Rushali Saha

The Elusive Quest for Stability

in US-China Relations

Rushali Saha

Tensions between the United States and China are rapidly escalating; and with
a bipartisan consensus emerging in Washington that Beijing’s expansionist
agenda needs to be checked, it is likely that the confrontational undertone
in bilateral relations will remain. No country will remain unscathed when
two of the world’s largest nuclear armed countries engage in unabated
competition in a globalised world. This paper traces the evolution of US-
China relations to identify the underlying dynamics which determine the
course of their bilateral relations.
Over the years, both sides have developed a pragmatic awareness of the
bilateral issues which have plagued their relationship and have even tried to
address them. However, fundamental differences and disagreement continue
to persist due to the inherent instability in bilateral ties. The paper begins
by outlining the historic origins of their bilateral relations which reveals the
long history of interactions both countries share, dating back to the early 18th
century. This is followed by an inquiry into the nature of relations during the
Cold War years and how the establishment of Communist China changed
the course of bilateral relations forever. It assesses the superficial nature of
rapprochement during the “honeymoon” phase in bilateral relations and
reveals that both countries only came together over convergence in their
strategic motives—that is, to counter the Soviet Union. By analysing the

Ms. Rushali Saha is Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

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The United States and domestic and international context in which

China share a wide- the Shanghai Communiqué was signed, the
ranging, pragmatic, paper shows how it fails to provide a durable
often mutually foundation for bilateral relations. In the post-
beneficial relationship Cold War period, the fundamental rationale
which is a result of for bilateral relations changed in response to
interactions which the changed balance of power equations at
date back to before the international level. Based on the analysis
the establishment of of the evolution of bilateral ties, the paper
Communist China in concludes that their bilateral relationship can
1949. be characterised as an “elusive search for a
common strategic purpose to temporarily
overcome fundamental differences in the absence of a solid foundation.”
It shows how, due to the lack of a common framework—bilateral relations
have depended heavily on shared perceptions of a common enemy, first the
Soviet Union, then terrorism—and in the absence of such an enemy, relations
have spiralled downwards.

Historical and Cultural Context

The United States and China share a wide-ranging, pragmatic, often mutually
beneficial relationship which is a result of interactions which date back to
before the establishment of Communist China in 1949. Historical records
show the first American commercial vessel engaged directly in trade with
China. Empress of China arrived in Guangzhou in August 1784.1 China had
already been trading with a range of Western European nations from roughly
1700 and instituted the Canton-Macao system in 1760 to control European
trade in China. The essence of the system was hierarchical subordination
of Europeans to the Qing dynasty which maintained no direct contact with
the foreigners but preferred to give orders via licensed Chinese monopolists
(collectively called Cohong) and imperial Chinese officials. The Americans
joined this system in 1784 but were able to reap benefits only after the
1. US Department of State, “Chronology of U.S.-China Relations, 1784-2000”, at https://history.
state.gov/countries/issues/china-us-relations. Accessed on: December 11, 2020.

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dissolution of the British East India company The Canton system

in 1834—which ended the Anglo-Chinese ended with the
guild which had come up to prevent entry of signing of the Treaty
newer English and American private traders. of Nanking which
The Canton system ended with the signing marked China’s defeat
of the Treaty of Nanking which marked China’s to the British in the
defeat to the British in the Opium Wars. Under Opium Wars. Under
the terms of the treaty, British merchants were the terms of the treaty,
permitted to carry out unrestricted trade at British merchants were
Quangchow, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo, and permitted to carry out
Shanghai ports, instead of just Canton. British unrestricted trade.
subjects were also granted residency right to
carry out their mercantile pursuits. The British supplementary Treaty of
Bogue signed in 1843 granted Britain unconditional Most Favoured Nation
(MFN) status, which meant that Britain would be granted any privileges
being extended to any other foreign countries. Following this, American
merchants also demanded that they be put on “the same footing as the
merchants of the nation most favoured.”2 The Treaty of Wangxia, the first
agreement between the United States of America and the Qing Empire—
signed in 1844—achieved this as America acquired many of the favourable
terms awarded to the British, including the MFN status. The five treaty
ports were opened to American citizens who could reside and trade from
there and extraterritoriality for US citizens was assured. In modern Chinese
discourse, these treaties are referred to as bupingdeng tiaoyue, or “the unequal
treaties”, by portraying them as unfairly disadvantageous to the Chinese at
the expense of the ‘foreigners’.3
A closer investigation into such a narrative reveals that it is intricately
linked to the CCP’s efforts to evoke nationalism, achieved by constructing
the West as the imperial enemy.4 It fails to capture the fact that America’s
2. Earl H. Prichard, “The Origins of the Most-Favored-Nation and the Open Door Policies in
China”, in The Far Eastern Quarterly 1, no. 2 (1942): 161.
3. Dong Wang, “The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China,” in Pacific Affairs, University
of British Columbia, vol. 76, no. 3, no. (2003), pp. 399-425.
4. Ibid.

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relations with China were not one-sided. In 1868, China and the United States
signed the Burlingame-Seward Treaty which removed many restrictions on
Chinese migrants entering the United States while also guaranteeing that
America would not interfere in China’s internal affairs.5 Between 1852 and
1888, roughly 300,000 Chinese entered the United States “in an attempt to
flee political instability or in search for economic opportunities.”6 Grounded
in mutual respect, this treaty undoubtedly represented a high point in
bilateral relations which was soon marred by the racial hostility faced by the
Chinese in America. The state and national governments in America legally
institutionalised this discrimination by passing Chinese exclusion laws, such
as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which restricted the legal rights of
Chinese residents in America.
Until 1899, it was the treaty system which dictated America’s relations
with China. It was when only Japan defeated China in 1895, and multiple
powers started claiming dominance in China, that America articulated an
official “open door” policy to govern relations with China. Through this
policy, America officially formalised the MFN principle—there would be no
discrimination against foreign trade and investment—while assuring China’s
territorial integrity is not compromised.7 The signing of the nine-power treaty
at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 marked the “internationalisation
of the U.S. Open door policy.”8 Subsequently when Japan tried to expand
its empire against the MFN principle, the US condemned this occupation
and did not recognise any agreement between the Japanese and the Chinese
which violated US interests in the region. The Lytton commission set up by
5. US Department of State, “The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 1868”, Office of the
Historian, n.d., at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-
treaty#:~:text=China%20and%20the%20United%20States,Treaty%20of%20Tianjin%20of%20
1858. Accessed on December 11, 2020.
6. Angela Zhang, “19th Century Chinese Exclusion and the U.S.-China Relationship Today,” in
China-US Focus, June 7, 2020, at https://www.chinausfocus.com/society-culture/19th-century-
chinese-exclusion-and-the-us-china-relationship-today. Accessed on December 11, 2020.
7. US Department of State, “Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China, 1899-1900”,
Office of the Historian, at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/hay-and-china.
Accessed on December 11, 2020.
8. US Department of State, “The Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922”, Office of the
Historian, at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/naval-conference. Accessed on
December 11, 2020.

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the League of Nations—which included an unofficial US delegate—in the

aftermath of the Japanese attack on Manchuria—divided the blame for the
conflict equally between Chinese nationalism and Japanese militarism, but
did not recognise the new state of Manchukuo, resulting in the Japanese
walking out of the League.9
During the inter-war years, domestically China was divided in a power
struggle between the Nationalist Party and Chinese Communist Party.
Following the Wuchang uprising, the Qing dynasty was overthrown by the
National People’s Party, or the Kuomintang (KMT), which officially established
the Republic of China. The US was the first nation to formally recognise the
Nationalist Government in 1928 by signing an agreement with the KMT
government granting it full tariff autonomy.10 Washington even extended
financial aid and assistance to the Nationalist government’s rural reconstruction
efforts, and provided a $25 million credit to the Nationalist regime to purchase
military supplies, which in 1940 was extended to $100 million.11 Interestingly,
Washington even made official contact with the communists through the Dixie
Mission—a group of US liaison officers—who arrived at communist base
camp at Yanan in 1944 to “to explore the most effective means of assisting the
Communists to increase the value of their war effort”.12 The communist leaders
welcomed the mission and were particularly fascinated by the state-of-the-art-
demolition supplies they had and were eager to obtain them, but arming the
communists was beyond the scope of the mission. Nevertheless US military
experts in the mission did teach them new guerrilla warfare techniques.

Cold War and the Establishment of People’s Republic of

China
Many in the US State Department Office of Chinese Affairs, serving
ambassadors in China and even Joseph W. Stilwell, who led the US
9. US Department of State, “The Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922”, n. 8.
10. US Department of State, “Chronology of U.S.-China Relations, 1784-2000”, n. 1.
11. US Department of State, “United States Relations with China: Boxer Uprising to Cold War
(1900-1949)”, at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/90689.htm. Accessed on
December 11, 2020.
12. William C. Spracher, “The OSS in Support of the Chinese Communists”, in American Intelligence
Journal, vol. 3, no. 3 (1980), pp. 14-20.

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mission China in World War II, had warned against supporting the corrupt
nationalist government. During World War II, American policy aimed to
make China domestically and economically stable and convert it into a
suitable ally in the region. Policymakers felt that the unification of Chinese
military forces and a single coalition of the Nationalists and Communist
forces would stabilise China. To accomplish this, President Truman sent
General George Marshall to “negotiate a cease fire agreement and form
a united national government.”13 Due to the failure of General Marshall’s
mediation, President Truman decided to send General Wedmeyer—a
supporter of the Nationalist government—to reformulate American policy.
On his recommendation, the US government extended aid to the Nationalist
government—made possible through the provisions of the China Aid Act
of 1948—which was designed to “encourage the Republic of China in
its efforts to maintain the genuine independence and the administrative
integrity of China through a program of assistance based on self-help and
cooperation.”14 The aid excluded any provisions for direct military aid to
the Chinese and was strictly economic aid which would “assist in retarding
the current economic deterioration”15 until the Chinese government could
ensure more stable economic conditions. Despite massive US aid, the
nationalists failed to hold back communist forces and Mao Zedong—the
leader of the communist forces—declared the establishment of Communist
China on October 1, 1949.
The emergence of communist China as the US was bracing itself to adopt
a global anti-communist containment Cold War strategy changed the course
of US-China relations forever. The long-cultivated ties of over 150 years
were “lost” with the subsequent emergence of the Cold War.16 Domestically,
within the US, pressures were mounting over who was responsible for this
loss. Sentiments ran high as the China lobby in US was composed of people
13. US Department of State, “Chronology of U.S.-China Relations, 1784-2000,” n. 1.
14. US Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China”,
vol. VIII”, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v08/ch8. Accessed on
December 11, 2020.
15. Ibid.
16. Zhang Zhongli and Huang Renwei, “China-U.S. Relations: An Historical Perspective on Trends
and Prospects”, in East Asia 16, no. 1-2 (1997), pp. 110-29.

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across the political spectrum—the US public, members of the Congress who

saw Chiang Kai-shek as the symbol of American ideals, and felt America was
responsible for the Kuomintang’s failure in China.17 Within the US Congress
there was strong opposition to the possible recognition of the communist
regime which Senator Knowland described as amounting to a “betrayal of
human liberty in that area of the world”.18 On August 5, 1949—under severe
domestic pressure—the Truman administration released a voluminous
record, running to over 1,000 pages, detailing Nationalist-Communist
relations, reports of the various US missions to China, US economic aid to
China to demonstrate that assistance to the nationalist government had been
“pursued vigorously” but they had “sunk into corruption … reliance on the
United States … to preserve own domestic supremacy.”19 The report also
depicted the Chinese communists as “agents of Soviet imperialism” and
America as the “traditional friend” of the Chinese people which had done
all it could to prevent foreign domination.20 Even before the publication of
the report, there were strong apprehensions within Washington about the
possible impact of it—which were confirmed as the report did evoke harsh
criticism from all quarters alleging that America “betrayed” the Republic of
China.21
Mao Zedong’s early optimism that the US and China could continue their
wartime cooperation even after the end of World War II prove to be short-
lived. Mao was well aware that Communist China would need US economic
assistance and support for international recognition—and even offered to
come to Washington in 1945, to talk in person with President Roosevelt and
establish the terms for a working relationship. He was looking for a cessation
of America’s unqualified commitment to Chiang Kai-shek and American
pressure on the Nationalist government to admit the communists on
17. Jeff Blackwell, “‘The China Lobby’: Influences on U.S.-China Foreign Policy in the Postwar
Period, 1949-1954”, in The Forum, A Journal of History, California Polytechnic State University,
vol. 2, issue 1, Spring (2010), pp. 43-59.
18. Congressional Record, XCV, no. 6 (June 27, 1949), 8406.
19. US Department of State, The China White Paper August 1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1979).
20. Ibid.
21. Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (Harper Collins Publishers, 1974).

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The first (and only) direct acceptable terms to a coalition government.

combat between American But with the failure of Marshall’s
and Chinese ‘soldiers’ mediation efforts, nationalists refusing to
took place during the proposals of a coalition government and
Korean War which lasted Washington’s pro-nationalist position,
from 1950 to 1953. North Mao declared working with “U.S.
Korean forces, on orders imperialists” as a “mistake” from the
from Premier Kim Il-sung, “previous period”.22 Any possibilities of
crossed the ceasefire line diplomatic rapprochement were discarded
between North and South following the publication of the China
Korea on the 38th parallel White papers which Mao denounced as a
and successfully pushed “counter-revolutionary document which
South Korean forces down demonstrates US imperialist intervention
to Pusan in an attempt to in China”23 and launched a nationwide
unify the country. anti-American propaganda campaign
which sought to gain public support for
his anti-US policies.
The first (and only) direct combat between American and Chinese ‘soldiers’
took place during the Korean War which lasted from 1950 to 1953. North Korean
forces, on orders from Premier Kim Il-sung, crossed the ceasefire line between
North and South Korea on the 38th parallel and successfully pushed South
Korean forces down to Pusan in an attempt to unify the country. To push back
North Korean troops, America got involved in the conflict and in a successful
military manoeuvre under the leadership of General MacArthur, North Korean
troops were pushed back to the 38th parallel. This military success convinced
the Americans that they could liberate North Korea and General MacArthur
pushed American military forces all the way up to the border with China.
On October 7, American troops crossed the 38th parallel, and China warned
against American forces moving further up north. To push back American
22. Mao Tse-tung, “Why It Is Necessary to Discuss the White Paper”, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-
tung: Vol. IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969).
23. As quoted in He Di, “The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong’s Perception of the United
States”, in The China Quarterly 137 (March 1994), pp. 146.

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soldiers, China sent thousands of volunteers, The period from 1971 to

and in just two weeks China cleared much 1989 is considered to be
of North Korea and isolated MacArthur’s the “honeymoon” phase
units into three bridgeheads. This brought in US-China relationship.
China and the US to the precipice of war. Major developments took
It was Truman’s pragmatic diplomacy that place during this period,
he denounced MacArthur’s calls to declare a including American
war on China and agreed to a ceasefire on the recognition of communist
North Korean peninsula. Chinese historical China, UN recognition of
accounts of the Korean War emphasises PRC as the official veto
how in a defensive war against American wielding representative,
aggression, communist China stood up to cultural exchanges,
a technologically superior foe and ‘forced’ exchange of high-level
them to sign an armistice.24 However, such visits, etc.
a retelling not only falsely implies that the
United States attacked China, but also ignores the reality that many nations
supported South Korea against North Korea’s abrasive aggression.25 Although
an all-out war in Korea was averted, the possibility of such a war in Taiwan
Strait emerged again when Mao started shelling the offshore islands of Quemoy,
Matsu and Dachen. The United States had committed itself to Taiwan’s
defence under the Sino-American Mutual Defence treaty with Taiwan signed
in 1955. In China, these instances in Korea and Taiwan cemented the budding
American antagonism and in America confirmed the image of ‘Red China’—
an authoritarian closed stated, monolithic in its identity and consumed by a
deep-seated ani-Americanism.

Assessing Sino-American Rapprochement

The period from 1971 to 1989 is considered to be the “honeymoon” phase in
US-China relationship. Major developments took place during this period,
24. Joe Renouard and Woyu Liu, “‘The War to Resist America’: How China Remembers the Korean
War”, in The Diplomat, June 25, 2020, at https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/the-war-to-resist-
america-how-china-remembers-the-korean-war/. Accessed on January 10, 2021.
25. Ibid.

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including American recognition of communist China, UN recognition

of PRC as the official veto wielding representative, cultural exchanges,
exchange of high-level visits, etc. Richard Nixon stunned the nation and
the world when he announced, during a live television and radio broadcast,
his visit to communist China in 1972. During his visit, Mao and Kissinger
signed the Shanghai Communiqué—a historic development, as it marked
the end of 23 years of diplomatic isolation and non-recognition.
With the advantage of historical hindsight, it now appears that this
visit in fact was not stunning but simply an affirmation of the iron rule of
geopolitics—“the enemy of my enemy, is my friend”. The rapprochement
played out against the backdrop of peak superpower rivalry, where the Soviet
Union was America’s primary enemy. Sino-Soviet relations were at an all-
time low, following border clashes between China and the Soviet Union in
1969. Since the mid-1960s deep-seated ideological differences between Mao
and Khrushchev began to reveal themselves, and visible cracks were evident
in the Sino-Soviet bonhomie. For the US, Chinese anxieties presented itself as
a strategic opportunity to pursue normalisation of relations—while pursuing
a détente with the Soviets—thereby putting severe pressure on the Kremlin.
Developments within America, specifically the social unrest caused
by the debacle in Vietnam, also made it imperative to reorient American
foreign policy in Asia. China embraced cooperation with the United States
to counter the military and political pressure from the Soviet Union, and
to get support for the reform and opening up policies being formulated by
Deng Xiaoping. Furthermore, alleviating fears of an imminent US-China war
through establishing healthy ties would allow China to focus on its own
domestic and economic development—which emerged as a necessity after
the ‘Great Leap Forward’ failed to achieve the desired economic results. It is
worth noting that Mao’s US policy during this period of rapprochement was
dictated by the terms set by his military rather than his diplomats.26 Defying
conventional knowledge that Nixon took the first steps towards China,
Michael Pillsbury’s analysis shows how Mao had made several overtures
26. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the
Global Superpower (Griffin, 2016).

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to Washington prior to Nixon’s visit.27 The clearest signal to America that

Mao was ready to engage with the United States was when Mao invited
well-known American journalist and author, Edgar Snow, and circulated a
picture of the two of them for all of China to see.
Rapid progress in ties was visible in the years immediately after the
issuance of the Communiqué as trade grew rapidly, exchanges of short-
term cultural and academic delegations took place, but strains in the
relations became visible from 1976. Here, again, the Soviet consideration
came into play. This time it initially deterred rapprochement as the newly
elected President Carter feared close ties with China would adversely
affect détente with the Soviets, ultimately hampering his primary
objective of achieving a new arms control agreement with Moscow.
As revealed in his memoir, President Carter understood the need to
improve relations with China, but had to do so without “reneging on our
commitment to the well-being of Taiwan and without further affecting
our already strained relations with Soviet Union.”28 Nevertheless, Soviet
activity in the Third World—beginning with the Horn of Africa in 1977
to Afghanistan in 1979—was seen in Washington as “intervention” which
could not be tolerated. The limits of such a “normalisation” was evident
in the stagnant diplomatic relations when the United States adopted a
harder stance on Taiwan under the Ford administration, causing China
to reassess its global strategy.
Kissinger, in his account of the negotiations which led up to the Shanghai
Communiqué, wrote, “China and the United States would find a way to
come together was inevitable given the necessities of the time. It would
have happened sooner or later whatever the leadership in either country.”29
Playing out against the backdrop of Superpower rivalry, evidently the
international context in which normalisation took place had a significant
role in determining the pace and manner of bilateral negotiations. The
27. Ibid.
28. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press,
2013), p. 197.
29. Henry Kissinger, On China (London: Penguin, 2012).

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clearest exposition of this is found in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s own admission

as President Carter’s National Security Advisor, who played a pivotal part
in formulation of the 1979 Communiqué:30

The Soviet dimension [of China policy] was one of those considerations of
which it is sometimes said, “Think of it at all times but speak of it never”. I,
for one, thought about it a great deal, even though I knew that publicly one
… had to make pious noises to the effect that U.S.-Chinese normalisation
had nothing to do with U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

Although the American outreach to China in the 1970s was not intended
to be a joint venture against the Soviets but a means of improving relations
with both countries, the crisis with détente ultimately led to a different kind
of relationship being forged between Beijing and Washington. Mao’s primary
motivation in forming a united front with the US, Japan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey
and Europe was to counter Soviet influence. Therefore, when the Soviet factor
rescinded, Mao shifted to a ‘three world strategy’ where both the United States
and the Soviet Union were declared as enemies, and he called on the Third
World countries to form a united front against both powers.
The strategic convergence over the “Soviet threat” could only last so long
and the “honeymoon” phase in bilateral relations ended. The ascendancy
of Ronald Reagan reopened the Taiwan issue, revealing that despite
“normalisation” this main irritant in bilateral relations was never adequately
addressed. Reagan was one of the most fervent supporters of Taiwan in
American politics, and had even opposed the normalisation of relations.
During his tenure as President he explored options to restore officiality
to American ties with Taipei, which the Chinese refused to tolerate. Deng
demanded more restrictive guidelines on supply of American weapons
to Taiwan and a pledge from Washington not to exceed the level of arms
sale to Taiwan carried out under the Carter administration. After arduous
negotiations, both sides reached an agreement in 1982 where the question
30. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983).

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of arms sale was “not settled” but America agreed to “reduce gradually its
sales of arms to Taiwan”, while Beijing stood its ground on the question of
Taiwan being “China’s internal affair”.

End of Cold War and the Quest for a New Rationale for
Bilateral Relations
A new rationale did emerge in the form of mutual economic interests as
China offered the world’s largest market for overseas investment; while
America provided much needed technology and financial and investment
capital to Beijing. China’s rapid economic and political change triggered
hopes in America that reforms would bring it closer to American ideals
of democracy, private ownership and free markets; however, liberalisation
remained limited and state controlled.31 Meanwhile, in China every time
liberalisation faltered, attacks on bourgeois democracy and racism in
the United States appeared in CCP-controlled newspapers.32 Economic
prospects could temporarily assuage irritants in the bilateral relationship,
but divergences over issues such as the Gulf War—particularly the sale
of Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran which posed a danger to US naval
vessels—did make it difficult to manage economic and strategic issues.
Washington was also uncomfortable with burgeoning ties between Moscow
and Beijing, visible in the Deng-Gorbachev summit in May 1989. Ultimately,
the collapse of the Soviet Union removed altogether the mutual interests
that were holding the two countries together.
Nevertheless, American President, George W. Bush, was determined not to
let Sino-American relations slip back to the pre-normalisation period due to the
Tiananmen Square incident, and sent National Security Advisor, General Brent
Scowcroft, and Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, on a secret trip to
Beijing to engage with Deng Xiaoping directly. Publicly, Bush kept up the rhetoric that
the United States could not have totally normal relations with China until Chinese

31. Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1992).
32. Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2019).

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China sought to deepen authorities “recognise the validity” of the protest

ties with other countries movements but made it clear that he wanted to
around the world, “preserve” what he saw as a relationship which
especially in Asia was “fundamentally important” to the US.33 To
and the Middle East. achieve this, he used his executive powers to
Motivated by its “hide dilute the practical effect of the sanctions, and
your strength, bide you persuaded Congress to provide him flexibility in
time” strategy, China implementing the sanctions.
adopted a largely non- Despite Bush’s attempt to diffuse the
obstructive posture in ideological dimension of the debate on US-
the international arena China relations triggered by the incident, any
which reaped benefits in Western criticism of Beijing’s human rights
the form of removal of record was seen by China as an attempt to
sanctions. conduct “ideological warfare” during the
post-Cold War era.34 Senior party leaders saw
the United States’ “excessive involvement” in Tiananmen as confirming that
the United States had not abandoned its “pernicious objective of undermining
socialism and converting China to capitalism” through attempts to conduct
peaceful evolution against China. Deng squarely blamed Washington for the
current stalemate in relations and placed responsibility on them to “untie” the
knot. Meanwhile, China sought to deepen ties with other countries around
the world, especially in Asia and the Middle East. Motivated by its “hide your
strength, bide you time” strategy, China adopted a largely non-obstructive
posture in the international arena which reaped benefits in the form of removal
of sanctions.
The Tiananmen Square incident completely altered the trajectory US-
China relations had followed until then. Before the massacre, strategic
realism together with a favourable American attitude toward China took

33. As quoted in David Skidmore and William Gates, “After Tiananmen: The Struggle over U.S.
Policy toward China in the Bush Administration”, in Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3
(1997), pp. 514-39.
34. Taifa Yu, “The Conduct of Post-Tiananmen U.S. China Policy: Domestic Constraints, Systemic
Change, and Value Incompatibility”, in Asian Affairs: An American Review 19, no. 4 (1993): pp.
229-47.

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precedence over ideological differences.35 There is little doubt

Now, with domestic public opinion against that one of the
China and increased focus on human rights defining features of
under the Clinton administration, ideological the 21st century has
differences began to resurface. been China’s rise as
Domestically China was embroiled in a a dominant economic
succession struggle over the question of post- force not only in Asia,
Deng Chinese leadership—Deng formally but the world. This
retired in November 1989, but continued has both aided and
to control internal affairs. Despite factional complicated relations
struggle, the Chinese leadership put up a front with the United States.
of unity and stability. The fourth plenum of the
13th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reiterated
commitment to the policies of reform; opening to the outside world “will
continue to be steadfastly carried out as before” and China will continue
to follow an independent, self-reliant and peaceful foreign policy.36 This
was motivated by a sense of insecurity among the Chinese leaders that they
would be the next targets of the West’s “peaceful evolution” strategy which
directly threatens the CCP’s existence. However, unlike the past, this time
China did not adopt an overtly revolutionary ideological struggle against
the West, but rather insisted on the continued need to maintain a peaceful
international environment for its economic modernisation. There was also an
underlying belief that the US would not be able to play a significant role in
the Asia-Pacific region and would face domestic problems in the aftermath
of the end of the Cold War.37 China made a few changes in its foreign policy
approaches to adapt to the changed international situation. It focused on
developing good relations with neighbouring countries and successfully
restored diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore—after 23 years—
followed by Israel and South Korea.

35. Ibid.
36. For the text of the communiqué, see Beijing Review, vo1. 32, no. 27, July 3-9, 1989, pp. 9-10.
37. Qimao Chen, “New Approaches in China’s Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era,” in Asian
Survey 33, no. 3 (March 1993), pp. 237-51.

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China’s Rise in the 21st Century and Its Implications for

US-China Relations
There is little doubt that one of the defining features of the 21st century
has been China’s rise as a dominant economic force not only in Asia,
but the world. This has both aided and complicated relations with the
United States. China’s accession to the WTO stands out as an important
event in Sino-US relations as it marked the completion of 15 years of
lengthy negotiations between the two countries. The underlying belief
in America was that Chinese entry into the WTO would fully integrate
Beijing into the international system, and serve as a check on China’s
communist government while speeding its transition to a liberal market
economy. China made serious concessions reflecting the fact that it was
required to make protocol commitments which substantially exceeded
those made by any other member of the WTO, including those that had
joined since 1995. The Chinese decision to ignore these short-terms costs
was based on the leadership’s assessment of the long-term benefits that
would accrue. Firstly, it would help improve China’s international image
which had been seriously affected by the Tiananmen Square incident.
Moreover, the main focus in China at this stage was on enhancing
comprehensive national power, which was crucial for stability at home
and for regime survival and required integration into the global economy.
Given America’s pre-eminent position in the global economy immediately
in the post-Cold War period, non-confrontational relations with the US
was a prerequisite for global integration. However, the motivation behind
global interdependence must not be overestimated since Beijing viewed
it as a means to advance state interests, which ultimately was centred on
competing values of sovereignty and independence.38 By the end of 2003,
US-China trade was approaching $200 billion while American firms had
invested around $45 billion in China.39
38. Thomas G. Moore, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization”, in Yong Deng and
Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 121-58.
39. Jia Qingguo, “One Administration, Two Voices: US China Policy During Bush’s First Term,” in
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 6, no. 1 (2006), pp. 27-28.

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All was not well on the other fronts of their bilateral relations. Incidents
such as the Chinese detention of a damaged US reconnaissance plane as it
collided with a Chinese jet,40 and President George W. Bush’s somewhat
tougher stance on the Taiwan question, did dampen overall relations.
The “war on terror” campaign ushered a positive upswing in relations.
After the 9/11 attacks, Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin condemned the
terrorists and even promised to cooperate with the United States to combat
terrorism. Under the umbrella of an anti-terrorism agenda, both countries
cooperated in bringing North Korea to the Six Part Talks, and on issues
of nuclear proliferation. Indeed—in the words of President Bush—“in this
moment of opportunity, a common danger is erasing old rivalries.”41 The
United States sought to secure Chinese cooperation in the United Nations for
its efforts, while China saw this as an opportunity to boost its international
credentials as a responsible stakeholder. However, Chinese actions did not
match its symbolic commitment towards the fight against terrorism. Chinese
support for Western counterterrorism activities was made contingent on
Washington acknowledging Uighur political activists as terrorists, while not
compromising on its own activities of weapons proliferation to countries like
Pakistan, despite its links with several terrorist groups.
Despite “war on terror” receding to the background, limited cooperation
continued on issues such as climate change, environmental issues, non-
proliferation, etc. Nevertheless, economic friction over China’s unfair trade
practices soon took centre stage. Bush administration responded to China’s
clear violation of its IPR protection policies by filing a case in the WTO. It
further imposed countervailing duties against subsidised Chinese goods to
oppose its subsidy programmes and market access barriers which violated
WTO regulations. Taiwan re-emerged as the central security issue more
prominently during President Bush’s second term. In America—within the
Bush administration—there were contrary opinions on how to deal with
40. https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/us-plane-in-china-after-it-collides-with-
chinese-jet.html. Accessed on January 10, 2021.
41. “President Delivers State of the Union Address” (January 29, 2002), available at http://
georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. Accessed
on January 10, 2021.

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China’s military and economic expansion in Asia. There were some who
saw China’s modernisation efforts as attempts to dominate Asia and, in turn,
undermine US leadership in the region.42 Then there was the view—chiefly
propagated by US Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick—that China’s
regional and international prominence called for greater US cooperation to
broaden US interests in Asia specifically.43 The National Security Strategy
of 2006 reflects an attempt to accommodate both positions wherein it states,

China encapsulated Asia’s dramatic economic successes, but China’s

transition remains incomplete … China’s leaders … walk the transformative
path of peaceful development. If China keeps this commitment, the
United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and
prosperous … Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right
strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.44

Nevertheless, Hu Jintao focused on sustaining a constructive relationship

with the US to reap full benefits of the “strategic opportunity” in international
affairs seen as advantageous to Chinese national interests. A constructive
relationship would give China greater leverage to pre-empt US action that
could perhaps be detrimental to Chinese interests. But bilateral economic
problems reached their zenith post the 2008 financial crisis. Referring to
the “deeply imbalanced” trade relations, President Obama—speaking in
2009—warned that if problems were not addressed it would put “enormous
strains” on the relationship.45 The long-term implication of the crisis was
the debate it generated about the viability of America’s economic model.

42. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2005 Report to Congress (Washington,
DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005), pp. 143-90.
43. Remarks of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, “Whither China? From Membership to
Responsibility”, New York, National Committee for US-China Relations, September 21, 2005,
at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Sep/22- 290478.html. Accessed on January 10,
2021.
44. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White
House, 2006), at https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/nss2006.pdf. Accessed on January 10, 2021.
45. Simon Denyer and Caren Bohan, “Obama Warns Strains Unless U.S., China Balance Growth”,
Reuters (Thomson Reuters, November 11, 2009), at https://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE5A85AQ20091111. Accessed on January 16, 2021.

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China’s emergence relatively unscathed from the global crisis—whereas

America suffered a steep economic decline—convinced Chinese officials that
they “no longer have to learn from their American counterpart on economic
matters.”46
Under the Obama administration, the American approach was largely
focused on prolonged consultation and dialogue with China on global
responsibility, while trying to preserve American interests and influence, which
were directly threatened by rising China’s power. But the Chinese narrative had
clearly changed to a more assertive, less accommodating posture. In fact, with
Chinese action in the South China Sea, North Korea directly challenged the US
position. Beijing even threatened to stop “investing in U.S. government securities
and to move away from using the US dollar in international transactions.”47
Publicly, they adopted a much more assertive stance on Tibet and Taiwan.
This was a direct expression of Chinese renewed confidence in their credentials
as a global power driven by its steady economic growth and strong political
clout around the world. However, China was still not prepared to risk serious
deterioration in relations with America that could potentially reverse the image
of a responsible stakeholder which it had been nurturing over the years. In
the period leading up to the visit of President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington
for the US-China summit, China toned down its aggressive posture and harsh
rhetoric to pave the way for smooth relations. The summit was fairly successful
and their joint statement reflected both areas of convergence and divergence.
They called for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and criticised
North Korea’s uranium enrichment programme but their persisting differences
on the human rights issue came out strongly in the joint statement.48
President Obama’s first term was focused on building a positive,
cooperative and comprehensive (PCC) relationship with China, so much
46. David L. Shambaugh, in Tangled Titans: The United States and China (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2013), p. 186.
47. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), p. 160.
48. “U.S.-China Joint Statement”, National Archives and Records Administration, January 19,
2011, at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-
statement. Accessed on January 18, 2021.

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so that his administration decoupled China’s human rights issue with

their bilateral economic relations. For the first time, America even accepted
that “the two sides agreed that respecting each other’s core interests is
extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.”49
Such a conciliatory stance encouraged China to act assertively, which led
to a discernible policy adjustment during his second tenure when he faced
heavy pressure to “stand up” against China.
Chinese Premier Xi Jinping was one of the strongest proponents of
building a “new type of great power relations which would be unprecedented
in history and open up the future.”50 This move was at least partially motivated
by Chinese desire to get formal endorsement from the US that China was
now a great power and that relations should be conducted from a position
of equality. It was also a signal to the international community that China
was ready to take on more global responsibility in tune with the reality that
the global power configurations had changed since the end of the Cold War.
The American response to such a proposition was positive, yet cautious,
as the Obama administration had reservations about Beijing’s definition of
“great power.” President Xi’s enthusiasm was reflected in his statements
after his bilateral meeting with President Obama where he spoke of “joint
efforts” to build such a model.51 However, President Obama refrained from
making any reference to such a model and instead reiterated that while
“broad understandings” were laid down, there was “a lot of work” to be
done “down to the specifics”.52 Chinese insistence on respect for each other’s
“core interests”—which meant that the United States had to remain silent on
issues of Taiwan, Tibet and South China Sea—only aggravated Washington’s
suspicion of Chinese vested interests. Moreover, America was concerned
49. Ibid.
50. People’s Daily, Xi Jinping huijian meiguo zongtong guojia anquan shiwu zhuli duonilun (“Xi
Jinping met National Security Advisor to the U.S. President, Thomas Donilon”), available at
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2013-05/28/nw.D110000renmrb_20130528_4-01.
htm. Accessed on January 16, 2021.
51. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the
People’s Republic of China after Bilateral Meeting”, The White House, June 8, 2013, at https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-
president-xi-jinping-peoples-republic-china-. Accessed on January 16, 2021.
52. Ibid.

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about its Asian allies’ responses to closer Under the Trump

US-China relations which could affect US administration, several
standing in the region. Nevertheless, the US developments took place
refrained from outright refusal of the concept which brought US-China
so as to keep open the possibility to cooperate relations to one of their
with Beijing on global issues. Following the lowest points since
election of Donald Trump, Beijing itself shifted rapprochement. From
away from its G-2 rhetoric and adopted a trade wars to a blame
confrontational tone in its relations with the game over the origins
US. Under the Trump administration, several of the COVID-19 virus,
developments took place which brought US- relations only went from
China relations to one of their lowest points bad to worse.
since rapprochement. From trade wars to a
blame game over the origins of the COVID-19 virus, relations only went
from bad to worse. With a bipartisan consensus evolving in Washington
that China’s expansionist agenda needs to be checked, it is likely that the
confrontational undertone in relations is here to stay.

Conclusion
It is clear that domestic and international context are both crucial to
understand the constantly changing dynamics of Sino-US relations. This
brief history of Sino-US relations reveals, that since the establishment of
PRC, they have been strategic competitors locked in a vague relationship
with elements of conflict, coexistence and cooperation—variously described
as ‘congagement’, ‘coopetition’—which bring out the contradictory dual
nature of their relationship.53 Their relationship can be characterised as the
elusive search for a common strategic purpose to temporarily overcome fundamental
differences in the absence of a solid foundation. For example, during the Cold
War, they knew what they were against (the Soviet Union)—as their strategic
interests in combating a common enemy aligned—however, they did not

53. David Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations: from Partners to Competitors,” in

Survival, 42:1, pp. 97-115.

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know what they stood for. Therefore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and the resultant end of the Cold War suddenly left little strategic rationale
for both countries to overcome ideological differences and cooperate
with each other. In fact, with the end of the Cold War and the spread of
democratisation, international human rights gained renewed attention in
foreign policy and proved to be a bone of contention between the US and
China. While a new rationale did emerge in the 1990s—in the form of mutual
economic interests—it failed to provide a durable foundation for what
was being touted as a “constructive strategic partnership”. Old problems
persisted and new problems emerged which continually disrupted stability
in relations.
This raises the question—how effective was the “normalisation process”
initiated by Richard Nixon? The Shanghai Communiqué has become
synonymous with the normalisation process, as it was the first concerted
effort to conduct an “active dialogue” and “seek common ground” or at least
“deconflicted policies”.54 Although it did establish the fundamental principles
which came to guide future relations and have been enriched and distilled in
the course of the long history of interaction between the two countries, the
inherent ambiguity in its terms has adversely affected relations. Undoubtedly,
though the three US-China Communiqués are historic in terms of relatively
stabilising a highly fluctuating relationship, they have failed to serve the
purpose of creating a framework for a fundamental solution to perennial
problems. At the core of their problems lies the fundamental differences
both countries have in their respective world views about the structure and
nature of international relations and security—which makes cooperation
difficult, albeit not impossible. The communiqués reflected the reality of their
time—a common strategic motive that made cooperation possible—but did
not represent a change in either Chinese or American perception of each
other. China’s participation in the strategic triangle consisting of US-Soviet-
PRC was its own relative weakness via-à-vis both the Superpowers, and it

54. Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., “Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics,” in Foreign Policy 104 (1996),
pp. 3-17.

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shifted sides according to its own strategic calculus. In the post-Cold War
period, this scenario changed as Beijing acquired economic muscle and the
international community could not help but take note of China’s development
miracle. Although there were hopes in America that reform would transition
China into a democratic country, the Tiananmen Square massacre of June
1989 rekindled latent Cold War images of China and confirmed its essentially
undemocratic character. This in turn triggered debates in America—was
China the next strategic threat or a market bonanza? George W. Bush tried
to reconcile this by arguing that there was a “moral” basis to remaining
economically engaged with China—that is, to “export the ideas of freedom
and democracy”.55
Chinese perceptions of America are multifaceted and layered, but one of
the fundamental factors governing this perception is the role of nationalistic
historical beliefs that have in turn shaped the structure of Chinese national
identity.56 China’s “century of humiliation” remains central in shaping Chinese
nationalism which continues to influence Chinese perceptions of America as
a threat. There is a sense in China that America continues to belittle China’s
accomplishments and thwart its international reputation and influence, and
is out to “contain” its rise. Due to this mutual suspicion, although there has
been constructive and cooperative engagement on various issues, it has more
often than not been supplemented by contingency planning or hedging.57
Sino-American relations can be described as a form of an anti-systemic
alliance, that is, essentially it was negative, dependent on common perceptions
of the enemy without any common framework. Inevitably, when perceptions

55. “Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut”,
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush (1991, Book I)—
Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New Haven, Connecticut, May 27,
1991, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/html/PPP-1991-book1-
doc-pg565.htm#:~:text=No%20nation%20on%20Earth%20has,will%20inevitably%20come%20
to%20China.&text=That’s%20the%20real%20world%2C%20not%20black%20and%20white.
Accessed on January 16, 2021.
56. Peter Hays Gries et al., “Patriotism, Nationalism and China’s US Policy: Structures and
Consequences of Chinese National Identity”, in The China Quarterly 205 (March 2011): pp. 1-17.
57. Robert Sutter, “The Obama Administration and China: Positive but Fragile Equilibrium”, in
Asian Perspective 33, no. 3 (2009): pp. 81-106.

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of the enemy begin to diverge, the alliance collapses.58 Therefore, when the
Soviet Union collapsed, the relationship collapsed. The War on Terror prove
to be a temporary stabiliser in relations but could not prove to be a long-
term foundation for relations, given its fading importance in US domestic
and foreign policy circles itself. Since then, sudden deteriorations and rapid
recoveries have become a norm in bilateral relations59 which only affirm the
two countries’ efforts to find a stable equilibrium, which has largely failed. The
recent downward spiral in relations therefore follows the historical trajectory
of US-China relations—however, what makes this phase different is the rise
of exclusive, nationalist sentiments in both societies due to which US-China
relations are increasingly being seen in terms of a zero-sum competition
which is shrinking the space for rapid recoveries.

58. The argument is a variation of Westad’s argument of Sino-Soviet relationship being an anti-
systemic alliance, as presented in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of
the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945-1963 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).
59. Yan Xuetong, “The Instability of China-US Relations”, in The Chinese Journal of International
Politics 3 (2010): pp. 263-92.

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