Analysis

Accident C-130H Hercules

Airbase Eindhoven, the Netherlands

15 July 1996

by
Harry Horlings
AvioConsult

The turn of conclusions

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ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN AVIOCONSULT

Analysis of the accident with a C-130H Hercules on Airbase Eindhoven, the Netherlands on 15 juli 1996.

The turn of conclusions.

Copyright 2001 – 2008, AvioConsult. All rights reserved.

Nothing out of this analysis may be copied and/or made public in any way without prior written consent of the
author (info@avioconsult.com).

AvioConsult is an independent aviation consultant. See also www.avioconsult.com.

The author is a graduate of the USAF Test Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base, CA, USA (class 85A).

First edition: 17 June 2001.  Translated into English March 2008.

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AVIOCONSULT ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents .................................................................................................................................... iii

List of tables and figures ........................................................................................................................ iii
List of abbreviations and symbols .......................................................................................................... iv
1. Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 1
2. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
3. Characteristics C-130H Hercules .................................................................................................... 3
4. Airplane, meteorological and airport data ....................................................................................... 4
5. Normal prescribed procedures ........................................................................................................ 4
6. C-130 Low-Speed Flying Qualities................................................................................................. 9
7. Analysis of the accident ................................................................................................................ 10
8. Cause of the accident..................................................................................................................... 14
9. Preventive measures ...................................................................................................................... 15
List of refered documents ...................................................................................................................... 16

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Airplane, meteorological and airport data. .......................................................................... 4

Table 2. Prescribed airspeeds and airplane configuration. ................................................................ 5

Figure 1. Effect of bank angle and weight on VMCA.......................................................................... 12

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Abbreviation/ Symbol Meaning

FM Flight Manual
GW Gross Weight
kt knots (in this analysis Knots Indicated Airspeed, KIAS)
lb pound(s)
OAT Outside Air Temperature
OEI One Engine Inoperative
SL Sea Level
SMP 777 Performance Manual
TEI Two Engines Inoperative
TIT Turbine Inlet Temperature
VMCA Air Minimum Control Speed
VMCA1 Air Minimum Control Speed with one engine inoperative
VMCA2 Air Minimum Control Speed with two engines inoperative

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AVIOCONSULT ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN

1. ABSTRACT

1.1. On 15 July 1996, a C-130H Hercules of the Belgian Air Force crashed
on Airbase Eindhoven in the Netherlands following the failure of engines #1
and #2 due to bird ingestion during a go-around that was initiated just prior
to touchdown. Engine #3 was already off before the approach.

1.2. The go-around (while n-1) was initiated at an airspeed close to 97 kt,
which is far below the flight manual required go-around speed of VMCA2 (134
kt in this case). The flight manual requires acceleration to VMCA2 (VMCA for
n-2) before selecting full go-around power to be able to maintain control and
in anticipation of another engine to fail on the same wing. If two engines
fail on the same wing and the power setting on the other engines is high, the
airplane will be uncontrollable at speeds below VMCA2.

1.3. In this case, the airplane lost the thrust of three engines (# 1, 2 and 3).
Only #4 was operating on max. thrust right after the bird ingestion. In this
very special case, the actual minimum control speed was however VMCA1.
As the airspeed was even a little below VMCA1, the airplane started to slowly
roll and slide away in a direction away from the operating engine, until it
impacted the ground.

1.4. The pilots of the airplane and the accident investigators did not know
about the real value of the minimum control speeds of the airplane, not about
the factors that influence VMCA, not how the magnitude of VMCA can be
'controlled' by the pilots and not what VMCA really means for the controllabil-
ity and safety of flight before and after engine failure, despite the fact that
Lockheed provided good VMCA data and explanations, including control limi-
tations, in the airplane flight manual as well as in a very good booklet 'C-130
low speed flying qualities' that is available to all C-130 pilots.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1. The accident investigation committee presented in § 5.1 of the Report

as probable cause:
The accident happened as a result of a collision with a
flock of birds during a go-around. The loss of engine pow-
er in combination with the landing speed subsequently led
to the loss of control of the airplane. In combination with
the low altitude, the accident could not be avoided.

2.2. The Advisory Council for Airplane Accidents of the Minister of De-
fense stated on page 13 of their report 01-97 the most probable cause of the
accident:

The accident was initiated by:

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going around from a very low altitude, most probably as a

reaction to the sighting of birds, during which a flock of
birds could not be avoided.anymore.

The accident became inevitable when:

following the bird hit, the thrust of both left engines was
lost because of bird ingestion;
the airplane became uncontrollable as a result of the loss
of thrust at very low altitude and crashed.

2.3. The first part of the conclusion of the accident investigation committee
is in itself correct, but the accident could have been avoided. The conclusion
does not go far enough and hence has no value for the prevention of acci-
dents after engine failure. In this analysis, the true cause of this accident will
be presented and explained, using the formal airplane manuals and the
knowledge the author has on experimental flight-testing of multi-engine air-
planes after being trained at the USAF Test Pilot School. The approach will
differ from the formal investigation report and might lead to improving the
recommendations for the prevention of similar accidents.
The formal manuals used for this analysis are the Flight Manual, and the
Performance Manual (SMP 777) that is part of the Flight Manual of the C-
130H Hercules, as well as a publication of Lockheed, the manufacturer of
the Hercules, titled 'C-130 Low-Speed Flying Qualities'. This analysis is li-
mited to the final flight phase and does not discuss the post-accident aid.
Airplane and flight data out of the formal accident investigation report was
used in this analysis.

2.4. This Analysis. In the analysis below, a reference to the page of the
Flight Manual (FM) or the Performance Manual SMP 777 (SMP) of the pre-
sented data will be given in italic print between parentheses. In the Perfor-
mance Manual, data of all Hercules versions are contained. The used Flight
Manual however, was of a long-body Hercules (C-130H-30), because a
Flight Manual of the Belgian C-130H version was not available. The quoted
Warnings from the long-body Flight Manual will however, without any
doubt, also be stated in the Flight Manual of the Belgian standard version of
the Hercules, but may be on a different page.

2.5. The author of this analysis is a graduate Flight Test Engineer of the
USAF Test Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base, CA, December 1985.
Following four engine failure related accidents (Hercules, Saab SF-340, Da-
kota DC-3, ElAl Boeing 747-300) in the Netherlands that happened within a
relatively short period of time, he published a paper in the Netherlands Air
Force flight safety magazine 'Veilig Vliegen' in November 1999. Following
retirement from his Air Force career, which he concluded as Chief Experi-
mental Flight Test, he founded AvioConsult and dedicated himself to im-
prove aviation safety using his knowledge of experimental flight-testing. He
researched many catastrophic accidents with multi-engine airplanes that oc-
curred after engine failure or while an engine was inoperative. He published
several papers and reports on the prevention of this kind of accidents on his
website and presented these to the European Aviation Safety Seminar of the
Flight Safety Foundation, to the Dutch TSB, the Engine and propeller Direc-
torate of the FAA and to a number of Airlines, Air Force and Navy organiza-

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tions. He also wrote supplementary analyses of individual catastrophic acci-

dents, of training and airplane flight manuals and of deficiencies in Aviation
Regulations FAR, CS 23 and 25 and equivalent, all of which can be down-
loaded (for free) from the downloads page of www.avioconsult.com.

3. CHARACTERISTICS C-130H HERCULES

3.1. Before analyzing the accident, a limited explanation of the applicable

and most important flight characteristics of the Hercules is presented. The
four engines each drive a propeller that rotates at a constant speed during ta-
keoff, cruise flight and approach & landing. The thrust of the propellers is
set by the throttles in the cockpit which change the blade angle, the pitch of
the propeller blades. If an engine fails, a difference in engine thrust on the
left and right wing occurs, that causes a yawing moment in the direction of
the failed engine. This yawing moment can only be compensated by deflect-
ing the rudder to prevent the yawing angle to increase and reduce the sideslip
(and therewith the drag). The aerodynamic force generated by the vertical
tail and rudder is proportionate to the square of the airspeed (V2). The lower
the airspeed, the smaller the rudder generated side force is and the more rud-
der deflection is required or, if the rudder is already maximum deflected, the
higher the airspeed must be to generate a high enough side force to counter
the asymmetrical thrust. Besides rudder deflection, also aileron deflection is
required to counter the rolling tendency due to the difference in propulsive
lift on both wings. The engines are numbered from left to right; number 1 is
the outboard engine on the left wing.

3.2. The airspeed at which the deflection of the aerodynamic controls is not
sufficient anymore to maintain the heading is called the minimum control
speed in the air: VMCA. VMCA is determined during flight-testing and is listed
as an operational limitation in the Flight Manual. If the airspeed is below
VMCA, then the airplane might not be controllable anymore once an engine
fails and the other engines are set to provide maximum thrust, as will be the
case during takeoff or go-around. Both the C-130 Flight Manual and Per-
formance Manual pay a lot of attention to the loss of control after engine
failure. A lot of warnings are included to warn the pilots for inappropriate
handling of the airplane after engine failure. Lockheed, the manufacturer of
the C-130 Hercules, did not only write about the problems that might occur
after engine failure in the Flight and Performance Manuals, but also issued
the already mentioned booklet 'C-130 Low-speed Flying Qualities', that is
solely devoted to explaining the not always benign flight characteristics of
the Hercules at low flying speed while an engine is inoperative and to ex-
plain the real value of the published VMCA. The author of this analysis also
wrote many papers and reports about this subject.

3.3. The minimum control speeds are determined during experimental flight-
testing and are prescribed in the Flight en Performance Manuals to be able to
continue the flight safely following the failure of one or more engines, and to
prevent catastrophic accidents from happening. If, however, these limiting
speeds are not used appropriately, control of the airplane might still be lost
after the failure of one or more of the engines at the moment that the air-
speed is low and the thrust on the other engines is high.

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4. AIRPLANE, METEOROLOGICAL AND AIRPORT DATA

4.1. The following airplane, meteorological and airport data were copied
from the formal accident investigation report as they were during the acci-
dent. It was assumed that these data were correct.

Airplane: Lockheed C-130H Hercules

Registration, operator: CH-06, Belgian Air Force
Engine type: T56-A-15
Gross weight: 98,000 lb
Flap position: 100 %
Landing gear: Down
Fuel distribution: Symmetrical over both wings
Engine thrust at the moment of the accident (Report §4.1.3):
#1: 2,174 lb
#2: 0
#3: 0
#4: +4,816 lb

Meteorological and airport data Airbase Eindhoven

Date/ time: 15 July 1996/ 18:02
Temperature: 21.3º C
Air pressure (QNH): 1,027 hPa (mb)
Wind: 010º/11-17 kt
Runway in use: 04
Runway height: 74 ft

Table 1. Airplane, meteorological and airport data.

5. NORMAL PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES

5.1. Takeoff and landing data. Using the data presented in Table 1 above,
the airspeeds that should have been used by the flight-crew of this flight
were determined from the graphs in the Performance Manual SMP 777 of
the C-130H. With each data item, the source where the data was found is in-
cluded within parenthesis. A brief explanation of the data is presented in the
next paragraph.

Speed kt Configuration, conditions en source

Approach speed 118 Is threshold speed + 10 kt, prescribed in
Performance Manual (SMP page9-2).
Threshold speed 108 For grossweight (GW) 98,000 lb (SMP page
9-7) with throttle at flight idle.
Touchdown speed 97 For GW 98,000 lb (SMP page 9-10). This is
the lowest approved threshold speed.

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AVIOCONSULT ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN

Speed kt Configuration, conditions en source

VMCA1 103 Gear down, 50% flaps, OAT 21,3º C, Sea
in ground effect Level, 5º of bank into good engines, max.
permissible power on operating engines, full
VMCA2 134
rudder or 180 lb of rudder force, minimum
in ground effect
weight (SMP pages 3-17 and 3-62, 3-63).
VMCA1 107
Data with 100% flaps is not available.
out of ground effect
VMCA1 is minimum control speed in the air
VMCA2 136 with one engine inoperative;
out of ground effect
VMCA2 is minimum control speed in the air
with two engines inoperative.
Power-off stall speed For GW 98,000 lb, 100% flaps. (SMP page
with bank angle: 3-118)
0º 78
30º 85
Go-around speed 134 Warning in FM: go-around not to be at-
tempted if airspeed is below VMCA2 (FM
pages 3-12 and 3-51)
Rotation speed 103 Is 5 kt lower than take-off speed but never
lower than VMCA in ground effect (SMP
page 3-17)
Take-off speed 91 With 3 & 4 engines, 50% flaps, 98,000 lb
(SMP 3-58). In this case (low gross weight)
lower than rotation speed, so not useful.

Table 2. Prescribed airspeeds and airplane configuration.

5.2. The meaning and intention of the airspeeds presented above are:
Approach speed is the airspeed required during the ap-
proach for landing;
Threshold speed is the airspeed required during overflying
the runway threshold;
Touchdown speed is the airspeed at which the airplane at
first touches the runway surface;
VMCA1 is de Air Minimum Control speed with one engine
inoperative.
The airplane is in ground effect if the height of the airplane
is within one half wingspan above the ground. At greater
heights, the airplane is out of ground effect;
VMCA2 means the same as VMCA1 but now if two engines (on
the same wing) are inoperative;
Power-off stall speed is the lowest speed at which the
wings produce just enough lift to maintain altitude while

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the power of the engines is off (throttles idle). When the

airspeed is lower, the wings loose lift generating capability;
Go-around speed is the airspeed at which a go-around can
be safely initiated and performed;
Rotation speed is the airspeed at which, during the takeoff
run, the nose wheel can be 'pulled' off the ground to initiate
the climb;
Take-off speed is the speed at which the main gear wheels
leave the ground.

5.3. Before and during every flight, these data are calculated or copied from
graphs in the Performance Manual and recorded on a so-called C-130 Take-
off and Landing Data Card (TOLD) that is always positioned in direct view
of the pilots.

5.4. In the Flight Manual, the normal and emergency procedures are pre-
scribed for all flight phases like take-off, approach, landing, go-around, etc.,
that have to be applied by the flight crew. Each of the procedures is accom-
panied, if applicable, by safety measures and Warnings and Cautions that
warn the flight crew for dangerous flight conditions. The relevant Warnings
and Cautions out of the Flight Manual for this analysis are presented below
to present an appreciation of the many warnings that are included for flying
at low speed and with inoperative engine(s). In addition, also Warnings are
quoted that are not directly relevant for this analysis, but because these
present an impression of the hazards that are threatening the safety in case an
engine fails and that contribute to the knowledge required for flying the Her-
cules.

5.5. In the Flight Manual in Chapter Flight Characteristics on page 2-66, and
in the Emergencies on page 3-10, the following Warning is stated:
Improper use of the rudder coupled with improper bank
angle control during asymmetrical thrust conditions may
result in immediate loss of control of the airplane. Rapid
yaw to very high sideslip angles will cause a drastic loss of
airspeed and abrupt roll toward the thrust-deficient wing.
Recovery to balanced flight with coordinated flight controls
and symmetrical power must begin immediately; the loss of
altitude during recovery may exceed 5,000 ft.

5.6. In the Flight Manual, in the figures on page 2-190 and 2-192 for typical
approaches on two engines, the following Warnings are printed:
A go-around is not recommended after flaps are lowered;
Do not extend full flaps or slow below 2 engine minimum
control speed until landing is assured.

These Warnings are not directly applicable to the mishap airplane, because 3
or 4 engines were still operating during the approach, but the Warnings do
indicate that if the flaps are lowered, and the airspeed is below VMCA2, and
two engines fail or are inoperative, a dangerous situation would occur if a
go-around would be initiated.

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5.7. In the emergency procedures in the Flight Manual on page 3-8 under
Take-off continued after engine failure:
Maintain directional control with flight controls and en-
gine power as necessary.

5.8. Under the head Three-engine ferry operation, the following Warnings
are printed:
It is imperative that the following limitations be observed
and procedure followed exactly since the loss of an addi-
tional engine after lift-off and prior to reaching two-
engine minimum control speed results in a hazardous sit-
uation. In addition, failure to follow the procedure may re-
sult in loss of directional control and destruction of the air-
plane.
It is important to obtain two-engine minimum control speed
as soon as possible after take-off.

In this procedure it is stated that as soon as the airplane is airborne, the head-
ing has to be maintained using 5 degrees of bank in the direction of the good
engines, or away from the inoperative/failed engine and rudder as required,
and that only after attaining VMCA, the throttle of the operating asymmetrical
engine may be advanced to the same torque setting as the symmetrical en-
gines.

5.9. In paragraph In-flight Emergencies under Flight Characteristics under

Partial Power Conditions on pag. 3-10 is stated: Failure of an outboard en-
gine may require power reduction on the opposite outboard engine.

5.10. In the same chapter under Turns: Turns into inoperative engine(s) are
not recommended due to the increase in VMCA encountered when the 5-
degree favorable bank angle (into the operative engines) is reduced.
The effect of bank angle and weight on VMCA is illustrated in Figure 1 on
page 12.

In the same chapter, under Propeller malfunctions during take-off the follow-
ing Note:
Propeller malfunctions during take-off may be difficult to
analyze at this most critical phase. If the engine is shut
down immediately and the propeller fails to feather, it is
possible that higher than normal minimum control speed
may result. When fire is not indicated, it is recommended
that the engine be allowed to run until at least two-engine
inoperative air minimum control speed is reached.

and the following procedure:

Continue the take-off; maintain directional control with flight controls

and engine power as necessary.

and the following Warnings:

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Below two-engine inoperative air minimum control speed it

may be necessary to reduce power on the opposite engine
to help maintain directional control.
A go-around should not be attempted if airspeed is below
two-engine inoperative air minimum control speed.

5.11. On page 3-51, under Go-around procedure with one or two engines in-
operative, the following Warning is included:
The use of 5 degrees of bank away from the inoperative en-
gine is necessary to maintain directional control when
power is applied during go-around. Attempting to fly with
wings level increases minimum control by as much as 20
knots. Go-around with two-engines inoperative should be
avoided unless absolutely necessary. Every precaution
should be taken so as not to let a situation develop that ne-
cessitates a go-around under these conditions. Descents
below safe, comfortable altitudes and airspeeds should not
be made until absolutely assured of landing.

and the following procedure:

Begin the 'go-around' at or above air minimum control speed.

Advance the throttles for all operating engines to maximum power as

directional control will permit. Power applied to the asymmetrical en-
gines will depend on the airspeed of the airplane at initiation of 'go-
around'.

and the following Warning:

Two-engine minimum control speed must be obtained as
soon as possible after initiation of go-around.

5.12. In the Performance Manual, the Air Minimum Control Speeds are
presented in numbers and are explained (page SMP 3-17 etc.). The follow-
ing remarks are included in the explanatory text:
Because of the powerful influence of bank angle on mini-
mum control speed, it is important to maintain a bank an-
gle away from the failed engine;
Reduction of power on the opposite engine will reduce the
yawing tendency caused by the asymmetric thrust and thus
lower the minimum control speeds; however, a sacrifice in
climb performance will result;
The importance of maintaining 5 degrees of bank away
from the failed engines is shown in figure 3-5 (is Figure 1
in this analysis on page 12).

5.13. These were the most important and applicable statements out of the
Flight Manual en Performance Manual for analyzing this accident.

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6. C-130 LOW-SPEED FLYING QUALITIES

6.1. Lockheed, manufacturer of the C-130 Hercules, has issued an already

mentioned publication titled C-130 Low-Speed Flying Qualities. The 3rd
printing is dated October 1992. This document contains text and illustra-
tions that were prepared to provide a better understanding of the low-speed
flying qualities and the minimum control speeds of the C-130 series aircraft
and should be used in addition to the Flight Manual.
The page numbers between parentheses below refer to the pages in the
Lockheed publication. Although there are some incorrect statements in the
publication, the content does provide the readers with a well-documented in-
sight to the flight characteristics of a high-powered airplane after engine
failure end presents several do's and don'ts. The quotes from the publication
were supplemented by additional remarks by the author of this analysis.

6.2. The minimum control speeds contained in the Flight Manual are in-
tended to preclude operation of the aircraft below speeds at which a sudden
loss of engine thrust or the reduction of control capability could produce an
uncontrollable situation with potentially catastrophic consequences (page 2).

6.3. Air minimum control speed (VMCA) is defined as the lowest airspeed at
which it is possible to maintain control of the airplane after the (sudden) loss
of thrust of an engine or while an engine is inoperative (page 6), whichever
is highest. VMCA is determined during flight-testing while engine #1 is
(made) inoperative, the center of gravity is aft, the weight is as low as possi-
ble, the rudder deflection is either maximum or up to a control force of 180
lb and the thrust of the opposite engine is maximum. This configuration, be-
sides other factors, provides the highest, worst case VMCA. In addition, dur-
ing the test straight flight is maintained while the bank angle is 5 degrees
away from the inoperative engine. As illustrated in Figure 1, any other bank
angle results in a higher actual VMCA. Hence, the VMCA listed in the Flight
manual is valid only during straight flight while a bank angle is maintained 5
degrees away from the inoperative engine (and the thrust of the opposite en-
gine is maximum takeoff). Any other bank angle increases VMCA to a value
higher than the Flight Manual listed VMCA. Although VMCA is determined
while engine #1 is (made) inoperative, it applies and should be used after
failure of any of the engines.

6.4. If an engine fails when the airspeed is higher than the Flight Manual
published VMCA, then less rudder deflection is required than maximum to
maintain straight flight. If however, an engine fails while the airspeed is be-
low VMCA, then the aerodynamic forces generated by the vertical tail and
rudder are not high enough to maintain straight flight. The airplane deviates
from its intended heading and cannot be controlled anymore. If the altitude
is low, this can lead to a catastrophe, like this accident.
Maintaining the airspeed above the Flight Manual listed VMCA and maintain-
ing straight flight while banking 5 degrees away from the inoperative engine
ensures controlled flight following an engine failure.
Of course, the total thrust generated by the remaining engines is less then
maximum, which affects performance. If more engines are inoperative, the
remaining thrust could not be adequate to maintain altitude (page 6).

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6.5. The asymmetric power condition following an engine failure generates

yawing and rolling moments that must be balanced either by reducing thrust
on the opposite engine or by using the aerodynamic flight controls: rudder,
ailerons and elevator. These controls are however only effective enough if
the airspeed is higher than VMCA.
During takeoff and go-around, the reduction of thrust on the opposite engine
(§ 5.11second bullet above) could lead to the loss of climb performance.
Then only aerodynamic control is available for which the airspeed needs to
be high enough. If not a bank angle of 5 degrees is maintained away from
the inoperative engine, VMCA is at least 10 kt higher than the VMCA that is
listed in the Performance Manual (Figure 1 below).
Because of the powerful influence of bank angle on VMCA, it is extremely
important to maintain a bank angle away from the failed engine (page 14).

6.6. Go-arounds are best accomplished by initiating the maneuver as early in

the approach as the need becomes evident. The best procedure is:
(1) engines to full takeoff power;
(2) flaps 50%;
(3) continue down the glides lope, while airspeed is increased at least
to VMCA for 50% flaps.

Once VMCA1 (or VMCA2 if one engine is already inoperative) has been at-
tained, the climb out can be initiated (page 34).

If the altitude is too low for the aforementioned procedure (as was the case
on Eindhoven) then the flight crew must be particularly alert as the throttles
are brought up toward takeoff thrust. Slow response of one or more engines
can lead to the loss of control if the situation is not recognized and if correc-
tive action is not immediately taken (page 34).

6.7. If at any time during the go-around, the pilot does not have both perfor-
mance and control margins, then the pilot should immediately pull back the
remaining engines and land straight ahead. An off-runway landing under
positive control is preferable to ground impact out of control (page 34).
Controllability without climbing capability is not desirable; but uncontrolla-
bility is even worse (page 35).

6.8. So far, the quotes out of the Lockheed booklet. Please also refer to the
report Airplane Control after Engine Failure by AvioConsult that is down-
loadable for free from website www.avioconsult.com and in which almost
all there is to know about VMCA is presented, including improved takeoff and
go-around procedures.

7. ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

7.1. The information in the paragraphs above is presented to gain an appreci-

ation for the many directions, procedures, Warnings & Cautions for the
flight crew to work with during the execution of flights and during handling
an engine failure. Lockheed wrote a lot about, and issued many warnings
for, dangerous situations that might occur after the failure of one or more of

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the engines. The C-130 should be handled by properly trained flight crew
using extreme care before and after engine failure, because of the powerful
engines.
In this chapter, the accident at Eindhoven Airbase is analyzed using the air-
plane and flight data presented before.

7.2. Assumed is that the approach to the runway in use was flown in accor-
dance with the normal procedures and that there were no control problems
until the bird hits occurred. The applicable VMCA's for the landing weight
and runway altitude should have been looked up in the Performance Manual
and recorded on the C-130 Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) Card prior to
the approach. This TOLD card is to be clipped in the direct view of the pi-
lots in order to be able to read the required data quickly as it becomes neces-
sary. The speeds for the approach under the weather conditions and aircraft
configuration at the time of the accident, as determined from the Perfor-
mance Manual, are presented in Table 2. The required approach speed
was 118 kt, the threshold speed 108 kt and the touchdown speed 97 kt. At
the instant of the bird hits, the airplane was passing the runway threshold, so
the airspeed must have been close to 97 kt.

7.3. According to the Report, the #3 propeller was feathered. It did not be-
come clear from the Report whether engines #1 and #2 quit first due to the
birds hitting the engines and that engine #3 was subsequently shut down by
the crew, or that engine #3 was already shut down before the bird hit, proba-
bly already before or during the approach. The answer is as follows.
If engines #1 and #2 quit first following the bird ingestion, and engines #3
and #4 generated full thrust for initiating the go-around, then the actual VMCA
would have been at least 134 kt (VMCA2), the minimum control speed for two
engines inoperative on the same wing, provided the bank angle was 5 de-
grees away from the failed engines. If this bank angle was not attained, then
the actual VMCA2 for a gross weight of 98,000 lb must have been almost 17 kt
higher than the value that is listed in the Performance Manual, in this case
approximately 150 kt, see Figure 1 below, which is copied from the C-130
Performance Manual SMP 777, and which also is used in the Lockheed pub-
lication that was presented in Chapter 6 above.
The actual airspeed however, must have been between close to 97 kt. The
consequence of the big difference between this speed and VMCA2 would have
been that control would be lost immediately following the failure of engines
#1 and #2 and that abrupt yawing and rolling moments to the left would have
caused the airplane to impact the ground a lot quicker than actually hap-
pened during this accident. The remaining flight time following the failure
of engines #1 and #2 was 12 seconds. No vigorous rolling motions oc-
curred; the left wing tip touched the ground at approximately 190 m from the
runway centerline.

7.4. If engine #3 was shut down and the remaining engines were all generat-
ing maximum thrust for the go-around, then the minimum control speed to
be observed was 103 kt, provided the other conditions, such as a 5 degrees
bank angle away from the failed engine ( in this case to the left), are com-
plied with. If however the wings are maintained level, then the actual VMCA
at 98,000 lb gross weight is nearly 10 kt higher than the VMCA that is listed in
the Performance Manual (see Figure 1 below). Then the minimum control
speed is 103 + 10 = 113 kt, instead of 103 kt. Because engine #3 is an in-

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ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN AVIOCONSULT

board engine on the less critical right hand side, the actual VMCA was most
probably lower (safer), and almost equal to the touchdown speed (97 kt).
The airspeed was indeed not much lower than the actual VMCA, which can be
concluded from the very slow increase of banking to the left and the path
that the airplane flew in the 12 seconds after the bird hit.
40

30

Increase of VMCA (knots)

20

10

VMCA from FM
0

-10
80 100 120 140 160
Actual weight (x 1,000 lb)

Legend (order as in figure):

TEI, 5° bank into bad engine
OEI, 5° bank into bad engine
TEI, 0° bank (wings level)
OEI, 0° bank (wings level)
OEI, 5° bank into good engine

Figure 1. Effect of bank angle and weight on VMCA

7.5. Therefore it is likely that engine #3 was shut down by the crew before
engines #1 and #2 were ingested by birds and quit operating.

7.6. If engines fail while the power setting of all engines is low, as is the
case during a normal approach, then of course no control problems occur.

7.7. The flight crew decided to go-around after observing birds and follow-
ing the intentional shutdown of engine #3 while the airspeed was between
close to 97 kt. In accordance with the Flight Manual (page 3-51, 3-12) how-
ever, the airspeed for initiating a go-around needs to be at least VMCA2, in this
case 134 kt as should have been listed on the Takeoff and Landing Data
Card. In other words, if a go-around should become necessary when the air-
speed is as low as the threshold or touchdown speed, whether engine(s) have
failed or not, the airspeed has to be increased first using operating symme-
trical engines before commencing the climb. This procedure guarantees con-
trollability in case an(other) engine would fail after moving the throttles for-
ward. If it is not possible to accelerate to VMCA2, in this case 134 kt, first,
then a go-around may just not be initiated and the airplane is committed to
land. See the corresponding Warnings in § 5.10 and § 5.11 above and the
remarks by Lockheed as presented in § 6.7.

7.8. The bird ingestion caused engines #1 and #2 to quit, leaving only engine
#4 operating at high thrust. For the distribution of forces and moments on

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AVIOCONSULT ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN

the airplane, it was favorable that engine #3 was already off when #1 and #2
quit (§ 7.3). The response of the airplane was therefore not as vigorous as
would have been the case if both engines #3 and #4 would have been operat-
ing at high thrust. The moments around the yaw axis, which are most rele-
vant for the magnitude of VMCA, now were as if only engine #1 failed, be-
cause the symmetrical engines #2 and #3 were off and did not contribute to
the yawing moments (nor to the rolling moments). The minimum control
speed with engines #1, #2 and #3 inoperative would, according to the Per-
formance Manual, have been approximately 103 kt, provided the bank angle
was 5 degrees into the operating engine #4. This banking was opposite of
the bank angle that the pilots would have had to apply after shutting down
engine #3 and while advancing the throttle. It the wings were kept level, the
actual VMCA was 10 kt higher or 113 kt, as was explained in § 7.3 above.

7.9. The yawing and banking motions under influence of the thrust of engine
#4 only could obviously not be avoided, despite the without any doubt ap-
plied yaw and roll controls against by the pilots. These are indications that
the airspeed was (slightly) below the actual minimum control speed. The
only way out, as described by Lockheed in the Flight Manual, Performance
Manual and in the publication mentioned before is to reduce thrust on the
asymmetrical engine, in this case #4, as much as possible for the controls to
become effective again. But since only engine #4 was operating, the per-
formance was most probably already insufficient to achieve a climb. Clos-
ing the throttles and landing with the wings level (in the dirt) was in this case
the only option. Please refer to the statement by Lockheed as presented in §
6.7 above. A controlled wings-level landing is preferable above an uncon-
trolled landing with a wing tip hitting the ground first, as happened during
this accident.

7.10. Another indication for the fact that the airspeed was slightly below
minimum control speed VMCA1 was the small bank angle that the airplane
had at the first impact with the ground, given the small distance between the
imprint of wingtip and that of both engine #1 and the left pylon tank. If the
airspeed would have been much lower than the actual VMCA, then the roll
rate would have been higher and the bank angle would have been greater in
the remaining flight time. Then, after the wingtip would have contacted the
ground first, the nose of the airplane would have hit the ground next and not
propeller #1 and the left pylon tank.

7.11. The thrust of one engine is not high enough to establish a positive
climb; the Performance Manual does not present data on this configuration.
Therefore, following the loss of thrust of three engines at an altitude of just a
few feet, the airplane was committed to land. The pilots should have closed
the throttles and land straight ahead. If engine #3 was indeed already shut
down before or during the approach, then the pilots should have realized that
the airspeed for initiating a go-around should have been increased to VMCA2,
in this case 134 kt, first. If this is not possible because of the low altitude or
number of failed engines, the airplane is committed to land.

7.12. The pilots initiated a go-around at an airspeed way below the Flight
Manual-prescribed go-around speed VMCA2, while it was impossible to acce-
lerate to this speed using symmetrical thrust first.

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7.13. It is possible to simulate the course of events during flight at a safe alti-
tude in order to confirm this analysis, provided it is performed or supervised
by an experimental test pilot or a flight-test engineer, because they know
how to determine VMCA and its real value. A flight simulator should not be
used, because the low speed flying qualities while one or more engines are
inoperative might not be reliable enough to draw the right conclusions.

8. CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT

8.1. The main cause of the accident was the initiation of a go-around at a
much too low airspeed and its continuation following the failure of two en-
gines. The manufacturer prescribes that the safe speed for performing a go-
around is always VMCA2, in this case 134 kt. When the pilots initiated the go-
around, the airspeed was close to 97 kt, meaning that the appropriate warn-
ings by the airplane manufacturer, that a go-around should not be initiated
unless the airspeed is increased to VMCA2 first, were disregarded.
The go-around speed (VMCA2) is prescribed in the Flight Manual because the
failure of both engines on one side is anticipated, which tragically indeed
happened during this accident. If the airspeed during the approach is below
VMCA2 and acceleration to VMCA2 is not possible by exchanging altitude for
speed, or by increasing the airspeed using symmetrical thrust of the remain-
ing engines, then a go-around may not be performed, even if there are no
birds, and the landing must be continued (see §5.10 and § 5.11). The air-
plane was committed to land.

8.2. After the bird ingestion, three of the four engines were off, but the dis-
tribution of yawing forces and moments on the airplane was as if only engine
#1 had stopped. Only engine #4 was generating maximum thrust leading to
an actual minimum control speed of 103 kt, or 113 kt if the required 5 de-
grees of bank were not maintained but the wings were kept level instead, and
not 134 kt (VMCA2). The used bank angle is unknown. Because of the fact
that the longitudinal axis of the airplane could not be maintained at runway
heading, but that the heading unintentionally changed to the left, the airspeed
must have been lower than the actual VMCA1 (103 kt) and therefore certainly
way too low for initiating a go-around.

8.3. If the thrust of engine #4 would have been reduced to recover controlla-
bility, as the Flight Manual prescribes, even if that would have been done if
the Hercules was away from the runway above the grass, the accident could
have been prevented, although the airplane would have suffered damage.
This is an emergency procedure for which the Flight Manual presents nu-
merous directions (§ 5.5, 5.7) and that are also discussed in the Lockheed
publication presented above (§ 6). A cause of the accident also is not reduc-
ing the thrust of engine #4.

8.4. The decision to initiate a go-around at a way too low speed, but also to
not reduce the thrust on engine #4 as the nose of the airplane started to divert
from the runway centerline, indicating out of control, show that the flight
crew was unfamiliar or inexperienced with the prescribed procedures, Warn-
ings and explanatory material on flight at low speed and with an inoperative
engine. This might be caused by inadequate flight crew training. The flight

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AVIOCONSULT ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN

crew, without doubt, had access to the manuals and publications that were
mentioned and used in this analysis at their home base and/ or in the air-
plane.

8.5. Contrary to the conclusions of the accident investigation committee and

the Advisory Council for Airplane Accidents of the Minister of Defense, the
accident was not unavoidable because of the loss of engine thrust in combi-
nation with the landing speed that led to the loss of control, but the accident
was caused by initiating a go-around at an airspeed approximately 37 kt be-
low the speed that the Flight Manual prescribes to initiate a go-around, even
if all engines would have been operating. At this low speed, the thrust on
engine #4, after #1 and #2 were ingested by birds, was maintained rendering
the airplane out of control after which it crashed.
The flight crew did not apply the procedures that are prescribed in the Flight
Manual for performing a go-around.

9. PREVENTIVE MEASURES

9.1. The Advisory Council for Airplane Accidents of the Minister of De-
fense did not order, or recommend improving the theoretical and practical
training of (Hercules) pilots for flight at low speed with an inoperative en-
gine. This analysis showed that this is absolutely required to prevent engine
failure related accidents from happening again.

9.2. The C-130 Hercules is a difficult to handle airplane after engine failure
and should not be the first airplane type for pilots who only have experience
on single-engine airplanes or helicopters and hence, have limited experience
on multi-engine airplanes. The requirements for Hercules crews should be
adapted to the degree of complexity of the airplane.

9.3. The author of this analysis published a number of analyses of similar

accidents, and wrote an extensive report and papers on the control of multi-
engine airplanes after engine failure. This report is referred to in the next
list. ■

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ANALYSIS ACCIDENT C-130H ON AIRBASE EINDHOVEN AVIOCONSULT

LIST OF REFERED DOCUMENTS

Accident investigation Report Accident on Airbase Eindhoven, The Netherlands, on 15

July 1996, with a Lockheed C-130 Hercules, registration
CH-06, of the Belgian Air Force. Report by the Belgian
en Netherlands Air Forces, dated 3 October 1996 (in
Dutch language)

Final Report 01-97 The Hague, March 1997, Advisory Council for Airplane
Accidents of the Minister of Defense

FM 382T-50F Flight Manual of C-130H-30, being the long-body ver-

sion of the C-130H as is in use with the Royal Nether-
lands Air Force

SMP 777 Flight Manual/Performance Manual for all C-130 Her-

cules versions

C-130 Low-Speed Flying Qualities Publication of Lockheed, 3rd printing, October 1992

Veilig Vliegen met een uitgevallen motor Article in the Dutch language by Lt-Col Harry Horlings
in flight safety magazine 'Veilig Vliegen' of the Royal
Netherlands Air Force, November 1999.

Airplane Control after Engine Failure A report by Harry Horlings, AvioConsult, June 2005,
downloadable from website www.avioconsult.com.

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