INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

SEMESTR VII
BALLB

INTERPRETATION OF STATUES
 1. Introductory: Meaning, Purpose and Scope of Interpretation
of Statutes; Nature of Statutes and their Classification.

Meaning: interpretation of statues is combination of two words

interpretation and statues.
Interpretation – the action of explaining the meaning of something.
Statues- A written law enacted by the legislature.
Interpretation of statues means the art of finding out the true sense of
an enactment by giving the word of the enactment their natural and
ordinary meaning.
It is the process by which the meaning of a particular legislation can be
ascertained.
What is meant by Interpretation of Statutes?
Out of the three organs of the State, i.e. Legislative, Executive and
Judiciary, interpreting the statutes is primarily concerned with Judiciary.
Being the machinery that puts the laws laid down by legislature into use,
it becomes primary function of Judiciary to interpret the statutes and
ascertain the correct meaning of the provisions of the statutes in their
true spirit as intended by the farmers.
According to Salmond “interpretation or construction is the process by
which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislation through
the medium of the authoritative form in which it is expressed.
Need for Rules of Interpretation of Statutes
The interpretation of statutes is crucial for the legal system because it
ensures consistency, predictability and fairness in applying the law. It
helps establish legal precedents and principles that guide future cases
and provides clarity to individuals, businesses and government entities
regarding their rights, obligations and responsibilities under the law.
The court while deciding the dispute between the parties reach a point
where the same word needs two, two different interpretation and both the
parties prefer the meaning beneficial to them.
At this point of time the court have to decide what was the true intention
of the maker comes into play.
If there is no ambiguity and unequivocal there there is no need for
intrpretation .
Nature and Scope :- Necessity of interpretation would arise only where
the language of a statutory provision is ambiguous, not clear or where two
views are possible or where the provision gives a different
meaning defeating the object of the statues.
Case Law :- R.S Nayak vs. A.R Antulay and unambiguous, it is plainest
duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the word used in
the
provision. The question of construction arise only in the event of an
ambiguity of the plain meaning of the words used in statute would
4:48/10:0g be "self- defeating" CC JL ‫ חר‬More videos Tap

 Classification of statues
What is the Classification of Statutes?
Classification of Statutes can be done based on their duration, nature of
operation, purpose and scope.
Classification of Statutes by Duration
Temporary Statute: A temporary statute is one that specifies a fixed
period of operation and validity within the statute itself. It remains in
effect until the specified time elapses unless repealed earlier. If the
legislature wishes to extend its effect, a new enactment is required. For
example, the Finance Act is a temporary statute, requiring annual
reauthorisation.
Permanent Statute: A permanent statute doesn’t have a predefined
expiration date. However, this doesn’t make the statute unchangeable. It
can be amended or repealed by another act.
Classification of Statutes by Method
Mandatory, Imperative or Obligatory Statute: A mandatory statute
compels the performance of certain actions or dictates that specific things
must be carried out in a particular manner or form. Non-compliance
typically leads to legal consequences.
Directory or Permissive Statute: A directory statute merely provides
guidance or permission for actions without compelling their performance.
In some cases, statutes prescribe conditions or forms that are considered
essential for the regulated action and their omission can render the action
invalid. In other cases, these prescriptions are seen as non-binding and
failure to follow them might result in penalties if any are stipulated by the
statute.
In the case of H.V. Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, it was determined that
mandatory provisions must be strictly adhered to, while substantial
compliance with directory provisions is generally sufficient to meet legal
requirements.
Classification of Statues with Reference to Object
Codifying Statute
A codifying statute is one that aims to comprehensively outline the entire
body of law on a specific subject. It seeks to provide a thorough and
authoritative statement of the key legal rules pertaining to that subject.
This includes existing provisions from various statutes on the subject and
may also incorporate common law principles.
An example is the Bill of Exchange Act of 1882 in England, which codified
laws regarding bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes. Similarly,
the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 in India is a codifying statute that
addresses intestate succession among Hindus.
Consolidating Statute
A consolidating statute consolidates all statutory enactments related to a
particular subject into a single law, making it easier to access and
understand. It brings together existing statutory provisions on the subject,
often with minor modifications.
For example, in England, the Law of Property Act of 1925 consolidated the
acts of 1922 and 1924. In India, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 is
a consolidating statute concerning criminal procedures. Such statutes not
only compile earlier laws but also repeal the earlier acts for the sake of
clarity.
Declaratory Statute
A declaratory statute is one that clarifies and removes doubts or
misunderstandings about the meaning of terms or expressions within the
common law or statutory law. When courts have interpreted an
expression differently from what the legislature intended, a declaratory
statute is passed to set the correct meaning of that expression. In India,
the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 1985, which added explanation 2 to
section 40 of the Income Tax Act of 1961 and the Finance Act of 1987,
which amended the definition of “Owner of house property” in section 27,
are examples of declaratory acts.
It’s important to note that the mere use of the phrase “it is hereby
declared” does not automatically make a statute a declaratory statute. A
declaratory statute typically contains a preamble and uses terms like
“declared” and “enacted” to signal its intent.
Remedial Statute
A remedial statute is a kind of law that offers new help or a new solution.
Its main purpose is to improve how rights are protected and address
problems or errors in the old law. Examples of remedial statutes include
the Maternity Benefits Act of 1961 and the Workmen’s Compensation Act
of 1923. In these laws, you’ll often find the phrase “for remedy whereof”
right before the actual law.
Blackstone, a legal scholar, thought that remedial statutes could either
expand or limit rights. They could expand rights when they made the law
more generous or they could limit rights when they restricted existing
legal rights. In a case called Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi v.
Vishwanath, the court decided that all laws in a welfare state aim to
promote general well-being. Some laws are more responsive to urgent
social needs and have a more direct and noticeable impact on fixing social
problems.
Enabling Statute
An enabling statute is a law that allows something that was previously
forbidden, with or without specific rules on how to do it. It widens the
scope of what’s allowed under common law. An enabling statute makes an
action lawful, even if it wouldn’t be otherwise.
In a case called Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants Association
v. State of Bombay, the court explained that an enabling act not only
permits something to happen but also gives the necessary authority to do
what’s needed to achieve the law’s goal. Any conditions set by an
enabling statute for the public good must be followed because they are
essential. An example is Section 49-A(1) and 49-A(2) of the Advocates Act
of 1961, as amended by Act 21 of 1964.
Disabling Statute
A disabling statute is one that limits or reduces a right granted by
common law. It’s a law that restricts a common law right.
Penal Statute
A penal statute is a law that punishes certain actions or wrongdoings. This
type of law can be in the form of a detailed criminal code with many
sections that define punishments for different wrongs. For example, the
Criminal Procedure Code, the Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act of 1954 and the Arms Act of 1959 are all examples of
penal statutes.
Penalties for breaking these laws can include fines, the loss of property,
imprisonment or even the death penalty. When the law enforces
obedience not through individual lawsuits but by imposing punishments as
commanded by the law, it’s considered a penal statute. Penalties can only
be imposed when the law explicitly states so and any doubts should
benefit the accused.
Taxing Statute
A taxing statute is a law that imposes taxes on income or certain types of
transactions. Examples include income tax, wealth tax, sales tax and gift
tax. These taxes help the government collect money to support public
welfare. However, it’s essential that a statute clearly states that taxes
must be paid and any doubts about this should benefit the person being
taxed.
Explanatory Statute
An explanatory statute is a law that explains another law. It’s created to
fill in gaps or clarify confusing parts of a previous law. An explanatory
statute aims to make the meaning of an expression used in an earlier law
clearer. For instance, in Britain, the Royal Mines Act of 1688 was passed to
encourage the mining of certain base metals. The Royal Mines Act of 1963
was enacted to provide a better explanation of the earlier law.
Amending Statute
An amending statute is a law that adds to or changes the original law to
improve it or better achieve its original purpose. It doesn’t cancel out the
old law; it becomes part of it. Examples include the Direct Taxes
Amendments Act of 1974 and the Land Acquisition (Amendments) Act of
1984.
Repealing Statute
A repealing statute is a law that cancels out an earlier law. It can do this
explicitly by saying so in the statute or implicitly through its language. For
example, the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act of 1956 repealed the
Hyderabad Municipal and Town Committees Act of 1951.
Curative or Validating Statute
A curative or validating statute is one passed to fix problems in a previous
law or to make legal proceedings, documents or actions valid, even if they
didn’t meet the legal requirements. These statutes often include phrases
like “notwithstanding any judgment, decree or court order.” They’re
meant to make previously unlawful actions legal or to overturn court
decisions.
In a case involving Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra and others v. State
of Orissa and others, the Supreme Court of India explained that while
deciding legal rights is a job for the courts, only the legislature can pass
laws to validate illegal actions or laws. However, when the validity of a
validating law is in question, the court must consider three things:
  Whether the law fixes the problems that made the action or law
invalid.
 Whether the legislature had the authority to validate what was
declared invalid before.
 Whether the validation respects the rights guaranteed by the
constitution. A validating law is effective only if the answers to these
three questions are “yes.”

Conclusion
 The classification of statutes refers to the categorisation of laws
based on their distinctive characteristics or purposes. Statutes can
be grouped into various categories depending on their intent, effect
or content. Common classifications include remedial statutes, which
aim to correct legal flaws and penal statutes, which outline
punishments for specific actions.

Unit-2 Internal Aids to Interpretation: Title; Preamble; Headings

and Marginal Notes. External Aids to Interpretation;
Parliamentary History; Stare Decisis (Judicial
Precedents); Dictionaries
Meaning of Internal Aids to Interpretation of Statutes
Internal aids to the interpretation of Statutes refer to the tools or elements
inherent within a statute. These aids allow the court to derive the
statute’s meaning without relying on external references.
By examining the content within the statute, such as specific provisions or
clauses, it becomes possible to interpret its intended meaning.
The following are examples of internal aids that can assist in the
interpretation of a statute:
Titles of Statutes
Within statutes, titles play an essential role in providing reference and a
general understanding of the purpose of the legislation. There are two
types of titles commonly used:
Short Title
The short title of an Act serves as a concise name given to the legislation
for easy reference and identification. It is typically stated in Section 1 of
the Act and includes the year of its enactment.
For example, Section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) states, “This
Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.” Similarly, Section
1 of the Indian Contract Act states, “This Act may be called the Indian
Contract Act, 1872.”
The short title is a convenient way to refer to the Act without mentioning
its full name and details.
Long Title
The long title is included in certain acts to provide a general description of
the objective or purpose of the legislation. It offers an overview of the
intended scope and purpose of the Act. However, it is important to note
that the long title is not considered a conclusive aid for interpreting
statutes.
It does not resolve ambiguities that may arise within the statutory
provisions but rather provides a broad understanding of the Act’s subject
matter.
For instance, the long title of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) states,
“An act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the criminal
procedure.” Similarly, the long title of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
states, “An act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the
procedure of the courts of civil judicature.”
While the long title provides a general idea of the Act’s purpose, it should
not be solely relied upon for interpretation when specific provisions and
other internal aids are available.
Preamble
The preamble of an Act serves as an internal aid to interpretation as it
outlines the main objectives and reasons behind the legislation. When the
language of a provision within an Act is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble generally does not play a significant role. However, if multiple
interpretations are possible, the preamble can assist in ascertaining the
true meaning of the provision.
The preamble is typically located on the first page of the Act, although it is
worth noting that modern acts are often drafted without a preamble,
diminishing its importance.
In the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, the constitutionality of
Section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was challenged on
the grounds of violating Article 14 of the Constitution. This provision
empowered the state government to select specific cases to be tried by
special courts with distinct procedures. The Supreme Court referred to the
preamble of the Act and determined that the state government had the
discretion to choose such cases.
Marginal Notes
Marginal notes, or side notes, are brief explanations placed at the side of
sections within an Act. They express the section’s effect but do not form a
part of the statute. Drafters, rather than legislators, usually insert
marginal notes.
In the past, marginal notes were sometimes considered for interpretation
when the clear meaning of a provision was uncertain. However, according
to the modern view of the court, marginal notes do not play a significant
role as legislators neither insert them nor are they part of the statute
itself. Nevertheless, marginal notes are occasionally referred to when
interpreting the constitution because the constituent assembly creates
them.
In the case of Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the Supreme
Court held that the marginal notes of Article 286, which addresses
restrictions on the imposition of taxes on the sale or purchase of goods,
are considered part of the Constitution of India. Therefore, they could be
relied upon to provide insights into the purpose and meaning of the
article.
While marginal notes may have limited significance in the interpretation
of statutes, they can still offer valuable context in interpreting
constitutional provisions.
Headings
Headings are prefixed to sections or groups of sections within a statute.
Courts have treated these headings as preambles to the corresponding
sections or sets of sections. However, it is important to note that headings
cannot control the plain words of the provision. Headings serve as internal
aids to interpretation of statutes.
Their role is limited to cases where the plain reading of the section allows
for more than one interpretation. In such situations, the court may seek
guidance from the headings to understand the legislative intent.
In the case of Tolley v. Giddings, the interpretation of Section 217 of the
Road Traffic Act was in question. The heading of the provision was
“Miscellaneous and general,” with the subheading “Penalisation of taking
a motor vehicle without authority.” The court held that the headings
clearly explained the legislature’s intention, and therefore, the passenger
could be held liable for an offense.
Illustrations
Illustrations are appended to statute sections to provide examples that
illustrate the law explained in the provision. They manifest the
legislature’s intention and can be referred to in cases of ambiguity or
repugnancy. However, it is emphasised through various judgments that
illustrations do not explain the entire principle contained in the section,
nor do they limit the scope of the section. In case of a conflict between
the section and an illustration, the section will prevail.
For example, Section 378 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) has 16
illustrations.
Explanations
Explanations are inserted in statutes to clarify the meaning of a particular
provision and to remove any doubts that might arise if the explanation
had not been included. The purpose of explanations is to explain the
meaning and intention of the Act, to clarify obscurities or vagueness and
to provide additional support to the objective of the Act.
Hence, explanations also serve as internal aids to interpretation of
statutes.
However, explanations do not expand or curtail the provision’s meaning;
they only aim to remove uncertainty. The court must harmonise the two in
case of a conflict between an explanation and the main section.
For example, Section 108 of the IPC defines the word “abettor,” which has
five explanations attached.
Definition of Interpretation Clause
Definition or interpretation clauses in statutes define certain words used
throughout the statute to avoid the need for repetitive descriptions and to
extend the natural meaning of some words per the statute’s intention.
These clauses also clarify the legislature’s intention regarding using
specific words in the statute and help avoid confusion.
The rule of interpretation regarding definition clauses is that when the
words “means” or “means and includes” are used, the definition is
exhaustive and does not allow for a wider interpretation. However, if the
word “includes” is used, it provides the broadest possible interpretation or
enlarges the word’s ordinary meaning.
However, if applying the definition clause would lead to an absurd result,
the court will not apply such definitions. Additionally, the definition clause
of one statute cannot be used to explain the same word used in another
statute, except in cases of statutes in pari materia (related subjects).
In the case of Mahalaxmi Oils Mills v. State of A.P., the interpretation
of the word “tobacco” was in question. The definition states that tobacco
includes any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured, manufactured or
not, and leaf stalks and stems of the tobacco plant. The Supreme Court
held that the definition was exhaustive and refused to include tobacco
seeds within the definition of tobacco.
Punctuation
Statue punctuation is represented by various symbols such as colons,
semicolons, commas, full stops, dashes, hyphens, brackets and more. In
earlier times, statutes were passed without punctuation, and courts
needed to give more importance to them. However, in modern times,
statutes are passed with punctuation.
The rule of interpretation regarding punctuated provisions is that if the
court encounters repugnancy or ambiguity while interpreting a provision
with punctuation, the court should read the provision as a whole without
attaching significance to the punctuation. If the meaning is clear, it should
be interpreted accordingly.
Schedules
Schedules are included at the end of statutes and provide additional
details, prescribe forms and contain subjects in lists. In case of a conflict
between the schedule and the main body of an act, the main body
prevails. So, Schedules help in internal aid to interpretation.
For example, Article 1 of the constitution states that India shall be a union
of states, and Schedule 1 contains the names of the states along with
their territories.
Saving Clauses
Saving clauses are typically appended in cases of repeal and reenactment
of statutes. They are inserted in the repealing statute to ensure that rights
already established under the repealed enactment are not disturbed, and
new rights are not created. In case of a conflict between the main part of
a statute and a saving clause, the saving clause is rejected.
Provisos
A proviso to a section is presumed to be part of the section and is an
internal aid to the interpretation of statute. It is meant to qualify or
exempt certain provisions, impose mandatory conditions for the
enactment to be workable, serve as optional addenda or become an
integral part of the enactment.
The rule of interpretation regarding provisos is that they cannot nullify the
main enactment’s implications nor expand its scope. Provisos can only be
referred to in case of ambiguity in the section. They must be harmoniously
construed in case of a conflict between the main enactment and a
proviso. However, some jurists argue that the proviso prevails as it
represents the legislature’s latest intention.
For example, Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India is considered a
proviso to Article 16(1) as held in T. Devadasan v. Union of India.
Exceptions
Exceptions are included in statutes to exempt certain matters that would
otherwise fall within the scope of the main provision. The latter should be
relied upon in case of a conflict between an exception and the main
enactment. However, in many cases, exceptions are considered the last
intention of the legislature and may be given aid in the interpretation of
statutes.
For example, Section 300 of the IPC has five exceptions attached to it.
When interpreting statutes, it is crucial to consider punctuation,
schedules, saving clauses, provisos and exceptions in conjunction with
other relevant factors to determine the legislative intent and give effect to
the law.
Difference between Proviso and Exceptions
The main difference between a proviso and an exception lies in their
functions within a statute.
Proviso:
 A proviso is a provision that follows the main enactment or section.
 It serves multiple purposes, including exemption, qualification,
mandatory conditions or optional addenda to the main provision.
 A proviso can modify or alter the operation of the main enactment.
 It is closely connected to and governs the main provision, providing
additional conditions or limitations.
 A proviso is integral to the enactment and must be read and
understood in conjunction with the main provision.
Exception:
 An exception is a provision that exempts certain things or cases
from the scope of the main enactment.
 It operates independently of the main provision.
 An exception creates a carve-out or exclusion from the general rule
stated in the main provision.
 It sets specific circumstances or situations that will not be subject to
the main provision.
 Exceptions are generally self-contained and do not directly impact
the interpretation or application of the main provision.
What are External Aids to the Interpretation of Statutes?
External aids to interpreting statutes are sources of information and
guidance utilised by courts and legal professionals to understand the
meaning and intent behind a particular statute. These aids are external to
the statute’s text and provide supplementary context for its
interpretation.
External aids provide valuable assistance in the interpretation of statutes.
They help resolve uncertainties and fill gaps in the statutory text. The
legislative history, including committee reports, debates and statements
made by lawmakers during the drafting process, is a commonly used
external aid. It provides insights into the statute’s objectives, purpose and
context, assisting in determining the lawmakers’ intent.
Case law is another important external aid. Judicial decisions on related
statutes or similar legal issues can help understand the interpretation
given by courts in previous cases. These precedents serve as a guide for
future interpretations and contribute to the development of legal
principles.
Other external aids include dictionaries, legal treatises and scholarly
articles. Dictionaries help ascertain the ordinary meaning of words used in
a statute. Legal treatises and scholarly articles provide academic analysis
and expert opinions on statutory interpretation, aiding in understanding
complex legal concepts.
Parliamentary History
Parliamentary history is another external aid to the interpretation of
statutes and comprises the original form of statutes presented before the
legislature’s enactment. The ministry responsible for introducing the bill
would have justified its enactment, known as the Statements of Objects
and Reasons, which hold significant importance. Additionally,
Parliamentary History encompasses records of debates held in Parliament,
committee reports, resolutions passed by both houses and any
amendments made to the bill.
Previously, Parliamentary History did not serve as a tool for interpreting
statutes. This perspective originated from the traditional English legal
system and was followed by the Supreme Court of India. However,
subsequent court cases led to a change in this view, including
Parliamentary History as an external aid to interpretation.
In the Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose case, Chief Justice
Patanjali Shastri expressed that the Statements of Objects and Reasons
should not be considered an external aid to interpretation. This was
because these statements are presented during the bill’s processing, and
the bill may undergo several changes during that period, making the
statements subject to amendments.
However, in the case of State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
Justice S. R. Das took the Statements of Objects and Reasons into account
to assess the socio-political and economic context of the introduced bill,
while still acknowledging the view expressed in the Ashwini Kumar case.
In the case of Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, the Supreme Court
referred to a speech by Dr B. R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly
while interpreting Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution. The Court held
that although Parliamentary debate is not binding on the courts, it can be
considered to understand the context, background and legislative intent.
Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances
Historical facts play a crucial role in establishing the context in which a
statute was enacted, providing background information and aiding in
interpretation. This external aid to the interpretation is particularly
significant when applying the Mischief Rule of Interpretation, as outlined
in the case of Heydon. The Mischief Rule seeks to address four key points:
 The state of the law before the enactment of the statute in question.
 The earlier law failed to address the problem or issue (referred to as
“mischief”).
 The remedy provided by the statute in question.
 The rationale behind the remedy.
These points directly correspond to the historical facts surrounding the
statute, reflecting the circumstances in which it was enacted. An example
of the application of the mischief rule can be seen in the case of Bengal
Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, which involved the interpretation of Article
286. The court ruled that a state can impose sales tax only if all sale
elements have a territorial connection, preventing multiple states from
imposing sales tax on the same transaction.
Historical facts are the facts that led to the evolution of a statute. They
can assist judges in uncovering the true nature of the statute, enabling a
more efficient legal process. Any relevant historical facts that contributed
to the development of the statute can be helpful in its interpretation.
 Stare Decisis ( judicial precedent):
Basically it is a doctrine which means "Law made by judges" & it is one of
the major sources of Law which is contributory in nature in the form of
making the new Laws.
It is a decision taken by a Court which will be a benchmark and used for
future reference in decision making by the subordinate Courts while the
legal facts and issues are exactly the same.

In the other word it is something which past decisions help to make future
decisions.

Judgments passed by the higher judiciary are applicable to the same on

the lower judiciary. Which means the judgment passed by the High Court
follows by the Lower Courts, the Supreme Court judgment follows by the
High Courts, Lower Courts & the Supreme Court itself means higher
division bench to lower division bench.

All the subordinate Courts are bound to follow where the legal issues,
facts and circumstances are sufficiently similar.

Meaning & Definition:

Judicial Precedents means in general terms a behavior which is previously
adopted becomes an example or rule for subsequent cases.

For example in the case of Kesavananda Bharati the basic structure

doctrine of the Indian Constitution was propounded which is applicable as
a precedent in the case of Indira Gandhi Vs. Raj Narayan, A Minerva Mills
and other cases where the facts of the case and the circumstances are
subsequently similar.

It may be defined as a decision by a competent Court of justice upon a

disputed point of Law becoming not merely a guide but an authority to be
followed by all the same system until it has been overruled by a superior
Court of justice or by statute.

Enactment & Provisions:

 Judicial Precedents were enacted from 1950 after the making of the
Constitution
 Article 141 of the Indian Constitution talks about decisions of the
Supreme Court.
 Article 225 of the Indian Constitution talks about decisions of High
Courts making them obligatory for their subordinate Courts.

Doctrine of Stare Decisis:

 The doctrine of "Stare Decisis" which means "to stand by what has
been decided
 This means that judges follow the legal principles already
established in earlier cases.
 This ensures consistency in the Law and predictability.
 Its presumptions are based on the hierarchy of the Courts and the
Courts are bound to follow the Court decisions by their chronological
 order. In case of an equivalent court, they have persuasive value
which means they respect the decision but are not bound to follow
it.
Merits of the doctrine of Judicial Precedents:
 It was judge-made Laws. Therefore, they are more practical and
realistic.
 It is about scientific development in Law. It brings logical perfection
in Law in the form of the principles.
 It brings flexibility in the Law. They mold and shape the Law
according to the changed conditions and thus bring flexibility in the
Law.
 Bring certainty in Law.
 Based on customs which have been a general practice in the people
for a long time.
Demerits of the doctrine of Judicial Precedents:
 A one of the great demerits of this doctrine is the development of
Law depends on the incident of motivation.
 Sometimes the conflicting decisions of superior Tribunals throw the
judgment of the lower Courts into the harms of a dilemma.
 There is a possibility of overlooking authorities if we follow the
precedent.
 An extremely erroneous decision was established as Law was not
being brought before the Supreme Court

Dictionaries:
Dictionary use/reference is of great importance and immense value in
interpretation of a statute. Where a word or an expression used in a
statute cannot be understood in common parlance, the courts, while
interpreting the statute may resort to refer dictionaries for its meaning in
common parlance. Therefore, the dictionaries are referred/consulted by
the courts, whenever need arises to find out the ordinary sense of the
words. However, the courts must be very careful while referring the
dictionaries because the dictionary meaning of the word may not be true
at all times in a particular sense. If a word or an expression in an Act has
been defined, there is no need to refer the dictionary to find out its
general meaning. One of the main objects of every dictionary of the
English Language is to give an adequate and comprehensive definition of
every word contained in it. Dictionaries are referred to, not only for
meaning of the word, but also to find out the general use of it.
Unit-3 Rules of Statutory Interpretation: Primary (Basic) Rules;
Secondary (Subsidiary) Rules; Literal Rule; Golden
Rule; Mischief Rule.

 Literal rule of interpretation: The fundamental principle of

interpretation is to assign words their natural original and precise
meaning, provided that the words are clear and consider the purpose of
the statute. This rule states that the provisions should be examined in
their literal sense and given their natural effect. It is also referred to as
the Plain Reading Rule, which means that the provisions should be read as
they are without any addition or substitution of words during
interpretation.

The essence of the literal rule can be summarized as follows:

“The focus should be on what the law says rather than what the law
means.”
However, even when giving such a literal interpretation, the overall
purpose of the statute must be taken into consideration. As quoted by
Viscount Haldane, “If the language used has a natural meaning, we
cannot deviate from that meaning unless, when reading the statute as a
whole, the context directs us to do so.”
In the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P. (2005) 1
SCC 308, it was held that:
“A literal construction should not be denied simply because complying
with it may result in a penalty. The courts should not be overly eager to
find ambiguities or obscurities in plain words.”
To understand the literal rule, the following conditions must be
considered:
 The statute must have a section for interpreting terms, where
special meanings of the terms are provided (i.e., the definition
sections).
 If the statute does not provide specific definitions, technical words
should be given their ordinary technical meanings.
  Words should not be inserted through implications.
 Over time, words may undergo shifts in meaning.
 It should be recognised that words derive significance from their
context.
This rule somewhat restricts the interpretation process and makes it
inflexible in its purest form. Additionally, criticism of this rule stems from
the assumption that words have fixed meanings, which is erroneous, as a
single word may have multiple meanings depending on the different
contexts in which it is used.

Examples of this rule:

R.v.Harris 1836
Where the defendant bites the nose of victim the statues state the offence
was stab or wound. Under the literal rule biting is not stabbing cutting or
wounding. The defendant was proven not guilty.
Bhav Nagar university v. palinana sugar mill pvt ltd
The supreme court observed that the true meaning is to determine n the
basis of what it provided clear language with due regard to the scheme of
law. The scope of the legislation cannot be enlarged when the language of
the provision is unambiguous.
Straughan Singh v. Kedarnath 1944 AlR 126
it has been observed that where the word of a statues are clear and
unambiguous it is the duty of the court of law to give these words their
natural meaning even though such interpretation leads to apparent
anomalies, but where the word are not clear and no light on the question
and issue it is open to the court to put such construction on those word
and would avoid anomalies and gives effect to the intention of the
legislation.
Jugak Kishore Saeeaf v. Raw cotton co.ltd AiR 1955 S.c 376
justice s.p Dass observed that the cardinal riles of construction of statues
is to read the statues literally, that is by giving to the grammatical
meaning if those ever such reading leads to susceptibility of another
meaning the court may adopt the one. But if no alternative construction is
possible the court must adopt the ordinary of literal interpretation. In the
present case the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and
there for there can be no compelling reason for departing from that
golden rule of construction.
In state of hariyan v. bhajan lal
It was held that when the language is plane and clear and unambiguous,
only the plane meaning rule of literal construction adopt so as to avoid
any hard ship or absurdity.

 Golden Rule
Meaning of Golden Rules of Statutory Interpretation
The golden rule of interpretation is an expansion or extension of the literal
rule, allowing judges to deviate from the strict literal meaning of words to
prevent absurd outcomes.
According to the golden rule, when interpreting a statute, the Court must
generally adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used.
The golden rule can be applied in both a narrow and wider sense.
In the narrow approach, the judge employs this rule when the word
used in the statute is ambiguous, meaning it has multiple possible
meanings. It is then up to the judge to choose the most appropriate
meaning in the case context.
In the wider approach, the golden rule is often utilised when there is
only one literal meaning of a word, but using that meaning would lead to
an absurd result. Therefore, the Court may modify the interpretation of
the word to avoid such absurdity.
Significance of the Golden Rules
The golden rule holds significant importance in the field of interpretation.
It imposes a duty upon the Court to give effect to the intended meaning of
the law when following the literal interpretation would lead to absurdity or
defeat the purpose of the enactment. In such cases, the Court may need
to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used in the
law.
However, the Court must exercise caution and not deviate from the
provision of a law that has a reasonably plain and clear meaning on its
face. This means that the Court can only partially redefine or rewrite the
law. The Court must strive to find the intended meaning within the words
used in the statute.
Unless the words of the law are absurd, ambiguous or lack a proper
meaning, it is generally preferable to interpret them based on their
natural and ordinary meaning. This approach ensures consistency and
maintains the integrity of the legislative intent.
Advantages of the Golden Rules of Statutory Interpretation
The golden rule of interpretation allows judges to select the most sensible
meaning when there are multiple possible meanings for words in an Act or
Statute. It respects the words the Parliament chose, except in limited
circumstances where the golden rule is applied.
One of the key benefits of the golden rule is that it provides a way to
address problems that may arise from a strictly literal interpretation. It
offers an alternative interpretation to avoid absurd or repugnant
situations. A notable example is the Re Sigsworth case, where allowing
the son to benefit from his crime would have been unjust, and the golden
rule was used to provide a reasonable decision.
However, one of the significant advantages of the golden rule is that it
allows judges to alter the law by changing the meaning of words in
statutes. This raises concerns about potential encroachment on the
separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature.
Another advantage of the golden rule is that it enables immediate
correction of statute drafting errors. This was demonstrated in the R v
Allen (1872) case, where the Court closed loopholes, aligned the
decision with the intentions of the Parliament and produced a more just
outcome.
Disadvantages of the Golden Rules of Interpretation of Statutes
The golden rule of interpretation needs clear guidelines regarding its
application, making it difficult to predict when it will be used. Its use is
limited and reserved for rare occasions.
The unpredictability of whether courts will apply the golden rule poses
challenges for lawyers and individuals seeking legal advice. It means that
the outcomes of cases can heavily depend on the personal interpretation
of individual judges rather than strictly following the law.
Moreover, what may appear absurd to one judge may not be seen as such
by another. This subjectivity further emphasises the influence of the
judge’s perspective on case outcomes rather than solely relying on the
law itself.
The golden rule may not be helpful if the statute has no inherent
absurdity. For instance, in the case of London and North Eastern
Railway v. Berriman, the widow could not receive compensation
because the statute’s wording did not allow for such circumstances. The
golden rule would not provide a remedy or solution in such cases.
Application of the Golden Rule of Interpretation of Statutes in
India
State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum (1963)
In the case of State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum (1963), the
respondents owned land that the appellant acquired without their
knowledge or presence during the award process. The Collector awarded
compensation, but the respondents later contested the valuation of their
land. The senior subordinate judge rejected their application because it
was beyond the limitation period as per Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act of 1894. The issue was whether the limitation period started from the
day of the sale or from the day the respondents became aware of the
award.
The Supreme Court ruled that for the parties to apply for reference under
Section 18, they must first be aware of the award. Since the parties were
not informed of the award through notice, the limitation period would start
from the date they became aware of the award rather than the date of
compensation. The Court applied the golden rule of interpretation to
modify the provision’s meaning and include the start of the limitation
period from the date of receiving notice of the award.
Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar (1962)
In the case of Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar (1962), the appellant and
his brother were charged with different sections of the Indian Penal
Code for assaulting a person. It was established that the younger brother,
19 at the time of the offence, had no intention to cause harm and was
charged under a less severe section. The appellant argued that since his
younger brother was under 21 years of age at the date of the offence,
Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, should be applied.
The issue before the Court was whether the age of the accused should be
determined on the date of the offence or the date of the guilty verdict.
The Supreme Court ruled that the younger brother’s age was below 21
years at the time of the offence, making him eligible for the benefits
under Section 6 of the Act. The Court applied the golden rule of
interpretation to conclude that the age determination for Section 6 should
be based on the date of the guilty verdict rather than the date of the
offence.
Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. (1940)
In the case of Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.
(1940), Section 154 of the Companies Act 1929 outlined the process for
transferring an old company to a new company, including transferring all
property, rights, liabilities and duties. The appellant, Tom Nokes, had a
service contract with the old company.
After the respondent acquired the old company, the transfer of property
and other obligations took place. However, the appellant was unaware of
the acquisition and continued working for the old company. The appellant
was held liable under Section 4 of the Employers and Workmen Act of
1875 when absent from work. The respondent argued that the transfer of
“property” included the service contract.
The main issue in the case was whether the property transfer
encompassed the existing contract of service between the individual and
the transferee company.
The House of Lords concluded that the benefits of the employee’s contract
with the former company could only be transferred with the employee’s
knowledge and consent. The notice of the amalgamation by either the
transferor or transferee company was deemed essential. Applying the
golden rule of interpretation, the House of Lords emphasised that words
should be given their ordinary meaning. If the legislature intended for
workers to be transferred to the new company without their consent, the
statute would have explicitly stated so. However, such provisions were
absent in this case. Thus, the golden rule was applied to modify the
meaning of “property” by limiting its scope.
Viscount Simon, L.C., reasoned that an interpretation should be avoided if
it renders the legislation futile and fails to achieve its intended purpose.
Applying the golden rule prevented injustice by preserving workers’
consent and shielding them from frivolous penalties, as was the case in
this instance.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial Company
(1967)
In the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial
Company (1967) case, a transport vehicle belonging to the defendant
was found to be carrying a parcel of opium during a routine check by
authorities. The defendant presented an invoice indicating that the parcel
contained crates of apples as the sole item. As per Section 11 of the
Opium Act of 1878, all vehicles transporting contraband articles were to
be impounded and the articles confiscated.
The transport company argued that they did not know the opium present
in their vehicle. The main issue was whether the magistrate was obligated
to confiscate the vehicle based on the wording of Section 11 of the Opium
Act of 1878.
The High Court ruled that it would be unjust to confiscate the vehicle of an
individual who did not know of the presence of opium. Considering that
the statute in question was penal, it should be interpreted in a manner
that does not penalise someone who has not committed an offence. The
word “shall” in “shall be confiscated” was interpreted to mean “may” in
the context of such cases.
Therefore, the golden rule of interpretation was applied to remove the
obligation under Section 11 of the Act. If the literal rule had been followed,
it would have resulted in a grave injustice by penalising an innocent
person.
Lee v. Knapp (1967)
In the case of Lee v. Knapp (1967), the defendant was driving around
the block to demonstrate the ease of driving the company’s new vehicle
to the van driver. Unfortunately, during the demonstration, the van
collided with a parked vehicle. Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act of
1960 states that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident causing
damage to another vehicle must stop and provide their information and
the car’s identification marks.
While the defendant did stop, they failed to provide the required details as
mandated by the Section personally. The main issue was whether “stop”
included stopping for a reasonable period before leaving the accident
scene.
The Court concluded that the defendant did not stop for a reasonable
period and failed to make an effort to search for the owner of the other
vehicle. Furthermore, the defendant’s failure to provide the details
personally violated Section 77(1) of the Act. In this case, the golden rule
of interpretation was applied to interpret the word “stop” more
expansively, including actively searching for the victim.
As a result, the defendant was held liable under Section 77(1) of the Act.
In this case, applying the golden rule broadened the meaning of “stop”. It
emphasised the defendant’s responsibility to search for the victim,
leading to their legal obligation to provide the required information.
Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Limited (1999)
In the case of Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Limited
(1999), the claimant had a longstanding homosexual relationship with the
deceased, who was the original tenant of a flat. Following the tenant’s
death, the claimant sought a statutory tenancy as the deceased’s spouse.
The main issue was whether a homosexual partner could be eligible for a
statutory tenancy on the same grounds as a spouse in a heterosexual
marriage.
The Court ruled that the claimant could not be considered the deceased’s
spouse under the existing law, as the term “spouse” referred specifically
to a “husband or wife” of the deceased. The Court noted that if the
Parliament had intended to include same-sex partners, it would have
explicitly stated so in the legislation.
However, the Court recognised that the meaning of “family” could be
extended to include same-sex partners. Therefore, the appeal was
allowed, granting the claimant the statutory tenancy based on an
interpretation that considered the claimant part of the deceased’s family.
In this case, the golden rule of interpretation was applied to ensure
fairness and justice for homosexual individuals in matters related to family
law. The Court carefully balanced its interpretation to respect the
boundaries between the judiciary and the legislature, avoiding overreach
into legislative territory while still addressing the claimant’s needs and
recognising the evolving understanding of family structures.
State of Mysore v. Sundaram Motor Private Ltd.
In the case of State of Mysore v. Sundaram Motor Private Ltd., the
issue of ambiguity arose in the interpretation of the term “motor vehicle
kept in the state” under Section 3(1) of the Mysore Motor Vehicle Act. It
was determined that the term referred to those vehicles utilising all the
facilities provided by the Mysore state.
Dimakuchi State v. Management 1958
In the case of Dimakuchi State v. Management (AIR) 1958, the
interpretation of the expression “by a person” was crucial under Section
2(k) of the Industrial Dispute Act. The scheme and objective of the act
clarified that “any person” referred to individuals with a direct and
substantial interest in the industry. A stranger or outsider could not be
considered “any person” under the Industrial Disputes Act.
Criticism of the Golden Rule of Interpretation of Statutes
The golden rule of interpretation of statutes, while presenting itself as a
viable alternative to the literal rule, is not without its criticisms and
shortcomings, such as:
 While seemingly an alternative to the literal rule, the golden rule of
interpretation has shortcomings and can lead to tragic results.
 The term “absurdity” used in the golden rule is vague and
subjective, leading to a lack of uniformity in its application.
 Each judge interprets the rule differently, resulting in inconsistent
outcomes and undermining the intended purpose of the rule.
 The literal, golden and mischief rules are different from the
traditional sense, as they rely on judges’ discretion and lack
independent authority.
 There must be a definitive guideline on when to apply the golden
rule, adding uncertainty for lawyers and advisors.
 The golden rule provides an excuse for judges to deviate from the
guidelines and introduce their own biases and personal views into
the interpretation of the law.
 Applying the golden rule depends on the wisdom and integrity of
the judges, which can vary and lead to potential injustices.

Conclusion
When interpreting statutes, clear, unambiguous and ordinary language
should be given effect in order to align with the legislative intent. In cases
where words have multiple meanings, the interpretation should strive for
balance and discretion, avoiding inconsistent or inconvenient outcomes.
Any interpretation leading to injustice or rendering the statute
meaningless and illogical should be avoided.

 The mischief rule

The mischief rule is an interpretive principle that examines the state of
the law before to the enactment of a statute and identifies the specific
problems or shortcomings that the legislation aims to address. This rule of
interpretation is advantageous and provides solutions for the problem or
the harm.

The mischief rule is a legal principle designed to prevent harm and

promote the resolution of legal issues. Occasionally, the mischief rule may
be ineffective, particularly when novel circumstances arise that were not
anticipated by the legislature and fall outside the scope of the act. This
legislation was designed to handle a specific problem. However, if a new
problem arises, it may be necessary to enact additional legislation.

This article discusses the concept of the mischief rule of interpretation, as

well as the pros and cons associated with it. The rule of interpretation has
been addressed in relation to many English and Indian case laws,
exploring its practical application.

Introduction
The mischief rule is a legal principle designed to prevent harm and
promote effective solutions. Occasionally, the mischief rule may be
inadequate in situations where novel circumstances arise, involving issues
that were not anticipated by the legislature and fall outside the scope of
the act. This legislation targeted a specific problem, but if a new problem
arises, a new legislation may be necessary. [1]

Keywords:
Explanation: Interpretation refers to the act of ascribing a clear and
unambiguous meaning to something. Judicial interpretation refers to the
process by which judges explain the intended meaning of words or
phrases found within a statute.

Ambiguous refers to a situation where a statute can be interpreted in

multiple ways and lacks a clear and obvious meaning.

Old / Common law refers to existing laws that have been in place for a
significant period of time. When a new law or act is enacted on a
comparable subject, the existing law is termed old. Furthermore, in this
context, old law refers to laws that have failed to address or give a
solution for a particular problem or issue.

New law: A law enacted after a previous law on a certain subject topic. In
this circumstance, the new law is introduced to rectify the wrongdoing.

Remedy: It is a means by which the harm, injury, or unjust act inflicted on

another can be rectified and the right can be enforced.

Mischief refers to actions that create difficulty and are seen to be bad,
inflicting harm or annoyance. These actions are seen as detrimental to
society and should be addressed and eliminated.

The Mischief rule necessitates that while interpreting a statute, the court
must ascertain the specific problem or harm that the legislature intended
to address through the legislation. This is done by conducting an
extensive investigation into the historical context of the legislation. It is
important to understand that not all legislation is created just to address a
problem. Additionally, it will provide a challenge if the judge in question
lacks a comprehensive understanding of history. [2]

Hart and Sacks outline the method of interpretation by starting with the
interpreter's objective of mentally placing themselves in the position of
the legislative body that passed the law. This involves assuming that the
legislature consisted of rational individuals who were pursuing logical and
justifiable objectives.

Edward Coke stated that when judges are confronted with choices and
uncertainties, they are provided with instructions on how to address them
and interpret the law in consideration of the problem it aims to answer,
and as a means to rectify the problem.

Case laws

1. Heydon's case[3]:
o The case of Heydon is a notable legal precedent that
established the mischief rule as a method for interpreting
statutes.
o Information:
 The Ottery college, a religious establishment, awarded a
tenancy in a property to an individual named Ware and
his offspring. The tenancy has been awarded in
 accordance with the copyhold, which pertains to a
particular form of land tenure wherein the land is held at
the discretion of the lord and in accordance with the
customs of the manor. Additionally, the copyhold
granted to the Wares is a fraction of a greater parcel.
Afterwards, the lot was leased to a person named
Heydon.
 Shortly thereafter, in under a year, the college was
dissolved, along with all other religious colleges, due to
legislation enacted by parliament. The legislation
enacted by the parliament contained a provision that
upheld the legal force of leases issued more than one
year before the enactment of the law.
o Verdict:
 The lease granted to the Wares has been determined to
be legal, but the lease supplied to Heydon has been
declared invalid due to the clause offered.
o Evaluation Criteria:
 The court employed the mischief rule in its decision,
which entails interpreting the laws by ascertaining the
true intention of the legislators.
 The courts underscored the importance of considering
four essential considerations when interpreting such
statutes.
1. The existing common law before the enactment of
the Act.
2. These were the deficiencies that the current
common law did not address.
3. What solution has Parliament found to solve and
rectify the dilemma produced by the
Commonwealth Act?
4. What is the true underlying reason behind the
solution?
2. Royal College Nursing vs. Department of Health and social
security[4]:
o The act in question is the Offences Against the Person Act of
1861.
o The term "mischief" refers to the classification of abortion as a
criminal act.
 o The Abortion Act of 1967 in the United Kingdom is a recently
enacted law.
o The remedy- If doctors perform abortions under specific
circumstances, it is not considered a criminal act.
o Issue: Can nurses administer hormonal abortion, a safe
method of abortion within 9 weeks using medication only,
without surgery?
o By using the mischief rule, the court determined that it was
lawful for nurses to engage in such actions. The conduct of
nurses fell outside the prohibited behaviour described in the
old regulation and fell within the permissible actions outlined
in the new statute.

3. Elliot vs Grey[6]:
During this occurrence, the defendant's vehicle was positioned on
the road, raised using a jack, and had its battery extracted. He is
facing charges for the violation of driving an uninsured vehicle on
the road, as mandated by the Road Traffic Act of 1930.

The defendant's defence contends that his conduct does not meet
the criteria for "utilising a car" due to the fact that the vehicle was
not functional. Nevertheless, the Court has used the mischief rule
and concluded that the vehicle was being driven on a hazardous
road, so warranting the necessity of insurance coverage in case of
an incident.

The court clearly stated that the purpose of the act was to ensure
that individuals who are harmed due to hazards posed by third
parties receive appropriate compensation.

4. Corkery vs. Carpenter[7]:

The accused was caught cycling while intoxicated. As to Section 12
of the Licencing Act 1872, it is unlawful to operate a vehicle on a
public road while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

In this instance, the court has utilised the mischief rule to establish
that the action of riding a bicycle falls within the scope of the
detrimental consequences that the Act aims to address. The
defendant's activities were determined to present a hazard not just
to himself but also to other users utilising the roadway. According to
Section 12 of the Licencing Act 1872, if a person is found drunk
while operating a vehicle on a public road, they can be arrested
without a warrant.
 In this case, a person was arrested for operating a bicycle while
under the influence of alcohol. According to the literal rule of
interpretation, the bike is excluded from being classified as a
carriage. Nevertheless, according to the Mischief rule, the bicycle
may be categorised as a carriage. The objective of this legislation is
to tackle the issue of inebriated individuals utilising transport while
on the road. Thus, it was concluded that a bicycle may be classified
as a carriage.

5. DPP v Bull[8]:
As per section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959, it is illegal for
those involved in prostitution to remain or actively solicit customers
in a public street or location. Here, a man was accused and formally
charged under this particular provision of the legislation. The
magistrates have acquitted him after interpreting that the word
'common prostitute' is gender-specific, applying only to females and
not males. Following that, the prosecution has filed an appeal
through the use of a case stated.

Consequently, the court has ruled that the Act specifically applies to
those who are biologically female. The term "prostitute" was subject
to varying interpretations, thereby requiring the use of the mischief
rule. The implementation of the Street Offences Act can be ascribed
to the discoveries of the Wolfenden Report, which examined the
subjects of homosexuality and prostitution. The Report solely
focused on female prostitution, without any reference to male
prostitutes. The QBD has concluded that the main purpose of the
Act was to govern the behaviour of female prostitutes solely.
6. Brown v. Brown[9]:
Sir Jocelyn Simon P has argued that the old law on condonation of
adultery had a drawback. It allowed for the possibility of a spouse
who had been wronged to be hesitant about resuming cohabitation,
even if it could have facilitated reconciliation that had not yet
occurred. If the attempt at reconciliation failed, the wronged spouse
would then lose the right to complain about the marital offence. The
provision in section 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1963 (now
found in section 42 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965) states that
adultery cannot be considered forgiven just because the couple
continues to live together for up to three months. This provision only
applies to situations where the purpose of the cohabitation is to
reconcile, and does not cover cases where the cohabitation is a
result of reconciliation.
7. Smith v Hughes:
According to the Street Offences Act 1959, it is illegal to solicit in a
public place. The defendants in this case were charged with the
offence of engaging in prostitution. The prostitutes had actively
sought clients from private establishments, displaying themselves in
windows or on balconies in order to be visible to the general public.

Held: In this case, the court employed the mischief rule to

determine that the defendants' actions fell within the scope of the
harm that the Act intended to address, despite the fact that,
according to the literal interpretation, these actions would be
considered to have taken place in a private location.
8. Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax:
In order to calculate an individual's overall income, the income of
their wife or minor kid, as stated in section 16(3) of the Indian
Income Tax Act 1922, must be included, regardless of whether it is
earned directly or indirectly. In the CIT v Sodra Devi case, the court
concluded that the legislature was responsible for employing a term
that had multiple possible meanings. The legislature's intention
regarding the application of these laws only to males, as previously
established, or if it also include females within the scope of the
words "any individual or such individual" is ambiguous.

The court has acknowledged that the term "individual" historically

pertained only to males, but it recognises that this narrow definition
was meant to solve a particular issue. This issue originated from the
prevalent habit of husbands establishing nominal partnerships with
their wives and dads enrolling their underage children as members,
thereby bestowing upon them the advantages of these partnerships.
Later, the money-tax Act was employed to tackle this issue, with the
primary aim of include the money earned by the wife or minor kid in
the computation of the male taxpayer's total income, specifically
the husband or father, for assessment reasons.

9. RMDC v. UOI
According to section 2(d) of the Prize Competition Act 1955, the
definition of 'prize competition' includes only those instances that do
not involve any significant skill. Therefore, prize competitions that
require some levels of skill are not considered as 'prize
competitions' under section 2(d) of this Act. Therefore, in this
instance, the Supreme Court has employed Heydon's Rule to curtail
the harmful effects and promote the solution, contrary to the literal
rule that may have encompassed prize competitions lacking a
significant level of ability necessary for victory.
Advantages and Disadvantages of mischief:
Advantages:
 It prioritizes the legislative intent behind the creation of laws.
 It enables the judges to exercise their cognitive abilities.
 Judges take into account the social and technological changes in
accordance with this rule.
 It enables the supremacy of the legislative body.
 It aids in circumventing inequitable outcomes.
Disadvantages:
 Deciphering the aim of parliament can be challenging.
 This rule of interpretation is widely regarded as antiquated.
 This rule creates ambiguity in the law.
 This system is considered undemocratic because it grants excessive
authority to the court, which is the unelected arm of the
government.

Conclusion
The Mischief Rule, as a technique for interpreting statutes, demonstrates
the dynamic nature of legal systems and their ongoing endeavors to
tackle societal issues. This article has examined how the rule functions by
examining the historical background of legislation to find the specific
problems or harms that lawmaker meant to address. Nevertheless, like
other principles of interpretation, the Mischief Rule possesses both
benefits and drawbacks. Its implementation also prompts significant
inquiries regarding the judiciary's influence on moulding the legal
framework.
 Doctrine of Harmonious Construction
What is Doctrine of Harmonious Construction?
Parliament creates different laws and rules, along with constitutional
provisions, using their specific powers. While making these laws, it’s
essential to be very careful, but sometimes conflicts arise because
these rules can overlap in their application. This happens because
when making these rules, lawmakers may not have foreseen every
possible situation. To resolve these conflicts, courts have developed
certain principles and rules for interpreting laws. One such rule is
the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction.
When there’s a conflict between two or more laws or different parts
of the same law, we need to use the Rule of Harmonious
Construction. Every law has a purpose and a legal intent and it
should be understood as a whole. When using the Harmonious
Construction rule in the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation
should be consistent with all parts of the law. In cases where it’s
impossible to reconcile both provisions, the court’s decision on the
matter prevails.

The underlying idea behind the Principle of Harmonious

Construction is that the legislature probably didn’t intend to create
contradictions in its laws. The legislature’s intention is for every
provision to have an effect. However, when two provisions conflict,
it may be impossible to follow both of them and as a result, one
provision becomes ineffective, which goes against the fundamental
principle of “ut res magis valeat quam pereat” (that a thing is better
understood so that it may have an effect than that it should be
made void). Therefore, the court should interpret the laws in a way
that removes the inconsistency and allows both provisions to remain
in force, working together harmoniously.

Meaning of the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is an essential rule for
interpreting statutes. This doctrine states that when there’s a
conflict between two or more statutes or between different parts or
provisions of a statute, we should interpret them in a way that
harmonises them. This means that when there are inconsistencies,
we should try to reconcile the conflicting parts so that one part
doesn’t negate the purpose of another.

The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is rooted in a fundamental

legal principle that every statute is created with a specific purpose
and intent. Therefore, it should be understood as a whole. We
usually assume that what Parliament gives with one hand, it doesn’t
intend to take away with the other. The goal is to give effect to all
the provisions. To avoid conflicts, the interpretation of the statute
should be consistent with all its parts.
If it’s impossible to harmoniously interpret or reconcile the different
parts or provisions, then it’s the responsibility of the judiciary to
make the final decision and give its judgment. Courts aim to
interpret the law in a way that resolves conflicts between the
provisions, making the statute consistent as a whole and ensuring
it’s understood accordingly.

Origin of Doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction has its origins in court
interpretations of various cases. Its creation can be traced back to
the first amendment to the Constitution of India, particularly the
landmark case of Sri Shankari Prasad Singh Deo vs. Union of India
(AIR 1951 SC 458). This case revolved around a conflict between
Part III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles of
State Policy) of the Indian Constitution.
In this case, the court applied the Harmonious Construction Rule to
resolve the disagreement. It concluded that Fundamental Rights,
which are rights granted against the State, could be limited under
certain circumstances and modified by Parliament to align with
constitutional provisions. Both sets of rights were given importance
and it was established that Fundamental Rights and Directive
Principles of State Policy are complementary aspects that must work
together for the greater good.

Historically, this theory of harmonious construction in interpretation

of statutes evolved through legal precedents, notably in the case of
C. P and Berar General Clauses Act, 1914. In this case, the court
used the Rule of Interpretation to avoid any overlap or confusion
between entries 24 and 25 of the State List and to interpret them in
a logical sequence by determining the scope of the subjects in
question.

Principles that Govern the Doctrine of Harmonious

Construction
In the landmark case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/S
Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2000), the Supreme Court established five
fundamental principles governing the rule of harmonious
construction:

1. Courts should make every effort to avoid conflicts between

seemingly conflicting provisions and should attempt to interpret
these provisions in a way that harmonises them.

2. A provision in one section of the law should not be used to nullify

a provision found in another section unless the court is unable to
find a way to reconcile their differences despite diligent effort.

3. In cases where it’s impossible to completely reconcile

inconsistencies between provisions, the courts must interpret them
in a manner that gives effect to both provisions to the greatest
extent possible.
4. Courts must consider that an interpretation rendering one
provision redundant or useless goes against the essence of
harmonious construction and should be avoided.

5. Harmonising two contradictory provisions means preserving and

not destroying any statutory provision or rendering it ineffective.

Application of the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction in in

Interpretation of Statutes
Courts have outlined specific procedures for the proper application
of the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction in the interpretation of
statutes based on extensive review of various case laws. These
procedures are as follows:

Equal Importance: Both conflicting provisions should be given equal

importance to minimise their inconsistency.

Comprehensive Reading: Provisions that are fundamentally

inconsistent or conflicting should be read in their entirety and the
entire enactment should be taken into account.

Broader Provision Consideration: When dealing with contradictory

provisions, the court should consider the provision with a broader
scope or applicability.

Analysing the Broader Law: In the comparison between broad and

narrow provisions, the court should analyse the broader law to
check for any additional considerations. If harmonising both clauses
can be achieved by giving them separate and full weight, no further
analysis is needed. This is because the legislature was well-aware of
the situation they intended to address when enacting the provisions
and all provisions should be given full effect.

Non-Obstante Clause Usage: When one provision of the law appears

to override the powers conferred by another provision, a non-
obstante clause should be applied if available.

Establishing Legislative Intent: It’s crucial for the court to determine

the extent to which the legislature intended to grant one provision
overriding authority over another.

Doctrine of Harmonious Construction Case Laws

Sri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math and
Others (2015)
In the case of Sri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha
Math and Others (2015), a conflict arose between the Sri Jagannath
Temple Act, 1955 and the Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951. The
Supreme Court found that Section 2(oo) of the Orissa Estates
Abolition Act conflicted with Sections 5 and 30 of the Shri Jagannath
Temple Act, making it impossible for both provisions to coexist. The
Court applied the rule of harmonious construction but noted that
when statutes are irreconcilable, one must take precedence.

The Court identified that it was only the first part of the proviso in
Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act that contradicted the Jagannath
Temple Act. If this part were given effect, it would render Sections 5
and 30 of the Jagannath Temple Act meaningless. The Court
emphasised that in cases involving the application of specific and
general laws, the court must scrutinise the nature of the case. When
two laws are in absolute conflict, the limitations and exceptions
imposed by the Legislature must be examined.

The Supreme Court held that the special provisions of the Jagannath
Temple Act should prevail, applying the principle of “generalia
specialibus non derogant.”

Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1957)

In Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1957), trustees of Sri
Venkataramana temple filed a suit under Section 92 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the exclusion of Harijans from
Hindu temples after the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act
(Madras V of 1947). They claimed the temple was private and
exclusively for Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, exempt from the Act.
The Government disagreed.
Trustees argued the temple wasn’t defined in the Act and Section 3
violated Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution. The Trial Court ruled
against them, but the High Court granted a limited decree, allowing
the exclusion of the general public during certain ceremonies.
The Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of the Madras Temple
Entry Authorisation Act, Article 25(2)(b) and Article 26(b) of the
Constitution. It held that Article 25(2) broadly governed both Articles
and Article 26(b) should be read in light of Article 25(2)(b).

The Apex Court dismissed the appeal and the application for special
leave to appeal.

State of Rajasthan v. Gopi Kishan Sen (1992)

In this case, the respondent was appointed as an untrained teacher
in Rajasthan in 1972 and the State of Rajasthan refused his salary
claim based on the pay scale of Rs. 160-360/- per month, which was
 granted only to trained teachers. Instead, the respondent was
initially appointed at a fixed salary of Rs. 130/- per month until he
became trained, in accordance with the Rajasthan Civil Services
(New Pay Scales) Rules, 1969 and the Rajasthan Education
Subordinate Service Rules, 1971.

The High Court partially struck down the provision fixing the salary
at Rs. 130/- per month as discriminatory, ordering the appellant to
pay the respondent at a higher rate from 1972 to 1982. This
decision was challenged by the appellant.

The Supreme Court emphasised the principle of harmonious

construction to uphold and give effect to all provisions without
rendering any of them powerless. Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Services
Rules, 1951, regarding pay scale increments, was general, while the
Rajasthan Civil Services (New Pay Scales) Rules, 1969, had a special
provision for untrained teachers. This case invoked the maxim
‘generalibus specialia derogant,’ where a special provision prevails
over a general one on the same subject.

Unit -4 Judicial Activism: Nature and scope

Introduction
Judicial activism is a dynamic process of legal perspective in a changing
society. In January 1947 Fortune Magazine article entitled “The Supreme
Court: 1947” Arthur Schlesinger Jr. introduced the term “judicial activism.”
Law making has taken on new dimensions in recent years through judicial
activism by the courts. The judiciary has embraced a healthy trend in
social interpretation of the law. Judicial activism describes court rulings
that are suspected of being based instead of existing legislation on
personal or political considerations. Judges sometimes appear to exceed
their powers when deciding cases before the Court. According to the
Constitution they are supposed to exercise judgment when interpreting
the law. However, judicial activists appear to exercise their will to make
law before the Court in response to legal issues. Judges should act with
greater courage when deciding on cases.
1. Legislation should be interpreted and applied on the basis of constant
changes in conditions and values.
2. As society changes, and their beliefs and values change, court
decisions should then be made in cases that reflect those changes.
Judges should use their powers to correct injustices, especially when the
other branches of government do not act to do so, according to the idea
of judicial activism. In short, the courts should play an active role in
shaping social policy on issues like civil rights, the protection of individual
rights, political injustice and public morality.
Evolution of Judicial Activism
India’s Supreme Court began in the 1950s as a technocratic tribunal but
slowly gained more power through constitutional interpretation. Their
transformation into an activist tribunal was gradual and imperceptible.
The roots of judicial activism are actually to be seen in the court’s early
assertion about the nature of judicial review.
Indian Judicial Activism can be both positive and negative;-
1. A court that is committed to changing power relations to make them
more equitable is said to be positive activist.
2. A court which uses its ingenuity to preserve the status quo in power
relations is said to be negative activist.
Need for Judicial Activism
Though there was no doctrine of the separation of powers recognized by
the Constitution in its absolute rigidity, the functions of the various organs
of the State were meticulously defined and demarcated by our
constitutions. Still a welfare state and like ours a developing country it is
highly impossible for the judiciary to confine itself to interpreting the laws,
given the existing socio-economic and political conditions. To extend its
jurisdiction in the field of law making or with the intention of promoting
the statute to reach and benefit the people it is meant for and for the
cause of social justice, it needs to read the laws. The legislature also
cannot foresee all the eventualities and future contingencies and enact
any law. It is the judiciary’s duty to scrutinize and complete the gaps.
When the executive fails to fulfill his duty, it becomes the judiciary’s
primary duty to compel the executive to perform the lawful functions.
Various Theories of Judicial Activism
There are two theories of judicial activism. They are:-
1. Theory of vacuum filling:-
The theory of vacuum filling states that a power vacuum is created by
inaction and laziness of any organ within the governance system. When
such vacuum is formed, it is against the nation’s good being and could
cause disaster to the country’s democratic establishment. Nature,
therefore, does not allow this vacuum to continue and other governance
organs expand their horizons and take up this vacuum. In this case, the
vacuum is created between the two governance bodies by inactivity,
incompetence, disregard for law, negligence, corruption, utter indiscipline
and lack of character viz. the legislative and executive branches. The rest
of the governance system, i.e. the judiciary, is therefore left with no
alternative but to expand and fill its horizons; the vacuums created by the
executive and the legislature. According to this theory, the so-called
judicial hyper- activism is thus the result of filling up the vacuum or void
created by the non-activism of the legislative and executive.
2. Theory of social want:-
Social Want Theory states that judicial activism emerged as a result of the
failure of existing laws to cope with existing country situations and issues.
When the existing laws failed to provide any path, it became the
responsibility of the judiciary to take on the oppressed problems and find
a way to solve them. In order to achieve this goal, the only way left to
them within the governance framework was to provide non-conventional
interpretations to existing laws in order to apply them for greater good. So
the activism of the judiciary has emerged. Supporters of this theory
believe- judicial activism plays a vital role in bringing about the
transformation of society. It is the state’s judicial wing which injects life
into the law and supplies the missing links in the law. The judiciary comes
to acquire the status of a catalyst on change having been armed with the
power of review.
Necessity of Judicial Activism in The Present Situation
An independent, unbiased and fearless judiciary is “Our” Constitution
Creed” that was why our Constitution’s founding fathers tried to insulate
the judiciary from external influences. As an institution, the fundamental
purpose of the judiciary is to establish the law and to rectify grievances
within the parameters of law enacted by the legislature. Therefore, to
understand judicial activism in its correct perspective, what needs to be
understood are the circumstances that forced it into an active role and the
Courts. It is the constitutional obligation to uphold the ‘rule of law’ and to
uphold and protect the constitution’s basic structure. It’s the judiciary’s
duty to lift the veil from ruling elite misdeeds and power brokers. Failure
to act by broadening their prudence and courage in an area where they
were reluctant to step in the earlier occasions could lead to the downfall
of democracy.
The judiciary is the only place to shelter justice, fair play, and equity and
life security in the event of legislative arbitrariness or executive abuse or
against unjust and unreasonable legislation. Prof. Upendra Baxi says:
“Judicial activism only arises under conditions in which power seekes to
shape its own law and ‘jurisprudence’ above and beyond the law and the
Constitution conferred on the title of legitimacy by the very constitution of
power, otherwise ‘Judicial Activism’ is a response to the state’s
lawlessness.
Course of Judicial Activism
Activism on the part of the judiciary in the first decade of independence
was nearly nil with the executive running political stalwarts and the
parliament functioning with great enthusiasm, the judiciary and the
executive went along.A judicial and structural view of the constitution was
held entirely by the apex court in the 50s through half of the 70s. Two
years before the emergency declaration, the Supreme Court declared in
the famous Keshavananda Bharati case that the Executive had no right
tamper with the Constitution and alters its fundamental characteristics.
But it was not able to prevent the emergency declared by Mrs. Gandhi and
it was only at the end that the apex court and the lower courts began to
intervene continuously in both executive and legislative areas.
The Bihar under trial case was the first major case of judicial activism
through litigation over social action. In 1980, some law professors in the
Agra Protective Home revealed the barbaric conditions of detention in the
form of a written petition pursuant to Article 21, followed by a case
against Delhi Women’s Home filed by a Delhi law faculty student and a
social worker. Then three journalists filed a petition to ban the prostitution
trade in which women were purchased and sold as cattle. The Supreme
Court ordered the police not to handcuff a man who had been arrested
purely on suspicion and not to take a woman to the police station after
dusk. Judges of the High Court visited the prisons to check prisoner’s
living conditions. In 1993, in just one month, the Apex Court declared a
judgment protecting the rights of innocent held in the Hazaratbal Mosque
in Srinagar, setting out the constitutional powers of the Chief Electoral
Commissioner, which threatened the closure of multiple crore rupees if
they continued to pollute the Ganga and Taj Mahal and brought all
government and semi-government entities under the Consumer Protection
Act. In a judgment of 1994, it asked the chief of staff of the army to pay
Rs. 6,00,000 to the widow and two children of an army officer who had
died some 16 years before due to the callousness of the authorities in
question.
The Rao government referred the controversial 27 per cent job
reservation in central government and public sector undertakings to the
Supreme Court. The Court ruling favored 49 per cent of backward caste
and class jobs but the ‘creamy layers; were exempt from this reservation.
Similarly the court placed a curb on the capitation fee operation in
Karnataka colleges. The Supreme Court providing direction to the CBI and
summoning the CBI head to report on the hawala case reveals the
breakdown of other government machinery. In the wake of the tactics of
delay and technical evasion undertaken by the investigate agencies, the
judicial interference with the CBI work became inevitable.
Article 21 And Judicial Activism
In India, the right to privacy is one right which is not properly recognized,
but which has been given a place under Article 21 of the Constitution
through judicial activism. It is not a right to physical restraints but a right
to psychological restraint or right infringement. It can have both positive
and negative implications. It protects the sanctity of women which reveals
personal issues (menstruation, pregnancy) would result in violation of
their right to privacy.
The Supreme Court also uses the right to privacy to increase the
punishment of women for crime, telephone tapping, disclosure of terrible
disease and personal affairs such as restricting what one eats is a
violation of the right to privacy. It is not absolute because in some
situations, such as athlete doping tests, cricketers, the right to privacy
does not stand for state security and public welfare. With reasonable
restrictions the courts can order that right. It may be legally restricted in
order to prevent crime, disorder or protection of health or morals, or in
order to protect rights and freedom of others.
In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, the Indian Supreme Court rejected
the argument that not only must the procedure prescribed by law for
doing so be followed to deprive a person of his life or liberty, but that such
proceedings must also be fair, reasonable and just. Holding otherwise
would be to introduce the due process clause in Article 21, which was
deliberately omitted when the Indian Constitution was framed.The most
recent case of judicial activism was the case of Aruna Ramchandra
Shanbaug v. Union of India and Others, Aruna Shanbaug, a nurse in
1973, was sexually assaulted while working at a hospital in Mumbai, and
has been in a permanent vegetative state since the assault. In 2011, after
37 years of being in this status, India’s Supreme Court heard a petition
filed by a social activist claiming to be Aruna’s friend to the plea for
euthanasia. The Court dismissed the petition but in its landmark judgment
it permitted passive euthanasia, i.e. withdrawl of life support to a person
in a permanently vegetative state, subject to the High Court approval.
Landmark Cases
In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, the inhuman and barbaric
conditions of prisoners under trial reflected in the articles published in the
newspaper. Many inmates who were being tried have served the
maximum persecution without being charged for the offence. An advocate
pursuant to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution has filed a petition in
writing. It was accepted by the apex court and held that the right to
speedy trial is a fundamental right and directed the state authorities to
provide free legal facilities to the inmates under trial so that they can
obtain justice, bail or final release.
In Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, a letter written by a journalist
was sent to the Supreme Court avouching the custodial violence of
women prisoners in jail. The court treated that letter as a written petition,
and acknowledged the matter and issued the apposite guidelines to the
state authorities concerned.
In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, the court had exercised its
epistolary jurisdiction and a letter written by a prisoner was treated as a
petition. The letter presumed the head warden had inflicted pain
atrociously and assaulted another prisoner. The Court said the
technicalities could not stop the court from protecting the individual’s civil
liberties. Some instances when the judicial activism mechanism turned to
overreaching the judiciary. India’s parliament has held the Judiciary
accountable or accused for intervening and exceeding its constitutional
powers.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, in this case the Supreme Court
restored the faith of the citizen in the justice system. The three landmark
judgments depicted a great change in the judiciary’s thinking process and
set the stage for the introduction of Judicial Activism.
Not only did the Supreme Court broaden the meaning of “personal
freedom”, but it also adopted the theory of “due process” in “law-setting
procedure”. The court acknowledged that when a law restricts personal
freedom, a court should consider whether the restriction on personal
freedom also imposes restrictions on any of the rights conferred by Article
19. In addition to those referred to in Article 19, the Court held that
personal liberty includes “a variety of rights which constitute the personal
liberty of man,” and that one such right included in “personal liberty” is
the right to go outside. According to the “audi alteram partem” theory,
the court also held that impounding the passport of Mrs. Gandhi without
giving her a hearing violated procedure established by law. These were
principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. Before their passport
was impounded, the court had to decide whether Mrs. Gandhi was entitled
to a hearing. It was resolved that the impounding was
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, as there was no post-decisional hearing.
Among the fundamental rights, the most frequently invoked articles 14,19
and 21 of the Constitutional, which composes the “golden triangle,”
declare invalid legislation or arbitrary state action. Whether the right to
travel abroad formed a right to personal freedom under Article 21 was in
conflict in this particular case. The Supreme Court departed from the
stereotyped notion and held that under the Constitution, fundamental
rights form an integrated scheme. Highlighting the need for a holistic
reading of Part III of the Constitution, the SC said that it was not exempted
from the operation of other fundamental rights by the mere fact that a law
fulfilled the requirements of one fundamental right.The majority of the
seven judge bench stated that any proceedings established by law
pursuant to Article 21 would have to be “fair, just and reasonable,” and
differed from the Satwant Singh case by establishing that an arbitrary law
will not be considered even in the presence of a law. After this judgment,
the Supreme Court became the constitution’s watchdog, instead of
supervisors.
Conclusion
The concept of judicial activism has positive as well as negative aspects.
The role of Judicial Activism cannot be negated or overlooked, as it played
a significant role in bringing justice to the underprivileged sections of
society, indigent individuals, backward classes socially and educationally,
victims of trafficking, and prisoners under trial. Only with the
advancement of judicial activism could proper implementation of
fundamental rights become possible. At times, the judiciary intervenes too
much in the process of judicial activism and reflects its personal beliefs in
the course of delivering justice. The interpretation of law, which is the
primary function of the judiciary but of the courts rather than the
interpretation of the law, begins to make the law, to issue guidelines and
directions that the legislature is to make.

Unit-5 Presumptions in Statutory Interpretation: Presumption as

to Jurisdiction; Presumption as to Prospective Operation of
Statutes; Presumption Against Violation of International Law.
What are The Presumptions of Statutory Interpretation?
The interpretation of statutes is guided by several presumptions that help
maintain the rule of law and ensure justice. These presumptions of
statutory interpretation play a crucial role in understanding the legislative
intent behind the enactment of statutes.
All the presumptions of statutory interpretation can be briefed as:
 Firstly, there is a presumption of validity, which assumes that
statutes are enacted within constitutional limits and are presumed
to be valid unless proven otherwise.
 Secondly, the territorial operation presumption limits the application
of an act to the territories of the country where it is enacted unless
specifically provided otherwise.
 Thirdly, the presumption against taking away the jurisdiction of the
courts emphasizes that interpretations should not readily strip
courts of their authority unless the statute clearly and explicitly
intends to do so.
 Lastly, the prospective operation presumption indicates that
statutes are generally meant to have an effect on future acts or
events rather than retroactively impacting past circumstances
unless the legislature expressly indicates otherwise.
Presumption of Validity
In legal interpretation, there is a presumption that statutes are valid and
do not violate the Constitution. Laws enacted by the Parliament, State
legislatures or their subordinate bodies should adhere to constitutional
boundaries and not contradict the provisions and spirit of the Constitution.
When faced with two possible interpretations, one that upholds the
constitutionality of the statute and another that renders it void, the
interpretation that preserves the constitutionality of the law should be
followed.
There is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enacted law.
If someone claims that a law is unconstitutional, they must demonstrate a
violation of constitutional boundaries. When the validity of a statute
passed by a competent legislature is challenged, the court assumes its
validity.
However, if the law appears arbitrary and discriminatory, the presumption
of constitutionality cannot be upheld. In cases of doubt regarding the
constitutional validity of a law, the benefit of the doubt should lean
towards its constitutionality. The court should assume that the legislature
acted intentionally and expressed its intention appropriately in the law.
Every word used by the legislature carries significance and unless it is
proven that the legislation has crossed constitutional limits, it is presumed
to be constitutionally valid.
When statutory language can be interpreted in multiple ways, the statute
should be construed in a manner that upholds its constitutional validity
and avoids any doubts about its constitutionality. This is the rule of
harmonious construction and applies even to bylaws and constitutional
amendments.
In the case of Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, the constitutional
validity of the “Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act” was brought into
question. The interpretation of Section 16 of the Act was a key issue. The
words “affairs of temple” in that section were construed narrowly to refer
only to secular matters, ensuring its constitutionality. If a broader
interpretation had been given to Section 16, it would have
violated Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, which guarantee the
freedom of religion and the right to manage religious affairs.
The Territorial Operation of the Act is within the Country
The general principle regarding acts of parliament is that they are
applicable within the territories of the country in which they are enacted
unless stated otherwise. Statutes passed by parliament are binding within
the boundaries of the country and do not have extra-territorial operation.
However, Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India provides that no act
made by parliament shall be deemed invalid on the ground of having
extra-territorial operation. Courts are obligated to enforce such legislation.
For instance, the Indian Penal Code, 1860, has extra-territorial application.
Section 3 states that any person bound by Indian law who commits an
offence outside India shall be tried in India as if the offence was
committed within the country. Section 4 further extends the application of
the IPC to offences committed by Indian citizens in any place outside India
or by any person on a ship or aircraft registered in India, regardless of its
location in the world.
State legislatures in India have the power to enact laws for the entire
state or any specific part of the state. These laws are applicable only
within the territory of that particular state and do not have extra-territorial
operations.
To establish a territorial connection, two factors must be considered:
i) The territorial connection should be real and factual, rather than
illusory.
ii) The liability under the Act being enforced must be related to that
territorial connection only.
In the case of Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court ruled
that the offence of criminal conspiracy is considered a continuing offence.
As a result, it does not matter where the acts constituting the conspiracy
are committed, whether in Dubai or Chandigarh. The offence can be tried
in India under Section 4 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which provides for
the extraterritorial application of the IPC.
In the case of K.K. Kochari v. The State of Madras, the Supreme
Court held that laws enacted by state legislatures apply within the
boundaries of the respective states. These laws can be challenged if they
have an extra-territorial operation. This is because Article 245(2) of the
Indian Constitution empowers only the Union Parliament to make laws
with extraterritorial application.
Interpretation That Takes Away Jurisdictions of Court Must Not Be
Enforced
There is a presumption in statutory interpretation that an interpretation of
a statute that restricts or takes away the jurisdiction of the courts should
not be given effect unless the words of the statute clearly and explicitly
provide for it.
In both civil and criminal cases, there is a strong presumption that civil
courts have jurisdiction over matters of a civil nature. The exclusion of the
jurisdiction of civil courts should not be readily inferred. This presumption
is based on the principle that courts should be accessible to all seeking
justice and that the existing state of the law should be maintained.
Unless the legislature clearly and expressly ousts the jurisdiction of the
courts or it can be inferred by necessary implication, the courts should be
presumed to have jurisdiction. Statutes should be construed in a manner
that avoids taking away the jurisdiction of superior courts or extending
jurisdiction through the right to appeal.
Statutes that confer jurisdiction on subordinate courts, tribunals or
government agencies should be strictly construed. Unless the construction
of an act clearly indicates the intention of the legislature to oust the
jurisdiction of the courts, the jurisdiction of ordinary courts of judicature is
not taken away. When jurisdiction is conferred by a statute, it is implied
that the act also grants the power to perform all acts necessary for its
execution.
Special powers granted by an act must be limited to the purpose for which
they are granted. The power of control by superior courts cannot be taken
away unless expressly provided by the statute. In the absence of clear
statutory provisions, it is presumed that new jurisdiction is not created or
existing jurisdiction is not enlarged.
Since legislation grants jurisdiction to the courts, only legislation can take
away that jurisdiction. If an interpretation of an act allows for two
constructions, one giving jurisdiction to the court and the other taking it
away, the construction that grants jurisdiction to the court should prevail.
Parties to a dispute cannot, by mutual consent, create or take away
jurisdiction from the court where their dispute can be adjudicated.
There is a general presumption that civil courts have jurisdiction to hear
all civil matters. The exclusion of civil jurisdiction must be expressed in
clear terms or by necessary implication. The general rule is that courts
have jurisdiction over civil matters and the burden of proof lies on the
party alleging the exclusion of civil jurisdiction. In cases where the
jurisdiction of courts is excluded, civil courts have the power to examine
whether the provisions of the statute have been complied with and
whether the prescribed legal procedures have been followed by tribunals
established by the statute.
Non-compliance with the statute or procedural requirements can be
challenged in a court of law. This principle is based on the presumption
that an aggrieved person should always have recourse to ordinary civil
courts, in addition to any remedies provided by the statute, unless
expressly excluded by the language of the statute or necessary
implication.
In the case of Provincial Government of Madras (now Andhra
Pradesh) v. J.S. Bassappa, the Supreme Court ruled that the exclusion
of the jurisdiction of civil courts should not be readily construed. Even if
the provisions of an act confer finality to the orders of a particular
authority, civil courts still retain jurisdiction if the provisions of the act are
not complied with or if the statutory tribunal has failed to adhere to the
principles of judicial procedure.
In the case of Bhimsi v. Dundappa, the Supreme Court held that if
a revenue court is granted exclusive jurisdiction to try certain matters and
the jurisdiction of the civil court is completely excluded, then the civil
court should transfer those matters to be tried and decide by the revenue
court alone.
Prospective in the Operation of Statutes
The term “prospective” with reference to statutes refers to the application
of laws in the future or from the date of commencement of the statute, as
indicated by its dictionary meaning. In the Indian context, the Doctrine of
Prospective Overruling was first introduced by the Supreme Court in the
case of I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1967 SC 1643). In
this case, the Supreme Court held that the Parliament did not have the
power to amend fundamental rights.
Chief Justice Subba Rao raised the question of how Parliament, even with
a two-thirds majority, could abrogate a fundamental right if it could not
affect fundamental rights through ordinary legislation, even unanimously.
He argued that the term “law” in Article 13(2) of the Constitution includes
both ordinary law and constitutional law, encompassing amendments as
well.
Therefore, according to the court’s interpretation, the state was not
authorized to make any constitutional amendment that would curtail or
diminish fundamental rights. The court declared that this principle would
only apply prospectively, meaning it would have no retrospective effect.
This concept came to be known as “prospective overruling.”
As a result of this decision, all amendments made to the fundamental
rights prior to the court’s ruling remained valid and effective. However,
after the date of the decision, the Parliament would no longer have the
power to amend any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the
Constitution.
Penal statutes generally have prospective operation and Article 20 of the
Constitution of India restricts the retrospective operation of such statutes.
According to Article 20, an act that was legal when it was committed
cannot be made illegal by the enactment of a new statute.
In the case of Gramma v. Veerupana, it was observed that Section 8 of
“The Hindu Succession Act, 1956” applies to the devolution of property of
a Hindu male who dies intestate. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act is
not applicable to successions that occurred before the Act came into
operation, which means it has only prospective operation. In other words,
the Act does not have retroactive effect on successions that took place
prior to 1956.
In the case of Govind Das v. Income Tax Officer, the Supreme
Court considered Section 171(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This
provision imposes joint and several liability on the members of a Hindu
Undivided Family (HUF) to pay tax assessed on the HUF property in case a
partition has taken place. The court held that Section 171(6) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 does not apply to assessments made before 1st
April 1962, which was the date the Act came into force. Therefore, the
provision has only prospective operation and does not apply
retrospectively to assessments made prior to that date.
Exceptions to Prospective Operation of Statutes
Procedural statutes, also known as adjunctive statutes, do not establish or
confer new rights. They pertain to procedural matters and are generally
presumed to have retrospective operation, meaning they can apply to
matters that occurred before the enactment of the statute.
Retrospective operation means that a statute can have an effect on
events or circumstances that took place prior to its enactment. A statute
can be explicitly declared as retrospective or implied as such by the court.
However, the retrospective application should not impair existing rights or
obligations.
If a statute allows for two interpretations, one retrospective and the other
perspective, the prospective interpretation is usually preferred based on
the presumption that the legislature did not intend to create injustice.
Generally, statutes are expected to apply to acts or circumstances that
occurred after their enactment, unless there is clear legislative intent to
apply them retrospectively.
Amendments to procedural laws typically have a retrospective effect.
Declaratory acts, which clarify the meaning and effect of a statute, are
also given retrospective operation. Such acts aim to rectify judicial errors
and remove doubts.
The presumption against the retrospective operation of statutes is
rebuttable, meaning it can be challenged with strong contrary evidence.
Courts should not give a statute a greater retrospective effect than
intended by the legislature.
In cases where a court declares an act void, the parliament has the power
to pass a validating act with retrospective effect to revive the void act.
However, penal laws generally cannot have a retrospective operation
unless expressly allowed by Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution. If a
retroactive application of a penal law benefits the accused, it may be
allowed.
In Balumar Jamnadas Batra v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme
Court held that Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, which dealt with
the burden of proof, pertained to procedural matters and thus had a
retrospective operation.
In Reliance Jute and Industries Limited v. Commissioner of Income
Tax, the Supreme Court stated that while interpreting taxing statutes, the
law in force during the relevant assessment year should be applied unless
there is an express provision or clear intention suggesting otherwise.
Conclusion
The presumptions of statutory interpretation include validity, territorial
operation, non-interference with court jurisdiction and prospective
operation. These presumptions of interpretation of statutes ensure
fairness and uphold the rule of law in legal systems.
Unit-6 Maxims of Statutory Interpretation: Ejusdem Generis;
Expressio Unius Est Exuclusio Alterius; Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam
Paraeat, Noscitur a sociis, Raddendo singular singulis.
(A) Ejusdem Generis: Ejusdem Generis is a Latin phrase
meaning "of the same kind or class." It is a rule of statutory
interpretation where general words following specific ones are
interpreted to include only items of the same nature as the
specific words. This rule is used to deduce the legislature's
intent and avoid over-generalization of statutes.
Application in Indian Legislation
In Indian law, the principle of Ejusdem Generis ensures that:
1. General words align with specific terms: It narrows the scope of
general terms to the class or category indicated by the specific ones.
2. Context is respected: It prevents extending the statute's
application beyond the legislature's intent.
Essential Conditions for Application
1. There must be a specific list of words followed by general terms.
2. The specific words must form a distinct class or genius.
3. No contrary legislative intent should be evident in the statute.
Key Case Laws
1. University of Madras v. Shantha Bai (AIR 1954 Mad 67)
In this case, the Madras High Court applied the Ejusdem Generis rule to
interpret the phrase “other authorities” under Article 12 of the
Constitution of India. It held that “other authorities” should include only
 authorities of a similar nature to the ones specifically mentioned, like
the government and local authorities. This judgment played a
significant role in defining the scope of "State" under Article 12.
2. K.K. Kochuni v. State of Madras (1960 AIR 1080)
The Supreme Court held that the principle of Ejusdem Generis applies
only when the specific words in the statute indicate a distinct genus or
category. The court interpreted "public purposes" in the Land
Acquisition Act to be limited to purposes similar to the ones expressly
mentioned.
3. Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise (1972 AIR
1863)
The court emphasized that the rule applies when general words follow
specific ones forming a distinct category. If no clear genus exists, the
rule does not apply.
4. Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1989 AIR
1019)
The expression "other processes" in the context of manufacturing was
interpreted to mean processes of the same nature as those specifically
mentioned, applying the Ejusdem Generis principle.
5. UP State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain (1979 AIR 65)
The court clarified that the Ejusdem Generis rule ensures that general
words are confined to the same genus as the specific ones unless the
statute suggests otherwise.
Conclusion: The Ejusdem Generis rule is a vital interpretative tool in
Indian jurisprudence. It ensures statutes are applied as intended by the
legislature by interpreting general terms within the framework of the
specific terms provided. The University of Madras case remains a
landmark judgment, highlighting the rule's relevance in constitutional
and statutory interpretation.

(B) Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius is a Latin maxim meaning "the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." This principle is a rule
of statutory interpretation, signifying that if a statute explicitly mentions
certain things, it implies that anything not mentioned is excluded. It
ensures precision in legal drafting and interpretation by focusing on what
is expressly included and disregarding what is omitted.
Application in Indian Legislation
This maxim is applied in cases where:
1. A statute contains a list of specific provisions or subjects, and no
general clause follows.
2. The legislative intent appears to be restrictive, meaning that the
statute deliberately excludes anything not mentioned.
3. The interpretation of the statute must adhere strictly to its textual
language to uphold the legislature's intent.
Key Features of the Maxim
1. Focus on express provisions: Only what is explicitly mentioned is
considered.
2. Omission is intentional: The absence of a subject in a list indicates the
legislature's intent to exclude it.
3. Limits judicial discretion: Courts must refrain from adding to or
expanding the scope of the statute.
Key Case Laws
1. Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur (AIR 1952 SC 362)
The Supreme Court applied the maxim to interpret the scope of statutory
powers. It held that if the legislature explicitly grants certain powers, it
implies the exclusion of any other powers not mentioned.
2. Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania (AIR 1981 SC 1786)
The court applied this principle to interpret provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It held that when certain appeals are specifically enumerated
under Section 96, it excludes all others not listed.
3. State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas (AIR 1969 SC 634)
The court held that express mention of compensation for certain
acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act implied the exclusion of
compensation for any other acquisitions not explicitly mentioned.
4. Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab (AIR 1961 SC 418)
The court ruled that the mention of specific categories of government
employees in a statute implied that others, not mentioned, were excluded
from its ambit.
Conclusion
The maxim Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius is a critical tool in
statutory interpretation in Indian legislation. It underscores the
importance of the legislature's precise wording and ensures that statutes
are not interpreted beyond their express terms. Indian courts frequently
apply this principle to maintain legislative intent, as evidenced by various
landmark judgments. However, courts also exercise caution to avoid rigid
application in cases where the legislative context suggests otherwise.
(C) Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Paraeat: ut res magis
valeat quam pereat
The saying ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ is a crucial rule for
understanding laws. In simple terms, it means that we should interpret
laws in a way that makes them work and have an effect, rather than
making them useless. This means that when we read a law, we should try
to understand it in a way that makes it do what it’s supposed to do.
Meaning of ut res magis valeat quam pereat
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat is a Latin legal maxim that translates to
“let the thing be more valued than it perishes” or “it is better for a thing
to have an effect than to be made void.” This principle is commonly
applied in the interpretation of statutes and legal documents.
In simple terms, ut res magis valeat quam pereat means that when
interpreting laws or legal provisions, courts should strive to give them a
meaning that allows them to be effective and operational rather than
interpreting them in a way that renders them useless or void. The goal is
to ensure that laws and legal instruments serve their intended purposes
and that they are not nullified due to overly restrictive or narrow
interpretations. This principle underscores the importance of interpreting
laws in a manner that upholds their practicality and usefulness.
Purpose of ut res magis valeat quam pereat
The purpose of the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat is to
ensure the effective and meaningful application of laws and legal
provisions. It emphasises that when interpreting statutes or legal
documents, the courts should adopt an interpretation that preserves their
functionality and intent, rather than an interpretation that renders them
meaningless or ineffective.
This principle promotes the rule of law, fairness and justice by preventing
legal instruments from becoming mere formalities. It encourages a
flexible and practical approach to legal interpretation, aiming to prevent
laws from being nullified or causing unintended consequences due to
overly strict or narrow interpretations, ultimately serving the broader
goals of justice and the rule of law.
Basis of Doctrine of ut res magis valeat quam pereat
The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat is based on the following
principles and presumptions:
The doctrine of ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ is based on several
important ideas:
 A law should not be declared invalid just because it is vague or
unclear.
 When the courts interpret a law, the primary goal is to ensure that
the law remains valid and effective.
 When determining the constitutionality of a law, the courts should
start with the assumption that the law is constitutional.
 The correct interpretation of a law is one that aligns with the
intention of the lawmakers. The legislature’s goal is to make all
parts of the law useful for achieving its intended purpose.
 Interpreting a law in a way that makes any part of it useless or
unworkable goes against the legislature’s intent.
 Courts have the authority to declare a law unconstitutional, but they
should not introduce vagueness or unconstitutionality into a law by
adopting an unusual interpretation or construing it in a specific
manner.
Application of ut res magis valeat quam pereat in India
Avtar Singh v. the State of Punjab (1965) SC
In the case of Avtar Singh v. the State of Punjab (1965) SC, there
was a dispute over the interpretation of Section 39 of the Electricity Act,
1910. The appellant had been found guilty of stealing electricity from the
Punjab State Electricity Board under Section 39 of the Electricity Act. The
respondent had also taken action against him under Section 379 of
the Indian Penal Code.
In his appeal, the appellant did not contest the fact that he had committed
theft but argued that his conviction was unlawful due to certain statutory
provisions.
Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 stated that anyone who
dishonestly abstracts, consumes, or uses energy would be considered to
have committed theft under the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, according
to Section 39, a person found guilty would be punished under Section 379
of the Indian Penal Code.
Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 outlined the procedure for
prosecution and stated that no prosecution could be initiated against
anyone for an offence under the Act unless it was done at the behest of
the Government, an Electrical Inspector, or a person who was affected by
the offence.
The appellant argued that he could not be convicted under Section 39
because the required procedure for prosecution, as specified in Section
50, had not been followed. He claimed that his prosecution was flawed
and legally invalid because it had not been initiated by the Government,
an Electrical Inspector, or an affected person.
The Supreme Court ruled that since the offence was related to the
Electricity Act and not the Indian Penal Code, the procedure outlined in
Section 50 must have been adhered to. Consequently, the appellant’s
conviction was overturned.
In this case, the Court applied the doctrine of ‘ut res magis valeat quam
pereat,’ ensuring that the interpretation adopted did not render Section
50 ineffective and pointless.
KB Nagpur, MD (Ayurvedic) v. the Union of India (2012) SC
In the case of KB Nagpur, MD (Ayurvedic) v. the Union of India
(2012) SC, the issue at hand concerned the interpretation of Section 7(1)
of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970. This provision stated that
the President, Vice President, or a member of the Central Council would
remain in office until their successor was duly elected or nominated. A
part of the clause that added “or until his successor shall have been duly
elected or nominated, whichever is longer” was challenged as
unconstitutional and in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, applying the principle of ‘ut res magis valeat quam
pereat,’ upheld the constitutionality of Section 7(1). The Court reasoned
that Parliament had included this provision to address situations where
the election to these positions might be delayed for various reasons. This
ensured that there would be no vacancy in the membership of the Central
Council.
Consequently, the Court interpreted Section 7(1) in a way that made it
effective and functional, preserving its intended purpose.
Supreme Court’s view
The Supreme Court’s views on the interpretation of statutes can be
summarised as follows:
Presumption Against Reducing a Statute to Futility
In the case of Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. the State of
Assam (1990), the Supreme Court emphasised that courts tend to avoid
interpretations of statutes that would render them ineffective or pointless.
Statutes and their provisions should be interpreted to make them
effective and operative. However, if a statute is completely vague and its
language is meaningless, it may be declared void for vagueness.
Presumption of Legislative Intent to Give Effect
In Sankar Ram and Co. v. Kasi Naicker (2003), the Supreme Court
established a presumption that legislative intent is to give effect to every
part of a statute. It is a fundamental rule of interpretation that no word or
provision should be considered redundant or unnecessary unless there are
compelling reasons to do so based on the statute’s scheme and
objectives, i.e. application of doctrine of ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Contextual Understanding of Statute
In Maharashtra Land Development Corporation v. the State of
Maharashtra (2010), the Supreme Court stressed the importance of
understanding every word and phrase in the context of the statute. Each
word and phrase should be given significance to avoid rendering them
redundant.
Smooth Functioning of the Statute
In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014), the Supreme Court
advocated for interpreting statutes in a way that facilitates the smooth
functioning of the system for which the statute was enacted or application
of ut res magis valeat quam pereat. When there are alternative
constructions, the Court should choose the one that doesn’t hinder the
statute’s purpose. A construction leading to the statute’s futility should be
avoided.
Read the Statute Reasonably
In Swami Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam (2005), the
Supreme Court emphasised the need to read statutes reasonably and
construe them to make them workable which forms the basis of doctrine
of ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Overcoming Obstacles to Implementation
In H.S. Vankani v. the State of Gujarat (2010), the Supreme Court
noted that the maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ also means that
when the statute’s obvious intention creates obstacles in implementation,
the Court should find ways to overcome these obstacles to avoid absurd
results. Statutory interpretation should not lead to manifest absurdity,
futility, injustice, inconvenience, or anomaly.
These principles guide the Supreme Court in interpreting statutes in a
manner that ensures they serve their intended purpose and are not
rendered ineffective or meaningless.
Conclusion
The legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat serves as a guiding
principle in legal interpretation, aiming to ensure that laws and legal
provisions remain relevant, purposeful and effective. By prioritising the
preservation of a law’s intended function over rendering it void or
meaningless, this maxim promotes fairness, justice and the rule of law.
The doctrine of ut res magis valeat quam pereat encourages a balanced
approach to legal analysis, preventing the undue restriction of rights or
the unintended consequences of overly strict interpretations. Ultimately,
this principle upholds the integrity of the legal system by ensuring that
laws continue to serve their intended purposes, adapting to changing
circumstances while maintaining consistency and coherence in legal
decision-making.
(D) Noscitur a sociis
Noscitur a sociis means “it is known by its associates” or “a word is known
by the company it keeps.” This is a Latin principle and is often used in
statutory interpretation and legal analysis to determine the meaning of a
particular word or phrase within a law or regulation by considering the
words and phrases that surround it in the same context.
In practical terms, when a word or term is unclear or ambiguous in a legal
document, such as a statute or contract, it is interpreted by looking at the
other words, phrases or terms that are associated with it in that specific
provision. By examining how the word is used within the context of the
surrounding language, one can better understand its intended meaning
and purpose.
Illustration of noscitur a sociis
Example: Professor Graham explained the noscitur a sociis rule with an
example involving an insured person who becomes bankrupt and is
unable to collect insurance proceeds in case of “illness, disability or
death.”
In legal terms, bankruptcy is seen as a form of disability because it
prevents a person from holding certain positions or offices. However,
according to the noscitur a sociis rule, even though bankruptcy is a form
of disability, it doesn’t entitle someone to collect insurance because the
word “disability” is associated with “illness” and “death” in this context.
In simpler words, when we look at this law, we can see that “disability”
here refers to a physical incapacity, as it is closely connected to the
concepts of “illness” and “death” mentioned alongside it in the same
provision.
Applicability of Rule of noscitur a sociis
The rule of noscitur a sociis is used when a word or phrase in a law can’t
be understood on its own. You need to consider the words around it to get
the full meaning.
There’s another legal saying that supports this idea: “qua non valeant
singular juna juvant,” which means “words that are ineffective on their
own become effective when considered together.”
Application of Rule of noscitur a sociis in the Indian Judiciary
There have been several notable cases in the courts where the noscitur a
sociis rule was applied, although it wasn’t always referred to by that exact
name. This chapter discusses some of these important cases without a
specific order.
One significant case where the rule of noscitur a sociis was thoroughly
discussed is the State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, dating back
to 1960, with a judgment authored by Justice Gajendragadkar. In this
case, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the rule, but it
examined its scope. The judgment clarified that the noscitur a sociis rule
is a tool for interpreting laws. It cannot be used when the legislative intent
is clear – that is, when lawmakers intentionally use broad and
unambiguous language. The judgment also outlined the rule’s scope,
stating that it can be employed when the legislative intent is unclear
because it associates broad words with those of narrower meaning.
In the case of State of Assam v. Ranga Muhammad, the court applied
the rule of noscitur a sociis to determine whether the High Court needed
to be consulted by the Governor when transferring a sitting Judge. The
court found that, in this context, the word “posting” was associated with
“appointments” and “promotions,” but it couldn’t be extended to include
“transfer.” Therefore, the Governor had to consult the High Court in such
a situation.
Subsequently, in the case of State of Karnataka v. UOI, clarification
was sought regarding Article 194 of the Constitution of India. The noscitur
a sociis rule was applied to determine whether the Article bestowed
powers on the legislature or on its members. The court used this principle
to argue that the word in question, “powers,” derived both its meaning
and context from the words used in relation to it.
In the case of Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan, Rule 2A of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, was interpreted using the noscitur a sociis rule. The
Supreme Court concluded that the words “and may also” in Rule 2-A
should not be understood as denoting a step that is permissible only in
addition to the attachment of the opposite party’s property.
In the case of Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise, the
Supreme Court succinctly explained the noscitur a sociis rule. They stated
that when words with analogous meanings are grouped together in an Act
of Parliament, they are understood in their related sense. These words
take on characteristics from one another and the broader term is
restricted to a meaning similar to the narrower term.
In the case of MK Jagannath v. Govt. of Madras, the meaning of the
term “any sale held without leave of the court” was interpreted alongside
the words “any attachment, distress or execution put in force.” This
interpretation implied that only sales involving court intervention were
covered by the section. Other sales, such as those to creditors, were
considered outside the scope of the section because they did not involve
court intervention.
Scope of Rule of noscitur a socii
The scope of “Noscitur a sociis” is primarily within the realm of legal
interpretation, particularly in statutory or contractual contexts. This Latin
principle, which means “it is known by its associates,” is used to help
determine the meaning of a word or phrase that may be unclear or
ambiguous in a legal document. Here’s an overview of its scope:
 Statutory Interpretation: “Noscitur a sociis” is commonly employed
when interpreting statutes or laws. It helps clarify the intended
meaning of a specific word or phrase within a statute by considering
the context of other words and phrases used in the same section or
provision.
 Contractual Interpretation: While primarily used in statutory
interpretation, this principle can also be applied to contracts. When
a term in a contract is unclear, examining the other terms and the
overall context of the agreement can help determine its meaning.
 Ambiguity Resolution: The principle is particularly useful when
dealing with ambiguity. If a word or phrase can be reasonably
interpreted in multiple ways, considering its association with other
words or phrases can provide clarity.
 Legislative Intent: “Noscitur a sociis” assists in discerning the
legislative or contractual intent. By looking at how a word is used
alongside others, it helps ensure that the interpretation aligns with
the broader purpose and objectives of the legal document.
 Avoiding Absurd or Unintended Outcomes: Applying this
principle can prevent absurd or unintended outcomes in legal
interpretations. It helps ensure that a word’s meaning is consistent
with the surrounding language and avoids interpretations that would
lead to illogical or unreasonable results.
Conclusion
“Noscitur a sociis” is a valuable tool in legal interpretation because it
helps ensure that the words and phrases in a legal text are understood in
a way that aligns with the overall legislative or contractual intent, rather
than in isolation, which could lead to misinterpretation or unintended
consequences.
It assists judges, lawyers and legal scholars in making sense of potentially
ambiguous language within the law.

Unit -7 Interpretation with Reference to the Subject Matter and

Purpose of Statutes:
Subject Matter of Statutes
The subject matter of a statute refers to the specific area, topic, or
domain that the legislation addresses. It represents the subject or field of
law that the statute is intended to regulate or govern. The subject matter
may vary widely, covering areas such as criminal law, family law, taxation,
environmental regulations, or contract law. Understanding the subject
matter is crucial as it provides the context for interpreting the provisions
of the statute and helps determine its scope and applicability.
Purpose of Statutes
The purpose of a statute refers to the underlying objective or goal that the
legislation seeks to achieve. Every statute is enacted to address a
particular issue, problem, or social concern. The purpose may include
promoting public safety, ensuring justice, protecting individual rights,
fostering economic growth, or regulating specific industries. Interpreting
statutes with reference to their purpose helps align the application of the
law with the legislative intent and societal goals.
Interpretation of statutes with Reference to Subject Matter
Interpreting statutes with reference to the subject matter involves
considering the specific area or field of law that the legislation pertains to.
This includes examining the terminology, concepts, and principles
relevant to that subject matter. By understanding the subject matter,
courts and legal practitioners can interpret the provisions of the statute in
a manner consistent with established legal principles and practices within
that particular field.
Interpretation of statutes with Reference to Purpose
Interpreting statutes with reference to the purpose requires analyzing the
intended objectives or goals of the legislation. This involves examining the
legislative history, policy considerations, and societal context that led to
the enactment of the statute. By aligning the interpretation with the
purpose, courts can ensure that the law achieves its intended aims and
advances the broader goals of justice, public welfare, or social progress.
Unit-8 Penal Statutes; Taxing Statutes, Welfare Legislation,
Prospective and Retrospective Operation.
Penal Statutes
Penal statutes, also known as criminal statutes, are laws enacted by
legislative bodies to define and prohibit conduct that is considered
harmful or against society’s interests. These statutes establish the
framework for criminal offenses and outline the penalties for individuals
who violate the law. Understanding penal statutes is crucial for
maintaining social order and ensuring the fair administration of justice.
Here are some key aspects and examples of penal statutes:
 Elements of the Offense: Penal statutes typically define the
elements that constitute a criminal offense. These elements include
the prohibited conduct (actus reus) and the mental state or intent
required to commit the offense (mens rea). For example, a penal
statute may state that “intentionally causing bodily harm to another
person” is a criminal offense. In this case, the act of causing bodily
harm is the actus reus, and the mental state of intention is the mens
rea.
 Classification of Offenses: Penal statutes categorize offenses based
on their seriousness. Offenses are often classified as misdemeanors
or felonies, with varying degrees of severity within each category.
Misdemeanors generally involve less serious offenses and carry
lighter penalties, such as fines or short-term imprisonment.
Felonies, on the other hand, are more serious crimes and may result
in longer imprisonment or significant fines. The classification of
offenses helps ensure that punishments are proportionate to the
severity of the offense committed.
 Prescribed Penalties: Penal statutes specify the penalties or
punishments for individuals convicted of criminal offenses. These
penalties can include fines, imprisonment, probation, community
service, or a combination of these. The severity of the penalty often
depends on the nature and severity of the offense. For example, a
penal statute may prescribe a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment
for up to five years for a particular offense.
 Defenses and Mitigating Factors: Penal statutes also address
potential defenses and mitigating factors that may affect the
culpability or punishment of the accused. Common defenses include
self-defense, necessity, duress, or lack of intent. Mitigating factors,
such as the defendant’s lack of criminal history or cooperation with
authorities, can result in reduced penalties. These provisions ensure
that the legal system considers relevant circumstances and provides
a fair and just resolution in criminal cases.
 Application and Enforcement: Penal statutes outline the procedures
for enforcing the law, including the powers and responsibilities of
law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and the judiciary. They
establish rules regarding the investigation, arrest, prosecution, and
 trial of individuals accused of criminal offenses. These provisions
help maintain due process and protect the rights of the accused
throughout the criminal justice process.
Examples of penal statutes include laws that criminalize offenses such as
murder, theft, assault, fraud, drug possession, and driving under the
influence (DUI). Each offense is defined by specific elements and carries
its own penalties as prescribed by the relevant penal statute. The precise
wording and provisions of penal statutes can vary across jurisdictions,
reflecting the unique legal frameworks and societal norms of each
jurisdiction.
In summary, penal statutes are laws that define criminal offenses,
establish penalties, and guide the enforcement of criminal law. They play
a crucial role in maintaining social order, deterring crime, and ensuring
justice. Understanding these statutes is essential for both legal
professionals and individuals to navigate the legal system and uphold the
principles of fairness and accountability.
Taxing Statutes
Taxing statutes are laws enacted by legislative bodies to impose taxes on
individuals, businesses, or other entities to generate revenue for the
government. These statutes define the scope of taxable activities,
establish the tax rates, determine the obligations of taxpayers, and
provide guidelines for tax collection and enforcement. Understanding
taxing statutes is important for individuals and businesses to comply with
tax laws and fulfill their tax obligations. Here are some key aspects and
examples of taxing statutes:
 Types of Taxes: Taxing statutes encompass various types of taxes
imposed by the government. Examples include income tax, sales
tax, property tax, corporate tax, value-added tax (VAT), excise tax,
and customs duties. Each type of tax has its own set of rules and
regulations outlined in the relevant taxing statute.
 Taxable Activities: Taxing statutes define the activities or events
that are subject to taxation. For instance, income tax statutes
specify the types of income (such as wages, salaries, investment
income) that are taxable. Sales tax statutes outline the taxable
goods and services and the conditions under which they are subject
to tax. Property tax statutes determine the criteria for assessing the
value of taxable properties.
 Tax Rates and Calculations: Taxing statutes establish the rates at
which taxes are levied. The rates can be fixed, progressive (varying
based on income or value), or a combination of both. The taxing
statute provides guidelines on how to calculate the tax liability
based on the applicable rates. For example, an income tax statute
 may specify different tax brackets and corresponding rates for
different income levels.
 Deductions, Exemptions, and Credits: Taxing statutes often provide
provisions for deductions, exemptions, and credits that reduce the
tax liability. These provisions allow taxpayers to reduce their taxable
income or claim specific benefits, such as deductions for certain
expenses, exemptions for dependents, or credits for specific
activities (e.g., renewable energy investments). The taxing statute
outlines the eligibility criteria and conditions for claiming such
deductions, exemptions, or credits.
 Filing and Payment Obligations: Taxing statutes prescribe the
procedures for filing tax returns and making tax payments. They
specify the deadlines for filing returns, payment due dates, and any
penalties or interest for late or non-payment. The statutes may also
require taxpayers to maintain records, provide supporting
documentation, or comply with reporting requirements to ensure
accurate assessment and collection of taxes.
 Tax Collection and Enforcement: Taxing statutes provide guidelines
for tax collection and enforcement mechanisms. They empower tax
authorities to conduct audits, investigations, and assessments to
ensure compliance with tax laws. The statutes outline the penalties
and consequences for tax evasion, non-compliance, or fraudulent
activities. They also establish procedures for appealing tax
assessments or disputing tax liabilities.
It’s important to note that taxing statutes can vary across jurisdictions,
reflecting the specific tax policies and legal frameworks of each
jurisdiction. Therefore, individuals and businesses should refer to the
specific taxing statutes applicable to their jurisdiction to understand their
tax obligations fully.
In summary, taxing statutes are laws that govern the imposition,
calculation, collection, and enforcement of taxes. They define the types of
taxes, taxable activities, tax rates, deductions, exemptions, and payment
obligations. Understanding taxing statutes is crucial for taxpayers to
comply with tax laws, fulfill their obligations, and avoid penalties or legal
consequences.
Welfare Legislation
Welfare legislation refers to laws and programs designed to provide
assistance, support, and social welfare benefits to individuals or groups in
need. The primary objective of welfare legislation is to promote the well-
being and improve the quality of life for vulnerable populations. These
laws address various social and economic issues and aim to ensure a
basic standard of living for those who are unable to fully support
themselves. Here are some key aspects and examples of welfare
legislation:
 Social Assistance Programs: Welfare legislation often establishes
social assistance programs that provide financial support to
individuals or families who are experiencing financial hardship.
These programs may include cash assistance, food stamps, housing
assistance, and healthcare coverage. For example, the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in the United States
provides financial assistance to low-income families with dependent
children.
 Social Insurance Programs: Welfare legislation also encompasses
social insurance programs that provide benefits based on
contributions made by individuals or their employers. These
programs aim to protect individuals against risks such as
unemployment, disability, or retirement. Examples include
unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and social
security programs. Social security programs, such as the Social
Security Administration in the United States, provide retirement
benefits, disability benefits, and survivor benefits to eligible
individuals.
 Health and Medical Assistance: Welfare legislation often includes
provisions for healthcare and medical assistance programs to
ensure access to essential healthcare services. These programs may
provide coverage for low-income individuals or specific vulnerable
populations. For instance, Medicaid in the United States is a welfare
program that provides healthcare coverage for individuals and
families with limited income.
 Housing Assistance: Welfare legislation may address housing needs
by providing assistance for affordable housing or rental subsidies to
low-income individuals or families. These programs aim to reduce
homelessness and improve access to safe and affordable housing.
Examples include public housing programs, housing vouchers, or
rental assistance programs.
 Child and Family Support: Welfare legislation frequently includes
provisions to support the well-being of children and families. These
programs may provide child care subsidies, child support
enforcement, foster care services, or programs promoting child
welfare and protection. They aim to ensure the safety, development,
and stability of children and families in need.
 Education and Training: Some welfare legislation includes provisions
for educational and training programs to enhance skills,
employability, and self-sufficiency. These programs aim to break the
 cycle of poverty by providing opportunities for individuals to gain
education, vocational training, or job placement assistance.
It’s important to note that welfare legislation can vary across jurisdictions,
reflecting the unique social, economic, and political contexts of each
region or country. The specific programs, eligibility criteria, and benefits
provided may differ. Individuals seeking assistance or benefits should
refer to the applicable welfare legislation in their jurisdiction to
understand the available support and the requirements for eligibility.
In summary, welfare legislation encompasses laws and programs that
provide support, assistance, and social welfare benefits to individuals or
groups in need. It includes social assistance programs, social insurance
programs, healthcare assistance, housing support, child and family
support, and educational or training initiatives. The primary goal is to
ensure the well-being and improve the quality of life for vulnerable
populations, promoting social justice and equality.

Prospective and Retrospective Operation

Prospective and retrospective operation are concepts that determine the
temporal scope or effect of a law or statute. These terms refer to whether
the law applies to future events (prospective) or past events
(retrospective). Understanding these concepts is important in legal
interpretation to determine the application and potential impact of a law.
Here are explanations and examples of prospective and retrospective
operation:
 Prospective Operation: Prospective operation means that a law
applies only to events or circumstances that occur after its
enactment or effective date. This means that the law governs future
conduct or situations. When a law has prospective operation, it does
not affect rights, obligations, or events that occurred before its
enactment.
Example: Suppose a new tax law is passed on January 1, 2023, with
prospective operation. This law would apply to all taxable events that
occur on or after January 1, 2023. Taxpayers would need to comply with
the new law for their income or transactions from that date onward, but
any income or transactions that occurred prior to January 1, 2023, would
be governed by the previous tax law.
 Retrospective Operation: Retrospective operation means that a law
applies to events, conduct, or circumstances that occurred in the
past. It retroactively changes the legal consequences of actions that
took place before the law came into effect. Retroactive laws can
 affect vested rights, obligations, or legal consequences that arose
prior to their enactment.
Example: Suppose a new criminal law is passed on January 1, 2023, with
retrospective operation. The law criminalizes a certain action that was
previously legal. This means that individuals who engaged in that action
before January 1, 2023, can be prosecuted and punished under the new
law, even though their conduct was lawful at the time it occurred.
It’s important to note that the prospective or retrospective operation of a
law is subject to constitutional limitations, fairness considerations, and
legal principles specific to each jurisdiction. Courts may interpret the
legislative intent and the nature of the rights affected by the law to
determine its temporal scope. In summary, prospective operation means a
law applies only to future events or circumstances, while retrospective
operation means a law applies to past events or circumstances.
Understanding these concepts is crucial in legal interpretation to
determine how a law impacts rights, obligations, and events in relation to
its enactment.
Conclusion
Interpretation with reference to the subject matter and purpose of
statutes is essential for understanding and applying legislation effectively.
The subject matter provides the necessary context and framework for
interpreting the provisions within a specific field of law. The purpose helps
align the interpretation with the intended objectives and broader societal
goals of the legislation. By considering both the subject matter and
purpose, courts can ensure the proper application and realization of the
legislative intent.

Unit-9 Principles of Constitutional Interpretation: Harmonious

Construction; Doctrine of Pith and Substance; Doctrine of
Colourable Legislation; Occupied Field; Repugnancy.
What are the Principles of Constitutional Interpretation?
The principles of constitutional interpretation guide courts in
understanding and applying the Constitution. These principles ensure that
the Constitution remains relevant and adaptable to changing societal
needs. Key principles include:
1. Literal Interpretation: Focusing on the plain meaning of the text.
 2. Harmonious Construction: Ensuring that different provisions of
the Constitution do not conflict and are interpreted in a way that all
can coexist.
3. Doctrine of Pith and Substance: Determining the true nature of
legislation to ascertain its constitutional validity.
4. Doctrine of Colourable Legislation: Preventing legislatures from
doing indirectly what they cannot do directly under the Constitution.
5. Doctrine of Severability: Allowing parts of a law that are
unconstitutional to be severed, keeping the rest of the law intact.
Various principles of constitutional interpretation guide this process and
the following are some of the most frequently discussed in judicial
decisions.
1. Principle of Colourable Legislation
The doctrine of colourable legislation addresses situations where the
legislature, within the constraints of the Constitution, attempts to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly. This principle of constitutional
interpretation is based on the Latin maxim “Quando aliquid prohibetur ex
directo, prohibetur et per obliquum,” meaning that what is prohibited
directly is also prohibited indirectly.
Key Features:
 Legislative Competence: The principle is primarily concerned
with whether a legislature has the authority to enact a particular
law.
 No Examination of Motives: It does not involve questions of
legislative bona fides or mala fides (good or bad faith).
 Direct vs. Indirect Legislation: The doctrine comes into play
when a legislature tries to achieve an objective indirectly that it
cannot achieve directly due to constitutional constraints.
 Application in India: This doctrine is often applied concerning
Article 246, which delineates the legislative competencies of the
Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies through the Union,
State and Concurrent Lists in the Seventh Schedule.
In cases where the legislature tries to enact laws under the guise of
legitimate objectives while circumventing constitutional limitations, courts
use this principle to determine the validity of such laws.
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, 1952
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh challenged the constitutional validity of
the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The Act stipulated that the rent from
the landlord’s land, prior to the state’s acquisition of the holding, would
vest with the state. However, half of this rent was to be returned to the
landlord as compensation.
The Supreme Court held that this provision amounted to naked
confiscation. The act of taking the entire rent and returning only half was
essentially the same as taking half without compensation. While the Act
purported to lay down principles for compensation, its actual objective
was confiscation—a subject falling under the Concurrent List.
Consequently, the Court deemed the Bihar Land Reforms Act as
colourable legislation, rendering it void.
Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights v. Union of India,
1997
In Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights v. Union of India, the
Supreme Court clarified the application of the doctrine of colourable
legislation. The doctrine is pertinent only when:
 The true intention behind a legislation is disguised.
 There is an intent to encroach upon the domain of another
legislature.
The purpose of a legislation might differ from its apparent objective.
However, it does not constitute colourable legislation if the issue does not
pertain to the legislative competence to enact it. The doctrine does not
consider whether the legislation was enacted with bona fide or mala fide
intentions. The only relevant question is whether the substance of the
statute falls within the legislative domain of the enacting body.
2. Principle of Pith and Substance
The principle of pith and substance is used to determine the true nature
and essential character of a legislation, especially when there is a conflict
regarding legislative competencies between the Union and State
legislatures.
Key Features:
 True Nature and Substance: “Pith” refers to the true nature or
essence of something, while “substance” refers to its most
important or essential part.
 Resolution of Conflicts: This doctrine of constitutional
interpretation helps resolve conflicts by determining which
legislative field (Union List, State List or Concurrent List) a particular
piece of legislation falls into.
 Intra Vires vs. Ultra Vires: If the pith and substance of the
legislation fall within the legislative competence of the enacting
 body, it is deemed intra vires (within powers), even if it incidentally
encroaches upon matters outside its jurisdiction.
State of Bombay v. FN Balsara
In State of Bombay v. FN Balsara, the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, which
prohibited the sale and possession of liquor, was challenged for
encroaching upon the Union List. The court upheld the act because its pith
and substance fell under the State List, despite incidental encroachments
on the Union List.
Premchand Jain v. R.K. Chhabra, 1984
In the case of Premchand Jain v. R.K. Chhabra (1984), the Supreme Court
reiterated that incidental encroachment does not render an enactment
invalid. The Court held that if a law primarily falls within the legislative
powers granted by the Constitution to the enacting legislature, it remains
valid even if it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another
legislature.
State of Bombay v. Narottamdas, 1950
In State of Bombay v. Narottamdas (1950), the Supreme Court held that
to validate incidental encroachment, it must be shown that the pith and
substance of the law lie within the enacting legislature’s domain. The
validity of a statute is determined by its true nature, not merely by the
degree of encroachment. If the core purpose and essence (pith and
substance) of the law fall within the legislative powers of the enacting
body, the law is upheld.
Krishna v. State of Madras, 1956
The Madras Prohibition Act, enacted in 1937, faced a challenge over a
decade later for prescribing procedures and principles of evidence for
trials. The appellants argued that the Act contradicted the central Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973. However, the court upheld the Act, stating that it
was ancillary to the central legislation. The court concluded that the Act,
in its pith and substance, pertained to intoxicating liquors—a matter
within the state list.
3. Principle of Eclipse
The doctrine of eclipse states that a law inconsistent with fundamental
rights is not entirely invalid but remains inoperative to the extent of the
inconsistency. This inconsistency can be removed through constitutional
amendments, thereby reviving the law.
Key Features:
 Inoperative vs. Invalid: The law does not become null and void
but is overshadowed by the fundamental right.
  Constitutional Amendments: The eclipse can be removed if a
constitutional amendment eliminates the inconsistency.
 Pre-Constitution Laws: This principle particularly applies to laws
that existed before the commencement of the Constitution and
became inoperative due to conflicts with fundamental rights.
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay
In the landmark case of Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of
Bombay, the issue revolved around a law that existed before the Indian
Constitution came into force. This pre-constitution law imposed
restrictions on the right to practice any profession, trade or business,
which is guaranteed to citizens of India under Article 19(1)(g).
Key Points of the Case:
 Existing Law: The law in question was already in force when the
Constitution was enacted.
 Inconsistency with Fundamental Rights: The restrictions
imposed by this law could not be justified as reasonable under
clause (6) of Article 19, which allows for reasonable restrictions on
the right to practice any profession, trade or business.
 Article 13(1): According to Article 13(1), any pre-constitution law
that is inconsistent with the fundamental rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution becomes void to the extent of such
inconsistency.
Supreme Court’s Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the law did not become void in its entirety or
for all purposes, times and persons. Instead, it became void only “to the
extent of such inconsistency.” This meant that the law remained valid
except for the parts that were inconsistent with the fundamental rights
enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.
The Court clarified that the law’s invalidity was limited to its conflict with
the new constitutional provisions. As a result, the law was not entirely
abrogated but was rendered inoperative only to the extent that it
infringed upon the fundamental rights of the citizens.
4. Principle of Severability
The doctrine of severability, provided for under Article 13 of the Indian
Constitution, states that if parts of a law are unconstitutional, those parts
can be severed, leaving the rest of the law intact and enforceable.
Key Features:
  Severable vs. Inseverable: The unconstitutional provisions are
severed if the remaining law can still function independently and
effectively.
 Constitutional Provisions: This principles of constitutional
interpretation states that laws that contravene fundamental rights
are void to the extent of inconsistency.
 Preservation of Legislation: Courts strive to preserve as much of
the legislation as possible by severing only the unconstitutional
parts.
AK Gopalan v. State of Madras
In AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, the Supreme Court said that in case of
repugnancy to the Constitution, only the repugnant provision of the
impugned Act will be void and not the whole of it and every attempt
should be made to save as much as possible of the Act.
If the omission of the invalid part will not change the nature or the
structure of the object of the legislature, it is severable. It was held that
except Section 14 all other sections of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950
were valid and since Section 14 could be severed from the rest of the Act,
the detention of the petitioner was not illegal.
5. Principle of Territorial Nexus
The principle of territorial nexus allows for legislation to have an effect
beyond the territorial limits of the enacting body, provided there is a
sufficient connection between the subject matter and the territory.
Key Features:
 Extra-Territorial Operation: Article 245(2) clarifies that
Parliament’s laws are not invalid due to extra-territorial operation.
 Sufficient Connection: There must be a real and substantial
connection between the law and the territory.
 Taxation and Other Laws: Often applied in cases involving
taxation where the subject matter is outside the territorial limits but
has a significant nexus with the state.
State of Bombay v. RMDC, 1957
In State of Bombay v. RMDC (1957), the legality of a lump sum tax
imposed by the Bombay Government on lotteries was challenged. The
lottery in question was conducted through a newspaper that had wide
circulation within the State of Bombay and outside its boundaries. The tax
extended to the circulation and distribution of newspapers that were
published outside the state.
The Supreme Court upheld the tax, stating that there was sufficient
territorial nexus to justify the imposition of the tax. The critical factor was
that the collection of entry fees for the lottery competition took place
within Bombay. Despite the newspapers’ wide circulation beyond the
state’s borders, the locus of the taxable activity—entry fee collection—
was within Bombay. Therefore, the court concluded that the tax was valid
due to the substantial and real connection between the activity being
taxed and the territory of Bombay.
State of Bombay v. Narayandas Mangilal, 1957
In State of Bombay v. Narayandas Mangilal (1957), the Supreme
Court addressed the validity of a law enacted by the Bombay legislature
that criminalised bigamous marriages. This law extended to marriages
conducted outside Bombay if one of the parties was domiciled in Bombay.
The Supreme Court struck down the law, citing an insufficient territorial
nexus. The Court reasoned that the law could not apply to marriages
performed outside the state merely because one party was domiciled in
Bombay. The connection between the act of marriage outside the state
and the domicile of one party within the state was deemed too tenuous to
sustain the legislative authority of Bombay over such marriages. Hence,
the lack of a substantial and real connection led to the law being
invalidated for its overreach beyond territorial jurisdiction.
6. Principle of Implied Powers
The doctrine of implied powers holds that powers not explicitly stated but
necessary for the execution of constitutionally granted powers are also
valid.
Key Features:
 Necessity and Proper Clause: Powers necessary and proper for
executing granted powers are implied.
 Constitutional Interpretation: General terms in constitutional
grants of power or restraints lead to implied powers or restraints.
 Execution of Powers: Ensures that the legislative and executive
branches can effectively perform their constitutionally assigned
duties.
Legal Basis: This principle is rooted in the functional and purposive
interpretation of the Constitution, ensuring that the spirit of constitutional
provisions is fulfilled even when not explicitly stated.
7. Doctrine of Harmonious Construction
The doctrine of harmonious construction is a judicial principle used to
resolve conflicts between different provisions of the same statute. It
operates on the presumption that the legislature did not intend for one
provision to negate or contradict another and that every provision should
be given effect to the fullest extent possible.
Key Principles of Harmonious Construction:
1. Avoiding Neglect of Provisions: The legislature does not intend
to prioritise one provision over another, nor does it intend to create
contradictions.
2. Ensuring Coherence: Conflicting provisions should be interpreted
in a manner that allows both to coexist without rendering any part
ineffective or redundant.
Sultana Begum v. Premchand Jain, 1996
In this case, the Supreme Court elaborated on the doctrine, stating that
conflicting provisions should be interpreted to ensure neither is ignored.
The court emphasised the need to read the statute as a whole and to
construe it in a way that maintains the effectiveness of all its provisions.
Jagdish Singh v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, 1997
Here, the Supreme Court reiterated the need to read statutes
harmoniously, ensuring that no provision becomes ineffective. The court
emphasised that the objective of harmonious construction is to avoid
conflict and promote the smooth functioning of the legislative intent.
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, 1951
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India addressed the objective of harmonious
construction by stating that when two articles of the Constitution are
broadly phrased and conflict in their operation, they should be controlled
and qualified by each other to maintain harmony.
Ram Krishan v. Vinod, 1951
In this case, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict within the
Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 33 allowed government
servants to nominate candidates, while Section 123 prohibited them from
assisting candidates except by voting. The Court harmoniously construed
these provisions, allowing government servants to nominate and vote for
candidates, but prohibiting any other form of assistance.
Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, 1955
Bengal Immunity Co v State of Bihar highlighted the limits of the doctrine.
The Court held that conflicting provisions should be interpreted to allow
both to be effective. However, if it is impossible to harmonise the
provisions, the less useful provision can be ignored, provided there is no
compulsion to adopt it.
8. Doctrine of Repugnancy
The doctrine of repugnancy addresses conflicts between state and central
laws in India. Article 254 of the Indian Constitution provides the
framework for resolving such conflicts.
Article 254(1)
Article 254(1) states that if a state law is repugnant (i.e., incompatible)
with:
 A law that the Parliament is competent to enact, or
 An existing law under the Concurrent List,
then the central or existing law prevails and the state law is void to the
extent of the repugnancy. The chronology of the laws’ enactment is
irrelevant.
Key Points:
 Central Law Prevails: In case of conflict, the central law overrides
the state law.
 Repugnant Provisions: The conflicting parts of the state law do
not become ultra vires (beyond powers); they are merely eclipsed. If
the central law is repealed, the state law provisions become
operative again.
 Doctrine of Pith and Substance: This doctrine is used to
determine if the true nature of the state law falls under a matter
listed in the Concurrent List. If the repugnancy is with a central law,
it must be assessed whether Parliament intended to create an
exhaustive code on the matter. If not, any qualifications or
restrictions by the state law are not considered repugnant.
Article 254(2)
Article 254(2) provides an exception where a state law on a concurrent
matter, repugnant to a central law, can prevail if it receives Presidential
assent. However, this only applies to the state concerned and not
uniformly across the country.
Key Points:
 Presidential Assent: The state law can override the central law if
it receives Presidential assent, but it must be specified that the
assent is sought for the repugnancy with a particular act. Failing to
specify this makes the state law invalid.
 State-Specific Application: The inconsistent provisions apply only
within the state that enacted the law.
  Subsequent Central Laws: If the central government enacts a
new law conflicting with the state act that had Presidential assent,
the central law prevails, as held in Pt. Rishikesh v. Salma Begum
(1995).
Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka, 1987
The case involved a state law restricting legal practitioners from
appearing before land tribunals. The Supreme Court found the state law
invalid due to its repugnancy to the Advocates Act, 1961.
Sukumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, 1993
The West Bengal State Health Service Act, 1990, barred state health
service members from private practice, conflicting with the Indian Medical
Council Act, 1956, which allowed practitioners to practice anywhere in
India. The Court upheld the state law, distinguishing it from the Srinivasa
Raghavachar case by noting that health service members voluntarily
gave up private practice rights.
Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, 1990
This case held that repugnancy must concern a matter in the Concurrent
List. If the subject matters of the conflicting laws are different, both can
stand together. However, a dissenting opinion argued that irreconcilable
conflicts should lead to the state law being struck down.
Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Education &
Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1996
This case dealt with a Tamil Nadu statute on the affiliation of medical
colleges, challenged for repugnance against the Indian Medical Council
Act. The Court held that Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive
code for the subject, making the state act invalid.
8.Doctrine of Occupied Field
The Doctrine of Occupied Field is a principle in constitutional law that
addresses situations where legislative powers are distributed between two
levels of government, such as federal and state governments. The
doctrine is applied to resolve conflicts between laws enacted by the two
levels of government in areas where their powers overlap.
Key Aspects of the Doctrine:
1. Legislative Supremacy in Concurrent Lists:
In federations like India, the Constitution often divides legislative powers
into three lists: Union List, State List, and Concurrent List. If both federal
(Union) and state governments legislate on a subject in the Concurrent
List, the federal law usually prevails, provided it explicitly "occupies the
field."
2. Precedence of Central Laws:
When a central law fully occupies a legislative field, states cannot enact
conflicting laws on the same subject. If they do, the state law will be
overridden to the extent of the inconsistency, as per the doctrine.
3. Relevance in the Indian Context: Article 254 of the Indian
Constitution governs this principle. It provides that if there is a conflict
between laws made by Parliament and laws made by a state legislature
on a subject in the Concurrent List, the law made by Parliament will
prevail.
However, a state law that receives Presidential assent can prevail over a
conflicting central law, except where Parliament subsequently amends or
repeals the central law.

4. Doctrine of Pith and Substance:

Courts may also consider whether the impugned law intrudes into the
"occupied field" only incidentally. If the intrusion is marginal and the law
primarily pertains to the state's jurisdiction, it may still be upheld.
Example:
If Parliament enacts a law regulating industries under the Concurrent List
and a state legislature enacts a law on the same subject with conflicting
provisions, the central law will prevail unless the state law receives
Presidential assent.
This doctrine ensures clarity and prevents legislative chaos in a federal
structure, maintaining the supremacy of federal laws while allowing state
autonomy within prescribed limits.
Conclusion
These principles of constitutional interpretation play a critical role in
maintaining the balance of power between different branches of
government, protecting individual rights and ensuring the Constitution
remains a living document capable of addressing contemporary issues. By
applying these doctrines, courts can interpret the Constitution in a
manner that respects its text and underlying principles while adapting to
changing societal needs.