Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy

Author(s): OLE R. HOLSTI

Source: Diplomatic History , Winter 1989, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 15-43
Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24911837

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Models of International Relations
and Foreign Policy

OLE R. HOLSTE

Universities and professional associations usually are organized in ways

that tend to separate scholars in adjoining disciplines and perhaps even to
promote stereotypes of each other and their scholarly endeavors. The
seemingly natural areas of scholarly convergence between diplomatic
historians and political scientists who focus on international relations have
been underexploited, but there are also a few welcome signs that this may be
changing. These include recent essays suggesting ways in which the two
disciplines can contribute to each other; a number of prize-winning
dissertations, later turned into books, by political scientists during the past
decade that effectively combine political science theories and historical
research and materials; collaborative efforts among scholars in the two
disciplines; and the appearance of such interdisciplinary journals as
International Security that provide an outlet for historians and political
scientists with common interests.1

I have greatly benefited from helpful comments by Alexander L. George, Joseph

Grieco, Michael J. Hogan, Timothy Lomperis, Roy Melbourne, James N. Rosenau, and
Andrew M. Scott on earlier drafts of this paper, and also from reading K. J. Holsti, The
Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London, 1985).
* See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political
Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," International Security 12 (Summer
1987): 3-21; John English, "The Second Time Around: Political Scientists Writing
History," Canadian Historical Review 57 (March 1986): 1-16; Jack S. Levy, "Domestic
Politics and War," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 653-73; Joseph S.
Nye, Jr., "International Security Studies," in American Defense Annual, 1988-1989, ed.
Joseph Kruzel (Lexington, MA, 1988), 231—43; Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment:
A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, 1985); Timothy Lomperis, The War Everyone
Lost—And Won: America's Intervention in Viet Nam's Twin Struggles (Washington, 1987);
Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars (Ithaca, 1984); Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches to
History, Theory, and Policy (New York, 1979); and Richard R. Neustadt and Ernest R. May,

15

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 16 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

This essay is an effort to

between the two disciplines
and "models" that politica
international relations durin
to the entire range of model
only because the period ha
perhaps the models described
representative works, will
sketchy, road map toward
neighboring discipline.
Because "classical realism" i
international relations, it p
comparison with competing
in hyperbole when he questio
relations has advanced sign
acknowledge that the latte
concepts that are not foreig
politics.2
Following a discussion of classical realism, an examination of "modern
realism" will identify the continuities and differences between the two
approaches. The essay then turns to several models that challenge one or
more core premises of both classical and modern realism. The first two
challengers focus on the system level: Global-Society/Complex
Interdependence models and Marxist/World-System/Dependency models.
Subsequent sections discuss several "decision-making" models, all of which
share a skepticism about the adequacy of theories that focus on the structure
of the international system while neglecting political processes within units
that comprise the system.
Three limitations should be stated at the outset. Each of the three
systemic and three decision-making approaches described below is a
composite of several models; limitations of space have made it necessary to
focus on the common denominators rather than on subtle differences among
them. This discussion will also avoid purely methodological issues and
debates; for example, what Stanley Hoffmann calls "the battle of the literates
versus the numerates."3 Finally, efforts of some political scientists to
develop "formal" or mathematical approaches to international relations are
neglected here; such abstract, often ahistorical models are likely to be of
limited interest to historians.4 With these caveats, let me turn now to

Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision-Makers (New York, 1986). Many other
examples could be cited.
Robert Gilpin, Change and War in World Politics (Cambridge, England, 1981).
^ Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," Daedalus
106 (Summer 1977): 54.
^ The British meteorologist Lewis Fry Richardson is generally regarded as the pioneer
of mathematical approaches to international relations. See his Statistics of Deadly Quarrels
(Pittsburgh, 1960); and his Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and
Origins of War (Chicago, 1960). These are summarized for nonmathematicians in Anatol

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 17

classical realism, the first of the systemic models

essay.
There have always been Americans, such as Alexander Hamilton, who
viewed international relations from a realist perspective, but its contemporary
intellectual roots are largely European. Three important figures of the
interwar period probably had the greatest impact on American scholarship:
the historian E. H. Carr, the geographer Nicholas Spykman, and the
political theorist Hans J. Morgenthau. Other Europeans who have
contributed significantly to realist thought include John Herz, Hedley Bull,
Raymond Aron, and Martin Wight, while notable Americans of this school
include scholars Arnold Wolfers and Norman Graebner, as well as diplomat
George F. Kennan, journalist Walter Lippmann, and theologian Reinhold
Niebuhr.5
Although realists do not constitute a homogeneous school—any more
than do any of the others discussed in this essay—most of them share at least
five core premises about international relations. To begin with, they view as
central questions the causes of war and the conditions of peace. They also
regard the structure of the international system as a necessary if not always
sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations. According
to classical realists, "structural anarchy," or the absence of a central authority
to settle disputes, is the essential feature of the contemporary system, and it
gives rise to the "security dilemma": in a self-help system one nation's
search for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure,
any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system
absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms races
and other types of hostile interactions. Consequently, the question of
relative capabilities is a crucial factor. Efforts to deal with this central
element of the international system constitute the driving force behind the
relations of units within the system; those that fail to cope will not survive.
Thus, unlike "idealists" or "liberal internationalists," classical realists view
conflict as a natural state of affairs rather than a consequence that can be

Rapport, "L. F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution

1 (September 1957): 249-99. For a more recent effort see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War
Trap (New Haven, 1981); and idem, "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility
Model," American Political Science Review 79 (March 1985): 156-77.
^ Among the works that best represent their realist perspectives are E. H. Carr, Twenty
Years' Crisis (London, 1939); Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The
United States and Balance of Power (New York, 1942); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York, 1973); John Herz,
International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York, 1959); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical
Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977); Raymond Aron, Peace and War
(Garden City, NY, 1966); Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in
The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honor of C. A. W. Manning, ed. Alan James
(London, 1973); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962); Norman A.
Graebner, America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan
(Wilmington, DE, 1984); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago,
1951); Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943); and
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York, 1945).

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 18 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

attributed to historical circ

systems, or inadequate interna
A third premise that unites classical realists is their focus on
geographically based groups as the central actors in the international system.
During other periods the major entities may have been city states or empires,
but at least since the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), states have been the
dominant units. Classical realists also agree that state behavior is rational.
The assumption behind this fourth premise is that states are guided by the
logic of the "national interest," usually defined in terms of survival, security,
power, and relative capabilities. To Morgenthau, for example, "rational
foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits." Although the
national interest may vary according to specific circumstances, the similarity
of motives among nations permits the analyst to reconstruct the logic of
policymakers in their pursuit of national interests—what Morgenthau called
the "rational hypothesis"—and to avoid the fallacies of "concern with
motives and concern with ideological preferences."7
Finally, the nation-state can also be conceptualized as a unitary actor.
Because the central problems for states are starkly defined by the nature of the
international system, their actions are primarily a response to external rather
than domestic political forces. At best, the latter provide very weak
explanations for external policy. According to Stephen Krasner, for example,
the state "can be treated as an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated
with power and the general interest of the society."8 However, classical
realists sometimes use domestic politics as a residual category to explain
deviations from rational policies.
Realism has been the dominant model of international relations during at
least the past five decades, perhaps in part because it seemed to provide a
useful framework for understanding World War II and the Cold War.
Nevertheless, the classical versions articulated by Morgenthau and others
have received a good deal of critical scrutiny. The critics have included
scholars who accept the basic premises of realism but who found that in at
least four important respects these theories lacked sufficient precision and
rigor.
Classical realism usually has been grounded in a pessimistic theory of
human nature, either a theological version (e.g., St. Augustine and Reinhold
Niebuhr), or a secular one (e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Morgenthau).
Egoism and self-interested behavior are not limited to a few evil or misguided
leaders, as the idealists would have it, but are basic to homo politicus and
thus are at the core of a realist theory. But according to its critics, because

® For useful comparisons of realism and liberalism see Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the
Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,"
International Organization 42 (Summer 1988): 485-507; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
"Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics 40 (January 1988): 235-51.
7 Morgenthau, Politics, 7, 5.
" Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and
U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1978), 33. Krasner's study compares realist, interest-group
liberal, and Marxist theories.

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 19

human nature, if it means anything, is a constant rath

an unsatisfactory explanation for the full range of int
human nature explains war and conflict, what ac
cooperation? In order to avoid this problem, most mod
their attention from human nature to the structure of t
to explain state behavior.
In addition, critics have noted a lack of precision an
in the way classical realists use such concepts
interest," and "balance of power."9 They also see p
between the central descriptive and prescriptive eleme
On the one hand, nations and their leaders "think and a
defined as power," but, on the other, statesmen are ur
and self-restraint, as well as to recognize the legitimat
other nations.10 Power plays a central role in clas
correlation between the relative power balance and pol
less than compelling, suggesting the need to enric
variables. Moreover, the distinction between "pow
"useable options" is especially important in the nuclea
While classical realists have tvnicallv looked to historv and political
science for insights and evidence, the search for greater precision has led
many modern realists to look elsewhere for appropriate models, analogies,
metaphors, and insights. The discipline of choice is often economics, from
which modern realists have borrowed a number of tools and concepts,
including rational choice, expected utility, theories of firms and markets,
bargaining theory, and game theory. Contrary to the assertion of some
critics, however, modern realists share rather than reject the core premises of
their classical predecessors.11
The quest for precision has yielded a rich harvest of theories and models,
and a somewhat less bountiful crop of supporting empirical applications.
Drawing in part on game theory, Morton Kaplan described several types of
international systems—for example, balance-of-power, loose bipolar, tight
bipolar, universal, hierarchical, and a unit-veto system in which any action
requires the unanimous approval of all its members. He then outlined the
essential rules that constitute these systems. For example, the rules for a
balance-of-power system are: "(1) increase capabilities, but negotiate rather
than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting

9 Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York, 1962); James S.
Rosenau, "National Interest," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 11
(New York, 1968), 34-40; Alexander L. George and Robert Keohane, "The Concept of
National Interests: Uses and Limitations," in Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign
Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, ed. Alexander George (Boulder, 1980);
Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" World
Politics 5 (July 1953): 442-77; Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of
Power," Journal of Peace Research 4, no. 3 (1967): 270-88.
10 Morgenthau, Politics, 5.
' ' Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization 38
(Spring 1984): 225-86.

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20 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

rather than eliminate an esse

actor that tends to assume a p
constrain actors who subscrib
(6) permit defeated or constra
Richard Rosecrance, J. David S
others, although not necessari
seek to understand internat
explanations. Andrew M. Sco
catalogue of propositions abou
quest for greater precision in s
Kenneth Waltz's Theory of I
effort to develop a rigorou
"structural" realism, has ten
during the past decade. It fo
influential book in which W
theory of war must include
image") and not just first (t
attributes) images. Why war
prevent it.14
Theory of International Re
microeconomics; internation
markets and firms. Oligopoly
interdependent choice in a self
his attention to a structural t
task of linking it to a theory o
can be joined in a single theo
level analysts, including Mo
Rosecrance, Karl Deutsch and
with various errors, including
terms of the attributes or intera
In order to avoid reductionis
erects his theory on the found
structure of the international
by which the system is order
decentralized rather than hiera

13 Morton Kaplan, System and Pr

13 Richard Rosecrance, Action an
idem, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity,
(September 1966): 314-27; Kenneth
(Summer 1964); 881-909; J. David
American Political Science Review
Model of Competitive Internationa
Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Sin
Stability," World Politics 16 (April
International Political System (New
^ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of Inte
the State, and War (New York, 1959)

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 21

each unit is formally equal.15 A second defining prop

of the units. An anarchic system is composed of simi
therefore the functions that they perform are also simil
for example, all have the task of providing for th
contrast, a hierarchical system would be character
division of labor, as is the case in domestic politi
distribution of capabilities among units in the system
are a unit-level attribute, the distribution of capabili
concept.16
A change in any of these elements constitutes a change in system
structure. The first element of structure as defined by Waltz is a quasi
constant because the ordering principle rarely changes, and the second
element drops out of the analysis because the functions of units are similar
as long as the system remains anarchic. Thus, the last of the three attributes,
the distribution of capabilities, plays the central role in Waltz's model.
Waltz uses his theory to deduce the central characteristics of international
relations. These include some non-obvious propositions about the
contemporary international system. For example, with respect to system
stability (defined as maintenance of its anarchic character and no
consequential variation in the number of major actors) he concludes that:
because the present bipolar system reduces uncertainty, it is more stable than
alternative structures; interdependence has declined rather than increased
during the twentieth century, a tendency that has actually contributed to
stability; and the proliferation of nuclear weapons may contribute to rather
than erode system stability.17
Unlike some system-level models, Waltz's effort to bring rigor and
parsimony to realism has stimulated a good deal of further research, but it
has not escaped controversy and criticism.18 Leaving aside highly charged
polemics—for example, that Waltz and his supporters are guilty of engaging
in a "totalitarian project of global proportions"—most of the vigorous debate
has centered on four alleged deficiencies relating to interests and preferences,
system change, misallocation of variables between the system and unit
levels, and an inability to explain outcomes.19
Specifically, a spare structural approach suffers from an inability to
identify completely the nature and sources of interests and preferences because

1 Because Waltz strives for a universal theory that is not limited to any era, he uses the
term "unit" to refer to the constituent members of the system. In the contemporary system
these are states, but in order to reflect Waltz's intent more faithfully, the term "unit" is used
here.

16 Waltz, Theory, 82-101.

17
Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in The International Corporation,
ed. Charles P. Kindleberger (Cambridge, MA, 1970); Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: More May Be Better," Adelphi Papers, no. 171 (1981).
' Joseph Grieco, States, Anarchy, and the Problem of International Cooperation
(forthcoming); Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, 1987). The best single
source for the various dimensions of the debate is Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its
Critics (New York, 1986).
Ashley, "Poverty," 228.

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 22 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

these are unlikely to derive sol

or domestic considerations ma
the model is also unable to spe
may change. The three definin
general, moreover, and thus th
sources and dynamics of system
the model is too static by poin
been a single structural chang
three centuries.
Another drawback is the re
which leads Waltz to misp
international relations that pr
focused on his treatment of
interdependence. Waltz labels
his critics assert that they are i
Finally, the distribution
international affairs only in th
the questions that are of cent
distribution of power at the e
predict the rivalry that emerg
Union, but it would have be
relations between these two nations—the Cold War rather than withdrawal
into isolationism by either or both, a division of the world into spheres of
influence, or World War III.20 In order to do so, it is necessary to explore
political processes within states—at minimum within the United States and
ine Ujjk—as well as between tnem.

Robert Gilpin shares with Waltz the core assumption

realism, but his study of War and Change in World Politi
to cope with some of the criticism leveled at Waltz's theory
the dynamics of system change. Drawing upon both
sociological theory, his model is based on five core propositi
that the international system is stable—in a state of equilibr
believes that it is profitable to attempt to change it. Seco
attempt to change the status quo of the international system
benefits outweigh the costs; that is, if there is an expected
revisionist state. Related to this is the proposition that a
change through territorial, political, and economic expan
marginal costs of further change equal or exceed the ma
Moreover, when an equilibrium between the costs and benef
change and expansion is reached, the economic costs of m
status quo (expenditures for military forces, support for all
rise faster than the resources needed to do so. An equilibrium
powerful state believes that a change in the system would yie
benefits. Finally, if the resulting disequilibrium betwe

20
I am grateful to Alexander George for this example.

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23

governance of the international system and the redist

resolved, the system will be changed and a new equili
distribution of relative capabilities will be established.
Unlike Waltz, Gilpin includes state-level processes
change. Differential economic growth rates among
systemic level variable—play a vital role in his explan
decline of great powers, but his model also includes p
law of diminishing returns on investments, the im
martial spirits and on the ratio of consumption to inv
change in the economy.22 Table 1 summarizes so
realism. It also contrasts them to two other syst
international relations—the Global-Society/Complex-In
Marxist/World-System/Dependency models, to w
attention.
Just as there are variants 01 realism, there are several Global
Society/Complex-Interdependence (GS/CI) models, but this discussion
focuses on two common denominators; they all challenge the first and third
core propositions of realism identified earlier, asserting that inordinate
attention to the war/peace issue and the nation-state renders it an increasingly
anachronistic model of global relations.23 The agenda of critical problems
confronting states has been vastly expanded during the twentieth century.
Attention to the issues of war and peace is by no means misdirected,
according to proponents of a GS/CI perspective, but concerns for welfare,
modernization, the environment, and the like are today no less potent sources
of motivation and action. The diffusion of knowledge and technology,
combined with the globalization of communications, has vastly increased
popular expectations. The resulting demands have outstripped resources and
the ability of existing institutions—notably the sovereign nation-state—to
cope effectively with them. Interdependence arises from an inability of even
the most powerful states to cope, or to do so unilaterally or at acceptable
levels of cost and risk, with issues ranging from trade to AIDS, and
immigration to environmental threats.
Paralleling the widening agenda of critical issues is the expansion of
actors whose behavior can have a significant impact beyond national
boundaries; indeed, the cumulative effects of their actions can have profound
consequences for the international system. Thus, although nation-states
continue to be important international actors, they possess a declining ability

2' Gilpin, War and Change, 10-11.

22 Ibid., chap. 4. Gilpin's thesis appears similar in a number of respects to Paul
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987).
23 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics
in Transition (Boston, 1977); Edward Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of
International Relations (New York, 1967); James N. Rosenau, The Study of Global
Interdependence (London, 1980); Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez, In Search of Theory:
A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York, 1981); Andrew M. Scott, The Dynamics of
Interdependence (Chapel Hill, 1982); Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (forthcoming).

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 24 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 25

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26 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

to control their own destinies.

of non-state actors can have po
These may include such power
Exxon, the Organization of Pe
Liberation Organization. On
decisions by less powerful o
international consequences
individuals, mutual funds, b
institutions to sell securities
unprecedented "crash" on Wal
were felt throughout the entir
take such actions as loosenin
were largely unable to contain
The widening agenda of cr
national solution, has also led
political boundaries; for examp
organizations, non-governme
and the like. Thus, not only d
fail to capture the complexitie
blinds the analyst to the ins
cooperation and significantly
In short, according to GS/CI p
emergent global system must
sufficient for all issues, and t
which states deal with tradit
obfuscate than clarify the reali
The GS/CI models have sever
international behavior and out
not merely security, at leas
strategic terms. They also aler
processes and conditions origin
also in the aggregated behavio
the analyst to deal with a b
importantly, they force one to
processes, and outcomes than
models. Stated differently
possibility that politics of t
environment, and the like ma
those typically associated with
Un the other hand, some Oà/
nationalism and the durability
them wrote that "the nation i
to which allegiances are atta

24 Rosenau, "National Interest," 39.

in Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of
Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 27

anachronism but, for better or worse, powerful loyalt

nation-states. The suggestion that, because even
nations have experienced independence movements amo
religious minorities, the sovereign territorial state m
wholly persuasive. Indeed, that evidence perhaps p
opposite conclusion: In virtually every region of the
which seek to create or restore geographically base
members may enjoy the status and privileges asso
territorial statehood. Evidence from Poland to Palesti
Estonia to Eritrea, Armenia to Afghanistan, and elsew
that obituaries for nationalism may be somewhat prem
The notion that such powerful non-nationa
multinational corporations (MNC) will soon transcend
equally premature. International drug rings do appear
such states as Colombia and Panama. However, the pat
confrontations between MNCs and states, including
expropriations of corporate properties, indicate that
nations are not always the hapless pawns of the M
Joseph Grieco and Gary Gereffi, among others, in
relations yield a wide variety of outcomes.25
Underlying the GS/CI critique of realist models
latter are too wedded to the past and are thus incapabl
with change. At least for the present, however, even i
from multiple sources (including non-state actors)
states and their agents would appear to remain the ma
the international system. However, the last group of
considered, the Marxist/World-System/Dependen
downplays the role of the nation-state even further.
As in other parts of this essay, many of the d
M/WS/D models are lost by treating them together an
common features, but in the brief description possib
denominators will be presented. These models challen
and state-centered features of realism, but they do s
sharply from challenges of GS/CI models.26 Rather t

and his reconsideration in "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflec

Nation-State," Polity 1 (Fall 1968): 12-34.
Joseph Grieco, Between Dependence and Autonomy: India
International Computer Industry (Berkeley, 1984); Gary Gereffi,
and Dependency in the Third World (Princeton, 1983).
26 John Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Jou
no. 2 (1971): 81-117; James Cockroft, André Gunder Fran
Dependence and Under-Development (New York, 1972); Immanue
World-System (New York, 1974); idem, "The Rise and Future Dem
System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," Comparative Stu
16 (September 1974): 387—415; Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Com
System Characteristics," International Studies Quarterly 23
idem, "Interstate System and Capitalist World Economy: O
(March 1981): 19-42; J. Kubalkova and A. A. Cruickshank, M

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 28 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

and peace, these models direct

uneven development, poverty,
These conditions, arising from
exchange, are basic and they m
and inter-nation conflict
At a superficial level, accor
exists today may be describ
nation-states. More fundame
between nations are classes an
"in the nineteenth and twenti
system in existence, the wo
capitalist system" is charact
between the periphery and co
drawers of water and the hewe
surplus of the entire world eco
not only gives rise to and per
between the wealthy core an
relationship from which the l
class structure within the co
capital and labor, is faithfully
share with their counterpart
system. Thus, in contrast to
and integrate theories of both
M/W VD models have been su
nationalism, security dilemma
these analyses; they are at the
"Capitalism was from the b
Wallerstein asserts, "not of
models is that they take a long
than merely focusing on con
nation-states and the dynamics
in an anarchical system—or at
a minor role—MÄVS/D mode
affairs during the past few cen
role seem as deficient as analys
and his motivations.
Second, the concept of "wo
models, but its relevance for t
Whether this term accurate

Relations (Oxford, 1985). Debates

Robert A. Denemark and Kenneth O. Thomas, "The Brenner-Wallerstein Debates,"
International Studies Quarterly 32 (March 1988): 47-66.
22 Wallerstein, "Rise and Future Demise," 390.
28 Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of
Dependency Theory," World Politics 31 (January 1979): 247-88; Aristide R. Zolberg,
"Origins of the Modem World System," ibid. 33 (January 1981): 253-81.
2' Wallerstein, "Rise and Future Demise," 401.

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 29

debated, but its declining analytical utility or even des

international affairs of the 1980s seems clear. Thu
Wallerstein's assertion that "there are today no socialist
economy any more than there are feudal systems becau
world system. It is a world-economy and it is by de
form."30 Where within a system so defined do we
Eastern Europe? This area includes enough "rich" indust
hardly seems to belong in the periphery. Yet to place th
of a "world capitalist system" would require terminolog
gymnastics of a high order. Does it increase our ana
describe the USSR and East European countries as "state
do we locate China in this conception of the system
dynamics within the "periphery," or the differences b
Asian nations such as South Korea, Taiwan, or Singap
growth neighbors in Bangladesh, North Korea, and
inclusion of a third structural position—the "semi-p
wholly answer these questions.
I hird, M/Wb/D models have considerable difficu
relations between noncapitalist nations—for exampl
and its East European neighbors or China—much les
between them. Indeed, advocates of these models usually
attention to West-South relations, eschewing analyses o
South relations. Does one gain greater and more genera
using the lenses and language of Marxism or of realism
between dominant and lesser nations; for example, t
Europe, the USSR and India or other Third World
Vietnam, India and Sri Lanka, or Vietnam and Kam
relationships better described and understood in ter
categories as "class" or such realist ones as "relative cap
Finally, the earlier observations about the persistenc
an element of international relations seem equally appr
national loyalties can be dismissed as prime ex
consciousness," but even in areas that have expe
generations of one-party Communist rule, as in P
feelings of solidarity with workers in the Soviet Union
replaced nationalist sentiments among Polish workers is
Many advocates of realism recognize that it cannot o
analyses of foreign policy behavior and, as noted earlier
is desirable or even possible to combine theories of int
and foreign policy. Decision-making models challenge t
fruitful to conceptualize the nation as a unitary rational
can adequately be explained by reference to the system
fourth, and fifth realist propositions identified earlier
groups, and organizations acting in the name of the stat

"*" Ibid., 412 (emphasis added).

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 30 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

pressures and constraints o

maintenance, electoral polit
ideological preferences, and b
national interest" are not def
less by its structure alone, bu
the domestic political arena. T
the state can be conceptualize
processes are both hard to co
its external behavior—decisio
these internal processes int
decision makers and their "d
how nations deal with each
through the eyes of those w
makers, and the group and bu
they act. Table 2 provides a
making models that form
beginning with bureaucratic-o
Traditional models of comp
the positive contributions to
and centralization, coupled w
models assumed that clear bo
and decision making, on the one hand, and administration and
implementation on the other. Following pioneering works by Chester I.
Barnard, Herbert Simon, James G. March and Simon, and others, more recent
theories depict organizations quite differently.33 The central premise is that
decision making in bureaucratic organizations is not constrained only by the
legal and formal norms that are intended to enhance the rational and eliminate
the capricious aspects of bureaucratic behavior. Rather, all (or most) complex
organizations are seen as generating serious "information pathologies."34
There is an emphasis upon rather than a denial of the political character of
bureaucracies, as well as on other "informal" aspects of organizational

3' Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds.. Foreign Policy Decision
Making (New York, 1962).
32 There are also models that link types of polities with foreign policy. Two of the
more prominent twentieth-century versions—the Leninist and Wilsonian—have been
effectively criticized by Waltz in Man, the Slate, and War. Although space limitations
preclude a discussion here, for some recent and interesting research along these lines see,
among others, Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983): 27-71; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World
Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-70; and Doyle,
"Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Winter
1983): 205-35.
33 Chester Barnard, Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA, 1938); Herbert
Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative
Organization (New York, 1957); James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New
York, 1958).
34 Harold Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in
Government and Industry (New York, 1967).

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 MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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32 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

behavior. Complex organizat

conflicting perceptions, valu
self-interest ("what is best f
also from different percept
of labor ("where you stand d
and memories, prior policy
routines, and standard operat
structuring of problems, ch
implementation of executi
politics within the executive
may significantly constrain
of options that may be con
decisions are implemented
decision making is essentiall
for resources, roles and miss
Perhaps owing to the domi
students of foreign policy
organizational models and ins
case studies on budgeting,
similar situations confirms
rarely conform to the Weber
analysts assert that crises ma
some of the non-rational asp
push decisions to the top o
intelligence is available; info
hierarchy directly, reducing
through several levels of th
may be invoked. Short decis
decision making by bargaini
denominator values, "muddlin
However, even studies of
organizational perspective ar
in such circumstances. Gra
crisis identified several critic

33 Henry A. Kissinger, "Domest

1966): 503-29; Graham T. Alliso
Crisis (Boston, 1971); Graham T.
Paradigm and Some Policy Imp
Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Po
3^ The literature is huge. See, f
Grand Strategy: Britain and Fra
Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats
Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in
of Military Doctrine.
37 Wilensky, Organizational Int
Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis
"Assumptions of Rationality and
World Politics 14 (October 1961)

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 33

or American aircratt in Honda, the location ot the naval blockade, and

grounding of weather reconnaissance flights from Alaska that might stray
over the Soviet Union. Richard Neustadt's study of two crises involving the
United States and Great Britain revealed significant misperceptions of each
other's interests and policy processes. And an examination of three American
nuclear alerts found substantial gaps in understanding and communication
between policymakers and the military leaders who were responsible for
implementing the alerts.38
Critics of some organizational-bureaucratic models and the studies
employing them have directed their attention to several points.39 They point
out, for instance, that the emphasis on bureaucratic bargaining fails to
differentiate adequately between the positions of the participants. In the
American system, the president is not just another player in a complex
bureaucratic game. Not only must he ultimately decide but he also selects
who the other players will be, a process that may be crucial in shaping the
ultimate decisions. If General Matthew Ridgway and Attorney General
Robert Kennedy played key roles in the American decisions not to intervene
in Indochina in 1954 or not to bomb Cuba in 1962, it was because
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy chose to accept their advice rather than
that of other officials. Also, the conception of bureaucratic bargaining tends
to emphasize its non-rational elements to the exclusion of genuine
intellectual differences that may be rooted in broader concerns—including
disagreements on what national interests, if any, are at stake in a situation—
rather than narrow parochial interests. Indeed, properly managed, decision
processes that promote and legitimize "multiple advocacy" among officials
may facilitate high-quality decisions.40
These models may be especially useful for understanding the slippage
between executive decisions and foreign policy actions that may arise during
implementation, but they may be less valuable for explaining the decisions
themselves. Allison's study of the Cuban missile crisis does not indicate an
especially strong correlation between bureaucratic roles and evaluations of the
situation or policy recommendations, as predicted by his "Model III"
(bureaucratic politics), and recently published transcripts of deliberations

10

Charles F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crises which L

Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 8 (June 1963
Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York, 1970); Scott Sag
Crisis Management," International Security 9 (Spring 1985): 99-
39 Robert Rothstein, Planning, Prediction, and Policy-Maki
Theory and Practice (Boston, 1972); Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bure
Allison Wonderland)" Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 15
"Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Criti
(December 1973): 467-90; Desmond J. Ball, "The Blind Men and th
Bureaucratic Politics Theory," Australian Outlook 28 (Ap
Perlmutter, "Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy: A Cr
and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations," World Politics 27 (Octo
Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in M
American Political Science Review 66 (September 1972): 751-8

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34 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

during the crisis do not offer

the other hand, Allison does
policy implementation that
"Model I" (the traditional real
Another decision-making
supplements bureaucratic-org
view to top policymakers. Th
of foreign policy decisions, w
Some analysts have drawn u
the impact of various type
Underlying these models are
sum of its members (thus dec
different than what a simple
might suggest), and that g
members, can have a signif
decisions.
Groups often perform bett
tasks owing to diverse perspe
and high-quality debates cent
recommendations for dealin
makers with emotional and ot
with complex problems. On t
conformity to group norms, t
policy options or cutting it o
some options, curtailing in
forms of intragroup conflict
options. Classic experiment
the extent to which group me
when faced with a major
counterfactual one.43

41 David A. Welch and James G

Crisis: An Introduction to the Ex
1987/88): 5-29; McGeorge Bundy
the Meetings of the ExComm," ib
42 Joseph de Rivera, The Psych
1968); Glenn D. Paige, The Kor
Irving L. Janis, Victims of Group
and Fiascos (Boston, 1972); idem,
and Fiascos (Boston, 1982); Margar
"How Decision Units Shape Foreig
Foreign Policy, ed. Charles F. H
(London, 1987); Charles F. Herman
Decisions and How: An Initial Test
American Political Science Assoc
Hermann, and Charles F. Herman
Soviet Decision Making" (Paper p
Society of PoEtical Psychology, A
43 Leon Festinger, "A Theory o
"Opinions and Social Pressure," in

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 35

Drawing upon a series of historical case studies,

Irving L. Janis has identified a different variant of gro
labels "groupthink" to distinguish it from the m
conformity pressure on "deviant" members of the gr
the conventional wisdom that strong cohesion amo
group invariably enhances performance. Under certain
cohesion can markedly degrade the group's performan
Thus, the members of a cohesive group may, as a mea
stresses of having to cope with consequential prob
bolster self-esteem, increase the frequency and int
interaction. This results in a greater identification wi
competition within it. The group dynamics of what J
seeking" may displace or erode reality testing an
processing and judgment. As a consequence, groups
unwarranted feelings of optimism and invulnerability,
adversaries, and inattention to warnings. Janis's analys
(the Marshall Plan, the Cuban missile crisis) and "u
Conference of 1938, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs inv
that "groupthink" or other decision-making pathologi
and he develops some guidelines for avoiding them.45
Still other decision-making analysts focus on th
approaches to the policymaker emphasize the gap betwe
classical model of rational decision making and the
theory and evidence about various constraints that co
relatively simple choice situations.46 The more recent
upon cognitive psychology, go well beyond some of th
that drew upon psychodynamic theories to ident
psychopathologies among political leaders: paranoia, au
displacement of private motives on public objects, etc
efforts to include information-processing behavior of
maker in foreign policy analyses have been directe

Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales (New York, 1965

Pressures upon Modification and Distortion of Judgment," in Gro
Theory, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and A. Zander (Evanston, IL, 195
44 Janis, Victims-, idem, Groupthink. See also Philip Tetlock,
Groupthink from Public Statements of Decision Makers," Journa
Psychology 37 (August 1979): 1314-24; and the critique i
Governments Learn? American Foreign Policy and Central Am
York, 1985), 112-14.
45 Janis, Groupthink, 260-76.
46 For a review of the vast literature see Robert Abelson and
and Decision Theory," in Handbook of Social Psychology, 3d
Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (New York, 1985). The relevance of
evidence for international relations is most fully discussed in Rob
Misperceplion in International Politics (Princeton, 1976);
Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political A
and Robert Axelrod, ed., The Structure of Decision: The Cognit
(Princeton, 1976).
47 See, for example, Harold Lasswell, Psychopalhology and P

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 36 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

motivational constraints that,

performance of "normal" rathe
directed to all leaders, not mer
evidence of clinical abnormalities.
I he major challenges to the classical model have tocused in various
ways on limited human capabilities for performing the tasks required by
objectively rational decision making. The cognitive constraints on rationality
include limits on the individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate
information about the situation; an inability to identify the entire set of
policy alternatives; fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each
option; and an inability to order preferences on a single utility scale.48 These
have given rise to several competing conceptions of the decision maker and
his or her strategies for dealing with complexity, uncertainty, incomplete or
contradictory information, and, paradoxically, information overload. They
variously characterize the decision maker as a problem solver, naive or
intuitive scientist, cognitive balancer, dissonance avoider, information
seeker, cybernetic information processor, and reluctant decision maker.
Three of these conceptions seem especially relevant for foreign policy
analysis. The first views the decision maker as a "bounded rationalist" who
seeks satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. As Herbert Simon has put
it, "the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex
problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose
solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world—or
even a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality."49 Moreover,
it is not practical for the decision maker to seek optimal choices; for
example, because of the costs of searching for information. Related to this is
the more recent concept of the individual as a "cognitive miser," one who
seeks to simplify complex problems and to find shortcuts to problem
solving and decision making.
Another approach is to look at the decision maker as an "error prone
intuitive scientist" who is likely to commit a broad range of inferential
mistakes. Thus, rather than emphasizing the limits on search, information
processing, and the like, this conception views the decision maker as the
victim of flawed heuristics or decision rules who uses data poorly. There are
tendencies to underuse rate data in making judgments, believe in the "law of
small numbers," underuse diagnostic information, overweight low
probabilities and underweight high ones, and violate other requirements of
consistency and coherence. These deviations from classical decision theory
are traced to the psychological principles that govern perceptions of problems
and evaluations of options.50

48 March and Simon, Organizations, 113.

44 Simon, Administrative Behavior, 198.
50Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice," Science 211 (30 January 1981): 453-58; Kahneman and Tversky,
"On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological Review 80 (July 1973): 237-51;
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(Cambridge, England, 1982).

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 37

The final perspective I will mention emphasizes th

the policymaker, forces that will not or cannot
makers are not merely rational calculators; impo
conflict, and a reluctance to make irrevocable ch
behavior that reduces the quality of decisions. T
analyst's attention to policymakers' belief systems, i
perceptions, information-processing strategies, heur
traits (ability to tolerate ambiguity, cognitive comp
impact on decision-making performance.
Despite this diversity ot perspectives and the d
between cognitive and motivational models,
convergence on several types of constraints th
processes.52 One involves the consequences of effor
consistency on perceptions and information proc
systematic bias have been identified in both exp
studies. Policymakers have a propensity to as
information in ways that conform to rather than ch
preferences, hopes, and expectations. Frequently
confront tradeoffs between values by persuading t
will satisfy all of them. And, finally, they indul
bolster the selected option while denigrating those th
An extensive literature on styles of attribution ha
of systematic bias in causal analysis. Perhaps the mo
policy analysis is the basic attribution error—a
adversary's behavior in terms of his characteristics
aggressiveness or hostility) rather than in terms of
while attributing one's own behavior to the latter (
security needs arising from a dangerous and uncert
than to the former. A somewhat related type of do
noted by George Kennan: "Now is it our view that
only of their [Soviet] capabilities, disregarding t
should expect them to take account only for ou
disregarding our capabilities?"53
Analysts also have illustrated the important e
policymakers' assumptions about order and predictab
Whereas a policymaker may have an acute apprec
environment in which he or she operates (arisi

^ ' Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A

Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York, 1977); Miriam
in a Disorderly World: Worldviews and Prescriptive Decisio
Organization 37 (Summer 1983): 373-414; Richard Ned Lebo
(Baltimore, 1981).
52 Donald Kinder and J. R. Weiss, "In Lieu of Rationality
on Foreign Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution 22 (Dec
Holsti, "Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively," in Ax
George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Current Reali
Policy (Boston, 1978), 87-88.

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 38 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

domestic political processes

especially adversaries, are
Robert Jervis, and others ha
believe that the realist "unitary rational actor" is the appropriate
representation of the opponent's decision processes and, thus, whatever
happens is the direct result of deliberate choices. For example, the hypothesis
that the Soviet destruction of KAL flight 007 may have resulted from
intelligence failures or bureaucratic foulups, rather than from a calculated
decision to murder civilian passengers, was either not given serious
consideration or it was suppressed for strategic reasons.54
Drawing upon a very substantial experimental literature, several models
linking crisis-induced stress to decision processes have been developed and
used in foreign policy studies.55 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann have
developed a more general conflict-theory model which conceives of man as a
"reluctant decision-maker" and focuses upon "when, how and why
psychological stress generated by decisional conflict imposes limitations on
the rationality of a person's decisions."56 One may employ five strategies for
coping with a situation requiring a decision: unconflicted adherence to
existing policy, unconflicted change, defensive avoidance, hypervigilance,
and vigilant decision making. The first four strategies are likely to yield low
quality decisions owing to an incomplete search for information, appraisal of
the situation and options, and contingency planning, whereas the vigilant
decision making characterized by a more adequate performance of vital tasks
is more likely to result in a high-quality choice. The factors that will affect
the employment of decision styles are information about risks, expectations
of finding a better option, and time for adequate search and deliberation.
A final approach we should consider attempts to show the impact of
personal traits on decision making. There is no shortage of typologies that
arc intended to link leadership traits to decision-making behavior, but
systematic research demonstrating such links is in much shorter supply.
Still, some efforts have borne fruit. Margaret G. Hermann has developed a
scheme for analyzing leaders' public statements of unquestioned authorship
for eight variables: nationalism, belief in one's ability to control the
environment, need for power, need for affiliation, ability to differentiate
environments, distrust of others, self-confidence, and task emphasis. The
scheme has been tested with impressive results on a broad range of

•*4 Allison, Essence; Jervis, Perception; Seymour M. Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed:
What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew about It (New York, 1986).
Charles F. Hermann, International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research (New
York, 1972); Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, "Maintaining the Quality of
Decision-Making in Foreign Policy Crises," in Report of the Commission on the
Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, vol. 2 (Washington,
1975); Margaret G. Hermann, "Indicators of Stress in Policy-Makers during Foreign Policy
Crises," Political Psychology 1 (March 1979): 27-46; Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation,
War (Montreal, 1972); Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, "The Effects of Stress on the
Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers," Political Science Annual, vol. 6 (Indianapolis,
1975); Lebow, Between Peace and War.
^ Janis and Mann, Decision Making, 3.

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 39

contemporary leaders.57 Alexander L. George has re

Leites's concept of "operational code" into five phi
instrumental beliefs that are intended to describe polit
beliefs, stimulating a number of empirical studies and, m
significant conceptual revisions.58 Finally, several
developed and tested the concept of "integrative compl
ability to make subtle distinction along multiple dimens
the integration of large amounts of diverse informatio
judgments.59 A standard content-analysis technique has b
on documentary materials generated by top decision m
of international crises, including World War I, Cu
(1911), Berlin (1948—49 and 1961), Korea, and the M
1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973.60
Decision-making approaches clearly permit the an
many limitations of the systemic models described ear
costs. The three decision-making models described here
heavy data burdens on the analyst. Moreover, there is a
levels of analysis may result in an undisciplined prolife
and variables with at least two adverse consequenc
increasingly difficult to determine which are more or le
hoc explanations for individual cases erode the poss
generalizations across cases. However, several well-d
decision-making studies indicate that these and
unavoidable.61

57 Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Beh

Characteristics of Political Leaders," International Studies Quarterl
idem, "Personality and Foreign Policy Decision Making," in P
Foreign Policy Decision Making, ed. Donald Sylvan and Steve Ch
Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, 1951);
Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly 13 (June 1969):
190-222; Stephen G. Walker, "The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry
Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 21
(March 1977): 129-68; idem, "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A
Re-Analysis of the Operational Code Construct," International Studies Quarterly 27 (June
1983): 179-202; idem, "Parts and Wholes: American Foreign Policy Makers as 'Structured'
Individuals" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political
Psychology, Secaucus, New Jersey, 1988).
57 Integrative simplicity, on the other hand, is characterized by simple responses,
gross distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage.
60 Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock, "Integrative Complexity of Communications in
International Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 21 (March 1977): 169-86; Suedfeld,
Tetlock, and C. Romirez, "War, Peace, and Integrative Complexity: UN Speeches on the
Middle East Problem, 1947-1976," ibid. (September 1977): 427-42; Theodore D. Raphael,
"Integrative Complexity Theory and Forecasting International Crises: Berlin 1946-1962,"
ibid. 26 (September 1982): 423-50; Tetlock, "Integrative Complexity of American and
Soviet Foreign Policy Rhetoric: A Time Series Analysis," Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 49 (December 1985): 1565-85.
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:
Theory and Practice (New York, 1974); Smoke, Escalation (Cambridge, MA, 1977);

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 40 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The study of international re

somewhat eclectic undertaking
other than political science a
primary differences today ten
of the first school focus on th
borrowing from economics fo
with an emphasis on rational p
to be shaped and constrained b
Decision-making analysts, m
political processes and ten
psychology in order to und
information nrocessins and rational choice.

At the risk of ending on a platitude, it seems clear that for many

purposes both approaches are necessary and neither is sufficient. Neglect of
the system structure and its constraints may result in analyses that depict
policymakers as relatively free agents with an almost unrestricted menu of
choices, limited only by the scope of their ambitions and the resources at
their disposal. At worst, this type of analysis can degenerate into Manichean
explanations that depict foreign policies of the "bad guys" as the external
manifestation of inherently flawed leaders or domestic structures, whereas the
"good guys" only react from necessity. Radical right explanations of the
Cold War often depict Soviet foreign policies as driven by inherently
aggressive totalitarian communism and the United States as its blameless
victim; radical left explanations tend to be structurally similar, with the roles
of aggressor and victim reversed.63
Conversely, neglect of foreign policy decision making not only leaves
one unable to explain the dynamics of international relations, but many
important aspects of a nation's external behavior will be inexplicable.
Advocates of the realist model have often argued its superiority for
understanding the "high" politics of deterrence, containment, alliances, crises,
and wars, if not necessarily for "low" politics. But there are several rejoinders
to this line of reasoning. First, the low politics of trade, currencies, and other
issues that are almost always highly sensitive to domestic pressures are
becoming an increasingly important element of international relations.

Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making,
and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, 1977); Michael Brecher and Barbara
Geist, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley, 1980); Lebow, Between Peace
and War. Useful discussions on conducting theoretically relevant case studies may be found
in Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political
Science, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA, 1975), 7:79-138; and
Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured,
Focused Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed.
Paul Gordon Lauren (New York, 1979), 43-68.
^ The classic overview of the field and the disciplines that have contributed to it is
Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York, 1955).
Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows:
Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left," American Political Science Review 68
(March 1974): 217-42.

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 41

Second, the growing literature on the putative doma

realism, including deterrence, crises, and wars, raises sub
the universal validity of the realist model even for the
exclusive reliance on realist models and their assumption
lead to unwarranted complacency about dangers in the
Nuclear weapons and other features of the system have
to the "long peace" between major powers.65 At the sam
narrow focus on power balances, "correlations of forces,
of the international system will result in neglect of da
the command, communication, control, intelligence pro
information processing—that can only be identified
decision-making perspective.66
At a very general level, this conclusion parallels that
ago by the foremost contemporary proponent of moder
image" (system structure) is necessary for understan
international behavior, whereas the first and second ima
and domestic political processes) are needed to understa
the system.67 But to acknowledge the existence of vari
is not enough. What the investigator wants to expla
specificity and comprehensiveness to be sought shou
level(s) of analysis are relevant and necessary. In t
essential to distinguish two different dependent variab
decisions by states, on the one hand, and the outco
interactions between two or more states, on the ot
understand the former—foreign policy decisions—H
Sprout's notion of "psychological milieu" is relevant an
the objective structural variables influence the decis
maker's perception and evaluation of those "outside" va
the goal is to explain outcomes, the "psychological milieu" is quite
inadequate; the objective factors, if misperceived or misjudged by the decision
maker, will influence the outcome. Political scientists studying international

In addition to the literature on war, crises, and deterrence already cited see Richard
Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, 1987); Robert Jervis, Richard
Ned Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 1985); Lebow,
Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, 1987); and Ole R. Holsti, "Crisis
Decision-Making," and Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and
Evidence," in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 1, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al. (New
York, forthcoming).
65 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace; Elements of Stability in the Postwar
International System," International Security 10 (Spring 1986): 99-142.
66 Paul Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven, 1983); Bmce
Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, 1985);
John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy 45 (Winter 1981-82): 16—28;
Sagan, "Nuclear Alerts"; Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign
Policy : The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, 1980).
67 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 238.
68 Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International
Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (December 1957): 309-28.

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 42 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

relations are increasingly disc

in studying outcomes that can
level of analysis.69
Which of these models and a
utility to the diplomatic histo
scientists are unable to agree o
relations and foreign policy;
single recommendation to hist
always-elusive unified theory
for all seasons and all reasons,
model for what purpose? Fo
research on major internati
systematic evidence on the be
policymakers bring to their d
above should prove very helpf
other research problems for w
that this type of analysis requ
justified by the benefits to be
Of the systemic approaches d
classical realism because its
weaknesses, are familiar to mo
security issues can hardly neg
other hand, modern or structu
rather limited appeal to hist
doubts about being able to inc
serve to raise consciousness ab
within which international re
gain—after all, such concep
standard part of the diplom
approach, which employs both
international dynamics, may
noted that there are some in
Change in World Politics an
the Great Powers.
The Global-Society/Complex-Interdependence models will be helpful to
historians with an interest in evolution of the international system and with
the growing disjuncture between demands on states and their ability to meet
them—the "sovereignty gap." One need not be very venturesome to predict
that this gap will grow rather than narrow in the future. Historians of all

69 See, for example, David B. Yoffie, Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly
Industrializing Countries (New York, 1983); John Odell, U.S. International Monetary
Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton, 1982); Jack Snyder, The
Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disaster of 1914 (Ithaca,
1984); Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized
Textile Trade (Berkeley, 1985); Larson, Origins of Containment-, Posen, Sources of Military
Doctrine-, and Walt, Alliances.

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MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43

kinds of international and transnational organizations a

useful concepts and insights in these models.
It is much less clear that the Marxist/World-System/
will provide useful new insights to historians. They wi
to be employed, but for reasons other than demonstrate
one has difficulty in accepting certain assumptions as t
for example, that there has been and is today a sin
system"—then the kinds of analyses that follow are lik
flawed. Most diplomatic historians also would have diff
models that relegate the state to a secondary role. Unti
models demonstrate a greater willingness to test them ag
of cases, including East-South and East-East relation
would appear to be limited at best. Finally, whereas
models can point with considerable justification to curre
that would appear to make them more rather than less r
supporters of the M/WS/D models have a much more d
resoect.

Although the three decision-making models sometimes include jargon

that may be jarring to the historian, many of the underlying concepts are
familiar. Much of diplomatic history has traditionally focused on the
decisions, actions, and interactions of national leaders who operate in group
contexts, such as cabinets or ad hoc advisory groups, and who draw upon the
resources of such bureaucracies as foreign and defense ministries or the armed
forces. The three types of models described above typically draw heavily
upon psychology, social psychology, organizational theory, and other social
sciences; thus for the historian they open some important windows to highly
relevant developments in these fields. For example, theories and concepts of
"information processing" by individuals, groups, and organizations should
prove very useful to diplomatic historians.
Decision-making models may also appeal to diplomatic historians for
another important reason. Political scientists who are accustomed to working
with fairly accessible information such as figures on gross national products,
defense budgets, battle casualties, alliance commitments, United Nations
votes, trade and investments, and the like, often feel that the data
requirements of decision-making models are excessive. This is precisely the
area in which the historian has a decided comparative advantage, for the
relevant data are usually to be found in the paper trails—more recently, also
in the electronic trails—left by policymakers, and they are most likely to be
unearthed by archival research. Thus, perhaps the appropriate point on which
to conclude this essay is to reverse the question posed earlier; Ask not only
what can the political scientist contribute to the diplomatic historian but ask
also what can the diplomatic historian contribute to the political scientist. At
the very least political scientists could learn a great deal about the validity of
their own models if historians would use them and offer critical assessments
of their strengths and limitations.

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