Cargo Crime

Security and Theft Prevention

J. J. Coughlin
Cargo Crime
Security and Theft Prevention
Cargo Crime
Security and Theft Prevention

J.J. Coughlin
CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
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Contents

Foreword....................................................................... ix
Preface........................................................................... xi
Acknowledgments.........................................................xv
About the Author........................................................ xvii

Section I OVERVIEW OF CARGO CRIME

1 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends.........................3
Introduction.......................................................................... 3
Background and Perspective............................................... 6
Definition of Cargo Theft.................................................... 8
Current Data and Data Collection Efforts..........................10
Analysis of SC-­ISAC Data for 2009­–2011............................11
Cargo Theft Activity by State..............................................13
Where Thefts Occur............................................................15
When Thefts Occur.............................................................17
What’s Stolen.......................................................................19
Conclusion...........................................................................25
2 Modes of Freight Transportation............................27
Introduction.........................................................................27
Freight Modalities............................................................... 28
Cargo Crime by Modality...................................................31
Conclusion...........................................................................34

v
vi ◾ Contents

3 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime..................................35

Introduction.........................................................................35
Organized Cargo Criminals................................................37
Full Truckload.............................................................37
Fictitious or Fraudulent Pick-­Ups........................................41
High-Value Warehouse Burglaries..............................43
Opportunistic Cargo Theft................................................ 46
Internal Theft Rings: Consolidation....................................47
Commercial Vehicle Smuggling..........................................51
Truck-Stop Crime................................................................52
Fencing: Where Stolen Cargo Goes....................................55
Conclusion...........................................................................58

Section II INDUSTRY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

RESPONSES
4 Industry Responses................................................63
Introduction.........................................................................63
The Vision.......................................................................... 64
Industry Security Councils................................................. 68
Southwest Transportation Security Council...............70
Eastern Region Cargo Theft Association....................70
Western States Cargo Theft Association.....................71
Mid-South Cargo Security Council.............................72
Southeast Transportation Security Council................72
Mid-­West Cargo Security Council...............................72
Virginia–Carolinas Cargo Security Council................73
Pharmaceutical Cargo Security Coalition...................73
National Transportation Security Organizations........75
National Insurance Crime Bureau............................. 77
ASIS Supply Chain and Transportation Security
Council.........................................................................78
Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA).....79
Information Sharing........................................................... 80
Archiving and Analysis...............................................82
Conclusion...........................................................................85
 Contents ◾ vii

5 Law Enforcement Responses..................................87

Introduction.........................................................................87
Cargo Theft Law Enforcement Responses..................89
Law Enforcement Education...................................... 96
Introduction........................................................ 96
SWTSC Law Enforcement Training.................... 96
Handling Contraband........................................ 112
Conclusion.........................................................................122
6 Prevention and Awareness....................................123
Introduction.......................................................................123
Prevention: The Best policy.............................................125
First Annual Texas Cargo Summit............................126
Personnel Security.....................................................135
Facility Physical Security...........................................138
Business Partner Requirements................................140
Procedural Security...................................................142
In-Transit Security............................................................. 145
Information Technology Security..................................... 151
Brokerage and Freight Boards.......................................... 151
Security Training and Threat Awareness......................... 154
Legal Best Practices........................................................... 155
Current Technologies for Prevention and Recovery........ 156
Cargo Insurance................................................................164
Conclusion......................................................................... 167
7 Moving Forward.................................................... 171
Introduction....................................................................... 171
Essential Decisions for Industry....................................... 171
Lobbying for Cargo Theft Task Forces and Cargo
Crime Programs................................................................187
Bordernet...........................................................................190
Procedures and Resources to Develop Bordernet.....194
The Freight Industry..........................................194
Bordernet Law Enforcement.............................195
Future: Bordernet Computer Scanning.............198
Lobby for formation of Cargo Theft Task Forces.............203
viii ◾ Contents

Section III USING BEST PRACTICES

8 Epilogue................................................................209
Learning from Reality.......................................................212
Appendix: Southwest Transportation Security
Council Freight Term Glossary.................................... 215
Bibliography................................................................239
Foreword

Professionals involved in supply chain security will dis-

cover that Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention by
J.J. Coughlin is both an indispensable overview of current
cargo trends and a viable desk­top reference for field
practitioners whose job it is to establish security plans and
predictive security operations in the transportation and
logistics fields.
This book was based on the premise that the wealth of
experience in law enforcement, cargo theft investigation, and
cargo theft intelligence analysis accumulated by the author as
director of the Supply Chain Information Sharing and Analysis
Center has given him an insight and understanding of the
criminal elements involved in these crimes that he wanted
to share with investigators and transportation security prac-
titioners. He achieved his goal and has produced a text that
will pass on to those who peruse it the benefit of his years of
practical experience in the specialty area of cargo crime.
The text is organized into a scenario that will enable the
novice or the grizzled veteran to proceed from Chapter 1,
“Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends,” to observing charts and
information that will answer the four basic questions (what,
where, when, and how) of crime. By the time the reader
proceeds through Chapter 3, “Perpetrators of Cargo Crime,”
he or she will be able to answer the fifth and final crime
question: who.

ix
x ◾ Foreword

Collectively, the chapters of this book represent a source

and definitive guide for transportation security managers and
law enforcement personnel. It has been designed to reveal the
experiences of the author in a practical, useful, and progres-
sive manner. The research is empirical and the results com-
piled into this text will be relevant for many years.
After answering the basic crime questions, the book
takes you through the responses of industries to build an
­information-sharing and communication system through
regional security councils that focus on highlighting risks
and threats via a shared BOLO/­A lert program and provid-
ing a networking system with law enforcement to respond
to crimes. The text also provides information on products
and solutions designed to prevent cargo crime and a highly
useful glossary of transportation security and freight terms
along with abbreviations as an important addendum to the
information in the chapters.
As a transportation attorney for more than 27 years, I con-
sider this book a must read for any transportation professional.
J.J. Coughlin has tackled a very complicated subject. He pres-
ents the material in an easy-­to-­understand review along with
solutions that are timeless.

Steven E. Lewis
Lewis & Backhaus, P.C.
Dallas, Texas
Preface

The purpose of Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention is

to provide practical conventional current information for trans-
portation and logistics industry and law enforcement units and
officers responsible for the security of supply chains and the
investigation of those who prey upon them.
This text is based on the author’s personal experiences as
a law enforcement detective and supervisor and as a regional
security manager for a large multi­mode transportation and
logistics company. This experience, along with many years
of serving as the director of the Supply Chain Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (SC-­ISAC)—an organization that
collects and analyzes cargo crime data and shares informa-
tion with transportation security experts—provides a thorough
overview of illicit activities impacting supply chains.
Analyzing cargo crime trends and patterns and using the
information derived to identify methods of operation of orga-
nized and opportunistic criminals who target supply chains
extremely helpful for determining risks and threats. The ability
to apply that information based on real world experience and
industry associations makes the information that much more
usable. If you look at the reference material for this book,
most of it was originally prepared by the author in his role as
chairman of the Southwest Transportation Security Council
in collaboration with many council members who are subject
matter experts in specific areas.

xi
xii ◾ Preface

In order to be successful, an industry security practitioner

must have an eye for detail while understanding the risks and
complexities of cargo operations so that the correct security
and recovery plan applied to a situation will be both effective
and cost-efficient.
One thing is certain: cargo security is much trickier than
just throwing guards, technology, and money at the problem.
Applying the right resource for the involved mode and issue
takes a true understanding of all of the variables. This book
attempts to identify and discuss those variables and make
each practitioner cognizant of the options available. This book
will cover the current trends, cargo criminal operational meth-
ods, and best practices and solutions for each circumstance.
Protection of cargo is not simple; it requires the ability to use
all the information presented. No single solution fits all situa-
tions, as shown in this book.
The investigation of cargo crime is hindered by a lack of
true federal response. Adequate law enforcement assistance,
particularly aiding recovery, is an issue industry has taken to
heart and pursued via industry councils, information sharing,
and building police networking in areas where crimes and
criminals are prevalent. This book speaks to those councils,
their activities, and their continuing push forward despite the
lack of cargo theft statutes in many states and the deficiency
of law enforcement cargo theft task forces in many jurisdic-
tions where they are sorely needed.
This book speaks to law enforcement training provided by
the industry and covers company operations and documenta-
tion. It deals with the subject of commercial vehicle interdic-
tion in a way I have not seen in other cargo-­related writings.
Many volumes have been written on this subject, frequently in
manual format, and not based on real experience from investi-
gation and security management in the transportation security
field. It has been my intention to present a factual down-­to-­
earth cargo theft handbook based on true experience and
ongoing involvement in the field. This book stresses the basics
 Preface ◾ xiii

of cargo crime and provides the reader with patterns and

trends upon which to build a solid foundation for construction
of a company security and recovery plan along with informa-
tion to assist law enforcement with investigations. I recommend
that the reader absorb the information related in the text and
realize that it includes strategically placed repetition because
certain known principles can never be stressed enough.
I truly hope this book will be an informative, enjoyable,
and interesting read for those who have interest in this
complicated and amazingly underreported criminal activity.
Acknowledgments

I want to personally thank and acknowledge the many peo-

ple, agencies, associations, and councils that contributed to
Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention. Their professional
expertise, suggestions, photographs, and information encour-
aged me to complete this text. Since I am not a professional
author, I needed all the help I could get. I am listing these
persons in alphabetical order and hope I have not inadvertently
omitted anyone.
Thanks to Mary Aftanas, NICB; Jerry Allen, NICB; Jennifer
Bennett, Polo Ralph Lauren; Charles Bergeron, FedEx; Wayne
Browning, Texas Association of Vehicle Theft Investigators;
Hans Bryson, Dallas Police Department, Retired; Stephen
Burau, Ryder Logistics; Nolan Burns, FedEx Freight; Sgt. Steve
Covey, Mid-­West Cargo Task Force; Pat Clancy, LoJack Law
Enforcement; Murry Cohen, CNF, Retired; Scott Cornell,
Travelers Insurance SIU; Brian Coughlin, Dallas County District
Attorney’s Office; Karen Coughlin, Hilton Bella Harbor; Phil
Crepeau, LoJack Law Enforcement; Eric De La Barre, Southeast
Transportation Security Council; Sheriff Ed Dean, Marion
County (Florida) and National Cargo Theft Task Force; Millie
DeAnda, NTCC; Shawn Driscoll, Swift Transportation; Kurt
Duesterdick, Eastern Regional Cargo Theft Association; Nick
Economu, Schneider National; Randy Ferguson, Ferguson
Investigations; Chuck Forsaith, Pharmaceutical Cargo Security
Coalition; Robert Furtado, LoJack Supply Chain Integrity; Rob
Gammon, HP Global Security; Laura Hains, ASIS Supply Chain
xv
xvi ◾ Acknowledgments

Security Council; Ivy Haley, Fort Worth Police Department;

Jeff Hall, PI Transit Risk Management; Merri Hawkins,
California Highway Patrol, Cargo Theft Interdiction Program;
Kevin Heath, CNet Technologies; John Heil, Conway Freight;
Patrick Hientz, Texas Department of Public Safety; Stacy
Hohenberger, NICB; Sgt. Mike Hoyt, Dallas Police Department
UCR; Kevin Johnson, Panalpina NA; Mike Johnston, DSC
Security; Steve Keller, Menlo Logistics, Retired; Michelle
Lanham, Texas Auto Burglary Theft Prevention Authority;
Keith Lewis, CargoNet; Steve E. Lewis, Lewis & Backhaus,
P.C. and SWTSC; Fred Lohmann, NICB; Rick Martin, Knight
Transportation, ATA, and S&LP; Patti Martinez, Floodlight Press;
Sgt. Kevin Mathias, ISP Mid-­West Cargo Task Force; Ed Matis,
Dallas Police Department; Sheri McKinney, ATS; Kevin Mazza,
HP Global Security and Mid-­West Cargo Task Force; Willie
Morales, Miami Dade Police Department; Jim Morgan, Ryder
Logistics; Charles Morton, Panalpina NA; John Murphy, Texas
Department of Public Safety; Jaime Olivarez, Yellow Freight;
Ray Rios, SAIA Freight; Vance Root, US Risk; Tom Sheets, CNF,
Retired; Alan Spear, Transported Asset Protection Association;
Michelle Standifer, A&O Photography; Geoff Stefany, ODFL;
Lt. Randy Stewart, Texas Department of Public Safety; John
Tabor, National Retail Systems; April Tiger, SC-­ISAC; Carlos
Velez, ASIS Supply Chain Security Council; Mark Walicki, DEA,
Retired; David Wallace, Dallas Police Department, Retired; Tina
Weatherford, Dr. Pepper; Ted Wlazkowski, LoJack Supply Chain
Integrity; John Yakstas, Ryder Logistics; and Mark Zavala, Los
Angeles Police Department.
Special thanks are extended to my wife Lynette, son Kyle,
and extended family members for their support and encour-
agement during the writing process.
Each person listed above contributed in some way directly
or indirectly, through participation in the real-life incidents
discussed in the book or through information shared with the
Southwest Transportation Security Council (SWTSC).
About the Author

John Joseph (J.J.) Coughlin is

currently vice president of law
enforcement services for LoJack
Supply Chain Integrity (SCI). He
is responsible for developing,
implementing, and overseeing
security processes, procedures,
and investigations for SCI mem-
bers. J.J. also works closely with
law enforcement officers in
deployment of LoJack In-­Transit
Service to support covert surveil-
lance, dispatch, and recovery operations and investigations.
He also serves as the director of the Supply Chain Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (SC-ISAC) and supervises the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of cargo theft and
crime data.
J.J. serves as the chairman of the Southwest Transportation
Security Council, which he founded to facilitate the sharing of
information and networking with law enforcement and private
industry. He has been a driving force behind the expansion
of regional security councils and promoting information shar-
ing by regional councils, law enforcement, and private indus-
try. He is an active member of the Western States Cargo
Theft Association, Southeast Transportation Security Council,
Virginia–Carolinas Cargo Security Council, American Society
xvii
xviii ◾ About the Author

for Industrial Security (ASIS) Supply Chain Security Committee,

International Associations of Chiefs of Police, International
Association of Auto Theft Investigators, Advisory Committee
of the National Cargo Theft Task Force, National Council of
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), and the
Trans-­Border International Police Association. J.J. also con-
ducts security consulting duties for Trans-­Secure Compliance
and Solutions.
Before joining LoJack, SCI, J.J. spent 10 years in the trans-
portation industry as a regional security manager for CNF/­
Conway, a national transportation and logistics company. Prior
to joining CNF/­Conway, he spent 22 years with the Dallas
Police Department and was assigned for 17 of those years as a
detective or supervisor in the areas of areas assault, homicide,
intelligence, and public integrity. J.J. has also instructed classes
in interview and interrogation techniques and supply chain
and cargo transportation related subjects.
OVERVIEW OF I
CARGO CRIME
Chapter 1

Cargo Crime: Definition

and Trends

Introduction
Cargo theft. When you hear or see those words, you may
imagine piracy on the high seas, stagecoach and train rob-
beries in the old west, or some other long-­ago image of a
romantic criminal element dramatically represented by the
entertainment media as the good old days. Cargo theft has
been portrayed as acceptable behavior. Robin Hood and his
merry men would inflict brutality on the king’s men in the
process of stealing the kingdom’s goods and gold to share
with the less fortunate. Stories about the likes of Butch Cassidy
and the Sundance Kid and their Hole-in-the-Wall Gang along
with Jesse and Frank James and the Younger Brothers also
entertained us. Who can forget Detective Axel Foley in Beverly
Hills Cop as he rode in the back of a hijacked trailer contain-
ing a load of stolen cigarettes?
Cargo theft has been a part of American history ever since
people started moving products by conveyances—whether horse,
wagon train, or Pony Express. As society and transportation and
logistics methods evolved, cargo criminals and their methods

3
4 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

progressed to meet the industrial changes but the intent to

deprive an owner of rightful property remains the same.
Cargo crime has always been lucrative for the criminal ele-
ment but probably never more so than today. Classification
as a property crime allows cargo theft to present low risks
and yield high rewards. Risk is low because the justice system
imposes small penalties on property crimes while stolen prod-
ucts bring high-dollar rewards to perpetrators. Even opportu-
nistic thieves who will take just about anything can turn stolen
goods for ten cents on the dollar in a short time. A $20,000
load will produce good pay for a short day’s work. The orga-
nized thieves continue to challenge much more expensive
loads but when caught usually net light sentences.
In this book, we are going to look at cargo theft in the
United States in the 21st century. Cargo theft is a global prob-
lem, but that is another book for another time. We are going
to focus on domestic theft issues and related criminal meth-
ods. It is important to understand these issues, the risks and
developments, so that persons and companies involved in the
US supply chain can make the assessments of their individual
risks based on their operations and the commodities they ship,
manufacture, carry, store, handle, or insure.
It is important to understand which commodities pres-
ent the highest risks, how those commodities are targeted,
where the thefts occur, how the criminals operate, and why
they choose the crime of cargo theft. All these points are very
important to the analysis of current trends and patterns. We
will look at charts from the Supply Chain Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (SC-­ISAC) that will answer several of the
questions and then look at criminal methods of operation to
resolve the who and why questions.
But before we look at the charts and analyze the loss infor-
mation, it is important to examine the impact of cargo theft.
The results are very far reaching and involve far more than the
direct losses shown in statistics and charts. When a cargo
theft occurs, whether during transit or from a warehouse or
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 5

terminal, the missing product and equipment represent direct

losses from a criminal act. The total losses from such offenses
average around $200,000.00 per theft. So what is the indirect
loss? The indirect loss will include the cost of replacing the
missing shipment by remanufacturing the lost inventory. It
also includes losses incurred because the consignee does not
receive the product it needs for sale or use. The carrier’s loss
arises from not having access to missing equipment. Another
indirect loss is the insurance cost to cover the cargo and
equipment. When you add all of the indirect factors, you see
that the cost of one criminal act produces huge consequences.
We will also look at the current law enforcement response
to cargo crime and how it is dealt with in various areas of the
country. Based on this law enforcement response, we will see
how the transportation and logistics industry has stepped up
to promote cargo crime awareness, share information, educate
and network with law enforcement, and seek preventative
alternatives to overcome the current criminal methods of cargo
crime perpetrators. It is important to impress on the industry
that the protection of its operations is not provided by any
government agency. The National Strategy for Global Supply
Chain Security is no more a company security plan than a call
to 911 is a comprehensive recovery plan.
Solutions and industry best practices applying to the cur-
rent threats and known criminal methods will be provided and
discussed in an effort to give industry operators a checklist to
aid security through various parts of the supply chain includ-
ing physical, in-­transit, personnel, and procedural guidelines.
When I was tasked to write this book, I did not want it to
be a manual written by someone who studied the issue or
was involved in security from a research or academic stand-
point. I wanted to bring about awareness of current cargo
theft trends and intertwine it with my own experiences from
working in the industry, conducting investigations, and observ-
ing at the grassroots level. I wanted to take all of the data we
currently collect and analyze at the SC-­ISAC and put a stamp
6 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

of reality on it, make sense of what it means from the views of

studying cargo crime and having actually lived with it.
I read several other books and saw that they were written
from a different perspective—not after doing dirty work in
the trenches and building relationships with industry security
professionals from whom I continue to learn. As you read this
book, I make references to many cases I actually worked. I
tried to relay personal experiences and the reality of being a
regional security manager tasked with problem solving and
investigative responsibility over multiple locations and business
units covering a large territory including a foreign country.

Background and Perspective

My first experience with cargo theft came long before I had
any real knowledge of the subject. As a young patrol officer in
the mid 1970s, I worked a patrol beat covering a government
housing project adjacent to a railroad switching yard. We spent
quite a bit of time chasing, investigating, and apprehending
thieves, both juvenile and adult, who were “shopping” the rail
cars for usable goods. We made many arrests and recovered a
plethora of railroad client property in private residences in the
government housing unit.
I spent quite a bit of time working with the railroad police
and assisting them with operations and property issues. This
experience was beneficial because I learned quite a bit about
the operations of railroads, insurance guidelines on the recov-
ered property, and how the railroad police jurisdiction and
rules worked in coordination with the Texas Penal Code and
Code of Criminal Procedures. During my time on that beat,
we worked on many thefts and burglaries; a railroad police
officer shot and killed a thief during an incident on the tracks.
The rail yard provided plenty of activity and useful experi-
ence in dealing with cargo crime early in my law enforcement
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 7

career. After leaving that assignment, I spent the next 17 years

as a detective or detective supervisor responsible for many
types of crimes not related to cargo.
In 1997, after spending almost 22 years with a large munici-
pal police department in Texas, I retired from police work
and detective toil to enter the private sector. Leaving the police
department was not a sad day; I never really longed to be an
officer. When I joined the department, I just needed a job. It is
still hard to believe I stayed that long.
I accepted a position with a large, multi­faceted transporta-
tion and logistics company. I was hired as its southwest regional
manager of security responsible for Texas, five other states, and
Mexico. This operation included a freight airline, a freight for-
warding company, a third party logistics company, a full truck-
load company, and two less-­than-­truckload companies (one
union and one nonunion). I was tasked with security responsi-
bilities for all the company entities in my assigned territory. My
police experience taught me how to investigate, interview, and
interrogate, but I soon found that I had very little knowledge
about transportation and logistics security operations.
Since I was new to the industry, this assignment seemed
overwhelming at first, but it actually turned out to be a great
benefit. I had to learn quickly what freight transportation
security was all about. The security needs for an industry are
as complex as the industry itself. Unless one works across an
entire industry, it is difficult to understand the workings of all
the moving parts (shippers, carriers, logistic providers, insur-
ers, brokers, vendors) involved in the many ways to move,
store, and distribute product; and the coordination required of
the participants. Moving a box, a pallet, or a truckload from
point A to point B, on its face seems like a simple proposi-
tion, but it is far more complicated than it appears. One must
first learn the language and acronyms of the industry and
master the documentation, transportation modes, and freight
movement details. The wide variety of modes and operations
8 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

involved in a large logistics and transportation enterprise

meant a very steep learning curve, but with the assistance of
patient operations personnel, I quickly found my way.
So let’s take a good look at the cargo theft issues, the industry,
and the current law enforcement response to the problem.

Definition of Cargo Theft

Let’s start with a definition. Cargo theft can occur by many dif-
ferent criminal activities such as theft, burglary, robbery, and
even fraud. I suppose the official or best all-­inclusive defini-
tion of cargo theft is the one provided by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting Program’s National
Incident-­Based Reporting System (NIBRS):

Cargo theft is the criminal taking of any cargo includ-

ing, but not limited to, goods, chattels, money, or
baggage that constitutes, in whole or in part, a com-
mercial shipment of freight moving in commerce,
from any pipeline system, railroad car, motor truck,
or other vehicle, or from any tank or storage facility,
station house, platform, or depot, or from any vessel
or wharf, or from any aircraft, air terminal, airport,
aircraft terminal or air navigation facility, or from
any intermodal container, intermodal chassis, trailer,
container freight station, warehouse, freight distri-
bution facility, or freight consolidation facility. For
purposes of this definition, cargo shall be deemed
as moving in commerce at all points between the
point of origin and the final destination, regardless of
any temporary stop while awaiting trans-­shipment or
other­wise (USDOJ n.d.).

This definition illustrates one cargo theft problem faced

by industry and law enforcement. Crime reporting and
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 9

classification are much more complex than one would think.

Each law enforcement jurisdiction in the United States has
a reporting system specific to its operation. Every state has a
distinct set of criminal laws and codes not tied to those of
other states. The National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
stores some crime data, but little or no integration and commu-
nication exist among local, county, state, and federal agencies.
When I first came into the transportation industry and
started networking with transportation security profession-
als, the great need was to quantify the cargo crime problem.
If you follow this subject, you will have noted estimates of
billions of dollars per year lost to cargo crime, but no factual,
recordable, or researchable data to back up those numbers
have been compiled. Many thought the unified crime report
(UCR) code for cargo theft would eventually assist the industry
in quantifying losses.
As someone who has worked in both law enforcement
and industry, I do not believe the UCR system will be able
to provide a true quantification of cargo losses. First, all of
the separate agencies would have to use the UCR system
and correctly code reported offenses. Complete reporting is
almost totally improbable because of individual case facts and
the need to distinguish between a cargo crime in the supply
chain versus a regular commercial building burglary or armed
hijacking. Also, a specific cargo theft statute is needed in
each state jurisdiction to allow a match with the federal UCR
code. Every industry operates in many different modes under
many different contracts, claims, and insurance programs. No
industry will report all of its losses to law enforcement simply
because so many exceptions are handled through internal and
contractual claims processes. Such internal systems hamper
true offense counts and reporting.
These real issues prevent the UCR code from providing
true quantification of the problem. We will talk about many of
these issues later in the book when we discuss the different
modes of freight transportation.
10 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Current Data and Data Collection Efforts

Several different entities now collect cargo theft data and
much of the information is collected from and shared with
many of the same sources. All these groups know that the
data they collect does not cover all the cargo crime that
occurs, but after years of collection and allowing the databases
to mature, a true analysis can be performed to provide indus-
try and law enforcement with current trends and methods of
cargo crime activities.
As the director of the Supply Chain Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (SC-­ISAC), I have been involved in the
collection and analysis of such data since 2007. We will look
at some of the past data and see what we have been able to
collect and learn. I will show you some charts and data that
allow us to understand the current threats and risks involved
in the transportation and logistics industry.
Let’s look back a little before we move forward. The
SC-­ISAC started collecting cargo theft information from mul-
tiple sources in 2006. It took several years for the data to
mature, more sources to be found, and data collection to be
enhanced. By 2007, enough data existed to start looking for
trends and information, but it really wasn’t until around 2009
that the data set matured enough to provide a reliable overall
picture. Although we identified much information on methods
and suspects before data analysis by industry, insurance, and
law enforcement, the true picture started to evolve through the
records by 2009.
We wanted our analysis to be able to answer the who,
what, where, why, and how surrounding cargo crimes. We
also wanted to compare the SC-­ISAC information to similar
reports provided by insurance companies and other industry
resources. While we knew that the SC-­ISAC did not receive
all cargo theft data, neither did the other sources. We were
looking for similarities from those sources to assist in the
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 11

confirmation of our data analysis. As each collector’s data

matured and underwent a comparison to the SC-­ISAC informa-
tion, the identified trends and information were confirmed and
enhanced. The following information and charts will give us
vital and vetted information from which to start analyzing the
current cargo theft and cargo crime issues.
When we understand how cargo thieves operate, we can
take the correct preventative measures to reduce risk. The charts
in this chapter will show thefts by state, location type, time
factors, and items targeted by both organized and opportunis-
tic thieves and assist us in understanding cargo crime trends
and the criminal methods of involved parties. After you “have
a handle” on that information as an industry security practitio-
ner, you will be able to put a security plan in place for your
operation, with a focus on prevention and the ability to include
a fail-safe system for recovery. You will be able to direct the
police during recovery efforts because you will understand cur-
rent cargo criminal methods and be able to predict their actions
after a theft. This knowledge will also allow you to successfully
devise company security and recovery plans.

Analysis of SC-­ISAC Data for 2009­–2011

The SC-­ISAC recorded 2,264 incidents in 2009, 2010, and 2011.
Of those, 611 incidents for 2009, 813 for 2010, and 678 for
2011, totaling 2,102, were categorized as cargo thefts for the
three-year period. The remaining 162 incidents were classified
as frauds, burglaries, or robberies. The SC-­ISAC also issued
intelligence reports to assist law enforcement investigations
seeking complainants or information on cargo-­related inci-
dents. Based on reported incidents, the losses of both cargoes
and vehicles for the three-­year period totaled $414,960,152 or
$197,412 per reported incident. Most incidents involved thefts
from full truckload carriers. The SC-­ISAC collects and archives
12 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

types of freight stolen, where it is stolen, state and type of

location (crime scene), time stolen, and location of recovery of
equipment and/­or freight.
At the SC-­ISAC, we take great care to make sure that we do
not over­report the incidents we receive—which is easily done
when taking batch information from law enforcement agencies.
While the SC-­ISAC does not gather anywhere near the full
number of cargo theft incidents, the last thing we want to do
is duplicate or count an incident more than once. The center
does not amass every single incident nor ever expect to; its
goal is to not quantify an issue but to conduct analysis of the
information collected to make determinations that can help
supply chain operators understand the risks, raise their levels
of awareness, and allow them to prepare security and recov-
ery plans based on the knowledge and analyzed information.
As you scour the loss and recovery data, please keep the
following points in mind:

1. Dollar amounts are often estimated by the information

provider, usually only to include direct loss information;
they could possibly change as an investigation progresses.
2. Dollar amounts are typically only provided for the items
owned or insured by the information provider and may
not represent the total loss sustained.
3. Single-load losses, especially for high-value Items such as
pharmaceuticals, can skew the average loss figures.

A review of three years of collected cargo theft data reveals

quite a jump in reported numbers in 2010 and then a little
step back in 2011. We continue to see the fraudulent pick-­up
category increase and we want to keep our eyes open to
new and effective cargo criminal methods. The SC-­ISAC also
records locations where the stolen items are recovered. From
this data, we can make logical determinations about current
and changing criminal methods. By tracking data over the
past three years, we have seen a change in the movement of
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 13

stolen products and evidence of the development of splinter

groups in several new and different locations. The methods
of targeting products and committing thefts remain consistent,
but stolen products are handled differently now in several geo-
graphical areas.

Cargo Theft Activity by State

Cargo theft activity has long been thought of as a crime that
knows no geographic boundaries as shown by the increasing
number of states reporting activities ranging from in-­transit
thefts to warehouse and carrier facility thefts. For the three-
year period from 2009 through 2011, we see more and more
states sending in reports and information. Even though data
for the top seven to ten states have remained consistent, this
is only one of four or five factors from which one can prepare
an in-­transit security plan.
As we look at the 2011 chart, California has by far reported
the most cargo theft activity in North America, holding the
top spot the entire year. Texas, New Jersey, Georgia, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have each appeared among the
top reporting states for all four quarters. Florida was one of
the most active states, listed for three of the four quarters. We
believe Florida has much more activity than reported to the
SC-­ISAC and the charts currently show. Florida would probably
be a constant second or third if all the data were obtained.
The data the SC-­ISAC collected enabled us to conduct the
analysis and make good logical determinations about cargo
thefts and their impacts.
Figure 1.1 shows the consistency in where the thefts occur.
I believe that reporting increases in states where industry
and law enforcement work together to share information
through industry councils and cargo theft task forces. This
public–private partnership activity invites a much more open
exchange of information and reporting than is possible in
14 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

80
69
70
60 54 53
50
40 33
29 27 27 27
30 24
20 21 19
20 15 15 14 13 11 12 12 12
9 8 9 9 8 7
10 6 6 4
2 1 3 2
0
NJ TX CA GA IL FL OH IN CA NJ TX GA IL FL OH PA IN CA TX NJ FL GA IL IN PA OH CA TX NJ GA IL FL IN

1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr

Figure 1.1 The top eight states subject to cargo thefts seldom change;
only their order on the charts changes.
states that do not have that advantage. I believe the data
sources and information sharing will continue to grow to
paint an even better picture of the cargo theft problem, but
we already have a pretty clear idea from the data we ana-
lyzed. When you break the information down further within
the listed states, you find that most theft occurs in highly
populated areas (big cities and metropolitan areas) within
those states as a result of the routing of interstate freeway
networks through major hubs.
In California, most activity occurs in the southern section
in and around Los Angeles. In Texas, the focus is on the
Dallas and Houston metropolitan areas; Chicago is the main
location in Illinois. Tennessee cargo crimes center in Memphis
and Nashville and most Florida activity is around Miami. Most
people in the cargo industry know that the Atlanta area in
Georgia is notorious and cargo theft action freely crosses the
state line between Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
I reviewed a recent California Highway Patrol (CHP) Cargo
Theft Interdiction Program Report (Hawkins 2011). In an
analysis of cargo theft by state, California was cited at the top
of the list, followed by Texas, New Jersey, Florida, Illinois,
and Georgia. This conclusion is in line with the SC-­ISAC
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 15

data and information from other sources. When CHP ana-

lyzed the cargo crime locations in California, 61% occurred in
the greater Los Angeles area followed by 22% in the Inland
Empire (Riverside and San Bernardino Counties).

Where Thefts Occur

If you were going to steal a cargo rig, where would you go?
Organized theft groups know the correct answer: the first
location where the equipment and cargo are left unattended
and thus present an opportunity to thieves.
Between 2009 and 2011, three cargo theft locations (truck
stops, carrier facilities, parking lots) jostled for the dubious
distinction of the top location for cargo theft activity. In 2009,
truck stops took the top spot while carrier facilities easily
carried 2010. Throughout 2010 the SC-­ISAC reported a more
strategic approach by cargo thieves. The 2010 data illustrated
a significant shift from 2009 when truck stops held the top
spot. Figure 1.2 shows that truck stops and parking lots lead
throughout the 2011 data.
The number of incidents where locations are not specified
is substantially higher than in past years, and is due primar-
ily to batch data received from the California Highway Patrol
(CHP) and the New Jersey State Police that required further
analysis. While the SC-­ISAC encourages members to provide
the most detailed theft information possible, it is not always
feasible. When looking at this information, the most striking
determination is that the thefts will happen at almost any type
of location where a driver leaves a rig and cargo unattended,
especially if the load contains one of the targeted commodities
identified in cargo theft data.
According to Figure 1.2, truck stop, carrier facilities, and
parking lots are the top three locations. Data for the previous
year are similar. But what you really learn from this graphic
is that a criminal using methods we will discuss later in this
16 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Unspecified 49
Truck Stop 26
Facility 17
4th Qtr

Yard 14
Street 11
Lot 9
Warehouse 4
Unspecified 70
Lot 26
Truck Stop 26
3rd Qtr

Facility 22
Yard 12
Street 10
Warehouse 6
Residence 2
Unspecified 56
Lot 38
Truck Stop 26
2nd Qtr

Facility 19
Yard 18
Street 6
Warehouse 1
Unspecified 37
Lot 36
Facility 21
Truck Stop 18
Street 15
1st Qtr

Carrier Yard 12
Warehouse 3
Residence 2
Yard 2
Unknown 1
Rest Area 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Figure 1.2 Common locations of cargo thefts. Thieves can strike

anywhere.

book will follow through with a theft at any location if the cor-
rect opportunity presents itself. Location rarely concerns orga-
nized groups; the important factor is the point at which the
load is vulnerable and they have an opening to do their work.
This is a key point for industries to understand and thus
step up protection in their own facilities and control circum­
stances of when and where drivers stop while carrying high-
value loads. These thefts can and do occur quickly. A victimized
driver who did not apply the locks or immobilization equip-
ment because he was only going to be away from the rig for
a few minutes has no valid excuse. It is important to stress the
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 17

awareness of this known risk to every employee level in the

supply chain. Cargo vulnerability is also pushing the industry to
look for security applications that do not have to rely on driv-
ers. Future security may rely on remote wireless communication
technology integrated into in-­transit units to control and operate
tracking, locking, and engine shut-­down hardware.
The willingness of cargo thieves to focus their efforts on
carrier facilities and secured lots where they are more likely to
confront a variety of security measures speaks volumes about
their perception of the risk-­to-­reward ratio of cargo crime.
While they do not intend to confront anyone in the course of
committing a crime, they are still bold enough to move into
highly controlled and sometimes secure areas to do their dirty
work. Whether moving covertly or acting boldly, the thieves
frequently operate “under the noses” of unsuspecting company
employees and truck stop patrons. Whether a driver is plan-
ning to leave a loaded rig unattended for 2 minutes or 2 days,
the security and immobilization devices must be deployed.
Drivers must be made aware of current risks, especially if they
are carrying the targeted commodities shown in Table 1.1.

When Thefts Occur

Figure 1.3 shows what supply chain stakeholders and law
enforcement have long suspected: cargo thieves are most
active over weekends, regardless of the time of year. The
bump in activity on Tuesdays can be attributed to extended
weekends due to state and national holidays. This issue is
very important to the operators of supply chain companies
as it clearly shows that their facilities and in-­transit loads are
more heavily targeted when left unattended or where activity
is minimal. Since the SC-­ISAC started this analysis, the data
have been consistent: weekends and 3-day holiday weekends
continue to be the windows of the highest cargo theft activity.
Although cargo thieves may have altered where they strike
18 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Table 1.1 Frequently Stolen Products

Category Items
Automotive Tires
Beverages Power drinks
Clothing and accessories Clothing
Computers and peripherals Computers
Consumer electronics Televisions
Drugs and medical aids Pharmaceuticals
Food Meats and non-­alcoholic beverages
Health and beauty products Perfume
Tobacco and spirited beverages Liquor, wine, and beer
Construction supplies Metals
Furniture Office furniture
Appliances Washers and dryers
Housewares Paper products

over the past few years, the data showing when thefts occur
remained very consistent, never once showing a dissimilar
result in any of the quarterly analyses conducted.
Among all the figures and data, Figure 1.3 shows the most
consistent trend over the 3-year period and earlier. It clearly
illustrates to the transportation security professional the huge
need for each supply chain operation to fully protect its assets
during weekends, and particularly over 3-day holiday weekends.
Locking down facilities is not the biggest challenge; the
challenges appear during the release of freight for transit,
while it is in transit, and during receipt at arrival. The risks
are not always easy to fix because of variations in consignee
needs, business schedules, and other factors. These vulnerabil-
ities should be major considerations for high-value shipments.
The goal should be to never allow your freight to be dropped
off or left unattended. “Freight at rest is freight at risk” is
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 19

Weekend 65
Fri 30
4th Qtr

Thu 25
Wed 13
Tue 25
Mon 13
Weekend 67
Fri 40
3rd Qtr

Thu 11
Wed 42
Tue 18
Mon 29
Weekend 64
Fri 41
2nd Qtr

Thu 14
Wed 27
Tue 22
Mon 33
Weekend 48
Fri 22
1st Qtr

Thu 16
Wed 19
Tue 24
Mon 19
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Figure 1.3 Weekends, particularly three-­day weekends, are the pre-

ferred theft days.
probably the most frequently used phrase in the industry. I do
not know who first spoke those seven words but they serve as
a very important reminder that freight should never be left at
rest without adequate protection.
The most common statement of a victimized truck driver
is “I was only going to be gone for a few minutes.” Once you
understand the methods of operations of organized theft
groups we will be talking about, you will understand why
both rig and freight can disappear very quickly.

What’s Stolen
The commodities and specific items most often reported stolen
during 2009 are certainly no strangers to our earlier analysis.
20 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

They simply confirm what we learned at the start of the

analysis. The data reveal something that our analysis shows
almost every quarter and every year: food is the most targeted
commodity. When we look at the data for 2009 and 2010, we
see that food commodities lead the way—at the top of eleven
categories for eleven of the last twelve quarters. This is a result
that very few persons without intimate knowledge of cargo
theft information would ever presume. Most people would
probably guess that consumer electronics would be number
one, but they move up and down the quarterly charts much
more so than food, which is the consistent leader. Different
sets of criminals target food and consumer electronics, but the
main issue for industry is being aware of the targeted com-
modities. Although the amounts of theft incidents increase in
the third and fourth quarters every year, the commodity per-
centages are fairly consistent as shown in Figure 1.4.
When I first started in the industry, you could almost
always count on a spike in theft activity in the third quar-
ter. The reason for this spike is that around Labor Day, the
high-value freight starts making its way from manufacturer to
distributor to destination store so that it will be in place for
“black Friday” shopping the day after Thanksgiving. Volumes
in freight stay high during the third and fourth quarters, usu-
ally with the higher value freight being shipped for Christmas
sales. When you look at all the data, you will see those
upward trends. The freight volume increase during those
quarters is very significant and it truly does affect the loss
numbers. When high-value shipments involving the targeted
commodities increase by a rather large percentage, adequate
handling procedures often fall below the standard security
requirements because of the pressure.
Cargo thieves consistently target the same commodities and
specific items, essentially offering supply chain stakeholders
a major page from their playbook. Knowing which commodi-
ties and products are on the target list is the most important
information a supply chain operator can have. If you aren’t
 0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%

Food
2.86%

twelve quarters.

Clothing & Accessories

2.41%

No Information
2.41%

Metals
2.26%

Consumer Electronics
2.26%

1st Qtr

Other
1.96%

Bvg
1.96%

H&B
1.96%

Automotive
Furniture
1.36%1.36%

Food
4.67%

No Information
3.92%

H&B
3.16%

Other
3.16%

Metals
3.16%

Bvg
2.86%

2nd Qtr

Clothing & Accessories

2.26%

Computer & Peripherals

2.11%

Bldg Sply
1.81%

Consumer Electronics
1.81%

Food
4.97%

Consumer Electronics
3.77%

Other
3.61%

Clothing & Accessories

3.46%

Bvg
2.86%

No Information

3rd Qtr
2.41%

Bldg Sply
2.11%

Metals
1.96%

Computer & Peripherals

1.81%
1.66%

H&B
Other
4.37%

Food
3.31%

Bvg
2.56%

Clothing & Accessories

2.41%
Consumer Electronics
2.11%
Metals

1.66%

4th Qtr
1.51%
Automotive
Bldg Sply

1.46%
Computer & Peripherals

1.20%
H&B

1.05%
Bvg

0.15%

Figure1.4 Food leads the list of commodities preferred for theft during three of four quarters and eleven of the last
21 ◾ Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends
22 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

An LTL (less than truckload) company in Houston had

a problem with flat screen television shipments going
to a specific consignee during the holiday season. The
consignee would only take deliveries at certain times and
because of some confusion between the shipper and the
consignee, the LTL company was left with a large number
of very high-value flat screen TVs and had to store this
high-value product in trailers at its terminal yard over the
Thanksgiving holiday.
An entrepreneurial employee decided to take advantage
of the situation. After he finished his shift for the evening,
he pulled one of the TV storage trailers from the yard to
a liquor store near the terminal and called several other
employees and friends to help themselves to the goods.
After a large portion of the freight had been removed,
he returned the trailer to the yard. When the significant
shortages were discovered, I was notified and began the
investigation that led to terminations and arrests of a large
number of employees.
The loss was caused by dishonest employees, but the
opportunity presented itself when the shipper and con-
signee could not coordinate the delivery of a very large
amount of valuable freight. This left the carrier “in limbo”
with large amounts of expensive freight that it was not
equipped to store in a secure manner. In retrospect, the
operations personnel could have handled the problem
better. Dealing with unexpected situations and exceptions
can hinder security planning if an oper­ation is not pre-
pared for aberrations.

working with the commodities shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5

and Table 1.1, your threats and risk go way down. The most
significant part of understanding organized cargo thieves
is being cognizant of the commodities they target, desire,
and pursue.
 18 17
16
14 13 13 13
12 11
10
10 9 9
8 8 8
8 7 7
6
6 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 4 4 4 4
4
2
0

Steel
Steel
Steel

Misc

Meat
Meat
Meat
Meat

Health

Frozen
Beauty

Copper
Copper
Copper

Alcohol
Alcohol
Alcohol

Perfume

Non-Alcohol
Non-Alcohol
Non-Alcohol
Non-Alcohol

Construction
Construction
Construction

Bvg Food H & Metals Bldg Bvg Food H&B Metals Bldg Bvg Food H & Metals Bldg Bvg Food
B Sply Sply B Sply
1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr
Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends
◾

Figure 1.5 Cargo thieves desire the same products most people want.
23
24 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

The data covering 2009 through 2011 list the same com-
modities and specific items—frequently very high-value
computer equipment, consumer electronics, and consumable
goods. It seems that stolen items that are sought after and not
expensive can be sold easily and are more difficult for law
enforcement to track via serial numbers or document by other
means. Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5 show commodities that are
known targets of organized cargo criminals.
Food commodities led the way—with the exception of the
fourth quarter, when they ranked second. There are many
things to learn from the three years of data and the 2011
charts. You can identify certain cycles for specific commodi-
ties. For example, metals cycle based on their market costs.
If the price of copper is up, the theft of copper increases. In
an analysis of targeted and stolen commodities in California,
a California Highway Patrol (CHP) analysis noted, “Food,
electronics, and clothing continue to be the most sought
after stolen products due to the ease of re­sell and value of
return on the product. In addition, the inability to identify
and recover the products efficiently and effectively once dis-
tributed. As stated earlier, we saw a significant increase in
construction materials (roofing material, lumber, tile, metal,
piping) in the southwest area. Most of the other products
stayed relative to the previous years” (Hawkins 2011).
The California study is almost a mirror image of our find-
ings nationwide as shown in Figure 1.4. The most significant
increase (that seems now to be an anomaly) is the “other” cat-
egory in the SC-­ISAC report ranking number one in the fourth
quarter. The “miscellaneous” category in the California report
jumped to third in 2011. This may show a change in targeting
strategies by the cargo criminals.
We need to watch this area for several more quarters to
see whether it is a changing factor. In the past, cargo crimi-
nals did not show a desire to prey upon consolidated loads or
mixed freight because variations limited their control over the
products they were seeking. The increase in thefts of “other”
 Cargo Crime: Definition and Trends ◾ 25

and “miscellaneous” items indicates that they are willing to

hit these loads now but the pattern seems to show that they
are targeting mixed loads that they know have value. In other
words, they seek loads from high-value shippers or warehouse
type store distribution centers that probably contain high-value
products that can be resold easily. Beverage loads continue
to be desirable targets, particularly power and non-­alcoholic
drinks. They too are easy to sell and hard to trace and track
by law enforcement. Table 1.1 lists the most frequently stolen
products over a three-­year span.

Conclusion
After looking at the data for 2009 through 2011 and the
2011 charts from the SC-­ISAC, we now have an idea about
three of the five cargo crime tenets. The what, where, and
when have been identified from analysis of the charts. The
what consists of commodities preferred by cargo thieves.
Remember that with organized cargo theft, the what is the
most important factor. Real cargo thieves know the prod-
ucts they are after and target those specific commodities as
part of their method of operation, which we will talk more
about in Chapter 3. No matter what the mode of freight
transportation, the listed commodities represent the first line
of products the thieves will target. The same principle also
applies to internal thieves working in consolidation units.
Their growth from simple pilferage to targeting pallets or
greater quantities will be based on what the involved com-
modity is.
The where issue is detailed in the charts showing states
where most thefts occur. Once again, the actual reporting
may be somewhat skewed by the fact that the areas most fre-
quently cited have cargo task forces or industry security coun-
cils that focus on the cargo crime issue. These entities tend
to promote much more regional participation in information
26 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

gathering and sharing. Also, because of the methods of opera-

tions of organized cargo thieves, thefts may not occur in the
same state where the origin distribution center is located or
the shipment originated. We will cover this in Chapter 3 also.
As the participation in data gathering and information shar-
ing continues to grow, the statistics will become even more
consistent and pinpoint the changes of methods of criminals
through better data analysis.
No real consistency has been demonstrated in connection
with types of locations from which cargoes are stolen and spe-
cific types of crime scenes. Crime scene frequency bounces
back and forth from truck stop to parking lot, to carrier facil-
ity. The main point garnered from charts and reports is to go
one step further and understand that location is not as impor-
tant as the fact that any location where a rig and cargo are left
unattended and unsecured is vulnerable.
The when factor remains consistent with most activity
occurring on weekends and during 3-day holiday weekends.
Cargo thieves like to operate when fewer people are around
and when buildings are left to the protection of alarms and
other systems that can be beaten or manipulated. This fact
is also important when an operation releases freight to carri-
ers. To prevent them from dropping loaded trailers or leaving
complete rigs unattended during these down times, the ship-
pers must plan the pick-­up, travel time, and service due date
to avoid circumstances that allow drivers time to drop trailers
or leave their rigs unattended.
For an operator in the supply chain, the information from
the charts in this chapter produces a pretty clear picture.
When we add the information in upcoming chapters about
the criminal methods of organized and opportunistic cargo
thieves, the focus will become clear as to what must be
done to protect freight, especially of cargoes of high value, in
transit or storage during its move from manufacturer to distri-
bution center and on to final destination.
Chapter 2

Modes of Freight
Transportation

Introduction
Freight is moved by many different means. Each mode of
freight transportation presents different challenges related
to theft and loss. To understand the big picture of theft
within the transportation industry, you must first understand
how freight moves. Companies have many choices, based
on their needs. When looking at the different transportation
modes, a company must determine which one provides the
transit times, service, cost-efficiency, and security its freight
needs. Depending on the commodity to be shipped and
the volume of freight to be moved, a shipper must consider
several factors and choices. Cost is usually the main factor
followed by special considerations needed to make the ship-
per’s customers or buyers happy by meeting service due
dates, preventing loss and damage, and being a responsive
business partner.

27
28 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Freight Modalities
Most of the information and figures reviewed in Chapter 1
relate to full truckload thefts, but industries use other types of
shipping modalities as described below.
Full truckload (FTL)—As the name indicates, the FTL is
one trailer load of freight belonging to one shipper, for exam-
ple, a 53-foot van loaded with product from a single owner.
FTL shipping is the movement of large amounts of standard-
ized cargo, generally the amount necessary to fill an entire
semi­trailer or intermodal container. A truckload carrier is a
trucking company that generally contracts an entire trailer load
to a single customer. The big advantage is that freight shipped
by FTL carriers is rarely handled or involved in a consolidation
while en route. This eliminates internal theft to a degree but
FTL loads are still subject to theft from external non-­employee
criminals. This mode is targeted by the commodity carried
and the loaded rig being left unattended. Most driver give-­ups
occur with this mode, especially when non-­company drivers
are used. We will talk about driver give-­ups and truck-stop
crime in the next chapter.
Less than truckload (LTL)—This mode transports rela-
tively small freight that is too big for parcel carriers and too
small to go with a full trailer load. LTL carriers use semitrail-
ers that are typically between 28 and 53 feet long. They fill
the trailers with freight, usually pallet size, from many cus-
tomers to make such transportation economical. This mode
uses a consolidation system to move each customer’s freight
from origin to destination. This consolidation system means
that the freight requires handling several times while in tran-
sit, depending on the shipment route. This system of freight
transportation is very controlled when it comes to the drivers
and the long-haul portion of the operation. The advantages
of this mode are control and the flexibility of the system for a
shipper. The move may take a little more time because of the
consolidation process, but it can service a shipper needing to
 Modes of Freight Transportation ◾ 29

distribute to multiple locations quickly. The consolidation pro-

cess is a security risk because product must be handled sev-
eral times while in transit. Due to the need for consolidation
in the LTL system, most thefts are committed by employees or
involve employee collusion with outside parties.
Air cargo and freight forwarding—This is the transpor-
tation of freight by air conveyance. There are several true air
carriers, such as UPS and FedEx, that use their own dedicated
cargo planes to move freight. This segment of the freight trans-
portation industry involves many international shipments. The
strengths of this mode are the shipment transit times and the
security during moves. The weakness and most thefts occur
during the loading or unloading phase, usually when cartage
agents and contractors are used. Many freight forwarders buy
space on cargo or passenger planes for their customers ship-
ments. After they secure space, they sell it to customers for
freight movement. In this mode, both the companies and freight
forwarders face most of their theft risks during consolidation.
Trucks are required at both ends of an air shipment for
pick-­up and delivery. Also, much of the freight-forwarding
shipping is done by truck and the truck segments create the
most opportunities for problems and exceptions.
Intermodal rail and ocean shipping—Freight is trans-
ported in an intermodal container or vehicle, (trailer) via truck,
rail, and/­or ship without any handling of the freight during
mode changes. The reduced cargo handling improves security
and lessens the chances for pilferage and losses. Full container
load (FCL) and less than container load (LCL) shipping are
involved. Rail shipments are vulnerable during movement or
in the switch yards. Shipping containers on a ship, because of
the way they are loaded, are less subject to in-­transit risks but
have the same issues as other types of freight once they reach
port and begin moving by truck. Rail and ocean modes are
usually secure and economical means of shipping.
Warehousing and third party logistic providers (3PLs)—​
These firms provide outsourced services to customers for some
30 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

or all of their supply chain functions. 3PLs typically special-

ize in integrated operation, warehousing, and transportation
services that can be customized to the needs of a particular
customer. Warehousing is the performance of administrative
and physical functions associated with storage of goods and
materials (receipt, identification, inspection, verification, stor-
ing, and retrieval) and issuing products. Warehousing must
secure the building, product, and its operating yard. A 3PL
usually selects the transportation carriers for its operation and,
depending on its needs, will use FTL, LTL or other mode car-
riers based on its requirements.
Parcel shipping or package delivery—Packages (parcels)
or high-value mail items are transported as single shipments.
While such service is provided by most government postal ser-
vices, parcel shipping is the prime business of private companies
like UPS and FedEx. Small package shipping and delivery is a
consolidated service that moves low-weight parcels and single
shipments. Using government postal services or private entities
is usually just a preference or based on pricing. Actually, many
private companies service or supplement postal shipping and
distribution. This form of shipping is definitely a consolidation
mode with most risk of theft present during handling stages.
When I worked for the transportation conglomerate, it
utilized all of these types of transportation modes except for
small parcel, rail, and ocean shipping. The company used
trucks to pick up and deliver freight to rail yards and ports
and participated in the consolidation of freight from these
locations. The company had a security department that had
a loss reporting process in place that assigned loss investiga-
tions over the entire enterprise to the security managers by
region. I was assigned cases involving different types of theft
and methods and occurred during all transportation modes.
I kept a case log that acted as my personal archive and record.
The ongoing record allowed me to make many determinations
as to the types of suspects, internal or external, and criminal
methods of operation.
 Modes of Freight Transportation ◾ 31

Cargo Crime by Modality

Cargo crime methods and theft risk vary by mode. Incidents
can be similar, slightly different, or wholly dissimilar challenges.
The most inherent risk in the FTL mode is theft of a complete
rig or a fully loaded dropped trailer. During my 10-year stint
working for a logistic service provider, our 3PL company that
handled warehousing and transportation for a large computer
company suffered numerous full truckload thefts.
Pilferage is not as prevalent with FTL movements with the
exception of trailer burglaries when the rigs are parked at
truck stops, rest areas, unsecured lots, or on streets. Burglaries
frequently occur while a driver is asleep in a rig or when the
unit is left unattended. Theft from external sources is much
more likely with this mode of transportation. Although you
may find employee collusion, about 85% of criminal activity in
FTL is from external nonemployee criminals. The 15% internal
activity can usually be traced directly to driver involvement.
The organized gangs that target specific commodities usually
commit thefts against FTL carriers.
The LTL mode of transportation removes the cargo crimi-
nal’s ability to choose and control the product when stealing
a completely loaded trailer because freight of all kinds may be
aboard. Pilferage committed by employees is a far more preva-
lent problem in the LTL mode because of the consolidation pro-
cess and the number of times shipments are handled. Exception
reports involving theft in the LTL mode indicate that about 85%
of the theft is from internal sources and greater problems can
be expected when organized employee theft rings evolve.
When I provided security and investigation services to our
carrier companies within my region, two of the larger aggre-
gated thefts of freight were committed by organized employee
theft rings. Employees of LTL companies learn how to manipu-
late the system to be able to remove large amounts of freight
from shipping lanes or terminals. Documentation and super-
visory control are extremely important in this or any other
32 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

mode that involves consolidation. Several full trailer load thefts

from an LTL carrier occurred in my region but each time we
recovered the majority of the freight. Stealing fully loaded LTL
trailers is a blind luck proposition unless you have collusion
from inside. As Forrest Gump said, “Life is like a box of choc-
olates, you never know what you’re gonna get.”
All modes of transportation that utilize facilities and yards
must secure those areas. These locations for every mode are
constant targets of criminals looking for easy marks. Since all
freight transportation modes begin and end with moves by
truck, all providers are vulnerable to truck crime and should
ensure adequate crime prevention. Truck, trailer, and con-
tainer security should be the number one task of every entity
involved in moving freight. People in the industry always say
that “freight at rest is freight at risk.” The slogan applies to every
part of the supply chain. Understanding this simple phrase can
assist you in preparing an effective security plan for each mode.
Rail shipments present their own unique challenges. Even
though they have the same task of securing their yards, ter-
minals, and trucks with trailers or containers, they are also
known to face organized gangs of thieves who target their
trains while in transit, especially in the west and desert south-
west part of the United States. The Conrail Boyz targeted
Norfolk Southern and CSX trainloads in the New Jersey and
New York area. Rail thefts are many times not discovered until
a car arrives at the last destination yard; the location where
the crime or breach occurred is unknown. Without that infor-
mation, making a police report is extremely difficult and a
follow-­up investigation without a crime scene is almost impos-
sible. Railroads have their own sworn police forces but they
deal with miles and miles of territory and the need to secure
exchange and switching yards in many very tough urban areas.
The majority of air cargo theft involves pilfering, theft at or
from a consolidation point, or during loading or unloading of
 Modes of Freight Transportation ◾ 33

the cargo hold area of a plane. It usually involves internal or

contracted employees who pilfer shipment pallets. As noted
above, all operating locations, terminals, and distribution cen-
ters face the same issues of security in their yards and during
truck moves to and from the airport.
True warehousing operations also see pilfering during stor-
age, loading, and unloading. Warehouse managers must look
at all of the same problems discussed above but also need to
put solid layered security in place. Warehousing operations are
subject to internal risk from employee theft and pilferage and
also face risks of burglaries of their storage facilities by exter-
nal criminals.
The parcel shipping mode presents all the risks cited above
and then some. Because of volume, size of the freight, and
value of some single shipments, this mode provides security
practitioners a true challenge in every way.
As we move through later chapters, remember how each
mode operates and how selecting the correct mode for cargo
movement is an important step for shippers and their com-
modities. Providing security for specific commodities while in
transit can be accomplished more easily with some transpor-
tation modes than others. Depending on what your require-
ments are, using the right mode can be the first step to
providing a secure shipping solution for your product.
The accountability for keeping goods safe during tran-
sit and in storage lies completely with the management of
transporters and manufacturers. As goods travel through
these various modes of transportation, legal accountability
changes. It usually lies in the hand of the company in pos-
session of the goods when an exception occurs although
responsibility is not always that easy to determine.
Understanding freight movement and claims procedures
along with cargo law is very important to shippers if they
are going to obtain indemnity.
34 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Conclusion
Is one mode safer than another? The answer depends on sev-
eral factors. Picking the mode for your commodity is as impor-
tant as picking the carrier. Once you understand how different
groups target commodities, how to choose specific modes for
certain shipments will make more sense. Do you want your
cargo handled fewer times? Do you not want a full truckload
of your product at risk?
In addition to cost realities, you have other issues to con-
sider when making your decision. Once you determine a
mode, you can pick a carrier. You should also base that
choice on how a carrier handles security in its company and
for its shippers. A chosen carrier should have a dedicated
security department with written security and recovery plans
and the ability to execute both. As I noted in Chapter 1,
moving a box, pallet, or truckload from point A to point B
can sometimes be more complex than expected. In the next
chapter, we discuss the groups that target the industry and
the methods they use. The information should allow you to
make educated decisions about modes and the risks attached
to them.
Chapter 3

Perpetrators of
Cargo Crime

Introduction
When I first ventured into the transportation world from the
public law enforcement sector and started learning and apply-
ing transportation security techniques in a real-life scenario
over a multistate area for a multimode company, I saw first-­
hand the risks and threats to this business from inside and
out. My region originally consisted of five southwest states
and Mexico. Over time, it grew to involve seven states.
The business units I oversaw included every mode dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 except intermodal rail, ocean, and parcel
shipping. We utilized truck operations to and from rail and
ocean ports but I did not have security responsibilities for
freight while it was actually on rails or on a ship. I quickly
learned what issues were relevant to my area versus what the
regional security managers (RSMs) in the other regions faced.
Most activities in my region, related to our LTL operations
by both our union and nonunion carriers. Within the first
month of my employment, I was introduced to a major inter-
nal theft ring that operated in our union LTL operation in

35
36 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Houston, Texas. My predecessor RSM started an investigation

and identified many of the participants. These employees had
long been targeting the freight of a client that shipped com-
puter ink cartridges. The ring started with a few boxes and
progressed to taking full pallets. I learned that the shipper
placed 72 cartons on each pallet and each carton contained
100 ink jet cartridges. The cartridges retailed for about $30
each, so each pallet was a very expensive shipment.
An investigative plan had been devised wherein this type
of freight was cut off from traveling to or consolidating at this
terminal. A baited pallet was going to be added into the sys-
tem at a time when the employees known to be involved were
on duty so that it would be stolen and then could be tracked
to an off-­company site or to a “fence.” As with most plans, an
unexpected activity changed the plan of action. A few days
before the planned bait freight activity, an unexpected return
shipment involving eight pallets of the same customer’s freight
was shipped into the terminal and stolen on a Sunday by sev-
eral of the theft ring employees. The eight pallets were all on
the same trailer. We later were able to determine that it was
pulled from the yard by an employee who was supposed to
be taking empty trailers to the rail yard. The theft happened
on a Sunday and I was notified early Monday morning that the
freight was missing.
Since we had already set up the bait operation with law
enforcement for the upcoming maneuver and shared sus-
pected employee and other information, a call to the police
allowed a quick response to the location of a previously
identified fence and suspects. Police observed a large rental
box truck parked in front of the fence location. Within min-
utes after the police placed the vehicle under surveillance, two
additional persons arrived and three suspects drove the box
truck to a private public rental warehouse where they started
off-loading the stolen ink. Subsequently, two employees and
the fence were arrested; all of the freight was recovered along
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 37

with stolen property from several previous thefts. The investi-

gation identified at least six involved employees.
This was a huge learning experience early on in my trans-
portation career. These employee/thieves were organized and
very good at their scheme but, to our benefit greed overcame
them. We will talk about these types of theft methods later.
Perpetrators of cargo crime may be a huge crew of external
bandits or a group of internal collusive employees. Let’s look
at some organized thieves that target full truckload shipments
so we can understand their methods and operations.

Organized Cargo Criminals

Full Truckload
While I was dealing with internal crimes in my area, my com-
pany became responsible for the transportation and warehous-
ing of a major computer manufacturer through a contract with
our 3PL (third party logistic) company. The warehousing and
transportation origin was set up in the state of Virginia, which
was not in my region of direct responsibility. But as the busi-
ness ramped up, we started experiencing full truckload thefts
from this location.
Our RSM in that region and another who was assigned as a
liaison for that account started following up on theft activities.
They quickly learned that the equipment involved in the thefts
was recovered without the cargo in the vicinities of Hialeah,
Florida, and Macon, Georgia. When the RSMs spoke with
law enforcement in those areas, they learned that empty rigs
were commonly found in Hialeah and Macon after full truck-
loads were stolen around the country. The Miami-Dade Police
Department’s Tactical Operations Multi-­Agency Cargo Anti-
Theft Squad (TOMCATS) unit is dedicated to the commercial
vehicle and cargo theft problem as part of the department’s
38 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Robbery Division. During a conference with the TOMCATS

Task Force, our company investigators learned much about
how these organized cargo criminals operated.
The group is made up of mostly South Floridians of Cuban
descent. Many have extensive criminal records indicating all
types of crimes. Many were taught by cargo theft veterans
that this activity presents low risk and produces high rewards.
They know that if they do not use force or traffic narcotics in
their crimes, they will not receive harsh punishments if appre-
hended because their offenses are treated as property crimes
by the courts. Although this concept varies around the coun-
try, it applies to most jurisdictions. The TOMCATS know that
criminal crews have most of the property fenced or commit-
ted to be sold before they even commit their crimes and often
target their theft by commodity and brand.
The scenario starts when the criminals and their buyers
decide on a product. Once a product is decided as a possible
target, an Internet search of the manufacturer is performed
with the intent of learning where its manufacturing or dis-
tributing sites are located. When they have this information
through Internet search or by other means, a team of thieves
set out to the selected location. Usually a minimum of about
four will travel to the city, rent several vehicles, and start
thorough surveillance of the location. This surveillance will
gather information about hours of operation, access control of
people and vehicles, and physical security measures including
guards, alarms, cameras, and other devices. The perpetrators
will study the configuration of the building and note storefront
entrances and guard access at the vehicle gates. After under-
standing the operation of the facility, they will start following
the commercial vehicles as they leave the facility. They will
note the types of seals or locks on the trailers; this information
aids thieves to determine the values of the contained loads.
By following the commerce from the location, they can find
other local distribution warehouses and operation locations
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 39

that could become future targets for other truck thefts or high-
value warehouse burglaries.
After they complete their intelligence gathering at a targeted
location, their plan to take down a vehicle in transit goes into
effect. When a fully loaded tractor trailer leaves a location under
the correct conditions, the thieves will fall in behind the unit,
start the surveillance, and wait for the driver to provide them
with an opportunity. Whether the driver goes 20 miles or 200,
they continue the shadowing until the unit is stopped and left
unattended. When that happens, within a short time, usually in
fewer than 90 seconds, the criminal team will take the entire
rig and escape. They can steal most rigs quickly using master
keys that may be purchased on the Internet or by using ignition
pullers or ignition jumpers, depending on the type of tractor.
Before 2007, theft perpetrators headed directly south to
Florida. They would immediately disable the access control
GPS devices and go to their fencing location to off-load the
stolen goods and dump the equipment nearby. Police then had
about a 16-hour window to have any chance of recovering the
cargo and, in most cases, it was not recovered.
Since then, both law enforcement and the industry have
acted to respond more effectively to this method of operation
and the thieves have also changed their procedures to circum­
vent the efforts. Many high-value shippers have started using
covert cargo tracking GPS equipment within shipments. Law
enforcement in Florida has installed license plate readers (LPRs)
at state border inspection sites. These actions have led thieves
to change their methods somewhat. They continue to use the
same methods to target the loads. However, after committing
a theft, they drive the rig to a nearby location such as a truck
stop, rest area, or mall where it does not look out of place,
then leave it there under surveillance to see whether law
enforcement responds. If no response is seen in a few hours,
they replace the tractor with a clean (not stolen) unit and have
been known to paint over logos on trailers.
40 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

We are also seeing a new phenomenon. Empty trailers are

not all found in Florida. They are now found in many areas
of the country where the crews have small splinter operat-
ing groups working areas such as New Jersey, Kentucky, and
northern Texas around Dallas.
An analysis of cargo theft by the Supply Chain Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (SC-­ISAC) confirms these activities
and changes in the operations of cargo criminals. In tracking
recoveries, we have definitely seen the equipment change-­
outs and differences in equipment recovery locations for about
two years now. Having this knowledge about the changes
in methods has assisted in several recoveries lately. When a
cargo theft occurs, if the complainant company can advise
the responding law enforcement agencies about the known
methods currently used by the thieves, the recovery prob-
ability increases as the search can be focused. No matter what
product is involved, knowledge about the who, what, where,
how, and why makes the response to the problem more man-
ageable and brings a better chance of success. Later in this
book we will talk about recovery plans. Not understanding the
methods of cargo theft predators will affect the strength of a
recovery plan.
The cargo theft crews in South Florida are not a “gang”
in the normal nomenclature of organized crime. They do
not operate like the Costa Nostra with a known boss and a
circle of lieutenants. Detective Willie Morales, a veteran of
the Miami-Dade Police Department TOMCATS, stated that he
would consider them “a loose-­knit group of crews who use
the same methods of operation, work with the same fencing
organizations, and intermingle in different criminal ventures
when the need arises.”
As our internal investigators worked on the FTL thefts from
our 3PL client, they developed a spreadsheet that listed over
250 persons of interest and potential suspects. This informa-
tion and other investigations led to a geographical area, mostly
by the recovery of the empty equipment and the common
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 41

knowledge of the theft activity. These crews are formidable

foes who are very good at what they do. The key is realizing
that the target of their theft is based on the commodity. If you
are a full truckload carrier of any of the targeted commodi-
ties discussed in Chapter 1, you need to understand that the
risk of theft in transit is much higher than if you are carrying
less desirable products. By knowing how these thieves oper-
ate, a provider of supply chain services can set up security
and recovery plans that are likely to be effective. Security and
prevention plans require driver awareness programs and a
support mechanism for drivers who notice suspicious activity
while in transit.

Fictitious or Fraudulent Pick-­Ups

The newest players in this space are cargo criminals who use
identity theft to pursue their cargo theft activities. As with every
other aspect of life, the Internet has changed the way that
industries and regulators handle the business of transporta-
tion. With the advent of freight boards and on­line registration
for almost anything, cargo criminals have jumped through
the industry and government loopholes to commit thefts.
Currently, criminals are setting up fictitious trucking compa-
nies using the identities of unsuspecting individuals or stealing
the identities of legitimate registered carriers.
Recently, a carrier was established in the name of a Houston
man who attended a truck driving school. The company was
established with the DOT, and insured and registered as a
business entity by the state, apparently all online—without any
official ever actually seeing anyone involved with the com-
pany. Once established, the company registered with several
transportation brokerage companies and started bidding on
loads posted on freight boards. During a 2-day period, the
company made eight freight pick-­ups in seven states and not
one of the shipments was ever delivered.
42 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

The involved shipments contained various commodities

including food and building supplies. Upon investigation,
authorities learned that the individual whose identity was
stolen did not know he had a trucking company in his name.
The location for the company was found to be a rented mail
drop box business and all the registration information was
falsified. The company registration on the DOT Safersys
website indicated a one-­power unit company that made eight
pick-­ups in 2 days. As of this writing, none of the freight has
ever been recovered.
This type of activity shows that it is critical for each ship-
per and brokerage company to take steps to protect its opera-
tion. The days of quick sign-­up and faxing applications to a
truck stop should be over. If companies continue to operate
as they did when the Internet boards were first created, they
are victims in waiting. We will talk about solutions later in the
book but we need a further look at the group that seems to be
behind this latest innovation in cargo theft.
Since this is a new phenomenon, investigation is starting
to point to a loosely organized group of Eastern Europeans
operating from North Hollywood, California. Private inves-
tigators have played a significant role in identifying these
suspects and California law enforcement is investigating the
activities and beginning to develop intelligence about the
group and its methods.
I spoke with Jeff Hall, a private investigator with Transit Risk
Management, and Randy Ferguson of Ferguson Investigations.
They are close friends and associates through the industry
councils. They both confirmed the evidence of an Armenian
group in North Hollywood as a major player but they added
that others are involved also. Randy is currently working on
some fraudulent pick-­ups (thefts) made by a known carrier.
The loads were not delivered. The carrier claims that he did
not receive the load, but the evidence seems to prove other-
wise. The carrier claims that someone stole his identity and is
fraudulently making these pick-­ups.
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 43

Randy noted that getting the DOT to investigate and pull

the operating authorities of bogus companies and companies
operating illegally has been a real problem. Jeff and Randy
have been working with the Los Angeles Police Department
BADCATS group on these issues to identify the participants
but because the thefts occur across the country in many dif-
ferent jurisdictions, obtaining investigative information and
prosecuting thieves is a slow and difficult process.
Another way to profit from identity theft is to take on the
identity of a current legitimate registered carrier. By using the
same freight boards and changing company contact numbers,
thieves bid on loads through unsuspecting brokerage agents
who assign the loads. The company wins the bid, the pick-­up
is made, and the freight is never delivered. After the service
due day is past, when the shipper and consignee start looking
for the freight, a call to the legitimate carrier shows that it did
not bid on the load or pick it up.
You now know three ways in which identity theft works
into the equation with shipment theft. Knowing who is pick-
ing up your freight and obtaining driver and vehicle informa-
tion during a pick-­up is now more important than ever. This
minimal information at least gives you an investigation starting
point even though the license of the pick-­up driver may also
be fraudulent. Knowing your contacts and confirming informa-
tion at the front end are the best bets to prevent being victim-
ized by this method. Remember, this crime does not involve
the recovery of the empty units to assist in identifying the
suspects or the area where fences operate.

High-Value Warehouse Burglaries

Earlier we spoke about full truckload thefts, and discussed
South Florida crews that specialize in that activity. The same
groups are behind many high-value warehouse burglaries. So
we now know the who. Let’s look at some of the other informa-
tion. Just as we spoke about the patience of these thieves and
44 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

the steps they follow for in-­transit thefts, we see the same fac-
tors in warehouse burglaries. Once thieves select a target ware-
house, many times from in-­transit surveillance activity, they
will conduct the same type of survey on a target warehouse to
become familiar with its operation. They will determine hours
of operation, the physical security at the location, and the arriv-
als and departures of employees, vendors, deliveries, and other
truck traffic. By watching the location, monitoring activities,
and learning what is normal, the perpetrators can devise a plan
to gain entry and be able to stay inside the location for a long
time without being discovered. These suspects are not using
smash-­and-­grab tactics; they plan to enter the operation, select
the property they want, and make a huge haul. To do this, they
must take control of the building, alarm, and security features.
They must have a plan for removing large amounts of property
and not being detected during the operation.
During their surveillance, the thieves will try to determine
the alarm company and see whether they can gain entry
via use of a code. If a warehouse has a storefront and they
observe employees enter and use an alarm pad, they can
plant a camera outside the storefront window in an attempt to
obtain an employee’s code. I have seen a TOMCATS training
video in which thieves placed cameras in plants and ashtrays
on the front porch of a location in an attempt to obtain the
video of an alarm code. They have been known to observe
the first employee enter a warehouse in the morning and
watch the employee make the alarm pad entry.
Since alarm company information is frequently posted in a
window, the thieves immediately phone the warehouse using
a spoof app showing the alarm company name on the caller
ID. When a warehouse employee answers, the caller explains
that the alarm has been triggered and was not cleared via the
pad. When the employee explains that the code was entered,
the caller asks for the code. If the employee provides it, the
thieves now have a code to clear the alarm.
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 45

If after all the surveillance and chicanery, they still have

no easy way to get into the warehouse, they will take action
to set off the alarm to time and monitor the law enforcement
response. When they are ready to commit the offense, they
will often act to set the alarm off several times until law
enforcement quits responding and determine whether a com-
pany stakeholder will respond. If they finally see no activity
after alarms, they will make their move.
Sometimes thieves cut all power and phone lines to a build-
ing. Usually they are known to make roof entry or sometimes
cut through bay doors, but once inside they will seek the
control box for the alarm and disable the whole system. While
all this is being done, look-­outs strategically placed with scan-
ners and two-­way radios watch for the police or anyone else
approaching the site. When they have completed the entry and
feel confident that they outmaneuvered the system and feel safe,
they will start gathering product and moving it to the dock for
loading onto large trailers. They may even use the warehouse’s
forklifts and other equipment to assist in their efforts. Once they
have the product in loading position, they will call in associ-
ates to bring tractor trailers to the location and back them to the
dock. Most of the units have usually been stolen from nearby
locations. Once the units are loaded with the goods, the thieves
will leave with several trailer loads of products.
We see many of these types of offenses over 3-day week-
ends when warehouse thieves commonly strike. Two recent
offenses occurred, one in the Dallas area that involved a ware-
house hit for the third time. The thieves took three trailer loads
of flat screen televisions and left empty stolen tractor trailers
at the location after leaving abruptly when they thought police
were responding. Another incident involved at least one of the
same suspects (matched by DNA) in a pharmaceutical ware-
house burglary in Connecticut. The suspects escaped with
approximately $76 million worth of goods. The method of
operations (MO) in both cases was almost identical and both
occurred during 3-day weekends.
46 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

We will look at solutions for these types of break-­ins in a later

chapter. Employee training and constant awareness are required
for a facility not to become a victim of some of the alarm code
tricks of crooks. Also, using the correct physical security equip-
ment can make the thieves’ MO much less effective.

Opportunistic Cargo Theft

Just about every major city in the United States has areas of
major industrial influence and heavy trucking activity. Truck
terminals and truck stops are very seldom the centerpieces of a
city and are in fact usually in section of municipalities that are
less than desirable. Truck stops are generally known as havens
for drugs, prostitution, and other illicit activities. It is unfortunate
that this is the case. Because of this reality, operators must con-
sider the true environment around their businesses. Obviously,
some are worse than others and not all present the huge prob-
lems that can be expected at certain big-city locations. It is
important to understand the dynamics of opportunistic theft.
People who use truck stops and areas near them must
understand that this environment subjects drivers to persons
offering illegal services or favors in return for the cargo in their
trucks. Predators work these areas and look for dropped trail-
ers in unsecured lots or areas that make for easy pickings. Most
opportunistic thieves who work this way have buyers who will
quickly give them ten cents on the dollar for anything they
bring. These vultures prey on drop lots, truck yards, and truck
stops and look for the easy mark. If they steal a trailer and pull
it a few miles, and check the load and find it is product they do
not want, they will just leave it and search for something better.
In some local jurisdictions, the district attorney may not
consider a driver’s give-­up of a load in exchange for drugs or
prostitution a crime. This is completely unfair to the transpor-
tation industry. A driver give-­up is a crime, not a civil case.
Those same district attorneys will prosecute internal thieves in
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 47

other industries for much smaller losses but will not prosecute
a truck driver who exchanges thousands of dollars of freight
for drugs or sex. This lack of support from the justice system
is totally wrong. Investigation should be warranted for any ille-
gal activity. A blanket statement of prosecutorial denial for any
incident deemed a driver give-­up is totally irresponsible and
allows this type of activity to continue unchecked.
Many opportunistic groups have their own tractor units
and troll the drop yards continuously for unsecured trailers.
Companies and drivers need to be aware of these types of activ-
ities and all drops of trailers must conform to secure guidelines.
One other activity of opportunistic groups is burglarizing
parked rigs. These thefts frequently happen at truck stops or
industrial areas where trucks park and wait to make deliveries.
When the trucks cannot park in secured areas and are forced
to park or wait in areas outside high-value distribution ware-
houses, they may be watched by thieves looking to make a
quick hit on a trailer full of product. Many drivers go to sleep
in their rigs and never know of a breach until the next day.
Many hazards await drivers who do not understand the risks
of a neighborhood, the value of the products they carry, and
the skills of predators looking for an easy mark.

Internal Theft Rings: Consolidation

Whenever freight is handled, at rest, or between conveyances,
it is always at high risk. When I worked for as large transpor-
tation consortium, many of the incidents I investigated were
internal thefts usually occurring at consolidation points while
the freight was handled. The company had a loss reporting
system that keyed regional security managers into shortages.
The system worked much like a law enforcement offense-
reporting structure and follow-­up assignment to detectives.
The system notified RSMs of losses that crossed through their
regions and they were assigned primary responsibility for
48 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

follow-­up of the losses. The system allowed RSMs to file, sort,

and archive information so that patterns and trends could
be identified. Freight paperwork is very detailed and usually
allows investigators to pinpoint where an exception or prob-
lem occurred. Through company documents such as bills of
lading, manifests, line-haul records, and final delivery receipts,
the paths of shipments can be totally recreated and a record of
every movement, handler, and driver can be established.
As a regional security manager, I was able to establish that
about 85% of the thefts occurring during shipments requiring
consolidation involved a company employee as the thief or
in collusion with other thieves. Internal theft rings can create
huge losses.
Large LTL companies and other transportation entities that
utilize consolidation face this problem fairly often. Sometimes a
problem arises from one employee involved in petty pilfering or
a loss can be caused by several employees who form major theft
rings. I had the occasion to investigate many losses arising from
both situations. When a ring of thieves starts working within an
organization and gains momentum, they can really stack up the
exceptions. As with all good police evidence, shipment informa-
tion tells a story and eventually points to the problem area.
People outside the shipping may be amazed that both small
portions of shipments are stolen and full pallets of merchan-
dise also disappear. In a theft situation, you must consider the
operation affected and all of its moving parts. The LTL opera-
tion often represents the perfect situation for thieves to victim-
ize. In large terminals that experience the most problems with
this type of activity, a city pick-­up and delivery operation may
co­exist with a line-­haul break bulk freight assembly center
(FAC). These two activities on the same dock assist the dishon-
est to hide their actions. If you have ever been on an LTL dock
when it is at the peak of an operation, it looks like an army of
ants on a mound. It can be very difficult to tell which ongoing
activity is dishonest. This is where the handling of paperwork
becomes a great benefit as it allows an RSM to tie together the
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 49

handlers of the freight with sections of the dock, times, and

other pertinent information. Full pallets that disappear usually
go right out of the gate on a city unit. The freight is taken and
loaded onto an accomplice’s trailer. During his runs around the
city, he drops it off at an agreed-­upon location and the unau-
thorized delivery is conducted almost like an authorized one.
The numbers of employees involved and their levels in the
organization determine the extents of losses. The two worse
cases usually involve a supervisory-level employee or mis-
guided dock workers and drivers who can be prodded by a
fence (buyer) who provides cash upon delivery. In my career,
both occasions occurred and the losses were pretty significant
before we were able to identify the thieving employees and
halt the activity.
When internal thefts start at a location, operational supervi-
sors often suggest that the problems started about the same
time as a new employee came on the job. However, if a com-
pany experiences losses of large amounts of freight on pallets,
the cause is most likely a longer term employee. I would say
most of those involved in the major theft activities I investi-
gated had tenures averaging at least four years.
After looking at the current known risks of cargo in the
supply chain, we also must remember that the securing of
facilities, vehicles, and other business property in addition
to cargo is also a huge business imperative for all modes.
Meeting all of the security needs for this type of business
operation can be a huge undertaking. The LTL operation I
worked for had 432 locations around the United States, includ-
ing facilities in very large cities that handled very large opera-
tions and very remote locations where no freight was ever
stored overnight. Each location had specific security needs
along with the in-­transit segments. The LTL mode is much
different from an FTL operation and provides a much more
controlled environment for drivers. The freight is seldom at
rest while in transit but because of consolidation, the freight is
put at some risk at every break-­out point.
50 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

In one circumstance, my region suffered a slew of short-

ages from a smaller terminal whose biggest operation was
as a major line-­haul FAC break bulk point during night
shifts handling major freight and large products. The ter-
minal was in West Texas and most of the product moving
from the West Coast passed through the location. One
major investigative factor was that all the loads checked
into the terminal FAC and left and all the shipments were
short (missing cargo) at the next destination or consolida-
tion point.
During the investigation, I gathered the records on
numerous shortages of consumer electronics, computers,
power tools, and appliances. The night operation was
run somewhat independently of the terminal operation.
It had its own supervisor and crew who worked the shift.
Because of the amount of freight that came up short at the
next stop down the line from this location, we decided to
place the night shift operation under surveillance. I and
a second investigator, Tina Weatherford, had not been in
place very long when we saw an employee take an item
to his car, smoke a cigarette, and return to the building.
I went to the vehicle and through a hatchback window
could plainly see a new case for a battery-powered drill
from one of our shippers. Many of the reported shortages
had been just such items. This gave us the opening we
needed to confront the involved employee.
We recovered the stolen drill and began our interview
with the employee. The trail led to other employees and
all the way to the night supervisor. Eight employees were
eventually terminated and faced criminal charges for their
collusive activities. A large trailer was required to recover
the property from the involved supervisor who worked in
collusion with a whole shift. They would load a 28-foot
trailer with the product they planned to steal during the
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 51

shift, remove the trailer, and stage it on a vacant lot in a

remote location east of the terminal. The employee par-
ticipants visited the trailer after work and used their per-
sonal vehicles to retrieve their illicit goods. Some of the
property recovered included refrigerators, lawn mowers,
laptops, and tools. The whole night shift was corrupted.
When deep background investigations were conducted
on the group of employee thieves, several, including
the supervisor, were found to have criminal records that
should have prevented their hiring.

Commercial Vehicle Smuggling

When a business is involved in moving product or using oth-
ers to move its product via commercial vehicles, it is vulner-
able to external forces and their own employees who can
use that commerce stream for purposes beyond the original
intent. In the supply chain, we see the smuggling of people,
contraband, and unauthorized freight. All the modes of
transportation are subject to smuggling activity. Each mode
of legitimate commerce must try to prevent specific types of
smuggling activities. The industry will always be vulnerable to
stowaways, contraband, and unauthorized freight.
Later in the book we will take a close look at how con-
traband is placed in commercial shipping lanes. I have
seen contraband in LTL and FTL trucking and air transport.
Commercial trucking from crossing the U.S.–Mexico border
is used for the transportation of illegal immigrants. These are
all concerns and legitimate carriers never want to haul illegiti-
mate freight or illegal people. The smugglers use commercial
vehicles and systems so that they can move their illicit prod-
ucts and stay an arm’s length away from the shipment. By
52 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

using certain methods that we will discuss at length later in

the book, they can move their product through government
checkpoints, thus allowing commercial shippers to act as their
unsuspecting mules.

Truck-Stop Crime
Truck stops are little cities and centers of commerce of all
sorts. Truck stops provide stores, restaurants, fuel, truck main-
tenance facilities, showers, rest areas, and Internet load boards.
They have large parking lots with spaces to accommodate
many tractors and trailers. Most truck stops do not claim to
provide secure parking and even forbid leaving drop trail-
ers in their lots. Most long-term truck drivers, usually owner-­
operators, feel secure in these surroundings. Each truck stop
has its individual appeal to drivers and they become loyal
to truck stops on the routes they frequent. But each truck
stop has an underbelly of crime and illicit activity.
Most big or inner city truck stops are known to have unau-
thorized drug dealing and prostitution activity within their
confines. These criminal activities can entangle drivers who
participate in drug activity and prostitution and can put the
cargo in their possession at risk. This is a common problem
and can even be exacerbated when law enforcement jurisdic-
tions will not prosecute a driver who gives up his load for
drugs or the entertainment from ladies of the evening. A driver
with a fully loaded unit who engages in this type of activity
puts himself and his freight at risk.
While I was writing this section of the book, I received a
“be on the look out” (BOLO) message about a case reported
in Dallas to an insurance company and to the Dallas police.
The BOLO reproduced below involved a theft of tires from
a driver who allowed a prostitute into his unit, as a result of
which he was robbed of his load.
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 53

CARGO THEFT
Stolen cargo: American tires waiting on bill of
lading

Stolen from: Flying J Truck Stop, I-20 and Bonnie

View, Dallas, TX

Date stolen: 3/12/2011 at 2:30 a.m.

Details: The driver was approached in parking lot

by a woman named Peaches, She asked for a ride
out of the parking lot. The driver gave her a ride
out of the truck stop. When she exited the tractor,
3 black males entered the tractor and forced the
driver into the sleeper. They dropped the trailer and
took the tractor and replaced the tires on it. They
went to some location off Highway 310 in Dallas.
Driver believed it was 7547 Highway 310. They
also took the bill of lading and the driver gas card.
One of the suspects went by nickname of “Daddy
Trailer” and the trailer is still missing. Driver has
tractor. The driver said the male subject left him
with the tractor and drove off in an older model
Impala, burgundy in color.

Law enforcement: Dallas Police Department

Report #60169Z

Source: Coughlin, J.J., 2011b

The above report leaves many questions unanswered. It is

obvious to me and others who work these crimes that there is
more to this incident than the information in the BOLO. I asked
the Dallas Police Department to provide me with some crime
statistics relating to the area where truck stops are concentrated
54 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

in the South Dallas area on Interstate 20 between Interstate 45

and Interstate 35. When I requested the data, the supervisor
who was going to provide me the detail, stated that the Dallas
Police now make all criminal complainants from truck stops
come to a station and make their reports in person. Obviously,
this cuts down on reporting and skews the crime data as
reporting persons may not take the extra step to file a report
if a report is not vital.
The data provided was from Dallas Crime Reporting Area
4376, which includes a major truck stop and numerous truck-
related businesses near Interstate 20. The reporting period
they provided covered the 5 1/2 months from June 1, 2009
until November 16, 2009. During the reporting period for the
area, the police listed 114 Part 1 offenses (felonies including
theft, robbery, burglary, murder, rape, aggravated assault,
and motor vehicle theft) of which 79 were thefts or burglaries
of motor vehicles and 4 were motor vehicle thefts.
The police department also provided information for a
second truck stop in that same area but in Crime Reporting
Area 4375, located north of Interstate 20, just across the inter-
state from the other one. In that same time period, 50 Part 1
offenses occurred in Area 4375—30 thefts or burglaries of
motor vehicles and 2 motor vehicle thefts. That means in
a 5½ month period in and around the two truck stops and
related businesses, 164 Part I offenses including 109 thefts or
burglaries of motor vehicles and 6 motor vehicle thefts were
reported—an average of about one major offense at each
location daily. These truck stops and businesses are all at the
intersection of Bonnie View Road and Interstate 20 in Dallas,
on the north and south sides of the highway (Dallas PD, 2012).
The Dallas information confirms much about truck stops
in big cities, especially in the states and areas identified in
Chapter 1. There is also a large FTL terminal and yard on the
north side of Interstate 20, just west of the one truck stop on
the north side. The physical security and controls in place at
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 55

the facility serve as testimony to the dangers of the area and

some of the crimes that occurred on the property before
installation of the necessary security features.
This Dallas Police crime report documentation did not
include information about arrests for drugs and prostitution
or the misdemeanor offenses reported. These statistics repre-
sent two truck stops in close proximity at an intersection in
South Dallas. I believe that if we pulled these types of records
from truck stops at locations where cargo thefts are prevalent,
we would find much of the same criminality statistics. Many
rural truck stop locations do not experience this level of crime
activity, but they are known for trailer burglaries and partial
load thefts. To reiterate, it is necessary for a freight operator to
be aware of conditions surrounding the transit of his freight
and understanding the risks when cargo is in transit.

Fencing: Where Stolen Cargo Goes

Fencing is the crime of buying and reselling stolen merchandise.
The criminal codes do not call the activity “fencing,” and usually
call the crime receiving of stolen goods. Three legal elements
are required to prove that such activity is a crime: (1) the
property must be stolen, (2) the property must be received or
concealed, and (3) the receiver must have knowledge that the
property was stolen. The element of exchange of money is
not necessary.
Most types of cargo theft involve a fencing element. The
level of the fence operation changes with the level of the theft
operation in most cases. The organized groups fill needs or
take orders based on what a fence and his market desire. The
professional crews of thieves working in organized groups
probably garner a higher percentage of the value of the goods,
or at least the leader of the crew does. Most stolen freight that
ends up in South Florida is believed to be shipped to foreign
56 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

destinations. Only a small percentage of the outbound freight

leaving the country is checked and stolen freight is often
shipped by carriers who are doing legitimate business and do
not know that the shipper’s freight has been stolen.
The opportunistic groups tend to be less selective and
have little control of what they steal. In turn, they make less
money—usually about ten cents on the dollar for the goods
they bring to their buyers. A small-time thief pilfering from a
consolidation operation usually steals small amounts of goods
and may achieve a quick turn of the goods through a reliable
system of pawn shops or street drug dealers. I recently solved
several internal thefts through the reliable method of tying sus-
pected employees to dock pilferages through pawn records.
We have seen incidents in which stolen freight worked itself
back into legitimate commerce from the black or gray market
and in each case an independent investigation would be needed
to determine how that happened. It is believed that most of the
fences for high-value cargo loads stolen by organized criminal
groups have referral fences or master fences that move the prod-
uct through their established networks to vetted and confirmed
buyers and sources known to be secure from law enforcement.
A new method is e-­fencing, which is the resale of stolen
goods online through Craigslist, eBay, and similar e-­commerce
sites. This type of fencing gives thieves and receivers access to
buyers they otherwise would never touch. In the cargo world,
e-­fending has been limited somewhat to pilferage from LTL
shipments rather than from large high-value heists, but sev-
eral higher echelon cargo thieves have been found using this
venue recently.
Cargo thieves and fences operate at different levels. The
fraudulent pick-­up thieves who steal loads of meat and food
along with construction and home building supplies prob-
ably use lower level fences such as store owners that sell
the types of goods that have been stolen. These goods are
not serialized and are very hard to trace, making their sales
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 57

easy for this level of receiver. Thieves of ethnic descent fre-

quently move goods within their own ethnic community to
prevent detection.
During the writing of this book, the Carrollton Police,
the Dallas Police, and District 1 State Police agents in Texas
located and identified two warehouse properties that received
and stored stolen goods that came from cargo thefts in the
Dallas and Fort Worth areas. The product represented at least
five different offenses and the eventual property recovery was
in the neighborhood of $1.5 million to $2 million. The prod-
ucts included paints, cosmetics, and furniture. The persons
linked to these operations had ties to South Florida crews and
a fencing and receiving location was set up for a local splinter
group operating in the area. The investigation has led to one
arrest so far and the police are still trying to determine how
the property was to be moved on from the fencing operation
and where it was headed. This incident confirms splinter
group activity in this area and is the second major group
identified in this region in a year. It would be ideal to take an
investigation like this one step further and trace where and by
what means the stolen property is routed. This is very difficult
to do without task force or federal jurisdiction involvement.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of the capabilities to commit
to long-term investigation, the police investigators are limited to
focusing on the thieves and not the receivers. The goal of all
organized criminal enterprise investigations should be to iden-
tify the thieves and the receivers and prevent future activities.
The lack of an easy outlet for illicit products will make such
crimes less desirable. A thief wants to finish a job and relieve
himself of stolen goods as soon as possible. In actuality, the
crime of theft is not complete in a thief’s mind until he com-
pletes both sides of the transaction without getting caught. In
the world of organized criminals, very few successful thieves
are also down-­line dealers of the product. This appears to
be the situation also in the world of cargo crime.
58 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

In one of the investigations I conducted and described

in the introduction of this chapter, the fence was identi-
fied and interviewed by law enforcement. He confirmed
his role in the crime. He advised that the transportation
company employees contacted him on a Sunday, advis-
ing that they obtained eight pallets of computer ink worth
$2.3 million. That afternoon, the fence met the employee
thieves at a fast food restaurant and gave them the
$190,000 in cash—a fine payday for the employee gang.
Not many persons I know have $190,000 lying around
to complete a transaction on any day of the week. A
fence contact with that kind of liquid cash can shake a
transportation company to its core with losses. The worse
thing that can happen to a transportation security man-
ager is for dishonest employees to meet a fence who has
access to cash and is willing to pay them for any product
they bring.

Conclusion
Figures 1.1 to 1.5 in Chapter 1 provided you information about
the what, where, and when of cargo theft. This chapter pre-
sented information on the various perpetrators of such crimes.
You can now tie a few other points together. When you fur-
ther analyze each theft, you can usually tie the offense to a
certain type of group. Food is almost always the number one
commodity on the targeted list, but is seldom the target of
the South Floridian ethnic crews. Food thefts usually involve
local opportunistic criminals and fraudulent pick-­up artists.
Electronics, pharmaceutical, and other high-value merchandise
falls more to the organized South Florida crews.
Although it is not always possible to determine responsibil-
ity because many crimes are never solved, you can make valid
conclusions based on where empty equipment is found and
 Perpetrators of Cargo Crime ◾ 59

where the products or parts of the loads surface. Each group

tends to specialize and operate in ways that tend to identify
them to industry officials and police who analyze the activ-
ity. Most criminals who succeed in their endeavors repeat
their activity using the same methods. An investigator can find
method similarities, for example, the way a perpetrator acts or
what he or she says during a crime. Groups are no different.
Success breeds repetition and repetition breeds analysis that
can identify trends, patterns, and behavior and link them to
the groups we have identified.
After reviewing the characteristics of the various groups of
predators who are looking to target parts of the supply chain,
you should clearly understand that the industry must find ways
to protect itself. It is really important to understand the risks
and threats prevalent in a specific operation and take the steps
necessary to have the best chance for success. As we go into
Section II of this book, we will look at what steps the indus-
try and law enforcement have taken in response to the cargo
theft problem. The industry has taken the lead but must not
be complacent. We should keep pushing for necessary law
enforcement support and participation and legislative assis-
tance where needed.
INDUSTRY II
AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSES
Chapter 4

Industry Responses

Introduction
Most people have no idea that a cargo theft problem exists.
Cargo theft is a property crime that is not reported in the
news media or grocery store tabloids. It is a reality that rides
under the radar of most of society and does not get sufficient
attention from businesses in the supply chain. Most law
enforcement officers have no idea that cargo theft is an issue
unless they are assigned to units that deal with it. A number
of people in law enforcement and industry, when added to
the Southwest Transportation Security Council (SWTSC) BOLO
(be on the look-­out) distribution list told me they had no idea
that this type of crime was so prevalent.
Cargo theft is a well-kept secret and bringing the attention
of industry and law enforcement to this type of crime has
been a slow, steady push. Every initiative to carve out a new
way of doing business in this industry, whether security
related or otherwise, always moves at the rate of a baby step.
Bringing the cargo theft reality to the attention of those who
need to know has proceeded at the same pace. The best way
to handle a loss situation is to deal with it and that is what the
transportation industry security management has done.

63
64 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

The Vision
Only seven dedicated law enforcement cargo task forces exist
in the United States and reside in areas where needs for such
task forces exist. There are areas in the country where task
forces are sorely needed but attempts to establish them have
been unsuccessful. It is much more glamorous to chase serial
killers, bank robbers, and other perpetrators of news-making
crime. Preventing and fighting property crime is not romantic
or newsworthy. Cities occasionally institute programs to thwart
auto or home burglaries for a short period but the lack of
excitement surrounding such crimes allows such plans to go
by the wayside quickly.
When I worked for a police department and supervised a
violent crime task force unit and street squad drug enforce-
ment unit, never once did I see or hear about a cargo theft task
force. Even the commercial auto theft investigators never spoke
of enforcement measures focused on cargo. Cargo protection
has never been a priority and only became an afterthought
when the industry formed regional councils and started push-
ing the issue in recent years. The security side of the industry
now realizes that it takes the effort from transportation and
logistics companies and their insurance carriers to bring the
issue into light and make law enforcement, the public, and
other segments of the industry aware of the problem.
When I joined the industry side of the equation in 1997,
several regional industry councils and a fairly active national
group known as the National Cargo Security Council (NCSC)
existed. The Eastern Regional Council was active in New
York and New Jersey and cargo associations existed in north-
ern and southern California. These groups advocated for
the industry in their own ways and under their own by­laws.
The sharing of theft information through company security
managers, although a good model, left a lot to be desired.
Information sharing should have been taken beyond the
industry security management groups and associations. Even
 Industry Responses ◾ 65

though transportation companies compete for the same busi-

ness in many cases, the sharing of nonproprietary information
related to theft methods and security risks made perfect sense.
The director of security at my company was Tom Sheets.
He was involved in the NCSC and was an active advocate
for regional council formation, information sharing, and net-
working between industry security management and law
enforcement. I attended several NCSC functions and started
to understand the need to support the industry by building
awareness and sharing information. It also became appar-
ent that building law enforcement contacts with officers who
handled cargo and commercial vehicle thefts was extremely
important to the industry. As a regional security manager for
a multimode transportation entity, having reliable contacts
throughout a region was vital. My jurisdiction included five
states and a foreign country. It appeared that the best way to
build useful contacts was to start a council in our region.
I started contacting several people from other companies
and proposed a meeting. Five people attended our organiza-
tional meeting: Ray Rios of SAIA Trucking, Jaime Olivarez of
Central (now with Yellow), Charles Bergeron of AF (now with
FedEx), Nolan Burns of Watkins (now with FedEx) and me.
We decided to form the Southwest Transportation Security
Council (SWTSC). Our goals were to: (1) start an industry
council, (2) build a law enforcement network, and (3) provide
educational opportunities for law enforcement about the inner
workings of the industry.
As a fledgling organization, we did not try to formalize
our existence immediately and we slowly started building the
group via monthly meetings and reaching out to the local
and state police contacts who worked on commercial vehicle
thefts. Distribution lists were built and a small communication
network was started. We achieved some local success in
assisting law enforcement to find complainants and investigat-
ing related offenses and thus started to build credibility with
law enforcement. We devised a half-­day training seminar for
66 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

law enforcement agencies to explain how the transportation

industry operates and how the paperwork flows. The training
also spoke to the mission of the council and our desire to
build a private–public partnership. Little by little, more mem-
bers joined the council and our distribution list grew. We
started transmitting information about stolen loads to both
industry members and law enforcement agencies via e-­mail.
An FBI agent from the local major theft unit participated and
began keeping the records of the incidents. That lasted until
September 11, 2001 when the terrorist attacks in New York
and Washington took away our FBI agent participation.
Around that time, the FBI agent introduced me to Millie
DeAnda of the North Texas Crime Commission (NTCC).
When she saw what we were trying to accomplish, she
invited our council to become a committee of the commission
and she offered administrative assistance in return for provid-
ing law enforcement training related to cargo theft and other
cargo crimes.
This arrangement worked for many years as the SWTSC
membership and law enforcement contact network continued
to grow. The council expanded its communication network
and sent BOLO alerts to a much wider audience. It spon-
sored and organized two law enforcement training seminars a
year and started sending and receiving information from other
councils and associations. The council also developed law
enforcement training covering cargo theft and drug shipment
interdiction in commercial vehicle lanes.
The SWTSC was eventually able to train law enforcement
officers who specialized in cargo crime investigation and pro-
vide scholarships to the Miami Dade TOMCATS Cargo Theft
School in Florida and other training opportunities. In 2006,
the council began looking for a way to archive the BOLO
alert information so that it could be stored and retrieved. The
Supply Chain Information Sharing and Analysis Center offered
to put the information in its database and further share it with
industry and law enforcement agencies.
 Industry Responses ◾ 67

With the addition of the database piece, the ability to col-

lect and analyze cargo theft data began. The information, as
seen in the first chapter, keeps maturing and allows us to
further understand the risks and threats. The analysis also
identifies changes that the perpetrators make in response to
industry and law enforcement actions. As the capabilities of
the council enhanced, it continued growing in size and influ-
ence. More and more successes were seen with the BOLO
alert system and in the ability to connect the dots by indus-
try and law enforcement. When law enforcement is in need
of assistance such as bait freight, equipment, an undercover
warehouse, or to identify a complainant, a request to the
industry council membership usually fills the need.
As the council continued to grow, the relationship with the
North Texas Crime Commission became too cumbersome for
processing payments and other administrative functions. In
2010, the SWTSC applied for and received its own designa-
tion as a nonprofit 501(c) 6 organization. This step allowed
it to control its own financial operations. The council’s sole
income had been company member dues that enabled us to
provide law enforcement training events, scholarships for other
industry training activities, and appreciation events for our law
enforcement partners. We have also been able to purchase
equipment for their use in cargo investigations.
SWSTC advocated for a cargo task force in Texas because
the state is continually identified as a hot spot for this type
of criminal activity. We were not completely successful but
because we were able to provide ample information on the
issue, District One of the Texas State Police named cargo theft
as a priority for its investigative agents. This has really helped
the industry in North Texas and, because of those contacts, it
is easier to get police involvement when incidents occur else-
where in the state. The larger cities in Texas have dedicated
detectives who work these crimes and industries interact often
with them. Having these resources yields smoother investiga-
tion and communication between public and private entities.
68 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Industry Security Councils

In 1999, when we started this group, one of our first goals
was to improve the communicaiton between law enforcement
agencies in North Texas. The Dallas–Fort Worth Metropolitan
area includes 28 police jurisdictions. The growth of SWTSC
into a large group with reach to industry groups and law
enforcement agencies all around the United States is amazing,
something I never envisioned. In today’s computerized world,
building a network like this is not hard; it just takes time,
effort, and continuous networking and relationship building.
We eventually started sending communications to the other
councils and several of them started participating fully in the
BOLO alert communication system, most notably the Eastern
Region Cargo Theft Association and the Southeast Cargo
Security Council. Sending information to other councils results
in sharing it with various police agencies and freight-­related
companies. The insurance industry-­backed Verisk Cargo-­Net
recently joined in the sending of BOLO alerts. It also main-
tains a database and obtains information from public-sector
groups through the Insurance Services Organization program
that other industry sources cannot access. This relationship
further enhanced the industry’s communication reach and it
should grow further in the future.
Each council determines its own membership rules, activi-
ties, and dues. When the SWTSC was formed, we made a
distinct effort not to be a secret society and planned to allow all
entities in the supply chain to become members. We included
vendors as long as they did not use the information to “chase
ambulances” and understood the council mission. Allowing
the insurance industry investigators into the fold has really
enhanced information sharing and the identification of theft
patterns and problems. By extending our membership to rel-
evant parties, we have been able to promote the information
sharing and increase the understanding of security risks and
 Industry Responses ◾ 69

Here is an example of how the council has grown and

how its reach has grown much further than we ever
anticipated when we started the group. I participated in a
conference call with a private investigator who is a mem-
ber of the council and a Nebraska State Police criminal
investigative division captain. The call concerned fictitious
pick-­ups of brokered loads at meat plants in Nebraska,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Northern Texas. Prior to the
call, I contacted the SC-­ISAC and other organizations to
gather information concerning this ongoing type of theft.
Because it is fairly prevalent in the Texas Panhandle,
Kansas, and Nebraska, I was able to provide the Nebraska
group with information and a report from another mem-
ber of the SWTSC who had already been investigating
these issues. The call was very productive and was a
good first step toward working up a strategy to deal with
the problem by the public sector.
About an hour later, another member of the council
who performs security investigations for a brokerage
group called me. He was looking for a contact in Omaha,
Nebraska, because his group had assigned a load to a car-
rier that they now realized he was using a false identity. I
was able to immediately connect him with a law enforce-
ment contact who already knew of the issue so that appro-
priate action could be taken. An arrest was made and the
follow-­up investigation will go well beyond this offense.
The targeted load was also prevented from being stolen.

threats in the transportation industry. Because the council is

at the forefront, we can make other public officials aware of
industry issues. Hiding the information in a closet does not
do anyone any good. Sharing nonsensitive information about
stolen product, methods used, vehicle descriptions, and other
data may aid recovery. Since the council’s archived information
70 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

started maturing, we have been able to find complainants for

cases and achieve property recovery long after thefts have
taken place. Information sharing is a win–win for public agen-
cies and private industry.

Southwest Transportation Security Council

The Southwest Transportation Security Council (SWTSC) is
based in Dallas, Texas. Meetings are held monthly and hosted
at member facilities. Local police investigators are invited to
the meetings to discuss local and regional issues. The council
website is www.swtsc.com and contact numbers and further
information are made available at meetings. Any company
operating in the supply chain in the Southwest should con-
sider participating in this group. The information and benefits
received far outweigh the costs of the association dues. The
benefits include access to a large law enforcement contact list,
a wide variety of industry contacts, and many sources and
resources for services.
The council also provides the BOLO alert system that can
transmit loss information to appropriate parties throughout the
country quickly. The system also gives members access to
alerts from other regions to keep the industry aware of the
ongoing cargo theft activity. This participation in information
sharing and networking keeps participants up to date via con-
tacts with industry members and law enforcement agencies.
Membership also provides access to cargo security training
events, important conferences, and industry and law enforce-
ment networking.

Eastern Region Cargo Theft Association

I believe that the Eastern Region Cargo Theft Association
(ERCTA), which is based in New York and New Jersey, is the
oldest council of its type and was the first one I encountered.
 Industry Responses ◾ 71

I was introduced by Murry Cohen, a company colleague

who was an association member long before his retirement.
This was my first exposure to the concept of a regional
industry council that brought industry security management
together with law enforcement. Its current Chairman is Kurt
Duesderdick who works for National Retail Systems. The
Eastern Region is very viable and has been a great partner
in the flow of BOLO alerts and other communications. Their
membership is robust and the network of law enforcement
contacts for their region is vigorous.
ERCTA really understands the concept of public–­private
cooperation, particularly with information sharing. It also fur-
nishes scholarships to allow law enforcement to attend
training events and works closely with the New Jersey State
Police Cargo Task Force. For companies operating in this
region, membership in this group and access to its informa-
tion and law enforcement network is tremendously valu-
able. At the time of this writing, no website was listed for
the group.

Western States Cargo Theft Association

The Western States Cargo Theft Association (WSCTA) has
northern and southern chapters. The southern group is based
in the Los Angeles area while the northern operates from the
San Francisco Bay area. This association has been in exis-
tence a long time also. It holds monthly meetings at member
facilities but its membership remains a little more restrictive.
It is not fully committed to the BOLO alert program but has
shared some information. The association maintains a very
good relationship with law enforcement authorities includ-
ing the California Highway Patrol Cargo Theft Interdiction
Program task force that focuses on cargo crime in California.
The WSCTA website at http://www.wscta.com/ provides con-
tact and membership information.
72 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Mid-South Cargo Security Council

The Mid-­South Cargo Security Council is based in Memphis,
Tennessee, and has supported the public–private partnership
in its region for many years. Unlike other regional councils,
the Mid-South does not participate in the BOLO system but
does maintain a close relationship with the Memphis Cargo
Task Force and relevant law enforcement agencies. The coun-
cil is very active and provides great benefits and information
for industry members operating in the region. The council
meets monthly and provides activities for industry members
and law enforcement groups including training events and
conferences. Its website is http://midsouthcsc.org/.

Southeast Transportation Security Council

The Southeast Transportation Security Council (SETSC) was
started a few years after the Southwest group and is based
in the Atlanta, Georgia, area. It is an effective organization
that partners with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and
State Police. Before his retirement, one of its leaders was a
Department of Agriculture Investigator so that agency was
very actively involved. SETSC is a very active group that con-
ducts monthly meetings and participates in the BOLO system
to share information with other councils. Georgia has always
been an active area for cargo theft, especially around Atlanta
and its border with Florida puts the state right at the gateway
of cargo theft traffic moving south. The SETSC website (at
http://www.setsc.org/) contains information about member-
ship and events.

Mid-­West Cargo Security Council

This council has not been very active and needs better indus-
try participation. It currently has one of the best law enforce-
ment task forces sponsored by the Illinois State Police and the
 Industry Responses ◾ 73

National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) is based in the

region. The council has the pieces in place to become more
effective. It does not meet monthly, has no website, and does
not participate in the BOLO system. The SWTSC has compiled
distribution lists for law enforcement and industry in this part
of the country to fill the lack of communication and informa-
tion sharing. One of the best yearly training events is held
by the Illinois State Police Mid-­West Cargo Task and is well
attended. The Mid-­West needs to promote public–private part-
nership because cargo crime activity including splinter group
operations in the area continues to increase.

Virginia–Carolinas Cargo Security Council

The VCCSC is the newest regional council and combines
a very interested private industry team and involved law
enforcement groups. Thanks to recent NICB meetings focus-
ing on cargo theft in the Carolinas, awareness has been raised.
These states now have the interest and tools to maintain a
very good organization and participate in the communica-
tion and networking activities of other councils. The Southern
Police Institute hosted cargo theft law enforcement training
and even requested the VCCSC to present the concept and
discuss its public–private partnership. Its website, at http://
www.vccsc.org/, provides contact and other information. We
look forward to having this new group in the brotherhood of
councils to share information and promote law enforcement
networking. The SWTSC developed and maintained contacts
in this region through a distribution list, but the formation of
a regional council will enhance the communication and law
enforcement networking exponentially.

Pharmaceutical Cargo Security Coalition

This council is a bit different from the others but was born
from the same need. Pharmaceuticals represented some of
74 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

the biggest targets of organized thieves both in transit and in

storage in the supply chain. As pharmaceutical shippers joined
transportation security councils after suffering in-­transit losses,
they saw the value of starting a group specific to their industry
and issues. When Chuck Forsaith of Perdue Pharma started the
Pharmaceutical Cargo Security Coalition (PSCS), he followed
suit with the cargo councils and became involved in informa-
tion sharing and education, both for industry and law enforce-
ment. The coalition became very successful in a short time
and is now a significant partner in the cargo theft communi-
cation system. The PSCS website is accessible at http://www.
pcscpharma.com/ and contacts and membership information
are available online. Pharmaceutical products at one time
ranked at the top of the product break-­down chart reviewed
in Chapter 1. Based on this coalition and industry promotion
of communication and information sharing, thefts of these
products have significantly reduced.
These councils and associations have proven immensely valu-
able. The SWTSC recently teamed with the Texas Department of
Public Safety, the National Insurance Crime Bureau, and Hewlett
Packard to host a two-day Texas Cargo Summit for industry and
law enforcement. The event is free and all participants receive
lunch, registration packets, educational materials, and training
that will be certified for law enforcement participants. Within
two weeks of announcing the summit event, the limit of 235
attendees was reached. This shows the great interest from both
sides of the public–private sector in the issue.
These training seminars and networking events are very
valuable to the freight industry and law enforcement groups.
I do not know of another industry that works together as well
as this one does, thanks to the councils and the people who
participate and support them. I learn something new each
day I work in this industry and I appreciate the education and
support I receive from all the participants on both sides of
the equation. Who ever thought that moving a box, pallet, or
truckload from point A to Point B could be this complex?
 Industry Responses ◾ 75

The councils filled a large void by creating a far-­reaching

communication system that provides both information and
assistance. Police are the last line of defense; they are not
recovery plans. It is important for a cargo operation to have
written security and recovery plans in place long before they
suffer major losses. Prevention, planning, and understanding
the risks go a long way in protecting shipments. If you have to
call the police to recover losses, your procedures and processes
have failed. Knowing whom to call, networking, and making
contacts will make the response quicker and more focused,
but you really never want to get to this point. By involvement
in councils and their communication systems, you will gain
awareness of the theft problem, understand the current risks,
and have access to resources to assist you in building an effi-
cient and effective cargo security program. As a transportation
security manager, membership in these organizations gives you
an unequaled force multiplier at your fingertips.

National Transportation Security Organizations

When I first entered the industry in 1997, The National Cargo
Security Council was the preeminent organization for secu-
rity managers and providers. I do not know the history of
the organization but it was well regarded and very active.
Within a few years, the organization changed its name to the
International Cargo Security Council (ICSC) and attempted to
extend its reach and influence. That move started the down-
ward spiral of the group until it became extinct in about 2006.
It would not be fair for me to provide a postmortem as I really
do not know enough of the facts to intelligently discuss the
failure that left a large void for a national organization focused
on freight transportation security.
Several groups have stepped in to provide some oversight
on the national level. Those groups include the Supply Chain
Security and Loss Prevention Council (SCSLPC) of the American
Trucking Association (ATA), the National Insurance Crime Bureau,
76 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

and the American Society of Industrialized Security (ASIS)

Supply Chain Security Council. These groups are not trying to
replace the ICSC/­NCSC and their agendas are not the same.
The ATA-­SCSLPC is a committee of the ATA with a focus on
the trucking side of the equation. Trucking is the largest piece
of the pie and we all understand the involvement of trucking
in all of the modes of freight transportation. The ATA-­SCSLPC
website contains the following statement about its mission:

The ATA Supply Chain Security and Loss Prevention

Council is the only national organization dedicated
exclusively to addressing, establishing and advancing
those policies and practices that achieve maximum
security (supply chain personnel, cargo, truck, facility,
information and the homeland); effective risk man-
agement and loss control, cargo theft reduction, suc-
cessful claims management; and secure, nonviolent
work environments. It exists to serve, promote and
create value for members and the industry through
research, education, information dissemination, peer
and law enforcement interaction, consensus build-
ing and incentive programs which inspire corporate
and individual excellence and contribute to a more
secure and profitable trucking industry and nation.

As someone who has worked with the ATA-­SCSLPC and

attended and provided instruction at its conferences, I know
the organization provides great value to its membership.
However, its membership requirements and fees are different
from those of the former NCSC and it does not serve the same
set of entities. The ATA-­SCSLPC conducts a yearly conference
and works closely within the ATA to provide its service and
guidance related to supply chain security to its members. The
ATA-­SCSLPC has not become an active part of the BOLO sys-
tem run by the councils.
 Industry Responses ◾ 77

National Insurance Crime Bureau

The NICB has really stepped up its involvement in cargo theft
in recent years and has become a driving force behind the
National Cargo Theft Task Force. The national bureau is
involved through its agents who sit on regional cargo theft
councils and by sponsoring and supporting theft-­related train-
ing events around the country.
The NICB originally adopted a National Commercial Vehicle
and Cargo Theft Prevention Initiative in February 17, 2005 and
revised and readopted it on October 20, 2010. The initiative
was a call for the adoption of a nationwide initiative by the
federal government, in cooperation with private industry
and state and local governments to combat cargo theft. The
national strategy involved a task force structure and funding
for and creation of new cargo theft task forces in several key
states. The eight-­point strategy included increasing the number
task forces, providing funding, increasing cargo theft penalties,
and making the public aware of the dangers to public health
arising from thefts of consumable goods. A critical component
of the strategy was the need for intelligence gathering and
information sharing and public awareness. The NICB also
formed several task force subcommittees specializing in best
practices, government affairs, technology, and public aware-
ness. The subcommittees compile and develop information in
their areas for use by the task force. Interested individuals can
access https://www.nationalcargothefttaskforce.org/­ncttf/­start.
action and become contacts.
NICB has been very supportive to the transportation indus-
try and its contacts and influence have aided efforts to solve
cargo theft problems. However, NICB is not a voluntary orga-
nization like the ICSC. It is a totally different entity involved in
a much different way.
Some associations represent segments of the supply chain
but at present no voluntary global organization exists solely
to advocate for freight transportation security related to cargo
78 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

theft issues. Is this a void that needs to be filled? The regional

councils do a good job of covering their regions and providing
a national reach via the BOLO communication system. They
interact for training and other cross functions. What is in place
now seems to work and is continuing to grow and handle fre-
quent requests to be added to the distribution lists.
I guess the question is whether we have a need for a
national council or association? I believe a need may exist but
a national group would have to be organized to coexist and
function with the current regional council configurations.
Cargo theft is a national issue, and the National Cargo Theft
Task Force (NCTTF) initiative is a good start. The NCTTF
could be the basis of a national organization if it allowed more
interaction. Cargo theft is a regional concern. A company that
suffers a cargo theft in a certain location needs assistance in
that area immediately. Acquiring valuable contacts through
regional councils provides the best assistance in those situa-
tions. These national and regional groups should work as part-
ners to benefit all segments of society except cargo thieves.

ASIS Supply Chain and Transportation

Security Council
This council is a committee of the large international ASIS
organization. ASIS is the largest and most comprehensive secu-
rity organization in the world and has committees for just about
every infrastructure. The SCTSC works across all modes of
freight transportation and its committees have expertise in most
areas of supply chains and transportation including maritime,
aviation, ground transport, railroad, and supply chain security.
Every committee is responsible for generating white papers and
webinars and submitting relevant works for annual seminars.
The SCTSC council members attend local chapter meetings
to update chapters on council activities. Its web page, http://
www.asisonline.org/­councils/­TRAN.xml, posts articles and
 Industry Responses ◾ 79

event information. SCTSC members are available to comment

on news related to supply chain security as subject matter
experts. At the ASIS annual conference, the SCTSC maintains a
booth to provide information from council resources and also
conducts training and round table discussions.
ASIS has opportunities for council members to serve on
various committees (for example, rail, trucking, or maritime
shipping) that relate to the SCTSC. Even though the ASIS
councils do not participate in information sharing or the
BOLO system, many of the council and committee members
belong to regional councils and they cross-pollinate through
dual memberships. The ASIS councils are more about pro-
cesses, procedures, and best practices. They act as good
sources of ideas and resources but are not concerned with
day-­to-­day communications handled by the regional industry
councils. The networking provided by ASIS membership and
participation reaches across the entire supply chain.

Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA)

TAPA was founded in 1997 to prevent warehouse thefts and
enhance facility security. It provides guidelines for distribution
facilities through Freight Security Requirements (FSRs) and
developed an auditing process with a certification standard.
Around 2005, TAPA moved to issue guidelines for in-­transit
moves by establishing Trucking Security Requirements (TSRs)
and implemented an auditing process for the TSRs in 2010.
My observation of the technology members involved with
TAPA indicated that they were acrimonious toward trucking
carriers and transportation because most of the group did not
work or operate in that space and lacked an understanding of
its value. Many times what they required or wanted was way
over the premium they were willing to pay for the service
and even unrealistic. However, time, maturity, and experience
made the organization far more reality based and cooperative.
80 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

The FSRs and TSRs it issued make sense, are reasonable, and
serve as realistic guidelines for carriers and service providers.
Security is not always about spending money; it often
simply requires working smarter. TAPA is now accepted into
the mainstream of supply chain security since it moderated its
views and started accepting membership outside the technol-
ogy world. Information about TAPA can be found at http://
www.tapaonline.org/. If you are tasked with building a secu-
rity plan, the TAPA FSRs and TSRs are very good starting
points for devising guidelines and requirements.

Information Sharing
The most important part of networking and group involve-
ment is the sharing of information. Companies that have similar
interests and operations can assist each other in nonpropri-
etary ways by sharing information related to risks and threats
that face the entire industry including manufacturers, shippers,
carriers in all modes, insurers, transportation security vendors,
security service providers, and all entities with interests in
protecting the supply chain. When some or all of these people
gather in the same room, they can all relate experiences or
incidents that will allow others to learn new tactics. Sharing
information is a way of not having to reinvent the wheel,
learning from experts, and hearing about risks and threats that
may arise in the future. It is also a great way to learn about
effective products and efficient resources for all types of secu-
rity problems. Discussions about losses and recoveries, where
they occurred, what was taken, where equipment was recov-
ered, and evidence at the scene paint a very informative picture.
Having knowledge about these incidents allows you and your
company a much better chance of recovery if a theft occurs.
When we first started talking about sharing information on
a much more public scale to raise awareness and analyze the
issues, many industry insiders feared such activity. They were
 Industry Responses ◾ 81

afraid that being open about losses would place the industry
in the wrong light or worried that their companies would lose
business or suffer other consequences. This has just not been
the case.
A few holdouts continue to guard their information. They
are only hurting their own companies and hindering better
security and recovery operations. One security director of a
company was adamant about not sharing information when
his company suffered a loss of a cargo of flat screen televisions.
He refused to share the details of the theft or the location
where the recovery took place—in this case, a west Texas city.
About six weeks later, his company was hit again at the same
location. A vendor of the shipping company reached out to the
SWTSC after the shipper had trouble getting an investigative
law enforcement response. A call was made to state police in
the area. The investigator was aware of the previous offense
and knew where the empty trailer was dropped after the
earlier incident. Quite a bit of time had passed. When he went
to the known location, he found the abandoned empty trailer
from the latest offense. Had the victimized company been
involved in information sharing and communication network
and immediately revealed the information, law enforcement
would have had an opportunity to place the recovery location
under surveillance before the unit was abandoned.
Sharing information does not require a company to reveal
names or proprietary information. It simply means a company
can get the necessary information out in the quickest manner
to the most authorized persons to help it recover its property.
Another benefit is entering product information into the archived
systems. If it is found later, it can be returned to the correct
party. All of this makes perfect sense.
A good case in point about sharing information and under-
standing how thieves operate involved a load of stolen baby
formula in Michigan. The company that sustained the loss
was aware of the thieves’ MO and informed the responding
law enforcement. Based on the information provided by the
82 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

complainant, the police were able to focus their search within

miles of the loss where they found the stolen tractor and
arrested a suspect leaving the recovery location. Then they
focused their search based on the company investigator’s infor-
mation and found the trailer a few miles away, where the other
suspects were painting over trailer logos. By understanding the
latest activities of the thieves, the company recovered its load.
Without studying past cases and understanding current cargo
crime activity, you place yourself in a position of not knowing a
criminal’s current MO, leaving you unable to advise the police.
Remember, few police officers responding to these calls have
any idea about the methods of the criminals. It is really up to
security personnel to understand the incident, direct the infor-
mation to law enforcement, or utilize networking contacts to
contact a law enforcement officer specializing in cargo theft in
the jurisdiction where the crime occurred. The small number of
cargo theft task forces in the United States means that a com-
pany probably has limited choices but it may be able to find
a commercial vehicle theft investigator or state police vehicle
enforcement officer who has some knowledge of such crimes
from participating in cargo theft information sharing.
The more that look, the more ears that listen, and the more
persons who understand cargo crime makes for a force multi-
plier beyond your security team and one agency that responds
to make a report. The National Crime Information Computer
(NCIC) was set up to allow police to enter information about
vehicle registrations, vehicle identification numbers, and other
data. It is a very good system for confirmation but not for
broadcast capability. Why would you not use all the resources
available to have the best chance to make a recovery?

Archiving and Analysis

The first step was sharing information obtained from the coun-
cils with their law enforcement partners and members. During
the early days of the BOLO alert system, no single database
 Industry Responses ◾ 83

captured relevant data and that meant no data were analyzed.

I often received calls from members during the early stages
of information sharing. They asked whether I remembered a
certain incident or report on a certain stolen commodity. The
only way of checking then was looking back through e-­mails
or reviewing a personal file containing alerts. We found some
information but we were not always successful. We knew we
needed a database where we could store reports; enter impor-
tant data from incidents into predetermined spreadsheet sec-
tions; and capture commodity, value, and recovery information
to aid efforts to identify cargo theft adversaries.
The SWTSC found just such a partner in the Supply Chain
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (SC-­ISAC). In 2006,
SWTSC started entering information on every cargo theft
incident reported. While quite a bit of information concerned
certain cargo theft groups, no one had ever really taken a close
look. After archiving started, sharing expanded and industry
people started to understand the goals of the councils and the
ISAC. As the amount of data grew and matured, supply chain
operators started to obtain very clear pictures of theft incidents.
Almost everyone in the industry who worked with FTL
shipments was aware of the influence of ethnic crews from
South Florida. Most insiders had good ideas of their activities,
targets, and methods. Industry and law enforcement had some
facts but did not have the capability of studying large numbers
of offenses through the United States.
Even as this database was put in place, many involved agen-
cies and companies refused to share information. Companies
did not understand the dynamics of information sharing and
police agencies long believed that all crime information had
to be shrouded in secrecy. In retrospect, we now know that
shining a light on the nonsensitive information is a much
better policy and most agencies now understand that not all
information surrounding an offense is sensitive. Over time,
law enforcement agents and agencies found that sharing even
scaled-­down batch data was helpful to all concerned parties.
84 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Expanding the number of data sources progressed in baby

steps but many groups now continue to press the issue and
lead the way. In 2007, I left my transportation security industry
position and joined LoJack Supply Chain Integrity as its direc-
tor of law enforcement services. My duties included recruiting
law enforcement members for the SC-­ISAC and expanding
information sharing. This was a very good fit because I knew
what benefits would result from sharing information generated
by industry councils. This intelligence is vital for developing
sufficient understanding of the threats and risks of industry
thefts. My position allowed me to work with both the law
enforcement sector and private industry. Understanding both
sides of public–private operations made it easy for me to
liaison with both sides. Through the SC-­ISAC and the SWTSC,
I pursued law enforcement contacts, completed relevant law
enforcement and industry training and “preached the gospel”
of cargo theft risks to any group that showed interest.
The SC-­ISAC data matured and allowed us to confirm
changes in activities of criminals in response to industry and
law enforcements actions and reactions. The ability to provide
definitive data to industry and law enforcement and discuss
it intelligently and passionately effected changes. A case in
point was the introduction of an SWTSC cargo theft template
form provided by the Texas Department of Public Safety. The
District 1 state police agreed to send theft information directly
to its road units if the information was placed in its template.
The template, which found its way around the country, seems
to serve as the reporting form of choice.
These are small victories but they build credibility with both
industry entities and law enforcement authorities. By compiling
and submitting data to law enforcement, building distribution
lists, and networking with various agencies, I have been able
to train and work with many state police agencies and build
great relationships that ultimately produce quick assistance
with recovery efforts by members of the industry.
 Industry Responses ◾ 85

The archived information in the database brings more suc-

cesses every day. We see more property identified and con-
nected to specific offenses. The identification of more crime
trends and patterns leads to more credibility with police agen-
cies. After an industry organization starts providing assistance,
for example, in finding complainants or identifying carrier
equipment, the public sector starts to understand the benefits
of partnerships with industry. Great benefits have resulted
from information sharing, analyzing data, and working in
partnership. Any company not participating in industry pro-
grams is not using all the tools available to transportation
security professionals.

Conclusion
In the past five years, two hard-­hit groups that made the
most of information sharing and analysis and improved sup-
ply chain security are the tobacco and pharmaceutical ship-
pers. The tobacco industry really was the first to make major
changes, demand accountability, and use technology to improve
the visibility of their shipments from origin to destination.
The industry also began participating in national and regional
groups to build network assets and obtain resources to protect
their products in transit and in warehouses. Tobacco loads
were hit often. A tobacco load is worth millions of dollars and
generates huge amounts of taxes. FTL thefts were common
until the industry took action. All industries must take steps to
thwart crime; if the police must be called, a company’s plans
and procedures have failed. Tobacco companies built security
programs that included driver awareness programs, installation
of covert tracking technology and the use of the carrier evalu-
ation matrix. When we look at best practices later in its book,
you will understand the value of a layered security approach
for theft prevention.
86 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

The pharmaceutical industry took a different approach and

started its own council. The industry has been very successful
in lowering losses and promoting the use of security resources
and tools that give their carriers better chances to succeed. We
still see some pharmaceutical losses but they are far smaller
than they once were. Tobacco and pharmaceuticals always
ranked at the tops of product theft charts (see Chapter 1).
Since they expanded their security efforts, they are no longer
at the tops of stolen commodity charts. This does not mean
they are not targets; it simply means that criminals know that
certain companies have taken steps to make stealing from
them much more difficult. A recent stolen load of cigarettes
contained a covert tracking device. It took the covert tracking
company for which I work only 42 minutes to make full recov-
ery with no loss of integrity.
Taking action can make a difference. Many companies
view security as a necessary evil instead of an activity that
can positively affect the bottom line. The prevention of one
major cargo theft will pay for security efforts for a pretty good
while. Targeted industries should look at these examples and
take some of the same steps. They should share information
and use it to build effective security and recovery plans.
Unfortunately, several companies that have been victimized
many times have not made any significant changes to their
operations to prevent further problems. The cargo criminals
know who these companies are. It is pleasing to watch secu-
rity professionals who have taken the time to understand
cargo theft issues and provide real security solutions and
options to their employers to achieve continued loss reduction.
Chapter 5

Law Enforcement
Responses

Introduction
The overall law enforcement response to cargo thefts in most
circumstances has been underwhelming for many reasons.
Obviously, unsatisfactory response is not the case in every
jurisdiction because some task forces actively react to and
investigate such crimes. Some of the problem relates to crime-
reporting issues. Most states do not have specific statutes
covering cargo theft and adjudication can vary depending on
how a crime is reported. If cargo is stolen along with a trac-
tor and trailer, the incident is treated as a commercial vehicle
theft offense and the cargo in the trailer is a supplement to the
vehicle crime. When a tractor and trailer are recovered, cargo
becomes an afterthought. Vehicle detectives are not always
trained to deal with issues beyond the vehicles and may not
understand the cargo losses involved in the equation.
Some departments actually cover cargo crime through their
auto theft units but these are more exceptions than rules.
Therefore, when police crime statistics and records do not
include cargo theft data, the agencies cannot be expected to

87
88 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

form task forces unless they see good reasons. We all under-
stand that reality. For many years, the Dallas Police Department
employed one auto theft detective, David Wallace, who also
had cargo theft responsibility. This is a city of over a million
people that constitutes a problem area for cargo crime. From
an industry standpoint, a single detective was better than
nothing. Over time, the SWTSC was able to lobby the Dallas
department to at least assign cargo, commercial vehicle, and
trailer thefts to the Auto Theft Section so that they were
assigned to one detective. Before that improvement was made,
trailer thefts were assigned to various burglary and theft units
at the precinct level and coordination of enforcement and
investigation efforts was nonexistent.
Detective Wallace soon became acquainted with the
industry by attending SWTSC meetings and training. He
understood the scenarios and criminals and became a very
good source and resource for area cargo theft information.
A task force or assigned detectives can make a huge differ-
ence in crime investigation. When a detective or group of
detectives work certain crimes—drugs, robberies, burglar-
ies, or cargo thefts—they start to understand the crime, the
criminals, and all the other moving parts. Stolen property
must be disposed of so police investigators identify fenc-
ing operations, pawn shops, and online sources that deal
in stolen goods. When suspects are identified or arrested,
specialized investigators conduct interviews and build local,
regional, and even national intelligence. Because cargo theft
information has been compiled, officers have a great deal of
background, resources, and sources to assist them in solving
crimes and recovering stolen property. If an area does not
have a task force or at least one assigned cargo theft detec-
tive, its ability to investigate crimes and recover stolen
property is greatly hampered by the lack of organization
and information.
Information is the big difference between the haves and
the have-­nots. Cargo thefts frequently victimize the have-­nots.
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 89

As I was writing this section of the book, I received an

e-­mail from a member needing a law enforcement contact
in Phoenix, Arizona. The area lacks a task force but I was
able to provide the member with contacts at the Phoenix
Police Department and the state police. Both contacts
have participated in information distribution for years and
I know they will assist our member based on their associ-
ation with our council and its relationship with their state
and national chapters of the International Association of
Auto Theft Investigators (IAATI). Through LoJack SCI’s
relationship with IAATI, we have been able to help
bring cargo theft awareness to IAATI through training
and networking with its national and regional chapters.
This organization is a natural partner for the freight indus-
try organizations and companies.

This is where the industry councils, information sharing, and

awareness of the issues by industry security management
can assist law enforcement investigators in jurisdictions of
the have-­nots and also put them in touch with the closest
state police or task force groups that have valuable informa-
tion. Actually several of the have-­nots became interested in
crime data, participated in distribution of information, and are
becoming more knowledgeable about cargo crime and many
detectives, through their own motivation and interest, have
become reliable contacts and work hard on their cases.

Cargo Theft Law Enforcement Responses

Cargo theft is the poster child for federal law enforcement
action. Stolen cargo is almost always moved from the jurisdic-
tion where the act occurred to another city, county, or state.
By the time the agency making the original police report
obtains all the necessary information and enters it into the
National Crime Information Computer (NCIC), the stolen
90 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

goods are already many miles away. Although federal agen-

cies are involved in some of the task forces, they seldom
actively assist in investigations or pursue prosecutions to the
federal level. This lack of action by federal law enforcement
agencies does not appear to be headed for change. The void
must therefore be filled by the industry councils and organiza-
tions that build relationships with state police and local investi­
gators in the areas where the most cargo crime occurs. Several
federal investigators from the Food & Drug Administration
and Department of Agriculture have done great work in sev-
eral locales.
The existing cargo theft task forces have done some very
good work and provide much information and partnership
benefits to industry security and operations managers. As I was
writing this book, I received an e-­mail message from the com-
mander of the Miami Dade Police Department TOMCATS unit
advising that due to budgetary constraints, the TOMCATS were
going to be disbanded. The message did not explain how
cargo theft cases were going to be handled in the future or
provide contact information for follow-­up. The TOMCATS
have been the primary cargo theft task force for many years.
Many former TOMCATS investigators found their way into the
industry and they have been the cornerstones of investigations
and intelligence gathering about Florida cargo theft crews for
many years.
The TOMCATS hosted a yearly training seminar that
became almost mandatory for law enforcement and industry
investigators. This disbanding is a huge blow to cargo theft
law enforcement efforts and will aid the thieves to continue to
victimize the industry and commit crimes with less pressure. It
is too early to tell what will happen, but the elimination of the
TOMCATS is not welcome news for an industry that already
has insufficient task forces and law enforcement contacts.
The TOMCATS task force enjoyed federal involvement and
participation. Although most of the investigations and inves-
tigators were local, federal support gave them funding and
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 91

overcame jurisdictional issues. It also made them very effec-

tive. Remember, property stolen in another jurisdiction and
transported to Miami does not fall under the investigation
responsibilities of the Miami Dade Police Department. When
freight is identified as stolen, a complainant can be identified,
and a police agency report can be found for the property,
the police in the jurisdiction where the property is found can
react. As a result of eliminating the TOMCATS program, all
of the intelligence and investigative work aided by informants
will slowly dwindle away. When Miami has no unit to main-
tain intelligence, informants, and underground contacts, the
chances of recovery in that area will greatly decrease and play
directly into the hands of cargo theft crews.
The TOMCATS consisted of eight Miami Dade Police
Department (MDPD) personnel including a lieutenant, a ser-
geant, a Florida Highway Patrol representative, and a Florida
DOT investigator. The group also had a counterpart FBI
Supervisor and five FBI agents assigned to the unit according
to the last update received from the group supervisor before
the disband memo arrived.
Recovery of stolen cargo has always been unpredictable at
best. When the South Florida crews pulled heists several years
ago, most of the equipment and cargo came directly south
from theft locations. A company and law enforcement had
about a 16-hour window in which to recover the stolen freight
before it found its way into temporary storage for a short time
before being moved again. Because the MO changed some-
what from the earlier days and the criminals now change
tractors closer to crime scenes and stash trailers to conduct
counter-­surveillance to determine whether cargo-­imbedded
GPS is involved, pursuers may have a little more time to effect
recovery but time is still of the essence.
One task the SWTSC has been trying to accomplish with
its distribution lists is adding state police interdiction squads.
These squads are on the road most of the time and transmit-
ting theft information to them can be a huge force multiplier
92 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

in the first stages of a search. Interdiction squads are great

resources for pursuing stolen units. Also keying commercial
vehicle enforcement officers into these crimes and methods of
operation will give them more information about what factors
they should look for during their inspections and stops. The
state police interdiction squads that work the north–south
freeways on the east coast from New York to Miami need
to be on some council distribution list. They should receive
BOLO alerts and communications because they are in prime
positions to find stolen units or aid recovery if a unit has GPS
tracking equipment.
Several cargo theft task forces exist around the country. In
Florida, the highway patrol still offers a Statewide Cargo Theft
Task Force. This group has done a lot of good work over the
years through the state and is still available to contact. Florida
also still has the Marion County Sheriff’s Office Task Force.
Ed Dean, the sheriff, has been a driving force in the National
Cargo Theft Task Force and the push for a national strategy.
In California, several units have some cargo theft responsi-
bilities. They include the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office
CARGOCATS, the California Highway Patrol Cargo Theft
Interdiction Program (CTIP) that utilizes several units around
the state from the Mexican border to the Bay area. California
also has the Los Angeles Police Department’s BADCATS and
its Airport Crimes Unit. San Francisco International Airport
has AIRCATS. As shown in the charts in Chapter 1, California
is almost always the top location for cargo theft crimes and
the state has positioned law enforcement groups to assist.
These units are highly effective and they have the information,
intelligence, and expertise to succeed. The CTIP group keeps
statistics and records that assist with recoveries and also shares
batch data with the SC-­ISAC.
The Georgia Cargo Theft Task Force is run by the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation and it started operation in 2008. The
task force has been very successful in making recoveries and
taking down some very large fencing operations and has a
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 93

great partnership with the Southeast Cargo Security Council.

The two entities helped establish the Georgia Cargo Theft
Alert System (https://www.gacargotheft.com/).
The Illinois State Police Midwest Cargo Theft Task Force
has worked hand in hand with private-sector counterparts
on the Midwest Cargo Security Council and also with the
SWTSC, the Eastern Region CTA, and the National Insurance
Crime Bureau. During its short existence, it moved fast by
hosting several highly attended training conferences and
becoming a resource in an area of the country where it was
sorely needed.
In Kentucky, the Louisville Metropolitan Police Department
and the state police have dedicated cargo investigative groups
that have been great resources and lately faced South Florida
crews operating in and around Louisville. These crews, when
they move into new regions, continue to use the same meth-
ods of operation but start from a different base. The Louisville
crews have been very active in the midwest recently.
The New Jersey State Police (NJSP) have a dedicated cargo
theft task force that has been extremely busy. Cargo theft
analysis shows a great deal of empty stolen midwest equip-
ment found in New Jersey. The state police have identified
and arrested quite a few South Florida crew members involved
in thefts or receiving stolen property in their area. The group
also has a splendid relationship with the Eastern Region Cargo
Theft Association. Their private–public partnership is a model.
Lieutenant Mike McDonnell is retiring. He will be missed by the
industry but we are sure the NJSP group will continue his excel-
lent work. The Eastern Region Chairman, Kurt Duesderdick,
made it easy for the two groups to work together. The NJSP
shares batch data with industry sources and works with other
law enforcement agencies and insurance investigators.
The Nevada Viper Auto and Cargo Task Force in Las Vegas
is a good resource for the industry. Most crime in Las Vegas
involves the stealing of dropped trailers or unattended rigs
from casino and hotel parking lots.
94 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

The Pennsylvania State Police lacks a designated cargo task

force but a number of its troop sergeants are industry contacts
who assist the industry. As noted earlier, these types of con-
tacts are invaluable because they have the knowledge and are
motivated through professionalism to understand the issues.
Pennsylvania is creeping up the cargo theft analysis charts and
many empties from Pennsylvania are found in New Jersey.
The Memphis Auto/­Cargo Theft Task Force (TAMCATS) is
a multijurisdictional task force composed of local police and
sheriff officers and the FBI. This group is busy because the
Memphis area has its share of cargo-­related incidents. The
task force covers the Memphis area along with nearby parts of
Arkansas and Mississippi. The group has undergone several
makeovers but remains a very good unit. The TAMCATS work
closely with the Mid-­South Industry Council and maintains a
good working public–private partnership.
You can see from this information that cargo task forces are
few and far between. It is incumbent upon industry through
the national and regional organizations to engage law enforce-
ment in this issue. Providing training, BOLO alerts, and other
communication to groups that need them is crucial and many
auto theft task forces and auto theft investigators are very
receptive to this type of activity.
During the writing of this book, the SWTSC, Hewlett
Packard, NICB, and the Texas Department of Public Safety
hosted the Texas Cargo Summit. The meeting filled to capacity
with 237 attendees; within 2 weeks from the date the summit
was announced, it had a waiting list. This shows that cargo
theft is relevant and industry and law enforcement people are
interested. One of the groups we urged to participate in the
summit was the Texas Automobile Burglary Theft Prevention
Authority (ABTPA). This organization supports statewide law
enforcement task force efforts through auto theft reduction
initiatives, education, and public awareness. I have been work-
ing with Michelle Lanham, the manager of the Dallas Program,
to Reduce Auto Theft (RATT) to involve RATT’s task forces
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 95

in cargo theft information and training. The ABTPA partici-

pated in the Texas Cargo Summit and provided information
about statewide task forces that are available to assist in cargo
theft and commercial vehicle theft recovery. The ABTPA and
Michelle have been very supportive of the SWTSC, its law
enforcement education efforts, and communication network.
By including those tasks forces in information sharing, the
efforts of all entities involved are strengthened. These are the
types of partnerships we like to participate in. Both sides ben-
efit from the interactions.
The SWTSC also established a communication link with the
Texas Motor Transportation Association (TMTA; http://www.
tmta.com/). TMTA receives SWTSC BOLO alerts and SWTSC
receives TMTA information with a mutual understanding that
the theft information sent by TMTA will be sent to the law
enforcement distribution lists of the SWTSC. This is a benefit
for both groups through simple information sharing program
and partnership.
Another relationship the SWTSC finds beneficial in the share
of information is with the Institute of Scrap Recycling
Industries (http://www.isri.org). This organization provides
BOLO alerts on metal thefts and groups can sign up to receive
regional notifications. The SWTSC receives information about
scrap recycling incidents. When they are transportation
industry-­related, for example, involving a trailer load, we also
send that information to our distribution lists. Partnerships of
public and private organizations that have similar goals are
very attractive and are effective ways to share information and
bring awareness to all interested parties.
There is still much to do and further outreach is needed.
Some organizations need macro views such as the twice
weekly bulletins of SC-­ISAC. Others need a more micro view
provided by timely BOLO alerts from the industry council’s
communication system. Many other organizations that share
the common goal of preventing cargo theft could benefit from
information-sharing partnerships. As we identify and find those
96 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

organizations or they find us, we will continue to build the

communication network one person or organization at a time.
This is a time-­proven successful technique that improves with
age and reach. Expanding that reach will always be the main
goal for both the industry and law enforcement groups.

Law Enforcement Education

Introduction
Throughout this book we have talked about law enforcement
training, specifically teaching law enforcement about our
industry, its moving parts, the documentation involved with
shipping, and the current crime trends and patterns we deter-
mine through our industry-­related intelligence-gathering orga-
nizations. The law enforcement officers we work with are well
trained by their agencies in investigation or and commercial
enforcement officers are trained in the areas of regulation
and inspection. The training we offer is a supplement to that
knowledge and is specific to our industry and how it works.
As many of us are former police officers, we understand
investigation from the public side and we also understand
the industry. We know how certain information generated
by the industry may be beneficial in law enforcement inves-
tigations. We also want to teach law enforcement about the
methods of cargo crime criminals so that they can be alert
to a situation that seems out of place and take action based
on knowledge obtained from our training, information, and
BOLO alerts.

SWTSC Law Enforcement Training

One training class the SWTSC offers is Cargo Investigation
Overview and it covers documentation and operations of inter-
est to law enforcement officers who perform cargo-­related
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 97

investigations or enforcement. It explains the different

modes of cargo transportation as discussed in Chapter 2.
Understanding operating modes is invaluable, especially when
questioning drivers. The training then discusses internal cargo
security oversight for industry security management and
government compliance issues and programs that apply to
the transportation industry. It also covers freight handling and
documentation. Understanding the documentation of freight
movement is very important to law enforcement investigators
because the paper trail provides much information.
The freight industry generates excellent documentation.
Every shipment—whether parcel, pallet, or truckload—is
traced from origin to destination through company documen-
tation and paperwork required by various departments of
transportation. Any shipment can be traced by records show-
ing who picked it up, where it was picked up and from whom,
who drove it, who moved it, and who delivered it to whom.
All records indicate the times involved with each process:

◾◾ Pick-up and dock-drop documents indicate who picked

up material and identified the shipper and location.
◾◾ Manifest documents show handling details (trailer num-
bers and dock handlers).
◾◾ Line haul and trip sheet information details tractor and
trailer data and line drivers.
◾◾ Delivery receipts serve as proof of delivery and identify
delivery driver, consignee, and location.

The industry generates thorough paperwork, not to help the

police when they serve a subpoena, but because the paper
trail provides proof of delivery and thus generates revenue.
Training explains the Pro (shipping) number and how that
number is the key to obtaining all the other paperwork and
identifying the parties involved in a shipment. It is important
98 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

for the police investigating a cargo theft to know the partici-

pants in shipments, to be able to identify stolen property, and
to understand how transport systems work. The training cov-
ers examples of industry records and explains their purposes.
When I conduct training, I advise law enforcement officers
to contact a security or operations person from a company to
help them collect the documentation needed and decipher the
information until they feel comfortable with the process. The
presentation also shows them various types of equipment to
familiarize them with the units, the way they are used, and the
modes that use them. The presentation stresses the way the
industry tracks freight movements via tractor and trailer num-
bers. If these numbers are provided to company dispatchers
or security personnel, they can immediately determine current
assignment, usage, and location.
Since the police use license plates and vehicle identifica-
tion numbers (VINs) to enter stolen equipment data into the
National Crime Information Computer (NCIC), a disconnect
can occur between company and law enforcement in report-
ing a problem. When I worked in the trucking industry, the
companies operated by tractor and trailer numbers. The only
way to obtain registration plate information was to contact
fleet management on the west coast during their business
hours and cross-reference the unit numbers. That meant the
company could not always provide registration information to
police quickly. Teaching police investigators and road officers
to access such information is invaluable. The presentation also
covers company loss reporting, high-value shipment handling,
internal preventative processes, and internal investigative tech-
niques used by company security managers including:

◾◾ Tracking devices such as GPS and AGPS

◾◾ Radiofrequency (RF) beacons in un­manifested freight for
driver integrity checks
◾◾ Surveillance of drivers and dock workers
◾◾ Sting operations using bait trailers and bait freight
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 99

The presentation also discusses current criminal methods used

by both organized and opportunistic criminal groups that tar-
get shippers and carriers including:

◾◾ Truckload theft rings

◾◾ High-value warehouse burglaries
◾◾ Fraudulent and fictitious pick-­ups
◾◾ Opportunistic local gangs

If the industry does not present this information to the police,

who will? It is incumbent upon the industry to provide this
information to law enforcement agencies. The police know
how to investigate and do their jobs, but specific knowledge of
how an industry operates and perpetrators that victimize it can
assist in the success of police investigations and apprehensions.
Another SWTSC law enforcement training course covers
its goals and objectives. This presentation is for law enforce-
ment groups that have not worked with the council in the past
and it speaks to the council’s proposed mission which is “To
promote a partnership among carrier security management
groups and law enforcement which will enhance communica-
tion and cooperation with a focus on transportation security
issues, cargo theft and contraband interdiction in Texas and
the Southwest area of the United States.”
The training also covers membership of the council: “Security
management groups from companies involved in the transpor-
tation field and law enforcement personnel assigned to units
which investigate shipment (cargo), vehicle, and commercial
vehicle theft or conduct commercial vehicle enforcement or
interdiction.” The presentation then discusses operating prin-
ciples, objectives, and goals of the council:

Principles
Status as a non-­profit 501(c)6 voluntary organization
Dedication to cargo security and transportation issues
Inclusion of all modes of transportation
100 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Membership composed of shippers, carriers, insurers,

warehousing, forwarders, and vendors
Law enforcement networking and education
Objectives
Improve cargo transportation security
Serve as clearinghouse for information for Southwest
cargo issues
Platform for Southwest cargo security matters
Assist voluntary initiatives by government and the private
sector
Goals
Increase communication between law enforcement and
transportation security
Promote exchange of security-­related information
between companies and law enforcement
Provide assistance and training to law enforcement
Provide education on supply chain methods and
documentation
Assistance with major recoveries
Assistance with theft stings
Develop law enforcement networks to provide alerts and
information related to cargo security and theft
Assist law enforcement with interdiction of illegal drug
shipments in commercial carriers through company
training and customer profiling

Interdiction: Company Operation and Documentation is

another presentation developed by SWTSC for law enforce-
ment. This training covers commercial trucking interdiction,
shows established profiles for contraband shipping, and dis-
cusses the different modes of transportation and makes other
points about freight transportation detailed below.

No matter which mode is used, all shipment movement

originates and is delivered by truck. Although this infor-
mation is elementary, it is important to understand in
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 101

dealing with non-­truck modes. It adds layers to the move-

ment that smugglers do not like.
Commercial trucking is a safe way for drug traffickers to
move large amounts of contraband. Drug traffickers like
commercial transportation since it insulates them from the
contraband and may allow easier passage through Border
Patrol checkpoints, especially in the LTL mode.
Trucking company policies can actually assist drug traffick­
ers. The director of one company I worked for set a rule
that if contraband was found, security managers had
to notify the shipper. This type of rule eliminates law
enforcement options including conducting reverse deliv-
eries and identifying traffickers. If I were a trafficker and
could identify a company with this type of asinine rule,
I would use it to ship all my contraband and eliminate
most of my risk.
Internet shipment tracking acts as a trafficker’s accomplice
and constitutes another Internet advantage for them. All
shipments are now tracked via the Internet so customers
can follow their progress. Before the Internet systems,
found contraband could be diverted to law enforcement
and they could plan a reverse delivery upon arrival at a
destination. Now the shipment tracking has to be kept
in place even if a shipment is diverted so the traffick-
ers will not be aware that a shipment has been inter-
dicted. Security management needs to work with law
enforcement to assist with the Internet tracking charade
when needed.

Company systems and shipments are also covered in train-

ing, specifically:

Every shipment is tracked from pick-­up to final delivery.

Every detail of movement is detailed (who handled cargo
and when). For investigative follow-­up, this information is
available through company security managers or can be
102 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

obtained through a subpoena after a legal action is started.

Every document related to a shipment can be produced.
Unknown shippers are not allowed to place shipments into
the supply chain. Before September 11, 2001, unknown
shippers existed but that is no longer possible.
Most companies assist law enforcement with delivery of
contraband with some restrictions if concerns about
employee safety and hazards at company facilities are
observed. However, some companies will not allow any
form of assistance on their property.

An important part of the training discusses the paperwork

continuum of a shipment:

The original shipment receipt showing dock drop or yard

entry data is a bill of lading (BOL) listing cargo, shipper,
and consignee (receiver).
The origin information is detailed in manifests generated at
the origin location indicating freight receipt, handlers, and
unit numbers.
At intermediate locations, loading and off-­loading manifests
list handlers and trailer numbers.
At the destination location, loading and off-­loading mani-
fests indicate freight handlers and trailer numbers. Pick-­up
and delivery (P&D) trip sheets show manifest, driver, and
time information A delivery receipt or proof of delivery
(POD) shows time of delivery, driver, and signature of
consignee (receiver).

Examples of the documents are presented and basic tractor

and trailer equipment information is reviewed. After that,
known drug shipment profiles are discussed:
Origin from Southern locations—Most shipments are
placed into commercial freight systems from southern loca-
tions on the US side of the Mexican border.
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 103

Placement into system through dock drop at origin—

Shipments are often brought to the dock by a representative of
the shipper. At this point most companies capture the rep-
resentative’s identification by entering the shipment and the
vehicle license plate number of the vehicle that brought the
shipment to the yard.
Use of company name or known customer informa-
tion—Shippers often use a current customer name and some
even use preprinted BOLs from known customers.
Payments with cash, prepaid credit card, or desig-
nation of cash collection at destination—These payment
methods are hard to trace or tie to financial records. Many
companies have stopped using cash collection.
Carrier’s receipt of numerous calls during shipment
to check on arrival—Before Internet tracking became rou-
tine, traffickers would constantly call a terminal to see whether
their shipments arrived. With Internet tracking, they call to see
whether their shipments are ready for pick-­up as soon as the
shipments are shown to arrive at their destinations..
Securely packed shipments—Packaging in wooden
crates, placement of straps, lack of transparency, and sealants
or caulks in the seams of boxes, barrels, and crates are clues
to illicit shipments. The photographs In this chapter illustrate
the packaging methods used for illicit shipments. Remember,
shipping is charged by weight so most legitimate shippers
(unlike traffickers) make their shipments as light as possible.
BOL description does not match packaging—This is
an important point. Traffickers sometimes declare to ship items
that are cheaper to buy at the destination rather than ship.
Product description does not match weight or ship-
ment size—Washer and dryers that weigh 300 to 400 pounds
are unusual items and require attention by dock personnel. A
product description that is not consistent with weight, ship-
ment size, or item description along with a lack of transpar-
ency is a big giveaway.
104 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Auto parts shipments—Traffickers frequently use auto

parts as covers for product descriptions and shipping and con-
signee company names. One reason is that auto parts cover
the weight issue better than many other products. Any “auto
part” shipment packed In a 3/4-Inch plywood wooden crate
with 3-inch screws is probably not legitimate, particularly if It
shows caulking in the seams or has the odor of dryer sheets.
Freight designated for dock pick-­up or false delivery
address—Shipments designated for pick-­up at a shipping dock
may contain illegal goods. A fraudulent consignee address may
be an empty lot or vacant house. Delivery to a false address is
dangerous to a driver. Drivers are not supposed to make outside
deliveries under these conditions, but in such circumstances it
may be safer for a driver to deliver than to try to refuse.
Use of prepaid cell phone and phone cards—
Traffickers frequently use these communications to prevent
detection because prepaid phones and credit cards do not tie
an individual to their use.
After listing some significant points and profiles of contra-
band shipments, the SWTSC training presents drug shipment
photos gathered from members. The photos show shipments
containing illicit narcotics that were interdicted during trans-
port. The LTL companies that provided them were willing
to share their information with the council and allow the
photos to be used in training. The photos are now the intel-
lectual property of the SWTSC. When contraband shipments
are found, most of the points made above are factors in the
crime. The shipment shown in Figure 5.1 was identified by
the weight discrepancy along with several other profiles listed
above. This packaging provides the trafficker one of the most
important necessities: no transparency.
The box shown in Figure 5.2 was listed as containing tools
and once again this shipment included several of the profile
points above including a dock drop, a cash payment, and the
weight of the shipping container. If several of the points above
relate to a shipment, it most likely will contain contraband.
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 105

Figure 5.1 Marijuana hidden in air conditioner as cover for trans-

port in a commercial transportation vehicle. (Source: Coughlin,
J.J. SWTSC’s Interdiction: Company Operation and Documentation
presentation. With permission.)
106 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Figure 5.2 Package placed in commercial shipping lane and labeled

as tools shows the lack of transparency found in contraband shipments.
(Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s Interdiction: Company Operation and
Documentation presentation. With permission.)
The occurrence depicted in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 is rare and
several of the above factors assisted in this discovery. The
smugglers bundled narcotics in liquid-­proof packaging and
dropped them into the Gaylord shipment pallet. They poured
some type of liquid clay over the narcotics and allowed it
to harden. The method was ingenious but the smugglers’

Figure 5.3 Narcotics bundled in waterproof packaging covered with

liquid clay after placement in Gaylord shipping pallet.
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 107

Figure 5.4 Narcotics bundled in waterproof packaging covered with

liquid clay after placement in Gaylord shipping pallet.

problems arose from their description of contents, the dock

drop, and cash collection of payment. When you put these
profiles together, contraband is involved 95% of the time.
Figure 5.5 shows a strapped and sealed pallet covered with
black shrink-wrap. This is a real attempt to eliminate transpar-
ency. On the right is the BOL (carrier company information
removed) listing satellite parts. The shipment raised several
flags. First, the weight was 965 pounds—a little heavy for satel-
lite parts—and the BOL cited a dock-drop shipment. Real ship-
pers never package their freight so well. Remember, shipping
costs are determined by weight and preparing a shipment for
shipping is also a production cost. A lot of density is required
for a box this size to weigh 965 pounds. An overwrapped and
overpackaged box is a definite flag for contraband.
The barrel shipment shown in Figure 5.6 involved mis-
matched description and weight and a few of the other factors
cited above. A significant flag was the use of a caulk or sealant
on the lid. Such sealing of lids and seams of barrels, crates,
and other containers almost always indicates that a shipper
is trying to conceal the true identity of the declared contents.
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 show a contraband shipment trifecta
108 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Figure 5.5 Satellite parts that weigh far too much, are not transpar-
ent, and fit several other profiles including dock drop as documented
on the BOL. (Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s Interdiction: Company
Operation and Documentation presentation. With permission.)

Figure 5.6 Bundled drugs sealed in a barrel for shipment. Relevant

points were no transparency and a weight problem based on informa-
tion on BOL. (Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s Interdiction: Company
Operation and Documentation presentation. With permission.)
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 109

Figure 5.7 Auto parts shipper and consignee were named. Package
has black shrink-wrap and no transparency.

on the packaging side. Figure 5.7 shows the outside of the

wrapped package—a 3/4-inch home­made plywood crate cov-
ered in black shrink-wrap addressed to an auto repair shop.
The description on the BOL was “car parts.” Figure 5.8 shows
how the narcotics were individually wrapped and placed in a
container with caulking or sealant around the seams. This ship-
ment almost hit every profile point listed. This type of packag-
ing for a common product almost always contains contraband.
Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 show another contraband ship-
ment interdicted by awareness of the profiles listed above.
These wire reels were stuffed with marijuana bricks that skewed
the weight. The shipment also raised several other flags that
made employees and security management more than a
little curious. The washer shown in Figure 5.11 was loaded
with bricks of marijuana. The weight of the shipment was a
huge flag.
110 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Figure 5.8 Overpackaging in heavy homemade wooden crate.

(Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s Interdiction: Company Operation and
Documentation presentation. With permission.)

Weight of product and description are frequent contraband

flags. A BOL description of a product that would be cheaper
to buy at the destination is a clue. The cost of transporting the
heavily loaded washer in Figure 5.11 made the cost at desti-
nation way out of line. One incident involved a shipper that
listed contraband as lawn chairs. The weight was a mismatch.
The shipping cost made new lawn chairs far cheaper. See
Figure 5.12.
Packaging that is too good should be considered an excep-
tion. Dock workers tell me that they spend much more time
repackaging poorly packed legitimate cargo; they spend little
time repackaging perfectly crated and sealed shipments.
The shippers of the crate in Figure 5.13 wrote the address
with a black felt marker. The crate was designated for an auto
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 111

Figure 5.9 Drugs stuffed inside wire spindles. Weight issues and
lack of transparency are clues. (Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s
Interdiction: Company Operation and Documentation presentation.
With permission.)

body shop destination. Figure 5.14 shows the bundles of mari-

juana found inside the crate. All of the shipments we have
looked at came from southern terminals near the border—
another point of the profile.
Several photos show details of a package delivered to an
LTL company for shipment from California to Georgia. The
BOL described the freight as ice cream machines. Figure 5.14
depicts how the machines were delivered to the LTL Company.
Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 show the canisters and motor parts.
The methamphetamine bags (50 pounds) pulled from the can-
isters inside the ice cream machines are shown in Figure 5.17.
This shipment fit several of the profile points including a
dock-drop shipment, a prepaid credit card, and discrepancies
in the consignee name and address.
112 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Figure 5.10 Drugs stuffed inside wire spindles. Weight issues and
lack of transparency are clues. (Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s
Interdiction: Company Operation and Documentation presentation.
With permission.)

Handling Contraband
Now that you have a good indication of the profiles of con-
traband shipments, you must consider how you would handle
one when discovered. After teaching frontline dock employ-
ees the indicators of contraband shipments, you will quickly
start identifying suspicious packages. Freight companies have
a right to inspect any package accepted into their shipping
systems. Laws against search and seizure are very strict. This
is very important to understand so that contraband can be
confiscated and taken into police custody without eviden-
tiary problems.
Treatment of a suspicious shipment or package must be
done correctly in case the law enforcement agencies decide to
pursue reverse delivery options and prosecution. Certain rules
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 113

Figure 5.11 Drugs stuffed into top-­load washer. No transparency.

Washer heavier than normal weight. (Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s
Interdiction: Company Operation and Documentation presentation.
With permission.)

should be followed when a package appears suspicious. The

best progression would be first identifying a package through
paperwork, suspicion, viewing a shipment, and combining all
three factors. An employee who notes a suspicious package
should notify the local terminal manager so that all details can
be reviewed. If the suspicions remain, the employee should
immediately involve the security manager or person desig-
nated to review such circumstances.
Here is the “catch 22” relative to the legality of search and
seizure. If company personnel have suspicions and search the
package and find contraband, this is legal and when reported
to the authorities they now do not need a search warrant for
the package. If, while relying on your suspicions based on the
114 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Figure 5.12 Homemade wooden crate described to hold car parts;

consignee was automotive operation. (Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s
Interdiction: Company Operation and Documentation presentation.
With permission.)

Figure 5.13 Homemade wooden crate described to hold car parts;

consignee was automotive operation. (Source: Coughlin, J.J. SWTSC’s
Interdiction: Company Operation and Documentation presentation.
With permission.)
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 115

Figure 5.14 How ice cream machines were tendered to LTL transporter.

Figure 5.15 Black cylinder canister above is the search target.

aforementioned profile and related facts, you do not search the

package but instead notify law enforcement, the ball is now
in their court. If they direct you to search the package, this
makes you their agent in the eyes of the law and the subse-
quent finding of the contraband would be an illegal search
and seizure. Based on this information, you need to either
search based on your training and suspicions or report it to
the law enforcement agents and have them come to the dock
116 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Figure 5.16 Fifty pounds of methamphetamine were found inside

these two motor parts of an ice cream machine.

Figure 5.17 Bags of methamphetamine stuffed in ice cream machine

parts.
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 117

Figure 5.18 Drug-sniffing law enforcement dock helper and cargo buster.
to conduct their own investigation to determine if they have
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the package. Of
course, as part of their establishment of probable cause, they
could use the known drug shipment profiles listed above as
part of the justification.
Many law enforcement responders use drug dogs like the
one pictured in Figure 5.18 to find the probable cause needed
to open a package. After a suspicious package is brought to
the attention of management, it should be moved to a section
of the dock where it can be overseen but does not interfere
with operations. When the police arrive, they will take pos-
session of the shipment until a determination can be made. If
a shipment is contraband, the police will take possession of
the shipment, ask for related documents, and discuss with the
company the strategy and options available.
Often after identifying a contraband shipment, analyzing
shipper, consignee, and locations for pick-­up and delivery, you
may be able to identify past shipments that may be related
and identify receivers. If this information is shared with other
carriers, it can yield information on other shipments and drug
conspiracies. If law enforcement officials follow this path, the
118 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

security manager or designate should assist the officers to

obtain information through the company legal office, usually
by subpoena.
Drug traffickers use many different transportation compa-
nies but their methods are pretty consistent. Much information
is provided in freight documents and documents from multiple
shipments will be helpful to law enforcement. The SWTSC
partnered with the Drug Enforcement Agency and several of its
agents to ensure that member companies experiencing traf-
ficking problems have immediate contacts for referral. I have
taught interdiction classes to several groups of DEA personnel
in Houston and Dallas to help them understand the company
side of the equation. Especially in the southern border region,
company security managers should establish a relationship with
drug enforcement agents in the jurisdictions where their termi-
nals are located so that when the issues arise, they will already
have contacts and plans for handling suspicious packages.
Council members have had better responses using federal
level agents instead of locals in the southern border region.
If smugglers put contraband into your system and it moves,
federal agents have much broader jurisdiction and better capa-
bilities. The DEA office in Houston assigned Mark Walicki to
work with the council as part of its federal initiative. This rela-
tionship worked very well and led to successful major investi-
gations and conspiracy cases prosecuted by the DEA.
These situations can come to the attention of the compa-
nies or law enforcement in many ways. It is incumbent upon
both sides to work together to prevent the use of the commer-
cial shipping lanes from abuse by traffickers. Furthermore, the
inclusion of illicit materials in commercial systems puts legiti-
mate company employees unknowingly in harm’s way during
pick-­up, transit, or delivery.
The placing of contraband in commercial vehicle systems has
gone on since the invention of the wheel. Moving unacceptable
or illegal materials is commonplace. Smugglers will use extreme
methods to get their goods to their markets. Smuggling balloons
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 119

In my 10 years working for a transportation company,

I assisted law enforcement with several cases involving
drug smuggling. Most cases started when an employee
identified a suspicious package in transit and assisted
law enforcement with interdiction and reverse deliveries
before company policy changes made cooperating with
law enforcement difficult. One unique case involved a
customer of our freight airline in a border city in Texas.
The customer had an account with our airline and used
preprinted airway bills for normal shipments.
During an audit, the customer discovered 12 shipments
over a period of 8 months that were billed to its account
but did not match its shipping records. The terminal
manager met with company staff and reviewed the infor-
mation. He notified our security department and I was
assigned the investigation since it was in my region. I com-
piled all the paperwork on the phantom shipments. The
suspect had to be an employee because he or she used
the customer’s preprinted airway bills to place the ship-
ment into the system. Every shipment was entered into the
system via a scanner that was used on the dock and not
assigned to a particular employee. All the shipments were
in the 500-pound weight range, traveled to locations in
the midwest and noted as dock pick-­ups. There were no
records of a shipper or vehicle coming to the dock around
the scanning times of the phantom shipments. This was
one of the first hints of a contraband shipment.
I reviewed employee records for the dates of the ship-
ments and compared shipment dates to determine which
employees were present on all the days in question. This
lowered our pool of suspect employees to a manageable
number. During my deep background checks of poten-
tial employee suspects, a federal investigator contacted
me about some of the shipments. We were able compare
120 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

information about the internal suspects and share infor-

mation about the other shipments. Due to law enforce-
ment involvement, the employee was eventually identified
and indicted along with several other traffickers. The
company lost revenue on the 12 shipments and the inves-
tigation later revealed that the suspect employee was paid
by the traffickers to handle the shipments. This was my
only case involving both traffickers and an internal part-
ner. Their connection allowed the illicit shipments to be
easily entered into the system without normal scrutiny.
Many cases involved our LTL companies. In one inci-
dent, I was notified by law enforcement officers that they
observed one of our trucks pick up a shipment (pallet) at
a location under surveillance for drug trafficking in South
Texas. They were able to provide license plate num-
bers on the truck and trailer and a time and location of
pick-­up. Note that law enforcement information utilized
license plate information instead of unit trailer or tractor
numbers as discussed earlier. Based on this information, I
identified the shipment in question, the shipper, and other
pertinent information. The shipment picked up by my
company and observed by law enforcement was already
en route to our Dallas break bulk facility. I notified law
enforcement of the scheduled arrival time of the shipment
and officers went to the Dallas dock to inspect the package.
As they waited for the shipment to arrive, I continued my
search and found several other shipments that the ship-
per placed in our system previously that were probably
going to be of interest to the police. When the shipment
arrived, law enforcement inspected it and obtained a
search warrant to open the package. They found hun-
dreds of pounds of marijuana. They took control of the
shipment and continued their investigation. The shipment
data from our company assisted the law enforcement
 Law Enforcement Responses ◾ 121

investigation. When I sought shipment information relat-

ing to use of a pick-­up location by other LTL companies
based on an SWTSC inquiry, law enforcement was able to
identify many previous illicit shipments and the informa-
tion helped them pursue a conspiracy and organized drug
investigation involving many parties.

of heroin in the anal cavity or swallowing them to get through

inspections is not new. This activity will go on long after this
writing and those who test the systems will continue to try to
find better, less detectable ways to move contraband.
The profiles we discussed earlier have been consistent in
the transportation industry for years and they seldom change.
We have seen a move to harder-­to-­trace prepaid phones, pre-
paid credit card payments, and other technology that assists
traffickers in protecting their true identities. The ability to
use the Internet to trace shipments is a boon to those who
want to follow their illicit booty from point to point. We
know that as drugs move north and pass the Border Patrol
checkpoints, they gain value. The profiles listed earlier in
this chapter represent information every supply chain opera-
tor and every law officer who deals in contraband activities
should know.
Parties that try to move contraband in commercial vehicles
continue to meet the profiles discussed above. If terrorists
want to use commercial vehicles to transport weapons of
mass destruction or their components, the same profiles will
come into play. They prepare their packages without transpar-
ency, falsify the contents descriptions, overwrap packages,
track packages frequently until they arrive, and use prepaid
phone and credit cards. The techniques work for any and all
contraband. The biggest problem arises because the packages
originate in many places. For that reason, the profile informa-
tion needs to reach everyone who needs to know. In a com-
mercial entity, every person from top to bottom, from CEO to
122 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

cleaning crew, should be aware of suspicious items or activi-

ties. Security and awareness must be included in a company’s
overall culture to achieve the best and most efficient results.

Conclusion
The training developed by members of the SWTSC has been
taught to many law enforcement officers over the years. The
classes are not designed to teach the police how to investigate.
They are designed to inform police about the industry and the
work of the industry councils. After working in law enforce-
ment and in the cargo industry, I realize the important role
industry paperwork plays in law enforcement investigations,
especially in smuggling cases. It is vital to provide industry
overviews to law enforcement officers so that are aware of
the sources and resources available to them. The SWTSC even
sends law enforcement officers to other cargo training schools
and conferences via scholarships and funding. This builds the
public–private partnership in a very solid way. Now that we
have talked about law enforcement training, we can focus on
best practices in the industry.
Chapter 6

Prevention and Awareness

Introduction
After looking at the many risks, threats, and obstacles which
can be found in the supply chain, we need to look at the
many ways we can use prevention, technology, and awareness
to build an efficient and effective system for each business unit
to have the best chance to succeed against the known and the
unexpected. The U. S. Government released the first informa-
tion on a national strategy for global supply chain security on
January 23, 2012. In this strategy, the government wrote about
undertaking a number of efforts to strengthen the global sup-
ply chain including legislative requirements (regulation) and
a number of strategic efforts with a specific security focus,
where they footnoted fourteen different laws and acts which
have been passed since 2002. Although I believe it is benefi-
cial to have a strategic government program, this macro vision
of the plans leaves most of us who work in the industry want-
ing more information concerning the operational grassroots
working on the implementation. In looking at the govern-
ment’s “path forward” bullet points, as part of their aligning
federal activities, I would suggest they consider sponsoring
or participating in cargo theft task forces, assisting the set-up

123
124 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

and financing of such task forces in those parts of the coun-

try where the volume of cargo crime justifies the investment.
I believe that if the government worked at the grassroots level
from the domestic side out, they would understand risk and
threats better than ever, which goes to the second point of
refining their understanding of threats and risks associated
with the supply chain. I believe that they should also closely
look at the national strategy proposed by the National Cargo
Theft Task Force (NCTTF) and incorporate some of those
proposals into their plan. The NCTTF plan seeks many things
which would work in concert with the government’s plan and
provide a more direct support to the industry from an opera-
tional level.
The NCTTF strategy calls for the government to define its
role and responsibilities for federal agencies’ involvement in
cargo theft investigation, intelligence gathering, interagency
cooperation, resources for state and local agency participation,
and intergovernmental agency data sharing. The plan would
connect existing cargo theft task forces and develop others in
key regions where they are needed. Most importantly, in my
estimation, the plan calls for enhanced information sharing
and intelligence collection. This information share needs to
include industry and public information and not be restricted
to a law enforcement or government secret network. There
can be tiers to protect law enforcement’s sensitive information,
but the systems need to share information effectively to get it
to persons who need to know.
The NCTTF also proposes that the need for funding be
directed to the task forces to pay for equipment and overtime
while asking for the laws to be enhanced for cargo crime pun-
ishment. Both plans call for threat assessments and the NCTTF
would like cargo theft to be a part of the assessment beyond
the government plan, which was more related to intentional
attacks, accidents, and natural disasters.
If these two strategies were combined and unnecessary reg-
ulation and redundancy were eliminated along with a robust
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 125

industry partnership, the program would be a huge benefit

for all parties. Federal law enforcement has had a very small
role in cargo theft investigation for quite some time, and it
would be good to see them engage on a much higher level in
a crime that so often involves interstate activity and organized
criminal enterprises.

Prevention: The Best policy

The reality is that prevention and awareness start with each and
every individual company or participant in the supply chain. I
tell industry people all of the time that it is best not to count
on any government agency for anything. The police are not
your recovery plan, and the government’s National Strategy of
Global Supply Chain Security is not your prevention or opera-
tion plan. Each company should set its own standards of
prevention, awareness, security, and safety. No one knows
your company needs or operation better than you do. I would
much rather set a policy based on my operational needs than
on some government mandate. Many government mandates
come to fruition though because companies choose to over-
look a true need. To have a security prevention program,
guidelines must be set for every part of the business where
security considerations should be a part of the operation. This
would include:

◾◾ Human Resources
−− Training and Orientation
◾◾ Business Partner Requirements/Vendor Management
◾◾ Facility Security
◾◾ Procedural Security
◾◾ In-Transit Security
◾◾ Brokerage (if applicable)
◾◾ IT Security
◾◾ Legal Best Practices
126 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

All of these may not apply to each and everyone’s busi-

ness or operation, but each one that is part of your opera-
tion should be addressed. We will look at each of these areas
when we discuss the best practices a bit later in the chapter.
There are discussions to be had on each and case examples,
which will show the reasoning for these guidelines or regula-
tions to be put in writing and made a formal part of the com-
pany process. Many companies have the best of intentions,
but fail to lay out specific written plans for each part of their
operations. I see this lacking in many areas of security. Ask a
company for its written security plan and recovery plan and
watch for the very empty look. I would not hire or deal with a
company that does not have a designated security manager or,
preferably, a team or that does not have a written security plan
and security training and awareness as part of employee ori-
entation. If you find a company with these in place, you will
probably not have many issues or conflicts and if you do, you
will be able to deal with someone who actually can resolve
your problem. I have had many people tell me that security
is a cash burn and not a revenue generator. Not true. If done
correctly, what you spend on security will pay off in multiples.
Not all security solutions cost money; many are just processes,
procedures, and efforts. It is the small things which many
times count. Crossing the T’s and dotting the I’s go a long
way in the security world. Understanding the risks and threats
and setting policy to protect the operation gives you the best
chance to succeed.

First Annual Texas Cargo Summit

During the final two days, I had the privilege of attending
the First Annual Texas Cargo Summit. This summit was put
together by the Southwest Transportation Security Council,
Hewlett Packard, the National Insurance Crime Bureau, and
the Texas Department of Public Safety. Being part of the
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 127

coordination of this summit and assisting with getting this pro-

gram together was a lot of work, yet much fun. This was our
first effort in Texas to provide industry and law enforcement
a two-day venue for training specific to the cargo theft issue.
The presenters included both law enforcement officers and
industry practitioners. The majority of the presentations spoke
to the points of prevention.
The first training session concerned the Southern border.
Most industry operators do not understand the problems and
issues of operating near the border. It has its own dynamic
and creates a curiosity for those who are in the industry, but
who do not live or work in that environment. When we look
at cargo stats, we see that the border areas are not major prob-
lems. There is no issue of major cargo theft occurring in the
United States and the cargo going to Mexico. The issue for the
industry has always been the loss of equipment, tractors and
trailers, and those pieces going south never to be seen again.
The theft of supply chain and heavy equipment that is then
taken into Mexico is a problem. The Texas Department of
Public Safety and border departments work with Mexico’s law
enforcement to try to repatriate stolen units back to the United
States. The drug cartels are much more involved in moving
drugs and people illegally north than being involved in theft
in the United States going back into Mexico. There is plenty
of cargo theft in Mexico but, so far, cross-border theft has not
been a major issue. This presentation put some myths to rest
and reinforced the fact that cross-border cargo theft is cur-
rently not a major issue, unlike the equipment theft.
Being from Texas and working here throughout my differ-
ent careers, I am asked about the border quite often. Moving
freight across the border has its ingrained processes involving
custom brokers and U.S. entry. Many people just want to
understand those things. There are border ports of entry, and
there are internal border patrol check points. Each has differ­
ent responsibilities and is operated by different federal law
128 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

enforcement agencies and mean different things to freight

companies. We will look to address different issues and have
different presenters discuss these issues in the future.
The second presentation came from CargoNet, a Verisk
Analytics Company which in 2009, through ISO and the
National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB), collaborated to cre-
ate a national information-sharing system to combat cargo
theft. They designed a system that enables more efficient,
accurate, and timely sharing of cargo theft information among
theft victims, their insurers, and law enforcement.
CargoNet established a nationally coordinated data-sharing
system which takes into account the needs of insurers, law
enforcement, transportation companies, manufacturers, retail-
ers, and their many agents and service providers. The core of
the network is a new database called CargoNet. The program
focuses on aggregating and sharing information and intelli-
gence from multiple task forces, other police agencies, and the
industry. CargoNet uses case management and analytic func-
tions that will enhance the effectiveness of cargo theft task
forces and law enforcement. The network will also encompass
training and investigative support for law enforcement, as well
as theft prevention services and analytics. The presenters were
Keith Lewis of CargoNet and Fred Lohmann of the National
Insurance Crime Bureau. They spoke of the aforementioned
collaboration and gave insight into the system and how its
database and information could be very informative and help-
ful in cargo theft and cargo fraud cases. Any law enforcement
agent or officer can gain access for free, and tapping into this
intelligence source will be very helpful when conduct-
ing investigations.
The third presenter was Detective Ivy Haley from the
Fort Worth Police Department, who is assigned to commer-
cial vehicle theft in the Auto Theft Unit. Ivy has been a very
good partner to the council and the industry and she works
diligently on cargo and industry investigations. During her
presentation, she discussed several successful arrests and
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 129

investigations. She also spoke to the many frustrations that

come when companies don’t have the best practices. She
made several points to industry where they could improve
themselves. Once police investigators have been around the
industry and have become involved with the councils and
attend the training events, they get a pretty good handle on
the basics. They truly understand how to investigate the cargo
side and realize what paperwork and information to look
for. They know to look for cameras at the victim company
or nearby to try to catch a glimpse of the act and they know,
based on the same factors we talked about earlier, which set
of suspects they may be looking for. Beyond that, not having
actually worked internally within the industry, they really do
not exactly know what companies do or don’t do when it
comes to security. All companies are not the same and based
on their specific operation, do things very differently. Most
large well-established companies have pretty robust security
operations and management teams. These security profession-
als work diligently to protect their company’s assets. They are

I was attending a Miami–Dade Police TOMCATS Cargo

Theft School in Miami in 2007 and one of the presenters
was a former member of their task force. During his pre-
sentation, he blurted out that companies “do not know
sh—!” This was not very professional and, in reality,
was coming from someone who had never worked for a
company, someone totally without knowledge. It is easy
to point fingers and give advice when you do not have to
factor in practicality and cost. Since I worked on both
sides of the fence, I have a better understanding of what
the police can do and what the companies can do and
both make pretty good efforts the majority of the times.
We really need to work at having a good public/private
partnership, which is what industry councils and infor-
mation sharing are all about.
130 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

able to adjust to the changing threats in the industry. Some

smaller companies are not able to accomplish as much.
The next presenter, John Tabor of National Retail Systems,
gave a presentation about their security program and opera-
tion. Where Ivy had pointed out some deficiencies of com-
panies in her talk, John showed how a company can be in
control of its entire operation using a yard management sys-
tem integrated into the overall security plan. John is a very
entertaining speaker and his presentation represented how
National Retail Systems as a company deals with issues. John
is very involved in the industry councils and cargo theft law
enforcement circles. He is on the board of the National Cargo
Theft Task Force and is a supporter of these types of events.
His presentation explained how companies accomplish an effi-
cient security program when they put in the effort and it was
a counterpunch to Ivy’s presentation, not in a negative way,
but showing the different ways in how things can be done.
After watching the two presentations, the point you would
probably get is that the companies that make the better effort
need the police much less often than those that don’t. John’s
presentation makes the point of this chapter which is about
the need for prevention and how security prevention saves
time and money in the long run. National Retail Systems has
had security issues in the past; after having those challenges, it
made the adjustments to its security operation to prevent fur-
ther problems. John’s presentation stressed prevention, smart
security, and follow through.
The second day of the conference started with a program
from the Texas Department of Public Safety. The presentation,
conducted by Lt. Randy Stewart, dealt with a specific group of
Cubans who had drifted to Texas and started a small splinter
cargo theft crew in Hunt County. This is indicative of what we
were identifying from the cargo theft stats in Texas. Four or
five years ago, we were seeing the organized in-transit thefts
and finding all of the empty and abandoned equipment in
Florida or Georgia. This group in Texas was working from this
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 131

area and not going back to Florida with each theft. There are
splinter groups like these in New Jersey, Kentucky, Texas, and
other places which are being identified bit by bit from the data
analysis. In this case, the Texas Department of Public Safety
District One investigators were able to obtain over a dozen
indictments for group members and eventually shut down
their Texas splinter operation. The presentation tied together
the local pieces and showed the independence of the crew
from the Florida influence. It is too early to tell, but these
cargo criminals may not like the sentences they receive from
some of these rural county juries. If they are going to splinter
out, they may want to hang in the large, metropolitan coun-
ties where property crime justice is routinely overlooked. This
is a fairly new phenomenon which investigators around the
country may want to start checking. Remember: the location
of the empties is going to be one of the first best indicators of
a splinter group operation.
The next presentation was conducted by two local National
Insurance Crime Bureau agents, Jerry Allen and Stacy
Hohenberger. They laid out the grassroots view of the NICB
cargo theft program. Both agents are sworn officers embedded
in law enforcement units with cargo theft and insurance fraud
as their main responsibilities. They are a major part of the
information sharing and law enforcement intelligence locally.
They provide assistance to law enforcement and work for
NICB member companies. Their presentation laid out an over-
view of the cargo theft problem and the assistance they are
able to give. They also discussed the CargoNet product and
capabilities since NICB is a part of the collaboration with ISO
for CargoNet. No company or entity has made a bigger push
into the cargo theft arena than NICB has in the past several
years. They are in position and very willing to help in cargo
theft investigations and the coordination of law enforcement
and industry efforts.
Following NICB was Shawn Driscoll, director of security
for Swift Transportation. He presented an overview of the
132 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Swift Security Department, explaining how it operates and the

impact it has had on the company issues. During his presen-
tation, he explained how Swift experienced thirty-five (35)
full trailer load thefts in 1997. The company started a security
focus in response to those incidents and, within a few years,
had reduced the losses to a small number. Swift purchased
another carrier that had not been using best practices in hiring
and other areas, and the first year after the merger Swift found
itself with twenty-two major thefts. Using the same security
focus and best practices on the new carrier, within a few years,
Swift had the full trailer load losses back down to one for year
2011. His presentation demonstrated a security department
which applied best practices from the hiring process on. Swift
has a system of tracking its equipment and loads and takes
great pride in controlling both drivers and the fleet. His pre-
sentation was a testament to prevention and best practices,
again showing how you can make a direct effect on your com-
pany’s bottom line through process and procedure.
After lunch, Scott Cornell, head of Travelers Insurance
Special Investigative Group (SIG) which works Cargo Theft
investigations for its customers, came to the podium. Travelers
has been in the cargo theft arena for many years and has par-
ticipated at all levels and across the country in the information
sharing and education. Travelers has a large team of investiga-
tors across the country that can conduct insurance investiga-
tions and assist industry and law enforcement. Travelers has
many additional capabilities including a forensic evidence
lab and other analytical tools which it offers for investigative
assistance. The company also works closely with the National
Insurance Crime Bureau in supporting covert investigative
tools for cargo theft task forces and investigators.
In many cargo cases, there are many people with skin in
the game. You have the shipper, the carriers, insurers, and the
consignee. Each of these parties may have different insurance
representatives. One cargo case could bring many different
groups into the investigation on the private side, not counting
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 133

the public responders. Much of what these conferences accom-

plish is to unite those resources to work together, to know
each other and to understand the capabilities of each distinct
group. This knowledge and understanding allow many cases
to enter into several intelligence systems and work across
industry and law enforcement to provide the best chance
for recovery if your processes do fail. Even a few short years
ago, this collaboration was not nearly as strong as it is now. It
still has room to grow, but it has been fun watching it come
together over time and having successes more and more often.
Next I did a presentation looking at the 2010 and 2011
Supply Chain-Information Sharing and Analysis Center Cargo
Theft charts. We looked at those charts and walked the audi-
ence through the analysis, even being able to refer to previ-
ous charts and information. I do this type of presentation for
many different audiences throughout the year and, depending
on the group, I stress different things. The fact that this group
was composed of about sixty percent law enforcement, most
of whom had not been involved in this issue, allowed me to
walk them through the charts and analysis and explain to the
audience what they mean. The charts reveal the most prolific
cargo theft states, the types of locations that host the most
thefts, the days of the week cargo criminals prefer to strike,
and the items or commodities they target. Like the old board
game, Clue, it gives you “Mr. Mustard in the kitchen with a
knife” scenario. When you look at the South Florida organized
gangs, the key to the cargo theft analysis starts with the com-
modity. The target is always the product in the truck, followed
by where it is first left unattended, and it really doesn’t mat-
ter whether that is a truck stop, carrier facility, secured yard,
or street. The involved state will be within the first need to
stop for the driver of the load. So in “Clue” game jargon you
could say, “Mr. S. Floridian in the truck stop with a load of
electronics using his ignition puller” or “Mr. Armenian with a
load of meat using identity theft.” This may sound elementary,
but in many cases, it is very true. We also discussed different
134 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

methods of operation out there currently and how that meth-

odology has changed during the last five years.
A key to understanding the identity of the possible suspects
is the location where the empty equipment trailer is recovered.
This has allowed us to see changing of tractors right after the
crime, painting over trailers, and identifying splinter groups
operating in locations other than Florida. The charts are not
just numbers; they usually tell us a story and allow us to see
those small deviations that give us a better chance to recover
and prevent.
The next presenters were from Hewlett Packard, the confer-
ence location host. Their presentation, led by Bob Gammon
and Kevin Mazza, provided great information about what HP
could do for law enforcement investigators. This is not only
important information from one shipper, it also relays informa-
tion about what could be expected from like organizations.
When property is recovered, law enforcement needs to know
what information its agents need to provide to a manufacturer
or shipper if they expect to track that property to the correct
owner or complainant. It was a short presentation but con-
tained very valuable information.
So, after looking at this two-day program, you see many
variables, but also good information and networking. Many
industries and law enforcement agencies will join the industry
council or SC-ISAC, and start getting the BOLO/Alerts and/or
weekly bulletins which will bring awareness to the issue.
Nothing but good can come from this type of conference,
and we plan on putting one together for next year. This entire
event was about awareness and prevention and building our
law enforcement networks.
Several years ago I put together a best practices document
for the Southwest Transportation Security Council. It took into
account most of the information we have discussed so far in
this book and also looked at legal points based on the addi-
tions provided by Mr. Steve Lewis of Dallas, our Council’s legal
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 135

advisor and transportation attorney. The best practices docu-

ment was a bullet point list with the aforementioned categories
we looked at earlier. Let’s take those points and expound on
each as we relate them to the information we have discussed
thus far.
The first section of the SWTSC Best Supply Chain Security
Practices starts with personnel security.

Personnel Security
Companies of all transportation modes should:

◾◾ Conduct pre-employment background investigation

to include criminal history, social security validation,
employment history, and drug screens. (Make sure you
use quality background checks that are FCRA compliant
and not just database checks.)
◾◾ Periodically check current employees for criminal history,
driver’s license status and random or suspicious behavior
drug screens.
◾◾ Maintain a current permanent employee list, which
includes the name, date of birth, social security number,
and position held.
◾◾ Have procedures in place to remove company identi-
fication and facility and system access for terminated
employees.
◾◾ Have an employee identification system in place for posi-
tive identification and access control purposes. Employees
should only be given access to those secure areas needed
for the performance of their duties. Company manage-
ment needs to adequately control the issuance of identifi-
cation badges.
◾◾ Procedures must be in place to identify, challenge, and
address unauthorized/unidentified persons who enter the
property.
136 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

◾◾ Provide employee orientation that includes security

awareness and loss prevention initiatives.
◾◾ Establish a company reward and tip hotline to provide
employees and others with incentives and venues in
which to report security or policy related violations
(J. Coughlin 2010).

This is true for just about any company in any industry,

but it is especially important in the supply chain for service
providers. In my career conducting investigations and now
assisting companies with their security, one of the big issues I
see is hiring employees with criminal pasts. It would be real
nice if we could all sing “Kumbayah” and give people second
chances in our industry, but it does not seem to work out.
Companies I worked for had hiring guidelines and did back-
ground screenings, but quite often when I was doing internal
investigations, I would find that the suspected employee did,
in fact, have a history that should have prevented his employ-
ment. On several occasions that missed background was a
major factor in pointing out the suspect or solidifying the
evidence. If you are going to entrust a driver with thousands
of dollars worth of high value freight, you best be able to trust
him. Here is another quote for which I can’t give proper credit
to the originator, but it is very true and seldom wrong: ”The
best indicator of future behavior is the past.”
Due to the way that public background searches work
and the information they rely upon being only official con-
victions, it leaves most of those services in the lurch. If you
are involved in doing a company investigation and the police
become involved, have them run a background screening
through their law enforcement system because they can get
information of past arrests and other details not based on con-
victions. I tell people all of the time that in Texas you could
probably have quite a few arrests for theft offenses and never
have a conviction due to the system of using non-adjudicated
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 137

probations and other courthouse stalls, especially in the large

metropolitan counties. This has been such a problem that it
made me seek a way to design a background screening pro-
gram for Transportation. I worked with another former police
officer, Kevin Heath, who has a company, C-Net Technologies,
which does background screening and vendor management.
We put together a very comprehensive background screening
program for these people that enables screenings to find the
data you are seeking because it focuses on the county level
with actual physical checks of those records.
Bad or unsuitable drivers are a cause for many problems
and proper screening is important. In almost every case where
I worked a theft-related investigation involving an employee,
either through my own searching or through the involved
law enforcement agency, we were able to find history which
confirmed the behavior of the suspect being investigated. Do
not be fooled by cheap database checks, they do not protect
you and are not worth the money you think you are saving.
One bad employee can cost you a large amount of money.
We were recently contacted by a SWTSC company that had
an employee who stole more than $250K, including fuel,
vehicle parts, and client freight. When the employee involve-
ment came to light, law enforcement agents discovered he
had numerous felony convictions, which the company’s back-
ground screening program had not revealed. That company
could have done a lot of good backgrounds with that $250K.
Instead it was out that money because management wanted to
save a few bucks and used an incomplete, unproven service.
Proper background screening may cost more upfront, but it
will save a bunch down the line.
The other main factor that ensures personnel security is
training and orientation. A company culture of safety and
security should be promoted from the very start. Discuss
company security expectations as part of the orientation so
employees know it is a prerogative.
138 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Facility Physical Security

Companies should have:

◾◾ Access controls to prevent unauthorized entry to facilities,

maintain control of employees and visitors and protect
company assets. Access controls must include the positive
identification of all employees, visitors, and vendors at all
points of entry.
◾◾ Visitors must present photo identification for documenta-
tion purposes upon arrival. All visitors should be escorted
and visibly display temporary identification.
◾◾ Proper vendor ID and/or photo identification must be
presented for documentation purposes upon arrival by all
vendors. Arriving packages and mail should be periodi-
cally screened before being disseminated.
◾◾ A search policy making all persons and vehicles entering
or leaving company facilities subject to search with signs
posted with such language at all major points of access
and egress.
◾◾ All fencing must be regularly inspected for integrity and
damage. The fencing should be of adequate material to
form a physical barrier barring easy entry or access.
◾◾ No Trespass signs posted on perimeter of facility and
fences to enforce laws as applicable to local and state
statutes.
◾◾ Facilities with alarm protection including redundant wire-
less verified alarm system back-up if location stores high
value goods to monitor premises and prevent unauthor-
ized access to cargo handling and storage areas.
◾◾ Segregated high value secure storage areas if location
stores high value goods or controlled substances.
◾◾ Adequate lighting must be provided inside and outside
the facility including the following areas: entrances and
exits, cargo handling, storage areas, fence lines, and park-
ing areas.
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 139

◾◾ All external and internal windows, gates and fences must

be secured with locking devices. Management or security
personnel must control the issuance of all locks and keys,
to include the locks and keys for tractors. When parked in
the yard, doors to tractors and trailers should be closed.
◾◾ Private passenger vehicles must be prohibited from park-
ing in close proximity to the storage areas for tractors and
trailers and should be segregated by fencing if possible.
◾◾ Gates through which all vehicles and/or personnel enter
or exit should be manned and/or monitored. The number
of gates should be kept to the minimum necessary for
proper access and safety.
◾◾ Any vehicle entering the yard should have license plate,
model and driver’s information recorded. (J. Coughlin 2010)

Controlling the premises where you conduct business is

paramount to security and control. The listed facility recom-
mendations are for large metropolitan business units and each
bullet point should be reviewed for each separate unit and
those which are applicable to that unit’s operation should be
put in place. Probably the most important recommendation for
each location is the need for good lighting. Criminals do not
like well-lit yards and areas. So, no matter the size of the facil-
ity or yard, make the lighting your first consideration because
it is an extremely effective deterrent. There are also very good
products to consider in this section of your security plan. If
you are experiencing security breaches from external sources
through fencing, add an electric fence to that yard and the
problem will be resolved. When I was working in the industry
and had facilities in five states, I added an electric fence to the
ones where I had multiple break-ins or fence cuttings leading
to trailer shopping and theft of propane tanks or other items
and brought those activities to a complete halt. I recommend a
product such as Electric Guard Dog because it is inexpensive,
attaches to the current fence, and is easy to look at while being
wonderfully effective. The other technology I recommend is a
140 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

verified video alarm system such as Videofied. This is a stand-

alone system. It is not integrated into the main alarm and con-
trol panel and will protect your business from the high value
business burglars who beat your alarm using the differ­ent
techniques we talked about earlier. If the burglar does manage
to beat your alarm, this technology will catch him and send
a verifying video of the intruder to the police. This will cause
them to respond, especially if they have already quit respond-
ing because they believe the alarm is dysfunctional.
If you have to use a guard service to protect your facility or
property, be sure to vet them properly and do not hire based
only on the cost factor. Never sign the guard company’s gen-
eral contract. Have a guard company representative sign your
contract prepared with the services and requirements you
set out. Also prepare the guard post orders with the services
you want performed and the information you require them to
capture. One of the biggest problems with contracted guards,
is their under use and general lack of expectations. You pay
good money for their services so make the contracted guards
a part of the team. If you give them responsibilities, it actu-
ally makes them feel like more of a member of the operation
and they can become a contributing force instead of a non-­
contributing placeholder.

Business Partner Requirements

Companies you partner with should:

◾◾ Have written and verifiable processes for the screening of

business partners including carrier’s agents, subcontracted
highway carriers, and service providers as well as screen-
ing procedures for new customers, beyond financial
soundness issues to include security indicators, such as
business references and professional associations.
◾◾ Have mutual written security standards equivalent to your
own company requirements and guidelines which can
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 141

be contractually enforced (security contract addendums

available).
◾◾ As highway carriers have the ultimate responsibility for all
cargo loaded aboard their trailer or conveyance, they must
communicate the importance of supply chain security.
◾◾ Have a security contact/group responsible for the written
security processes.
◾◾ Report all major losses or thefts to your company
immediately.
◾◾ Partner with you during the recovery of a loss.
◾◾ Conduct loss reviews and corrective action plans on all
major losses.
◾◾ Allow your company to audit all phases of the contractual
agreement.
◾◾ Participate in regional industry councils and industry-wide
information sharing programs. (J. Coughlin 2010)

Proper relationships between partners are often overlooked

and not controlled as closely as they should be. One of the big
problems in relationships between shippers and carriers is that
they are immediately put at odds by the carrier claims process,
especially if the claims amount has the potential to be greater
if the carrier was negligent or had some fault in the loss. This
wedge between companies sometimes makes it harder for
them to work together when there is a major issue.
When a major loss occurs, it is of tantamount importance
to have all parties on deck reach into their bags of contacts
and resources to work together to make the best effort at
recovery. By holding a loss from the shipper while the carrier
tries to determine the circumstances and make the recovery,
the whole recovery process and effort is hampered. Be true
partners when the chips are down, and you will have a much
better relationship and working partnership every time.
As far as vendors who come on your property to conduct
business are concerned, have a vendor management system
in place to vet them and their employees to your guidelines
142 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

and standards and place them in an audit process to make

sure they remain contractually fit. I have seen a multitude of
problems result from undervetted vendor companies wherein
their employees gain access to your business areas, but do
not match your company’s business security and hiring quali-
fications. It is important to have a standardized partnership
requirement across the entire company so that one termi-
nal is not doing it one way and another is doing it another.
Company partnerships are crucial to the success of the com-
pany and should be entered into with viable relationships
and expectations.

Procedural Security
Companies should have:

◾◾ Security measures in place to ensure the integrity and

security of processes relevant to the transportation,
handling, and storage of cargo in the supply chain to
prevent, detect, or deter un-manifested material from
gaining access onto the commercial conveyance.
◾◾ Procedures in place that document the movement, han-
dling, and storage of cargo in the supply chain.
◾◾ A manifesting system in place which will ensure the
integrity of the cargo and be accurate, timely and able
to be archived.
◾◾ A manifesting system which accurately described,
weighed, labeled, marked, counted, and verified each
shipment. Departing cargo should be checked against
purchase or delivery orders. Drivers involved in the deliv-
ering, receiving, or handling of cargo must be positively
identified during the shipment process.
◾◾ All shortages, overages, and other significant discrepan-
cies or anomalies must be resolved and/or investigated
appropriately. The appropriate law enforcement agencies
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 143

should be notified if illegal or suspicious activities are

detected.
◾◾ Cargo properly marked and manifested to include accu-
rate weight and piece count.
◾◾ A process in place where all vehicle identification infor-
mation (unit numbers, license plate and state and VIN)
of the involved carriers equipment is recorded and easily
accessible when needed.
◾◾ A documented theft recovery plan. (J. Coughlin 2010)

All of the above is pretty normal for most transportation and

logistics companies with the exception of a written theft recov-
ery plan. If a company has a security manager or group, the
theft recovery plan is usually to call security. The plan needs
to be much more specific and include the ability to immedi-
ately provide law enforcement officers with the information
to make their police reports. They will need the license plate
numbers and VIN numbers of the involved vehicle/equipment.
They will need a good description of the involved cargo and
the ability to quickly obtain any related serial numbers. They
will need pertinent driver information in case the driver is not
available. Remember, the opportunity to recover the cargo is
about a sixteen-hour window in the best case scenario. Any
delay in getting this information into the hands of law enforce-
ment reduces the chances of recovery. You also must have the
ability to get a BOLO/Alert out through the industry sources
as quickly as possible. Not having or doing the above will
impede your chances of recovery every time. Be prepared.
Know who you are going to call and what you need as soon
as you get the bad news. At the Southwest Transportation
Security Council we have a Cargo Theft Reporting Template.
If we receive the information in this format, we can send it to
our contacts, including state police agencies near the offense
location and that information will be sent to the road vehicles
in short order. Here is the template the SWTSC uses:
144 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

CARGO THEFT REPORT

Stolen Trailer: Give trailer description (make and
model) including color and markings:
License Plate number and State:
VIN Number:
Tractor:
Give Tractor make and model description including
color and markings
License number and State:
VIN Number
Stolen from:
Give location including address, city, and state
Date and Time:
Give date and time of incident or range of dates and
times
Stolen Cargo:
Describe missing freight
Commodity/Amount/Description
Police report number and Agency:
Give police agency taking report or handling the
incident
Police Contact Info:
Give agency contact information to include any offi-
cer names and phone number
Reporting Person:
If different from police/company reporting person
Reporting Person contact information:
Reporting Person’s phone number/email address
Further info:
Give brief narrative of how incident occurred
Source: J. Coughlin, 2009.
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 145

In-Transit Security
Companies should:

◾◾ Have security measures for the company assets, freight,

and drivers during in-transit moves.
◾◾ Have drivers perform a documented equipment checklist
and inspection of unit prior to departure including docu-
mentation of seal number and verification of being prop-
erly applied.
◾◾ Processes in place to monitor the movement of the com-
pany units in-transit and have the ability to communicate
with the drivers at all time.
◾◾ Perform a documented, periodic, and unannounced veri-
fication process to ensure the logs are maintained and
company tracking and monitoring procedures are being
followed and enforced.
◾◾ Have seal verification processes in place at all locations
to check departing and arriving trailers. All empty trailers
being removed from a location should have the inside of
the trailer physically checked to prevent the removal of
unauthorized property from that location.
◾◾ Have a process in place for the discovery of a broken
seal during the in-transit move and its documentation as
to when discovered, how it was broken, and to whom it
was reported.
◾◾ Use satellite tracking technology on the tractor and trailer
equipment and use covert cargo tracking in the freight if
load has a high value and is a known targeted commodity
of organized cargo thieves.
◾◾ Provide drivers with locks and immobilization devices.
◾◾ Plan routes to avoid high crime areas and known problem
truck stops and drop areas.
◾◾ Provide drivers with security awareness training to
include information on what steps they should take if
146 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

they believe they are being followed especially if they

have come from an origin of a high value shipper’s location.
◾◾ Have a recovery plan in place in the case of any reported
loss.

Drivers should:

◾◾ Start with full fuel tanks from origin pick up.

◾◾ Have the DOT hours to complete the pull or to travel for
a long period before having to stop.
◾◾ Avoid unnecessary stops.
◾◾ Always keep equipment locked and use immobilization
devices when leaving the equipment unattended.
◾◾ Only stop in well-lighted, secure areas.
◾◾ Never leave the loaded rig or trailer unattended in an
unsecured location.
◾◾ Always notify dispatch or employer of route change due
to weather or other problems.
◾◾ When doing LTL pick-up and delivery, use high quality
locks on the doors at all times, especially when having to
leave the units unattended. (J. Coughlin 2010)

For shippers and carriers, this section is very pertinent so

we will discuss it at length. The hardest part of this policy is
getting the driver or drivers to follow all of your guidelines
or regulations. Drivers tend to become the kings of their own
worlds once they take to the road. It is important to impress
on them the importance of taking care of this high value load.
It is very important for the drivers to follow the guidelines and
not deviate from the security plan. Most importantly, drivers
must understand the risks and the methods that thieves will
use to take the rig and load from them. Making them aware is
the most important part of this section. The drivers have no
chance of recognizing a problem or understanding the risk if
they are not made aware of the risk inherent with the high
value load and the methods of operation used by organized
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 147

cargo criminals. Drivers should be given a driver awareness

warning sheet containing information that will remind them of
their responsibilities, explain what they should be on the look-
out for and providing a number to respond to should they
have a problem. The drivers should be given a driver warning
sheet and be briefed on the issue during the pick-up process
at origin. On the next page is a Driver Warning Sheet template
that I have provided to customers and colleagues.
Giving the driver or drivers this sheet during a briefing
puts them on notice that this load is high value and has been
a target of organized criminals in the past. It gives drivers a
way to respond should they see something suspicious and it
also reinforces the high value handling procedures that are
involved in this move. Many times drivers are required to sign
for this sheet during the briefing which makes their responsi-
bility for this load very plain. Driver actions are normally the
weak point in any in-transit security plan. Remember from
the charts about location of thefts and the description of the
organized thieves’ methods of operation that the targeted
load becomes an opportunity when left unattended. It does
not matter where the load is left or for how long, thieves are
looking for the opening. The drivers must not give it to them.
Drivers should be expected to provide the protection of the
units if they have been given the knowledge, awareness and
way to respond.
Many high value shippers now have programs in place
that contractually require the carriers to arrive to origin with
full fuel tanks, enough hours of service for driver to service
the requirement of traveling at least a minimum of 200 miles
from the origin before stopping. These requirements are put in
place to make it more difficult for the possible suspects who
may follow the units from the location.
When we first started using covert cargo AGPS devices in
the cargo, they were placed as security devices for the freight.
An advantage in using the devices was that they provided
the shipper with visibility of the shipment from origin to
148 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

ATTENTION DRIVERS!
Individuals will follow you with the intent to steal your
entire truck and trailer if left unattended or unsecured.
Immediately notify local law enforcement authorities
and your dispatch if you believe you are being followed.
Follow your company guidelines for in-transit high
value freight handling.
(1) Always engage any issued anti-theft and immobiliza-
tion devices and remove the keys from your tractor,
including spare keys, when leaving the truck during
breaks or fuel stops. Lock all windows and doors.
(2) Never leave your truck engine running while away
from the truck.
(3) If you’re part of a driver team, one of you must stay
with the load at all times.
(4) If you must stop for a break, park in a manner to
ensure a full view of your load at all times and
inspect seals before leaving and upon return.
(5) Do not discuss the contents of your load with
anyone.
We strongly advise against stopping for any reason if load
cannot be attended, secured or kept in sight at all times!
If your load is stolen, immediately notify law enforce-
ment, your dispatch and __________________ at
__________________ 24 hours a day.
Source: J. Coughlin, Driver Warning Sheet 2001.

destination and recorded the actions and activities of the car-

rier. This tool became a great auditing process and evaluator of
carriers for the shippers. The shippers now had more informa-
tion and with the use of virtual fencing and alert notification,
they could control the carriers’ behaviors and monitor activities
better than ever before. Shippers were now able to enforce
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 149

those contractual requirements they put in place for the carriers

because of the visibility of the shipment the AGPS gives them.
The last bullet in the above list of in-transit security needs
is to have a recovery plan in place in the case of any reported
loss. This is very important and fundamental. Earlier in the
book, I spoke about a sixteen-hour rule concerning the oppor-
tunity to recover the cargo from an in-transit theft. This means
that you must be prepared the moment you receive the call that
a theft has occurred. This preparation includes having the
equipment information, at minimum the license plate/state of
the of the involved tractor; the license plate/state of the trailer;
the commodity information of the cargo and the identification
information, including the CDL of the driver, in case he is also
missing. This now gives you the information so that a police
report can be made at the original jurisdiction which enables
that agency to put that information in the National Crime
Information Computer (NCIC). This is important because
entering the information in the NCIC allows other agencies to
check the license plate and get a stolen verification.
Your recovery plan should also include preparing a cargo
theft reporting template and forwarding the report to your
local council or to one of the regional councils for dissemina-
tion through the BOLO/Alert notification systems they operate
with industry and law enforcement contacts. Your recovery
plan should include notifying all parties of the shipment
including the shipper and insurer so they can bring to bear all
of their law enforcement contacts and get all hands on deck.
When a major theft occurs, this is not the time to withhold
information from any of the parties; it is the time to engage
all resources. If the cargo is not found but the empty equip-
ment is located, make sure law enforcement, an SIU insurance
investigator, or a private investigator is dispatched to the scene
to follow-up on possible leads in that area including checking
for surveillance cameras from businesses in the area or known
operations or related offense location information from pre-
vious incidents. If the cargo is not recovered and a criminal
150 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

investigation does not lead to a prosecution but does identify

possible suspects, companies should look at the possibility
of a civil prosecution against the higher level criminal actors
based on a preponderance of evidence. Many of the higher
level buyers and participants have assets, and filing a civil suit
may be worth the effort based on the evidence or informa-
tion that has been found. If the company legal staff does not
have that expertise, a transportation attorney or law firm could
be retained to pursue those possibilities. These types of legal
actions can severely hamper and impede the financial parties
behind the thefts.
The recovery plan involves operating in a manner that
prepares you for the worst and when something occurs, not
making it worse. Most of this is simple and elementary, but
you would be surprised by the number of operations that let
trucks bump their docks and take the freight without record-
ing any of the driver or equipment particulars. That makes it
worse. Although much of this in-transit security is directed
at FTL operations, the last bullet for the driver is related to
LTL operations and it states that when doing LTL pick-up
and delivery, high quality locks should be used on the doors
at all times, especially when having to leave the units unat-
tended. The company I worked for had two LTL companies.
The pick-up and delivery (P&D) drivers were issued locks for
their units just for this purpose. It was in their standard oper-
ating procedures and these were reinforced constantly. Just as
over the road drivers are kings of their own world, so appar-
ently are the P&D runners. When I was a security manager,
we had numerous incidents where following this simple rule
would have prevented the problem, but drivers would start
the day with the lock in place. Then, after the first stop, the
driver would lock the lock to the door handle and go about
their duties during their city operation, leaving the truck
contents vulnerable to quick attacks by opportunistic thieves.
Auditing and monitoring the enforcement of this locking rule
is well worthwhile.
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 151

Information Technology Security

Companies should:

◾◾ Protect data from unauthorized access or manipulation.

◾◾ Establish and review access levels for operation person-
nel establishing a “need to know” rule for the shipping
information.
◾◾ Have a system in place that is password protected which
could identify the abuse of IT including improper access,
tampering or the altering of business data. (J. Coughlin 2010)

I do not proclaim myself an expert in the IT field, just the

opposite. I do know that access to the shipping and loading
information needs to be held at a level where not everyone
on the dock can have vision of all shipping or storage records.
Many times, when a trailer is stolen from a yard or is broken
into on the yard, there is the possibility of collusion or col-
laboration from the inside. From the investigative standpoint,
it is not too hard to tell if the criminals knew what they were
looking for. If you have ten trailers on the ready line and the
criminals cut through a fence and go directly to one unit leav-
ing the others unmolested, they probably had inside infor-
mation. So the question is who had the information of the
shipments which were loaded on that unit and how did they
know? It may have nothing at all to do with IT access, but it
very well could. Establishing access to the shipping and load-
ing information on a need-to-know basis is just good business
and eliminates multiple sources of potential issues.

Brokerage and Freight Boards

Shippers and carriers using brokerage, sub-contractors, or
posting loads to freight boards should be aware of the risk of
company identity theft and fraudulent or fictitious pick-ups.
152 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

If using these services, the broker agent should:

◾◾ Confirm that the company that they are doing business

with is legitimate and has a good track record of perfor-
mance. Use a carrier management system or carrier selec-
tion process to vet your carriers.
◾◾ Obtain references and call organizations to verify past
performance.
◾◾ Contact the Better Business Bureau in the shipper’s area
to see if any complaints have been lodged against the
provider.
◾◾ Access www.safersys.org to validate company, DOT num-
ber, insurance and registration.
◾◾ Contact company to confirm pick up information and
insurer and current insurance.
◾◾ Confirm listed business/operating location of the involved
carrier.
◾◾ Do not provide information or fax application to phone
numbers which you can’t confirm to original company
information.
◾◾ Place a higher scrutiny on operations using a 714 or 786
phone area code.

When driver and equipment arrives on-site shipper should:

◾◾ Cross reference name with identification and ensure that

driver’s handwriting is legible on documents he signs and
matches signature on his driver’s license.
◾◾ Document and photocopy all information on CDL includ-
ing state and obtain thumb print of the driver.
◾◾ Document particulars about the transport vehicles, includ-
ing license plate number and state.
◾◾ Take picture of tractor and trailer or at a minimum note
markings and identifiers on both units. (J. Coughlin 2010)
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 153

With the fraudulent pick-ups and fictitious company identity

theft, brokerage and Internet freight boards offer much oppor-
tunity for illegal activity. Even though this is a somewhat new
phenomenon, we have collected enough data to start putting
a finger on how they operate, what they target and who they
are, which gives us an idea as to what needs to be done to
eliminate the current opportunities to commit fraud. We have
already discussed their methods of operation earlier in the
book so we know they operate illegally in several different
ways. The first is to create a company based on the identity
theft of a person’s name. When this is done, everything is
set up making the company look legitimate. Flags to look for
include the time of the insurance policy was put in place and
the operating location. Several investigations have shown us
that the operating locations are often mailbox rental locations.
So, if you have a question, Google the location and see if you
can determine whether it is a truck terminal or an appropri-
ate business or have a site inspection preformed as part of
the vetting.
In the other scenario, thieves steal the identity of a legiti-
mate carrier and bid on loads using that carrier’s information.
Often they change the company contact information or ask the
broker to fax the application to a non-company fax number.
This can usually be vetted via a check of the legitimate com-
pany’s website. Also, since many involved in this scam are of
Armenian descent, one should be suspicious if the caller has
an eastern European accent and a 714 area code, since many
of these criminals seem to work from the North Hollywood,
California, or a 786 area code as some South Floridians have
adopted this scam. To protect one’s company from these
predators, you must understand the current weaknesses in
the carrier selection process and, based on the awareness of
the current trends, take the vetting process steps further when
necessary. It is also important to share information so that
154 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

during pick-up, if suspicions are raised there can be commu-

nication between both the shippers and brokers and a process
to not accept the selected carrier. Networking, communication,
and information sharing have never been more important.

Security Training and Threat Awareness

Security training and awareness should be incorporated into
each company’s culture starting with employee orientation.
The program should foster security awareness and reinforce
the importance of security to the company operation.
Employees should be trained to report suspicious activities
including theft, the introduction of contraband into the sys-
tem, and any activity involving business abuse. Additionally,
specific training should be offered to assist employees in
maintaining trailer and tractor integrity, recognizing inter-
nal conspiracies, in-transit vulnerabilities and dangers, and
protecting company access controls including confronting
unauthorized persons on company property. These programs
should offer incentives (reward/TIP program) for active
employee participation. (J. Coughlin 2010)
I know I have harped on this continually throughout this
book, but it is one, if not the most important parts of any
transportation and logistics company program. Awareness of
the threats and risks make employees much more cognizant
of things going on around them. Reinforcing security, just
like safety, makes for a better work environment and allows
employees to know the importance the company places on
the issue. Having a reward program and a security hotline let
employees know that the company takes it serious. If you have
a hot-line, make sure you send the hotline reward information
to each employees’ residence or publish it in a newsletter. The
spouses or romantic interests of employees have provided me
much information in the past about an employee’s job-related
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 155

honesty when their relationship sometimes go sour. This pro-

vides more information than you may realize.

Legal Best Practices

Companies should:

◾◾ Have corporate counsel or hire specific transportation

counsel who know the legal doctrine of Transportation
law including:
1. Hague Convention-International Agreements
2. Hague Visby
3. COGSA (Carrier of Goods Sea Act)
4. Warsaw Convention-Air Cargo
5. Rotterdam-Contract Out or Designate International
Standard as to limit of Liability
6. Carmack-U.S. Federal Interstate Cargo Laws
◾◾ Prepare contracts specific to the needs of their specific
company, operation and security requirements for each
provider including:
1. Shipper/Carrier
2. Brokers
3. Depot, Terminal or Container, Trailer or Drop Yards
4. Security Service Providers
5. Vendors
6. Personnel/Temp Employee Providers (J. Coughlin 2010)

This part of the SWTSC Best Practices was prepared with

the assistance from our council transportation attorney,
Mr. Steve Lewis, Esquire. It is important to understand and be
able to operate within the correct legislative influence. Having
an attorney who understand the laws and can correctly inter-
pret them when necessary is very useful. Steve has been a
great addition to the SWTSC membership and a guiding light
156 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

for our nonprofit entity along with educational instruction and

taking care of the council’s legal responsibilities with sub­
poenas and such. One of the things I recommend in most
circumstances is to not use a service provider’s contract, at
least not without review. Most of those are slanted toward the
provider and do not give the involved company the latitude
to audit and evaluate the provider’s service. It is important to
prepare contracts for all of the above listed providers specifi-
cally for their service with your company. This allows setting
the contract standard for the service along with the guidelines
and the auditing of those guidelines laid out in common
terms. I believe all vendors and service providers should be
subject to audit and review to confirm that they are following
the contractual guidelines. When I was working in the trans-
portation industry, we had several logistics and warehouse
circumstances where we used temp agencies to provide part-
time employees. We set the guidelines for those employees as
far as background and drug screening and then an auditing
process whereby the temp agency provided documentation to
confirm the screening had been completed for any employee
who was assigned to our account. Because of co-employment
issues and the law, this can be a problem if it is not dealt with
contractually and legally. Each contract for services has spe-
cific requirements you want to set and then audit for confirma-
tion and evaluation. Security guard contracts and post orders
should definitely be prepared by the hiring entity and not
the provider.

Current Technologies for Prevention

and Recovery
There are many products in the market for cargo theft preven-
tion and protection. There are locks, king pin locks, immobili-
zation devices, and many other products which provide many
different deterrents. The largest problem with most of them
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 157

is that they have to be applied by the drivers. This has been

a huge issue in the past as drivers, once on the road, tend to
have an aversion to applying security devices each and every
time when they leave the loaded vehicle unattended. We have
seen from the past discussion that the thieves are able to steal
a complete rig most of the time in less than ninety seconds
and are just looking for that unattended vehicle opportunity.
Over a period of time, I have seen the industry moving toward
security which is covert and can be applied or monitored
remotely. This takes away the total dependence on a driver.
Back in the days when technology wasn’t available to pro-
vide immediate access to information, supply chain security
was limited to physical obstacles such as fences, locks, seals,
and uniformed guards. There were also closed loop camera
surveillance systems with video recorders which were set
up to oversee warehouse and transportation facilities usually
with limitations in the recording capabilities and reproduction.
These all had a significant impact on facilities but did little or
nothing for the security of loads while in-transit. These loads
were subject to theft by thieves having only a bolt cutter, crow
bar or ignition puller. Most of the times, the drivers and carri-
ers had no real awareness of the risks and threats. The ship-
pers were also in the dark about the problem until they were
victimized. I know when the company I worked for had our
3PL take over an account of a large computer manufacturer;
our company started operating the warehousing and distribu-
tion without a single word about the issue. It was not until we
started to experience Full Truckload losses did our investiga-
tors began to gather intelligence and information to identify
the root cause of the thefts. It was the organized South Florida
crews who were at work and our assigned security personnel
had to discover their methods of operation from real world
losses. Over a period of time, our company investigators had
a list of over two hundred fifty (250) crew members who were
persons of interest in losses from our 3PL location. The secu-
rity personnel put together some driver awareness programs
158 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

and worked closely with the carrier security teams. Large com-
pany carriers were hired, as they had better systems and secu-
rity groups to respond to the threats and risks. At this time the
embedded cargo security AGPS was not really available in the
market but the need for full visibility of shipments from origin
to destinations was shown to be sorely needed.
Most carriers had fleet management systems based on GPS.
These systems focused on operations and maximizing equip-
ment usage but did not protect the cargo at all. In matter of
fact, the organized criminals were known to immediately
disable the fleet management GPS systems upon the theft
of the vehicle. The only record you would have from these
systems was a last ping identifying when and where the
theft occurred.
As mobile communications, technology and web-based solu-
tions came on the scene in the supply chain, companies started
providing the AGPS tracking to offer a truly integrated solution
for in-transit protection. The solution included the use of embed-
ded cargo AGPS devices. The program included the use of the
covert tracking, along with monitoring, controlling the shipment’s
carrier, and providing recovery, investigation and prevention.
Covert tracking stepped up the security game against the
South Florida crew method of operation. This covert applica-
tion did not allow the criminals to disconnect the tracking
device and would not allow them the time to search for the
device and locate it prior to the police being able to respond.
It has made them change their method of operations but has
not stopped their activity. The monitoring, using virtual geo-
fencing available on the mapping and tracking interfaces,
allow the shippers to have vision of their shipment from origin
to destination. It allows them to monitor the carrier and con-
trol the shipment movement. The system can alert to many
circumstances, including exit and entry of geo-fence locations
and routes, stationary and moving after stationary, and proto-
cols can be set by the shipper with requirements put in place
for their designated carrier. The monitoring is conducted to
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 159

confirm the carrier is following the set out requirements. The

monitoring also allows for recovery in the case of a theft or
problem. The recovery is made by vectoring law enforcement
to the stolen unit once the determination of theft is made. It
does not do any good to track something if upon receiving an
exception, you can’t respond and recover. This not as easy as
it may sound, but the main companies that offer this service
have very robust recovery capabilities.
The monitoring and subsequent shipment history of each
move can also be used by the shipper to evaluate the carrier’s
performance during their overall annual business review.
When you talk about investigation, the transmissions you
get from the unit will provide location based investigative
information. Using this documented information, industry
security managers and law enforcement can locate and iden-
tify locations the criminal element operate and use for their
illegal activities. This intelligence is very important for follow-
up and piecing together larger conspiracies, related offenses,
and long-term organized crime cases along with fencing loca-
tions, safe houses, and storage operations.
GPS, Assisted GPS, Cellular (CDMA and GSM), and integra-
tion with Radio Frequency provides a multi-faceted solution
that can integrate the right solution for a shipper based on
needs and coverage, to deliver the most advanced features
available for covert protection and tracking, real-time surveil-
lance and web-based monitoring along with integration with
law enforcement for dispatch and recovery. A truck owner
can also use an RF vehicle recovery system as an added layer
of protection for trucks and trailers. Since most thefts occur
while the driver is out of the truck at an unsecured location,
having a tracking device hidden in the cargo as well as on
the truck and trailer, gives the driver the freedom to stop at a
rest area or truck stop knowing that his entire rig is protected
without having to turn on a single switch or apply a single
device. This type of technology, which can monitor and react
remotely, is the future of the transportation security industry.
160 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Most companies have figured out that they need to remove the
human factor from the equation as much as possible. The use
of web-based monitoring and mobile communication is the
impending wave of future products as most security providers
are looking for better ways to protect or immobilize the truck
and trailer without having to depend on the driver.
Covert AGPS systems and mobile communication locking
or controlling devices which can be monitored or applied
remotely is where the security for the in-transit piece of the
transportation industry is heading, especially for high value
shipments. In the not too distant future, insurers are going to
require this type of technology in return for affordable high
value cargo shipment liability insurance coverage.
Old fashioned hardware locks still provide a certain aspect
of security and continue to have their place in the industry but
it is time to step up the transportation security game. During
the theft of a chassis and container reported to the SWTSC
recently, the complainant had a video camera at the gate of
the involved yard. The camera caught the image of the crimi-
nals entering the yard in their tractor and removing a chas-
sis and container, all within two minutes. The complainant
stated that the chassis had been secured in the yard with a
king pin lock. So it took the thieves less than two minutes to
enter the yard, break off the king pin lock, hook the chassis
and drive away. This freight was never recovered. Within five
minutes, the thieves returned and took a second unit, also in
less than two minutes. The broken king pin locks were found
on the ground.
Had these same units been tracked and geo-fenced, when
they left the location they would have alerted their owners or
monitors and the units could have been tracked to a location
where the police could have responded. Going with the new
technology is the future and the industry is slowly trending
in that direction. The Internet and technology have changed
everything and transportation security is no different, even
though it is transforming at a very leisurely pace.
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 161

There are many different products and technologies which

are available today and which continue to grow cheaper and
better with the evolution of systems. Photos can be taken of
units, drivers, and drivers’ licenses. Units can be fitted with
remote locking technology, tracking and immobilization
devices, and when layered with old fashioned locking and RF
recovery devices the units begin to have the security that is
needed for high value shipping. Technology is now available
to specifically track air shipments and ocean and rail contain-
ers via GPS technology. Some of the technology is still a little
expensive but will slowly depreciate with time and further
invention, interaction, and use. Even though technology pro-
vides many new robust products with tremendous capabilities,
all are not 100% fail safe. You still need layered protection and
very adroit procedures and protocols.
When looking at new technology for facilities, I want to
point out the wireless verified video alarm units such as
“Videofied.” This is a solution to the South Floridian ware-
house burglary method of operation. Remember earlier when
we discussed their methods of operations where they both
steal the code through surreptitious activities or eventually
break-in and cut the power to the complete integrated security
system and control panel after setting off the alarm numer-
ous times making it appear the alarm is faulty. Once they
gain entry and law enforcement and the stakeholders quit
responding, they use the warehouse equipment to stage the
freight for loading into trailers to complete their theft unless
the warehouse has a wireless verified video alarm unit. This
unit, powered by its own battery and wireless communica-
tion, takes a ten (10) second video clip based on motion. That
video clip is sent to a monitoring center who determines that
the motion is caused by the burglars. The clip is sent on to the
police showing them that the alarm location is in fact under
siege by thieves and it was not a false alarm. With this new
information, they respond promptly to a burglary in progress.
This type of alarm can be used for many purposes, outside
162 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

AN EXAMPLE OF LAYERED SECURITIES

Recently, at the company where I work, we were track-
ing some very high value shipments going from a Mexico
origin to a Canadian destination for a large consumer
product company. For this tracking application, we use an
AGPS GSM tracking base unit with 20AH of battery and
layered with an RF beacon technology. When the driver
arrived at the destination location in Canada in the early
morning hours, he was inside the virtual geo-fence but
not inside the receiving location’s physical barrier. His
arrival in the virtual geo-fence set the tracking device
to a longer reporting rate. Waiting to make the delivery,
the driver climbed into his sleeper to await the morning
receiving shift. After a short period of time, he heard the
tractor window break and was confronted by two gun-
men who had him disable an immobilization device, tied
him up, and placed him back in the sleeper area of the
tractor. The suspects drove the unit for about forty (40)
minutes and bumped a dock. The driver could feel and
hear them off-loading his trailer. When they finished,
they drove him about fifteen (15) minutes away and
abandoned the unit and him. Once he was able to untie
himself, he notified the authorities. When the monitoring
center was notified, they could not get the tracking device
to provide a cellular or GPS signal. Authorities who had
been notified were put in touch with our Canadian com-
pany members and a RF receiver was provided and tuned
to the advised RF frequency. When law enforcement
checked several locations where these types of cargo
criminals were known to operate, they were able to vec-
tor into the beacon signal with the RF receiver at a ware-
house complex. Law enforcement put the location under
surveillance, used the RF tracking information to obtain
a search warrant and then when they saw activity at the
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 163

location, they executed the search warrant. Inside they

found the involved freight from our customer’s theft and
over $500K of merchandise from other cargo crimes. They
also made eight arrests. The interesting fact was when the
freight was found, the criminals had placed a cellular jam-
ming device on top of the freight, which was prohibiting
the AGPS device from transmitting. The jamming device
did not jam the RF signal; it actually enhanced that sig-
nal allowing the eventual recovery. This is an example of
using layered security and multiple recovery capabilities.

copper thefts, construction yards, and remote locations but it

is the currently a proven solution to the professional burglars
who target high value warehouses.
There are many technologies and solutions for commercial
issues. Name the problem and find a solution. The majority of
the time the answer does not have to cost a lot of money. One
of the best solutions out there is older but is tried and true.
That is electric fencing for yards where external theft becomes
a huge problem. During my time in the industry, I put that
solution in four (4) locations. Each and every time I went from
having numerous breaches a week to absolutely nothing. The

Figure 6.1 This sign, whether power is engaged or not, acts as a good
deterrent by providing perimeter control to prevent illegal entry.
164 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Electric Guard Dog product is one of my personal favorites.

The barrier works by the sign alone, and on several occasions
I have known it to do so because some governmental zoning
issues have forced companies to turn them off.
The fence is really not noticeable and is surely not an eye-
sore, health hazard or a risk. It works using:

◾◾ 7,000 Volt Electrical PULSE—every 1.3 seconds

◾◾ Extremely SHORT—.0001 to .0004 seconds—pulsed versus
steady power
◾◾ Therefore, poses NO medical risk … yet strong enough to
zap intruders off or away from fence
◾◾ 10-foot tall (approx), 20-strand Electric Fence
◾◾ Energized by 12-volt marine battery
◾◾ Charged by a solar panel. (Allows remote installation.
Eliminates daily energy costs.)
◾◾ Safety of The Electric Guard Dog is certified—well below
international standards established by IEC 60335-2-76

I used this solution and know many others who have also
used it. It is the real deal with positive results. In one location
where I had it installed, I was able to do away with one 24/7
guard, which allowed me to pay for the fence and have budget
money left over. Very reasonable solution with great results!!

Cargo Insurance
Cargo insurance coverage does not come standard with your
commercial trucking insurance policy, and the purchase of
a full coverage vehicle policy does not cover your freight if
it is damaged or stolen. Cargo insurance is a separate policy,
which covers the freight you are hauling if lost, damaged, or
stolen. Considering that many loads that are worth thousands
of dollars, you can understand why this coverage is so impor-
tant and required by many contracts to protect their property
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 165

while it is in the care, custody, and control of the carrier. Many

companies are self-insured up to certain thresholds, and if
they suffer a loss or damage, they pay that amount directly
from their own funds. It is extremely important to make
certain that the cargo insurance being used does not have
exclusions from covering the necessary risks and is in the
appropriate amounts. Cargo insurance policies many times
come with some built in coverage. Make sure you understand
what is covered and what is excluded. Not having the proper
cargo insurance coverage can leave you paying some large off
the bottom line costs if something unexpected happens.
I spoke with Mr. Vance Root, a Vice-President at U.S. Risk
about current Cargo insurance policies. He referred me to
some cargo related information articles in the Insurance
Journal which had the following quote. “The global commer-
cial property insurance market is continuing to show signs of
upwards rate trends, especially for catastrophe-exposed risks,”
said Dean Klisura, U.S. Risk Practices Leader, and Marsh.
Klisura said that the U.S. property market continues to be
in a state of transition with insureds more likely to experi-
ence rate increases than those renewing with flat or modest
rate decreases. “We believe that this trend will continue in the
short term, with the average rate of increase continuing to rise
month over month,” the Marsh executive said (Marsh 2012).
So cargo insurance rates are subject to the upward pres-
sures according to the insurance professionals but not any way
out of the norm of the current market.
Let’s look at the different Cargo Insurance definitions as
provided by U.S. Risk.
Motor Truck Cargo—This type of insurance protects the
owner or the carrier against certain types of perils like theft,
damage during transit, and various other occurrences that
cause loss depending on the type of cargo being shipped.
Mostly all of the products that are shipped over land can and
should be insured for a specific coverage under a motor truck
cargo insurance policy.
166 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

Marine Cargo—This type of insurance protects cargo

being shipped internationally, usually by sea or air. This also
protects the owner or the carrier in the event of a loss due
to damage or exposure to weather, jettison, theft, mishandling
or damage from the loading and the unloading process. Other
special circumstances can also be insured like a breakdown
in equipment, i.e., refrigeration units, or delays that expose
perishable items.
Open Cargo Policies—This type of insurance is usu-
ally for carriers or owners that would involve coverage for
large volumes of cargo. There are many types of policies that
have broad coverage for many areas of truck and marine
cargo insurance; one of the most common is an open perils
policy, or open cargo policy. Any party with a vested inter-
est can insure a certain agreed value or a specified period
of time or both. These policies are broad in nature and do
not usually list the details of the specific transaction such as
the name of the ship, destination or specific details of the
cargo being insured since it is an agreed value or time that is
being insured.
Voyage Policies—This type of insurance is to insure that
the cargo gets from its place of origin to its final destination.
This type of policy has more specific details than an open
cargo policy since the terms are for a certain trip with a
specific origination to a destination at a specified location.
Because there are many types of potential delays, the length
of the passage is not typically stated. After the cargo has
been delivered to the specified destination, then the cargo the
policy would typically expire and a new policy would have to
be written to continue coverage to the final destination.
Contingent Cargo Policies—This type of insurance
policy is for an event where a third party who is directly
responsible for the cargo does not have the insurance or
maybe is underinsured for the damage or loss of value to
the cargo while it is in their custody and control. Therefore
this type of coverage is a secondary insurance policy to the
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 167

primary insurance policy in the event the primary insurance

does not cover or is not in place to cover the loss. A contin-
gent policy may also apply when a carrier causes damage or
just may refuse to deliver the cargo or for some reason refuses
to accept liability for a loss or damage to the goods during the
time it was in their control.
Shipper’s Interest—This type of insurance policy is for
coverage needed when the value of the load is greater than
the amount of insurance being carried by the carrier that is
slated to haul the shipment.
The key is to retain an experienced cargo insurance agent
who understands the different cargo insurance products and
can review the transportation/cargo contracts to determine the
amount and type of cargo insurance needed. Coverage has to
be secured in advance of the trip and exclusions should be
identified to eliminate “gaps in coverage” that may expose a
carrier to a large uninsured exposure.
With the advent of the fictitious pick-up scam currently,
insurance coverage is being tested in new ways. Recently after
a fictitious or fraudulent pick-up, the shipper filed a claim
against a carrier that did not make the pick-up as they were
a victim of the identity theft. The shipper stated that the car-
rier was still responsible for the loss since they had the duty to
protect their identity and not allow it to be stolen. This is all
facts for lawyers and courts to work out but it does go back to
protecting your own company and having awareness to cur-
rent cargo criminal methods. I am sure the shipper’s broker
made several errors that would make it very difficult to push
liability over to the identity theft victimized carrier.

Conclusion
I have given a technology/solution for in-transit security, ware-
houses and facilities. There are many others I could offer but
these are my number one recommendations in those areas. I
168 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

also have been working on a solution for identity theft and fic-
titious pick-up gangs. My system will vet a carrier to eliminate
the identity theft angles involved with this crime. Further, the
program will vet a carrier to a brokerage company’s guidelines
and then provide compliance and audit processes to maintain
the vetting status to the requirements.
The current problem is age old: companies are reluctant
to change the ways they operate. As long as they continue
down their current path, they will continue to be victimized.
They must slow the carrier selection process and initiate real
checks and balances to avoid being targeted for fraud. They
do not have to do it for every carrier, but they must do it for
any carrier they plan to use for high value or the known high
risk commodity loads discussed in this book. The vetting must
include a close inspection of all of the required DOT docu-
ments, insurance coverage and exclusions, a site inspection,
and references.
Recently, the SC-ISAC had eight loads reported stolen by
fictitious pick-up. This crime is increasing daily and will not
stop until companies take the correct steps. I collaborated with
a company called C-Net Technologies and we put together two
programs for transportation. One was a carrier management
system for brokerage to vet carriers for their high value clients
as mentioned above. The other is a transportation specific
background screening program for hiring drivers. Both pro-
grams were designed as solutions for known problems in the
industry. The SWTSC isn’t a social alliance; it provides law
enforcement training and the BOLO/Alert program and strives
to find solutions for problems, resources, and providers which
can assist our membership and the industry. I keep informa-
tion on all types of different services and products relative
to our transportation scope of work, and I continually make
referrals to industry members. There are many service provid-
ers and products that I can recommend based on their service
and effectiveness.
 Prevention and Awareness ◾ 169

The key to security in all areas is using a multi-layered

approach in all phases. Whether it is facility, in-transit, person-
nel, or procedural security, it is best handled if done in com-
mon sense and logical layers to provide the best protection
and results. The goal is prevention in a cost efficient manner.
When you scroll through the SWTSC Best Practices above, all
may not be relevant to your operation but they will act as a
good reminder for process, procedure, and products that can
be used to best secure your company’s operation.
As far as insurance coverage for cargo goes, the same
Insurance Journal Internet edition contained an article about
CargoNet and its position as the insurance industry tie-in to
the cargo theft information sharing and networking. We have
discussed that point several times throughout this book but, as
it said in that article, the public/private partnership involving
the transportation industry, law enforcement, and the insur-
ance industry is definitely building.
Chapter 7

Moving Forward

Introduction
I would hope from all the information which has been pre-
sented thus far, it is apparent to the industry and its members
that we must do all we can to protect ourselves. It is incumbent
upon the industry and its members to take the necessary steps
to protect one’s own operation. By taking the security steps
necessary to protect one’s company and operation from theft,
we are also preventing interference and disturbance from other
possible harm including terrorist acts. Taking the initiative to
take the necessary steps to protecting our own companies will
make our operations more efficient and less susceptive to busi-
ness continuity issues and disruptions.

Essential Decisions for Industry

During the writing of this book, which occurred between
January and April 2012, several things happened relative to
cargo theft which affected the industry and law enforcement.

171
172 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

We will talk about several of those things, but first we need

to stress the need of involvement in the industry councils, law
enforcement networking, and pushing for the needs of the
industry through initiatives such as the National Cargo Theft
Task Force. These are not initiatives which take countless time
or money, just participation and effort.
One of the most important go-forward actions should be to
further enhance the information sharing and networking. This
is currently in process with the addition of a new industry
council for Virginia and the Carolinas. The way they are being
set-up will provide another partner in the BOLO/Alert program
which will not only strengthen what is currently in place but
also give a broader reach for the current communication net-
work. Also with the evolution of CargoNet being sponsored by
the insurance industry, the network and communication sys-
tem can be greatly expanded through its ISO and law enforce-
ment connections. Driving more cargo theft data into the
collection databases will allow for further analysis and more
information and awareness concerning cargo crime issues.
More communication, more data, more information sharing,
and more law enforcement networking will overcome the lack
of a government enforcement response.
Every new change or implementation that has come in
the transportation security arena that I have seen has come
in low, slow doses. It has been baby steps to get us where
we are today, although much has been accomplished. We
can get it done through the current sources and resources by
just continuing to push forward. This will not take a bunch
of money, just the effort to get the problem recognized by
the right parties. As an industry, transportation pays a ton of
taxes and the supply chain industries deserve our share of
service from the law enforcement agencies paid with our tax
dollars. We can’t sit quietly in the corner and allow district
attorneys to decide not to take a case because it is a driver
give-up. The law does not allow district attorneys to pick and
choose which types of theft they will prosecute. We can’t sit
 Moving Forward ◾ 173

back and let the government make all kinds of regulations,

but provide no resources for cargo theft. This is not a one-way
street, although lately it seems that way. Through awareness
and bringing attention to the problems and issues, more can
be done. Letting the right people know and getting the right
people involved will assist in getting the attention needed.
One major need to be pursued is the establishment of a
cargo theft statute in each state of the union to pair with the
Federal Cargo Theft UCR statute. This statute needs to provide
enhanced penalties for cargo theft and organized cargo theft
along with language making the theft of a (police operation)
sting trailer a felony offense not based on the value of the
stolen goods.
Below is a rough draft of a soon to be proposed Cargo
Theft Statute which is being prepared for introduction to the
legislature in Texas. This is being drawn up NICB Agent Stacy
Hohenberger, with input from several parties, and it is not yet
completed. Having this statute in the Texas Penal Code will
make prosecution easier and more specific to a cargo crime.
Language still needs to be added concerning the sting trailers.
This will also give the state a better statute to pursue prosecut-
ing the driver give-up situation and other related cargo crime.

Sec. 31.17. CARGO THEFT AND

ORGANIZED CARGO THEFT:

(a) “Cargo theft” is defined as the criminal taking

any commercial shipment of cargo moving via
a pipeline system, trucks, railroad cars, ships,
aircraft, an intermodal container, intermodal
chassis, trailer, or other vehicle from point of
origin to final destination, regardless of any
temporary stop while awaiting transshipment or
otherwise, including any tank or storage facil-
ity, station house, platform, depot, wharf, air
174 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

terminal, airport, aircraft terminal, air navigation

facility, container freight station, warehouse,
freight distribution facility, or freight consolida-
tion facility.
US H.R. 3199 (USA Patriot Act Improvement
and Re-authorization Act of 2005)
(b) In this section “cargo” is considered but not
limited to the following:
(1) articles,
(2) articles of commerce,
(3) assets,
(4) belongings,
(5) capital goods,
(6) cargo,
(7) chattel,
(8) consumer durables,
(9) consumer goods,
(10) contents,
(11) effects,
(12) freight,
(13) goods,
(14) goods for sale,
(15) items for sale,
(16) line,
(17) line of goods,
(18) manufactured goods,
(19) material assets,
(20) materials,
(21) merchandise,
(22) movables,
(23) possessions,
(24) produce,
(25) property,
(26) res venales,
(27) salable commodities,
 Moving Forward ◾ 175

(28) shop goods,

(29) staples,
(30) stock,
(31) stock in trade,
(32) store,
(33) supplies,
(34) tangible assets,
(35) vendibles and
(36) wares
(c) A person commits an offense if the person
intentionally or knowingly conducts, promotes,
or facilitates an activity in which the person
receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters,
sells, or disposes of a total value of not less than
$1,500 of:
(1) stolen cargo; or
(2) cargo explicitly represented to the person as
being stolen cargo.
(d) An offense under this section is:
(1) a state jail felony if the total value of the
merchandise involved in the activity is
$1,500 or more but less than $20,000;
(2) a felony of the third degree if the total value
of the merchandise involved in the activity
is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000;
(3) a felony of the second degree if the total
value of the merchandise involved in the
activity is $100,000 or more but less than
$200,000; or
(4) A felony of the first degree if the total value
of the merchandise involved in the activity
is $200,000 or more.
(e) An offense described for purposes of punish-
ment by Subsections (d)(1)-(3) is increased
to the next higher category of offense if it is
shown on the trial of the offense that the person
176 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

organized, supervised, financed, or managed

one or more other persons engaged in an activ-
ity described by Subsection (d).
(f) For the purposes of punishment, an offense
under this section is increased to the next high-
est category of offense if the cargo taken was
a controlled substance as defined by the Texas
Health and Safety Code, Section 481.001 (1)(5)
or controlled substance analogue as defined
by the Texas Health and Safety Code, Section
481.001 (1)(6).
(g) It is not a defense to prosecution under this sec-
tion that:
(1) the offense occurred as a result of a decep-
tion or strategy on the part of a law enforce-
ment agency, including the use of an
undercover operative or peace officer;
(2) the actor was provided by a law enforce-
ment agency with a facility in which to com-
mit the offense or an opportunity to engage
in conduct constituting the offense; or
(3) the actor was solicited to commit the
offense by a peace officer, and the solicita-
tion was of a type that would encourage a
person predisposed to commit the offense
to actually commit the offense, but would
not encourage a person not predisposed
to commit the offense to actually commit
the offense.
Source: Hohenberger 2012.

The above is a good first step for getting this in the Texas
Penal Code and closing existing loop holes for cargo thieves.
This effort needs to be taken up by every state in the United
States where one does not exist. Why is it needed? Very simple.
 Moving Forward ◾ 177

I looked in the index of the Texas Penal Code and the word
Cargo is not even listed. No reference to that word appears
anywhere in the code. Read the current penal code for theft,
from the 2010 Texas Penal Code below. Nothing is mentioned
about cargo in this statute and thus leaves much to be desired
when enforcing the law related to cargo theft and the district
attorneys in some jurisdictions not wanting to prosecute driver
involved type offenses.

CHAPTER 31. THEFT

§ 31.03. THEFT.
(a) A person commits an offense if he unlawfully
appropriates property with intent to deprive the
owner of property.
(b) Appropriation of property is unlawful if:
(1) it is without the owner’s effective consent;
(2) the property is stolen and the actor appro-
priates the property knowing it was stolen
by another; or
(3) property in the custody of any law enforce-
ment agency was explicitly represented by
any law enforcement agent to the actor as
being stolen and the actor appropriates the
property believing it was stolen by another.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (b):
(1) evidence that the actor has previously par-
ticipated in recent transactions other than,
but similar to, that which the prosecution is
based is admissible for the purpose of show-
ing knowledge or intent and the issues of
knowledge or intent are raised by the actor’s
plea of not guilty;
(2) the testimony of an accomplice shall be cor-
roborated by proof that tends to connect the
178 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

actor to the crime, but the actor’s knowledge

or intent may be established by the uncor-
roborated testimony of the accomplice;
(3) an actor engaged in the business of buying
and selling used or secondhand personal
property, or lending money on the security
of personal property deposited with the
actor, is presumed to know upon receipt
by the actor of stolen property (other than
a motor vehicle subject to Chapter 501,
Transportation Code) that the property has
been previously stolen from another if the
actor pays for or loans against the property
$25 or more (or consideration of equivalent
value) and the actor knowingly or recklessly:
(A) fails to record the name, address, and
physical description or identification
number of the seller or pledgor;
(B) fails to record a complete description of
the property, including the serial number,
if reasonably available, or other identify-
ing characteristics; or
(C) fails to obtain a signed warranty from the
seller or pledgor that the seller or pledgor
has the right to possess the property. It
is the express intent of this provision that
the presumption arises unless the actor
complies with each of the numbered
requirements;
(4) for the purposes of Subdivision (3)(A),
“identification number” means driver’s
license number, military identification num-
ber, identification certificate, or other official
number capable of identifying an individual;
(5) stolen property does not lose its character as
stolen when recovered by any law enforce-
ment agency;
 Moving Forward ◾ 179

(6) an actor engaged in the business of obtain-

ing abandoned or wrecked motor vehicles
or parts of an abandoned or wrecked motor
vehicle for resale, disposal, scrap, repair,
rebuilding, demolition, or other form of sal-
vage is presumed to know on receipt by the
actor of stolen property that the property
has been previously stolen from another if
the actor knowingly or recklessly:
(A) fails to maintain an accurate and legible
inventory of each motor vehicle compo-
nent part purchased by or delivered to
the actor, including the date of purchase
or delivery, the name, age, address,
sex, and driver’s license number of the
seller or person making the delivery,
the license plate number of the motor
vehicle in which the part was delivered,
a complete description of the part, and
the vehicle identification number of the
motor vehicle from which the part was
removed, or in lieu of maintaining an
inventory, fails to record the name and
certificate of inventory number of the
person who dismantled the motor vehi-
cle from which the part was obtained;
(B) fails on receipt of a motor vehicle to
obtain a certificate of authority, sales
receipt, or transfer document as required
by Chapter 683, Transportation Code,
or a certificate of title showing that the
motor vehicle is not subject to a lien
or that all recorded liens on the motor
vehicle have been released; or
(C) fails on receipt of a motor vehicle to
immediately remove an unexpired
license plate from the motor vehicle, to
180 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

keep the plate in a secure and locked

place, or to maintain an inventory, on
forms provided by the Texas Department
of Transportation, of license plates kept
under this paragraph, including for each
plate or set of plates the license plate
number and the make, motor number,
and vehicle identification number of the
motor vehicle from which the plate was
removed;
(7) an actor who purchases or receives a used
or secondhand motor vehicle is presumed to
know on receipt by the actor of the motor
vehicle that the motor vehicle has been
previously stolen from another if the actor
knowingly or recklessly:
(A) fails to report to the Texas Department of
Transportation the failure of the person
who sold or delivered the motor vehicle
to the actor to deliver to the actor a
properly executed certificate of title to
the motor vehicle at the time the motor
vehicle was delivered; or
(B) fails to file with the county tax assessor-
collector of the county in which the
actor received the motor vehicle, not
later than the 20th day after the date the
actor received the motor vehicle, the reg-
istration license receipt and certificate of
title or evidence of title delivered to the
actor in accordance with Subchapter D,
Chapter 520, Transportation Code, at the
time the motor vehicle was delivered;
(8) an actor who purchases or receives from
any source other than a licensed retailer
or distributor of pesticides a restricted-use
pesticide or a state-limited-use pesticide or
 Moving Forward ◾ 181

a compound, mixture, or preparation con-

taining a restricted-use or state-limited-use
pesticide is presumed to know on receipt
by the actor of the pesticide or compound,
mixture, or preparation that the pesticide or
compound, mixture, or preparation has been
previously stolen from another if the actor:
(A) fails to record the name, address, and
physical description of the seller or
pledgor;
(B) fails to record a complete description
of the amount and type of pesticide or
compound, mixture, or preparation pur-
chased or received; and
(C) fails to obtain a signed warranty from the
seller or pledgor that the seller or pledgor
has the right to possess the property; and
(9) an actor who is subject to Section 409,
Packers and Stockyards Act (7 U.S.C.
Section 228b), that obtains livestock from
a commission merchant by representing
that the actor will make prompt payment is
presumed to have induced the commission
merchant’s consent by deception if the actor
fails to make full payment in accordance
with Section 409, Packers and Stockyards
Act (7 U.S.C. Section 228b).
(d) It is not a defense to prosecution under this sec-
tion that:
(1) the offense occurred as a result of a decep-
tion or strategy on the part of a law enforce-
ment agency, including the use of an under-
cover operative or peace officer;
(2) the actor was provided by a law enforce-
ment agency with a facility in which to com-
mit the offense or an opportunity to engage
in conduct constituting the offense; or
182 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

(3) the actor was solicited to commit the offense

by a peace officer, and the solicitation was
of a type that would encourage a person pre-
disposed to commit the offense to actually
commit the offense, but would not encour-
age a person not predisposed to commit the
offense to actually commit the offense.
(e) Except as provided by Subsection (f), an offense
under this section is:
(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen is less than:
(A) $50; or
(B) $20 and the defendant obtained the
property by issuing or passing a check or
similar sight order in a manner described
by Section 31.06;
(2) a Class B misdemeanor if:
(A) the value of the property stolen is:
(i) $50 or more but less than $500; or
(ii) $20 or more but less than $500 and
the defendant obtained the property
by issuing or passing a check or simi-
lar sight order in a manner described
by Section 31.06; or
(B) the value of the property stolen is less
than:
(i) $50 and the defendant has previously
been convicted of any grade of theft; or
(ii) $20, the defendant has previously
been convicted of any grade of theft,
and the defendant obtained the
property by issuing or passing a check
or similar sight order in a manner
described by Section 31.06;
(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen is $500 or more but less
than $1,500;
 Moving Forward ◾ 183

(4) a state jail felony if:

(A) the value of the property stolen is $1,500
or more but less than $20,000, or the
property is less than 10 head of cattle,
horses, or exotic livestock or exotic
fowl as defined by Section 142.001,
Agriculture Code, or any part thereof
under the value of $20,000, or less than
100 head of sheep, swine, or goats or any
part thereof under the value of $20,000;
(B) regardless of value, the property is stolen
from the person of another or from a
human corpse or grave;
(C) the property stolen is a firearm, as
defined by Section46.01;
(D) the value of the property stolen is less
than $1,500 and the defendant has been
previously convicted two or more times
of any grade of theft; or
(E) the property stolen is an official ballot or
official carrier envelope for an election;
(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of
the property stolen is $20,000 or more but
less than $100,000, or the property is:
(A) 10 or more head of cattle, horses, or
exotic livestock or exotic fowl as defined
by Section 142.001, Agriculture Code,
stolen during a single transaction and
having an aggregate value of less than
$100,000; or
(B) 100 or more head of sheep, swine, or
goats stolen during a single transaction
and having an aggregate value of less
than $100,000;
(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of
the property stolen is $100,000 or more but
less than $200,000; or
184 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the

property stolen is $200,000 or more.
(f) An offense described for purposes of punish-
ment by Subsections (e)(1)-(6) is increased to the
next higher category of offense if it is shown on
the trial of the offense that:
(1) the actor was a public servant at the time of
the offense and the property appropriated
came into the actor’s custody, possession,
or control by virtue of his status as a public
servant;
(2) the actor was in a contractual relationship
with government at the time of the offense
and the property appropriated came into
the actor’s custody, possession, or control by
virtue of the contractual relationship; or
(3) the owner of the property appropriated
was at the time of the offense an elderly
individual.
(g) For the purposes of Subsection (a), a person is
the owner of exotic livestock or exotic fowl as
defined by Section 142.001, Agriculture Code,
only if the person qualifies to claim the animal
under Section 142.0021, Agriculture Code, if
the animal is an stray.
(h) In this section:
(1) “Restricted-use pesticide” means a pesti-
cide classified as a restricted-use pesticide
by the administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency under 7 U.S.C. Section
136a, as that law existed on January 1, 1995,
and containing an active ingredient listed in
the federal regulations adopted under that
law (40 C.F.R. Section 152.175) and in effect
on that date.
(2) “State-limited-use pesticide” means a pesti-
cide classified as a state-limited-use pesticide
 Moving Forward ◾ 185

by the Department of Agriculture under

Section 76.003, Agriculture Code, as that
section existed on January 1, 1995, and con-
taining an active ingredient listed in the rules
adopted under that section (4 TAC Section
7.24) as that section existed on that date.
(i) For purposes of Subsection (c) (9), “livestock”
and “commission merchant” have the meanings
assigned by Section 147.001, Agriculture Code.
(j) With the consent of the appropriate local county
or district attorney, the attorney general has
concurrent jurisdiction with that consenting local
prosecutor to prosecute an offense under this
section that involves the state Medicaid program.
Source: Texas 2010.

This is the current Texas law and it makes no reference to

Cargo in the entire statute. That does not prevent this statute
from being used to prosecute cargo thieves but is not nearly
as specific as the proposed statute. This law currently does not
match up well with the Cargo Theft UCR shown in Chapter 1
and makes it difficult to match up the UCR reporting in Texas
to the Federal Code. Obtaining a specific cargo theft statute is
very important to being able to place a bit more significance
in the law and make it more easily enforceable. After reading
both entries, you can make your own determination.
In the states which have been identified in Chapter 1, an
effort should be made to either organize a multi-agency cargo
theft task force or to strengthen the existing ones.
Why are task forces so important? As a former police offi-
cer who has worked numerous investigations, the simple
fact is that when an investigative group is allowed to special-
ize or focus on certain types of crime, the group becomes
much more involved in the overall intelligence aspect of that
criminal activity, thus enhancing their investigative abilities.
186 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

They also have time to focus on the persons arrested for the
offenses, interview them while they are in custody, and build
an investigative “hook book” of suspects, fences, and asso­
ciates. This collected intelligence leads to further information
about involved parties and accomplices along with informa-
tion about where the stolen property is being sold or deliv-
ered, which, in turn, leads to the development of informants
and all types of related investigative information.
Once this investigative process is in place, the Task Force
Officers (TFOs) have many more options when a theft occurs
than just working the case without the background and infor-
mation that true investigative techniques bring forth. It is
really no different than a long-term narcotics or organized
crime investigation with the goal of identifying the players and
locating the big fish or the buyers so that those persons can
be charged and put out of business. This will not happen if
you do not have a focused investigative effort. Blind luck is
good for investigators but working hard, building information
and intelligence will get you much further when dealing with
organized criminal groups. That is why we need cargo theft
task forces in several major areas so that those types of inves-
tigative inroads can be created. These task forces could also
start networking and communicating and sharing informa-
tion which would lead to tying together other associates and
related crimes and criminal activities.
Remember earlier when we discussed high value ware-
house burglaries, the DNA of one of the suspects of several
warehouse burglaries around the country has been matched to
DNA found in a pharmaceutical burglary in Enfield, Connecticut.
These were not local criminal acts; these involve the organized,
traveling, professional criminal elements. Single, one-time
investigations will seldom connect the dots, matching informa-
tion from these types of activities which occur in very distant
and distinct jurisdictions.
 Moving Forward ◾ 187

Lobbying for Cargo Theft Task Forces

and Cargo Crime Programs
Through the National Cargo Theft Task Force, a lobbying and
legislative effort has been started. This part of the NCTTF
program needs to be enhanced and cargo crime awareness
brought to the attention of both federal and state legislators.
The goal would be to get cargo theft statutes passed in all of
the states and to bring the need for a better cargo theft and
cargo related crime response to the attention of federal law
enforcement agencies.
The crimes themselves are starting to get attention from
federal agencies. Just recently, on March 23, 2012, the Food
and Drug Administration released an agency program directive
titled “FDA’s Response to Cargo Thefts.” The purpose of the
document was to establish a general procedure by which the
agency would respond to a cargo theft involving an FDA-
regulated product. The directive spoke to established pro-
cedures for product removal from the market, public notice,
and handling medical product shortages. The purpose of the
directive was to also ensure that the FDA’s regulatory response
to cargo thefts is consistent and effective.
The SOP addresses FDA’s response to cargo thefts of FDA-
regulated products as determined by the Office of Regulatory
Affairs (ORA), Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI), and the
Commissioner’s Office via the Cargo Theft Response Team
(CTRT), a workgroup comprised of representatives from those
parts of FDA. The Office of Criminal Investigations will lead
the criminal investigation for the agency and will communi-
cate/coordinate with other federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment agencies. The Office of Enforcement will coordinate the
Agency’s regulatory response to the potential public health
concerns associated with the stolen products re-entering
the market, coordinate the development of the appropriate
188 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

regulatory response to the firm’s action plan regarding the

theft through the CTRT, and will ensure dissemination of
public notification of cargo theft incidences whether issued by
FDA or the firm(s).
OCI’s primary objective related to cargo theft investiga-
tions is to identify, target, and dismantle illicit prescription
drug diversion networks that threaten the legitimate pharma-
ceutical supply chain. FDA considers cargo thefts to include
tractor-trailer and warehouse thefts of FDA-regulated products,
including prescription drugs, OTC drug products, infant for-
mula, and medical devices which may pose a threat to the
public health or a risk to the legitimate supply chain. OCI
cargo theft investigations may be initiated because the crimi-
nal organizations behind such thefts are suspected of being
associated with drug diversion networks. (Administration 2012)
You can see the full directive by going to Staff Manual
Guides, Volume IV. The fact is that several things that hap-
pened here are good for the industry. A federal agency has
taken note that there is a problem with cargo thefts and it
has established a way to respond. In its directive, the agency
also makes reference to the Pharmaceutical Cargo Security
Coalition (PCSC) and proclaims to be a member of that group.
The agency also recognizes this group’s mission is to share
information and identify emerging trends while working
together to better secure pharmaceutical products in-transit.
This is probably the first federal agency to mention an indus-
try council and actually give it credit and authentication. Even
though the directive appears more regulatory toward the firms
involved rather than toward the cargo criminals, it is still good
to open up other possible federal jurisdictions for prosecution.
Now if we can get several other federal agencies to under-
stand there is an issue and obtain federal investigation and
jurisdictional assistance, we will have taken a significant step
toward eliminating the criminal enterprises involved in this
illicit activity. We have to hope it will not string a bunch of
 Moving Forward ◾ 189

regulations into place without offering any true assistance with

the cause of the problem.
Cargo theft is not the only cargo crime which needs a more
focused federal response in relation to drugs and contraband
interdiction. Once again, when contraband enters a commer-
cial vehicle conveyance and/or transportation lane, it seldom
begins and ends in the same local or even same state jurisdic-
tion. As we discussed earlier, there are real and known pro-
files and intelligence from these types of shipments that could
be used to spotlight the illicit shippers.
While I was still working for the transportation company,
Detective Ed Matis from the Dallas–Fort Worth Interdiction
Task Force took an interest in our industry and began attend-
ing council meetings and working freight interdiction as part
of his duty with the DFW Drug Interdiction Task Force. As
he met more and more of the company security managers, he
started coming to the docks and bringing a dog handler to
scan the freight on the dock. After a time, he realized that
this was an exercise in futility. We began talking to him about
the known profiles that could be associated with just about
every contraband shipment, and he began to understand how
those factors could be used to put together a comprehensive
commercial vehicle interdiction program. Eventually, Ed put
together an investigative proposal for his DFW Task Force
which he called “Bordernet.” This proposal, which was never
accepted or acted upon, put together several key features to
partner with the industry to identify suspicious shipments
placed into the commercial commerce lanes and to protect
carrier company personnel on the border from the threats of
the cartel.
When I was in the industry, terminal managers on the bor-
der had fears about reporting suspicious shipments and having
law enforcement respond to their locations. We had a man-
ager at one border location threatened, and he did not want to
deal with the issue locally. Many times when reported at the
190 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

origin terminal, the local police would respond and take pos-
session of the shipment leading to no follow-up or controlled
delivery being completed. It is much worse on the border
now. It makes much more sense now to investigate a package
identified as suspicious, at the first break point, thus remov-
ing the local anxiety and border difficulty. This also allows for
law enforcement at the break bulk to be notified as to exact
time of the suspicious shipment’s arrival so that law enforce-
ment can be present to meet the shipment at the time when it
arrives for consolidation at the Freight Assembly Center.
By getting a pre-alert concerning its arrival, the TFOs have
time to research the shipper, shipment, and consignee. They can
have the paperwork ready for a search warrant and have a
canine and dog handler present to immediately scan the ship-
ment. If it is contraband, the TFOs would be able to make a
determination as to how it would be handled from that point
on. If it is not contraband, it could be quickly released and
moved on through the consolidation process. This makes a lot
of sense. See significant parts of the proposal below. I believe
this type of program would reap huge benefits for both the
industry and law enforcement. This type of enforcement
program would act to enhance finding shipments involving
contra­bands other than narcotics as well.

Bordernet
We are proposing the development of a network of terminal
managers (TM)/freight employees in LTL freight companies in
Laredo and McAllen/Brownsville, and other border areas that
can identify shipments with suspicious characteristics. The
initial profile that we would use would make this easy for the
freight companies and would consist of characteristics that
have been the most common on previous seizures and are
the easiest to track. The characteristics we would like to tar-
get are: 1) Dock drop off at the border terminal, and 2) cash,
 Moving Forward ◾ 191

money order or pre-paid credit card payments by shippers

or other suspicious activity observed at the terminal or in the
paperwork. The shipment at this time would be considered
suspicious, but would not necessarily contain contraband. The
TFOs have learned from speaking with terminal managers
along the border with hubs in Dallas/Houston that approxi-
mately ten to fifty shipments per week meet this criteria com-
ing through Dallas and Houston. With the ability to inspect
this volume of freight which has suspicious characteristics, the
seizure success rate would greatly increase.
Upon the border terminals identifying suspicious shipments,
a protocol developed between the freight companies and
freight interdiction units to report the suspicious shipments
would be established in Dallas/Houston. By contacting freight
interdiction units in Dallas/Houston, this would solve the
problems which TFOs have been told are reasons the freight
industry did not care to report suspicious freight. The first
reason, financial, would be solved because the freight would
not be waiting on the border dock. When the suspicious
freight was observed, the freight would be loaded as normal
and depart the border terminal. The time of arrival/departure/
delivery, PRO#, bill of lading, and other billing information
would be forwarded to freight interdiction units in Dallas/
Houston to be researched.
By the freight interdiction units receiving this information
in Dallas/Houston five to nine hours before the freight reaches
those terminals, TFOs would be able to research the informa-
tion establishing any connections to other cases, set up techni-
cal support for the surveillance, and prepare a search warrant
if information warrants. Due to the fact that narcotic traffickers
shipping through freight companies often track their ship-
ments through the freight company web pages, this advanced
notice will help by being “invisible” to narcotic traffickers. By
working within the parameters set by the freight companies
and moving the freight, the traffickers will not be alerted to
law enforcements involvement. If the suspicious shipment is
192 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

unable to be cleared in a timely fashion, the freight would

continue moving within the system and be checked by
LEOs at the next transfer point. When the shipment arrived
at the hub/destination terminal, the freight interdiction con-
tact using narcotic detecting canine and other research tools
would either establish probable cause for a warrant or clear
the shipment.
The second reason, safety, would be solved by the freight
following normal shipping protocol and the fact that only
a limited number of freight employees would be aware the
freight was being tracked. Law enforcement officers (LEO) liai-
sons at the border would be contacted by freight interdiction
units in Dallas/Houston regarding positive, suspicious ship-
ments freeing those officers/agents from the responsibility of
having to check out this large volume of freight.
By LEOs not having a physical presence at the freight docks
it is less likely that the other freight employees would notify
traffickers of their freight being identified as suspicious. The
freight identified as suspicious in this program would normally
not come to the attention of LEOs at the border. Officers/agents
working at the border will continue to get tips on freight,
which in the past has been identified by traditional means. By
developing relationships with freight terminals at the border,
these investigations should also be enhanced because of the
resulting better cooperation and understanding. We feel that
implementing the above program will improve the amount
of intelligence regarding suspicious freight shipments received
and reduce the volume of freight to be reviewed making it man-
ageable. The intelligence received not only will be expanded
to the destination cities but back to the border cities in which
the shipment originated.
As a result of the events of 9/11, the freight industry is
under scrutiny by the government to control criminal activ-
ity and potential terrorist activities. The freight industry would
benefit by being given a way to report suspicious shipments
and alleviate their fears of threats and loss of revenue by
 Moving Forward ◾ 193

policing themselves. It has been found that drug organizations

are embedded into the freight industry and have been using
freight to move their drug shipments throughout the country.
By making the freight industry employees more comfortable in
reporting this activity, we can draw on their expertise to iden-
tify and uncover these shipments and organizations.
The “net” part of Bordernet would consist of freight inter-
diction units off the border in Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston,
and El Paso working to set up a network of officers/agents
willing to receive information and work together to develop
the information to the fullest with LEO liaisons on the border
in Laredo and McAllen/Brownsville. Officers/agents would use
their contacts within the LTL freight industry to develop SOIs to
track suspicious freight. Members of the DFWTF have contacted
officers/agents in Houston and El Paso regarding working
freight interdiction. Officers/agents in Laredo, McAllen, and
other border cities who have been found to work with freight
companies have been contacted to liaison on the border. All
of the above locations have shown interest in coordinating
intelligence received from border freight terminals and con-
ducting investigations.
Since 9/11, the New York City Police Intelligence Unit
has taken a different approach to identifying terrorist look-
ing at New York City as a target. The NYPD has developed
the “NEXUS” program which is basically developing relation-
ships with legitimate businesses to report suspicious activity,
“interdiction.” The NYPD has also assigned detectives to
foreign countries to liaison with intelligence units to see what
is coming at New York from places where terrorism origi-
nates. Bordernet is similar in concept attempting to look at
the drug and contraband problem from a different angle and
knowing what we are dealing with before it arrives in Dallas/
Fort Worth or Houston. We are not taking away from the
efforts of officers/agents at the border, but enhancing the capa-
bility to identify narcotic trafficking organizations which would
fly under the radar.
194 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

We have been told by the freight industry that these charac-

teristics have been observed in the past. When contacted, we
have been successful on many occasions in making seizures
and uncovering organizations. This program is not trying to
move in on the other’s territory, but rather to enhance and
utilize an untapped resource. A hundred percent of zero still
equals zero. If we cannot get this industry to work with us,
and if we cannot work with each other, we are missing a
great resource!

Procedures and Resources to Develop Bordernet

The Freight Industry
◾◾ Work with contacts/SOI’s developed by freight interdic-
tion units in Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, and El Paso to
develop to identify potential contacts/SOI’s in McAllen/
Brownsville, Laredo, El Paso, and other border areas.
◾◾ Travel to Laredo and McAllen/Brownsville area terminals
to discreetly meet with terminal managers and conduct
training to set up the program and develop their trust.
Border LEO liaisons would be introduced as border liai-
sons/contacts during these meetings.
◾◾ Develop protocols working with representatives of the
freight industry to establish how information regard-
ing suspicious shipments is relayed to law enforcement
(through security directors versus directly from TMs to
“net” LEOs. Phone versus e-mail or terminal access).
◾◾ Set initial criteria of characteristics for suspicious ship-
ments to be:
1. “Dock drop off” at the border terminals.
2. Cash or money order or pre-paid credit card payment
by shipper or other suspicious activity observed at the
terminal or in the paperwork. The shipment at this
time would be considered “suspicious” and would be
sent as a normal shipment.
 Moving Forward ◾ 195

All shipments with the above characteristics would be

considered suspicious shipments at the border terminals and
would not be treated any differently than a normal shipment.
The shipment would depart the terminal to Dallas, Houston,
or other hub along with other freight. The SOI at the terminal
would follow the contact protocol and notify “net” LEOs of the
suspicious shipment prior to departure of the trailer. (Contact
prior to departure is necessary due to the Border Patrol con-
ducting checkpoints off the border and possibly intercepting
the suspicious shipment. By prior knowledge by “net” LEOs the
release of the driver/tractor trailer may be expedited).

◾◾ The information needed regarding the suspicious ship-

ment would be: PRO #, time of arrival at hub/destination
terminal, time of departure or delivery from hub/­
destination terminal, bill of lading/manifest information
(shipper/consignee: names, addresses, phone numbers,
weight, listed contents, quote price, price paid, form of
payment), suspect description, vehicle description and
identification shown upon shipping.
◾◾ Freight companies should always receive full payment
upon shipping, or as soon as suspects arrive to pick up
freight on “dock pickups.” If the shipment is reweighed
upon arrival at destination terminal and discrepancy is
found, the suspect should be advised he will have to
pay for the discrepancy before receiving the shipment
(benefits LEOs/freight company by having suspect possi-
bly leave and identify co-conspirators/get freight company
money due).

Bordernet Law Enforcement

◾◾ Develop and meet with law enforcement liaison contacts
in McAllen/Brownsville, Laredo, El Paso, and other bor-
der areas that may currently have contacts within the
freight industry interested in coordinating intelligence
196 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

information and conducting investigations within the

network where it will do the most good developing cases
and intelligence to the fullest.
◾◾ Establish contact list and meet with officers/agents work-
ing the “net” in Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, and El Paso
checking the availability resources (narcotic detecting
canine, officers, travel funds, etc.) and commitment to
the program to be able to efficiently work the suspicious
freight within the parameters set by normal shipments.
◾◾ Prior to the suspicious shipment arriving at the hub/­
destination terminal the information being received from
the SOI approximately five to nine hours before by “net”
LEOs/analysts in Dallas/Houston should be researched
for any criminal history or related cases. The addresses
should be verified to see what is at that location and
search warrant can be prepared documenting observed
characteristics and researched information.
◾◾ Upon the suspicious shipment arriving at the hub/­
destination terminal the shipment will be met by “net”
LEOs and a narcotic detecting canine. The suspicious
shipment should be removed from the trailer and placed
on the dock in an area not to disturb the normal flow of
the dock. The suspicious shipment should be checked by
a narcotic detecting canine for the presence of a nar-
cotic odor and reweighed for any weight discrepancy. A
description, measurements, and photographs of all sides
of the shipment should be taken. Upon probable cause
being developed a search warrant should be received
as soon as possible to stay within the parameters set for
the departure/delivery time. (Search warrants are recom-
mended due to the evidence possibly being inadmissible
in court by administratively opening shipment under
freight company’s authority to inspect freight/freight
companies potentially become agents of the government
by the training received and advising to look for suspi-
cious freight.)
 Moving Forward ◾ 197

◾◾ If the suspicious shipment is found to be negative for

canine alert and no probable cause developed, the ship-
ment will be considered clear and will remain in the
care of the freight company to continue in the freight
system. If the shipment is a transfer shipment and cannot
be checked or cleared between the time of arrival and
departure, LEOs at the next transfer point would be con-
tacted to check the suspicious shipment.
◾◾ Upon a search warrant being received for the suspicious
shipment, the shipment will be carefully opened and
inspected to preserve the package for a possible con-
trolled delivery. If contraband is found in the shipment,
the evidence will be photographed, fingerprinted, and
documented. If a controlled delivery is to be attempted,
the evidence will remain or be removed pending the
advice of the AUSA/DA. Technical equipment (tracking
device/package beacon) should be installed upon estab-
lishing surveillance for a controlled delivery. If the ship-
ment is a transfer shipment going to other parts of the
country, contact should be made with LEOs at the desti-
nation city. If destination LEOs are interested in conduct-
ing a controlled delivery, the evidence should be removed
and the package should be reconstructed as accurately
as possible. The shipment should then continue within
the freight system. (Check with freight company to make
sure “no” notations have been made within the freight
company tracking system. Narcotic traffickers track ship-
ments for any deviation on freight company websites.)
Arrangements should be made to transport the contra-
band to the destination city for a controlled delivery.
◾◾ Upon no interest by destination city to conduct a con-
trolled delivery, remove and process the evidence. The
package should be reconstructed as accurately as possible
and should continue within the freight system to the des-
tination city. Local law enforcement could be contacted at
the destination city to conduct a traffic stop and identify
198 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

suspect upon shipment being delivered by a freight com-

pany. Intelligence received can be documented and dis-
tributed to the originating and destination cities.

Future: Bordernet Computer Scanning

The Bordernet program is an evolution of traditional interdic-
tion; the next stage in the evolution of interdiction regarding
freight interdiction would be “computer scanning.” This pro-
gram is similar to the hijacker profile that the FAA used to
track characteristics which identified potential hijackers. This
program would give us the ability to review even more freight
and eliminate the time constraints put on employees review-
ing manually. Even though we would always have the need
to learn from the “expertise” of freight employees, this would
give us the ability to check freight which has met the charac-
teristics set. In some cases, employees might see shipments
with characteristics that they are too busy to check or notify us.
In working with the freight industry in the past, we have
found that there is the ability to tap into the LTL freight com-
panies’ computerized billing information and identify charac-
teristics which have been found to be common on a number
of freight seizures which were observed to be suspicious. We
know of at least one freight company security director who
was able to develop a computer program with his IT unit that
would scan shipments for characteristics and identify suspi-
cious freight containing narcotics, currency, and other ille-
gal items. This security director stated, “My IT guys had this
installed in less than two hours.” We have found by talking
with representatives of the freight industry that the ASA 400 is
the most common base operating system currently used in the
freight industry to track billing information. Representatives
who have systems other than the ASA 400 have said that this
program can be adapted to other systems also.
The program we would like to develop would be working
with corporate/security in the freight companies where the
 Moving Forward ◾ 199

computer would watch certain cities known for narcotic traf-

ficking, possible terrorist activity, or other illegal activity. The
computer would be programmed to scan for some of the fol-
lowing characteristics: shipping routes, form of payment, how
delivered/received, weight discrepancies, coded to un-coded,
addresses, person to person, business names, phone numbers,
or cost-to-profit ratio. If the computer observes a shipment
containing at least two of the identified characteristics, the
PRO # is then emailed to a company security investigator. The
bill is then reviewed further to see if it is a common customer
or should be investigated further. If the shipment is found to
be suspicious, it would be referred to a freight interdiction unit
to be investigated as suspicious freight.
Since 9/11, we have all heard that we need to tighten up
security with regard to terrorism. We have also heard that
the Department of Homeland Security would like to implement
rules on the freight companies to tighten security in the freight
industry. We hope that if we can implement this program we can
give the freight industry a proactive approach to scanning for
narcotics, contraband, illegal weapons, people, and other terror-
ist related activity. We feel that it would be much better for the
freight industry to show it is policing its own business and doing
everything possible to identify and keep illegal shipments out of
the freight industry, than be told how policing should be done.
The advantage to law enforcement would be that a greater
amount of freight would be reviewed with characteristics
which have been found on prior seizures. This would increase
the probability that more seizures would be made. The char-
acteristics could be periodically adjusted in the computer to
reflect changing trends which narcotic traffickers and other
criminal enterprises make to avoid detection. The computer
would also be more objective and take away some of the con-
cern of racial profiling. The computer would look at character-
istics of criminal activity, not race or ethnic backgrounds.
Obviously to develop this program there are quite a few
hurdles to jump. Some hurdles found up to this point include
200 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

“right to privacy” or government access to private companies’

records, the government acting as “big brother.” The freight
industry also has concerns about sharing shipment records
between competing companies that might also be shared by
law enforcement. Most companies have shown an interest in
the program due to their belief that they have an obligation to
run a clean company, be good responsible corporate citizens,
and to keep criminal enterprises from using the industry to
conduct criminal activity. Another and probably the bigger of
the problems is financial side of the IT needs for computer
scanning. What we have encountered when attempting to
develop this program is that the IT personnel are extremely
busy developing projects that enable the company to be more
efficient and profitable. The other part is determining who
would have the actual work assignment to review the informa-
tion generated by the computer system and make the referral
to the security department unless it could be built with an
alert notification and send the qualifying suspicious shipments
information directly to them. Normally, corporate security
managers/investigators have worked with us, but sometimes,
due to the relatively small number of these positions and the
fact that they have to cover large areas of the country, they are
not always immediately available.
Upon working with the freight industry while conducting
freight interdiction operations, I have rarely found another
industry more willing to work with law enforcement to keep
the industry free of criminal activity. The employees we have
contacted are extremely proud when they have assisted us in
identifying shipments in which seizures have been made. I
feel that the access to billing records could be overcome by
developing tight and proper protocols for how and by whom
this information is received and developed. The issue of devel-
oping the actual program with the technology people would
possibly take funding from a grant to fund overtime for IT to
work on this project outside normal responsibilities. It is cur-
rently anticipated very little if any funding would be needed
 Moving Forward ◾ 201

for any other resources. The ability to receive this information

upon computer scanning for suspicious shipments possibly
could be overcome by law enforcement showing a commit-
ment to the freight industry and gaining the trust of corporate
to receive this information more directly (Matis 2006).
This proposal, although it was never acted upon, shows
some thought into how the government and the industry
could work together for a common goal without one having to
acquiesce to the other. This program has validity even though
several factors would have to be worked out. The main fact
is that by using the known contraband profiles we have dis-
cussed in this book, many of the illicit shipments placed into
the commercial systems could be identified and interdicted.
Because no task force currently operating is using this infor-
mation and informational sources, a high percentage of these
shipments are not identified. When I worked in the industry
and we identified one of these shipments, we would go back
into the records using shipper and consignee information
and usually we would find numerous shipments tied to the
same sources which had traveled through the system to final
delivery without being interdicted. Using these profiles allows
investigators to work smarter and more efficiently than using a
dog handler to scan millions of pounds of freight.
The DEA could easily setup a program like this that would
not take a lot from what they do now and probably would
provide significant return. DEA would be the agency that has
the jurisdiction and capability of covering the shipments off the
border and the first break points. This Bordernet proposal,
drawn up by a city police detective working in a drug inter-
diction task force, is a good starting point. Personnel assigned
to a unit like this would need to be educated on the work-
ings of the industry and to build the public/private partnership
with the involved companies but it is all very easily accom-
plished. Government agencies and agents currently do not use
the resources available to them in most companies. The major-
ity of security managers for medium to large transportation
202 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

groups are former law enforcement personnel. They under-

stand the rules of engagement on both sides of the fence and
are more than happy to assist when wrongdoing is involved.
Just recently, an NICB agent referred a federal law enforcement
officer to me. The officer was doing a drug investigation that
involved commercial vehicle shipments, and he needed infor-
mation on how to locate certain information for his investiga-
tion. He provided a quick overview of his situation, and I was
able to refer him to several sources that could help him find
the information he needed. I did not need to know any secret
information or be clued into any law enforcement sensitive
data in order to guide him to sources where he could obtain
the company and insurance information he was seeking. Why
work harder than you have to? If a trusted resource is avail-
able, reach out and use it.
Over the years, members of the SWTSC companies have
had issues with different federal agencies and operations or
the checkpoints they operate which involve the transportation
industry. Many times the decisions federal agencies make or
the actions they take suggest that their agents have no idea
how the different parts of the industry work. If they had that
fundamental understanding, they could avoid taking actions
that were not in the best interest of the involved company or
its inspection or investigation. Many times by reaching out to a
company security or operations manager, their questions could
easily be answered and the issue resolved without detaining
drivers or impeding freight operations. Many times, just by
having a basic understanding of the modes of transportation
operation, a proper investigative decision could be made. This
is currently the exception and not the rule. Most companies
want very much to cooperate and to operate in a lawful man-
ner. Reach out to your public/private partnership groups like
the councils and associations and make those contacts and
build your resources. It helps everyone in the long run.
In the normal course of my daily activity, I receive bulle-
tins involving the recovery of stolen cargo. One was in Dallas,
 Moving Forward ◾ 203

Texas, and the other in Kansas City, Missouri. The reason I

mention these circumstances here is because both circum-
stances involved not only law enforcement personnel, but also
insurance investigators and private investigators all working
and sharing information with one another. Both operations
recovered hundreds of thousands of dollars of goods. The
point is that it takes everyone working together. I am proud
of the networking we have put together with the councils and
law enforcement and I see success from these actions almost
every week. In the aforementioned Dallas recovery, every loss
was reported through the council and several of the clues
which lead to the recovery came from information passed
between many different council members. This is what it is
all about and is how it should work. As we move forward, we
need to keep pushing the sharing of information and working
together. Many law enforcement agencies and industry partici-
pants still need to hop aboard. This public/private partnership
works and pays huge dividends.

Lobby for Formation of Cargo Theft Task Forces

As mentioned above, one of the recommendations of this
book is to work toward establishing cargo theft task forces
in locations which have been identified as having a large
amount of cargo theft activity. Since the inception of the
SWTSC in 1999, there have been two efforts to form a task
force for this purpose in Texas. Both times the efforts were
thwarted. During the first effort, many years ago, the FBI in
Dallas, Texas, was willing to sponsor the task force and pro-
vide some funding for overtime and equipment, but the local
law enforcement agencies would not provide the investigators
needed. Many of the departments really did not understand
the need. Several jurisdictions in the DFW Metroplex would
really benefit from an organized group for this purpose,
but their chiefs outsmarted themselves by turning down the
204 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

assistance the group would have brought their investigators

along with the extra funding. Assigning someone to a task
force does not remove them from your department, they can
still be assigned offenses, still be under the departmental
control, but they now have access to assistance from the other
task force members and the extra funding.
In 2010, another effort to put together a cargo theft task
force for Texas was made. The effort was led by a former
Irving, Texas, police chief and a member of the North Texas
Crime Commission’s Board of Directors. They put together
a plan with the mission and organization and were able to
take the information all the way to the governor’s office. They
made quite a bit of headway with legislators and garnered the
backing of the National Insurance Crime Bureau, the SWTSC
and others before their efforts fell short and they were unable
to obtain funding. Their effort was appreciated by the industry
and related associations and has led to other venues which
may be open to getting cargo crime added to the responsibili-
ties of current auto theft and auto burglary task forces that
exist around the state.
Even though several of our efforts have been rejected, we
keep trying to bring awareness to the people who need to
know so that cargo theft prevention and investigation can be
given consideration in law enforcement efforts beyond the
hard work of each single jurisdiction. In Texas, we know that
the majority of the cargo crime is in the Dallas/Fort Worth
Metroplex and the Houston areas. If a task force were to be
put in place, because of the miles between those areas, one
task force would not be able to cover both areas easily. It
would have to be organized like the California Highway Patrol
Cargo Theft Interdiction program where they have differ-
ent divisional assignment locations for the border, southern
and northern areas, and use multi-agencies to fill their inves-
tigative detective slots. The mission of their investigations
includes tractor and trailer theft, stolen property investigations
(large quantities, multiple cases), theft of cargo stolen from
 Moving Forward ◾ 205

warehouses, trailers and trains, and assisting allied agencies

in like investigations. This set-up would work well in Texas. If
not, we need to seek the assistance of the Auto Burglary Theft
Prevention Authority (ABTPA) statewide task forces or at the
least get the investigative agents of the Houston Area District
of the Texas Department of Public Safety to add cargo theft
as a priority, as was done in Dallas. The ABTPA route would
take a dedicated funding source or a fee which could be
assessed to provide dollars to the current ABTPA Task Forces
so they could allocate manpower and time toward cargo along
with their other duties. This funding source and idea is cur-
rently being studied. It is a proven fact that in areas where a
cargo theft task force is in place law enforcement has much
greater success in arrests and recovery.
The main thing for the industry is to keep looking at any
and all remedies to support the creation of law enforcement
task forces to engage in the investigation of this hard to pur-
sue criminal activity.
The other states identified as having a problem with cargo
theft include California, Georgia, New Jersey, and Illinois,
and they have task forces. Florida, which is also identified as a
problem area, just lost the TOMCATS, but still has some state
police groups assigned to follow up cargo theft responsibility.
The main focus continues to be in Texas and we will continue
to work toward more resolutions for cargo theft investigation
for our industry.
As far as cargo crime programs and cargo task forces go,
what has been done in the past is the future. We must keep
building the current industry council’s membership and reach.
These organizations have had a powerful impact and filled a
large void where in the past there was nothing. The Southwest
Transportation Security Council has more members and a far
wider reach today to fill many needs, but there is much more
we can do. To work at creating task forces or meeting any
goal of the transportation security industry, there must be an
organization and communication backbone from which to
206 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

work. The system of communication that exists today because

of the councils is unprecedented for this industry but is still a
work in progress. Considering where the SWTSC started and
where it is today, the progress is pretty amazing. The fact is
that it has been involved in many success stories for both the
police and the industry and that as a group it provides many
services to its members and beyond. Those services include
the BOLO/Alerts, law enforcement contacts, employment and
job announcement services, and an industry and law enforce-
ment assistance network that has connected the dots for many
people, companies, and agencies around the country and into
Canada and Mexico. We will continue to grow our council
and assist other councils with formation and membership.
The strength and reach of our council grows with the groups
who network with us. The coming formation of the Virginia
Carolina Cargo Security Council will really assist with the east
coast port authorities and growing the law enforcement reach
on Interstate 85 and 95 through those areas. We have seen
increased cargo theft activity in Charleston, SC, in the past
year so the forming of the VCCSC is good timing. This council
will be a force multiplier for all of the current councils and is
a welcome addition to the information share, networking, and
vendor resources and solutions.
Finally, the job of organizing the transportation security
industry is never done. Adding new councils or members is a
welcome addition to the current arrangement and keeps the
network growing and moving forward.
USING BEST III
PRACTICES
Chapter 8

Epilogue

Early in this book, I noted the wish of cargo security profes-

sionals to be able to quantify cargo theft. We looked at the
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) definition of cargo theft and
saw very convoluted reporting guidelines. We also learned as
we traveled through this book that states that want to report
crimes through the UCR system must have their own cargo theft
statutes in place. Very few states currently have such statutes.
That restriction causes many cargo theft crimes to fall
through the cracks and into other UCR index categories that
are more easily identified by law enforcement reporting units.
I do not believe the UCR system will ever resolve the issue.
One reason is that it does not look at the UCR system from
both the police and private sides.
We talked about the many modes of transportation and
their practices. Private companies, especially consolidators
such as LTL trucking firms, never report all of their losses
to the police. They may report major losses with traceable
serial numbers, but most pilferages and thefts of nonserial-
ized products are handled through contractual agreements
and internal claims and security investigations processes. A
company investigation may or may not identify a suspect.
A root-cause investigation may often identify weaknesses in

209
210 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

On one occasion, I suspected a driver working city deliv-

eries and pick-­ups from a south Texas terminal of several
terminal thefts and was the focus of our investigation.
We set up a sting by placing un­manifested freight on his
delivery route and we planned to conduct surveillance.
The freight (very expensive home hardware) was placed
on his unit. The value of the freight made theft a felony
offense according to the Texas Penal Code. I hired a pri-
vate investigator to assist with the surveillance and placed
a radio frequency beacon in the freight so that I could
track the bait during the operation. We had a delivery
manifest for the day so we know the driver’s schedule for
deliveries.
He left the terminal and went about making deliveries.
After the third delivery, he drove south, off his expected
route. We followed and confirmed via the beacon that the
freight was on board his vehicle. The driver drove about
12 miles off route to a downtown area. He drove through
alleys and small streets, making following him somewhat
difficult. He stopped at a used clothing location that was not
on his route or manifest and unloaded a shipment. After he
left, I found that the beacon no longer emitted signals from
his delivery unit. I returned to the used clothing store and
I found that my RF beacon was chirping like a happy bird.
The private investigator and I entered the location and
saw the suspected shipment. We recovered the shipment
and interviewed women at the location who told us that
the driver left the shipment and said he would return to
pick it up later. We returned to the terminal and called
the suspected driver to the terminal. Of course by then,
he knew about the problem. He was interviewed. In a
written statement, he admitted taking the property and
not following company rules pertaining to unmanifested
freight found on his unit.
 Epilogue ◾ 211

I called the police and made a theft report. The case

was assigned to an investigator many days later. He related
that I should have involved the police in the surveillance.
Because I did not do that, I would have to take the case
directly to the district attorney. The district attorney, in
turn, said that the police had to file the case. Obviously, I
was stuck in the middle of law enforcement agencies that
did not want to do their jobs.
At this point, the prosecution attempt was abandoned.
The employee had resigned during his interview. About
18 months later, I learned that another LTL carrier had
hired the suspected employee and now was also hav-
ing theft issues. If he had been prosecuted, he probably
would not have been hired by the next company. Because
companies are restricted legally from passing on informa-
tion about former employees, we see much of this kind
of turnover in the industry. Remember, the best predic-
tor of future behavior is past behavior and that analogy
seldom fails, no matter the time span.

the process that allow exceptions to happen and operational

adjustments will be made
If a suspect is identified, security investigators will deter-
mine whether the offense is reportable because the company
has supportable evidence, in which case the police will be
engaged. If not, an employee suspect may be terminated
or allowed to resign and all parties move forward. When
I worked for an LTL, I investigated several such thefts.
Depending on the evidence or circumstance, we may have
given the investigation information to the police who would
file a case, usually if the case was a felony and good evidence
existed to support the prosecution.
If the facts and the value of a theft do not meet certain
thresholds, they are handled internally and never reported.
That is a reality of the shipping business and will probably
212 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

never change. Smaller thefts and exceptions will always be

dealt with in the most efficient way and reporting the informa-
tion to the police is not always necessary or practical. Many
times it is easier to solve the problem and move on.

Learning from Reality

We as an industry must be the force that causes law enforce-
ment officers to engage regarding cargo theft and other
offenses. I believe that one of the best approaches is through
local auto theft units and detectives assigned to commercial
vehicle theft investigation and also though the International
Association of Auto Theft Investigators (IAATI) and its regional
affiliates. These parties understand the connection of auto
theft and cargo theft and many of them are already actively
working such cases. Through my association with LoJack
Corporation, I have already provided organizations and
regional affiliates with cargo theft training and I attend most
of their conferences to network with detectives around the
country. Pat Clancy, LoJack’s director of law enforcement, has
been a great advocate for a partnership of IAATI members
and the cargo industry. Pat has encouraged his law enforce-
ment liaisons around the country to assist with cargo thefts
and recoveries.
As I have said throughout this book, the freight industry
must protect itself. The police will assist, but the industry must
forge networks and foster contacts or it will be left calling 911
like other crime victims. We do not want that. We want rela-
tionships with law enforcement departments, agencies, and offi-
cers who will attend training conferences, pay attention to our
criminal issues, and help when needed. Building those relation-
ships is imperative. If everyone in the industry builds networks
and shares information, the force multipliers are in action.
 Epilogue ◾ 213

The SWTSC and other councils support the law enforce-

ment groups that work our industry cases in every way pos-
sible. I have seen the positive sides of such relationships and
also felt the isolation of not having a direct connection when
needed. If everyone who works in the industry adds one
police investigator to the distribution lists of the councils that
provide BOLO alerts and participates in SC-­ISAC or CargoNet
efforts, they are building something that is much bigger than
any single entity. I have a very full Rolodex and over 500 con-
tacts in my cell phone. They are not enough. I will never refuse
to assist anyone who needs a law enforcement connection. I
may not be able to do it in every case but I will make the effort.
Most people who contact me are assisted quickly. A contact
not entered in my cell phone might be on the SWTSC distribu-
tion list or among my computer contacts. If law enforcement
needs a contact in the industry, the SWTSC can usually pro-
vide one. The goal of every good company investigator should
be to build a personal network that in turns builds the indus-
try’s network and reach
A glossary of freight and transportation security words and
acronyms is included at the end of this book to help explain
the language of the industry and related security terms.
Future work is simple: keep doing what we have been
doing by supporting entities that advocate and promote infor-
mation sharing and public–private partnerships. Understand
your industry and the criminal elements that attack and
exploit it. Awareness, education, and communication are
the answers to most problems, even cargo theft. With a full
knowledge of the risks and threats, it is easy to set in place
a plan to prevent incidents and protect an operation. Cargo
industry operations have many similarities and also differ-
ences. Every company has unique needs and requirements
to make its operations secure. This book covered the many
risks, discussed the collected and analyzed cargo theft data,
214 ◾ Cargo Crime: Security and Theft Prevention

and explained criminal methods of operation and the threats

facing each mode of transportation. Although the industry is
complex and moving freight is a far more complicated opera-
tion than it appears, the vital information in this book will
help you make the best decisions in operations and security
planning for your employer.
Dialing 911 should not be your recovery plan and the gov-
ernment’s Global Supply Chain National Strategy is not your
security plan! You can do much better!
Appendix: Southwest
Transportation Security
Council Freight
Term Glossary

Abloy: High-strength transportation lock.

Absolute minimum: Minimum charge below which a carrier
will not discount.
Access control: Control of persons, vehicles, and materials by
implementation of security measures for a protected area.
Accessorial service: Service rendered by a carrier in addi-
tion to regular service typically for a fee.
Adjudicate: Settle or determine a matter finally through the
course of judicial authority. In criminal justice usage,
the term is used with reference to a judgment of acquit-
tal or conviction.
AG IMP: Agricultural implement.
AGPS: Assisted global positioning satellite.
Air bag: Bag designed to secure and block freight loaded in
trailers by using air pressure.
Alarm system: Combination of sensors, controls, and annun-
ciators arranged to detect and report an intrusion or
other emergency.

215
216 ◾ Appendix

All short: Exception indicating that there is no freight to

match a shipping document.
AMC: Account management center.
Arbitrary (Arb): Charge added to certain delivery points or
for various activities to cover additional expense.
Arrival notice: Written or verbal notice to consignee that a
shipment has arrived.
Asset protection: Shielding from danger or harm the money,
receivables, information, resources, rights, property, and
other valuables of an owner.
A sheet: Reference in multiple load manifests for loads going
to separate destinations including A, B, and sometimes
C sheets and loads.
Astray freight: Freight separated from its billing documents.
Attempt: Act done with intent to commit a crime but fall-
ing short of its actual commission; a form of conduct
coupled with intent that tends to effect the commission
of a crime.
Audit: Examination of procedures and practices for the pur-
poses of identifying and correcting unwanted conditions.
Axle weight: Amount of weight bearing on one axle.
Back haul: Traffic moving in direction of light flow when a
carrier’s traffic in a given lane is heavier in one direction
than the other or moving a load back to original origin.
Background screening: Inquiry into history and behaviors
of an individual under consideration for employment.
Banding machine: Dock machine used to install straps.
Barrel wheeler or truck: Dolly hand truck built to move
drums and barrels.
BBL: Barrel.
BDL: Bundle.
Best practices: Elements found to be successful such as
policy and planning as guides, work rules and proce-
dures as directives, risk assessment, crime opportunity
reduction, and training of employees.
 Appendix ◾ 217

Bill of lading: Legal contract between shipper and carrier to

move goods; may serve as shipper’s receipt.
Bill to: Designation for billing to a responsible party.
Blind side: Nondriver side of vehicle.
Blocking: Supports to stabilize shipment loaded in trailer.
Bob tail: Tractor operating without trailer.
Bogie: Two-­axle assembly or tandem axle.
BOL or B/­L: Bill of lading.
BOLO: Be on the lookout (theft alert).
Bonded warehouse: Location authorized by government,
under bond, for observance of revenue laws.
Bottom freight: Heavy freight or floor freight that cannot be
stacked or loaded on other freight.
Box: Trailer or semitrailer.
Bracing: Same as blocking.
Break bulk: Point where freight is exchanged or consolidated
for continued movement to final delivery destinations.
Broker: Person or company that arranges truck transporta-
tion of cargo belonging to others, using for-­hire carriers
to provide transportation.
Bulk freight: Nonpackaged or containerized freight.
Bulkhead: Wall built in trailer to stabilize freight in-­transit.
Burden of proof: Burden on prosecuting authority to prove
guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
BX: Box.
Cab: Driver’s compartment of truck or tractor.
Cable seal: Heavy steel cable used to secure closed trailer doors.
Cab-­over: Driver compartment substantially over the engine
compartment.
Canine security: Use of dogs in security for guarding property,
protecting people, and detecting drugs and explosives.
Capacity load: Trailer loaded to either legal weight or where
no additional piece can be added.
Cargo Intelligence Process: Continuous cycle of infor-
mation collection, evaluation, analysis, collation,
218 ◾ Appendix

reporting, and dissemination directed toward convert-

ing raw information into material useful for cargo
theft prevention and awareness.
Cargo liability insurance: Motor truck cargo insurance
coverage purchased to protect truck drivers and carri-
ers from liability for transported cargo that belongs to
shippers or clients.
Cargo security: Multilayered, multimode approach to secure
cargo in transit in the supply chain.
Cart: Four-­wheeled dock dolly for moving freight.
Cartage: Hauling between locations in same area or P&D of
freight within a commercial zone acting as agent for
shipper or over the road (OTR) carrier.
Cash collect: Order to collect cash at point of delivery.
CBP: Customs and border protection.
CDL: Commercial driver’s license.
Check stand: Dock desk at loading door.
Checkstop: Regular scheduled stop at customer location.
CHEM: Chemicals.
Chock: Wedge used to block trailer tires or to block freight in
a trailer.
CHP CTIP: California Highway Patrol Cargo Theft
Interdiction Program.
Claim: Demand made for payment from carrier for loss or
damage.
Claim tracer: Claim status request.
Claimant: Filer of a claim.
Class rate: Transportation rate established for a group of
commodities.
Classification of freight: Category assigned an article
of freight according to the National Motor Freight
Classification (NMFC).
Clean BOL: Signed delivery receipt with no exceptions.
COBZ: Company business shipment.
COD: Collect on delivery.
 Appendix ◾ 219

COLL: Collect.
Collect shipment: Shipment paid for upon delivery to
consignee.
Combination: Truck or tractor coupled to one or more
trailers.
Commodity: Cargo articles, goods, or merchandise.
Commodity rate: Special rate for specific goods.
Commodity tariff: Tariff of commodity rates.
Common carrier: Transportation company that offers service
to the general public.
Concealed damage: Damage not apparent and subsequently
not noted on delivery receipt.
Concealed loss: Loss that is not apparent and subsequently
not noted on delivery receipt.
Connecting carrier: Carrier that originates or completes
shipment but does not handle entire shipment.
CONS: Consignee.
Consequential damages: Special damages related to addi-
tional cost of loss or damages based on loss of profit or
advertising promises.
Consign: Send goods.
Consignee: Receiver of goods.
Consignor: Shipper.
Constant surveillance service: System by which a ship-
ment is signed for and confirmed at each point of
consolidation.
Contingent cargo insurance: Coverage that takes over a
claim if primary cargo liability policy fails to provide
coverage or is not adequate to cover the entire loss. A
contingent cargo liability policy pays any remaining
losses subject to conditions of the policy.
Contract carrier: Company that engages in for-­hire trans-
portation of property under contracts with one or more
shippers.
Contract rate: Rate agreed upon by shipper and carrier.
220 ◾ Appendix

Contract security: Protective services provided by a com-

pany specializing in such services to another company
on a paid contractual basis.
Control panel: Centrally located assembly containing power
supplies, relays, amplifiers, and other equipment
needed to receive, interpret, and supervise alarm sig-
nals from a protected area; device that arms, disarms,
and supervises an alarm system.
Controlled access area: Clearly demarcated area, access to
which is controlled, that affords isolation of materials or
persons within it.
Controlled lighting: Exterior lighting that directs illumina-
tion on a particular area.
Conventional cab: Tractor with engine in front of cab.
Copy bill: Copy of original movement document used when
the original is lost.
Corrective action: Action to eliminate the cause of a
detected operational or security flaw.
COSO: Copy of shipment order.
Covert cargo tracking: AGPS tracking technology. An AGPS
device is placed in cargo to produce reports on location
of the load.
Cross dock: Transfer of freight from one trailer to another.
CSS: Constant surveillance service.
CTN: Carton.
C-­TPAT: Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism; volun-
tary government–industry program to create and secure
an efficient supply chain for importers.
Cube: Cubic capacity of a trailer, usually by percentage.
Cubic capacity: Carrying capacity of trailer measured in
cubic feet.
CWT: Hundred weight.
Dead axle: Nonpowered rear axle on tandem truck or tractor.
Deadhead: Trailer moving empty or uncharged shipment.
Delivery set: Freight bill delivery set.
 Appendix ◾ 221

DELY or DLVY or DELV: Deliver.

Demurrage: Detention charge for freight vehicle or container
beyond stipulated time and payment.
Density: Weight of an article per cubic foot.
DEST: Destination.
Detention: Charge made for held vehicle or for consignee
loading.
DHS: Department of Homeland Security.
Diagraph marker: Dock tool used for marking metal.
Direct loss: Dollar measure of costs associated with loss of
money, negotiable instruments, property, information,
and personnel; a loss that is a direct consequence of a
particular peril.
Dispatching: Scheduling of line-­haul or P&D routing.
Diversion: Change in routing that will require a new freight
bill (reconsignment).
Dock: Area where trucks load, unload, or consolidate.
Dock drop: Delivery of freight to origin dock by a shipper or
its representative.
Dock pick-­up: Consignee picks up shipment at destination
dock.
Dock plate: Metal plate used to bridge space between dock
and trailer.
Dolly: Single-­axle device used to couple two trailers together;
non-­motorized two-­wheel hand truck.
Domicile: Driver’s home base location.
DOT: Department of Transportation.
D/­R: Delivery receipt.
Drayage: Charge for hauling freight, usually by local cartage
agents.
Drive axle: Power axle powered by drive shaft.
Driver collect: Driver collect fee upon delivery.
Driver sales representative: Driver who interacts directly
with customers.
Drums: Barrels.
222 ◾ Appendix

DSR: Driver sales representative.

Dual: Pair of tires mounted together.
Dub: Twenty-­eight-foot trailer designed to be pulled two or
three at a time.
Dunnage: Wood, cardboard, foam rubber, air bags, or other
items used to block or cushion freight.
EDI: Electronic data exchange.
ELEC: Electric or electronic.
Electronic countermeasure: Defensive technique designed
to detect, prevent, or expose the use of electronic com-
munication surveillance devices.
EOL: End of line.
Equip: Equipment.
ERCTA: Eastern Region Cargo Theft Association; an industry
regional cargo security council in the northeast region
of the United States.
Escort: Security convoy providing physical presence to pro-
tect high-value shipments.
Exception: Shortage, overage, or damage to a shipment.
Exclusive use: Use of one trailer by one customer for a fee.
EXPD: Expedite.
Expedite: Form for moving astray freight to its proper
destination.
Extension: Long forklift blades
FAC: Freight assembly center.
FAK: Freight of all kinds.
FAST: Free and secure trade.
FB: Freight bill.
Fence: Person who receives or buys and then sells stolen
goods, usually as a business.
Fictitious Pick-­up: Theft of identity of individual or com-
pany and using Identity to pose as contract transporta-
tion carrier and bid for loads on Internet load boards;
load is picked up and never delivered.
Fifth wheel: Device on back of tractor that hooks to king pin
of trailer.
 Appendix ◾ 223

Fingerman: Person who provides information on a truck

marked for hijacking by supplying a description of the
truck, cargo, plate number, road route, departure time,
schedule of stops, arrival time, and similar details of
interest to cargo thieves.
FLF: Forklift.
Forced entry: Entry accomplished by the use of force on
physical components of premises or vehicle using tools
or muscle power.
Forklift: Vehicle used on a dock to lift and move freight.
FRCE: Forced bill; delivery of over freight.
Free Astray: MOVR Pro for moving astray freight free of
charge to correct destination.
Free on Board (FOB): Ownership of goods passes to con-
signee after shipment is loaded.
Free time: Period before stored freight charges are applied.
Freight bill: Transportation company invoice showing
Information about movements and charges.
Freight forwarder: Company that owns no means of trans-
portation and obtains space for freight transportation
from providers. It then sells space to customers.
Freight of all kinds (FAK): Procedure to classify all freight
the same for a single rating.
FRT: Freight.
FTGS: Fittings.
FTL: Full truckload; trucking company that handles high-
volume shipping and utilizes one trailer to transport
freight for one shipper.
Full visible capacity: Trailer loaded to point where no addi-
tional piece can be added.
Gateway: Point at which freight leaves one country and
enters another.
Gaylord container: Pallet size container for movement of
liquid shipments.
GBL: Government bill of lading.
GCBZ: General claims business.
224 ◾ Appendix

Geo fence: Virtual fence that defines a geographical area; can

be used to generate an alert when an asset enters or
exits an area.
Glad hand: Coupling on the front of a trailer to which the
air brake hoses are connected to couple the tractor and
trailer brake systems.
Glad hand lock: Lock that prevents air brake hoses from
being connected to a trailer.
Global positioning satellite (GPS): System that provides
location fixes through a mapping interface from a set of
geostationary satellites orbiting above the earth.
GPS: Global positioning satellite.
Gross negligence: Intentional failure to perform a duty in
reckless disregard of consequences that may affect the
life or property of another; lack of ordinary or even
slight care.
Gross weight: Weight of contents, packing, and equipment.
HAZ MAT: Hazardous material.
HDWE: Hardware.
Header: Shipment loaded in front or nose of a trailer.
HHG: Household goods.
High and tight: Using full cube of a trailer.
Hijacking: Taking control of a vehicle by threat, use of force,
or intimidation.
HM: Hazardous material; substance or material determined by
US Secretary of Transportation to be capable of posing
significant risk.
Homeland security: Federal government effort in coordina-
tion with state and local governments and the private
sector to develop, coordinate, fund, and implement
programs and policies necessary to detect, prepare for,
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from ter-
rorist or other attacks within the United States.
Hostler: Employee who moves trailers to and from a dock in
a yard.
 Appendix ◾ 225

Hostling tractor: Tractor used to move trailers to and from a

dock and around a yard.
Hotline: Dedicated telephone line used exclusively for receiv-
ing security tips; part of a reward system.
Hot shipment: Shipment that requires special attention or
priority delivery.
Hot wire: Starting a vehicle without using a key, for example,
using an electrical jumper wire.
Hybrid locking system: Locking system that derives its
security from two or more different technologies oper-
ated by the same key in one device.
I&E: Income and expense.
I/­S: Iron and/­or steel.
In bond: Goods on which duties or taxes become due and
are placed in a government-bonded warehouse.
Indemnification: Compensating insured individuals for their
losses; restoring the victim of a loss to the position that
existed before the loss occurred.
Indemnity: Insurance contract to reimburse an individual or
organization for possible losses of a specific type.
Indirect loss: Loss that results from a peril or theft beyond
the direct loss of a product. Examples are remanufac-
turing costs, replacement costs, and losses incurred
when product is unavailable.
Information security: Protection of information against
unauthorized disclosure, transfer, modification, and
destruction.
In-­house security: Protective services provided company
employees.
Inside delivery: Delivery that requires moving freight to
positions further than adjacent to a trailer. for example,
to a mall or downtown building. Usually an additional
charge is added for this service.
Integrity seal: Seal that provides clear evidence that it has
been tampered with or illegitimately opened.
226 ◾ Appendix

Interface: Mapping and controlling screen for AGPS covert

cargo-tracking technology.
Interline: Transfer of freight between companies.
Intermodal: Involving more than one mode of transportation.
Interstate: Between states.
Intrastate: Within one state.
Invoice attachment: Document needed for payment, usually
a delivery receipt (DR).
ISO: Insurance services office.
Jammer: Radio frequency or audio frequency oscillator that
interferes with the operation of an electronic audio sur-
veillance system.
Jamming: Deliberate introduction of radio frequencies, elec-
trical signals, or physical objects that are not normal to
the operation of a circuit or device.
Johnson bar: Large crowbar used on freight docks.
KD: Knocked down.
KDF: Knocked down flat.
Key control system: Special cabinet, tray, or other enclosure
for storing keys in an organized system and protecting
them from unauthorized removal.
King pin: Large steel pin under the front of a trailer designed
to mate with fifth wheel on a tractor for towing.
King pin lock: Lock designed to attach to king pin of trailer
that prevents the unit from being connected to the fifth
wheel of a tractor.
Known damage: Damage discovered before or at time of deliv-
ery and notated on a delivery receipt as an exception.
Known loss: Loss discovered before or at time of delivery
and notated on a delivery receipt as an exception.
Landing gear: Support legs at front of a trailer that hold it up
when It is detached from the tractor.
Lane: Movement between origin and destination service points.
Layered security: Physical security approach that requires a
criminal to penetrate or overcome a series of security
layers before reaching a target.
 Appendix ◾ 227

LH: Line haul.

Lift jab: Boom of portable crane that lifts objects with a
chain or cable.
Lift truck: Forklift or tow motor.
Line haul: Movement of freight from one service center to
another (unlike city P&D).
Live axle: Axle powered by engine via drive shaft.
Load bar: Portable adjustable metal bar used to stabilize
freight loads in a trailer.
Load factor: Weight in pounds loaded onto a trailer; the
greater the load factor, the lower the cost.
Load manifest: Bill pack acting as summary of trailer con-
tents (TCON).
Log book: Book containing daily records of hours and routes
of line-­haul drivers required by U.S. DOT.
LPG: Liquid petroleum gas.
LSE: Loose.
LTD QTY: Limited quantity.
LTL: Less than truckload; type of trucking company that spe-
cializes in small-volume hauling by consolidating mul-
tiple clients’ freight loads.
LTL rate: Rate applicable to LTL shipments.
Manifest: Document containing trailer content information
used for control purposes during loading and unloading.
Marine cargo insurance: Protection of cargo shipped inter-
nationally, usually by sea or air, to protect the owner or
carrier in the event of loss due to exposure to weather,
jettison, theft, mishandling, and damages arising from
loading and unloading. Other special circumstances
such as equipment breakdowns and delays that expose
perishable items can also be insured.
Mark: Slang term for a shipment.
Marking or mark: Letters, numbers, or characters placed on
a container for identification.
Master bill: Summary bill for a shipper; not a freight control
document.
228 ◾ Appendix

Meet and turn: Over-­the-­road (OTR) meeting point where

drivers exchange loads and return to their domiciles.
Mid-­South Cargo Security Council: Industry cargo security
council based in Memphis, TN.
Mid-West Cargo Security Council: Regional industry secu-
rity council based in Chicago, IL.
Mid-West Cargo Task Force: Illinois State Police cargo task
force.
Mileage rate: Rate based on mileage instead of commodity.
Mileage tariff: Tariff containing mileage rates.
Minimum charge: Lowest charge for which a shipment can
be handled.
Mix: Combination of freight weights used to max out weight
and cube of a trailer.
Mode: Basic type of freight transportation.
Monitoring by exception: Electronic alert system that
annunciates only when an undesirable act takes place.
Motion detection: Detection of an intruder by monitoring
movement in a protected area.
Motion detection alarm: System that monitors motion in an
area under surveillance.
Motor truck cargo insurance: Insurance that protects an
owner or carrier against certain types of perils like
theft, damage during transit, and other occurrences that
cause loss depending on the type of cargo shipped.
Most products that are shipped over the road can and
should have specific coverage under a motor truck
cargo insurance policy.
MOVR: Bill used to move astray overfreight to its original
PRO destination; matched over freight.
MSCSC: Mid-­South Cargo Security Council.
MSDS: Material safety data sheet.
MSTR: Master bill.
MTL: Material.
NAE: National account executive.
 Appendix ◾ 229

Narcotic: Drug that dulls a person’s senses and produces a

sense of well-­being.
Negligence: Doing something a reasonably prudent person
would not do, or the failure to do something a reason-
ably prudent person would do in similar circumstances.
Negligent hiring: Failure to use reasonable selection in the
employee hiring process, resulting in harm caused to
others.
Nested: Freight packed within other freight.
Net weight: Weight of trailer contents excluding the trailer.
NICB: National Insurance Crime Bureau; organization that
provides agents to assist in investigating insurance fraud
and cargo crime.
NMFC: National motor freight classification. Motor carrier pub-
lication containing regulations, commodity descriptions.
and classifications for most shippable commodities.
NOI: Not otherwise indexed (in NMFC).
Nose: Front of trailer.
Noseload: Same as header.
Noted damage: Freight damage discovered and noted prior
to or during delivery.
NVOCC: Non-­vessel operating common carrier.
O/­O: Owner operator.
Open Cargo Insurance:  Insurance for carriers and own-
ers that covers large volumes of cargo. Several types
of policies provide broad coverage for many areas of
truck and marine operations. One of the most com-
mon is an open perils or open cargo policy. Any party
with a vested interest can insure a certain agreed value,
a specified period of time, or both. These policies are
broad and do not usually list the details of the specific
transaction such as the name of a ship, destination, or
other details because they cover an agreed value or
losses during a specific time.
Open-top trailer: Trailer with removable tarpaulin cover; rag top.
230 ◾ Appendix

Operating ratio: Relationship of total expenses to total

revenues.
Operational audit: Examination of operations of an enter-
prise to ensure that the activities performed are consis-
tent with expressed policy and best practices.
Operational intelligence: Intelligence acquired for planning
and executing operations consistent with a company
strategy.
O/­R: Operating ratio.
OREP: Over report; report covering delivery of pieces in
excess of billed piece count.
Organized crime: Organized criminal activity of persons
who engage in crime as a primary source of income
and cooperate and coordinate illegal activities including
cargo thefts.
ORM: Other regulated materials.
OS&D: Over, short, and damaged; exception between freight
on hand and freight on bill.
OTR: Over the road.
Over freight: Freight separated from movement control docu-
ment or more freight than noted on shipment document.
Over-­the-­counter (OTC) Drugs: Drugs that may be pur-
chased without prescription.
OWB: Over without bill.
Owner-­operator: Self-­employed independent driver who oper-
ates an owned or leased truck; not a company driver.
Pallet: Wooden platform on which freight is stacked during
shipping.
Pallet jack: Hand-­operated lift tool used on dock.
Palletized: Stacked on pallets.
Part Lot PRO: Umbrella PRO number used to cover all parts
of a split shipment moved in more than one trailer.
Payload: Net weight of cargo.
PCS: Pieces.
P&D: Pick-­up and delivery.
 Appendix ◾ 231

Peddle freight: Shipment delivered from service center to

far-­reaching points of service area.
Peddle run: Pick-­up or delivery made outside normal service
center coverage area.
Perimeter barrier: Physical barrier around perimeter of a
protected area to prevent or delay entry.
Perishable freight: Freight that can deteriorate or decay if
not stored properly or delivered on time.
Physical security: Security involving physical measures
designed to prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
facilities, materials, and documents.
Pig: Trailer or container transported on a rail car.
Piggyback: Transportation of highway trailer on a flat rail car.
Pintle hook: Hook mounted on a trailer to connect with the
eye of a dolly trailer.
PLT: Pallet.
Pool shipment: Shipper’s consolidation of several shipments
destined to different delivery points into a single ship-
ment for a carrier.
Powered axle: Drive (powered) axle of a tractor.
PPD: Prepaid.
PPR: Paper.
Prepaid: Payment for shipping is made at origin or shipper is
responsible.
Private search concept: Searches undertaken by private
persons or companies are not subject to constitutional
regulation.
PRO (tracking) number: Carrier control number that links
all related freight movement documents to a shipment.
Proof of delivery (POD): Delivery receipt signed by
consignee.
Property crime: Offenses against property such as burglary,
larceny, motor vehicle, cargo, and other theft.
PSEG: Part segment (billing term).
PTLT: Part lot (billing term).
PTS: Parts.
232 ◾ Appendix

PU: Pick-­up.
Pull the pin: Release fifth wheel lock.
Pup: Twenty-­eight foot trailer designed for multiple uses or to
make city pick-­ups and deliveries.
Pyramid: Palletized freight stacked in pyramid pattern.
Radiofrequency motion detection: Use of radiofrequency
generating and receiving equipment to detect the pres-
ence of an intruder.
Rag top: Open-top trailer that may have tarpaulin cover.
Rail trailers: Trailer usually provided by railroad for load-
ing on flat railcar.
Rate: Charge per hundred weight for transporting freight.
Reconsignment: Change in routing or destination for in-­
transit freight.
Recooper: Repair damaged cartons or containers.
Recovery plan: Documented collection of procedures and
information maintained in readiness for use after a
cargo theft incident.
Reefer: Refrigerated trailer.
Release value: Value specified by a shipper to establish car-
rier’s minimum liability.
Residential delivery: Delivery to private residence; involves
accessorial charge.
Restitution: Returning stolen money or property; may be
done voluntarily or ordered by a court as part of a sen-
tence or as a condition of probation.
Revenue PRO: PRO number or bill used to capture revenue.
Reverse sting: Law enforcement strategy in which under-
cover police pose as criminals and arrest persons who
plan or engage in illegal activity.
RF: Radiofrequency.
RFID: Radiofrequency identification.
Root cause analysis: Technique used to identify circum-
stances that initiate an undesired activity or state.
Rug pole: Forklift attachment.
 Appendix ◾ 233

S/­O: Shipping order.

SC-­ISAC: Supply Chain-Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
Seal: Numbered aluminum or plastic strip fastened to a closed
trailer door to verify door integrity during transit.
Security: Protection against hazards, threats, risks, and losses.
Security manager: Management-level employee with respon-
sibility for the security of an organization or facility.
SED: Shipper’s export declaration.
Semi: Trailer 48- to 53-feet-long equipped with rear wheels
and landing gear.
SETSC: Southeast Transportation Security Council.
Shipper load and count: Indication that the contents of a
trailer or pallet were loaded and counted by a shipper
and the carrier did not participate in loading.
Shipper’s interest insurance: Coverage needed when the
value of a load exceeds the amount of insurance car-
ried by the carrier slated to haul the shipment.
Shipping papers: Documents covering freight movements;
the COSO usually is the only document that travels with
a shipment.
Shore power: Land-­based electric power supply for trucks.
Eliminates the need for engine idling while parked;
may include climate control within the truck cab and
Internet and TV access.
Short or shortage: Number of pieces in a shipment fewer
than number indicated on the freight bill.
Shrink wrap: Plastic wrap used to secure cartons on a pallet.
Shrinkage: Decrease in inventory or loss of volume, usually
applied to a decrease by reason of employee pilferage.
SIC: Standard identification code.
Signature security service: Service designed to provide
continuous responsibility for the custody of shipments
in transit that requires written acknowledgement by
each person handling the shipment at each stage
(consolidation) from point of origin to destination.
234 ◾ Appendix

Single shipment: Shipment weighing less than 500 pounds and

picked up at customer’s dock; subject to accessorial fee.
Skid: Wooden or plastic platform upon which freight is
stacked; base has clearance for lift blades.
SL&C: Shipper load and count.
Slam hammer: Tool used by car thieves and cargo thieves to
remove cylinders of ignition locks.
Sleeper: Tractor with sleeping compartment.
Sleeper run: No-­layover line-­haul with two drivers taking
turns sleeping and driving.
Sliding fifth wheel: Adjustable fifth wheel used to obtain
desired load distribution.
Smuggling: Illegal transport of contraband (drugs, people,
unauthorized freight) usually via commercial vehicles
and transit systems.
Southeast Transportation Security Council: Regional
industry security council based in Atlanta.
Southwest Transportation Security Council (SWTSC): ​
Regional industry security council based in Dallas.
Special damages: Damages in excess of the actual freight
damage such as losses of profit and losses arising from
promises of delivery for advertised products.
Spectrum analyzer: Electronic device that detects the pres-
ence of radiofrequency transmissions characteristic of
covertly installed transmitters.
Split pick-­up or delivery: Multiple location service subject
to accessorial charge.
Spot a trailer: Park a trailer.
Spotter: Yard employee who parks trailers.
Staging: Assembling material and equipment in a particular
place.
Stakeholder: Person or group that has an interest in the per-
formance or success of an organization.
Stop In transit: Scheduled stop to load or deliver en route,
usually involving an accessorial charge.
 Appendix ◾ 235

Straight truck: Truck with power unit and van body in one
piece.
Stretch wrap: Shrink wrap.
Strip: Unload, count, and check a trailer.
Subpoena: Written order issued by a judicial officer requir-
ing a specified person to appear as a witness in a case
and/­or produce written records to the court.
Supply chain: Set of linked resources and processes that
begins with the acquisition of raw material and extends
through the delivery of products or services to end
users across the modes of transport; may include
suppliers, vendors, manufacturing facilities, logistics
providers, internal distribution centers, distributors,
wholesalers, and other entities involved with movement
of products to end users.
Surcharge: Additional charge, most commonly for fuel.
Surveillance: Covert observation of a location, activity, or
person.
Suspect: Person considered by a criminal justice agency to
have committed a criminal offense before he or she is
arrested or charged.
SWTSC: Southwest Transportation Security Council.
SYN: Synthetic.
TAMCATS: Tennessee–Arkansas–Mississippi Cargo Auto Theft
Task Force.
Tandem: Semitrailer, truck, or tractor with two rear axles to
allow for carrying of larger payloads.
Tare weight: Weight of container and packing material;
weight of truck exclusive of contents.
Tariff: Published list of transportation rates, charges, and rules.
Tarpaulin or tarp: Cover for open-top rig.
TCON: List of all PRO numbers in loaded trailer; trailer
contents.
Team drivers: Two or more drivers who ride together and
drive the same truck in shifts, essentially allowing the
236 ◾ Appendix

truck to remain in motion almost constantly. Primarily

used for time-­sensitive or high-value freight.
Technical security: Measures used to identify and prevent
technical threats including electronic wiretapping,
bugging, eavesdropping, signal intercepts, covert sur-
veillance, and attacks on information technology and
communications systems.
Theft: Group of offenses including larceny, burglary, extor-
tion, fraud that share the intent of depriving an owner
of property.
Third party billing: Billing to a party that neither the ship-
per nor the consignee.
Third party logistic provider (3PL): Entity that handles
transportation and logistics for a shipper.
Through rate: Rate covering shipment from origin to desti-
nation as opposed to interline combo rates.
TL: Truckload.
TM: Traffic manager.
TMAN: Trailer manifest. Document used to check load during
unloading; contains PRO numbers, pieces, weight, and
destination standard identification code (SIC).
T/­O: Transport operator.
TOFC: Trailer on flat car.
Top freight: Light or fragile freight that should be loaded on
top of a cube.
Top-­heavy freight: Freight that must be restrained to prevent
falling or damage.
Trace: Determine shipment location.
Tracer: Request to carrier to locate a shipment.
Tracking GPS: Obtaining location report via global position-
ing satellite through a mapping interface.
Tractor: Power unit for pulling trailers.
Traffic manager: Controller of outbound and inbound freight
movements at a location or for an entire company.
Trailer on flat car (TOFC): Transport of a highway trailer
on a rail flat car; piggyback.
 Appendix ◾ 237

Trap trailer: Trailer used to store or stage freight, usually

high-value freight, secured with locks and under super-
visory control.
Trip lease: Hire of an owner operator to make a single trip.
Triple: Tractor pulling three trailers (pups).
Truckload: Quantity of freight that will fill a vehicle or
weigh legal maximum.
TSA: Transportation Security Administration.
TWIC: Transportation worker identification card.
Unloading check sheet: Reverse of trailer manifest; excep-
tions and freight left on are noted.
Vendor audit: Examination of the records of transactions
between a purchaser and a vendor to determine contin-
ued compliance to contract requirements and guidelines.
Vet: Legally examine; physically inspect; inquire, for example,
during a security investigation or background check for
potential employees or service providers.
Via: Line haul stop to load or deliver.
Virtual geo fence: See geo fence.
Voyage Insurance: Coverage to ensure that a cargo moves
from its place of origin to its final destination. This type
of policy has more specific details than an open-cargo
policy because it applies to a trip from a specific origi-
nation to a specific destination. Because of the many
types of potential delays, the length of the passage is
not typically stated. After the cargo is delivered to the
specified destination, the policy typically expires.
Vulnerability analysis: Method of identifying the weak
points of a facility, entity, location, or transit route.
WT: Weight.
WVN: Woven
Warehouseman’s liability: Less than full common carrier
liability based on reasonable care while freight is in
carrier’s possession.
War-­Lok: Transportation locking device.
238 ◾ Appendix

White collar crime: Wide variety of typically nonviolent

crimes that involve deception, corruption, and unau-
thorized use of company assets.
Yard goat or mule: Hostling tractor used to move trailers
around terminal yards.
Zone: Section of alarmed, protected, or patrolled area.
Zone terminal location: Not fully staffed service center
established in area of substantial business activity.
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Transportation Security Council.
Coughlin, J.J. 2010. SC-­ISAC Cargo Theft Report. Forney: SC-­ISAC.
Coughlin, J.J. and Lewis, S. 2010. Best Supply Chain Security
Practices. Dallas: Southwest Transportation Security Council.
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Transportation Security Council.
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US Department of Justice. No date. Cargo Theft UCR Definition.

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Supply Chain Management / Security

Cargo crime—including theft, fraud, and the passage of contraband through

commercial shipping lanes—poses an enormous threat to security and the
economy. By understanding the current methods and operations of those who
attack the supply chain, industry professionals can design effective security
plans and law enforcement can properly investigate these crimes. Cargo Crime:
Security and Theft Prevention is drawn from the author’s personal experiences
as a law enforcement detective and supervisor and as a regional security manager
for a large multimode transportation and logistics company. The book reviews
emerging trends, identifies criminal tactics, discusses law enforcement response to
cargo theft, and presents best practices to help businesses avoid victimization by
cargo thieves.

Topics include:
• The various modes of freight transportation and the differences in
cargo crime activity in each mode
• Methods of operation used by organized crime syndicates and
narcotic smugglers
• The effective use of public and private information-sharing
partnerships to thwart criminal activities
• Known profiles consistent in over 90 percent of contraband shipments

Cargo crime is a critical concern of freight transportation operators, manufacturers,

shippers, insurers, law enforcement, and consumers. This book arms professionals
charged with protecting the supply chain with essential information that can help
them investigate and uncover criminal activity and develop a first class cargo
security program.

K14902
ISBN: 978-1-4665-1245-0
90000
www.crcpress.com

9 781466 512450
w w w.crcpress.com