in a common understanding
of the ends that are to be achieved.

6 The comprehensive approach

How to write a strategy 29

7

Strategy and Multi- out the strategy and improve the chances the results will
achieve the common objectives of NATO and the other

Domain Operations stakeholders.

Having covered the definition of strategy, approaches
to teaching strategy, and various considerations for de-
veloping strategy, the next section describes a process for
writing a strategy.

N ATO’s emerging concept for Multi-Domain

Operations entails making effective use of
operations in five domains: Maritime, Land,
Air, Space and Cyberspace. Despite the challenges of
fitting civilian and military organizations together to
accomplish common goals, the crux of Multi-Domain
Operations is to enable “the orchestration of military
activities, across all domains and environments, synchro-
nized with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance
to deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance.”59
Achieving the desired synchronization between military and
non-military activities – which for purposes of simplicity
can be summarized as the diplomatic, informational, and
economic instruments of power – necessarily entails the
implementation of a Comprehensive Approach.60
Multi-Domain Operations and the Comprehensive
Approach are not synonymous, but execution of the for-
mer concept depends upon implementation of the latter.
This observation means that developing strategies for
Multi-Domain Operations will require collaboration with
7 Strategy and Multi-Domain Operations

stakeholders representing the non-military instruments

of power. Effective collaboration will require more than
inviting their representatives to meetings: a shared un-
derstanding of the desired ends, and the ways and means
to achieve them, is necessary. Developing a strategy in
common will both increase organizational buy-in to carry

59 See Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Anyplace, Anywhere, Anytime: NATO and Multi-Domain Operations,” Outlook No. 2, NATO Defense College, October
2023, https://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=809 (accessed December 15, 2023).
60 The instruments or elements of national power are described in Appendix A.

How to write a strategy 31

7 Strategy and Multi-Domain Operations

Source: NATO Allied Command Transformation, “Multidomain Operations: Enabling NATO to Out-Pace and Out-Think Its Adversaries,” July 29, 2022,
https:// www.act.nato.int/article/multi-domain-operations-enabling-nato-to-out-pace-and-out-think-its-adversaries/ (Accessed 30 June 2023).

32 How to write a strategy 

8

Steps to write be the best choice. This process can also be useful for
non-security strategies such as those to achieve the ends

a strategy of international development organizations, domestic

policy makers, and businesses.
(Note: the proposed process is not necessarily linear.
Strategists might vary the order in which they address the
various components and perform some of them several
times, thus moving “back and forth” through the pro-

T
cess. Furthermore, it is usually iterative. Understanding is
he conditions a strategy is expected to address particularly likely to require multiple updates.)
and the context in which it is developed will vary
widely. A key variable is how much direction is
given from a higher echelon or authority. This doesn’t
only apply to the situation of a higher military headquar-
ters or national security policy making body. In civilian
contexts, it could also pertain to a board of directors,
steering committee, or donor council. The distinction
between “strategies” and operational or tactical “plans”
lies along a continuum, but it is certainly true that tactical
planners have a great deal of guidance that is a given –
almost always including specific objectives to achieve and
clearly designated forces (means) they have available to
use. In the case of a strategy, there will be far more com-
ponents that must be inferred or developed from scratch.
The following is a generic process for developing a
strategy. Other approaches may be more useful in certain
contexts.61 For example, if the developers have very
clear, specific guidance and fit within a well-established
hierarchy (such as a military headquarters), a linear
deductive process such as the “Guidelines for Strategy
Formulation” in Appendix II of The U.S. Army War
College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National
Security Policy and Strategy may be more helpful.62 How- Steps to write a strategy
ever, in cases where the ends must be established largely
from scratch without clear direction from a higher eche-
lon (e.g., teams of collaborative planners without a single
8 Steps to write a strategy

common higher headquarters or working at the highest

levels of government) the following approach might

61 The United Kingdom Royal College of Defence Studies has a helpful chapter on strategy formulation in its publication, Making Strategy Better 2023.
Unfortunately, it was not available to the public at the time this paper was written. In case it might be openly released in the future, the public affairs
announcement can be found at this link: https://www.da.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2022/the-royal-college-of-defence-studies-updates-strategy-
making-guidebook (accessed September 22, 2023).
62 J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (editor), Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006, 115-126, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12025.13 (accessed September 5,
2023).

How to write a strategy 33

 At the most basic level, any strategy is about changing
Estimate the the behavior of an actor or actors. This places a premium
development timeline on knowledge about the key stakeholders, their points of
view, capabilities, and interactions. A good starting point
might be to ask: “What can we not control?” This leads
Determine the deadlines for writing to other useful questions such as: What can we control?
the strategy. When a strategy team is tasked by a What can we influence? What conditions are more sus-
higher echelon, it will usually be given a “due date” for ceptible to our influence? It is important to avoid what
completion. However, when the team is at the high- Ben Eielson describes as the thinking which “oversimpli-
est echelon or when a specific deadline has otherwise fies complex systems and sets up the military organiza-
not been externally established, it should establish its tion for tactical success with strategic failure because the
own deadlines and decide how much time to apportion world is not as malleable as the detailed planning expects
various parts of the development process, keeping in it to be.”65
mind that some elements will likely need to be repeated. Be as explicit as possible regarding the degree of un-
In a crisis situation there will be a limited amount of certainty, e.g., what is the level of confidence in estimates,
time available before action must begin. This constraint information, and predictions? What do we strongly be-
will restrict how much time can be devoted to various lieve that we “know” versus what is an “educated guess”
elements of the process. Otherwise, some parts – such as that is necessary to proceed in an absence of knowledge?
developing understanding – could take virtually forever. Also, consider the construct made famous by former U.S.
Like all elements of the process, the timeline may need Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: the “unknown,
to be revisited and adjusted as relevant information is unknowns.”66 At a point determined in the timeline, the
obtained. This particular timeline is an internal schedule process must move on to the other elements of creating
for completing the development of the strategy itself. a strategy. However, the development of understand-
Developing a timeline, at least conceptually, for the im- ing should continue throughout the strategy process to
plementation of the strategy to unfold is also an impor- include its implementation.
tant aspect but takes place later in the process. Business consultants Hugh G. Courtney, Jane Kirkland,
and S. Patrick Viguerie suggest a four-level framework
that can help strategists recognize and deal with the de-
gree of uncertainty they face:67

Develop understanding • Level one: a future that is “Clear Enough.” A

single, simple forecast is sufficient to inform the
Gather information and relate it to strategists. They can heavily rely on its prediction
conditions and actors. This element of the when formulating their ends, ways, and means.
process attempts “to explain the qualitative relationships Such a condition is extremely rare in most con-
embedded within complex problems, including their his- texts, especially in developing security strategies.
tory, dynamics, propensity, and trends [but nonetheless]
recognizes that complete knowledge is not achievable, • Level two: a few “Alternative Futures” can be iden-
and therefore constantly questions the limits of existing tified. These are a small number of clearly defined
knowledge and prevailing public myths or paradigms.”63 scenarios that reliably comprise the full set of
It requires more than the simple collation of facts or outcomes. Although the strategists cannot predict
assumptions. The contextual factors that were previously which particular one will come to pass, they may
discussed provide a starting point to list key aspects that be able to rank them in order of likelihood. The
must be analyzed. The United Kingdom’s Department key consideration is that “some, if not all, elements
for International Development proposes a framework of the strategy would change if the outcome were
that examines the overall environment, inputs and re- predictable.” Level Two seems to best approximate
sources, existing strategies of the relevant actors and their the approach taken by NATO in its “Multiple
organizational structures, culture, people, systems, and Futures Project,” which was intended to inform
outputs.64 development of the new Strategic Concept that
the Alliance adopted in November 2010. 68
8 Steps to write a strategy

63 See U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 (Op. Cit.), p. 15.

64 See Promoting Institutional and Organisational Development: A Source Book of Tools and Techniques (Op. Cit.), 18.
65 “Design Theory and the Military’s Understanding of Our Complex World,” Small Wars Journal August 7, 2011, 9, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/
design-theory-and-the-military%E2%80%99s-understanding-of-our-complex-world (accessed September 6, 2023).
66 The Uncertainty Project, undated webpage, https://www.theuncertaintyproject.org/tools/rumsfeld-matrix (accessed December 19, 2023).
67 “Strategy Under Uncertainty,” McKinsley Quarterly June 2000, 81-90. Available free with registration at: http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Strategy_
under_uncertainty_1064.

34 How to write a strategy 

 • Level three: the difference between “A Range of who take the initiative might be able to leverage a
Futures” and level two is the absence of “natu- better strategy to achieve a disproportionate effect
ral discrete scenarios….A limited number of key in shaping the environment.
variables define that range, but the actual outcome
may lie anywhere within it.” As is the case with Al- Although strategic foresight is different than writing a
ternative Futures, the strategy would change in part strategy, in a situation of true ambiguity strategic fore-
or completely if the outcome could be calculated. sight analysis can be useful to develop understanding and
identify potential ways for achieving the desired ends.69
• Level four: “True Ambiguity” is a situation where The greater the level of uncertainty, the more critical
the variables are such that “it is impossible to it is that strategists consider a very wide range of alterna-
identify a range of potential outcomes, let alone tives, maintain flexibility among the possible options for
scenarios within a range. It might not even be pos- action, and explicitly provide for continually surveying
sible to identify, much less predict, all the relevant the environment and adjusting the strategy in response to
variables that will define the future.” Courtney et new information. It seems counter-intuitive, but the more
al write that such conditions are “quite rare” and complex the problem and the greater the uncertainty
tend to evolve into one of the other levels over involved, the more important it becomes for the strategy
time. While making the development of strategy to be simple.70
more difficult in many respects, conditions of high
uncertainty can also present great opportunity: Determine what is the question or
competitors face the same challenges and actors problem to be solved. Another way to view this
step is to ask: why is a strategy needed? It might seem
intuitive that this should the first step in the process.

Source: Hugh Courtney et al, “Making the Most of Uncertainty,” McKinsey Quarterly 2001 No.4, 44, “Exhibit: The Four Levels of Residual Uncertainty.”
8 Steps to write a strategy

69 For an example on applying strategic foresight to the current Russia-Ukaine, see Andrew Monaghan and Florence Gaub, “Strategic Foresight and the
War in Ukraine,” RUSI Commentary, April 6, 2022, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/strategic-foresight-and-war-
ukraine (accessed January 11, 2024).
70 See Jeremiah S. Pam, “The Paradox of Complexity: Embracing its Contribution to Situational Understanding, Resisting its Temptation in Strategy and
Operational Plans” in “Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the Margins of War,” Forum Paper 14, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy, July 2010,
26-45, http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=201 (accessed 3 February 2012); and Andrew G. Haldane and Vasileios Madouros, “The
Dog and the Frisbee,” paper given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th economic policy symposium, August 31, 2012: https://www.bis.org/
review/r120905a.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).

How to write a strategy 35

 Source: HQ Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 5-0, May 2012, p. 2-6: https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/ARI-MSCP/
pdfs/adrp5_0.pdf (accessed December 19, 2023).

However, an understanding of the situation is necessary however, the important element in decision
to recognize whether a problem exists and if yes, what making is defining the question. The crucial steps
problem. There will typically be a back and forth between are to decide whether there is a need for a
these components of the process. Framing the problem decision and what the decision is about. And it
will usually expose shortfalls in understanding. Achieving is in that step that the Japanese aim at attaining
better understanding may result in a different framing consensus. Indeed, it is this step that, to the
of the problem. Strive to capture the nature of problem Japanese, is the essence of decision. The answer
realistically rather than let wishful thinking dictate the to the question (what the West considers the
approaches used to address it. decision) follows from its definition. During the
It has been argued that defining the problem is the process that precedes the decision, no mention
essence of developing a strategy. In 1974, management is made of what the answer might be. . . . Thus
guru Peter Drucker wrote: the whole process is focused on finding out
8 Steps to write a strategy

what the decision is really about, not what the

The Westerner and the Japanese man mean decision should be.71
something different when they talk of “making
a decision.” In the West, all the emphasis is on
the answer to the question. To the Japanese,

71 Quoted in “Consensus Team Decision Making,” Strategic Leadership and Decision Making, National Defense University, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, (undated).

36 How to write a strategy 

 Questions strategists should consider include:
Draft proposed ends
The external problem context72
Envision what is to be accomplished. In
• What is the history of the problem? What is other words, describe the outcome that is expected to
its genesis? result from implementation of the strategy. This element
• Who are the parties interested in the problem and of the process establishes the scope of the strategy and
what are the implications of likely outcomes? gives it focus. However, as the strategy is developed the
• What caused the problem to come to the fore? originally proposed ends may need to be adjusted as
• How important is the issue in terms of key stake- the ways and means are explored and the likely costs of
holder willingness to devote resources towards achieving the initially desired ends become recognized.
a solution? It may turn out that the projected costs of the means
• Why is this problem now becoming salient? In necessary to achieve the ends will exceed the perceived
other words: why wasn’t it addressed earlier or why value of those ends.
can’t dealing with it be postponed? The sources from which the ends can be determined,
or inspired, will vary widely upon the situation. They are
The internal context for the strategy heavily dependent upon the echelon at which the devel-
development process opers of the strategy and their stakeholders reside, which
will also relate to the amount and specificity of guidance
• Who is directing the creation of the strategy (a provided to the developers. In general, the higher the
higher echelon or group of stakeholders)? level, the less guidance will be provided. The President
• What are their expectations? If stakeholders are of the United States may give guidance regarding desired
multiple and diverse, are their collective interests ends to his National Security Council, but where does he
coherent? If not, where are interests misaligned get his (or someday, her) ideas from? Ends at this level
and how can potential conflict be mitigated? will often be inferred from concepts of national values or
• What, if any, policy guidance should shape the national interests.
strategy? At slightly lower echelons, for example for those writ-
• Can the ends be deduced, or must they ing the U.S. National Military Strategy, they might – at
be inferred? least in part – be deduced from higher level statements
• Who must approve the strategy? such as the National Security Strategy.74 However, this
task falls mostly, perhaps exclusively, in the realm of art
A technique from the literature on business strategy rather than science or logic.
may also be useful for framing the problem in the secu-
rity realm.73 S.W.O.T. analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, How does one gain this artistic ability?
Opportunities, and Threats) is one approach for examin- Aye, there’s the rub. As is also the case with identifying
ing the advantages and disadvantages held by the relevant appropriate means and prescribing effective ways, stud-
actors and relating them to one another in a useful man- ying strategic theory – such as the publications found in
ner. This technique is particularly valuable when the time the bibliography – and the work and resulting experienc-
available is short. It can be used to provide structure for es of other strategic practitioners is a good place to start.
a rapid brainstorming session in “low tech” conditions The U.S. Institute for Peace has published a handbook
using an easel or whiteboard. called Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction75

72 According to U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: “Context: the set of circumstances or facts that surround a particular event, situation, etc.
Context as described by Mao Tse Tung: ‘Thus the different laws for directing different wars are determined by the different circumstances of those
wars – differences in their time, place, and nature. As regards the time factor, both war and its laws develop; each historical stage has its special
characteristics, and hence the laws of war in each historical stage have their special characteristics and cannot be mechanically applied in another
stage. As for the nature of war, since revolutionary war and counterrevolutionary war both have their special characteristics, the laws governing them
8 Steps to write a strategy

also have their own characteristics, and those applying to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. As for the factor of place, since each
country or nation, especially a large country or nation, has its own characteristics, the laws of war for each country or nation also have their own
characteristics, and here, too, those applying to one cannot be mechanically transferred to the other. In studying the laws for directing wars that occur at
different historical stages, that differ in nature and that are waged in different places and by different nations, we must fix our attention on the characteristics
and development of each, and must oppose a mechanical approach to the problem of war,’” (Op. Cit.), 23.
73 See Allen Burch, “Strategy, Segmentation, and Incrementalism – A Corporate Approach”, in “Towards A Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian
and Military Concepts of Strategy”, Forum Paper 15, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy, March 2011, 79-80. Available at: http://www.ndc.nato.int/
download/downloads.php?icode=272 (accessed September 6, 2023).
74 The World Bank argues that two kinds of approaches are necessary for success in strategic and program planning: “A convergent model develops
causality deductively from a desired set of strategic outcomes…. A divergent model develops [its] causal logic inductively….” (The LogFrame Handbook: A
Logical Framework Approach to Project Cycle Management (Op. Cit.), 7.
75 Washington, DC, USIP Press, 2009, 2-9. Available at: http://www.usip.org/publications/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction (accessed
September 6, 2023).

How to write a strategy 37

 Especially when competing efforts are considered,
that suggests the following list of “End States” that when and/or how quickly are the means likely to become
might be useful for many operations that will apply a available? At the highest levels, significant resources are
comprehensive approach. unlikely to be available immediately and in total. Are the
key ways immediately executable, or will they require
• Safe and Secure Environment language training, acquisition of additional knowledge,
• Rule of Law skill, or abilities within the implementation force, or
• Stable Governance garnering the cooperation or collaboration of allies? As
• Sustainable Economy was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, must the security
• Social Well-Being forces of the supported government be recruited, trained
and equipped – a process likely to take many years? And,
Strategic practitioners, however, will probably find generating forces alone is likely to be inadequate: they will
that these objectives need to be placed within a specific also require ministries capable of providing long term
context – one which thoroughly considers the factors management, direction, and sustaining the forces that
described above – before they are very useful as a guide were initially built with outside help. The status of some
for developing strategy. Unfortunately, a simple menu important inputs may be impossible to know with a high
of desirable outcomes will rarely suffice to craft a useful degree of certainty at the time the strategy is developed.
statement of the ends to be achieved. In such instances, explicit assumptions are required but
they must be realistic, and the strategy adjusted accord-
ingly as information is obtained.76 When assumptions
involve critical elements, alternatives should be developed
in case the assumptions turn out to be incorrect. For
Determine the example, building national security forces in Iraq took
ways and means much longer than anticipated so a “surge” of U.S. troops
was implemented to help fill the gap until the size and
capabilities of the Iraqi Army and police were sufficiently
Compare the contemporary problem increased.77
frame with the vision of what should
be achieved. How can we proceed from here to
there? What resources (Means) are available now or will
be reasonably available within the necessary time frame)?
How can they best be used (Ways)? What are the options? Consider risk
How do they compare in terms of cost and effectiveness?
One approach to evaluating a potential strategy is by Assess whether the ends, ways, and
applying the standards of feasibility, acceptability, and means are in sustainable balance. The
suitability. These characteristics should be considered as degree to which the perceived cost of Ways + Means
potential combinations are developed. Are the means exceeds the perceived value of the Ends is Risk.
realistically available? Are the ways legal and the means A useful aspect of our formula for strategy is that:
worth the cost? Is it likely the strategy will actually Ends = Ways + Means + Risk. Risk is the probability
achieve its ends? that our strategy will fail to accomplish its ends. There
Also, consider the role of time. How is implementa- will never be enough resources available to deal with all
tion of the strategy likely to unfold? Is there a desirable of the problems and achieve all of the various ends an
pattern of execution: should implementation be simul- organization desires to achieve – a reality that will drive
taneous, sequential, or dependent? In other words, must the need for senior decision makers to accept tradeoffs.
everything happen all at once, in a particular order, or In the case of national security strategy, there are a
should those executing the strategy “wait and see” what plethora of current and potential threats in the world
happens before deciding upon and carrying out succes- but a finite amount of military and other elements of
sive steps? national power available to deal with those threats. For
development agencies and organizations, the amount of
poverty and health problems across the globe exceeds the
8 Steps to write a strategy

76 The use of assumptions here is somewhat different than that found in the Logical Framework applied by many development organizations. The World
Bank defines assumptions as “conditions or factors over which the project either chooses not to exert control or does not have control” (The LogFrame
Handbook: A Logical Framework Approach to Project Cycle Management, Op. Cit., 55). Alternatively, they may be described as “dependencies.” In the
approach used in this monograph, the strategist or implementers of the strategy may indeed be able to control or strongly influence the relevant
conditions or factors, but they are uncertain at this point in the process of strategy development. For example, the experience of the U.S. and its NATO
allies in Afghanistan demonstrated that creating host nation security forces that are sufficient in size, capability, and loyalty is a difficult and hard to
predict task even if, at least in theory, one that intervening forces can heavily influence.
77 Arguably, the ends were also reduced by placing more emphasis on stability and downplaying the desire for a Western-style liberal democracy.

38 How to write a strategy 

funding, other material support, and expertise available ing a separate group (preferably outside of the original
to ameliorate them. The assessment of risk should help developers of the strategy) to play “devil’s advocate” to
decision makers determine what tradeoffs are necessary. find holes in the strategy and/or identify unanticipated
For a given defense budget, how much should be spent ways in which the object of the strategy may react, can be
on tanks versus aircraft? In a particular development pro- a useful technique for reframing the problem.
gram, should more funding go to the delivery of educa-
tion or building infrastructure?
It is extremely rare for strategists to be able to call
upon all of the means they would like to have at their
disposal. Therefore, they must consider the impact of Finalize the statement of
dealing with less than optimal amounts at the optimal
times. Additionally, the ways for employing the available ends, means, and ways
means will often be unproven in the particular context
at hand. The U.S. for example, began promulgating a Write the strategy. There is no “school solu-
national security strategy that included ballistic missile tion” for the format of a strategy but the steps in this list
defense before a robust capability was actually in place. are a good starting point.80 There are too many possible
The nature of complex problems is such that there variations in requirements, context, detail, and degree of
will always be uncertainty and thus some level of risk is complexity to suggest a specific format or outline. Exam-
always present. However, it should be recognized that ples of current and historical national security strategies,
there is an interdependent relationship between ends and military strategies, and business strategies abound on the
the ways and means such that if the means are reduced, web. Length is not necessarily indicative of quality or
while the ends and ways are held constant, there is an likelihood that a strategy will be successful. In some cases
increase in risk.78 A frequent cause of strategic failure is a succinct, one-page statement will be best. One of the
establishing ends that exceed the ability of the designated most critical characteristics is that the strategy must be
ways and means to achieve them. For example, the ends clearly understood by the organizations and individuals
pursued by the U.S. in its initial strategy for the Iraq War who will implement it. How to effectively convey the
were too ambitious prior to 2007, when the means were desired ends and the ways and means to achieve them,
increased through a “surge” of forces and the ways were again, entails more art than science.
adjusted by implementing a counterinsurgency approach.

Monitor strategy
Reframe the problem implementation and
Consider the likely evolution of the sit- effect; revise as necessary
uation in light of proposed actions. This
element of the process should be conducted frequently, Determine whether the strategy is be-
if not continuously. In a sense, all strategy is prediction ing properly implemented, is producing
in the form of an “if-then” statement: if we do x, the the expected effects, and progressing
object of our strategy will do y in response. Strategists adequately towards the desired ends.
should be wary of making specific detailed predictions, If not, revise the strategy or the plans and/or activities
and especially about relying on them too heavily, yet must that implement the strategy. It would be difficult to over-
consider how the enemy may react – or in cases other emphasize the dynamic, interactive nature of strategy. A
than armed conflict, such as domestic tax policy, how the good strategy will include mechanisms to see whether it
situation may change in response to implementation of is generating the desired effects and to make adjustments
the strategy. What might be the second- and third-order if the object of the strategy is not behaving as desired.
effects that result from implementation of the poli- There are at least two parts to the required assessment:
cy?79 Even after the strategy has been promulgated and
resulting actions have begun, reframing the problem must • Measures of performance examine whether the strate-
8 Steps to write a strategy

continue to assess the effects of the strategy and the gy is being properly implemented. In other words,
need for revision. “Red Teaming,” which entails designat- are the activities directed by the strategy being

78 Strategy is far more art than science; but even in the fine arts, an understanding of balance and proportion is usually required for a piece to be
successful. A painter must decide when his piece is completed and thus the time to stop painting it.
79 In 1992, for example, Israel killed the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Abbas Musawi, with a helicopter strike as part of a decapitation strategy.
However, he was replaced by Hassan Nasrallah, who turned out to be much more charismatic and media savvy, and probably a far better leader and
more effective organizer than his predecessor. Thus, it is very likely that Israel inadvertently strengthened Hezbollah by assassinating Musawi.
80 One option, of course, would be to use the steps in this monograph as an outline.

How to write a strategy 39

 conducted as expected? The World Bank describes
this as monitoring “the conversion of Inputs into
Outputs: Are we doing the project right?”81

• Measures of effectiveness examine whether the actions

being performed have produced the desired out-
comes. Or, “Evaluate the conversion of Outputs
into [Development Objective] impact. Are we
doing the right project?”82

Developing measures of performance and effective-

ness is a controversial and contentious issue. It is often
argued that “the most important things cannot be meas-
ured.”83 Nonetheless, a good strategy must have some
mechanisms identified to judge whether it is working as
intended. Otherwise, it cannot be adjusted to compensate
for unanticipated changes in behavior by the object of
the strategy. Potential sources for indicators of whether
a strategy is working as intended include best practices/
lessons learned from previous efforts which can be gar-
nered from a study of strategy.84

Although intended for development projects, the

World Bank suggests the following “Four Feasibility
Questions” that are useful for any strategy, including
military strategies:85

• Is it working?
• Can it be improved?
• Is there a better way?
• Is it worth it?
8 Steps to write a strategy

81 World Bank, The LogFrame Handbook: A Logical Framework Approach to Project Cycle Management (Op. Cit.), 49.
82 Ibid.
83 This quote is ubiquitously attributed to W.E. Deming, but I was unable to find a primary source. Also see Andrew Natsios, “The Clash of the Counter-
bureaucracy and Development,” Center for Global Development, July 2010 at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1424271/https://www.
cgdev.org/publication/clash-counter-bureaucracy-and-development (accessed September 6, 2023); and “The Art and Science of Assessing Iraqi Security
Force Performance” in Sarah Jane Meharg, ed., Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations and Crisis Management, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2009, 169-176.
84 For example, Christopher Paul et al have produced an excellent historical analysis of successes and failures in counterinsurgency efforts: Victory Has a
Thousand Fathers: the Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2010. Available for free download at http://www.rand.
org/pubs/monographs/MG964.html (accessed September 6, 2023). Unfortunately, cynics often refer to “lessons recorded, rather than learned.” In my
experience, very few senior officers responsible for approving and implementing counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan were familiar with this
report or had otherwise devoted significant study to topic.
85 Op.Cit.

40 How to write a strategy 

9

Some concluding push,’ but the leader’s job is more than that. The job
of the leader – the strategist – is to also create the

thoughts conditions that will make the push effective, to have

a strategy worthy of the effort called upon.”

• Bad strategic objectives. There are two

aspects of this error: “a scrambled mess” (fuzzy
objectives) that is “just a list of things to do,” and
“a simple restatement of the desired state of affairs
or of the challenge” (blue sky objectives) that “skips
over the annoying fact that no one has a clue as to

D
how to get there.” As the Ends = Ways + Means
eveloping good strategy is extremely difficult. + Risk formula so nicely illustrates, a good strategy
Because of its dynamic nature, providing a must not only define what to accomplish but also how
simple template or “one size fits all” process is to accomplish it and with what resources.
impossible. In an adversarial or competitive situation,
however, there may be some comfort in recognizing that • Fluff. According to Rumelt, the “final hallmark of
one’s opponents are faced with similar challenges. Ironi- mediocrity and bad strategy is superficial abstraction
cally, it is often easier to identify approaches that do not – a flurry of fluff – designed to mask the absence of
work than best practices. thought.” Readers should find it easy to think of nu-
Richard Rumelt identified four characteristics that merous political or organizational pronouncements
usually equate to “bad strategy.”86 The following may that relied on the use of buzzwords rather than
provide some useful tips for things to avoid when creating logic and clearly expressed concepts. If the fluff is
a strategy: removed or replaced with simple and easy to define
terms, does the strategy still make sense?
• Failure to face the problem. If strategy
is simply viewed as a problem solving process, clearly
identifying the problem to be solved is an essen- Developing sound strategy is difficult but done
tial requirement. A strategy that fails to define the properly it can be very useful to achieve national or
correct problem(s) is highly unlikely to achieve the organizational goals in a wide variety of contexts. The
desired outcomes. Ends = Ways + Means + Risk formula can be applied
to both war and less violent levels of conflict, as well
• Mistaking goals for strategy. Some as domestic political policy and business practice. The
leaders believe it is sufficient to simply establish preceding framework doesn’t tell the reader how to
extremely high goals and then to push organizations “fill in the blanks” shown in the process but provides a
9 Some concluding thoughts

to achieve them without providing a logical plan that starting point by suggesting what blanks need to be filled.
identifies the necessary resources related to useful The readings in the bibliography can help to educate the
methods for employing them. Evoking the frequent reader and develop the artistic abilities needed to fill in
and futile great offensives during World War I, the blanks.
Rumelt writes: “A leader may justly ask for ‘one last

86 “The Perils of Bad Strategy,” McKinsey Quarterly, June 2010, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-

perils-of-bad-strategy. Also see “Why Bad Strategy is a Social Contagion,” McKinsey Podcast November 2022, https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/
strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/why-bad-strategy-is-a-social-contagion (accessed September 6, 2023).

How to write a strategy 41

APPENDIX
 Appendix A

A few key concepts

On one hand, the levels are conceptually interrelated with
no easily-defined boundaries between them. On the other

in military strategy
hand, strategic theory typically asserts there is a quantum
distinction between the tactical and strategic levels that
is greater than the quantitative difference in terms of
geographic area, amount of materiel, or the number of
people potentially affected. It is probably too simplistic to
say that tactics are the realm of lieutenants while strat-
egy is in the realm of generals, but this truism gives the
layperson an idea of the differences.
Carl von Clausewitz discussed only two levels of war:

T
strategic and tactical. Although some theorists distinguish
his monograph is intended to recommend a additional levels, the most common modern typology has
process for developing strategy that would be three levels. The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions88
particularly useful to efforts requiring effective ci- states the following:
vilian and military integration, such as counterinsurgency,
stability, post-conflict reconstruction, disaster relief, and
humanitarian assistance operations. With this purpose in
mind, the main text attempts to be as generic as possible Tactical level
and minimize military-specific jargon and concepts that
apply solely to armed conflict. The level at which activities, battles and engagements are
Yet, it is all but inevitable that civilian members of a planned and executed to accomplish military objectives
joint strategy development team will encounter some of assigned to tactical formations and units.
the following terms and concepts when working along-
side military personnel. Even though the following terms
and concepts might not be relevant or useful to particular
civil-military endeavors, civilian strategists are likely to Operational level
find it advantageous to have some knowledge of them
– especially when involved in developing strategy for a The level at which campaigns and major operations are
comprehensive approach. planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic
Appendix A A few key concepts in military strategy

objectives within theaters or areas of operations.

Levels of war
The levels of war are an approach for conceptually
organizing the spectrum of goals, decisions, and actions
during conflict and similar national security activities.87

87 NB: Although the words are similar, “strategy” and “strategic level” are not synonymous. Strategies can be written for activities completely unrelated
to the strategic level of war. Additionally, tactical activities can have strategic impacts. See the discussion on the spectrum of conflict and strategic
compression in the introduction to “Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the Margins of War,” Forum Paper 14, NATO Defense College, Rome, July
2010, 13-20. Available at: http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=201 (accessed December 29, 2011).
88 AAP-6(2009). Available at: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/Other_Pubs/aap6.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).

44 How to write a strategy 

 right place, at the right time, with the right equipment
Strategic level and supplies was a key facet of successful generalship.
The idea has expanded from the coordinated move-
The level at which a nation or group of nations de- ment of military forces to embrace the coordination of
termines national or multinational security objectives different activities toward achieving a common objective.
and deploys national, including military, resources to During contemporary civil-military operations, lines of
achieve them. operation are sometimes called “logical lines of opera-
The following chart from the U.S. Army Field Manual, tion” or “lines of effort,” but the underlying concept is
Operations, shows one concept of how the levels relate to generally the same: establishing a framework to coordi-
one another: nate interrelated efforts that must be accomplished in
sequence, synchronized, and/or performed in a comple-
mentary fashion.
The chart on next page is an example drawn from a
hypothetical stability operation:
Especially since many of the tasks do not need to
be accomplished in a particular sequence (they are
“non-linear”), it would often be more accurate to refer
to sets of activity rather than lines of operation (or lines
of effort). However, this term is ubiquitous in NATO
military plans.

Center of gravity
Center of Gravity (COG) is a concept that is greatly
debated and lacks a consensus understanding despite its
high frequency of use in the security literature. The orig-
inal meaning of the term as used by Clausewitz meant a
single, specific focal point upon which the enemy’s power
rested. It is typically translated as “the hub of all power
and movement, on which everything depends.”89 If the
Center of Gravity was struck with enough force, the
enemy would fall like a house of cards. Possible exam-
ples might be the capital city, an army, source of supply,
public support, or a specific leader or leaders.
Source: Source: U.S Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0,
Operations, Washington, DC, February 27, 2008, 6-2. Available at: It is now common to read of multiple tactical, oper-
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/fm3-
0_2008.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023). ational, and strategic COGs. Often in NATO strategies
and plans, one’s own greatest vulnerability is mistakenly
listed as a COG.90 However, such assertions run far
astray from Clausewitz’ original theory. In my own opin-
Lines of operation
Appendix A A few key concepts in military strategy
ion (admittedly, a minority view among military practi-
tioners), the hypothesis that such a thing as a COG exists
The concept of “lines of operations” is inherited from or can be effectively struck is rarely – if ever – valid in
the Napoleonic era when it was geographically necessary contemporary conflict. It tends to resemble a search for a
to march an army from Point A to Point B to engage “magic bullet” and inhibits critical thinking at the stra-
offensively in battle. Bringing land forces together at the tegic and operational level. Our enemies are unlikely to

89 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Paperback indexed edition, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1989,
595-96. To give a fictional example: in the original “Star Wars” film, the thermal exhaust port was the COG for the Death Star.
90 Domestic public support is frequently identified as the friendly strategic COG. A ubiquitous contemporary example in U.S. military strategy and high-
level planning is stating that public support is the strategic COG. At least in the U.S., however, it directly correlates with the perception of whether or
not its armed forces are winning. Thus, this assertion tends to be tautological and risks blaming the public for the military’s own failures. Evoking the
specter of the Vietnam War, the implication is that failure should be blamed on the American people rather than the political and military decision
makers who were responsible for strategies that failed.

How to write a strategy 45

 Source: U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Op. Cit.), 6-14.
Appendix A A few key concepts in military strategy

46 How to write a strategy 

be such unitary actors or have such a critical weak link in achieve objectives, there is no consensus on a specific list.
an interdependent system that striking a single point will Nonetheless, the construct generally entails diplomatic,
cause them to collapse.91 informational, military, and economic resources, fre-
If the concept of COG is used, it should logically drive quently summarized by the acronym “DIME.” Some au-
the selection of objectives and designation of the top pri- thors expand this set to include financial, intelligence, and
ority (in military parlance, the “main effort”) within the law enforcement (DIMEFIL) aspects or reorder them,
strategy and/or plans for implementing it. If COGs are such as military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforce-
not something the organization developing the strategy ment, information, finance, and economic (MIDLIFE).92
can strike at or influence, their identification tends to be Expanding the list even further, Geoffrey Kirkwood and
an exercise in front-loading an excuse for failure. Dara Massicot argue that Russia uses “informational,
diplomatic, economic, energy, clandestine, and military
instruments” to exert influence in the Black Sea region.93
It would be easy to also add cyber, lawfare, culture, social
control, and space to the Russian tool kit.
Elements of Regardless of how the elements of power are defined,
national power the critical issue for strategists is to look well beyond
military means when identifying resources that may be
useful to produce necessary effects and achieve the goals
As illustrated in the chart below, these are the means for of a strategy.
carrying out a strategy at the national level: the where-
withal a state can bring to bear to achieve its national
security objects. (In the case of alliances and international
organizations, a frequently used term is “national and
international elements of power.”)

Source: David Jablonsky. “Why is Strategy Difficult” in The U.S. Army

War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War
and Strategy 4th edition. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (editor). Strategic

Appendix A A few key concepts in military strategy

Studies Institute, July 2010, 9.

Like so many other aspects of strategic theory, there is

no undisputed definition regarding the elements of na-
tional power. While there is broad agreement on the gen-
eral concept that types of power can be categorized, and
that power can be applied to protect national interests or

91 For an extended analysis of center of gravity when planning operations at the brigade level, see Christopher M. Schnaubelt et al., Vulnerability
Assessment Method Pocket Guide: A Tool for Center of Gravity Analysis, Santa Monica, California, RAND Corporation, 2014, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
tools/TL129.html (accessed December 19, 2023).
92 See Jack Kem, “Understanding the Operational Environment: The Expansion of the DIME,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin April-June 2007, 49-
53, at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2007_02.pdf (accessed September 6, 2023).
93 “Russian Measures of Influence Short of Force,” in Stephen Flannigan et al., Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2020.
Available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA357-1.html (accessed September 5, 2023).

How to write a strategy 47

 Appendix B

Examples TO SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
12 February 1944
1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied
Commander of the forces placed under your orders
for operations for liberation of Europe from
Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander
Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and,

R
in conjunction with the other United Nations,
eaders and students frequently clamor for exam- undertake operations aimed at the heart of
ples of strategies. Here are three. Do they contain Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.
enough information to identify Ends, Ways, The date for entering the Continent is the month
and Means? of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have
been secured, exploitation will be directed towards
• NATO tends to publish strategic concepts rath- securing an area that will facilitate both ground and
er than strategies. The latest can be found at this air operations against the enemy.
link: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/top- 3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be
ics_210907.htm. (NATO has a Military Strategy, prepared at any time to take immediate advantage
but it is classified.) of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by
the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the
• The U.S. State Department Integrated Country Continent with such forces as you have available
Strategy for Iraq can be found at this link: https:// at the time; a general plan for this operation when
www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/ approved will be furnished for your assistance.
ICS_NEA_Iraq_Public.pdf. (Spoiler: It does not 4. Command. You are responsible to the Combined
follow the formula recommended in this paper.) Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally
in accordance with the diagram at Appendix.
• The directive to General Eisenhower for the Direct communication with the United States and
invasion of Europe during World War II was only British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest
three pages long. It’s debatable whether this doc- of facilitating your operations and for arranging
ument should be considered a strategy, yet it des- necessary logistic support.
ignates the ends, means, and ways for a significant 5. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the responsibility
effort that would eventually result in a strategic for logistics organization, concentration, movement
success.94 and supply of forces to meet the requirements of
your plan will rest with British Service Ministries
so far as British Forces are concerned. So far
as United States Forces are concerned, this
responsibility will rest with the United States War
Appendix B Examples

and Navy Departments. You will be responsible

for the coordination of logistical arrangements

94 “Appendix II: to Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force,” The European Campaign: Its Origins and Conduct, June 1, 2011, 453-455 https://www.
jstor.org/stable/resrep12096.18?seq=1

48 How to write a strategy 

 on the continent. You will also be responsible for
coordinating the requirements of British and United
States forces under your command.
6. Coordination of operations of other Forces and
Agencies. In preparation for your assault on enemy
occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces agencies of
sabotage, subversion and propaganda, acting under
a variety of authorities are now in action. You may
recommend any variation in these activities which
may seem to you desirable.
7. Relationship to United Nations Forces in other
areas. Responsibility will rest with the Combined
Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating
to operations of the Forces of the U.S.S.R. for your
guidance in timing your operations. It is understood
that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at
about same time as OVERLORD with the object
of preventing the German forces from transferring
from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied
Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater,
will conduct operations designed to assist your
operation, including the launching of an attack
against the south of France at about the same time
as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his
operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. You will establish contact with him and
submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views
and recommendations regarding operations from the
Mediterranean in support of your attack from the
United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff
will place under your command the forces operating
in Southern France as soon as you are in a position
to assume such command. You will submit timely
recommendations compatible with this regard.
8. Relationship with Allied Governments--the
re-establishment of Civil Governments and
Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of
enemy territories. Further instructions will be issued
to you on these subjects at a later date.

Appendix B Examples

How to write a strategy 49

 Annotated
Bibliography/
Recommended
Readings
 Annotated Bibliography/
Recommended Readings

Books, Articles and Books

Web Resources
Balzacq, Thierry, and Ronald R. Krebs. The
Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy. Oxford
Handbooks Online. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2021.

Balzacq and Krebs edited a thick and comprehensive

M
volume with 44 essays by 50 different authors comprising
ost of the thoughts and concepts in this mon- more than 700 pages. The book addresses grand strategy
ograph do not present original thinking but are from many different angles and presents a significant
instead a distillation of many books, articles, number of viewpoints. However, upon finishing this
and presentations on the subject. In addition to a robust tome the reader is likely to remain uninformed about
number of footnotes, works that I have drawn upon how to write a strategy. The pieces closet to providing
most heavily are listed here. Additionally, this bibliogra- a map to developing strategy are Charles Glaser’s “Ra-
Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

phy serves as a list of recommended readings. In the case tional Analysis of Grand Strategy,” (pp. 107-122) which
of relevant journal articles, with two exceptions,95 I have on page 109 provides a five-bullet checklist of “essen-
chosen only those that are available online at no cost (at tial components” of a grand strategy. Similarly, in the
least as of the time this monograph was written). Thus, “Challenge of Evaluating Grand Strategy,” (pp. 575-589)
this bibliography is not exhaustive but should be enough William C. Wohlforth offers four steps that might be
to recommend a selection of key works for readers in- almost as useful in developing as strategy as in evaluating
clined towards further research. one. The briefest prescription in the book comes from
Peter Dombrowski’s “Alternatives to Grand Strategy”
(pp. 620-636). He offers:
• Assess the international and domestic en-
vironments,
• Analyze threats, opportunities, national interests,
and the means of power and influence, and
• Plan on how to use the available instruments of
power to achieve the objectives.96

95 Originally available without charge, the articles by Huba Wass de Czege are now behind a paywall but well-worth the price.
96 Dombrowksi cites Terry Dieble, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 24-32.

52 How to write a strategy 

 Brafman, Ori and Rom Brafman. Sway: The in pursuit of those aims – is thus a common phenome-
Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior. New York: non. Perhaps his most important insight for developing
Broadway Books, 2008 (paperback edition). strategy is that war is “a true political instrument, a con-
tinuation of political intercourse, carried on with other
This book is unlikely to be on many, if any, other strategy means” (p. 87). One cannot develop an effective military
reading lists. However, it is a useful leavening to a body strategy without first understanding the political objec-
of literature that tends to be highly rationalistic – a must tives to be obtained. Therefore, he states: “at the outset
read for anyone who wants a better understanding of of a war its character and scope should be determined
human behavior in supposedly rational contexts such as on the basis of the political probabilities” (p. 584). In my
military strategy, international relations, or business. It view, this means fully establishing the ends to be realized
builds a convincing argument using well-chosen exam- and the costs (ways + means) that would be acceptable in
ples that effectively illustrate the key concepts and make achieving them.
the book very interesting reading. The Brafmans do an
excellent job of explaining the frequent irrational sources
of choices that sometimes turn out to be extremely poor. Gray, Colin S. The Strategy Bridge: Theory for
These include value attribution, commitment, diagnosis Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
bias, and different concepts of “fairness.” (My favorite
chapter title is: “In France, the Sun Revolves Around Laypersons may find this book challenging. Joseph
the Earth.”) Rather than being just another critique of Collins, no mean military theorist himself, described it
rational actor theory, this book provides some useful as “brilliant, but often not easy to read.”98 Gray has a
suggestions on how to minimize the ways in which emo- very specific definition of “strategy” that is close to what
tional or other psychological factors can inhibit sound many others would describe as “military strategy.” (He
decision making. also describes the Comprehensive Approach as being
synonymous with “grand strategy.”) He expects his
readers to have a basic background in military strategy.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Paperback His introduction, for example, is a very favorable critique
indexed edition). Edited and translated by of Clausewitz that assumes the reader is already familiar
Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: with On War and does not provide much summarization
Princeton University Press, 1989. of what Clausewitz wrote. Nonetheless, this is one of
the best modern books about strategy. Gray uses the
First published in the early 1800s, On War is the stand- metaphor of a bridge to build his theory: strategy is the
ard work on strategy for the military in most, if not all, bridge that links politics/policy to military action. He
NATO countries. Some scholars have occasionally lively proposes twenty-one “dicta” as the core of his theory.

Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

debate on how to interpret Clausewitz and disagree on Among those I find most relevant to this monograph,
whether his work is relevant to contemporary conflict. they include: “Politics, instrumentality, and effect,” “Ad-
Nonetheless, just as one cannot be taken seriously as a versary and control,” “People,” “Contexts,” and “Tactical,
scholar of English literature without having read Shake- operational, and strategic effect.” An important aspect
speare, familiarity with Clausewitz is necessary to be a of his theory is that he distinguishes between “strate-
strategist (at least for strategists in the national/inter- gy” – which is a permanent theoretical construct with an
national security disciplines). Important concepts to be unchanging nature – and “strategies” – which change in
found in On War include the recognition of friction and character (versus nature) and must be adaptive to contex-
the fog of war. By these he means that battle is inherently tual elements such as geography, technology, and specific
confusing, and commanders must make decisions with adversaries.
imperfect and often incorrect information. (Contem-
porary adherents of a “Revolution in Military Affairs”
believe – erroneously, in my opinion – that technology Hanson, Victor Davis. A War Like No Other. New
could allow U.S. armed forces to eliminate the fog of war York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006.
and dominate the battlefield through superior informa-
tion rather than the traditional elements of combat pow- Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War is a
er.97) Clausewitz also argues that since the importance frequent staple in courses on international relations, war,
of political aims vary, the kinds of war will also vary. or strategy.99 It is the very definition of a “classic” work
Not all war will be “total” war. Limited war – in terms of addressing these topics. In this history of the war, Han-
objectives and the costs a belligerent is willing to accept son draws very heavily on Thucydides and other ancient

97 See Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Whither the RMA?” Parameters 37 (Autumn 2007), p. 95-107. Available from: http://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2384
98 Email to this author, July 5, 2011.
99 An English translation of his History of the Peloponnesian War can be downloaded free of charge at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200

How to write a strategy 53

 sources while adding statistical analysis and new insights support particular explanations of international relations
gained from examining how the war was fought to make is largely unsatisfying.
it more relevant to contemporary conflict. As Hanson
states: “The struggle more resembles the seemingly end-
less killing in Northern Ireland, the French and American Luttwak, Edward N. The Grand Strategy of the
quagmires in Vietnam, the endless chaos of the Middle Roman Empire from the First Century A.D. to the
East, or the Balkan crises of the 1990s rather than the Third. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
more conventional battles of World War II with clear-cut 1979 (paperback edition).
enemies, theaters, fronts, and outcomes” (p. xv). Instead
of strictly following a chronological timeline, such as The result of Luttwak’s Ph.D. dissertation, this is a
Thucydides used, Hanson organizes his narrative accord- thoughtful and imaginative book. There is very little
ing to major topics such as “Fear,” “Fire,” “Armor,” and historical evidence to suggest that Roman emperors or
“Walls.” This approach highlights the lessons that may the Senate consciously developed and conscientiously
be most relevant to today’s conflict. In particular, at the pursued an explicit strategy for the defense of the empire
beginning of the war none of the belligerents imagined it –Luttwak infers what the Roman’s intended by examining
would produce so much carnage, last so long, and in the their actions in the historical and archaeological records.
long-term prove so destructive even for the victorious Yet, this makes the book all the more instructive as
Spartans. In Hanson’s succinct assessment: “Everything example of strategic analysis. Luttwak argues that Rome
considered wisdom at the beginning of the war would be successfully grew for centuries because it “harnessed the
proven folly at the end” (p. 18). Ironically, the conserv- armed power of the empire to a political purpose” and
ative oligarchic Spartans proved much more adept than “Above all, the Romans clearly realized that the dominant
the democratic Athenians in changing their initial strate- dimension of power was not physical but psychological
gy when it became clear that it wasn’t working, and this – the product of others’ perception of Roman strength
flexibility led to their victory. rather than the use of this strength” (pp. 2-3). One might
argue that the book concentrates on the tactical level,
with detailed descriptions of legionary organization
Hill, Charles. Grand Strategies: Literature, and individual fortifications. This is necessary, however,
Statecraft, and World Order. New Haven: Yale to support Luttwak’s thesis that during this period the
University Press, 2010. empire evolved through three different strategic systems:
“client states and mobile armies,” “‘scientific’ frontiers
Hill provides a unique, eclectic take on the topic by argu- and preclusive defense,” and “defense in depth” in
ing that literature is as useful as history or social science response to changes in the external threat and internal
in illuminating strategy, war, and statecraft because the political environment.100
Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

most important and enduring questions about the human

condition cannot be comprehended by rational analysis
alone. It is a provocative argument and an interesting Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of
book, especially when dealing with classic texts such as War in the Modern World. New York: Vintage
those of Thucydides, Homer, and Virgil as well as more Books, 2008 (paperback edition).
modern works such as Thomas Mann’s The Magic Moun-
tain and Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago. A particularly Smith makes an important argument, targeted primarily
fascinating section uses Clausewitz’ On War as a lens to towards policy makers: modern conflict consists pri-
analyze Milton’s Paradise Lost as a story of strategy, war, marily of war amongst the people, which has a different
and state formation. Ultimately, however, one is left character than industrial interstate war, and thus in many
with the feeling that other stories could just as easily be respects a different logic. Although Smith claims he is
chosen (or written?) to produce opposite conclusions. trying to “advocate a revolution in our thinking…our con-
While arguments based on history and social science also frontations and conflicts must be understood as inter-
involve a process of selection regarding what evidence to twined political and military events, and only in this way
present, good practice in those disciplines require at least they can be resolved” (p. 375, italics added), it’s hard to
some degree of arguably objective rules for sifting infor- think of Clausewitz’ nearly 200-year-old treatise as being
mation. Because literature has no such bounds, its use to new and revolutionary. Indeed, early in the book (p. 60)
Smith directly quotes Clausewitz on the linkage of policy
and war. The real problem is that policy makers often

100 Luttwak’s The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, is also excellent but not listed here because it contains
a great deal of detailed history that is fascinating but not directly relevant to the study of strategy. However, an additional keen insight that Luttwak
draws from Byzantium is the reality of an “enemy over the horizon.” Although a particular war might be won, conflict is an enduring condition.
Therefore, the ability to turn current enemies into future allies may be necessary to defeat future enemies. A modern example of this at the end of
World War II was the rapid integration of then-West Germany into the NATO alliance to help the U.S., UK, and France to face the emerging Soviet
threat.

54 How to write a strategy 

commit to the use of military force without having the preserving his force. Rather than showing solidarity and
most basic understanding of this rudimentary principle keeping the French from defeat –the political purpose for
of strategy. Rather than a change to the utility of force his deployment – he unilaterally fell back several times,
during wars amongst the people per se, the bigger issue exposing the French flank to German attacks.
is probably a failure by decision makers – both civilian
and military – to understand the costs of achieving aims
that are related to less than vital interests. This brings us
back to Clausewitz again. In total war, costs are irrelevant
because a nation will spend all that it has if necessary to Articles 101

defeat an existential threat. In a war with limited aims,

costs are expected to also be limited and the contest of
wills becomes one of raising the costs to an opponent
beyond the expected value of its aims. Allen, Charles D. and Breena E. Coates.
“Strategic Decision Making Paradigms: A Primer
for Senior Leaders.” U.S. Army War College,
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New July 2010.
York: Ballentine Books/Presidio Press, 2004
(paperback edition). Allen and Coates provide a brief description of strate-
gic decisions: they are “non-routine and involve both
Tuchman’s Pulitzer Prize winning book about the first the art of leadership and the science of management.”
month of World War I doesn’t directly address the de- Furthermore, they address issues that entail complex or
velopment of strategy per se, but brilliantly illustrates the “wicked” problems. They are qualitatively different than
dynamic nature of strategy: the plans and decisions of tactical or operational level decisions, which usually have
the enemy effects the outcome of wars and battles as well commonly agreed upon procedures. Instead, “Strategic
as one’s own plans and decisions. Her riveting account decision making occurs at a key nexus of [interaction
describes how the Germans separated politics from between multiple domains and stakeholders], culminating
military strategy and forced Great Britain to join the war from decision criteria associated with dynamic, nonlinear,
by attacking through neutral Belgium. Furthermore, in highly interconnected, and interdependent relationships.”
response to French attacks in the center, the Germans The uncertain and ill-structured nature of the problems
also undermined their own strategy by weakening their that must be addressed makes establishing a standard
right wing (and thus failed to implement von Schlieff- methodology for making strategic decisions difficult, if
en’s famous plan) in a failed attempt to double envelop not impossible. To help leaders understand the range
the French armies. Yet, the only reason for violating the of processes and approaches they can draw upon when

Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

treaty promising Belgian neutrality and attacking through faced with strategic problems, Allen and Coates pro-
Belgium in the first place was to ensure the right wing of vide descriptions and analyses of eight decision making
the German armies was massive enough with room to models: Rational, Bounded-Rationality, Incremental,
maneuver that would “let the last man on the right brush Mixed-Scanning, Polis, Garbage Can, Bargaining, and
the channel with his sleeve” (p. 21). On the other hand, Participative. Each of these has strengths and weakness-
the French remained wedded to their “Plan 17” long after es. None is ideal but depending on the context some may
it was clearly unsuitable. Oblivious to German defen- serve as suitable guides for leaders seeking a process they
sive preparations and a realistic consideration of force can employ.
ratios, they launched a massive counter-attack through
the mountainous forests of Ardennes. Their defeat and
subsequent retreat enabled the Germans to seize criti- Bartholomees, J. Boone Jr. “A Survey of the
cal iron mines and nearly capture Paris. Meanwhile, the Theory of Strategy” in The U.S. Army War
Russians heroically tied down substantial German forces College Guide to National Security Issues,
on the Eastern Front but took tremendous losses due to Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy 4th
incompetent leadership, poor planning, and inadequate edition. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (editor).
logistics – shortfalls that could not be readily overcome Strategic Studies Institute, June 2012, pp. 13-44.
by a ready supply of cannon fodder. The British also
failed to shine at the onset of the war. The commander Bartholomees begins with a summary of the definitional
of the British Expeditionary Force refused to coordinate problem. He notes that the “military community has an
his operations with the French. His primary concern was approved definition” but in the broader national security

101 This selection is admittedly U.S. Army-centric. However, aside from my own bias, it is simply true that the U.S. Army War College has available online
without charge the largest collection of articles and papers related to strategy located in one place. The Air University of the U.S. Air Force also has an
excellent web page on the broader topics of “military theory, theorists, and theory” at: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Subjects/ (accessed
September 5, 2023).

How to write a strategy 55

 arena “there is no consensus on the definition of strate- possible consequences of failing to adequately consid-
gy….” His own view is that “strategy is simply a problem er the problem and opportunities being faced. The six
solving process…that asks three basic questions: what is questions are: (1) “What it is about…. What specific na-
it I want to do, what do I have or what can I reasonably tional interests and policy objectives are to be served by
get that might help me do what I want to do, and what is the proposed military action?” (2) What are “the proper
the best way to use what I have to do what I want to do?” methods of fighting the war once it starts?” (3) “What
After brief consideration of the tests for a strategy (suit- are the limits of military power?” (4) “What are the al-
ability, acceptability, and feasibility) and some ways it can ternatives?” (5) “How strong is the home front?” and (6)
be categorized either conceptually (declaratory, actual or “Does today’s strategy overlook points of difference and
ideal) or by the pattern of execution (sequential, simulta- exaggerate points of likeness between past and present?”
neous, or cumulative), he provides a readable and com-
prehensive look at the major theories about strategy. The
authors surveyed include Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, Gaddis, John Lewis. “What is Grand Strategy?”
Beaufre, Luttwak, Van Creveld, and many others. (Lecture), February 26, 2009.

This excellent piece was the keynote address given by

Burch, Allen. “Strategy, Segmentation and Gaddis to a conference at Duke University on American
Incrementalism – A Corporate Approach” Grand Strategy. It opens with a vignette that illustrates
in Towards a Comprehensive Approach: an apparent lack of strategic thinking within the Clinton
Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of administration when pursuing a policy of NATO en-
Strategy, NDC Forum Paper #15. Christopher largement in 1998 (pp. 2-3). He provides other examples
M. Schnaubelt (editor). NATO Defense College, of why strategy is important and gives an overview of
March 2011, pp. 70-90. the approach taken by Gaddis and colleagues in teaching
a course on strategy at Yale University. While most of the
Developing a successful strategy for implementing a strategy discussed by Gaddis concerns national security,
comprehensive approach will require integrating both it is a decidedly not an approach typically found within
“military” and “civilian” points of view. Burch’s paper Pentagon manuals and PowerPoint briefings. Indeed, he
demonstrates the value of cross-fertilization amongst writes that “…strategy need not apply only to war and
the varying civilian and military approaches to strategy. statecraft: it’s potentially applicable to any endeavor in
There are many articles on business strategy that draw which means must be deployed in the pursuit of impor-
upon principles of military strategy.102 Burch, however, tant ends” (p. 7).
is especially noteworthy because he specifically applies
business approaches to military strategy rather than vice
Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

versa. He provides an overview of successful examples Jablonsky, David. “Why is Strategy Difficult” U.S.
of strategy within the consumer products goods industry Army War College Guide to National Security
and suggests ways in which some of the lessons from Policy and Strategy, July 1, 2006, pp. 115-12.
business strategy might be applied to NATO efforts in
Afghanistan. The methods of segmentation, “strengths, (NB: If you are going to read only two articles from this
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT)” analysis, bibliography, this and H. Richard Yarger’s “Toward a
and incrementalism could provide useful new ways of Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War
looking at ongoing operations in Afghanistan as well as College Strategy Model” are the ones to choose.) After
future counterinsurgency and stability missions. the briefest mention of Lykke’s framework for strategy
as being the linkage of ends (or objectives) with ways (or
concepts) and means (or resources), Jablonsky provides a
Crowl, Philip A. “The Strategist’s Short succinct review of Clausewitz’ conceptions of the policy
Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers.” continuum that links policy, strategy and tactics; and the
Reprinted from The Harmon Memorial “remarkable trinity” consisting of the government, the
Lectures in Military History, No. 20, October 6, military, and the people. He then draws brief lessons
1977, pp. 1-14. from World War I to illustrate how the advent of modern
war fighting technology altered the interrelation of the
Crowl’s article has some overlap with other articles listed government-military-people trinity in ways that Clause-
here, and the opening section on the value of studying witz did not anticipate, arguing that technology resulted
history is a bit ponderous. However, his six questions in “self-defeating offensive strategies.” The impact of
are excellent analytical tools for developing strategy and technology necessitates expanding the continuum of war
each is illustrated by pithy examples that demonstrate the – envisioned by Clausewitz as consisting only of strategy

102 For example, the article noted further below by Richard Rumelt begins with an engaging vignette of Admiral Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar.

56 How to write a strategy 

and tactics – to add an operational level to link strategy Rumelt, Richard. “The Perils of Bad Strategy.”
and tactics. Jablonsky concludes his article with the figure McKinsey Quarterly, June 2011.
of a large arrow of NATIONAL STRATEGY, illustrat-
ing a horizontal plane of the economic, psychological, Illustrating how much strategy for war can inform strat-
political, and military elements of national power, while egy for business (and vice versa), Rumelt begins this very
the military element also has a vertical continuum of the readable article with a short vignette regarding British
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (reprinted Admiral Horatio Nelson’s strategy for his outnumbered
above in the annex’s section on the elements of power). fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar. He then describes what he
He also quotes Admiral Henry Eccles on the complexity calls “bad strategy” and provides a list of dysfunctional
of national strategy: “Because these various elements of behaviors that are often found. These include: Failure
power cannot be precisely defined, compartmented, or to Face the Problem (detailed plans that have exten-
divided…it is normal to expect areas of ambiguity, over- sive information yet to do not address the core issue(s)
lap, and contention about authority among the various that needs to be tackled), Mistaking Goals for Strategy
elements and members of any government” (p. 9). While (making a list of desired outcomes without a realistic plan
one must acknowledge that any model or chart has limits, to identify and dedicate resources necessary to achieve
is it glaringly obvious that missing from the national strat- those goals), Bad Strategic Objectives (a “dog’s dinner of
egy arrow is any notion of relevant continuums below goals” rather than a thoughtful statement of the most im-
the non-military elements or the interactions amongst the portant things that much be achieved), and Fluff (“super-
various elements. ficial abstraction – a flurry of fluff –designed to mask the
absence of thought). Rumelt concludes by providing a
“kernel of good strategy,” three characteristics that form
“National Power” in U.S. Army War College the backbone of a good strategy: A diagnosis, a guiding
Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, policy, and coherent actions.
July 1, 2014. pp. 101-118.

In this article, Jablonsky begins by defining power at the Stolberg, Alan G. “Crafting National Interests
most basic level as being able to cause others to behave in the 21st Century” in U.S. Army War College
in a manner conducive to one’s own objectives: “At the Guide to National Security Interests, Jun. 1, 2012,
national level, this influence is based on relations between pp. 13-26.
nation-state A and another actor (B) with A seeking to
influence B to act in A’s interest by doing x, by contin- A significant difference between “developing strategy”
uing to do x, or by not doing x.” He next describes the and “planning” is that during the latter, the starting point
importance of context – explaining that “The question is usually deductive: one analyzes the specific and im-

Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

should always be: power over whom, and with respect to plied tasks assigned by a higher echelon or authority to
what?” – touches upon the difference between potential determine the outputs or outcomes the echelon doing
and actual power, and highlights what should be obvi- the planning is supposed to achieve. For plans, the means
ous but often missed: “National Power is relative, not are also typically designated as part of the tasking to start
absolute.”103 The bulk of the article analyzes the various planning. Strategy, however, often begins with a blank
factors that help to determine national power. These slate: the outputs or outcomes must be inferred with little
are organized according to natural and social factors, or no guidance from a higher echelon; indeed, the highest
although he notes that a sharp distinction between these echelon (e.g., the U.S. National Security Council or the
two categories is impossible to establish. The key factors North Atlantic Council) may be the one developing the
analyzed include geography, population, natural resourc- strategy. Identifying national interests (or in a multi-lateral
es, economic capacity, military strength, political organ- alliance such as NATO, the process might begin with
ization, psychological components such as national will, identifying the common interests or values of the Alli-
character, and integration, and information/communica- ance) is the starting point of the process in nearly every
tions capabilities. proposed approach to crafting national security strategy.
Stolberg efficiently provides a brief definition of national
interests and reviews debates about their nature, includ-
ing “realism” vs. “morality” and summarizes one of the
standard typologies that categorize interests by their
intensity: survival, vital, important, and peripheral.

103 Relative nature also applies to the ability to bring national power to bear against an opponent. A contemporary example is the error of Vladimir Putin,
as well as many Western analysts, in believing the Russia would quickly overrun Ukraine because of Russia’s far larger armed forces, population, and
economy.

How to write a strategy 57

 Troxell, John F. “Military Power and the Use of how much power is applied, or how precisely the blows
Force” in Vol. I: Theory of War and Strategy, June are delivered. It is difficult to judge how the enemy will
1, 2012, pp. 217-242. react to extreme acts of violence and military threats.”
Therefore, although efforts to influence the enemy’s will
Troxell begins by advising the reader that: “As important are worthwhile, the other arm of the strategy must be the
as military power is to the functioning of the internation- deployment of substantial ground forces that can close
al system, it is a very expensive and dangerous tool of with and engage the enemy. When fighting an implacable
statecraft….” He then describes several tasks that military foe, “winning will always require eliminating the enemy’s
action can be assigned in pursuit of a political objective. option to decide how and when the war ends.” Wass de
The “purest” use of military power is to “physically de- Czege makes a strong argument that this is something
feat an adversary” and “eliminate an adversary’s ability to that cannot be accomplished with standoff and precision
choose course of action.” It can also be used to coerce, weapons alone.
which is to “cause an adversary to change his potential or
actual course of action.” Coercion can be subdivided into
deter, which is to convince an opponent not to take a “On Policing the Frontiers of Freedom” Army 56,
particular action because the costs and risks would exceed no. 7 (July 2006), pp. 14-22.
the perceived benefit, and compel – forcing an opponent
to engage in certain behavior. Two other effects that This article is the bookend for the preceding one. In it,
military power can produce are to reassure and dissuade. Wass de Czege posits a dichotomy of military opera-
The summary that Troxell provides is good, but would tions that require the use of force: warring and policing
have been better if he had tied it into Rupert Smith’s (consensual, unopposed humanitarian assistance and
arguments in The Utility of Force or otherwise been more disaster relief missions are not considered in this spec-
explicit about the fact that there are only so many effects trum). While there is some overlap, he says each has its
that can be achieved through military action and thus in own fundamental logic: “we make war on an enemy, and
many instances its ability to produce the desired political we police a problem.” Policing usually entails complex social
outcome is inherently limited. The second half of the pa- or “wicked” problems, the solution of which “requires
per is a brief but excellent analysis of various arguments restoring a bargain in which the people provide support
during the past three decades about when to use force, and soldiers and marines provide a safe environment, not
particularly the so-called “Weinberger Doctrine,” and a only for the people, but for the nonmilitary actors who
review of the debate about legitimacy and multilateralism. really have the expertise and means to deal with the root
social causes.” A key difference from warring is that “War
implies ending when the adversary yields overtly. Policing
Wass de Czege, Huba. “War with Implacable with military forces implies an ending when civil author-
Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

Foes: What All Statesmen and Generals Need to ities can contain the danger of violence through normal
Know” Army 56, no. 5 (May 2006), pp. 9-14. processes – civil police, courts, and prisons.” War does
not end until the loser has decided he has lost. In policing,
This article provides a brilliant distillation of Clausewitz the stronger side determines when the problem has been
and applies the key premises towards developing a strate- reduced to a manageable level. Although troops may be
gy to defeat a determined enemy. Based upon the critical conducting both warring and policing in the same loca-
axiom, “It is the loser who decides that he has lost,” Wass tion, the distinction between the two activities has critical
de Czege argues that prudence dictates the pursuit of war implications for the employment of military forces.
along “two complementary lines.” One of these should Among them, in policing “The lives of innocent foreign
attempt “to influence the will and decisions of enemy civilians are valued as much as those of the soldiers and
political leaders.” These efforts could include threats, marines protecting them.”104 In war, seizing the initiative
“shock and awe” effects through the use of airpower is imperative, rapid action is premium, and reconnais-
and other standoff weapons to attack critical nodes and sance by fire is often necessary and acceptable. During
troop concentrations, and – although not specifically policing, on the contrary, in many cases doing nothing
mentioned in this article – non-military tools such as other than “getting your bearings and sensing the mere
economic sanctions and international regimes to weaken impact of your outfit’s imperial and seemingly ubiquitous
the legitimacy of the enemy regime. According to Wass presence is enough.” Therefore, Wass de Czege argues
de Czege, however, “Applying military power for psy- that “How politicians define the problem of a nonstate
chological and political effect is simple to conceive, but adversary [i.e. warring or policing] is an important strate-
it is very difficult to obtain predictable results, no matter

104 I have argued elsewhere that a paradox of using military force for humanitarian purposes is that when less than vital national interests are involved,
avoiding friendly casualties becomes an imperative and inadvertently results in greater risk to the civilians who are supposed to be protected. See
“The Limits of Military Force,” The International Herald Tribune May 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/opinion/19iht-edschnaubelt19.html
(accessed September 6, 2023).

58 How to write a strategy 

gic decision…. Being able to define the problem in terms
other than war is a privilege reserved to the strong, and
such decisions are profoundly political.”

Yarger, H. Richard. “Toward a Theory of

Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War
College Strategy Model” in Vol. I: Theory of War
and Strategy, June 1, 2012.

(NB: If you are going to read only one article from this
bibliography, this is the one to choose.) In a mere six
pages, Yarger describes the model developed by Arthur
Lykke that has been used at the U.S. Army War College
for more than 20 years. It is almost impossible to sensibly
pare down his article further, but in a nutshell: “Strate-
gy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use
the power (means or resources) available to the state to
exercise control over sets of circumstances and geo-
graphic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support
state interests.” Thus, “strategy = ends + ways + means”
and the degree to which ends, ways, and means are out
of balance equals risk. Finally, Yarger posits that the
standard for assessing a strategy is whether it is suitable,
feasible, and acceptable.

Web Resources

In addition to the specific works cited above, several

e-journals and web pages present up-to-date pieces and

Annotated Bibliography/Recommended Readings Books, Articles and Web Resources

discussions on strategy and strategic topics.

These include:

IISS - International Institute for

Strategic Studies
- https://www.iiss.org/

Journal of Strategic Studies

- https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/fjss20

Military Strategy Magazine

- https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/

Strategic Studies Institute

- https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/

The Strategy Bridge

- https://thestrategybridge.org/

How to write a strategy 59

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