[ G.R. No.

238203, September 03, 2020 ]

LIGAYA ANG, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
AND WARREN T. GUTIERREZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CARMELITA T. GUTIERREZ,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LOPEZ, J.:
Whether the appellate docket fees were duly paid is the
principal issue in this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Resolutions dated September 22, 20171 and February 20,
20182 in CA-G.R. SP No. 152427-UDK.
ANTECEDENTS
In 2016, Warren Gutierrez (Warren) filed an action for
unlawful detainer against Spouses Ricardo and Ligaya Ang
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) docketed as Civil
Case No. 10549.3 Warren alleged that he is the owner of a 94-
square meter lot registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 013-2015003219.4 On December 29, 1998, Warren sold
the lot on installment basis to Spouses Ang. They agreed that
the contract shall be extinguished in case of non-payment of
monthly amortizations.5 After giving the initial payment,
however, Spouses Ang refused to settle the balance of the
purchase price despite repeated demands.6 In their answer,
Spouses Ang moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. They also claimed that the
ejectment case must fail because the contract was not validly
cancelled in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 6552 or
the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act.
On November 15, 2016, the MeTC ruled in favor of Warren and
ordered Spouses Ang to vacate the lot. It held that the
complaint sufficiently alleged and proved a cause of action for
unlawful detainer. On the other hand, RA No. 6552 is
inapplicable since Spouses Ang failed to pay any installment,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendants x x x to immediately VACATE the
subject property and restore peaceful possession thereof to
plaintiff x x x.
2. Ordering defendants to PAY reasonable compensation for
the use and occupancy of the subject property in the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (Php 5,000.00) representing the unpaid
monthly rentals starting December 2015 until they vacate the
same with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
commencing from the date of judicial demand on March 14,
2016 until the obligation is fully satisfied.
3. Ordering defendants to PAY reasonable attorney's fees in
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php 10,000.00); and
4. Ordering the defendants to PAY the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis in the original.)
Spouses Ang appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
docketed as Civil Case No. 185-V-16.10 On July 3, 2017, the
RTC affirmed the MeTC's findings and explained that the
requisites for filing an action for unlawful detainer are present.
Likewise, Spouses Ang cannot invoke RA No. 6552 because
they failed to pay any monthly amortization for 17 years after
signing of the contract, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court x x x in Civil Case No. 10549 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and italics in the original.)12
Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, Ligaya Ang elevated the
case to the CA through a motion for extension of time to file a
Petition for Review under Rule 42 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
152427-UDK. On September 22, 2017, the CA denied the
motion for non-payment of docket fees,13 viz.:
Considering that Petitioner merely filed her Motion for
Extension of Time without however paying in full the amount
of docket and other lawful fees, this Court may not grant the
said motion consistent with the rules and jurisprudence.
xxxx
Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but
in the sound discretion of the court. x x x The requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified
in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for
orderly discharge of judicial business.
WHEREFORE, premised considered. Petitioner's Motion for
Extension of Time is DENIED. Accordingly, this case is
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
Ligaya sought reconsideration arguing that her counsel's
messenger was unable to purchase postal money orders on the
last day for filing the motion for extension of time. Thus, the
messenger decided to enclose the docket fees of P4,730.00 in
the envelope containing the motion. The messenger allegedly
panicked and thought that he would not be able to file the
motion on time if he would transfer to another post office. As
supporting evidence, she submitted the messenger's affidavit.
Ligaya also invoked liberal application of the rules and
insinuated that the money might have been stolen. Lastly,
Ligaya manifested that she already filed her petition for review
and expressed her willingness to pay again the docket fees.
On February 20, 2018, the CA denied the motion for lack of
merit absent compelling reason to suspend the rules. The
sworn statements of the personnel assigned to the appellate
court's receiving section belied the narrations in the
messenger's affidavit. Worse, Ligaya failed to comply with her
commitment to pay again the docket fees, thus:
Petitioner alleges that: the docket and other lawful fees in the
amount of Php4,730.00 were fully paid, as the cash
representing said amount was actually enclosed in the
envelope containing the Motion for Extension of Time; she was
allegedly a victim of theft; and the question of who took the
money is impossible to be determined.
The said hare and self-serving allegations are bereft of merit.
On 11 January 2018, Division Clerk of Court Ally. Josephine
Yap referred to Ms. Myrna Almira ("Almira," for brevity), Chief
Receiving Section of this Court, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, with the attached Salaysay of Cajipe. A letter-
compliance dated 19 January 2018 was made by Almira,
Records Officer III/Officer-in-Charge of the Receiving Section,
and she submitted therewith her Affidavit of even date,
together with the Affidavits of Ms. Joan A. Veluz ("Veluz," for
brevity) - Records Officer I of the Receiving Section, and Ms.
Catalina Santos ("Santos," for brevity) - Utility Worker 1 of the
Receiving Section.
In the Affidavit of Almira dated 19 January 2018, the same
stated, inter alia, that: at about 2:30 pm of 07 September
2017, upon receipt of the transmittal letter of Ms. Veluz
pertaining to the Motion for Extension of Time, she carefully
checked if a postal money order or any cash was attached to
the Motion, including the extra copies of the Motion, since
there was a notation by Ms. Santos (the person in charge of
opening the small envelope) on the Motion "3c w/o PMO
attached": upon diligent verification, she discovered that no
PMO or cash was included in the Motion which was enclosed
in a small white mailing envelope; she strongly refutes the
allegation of Cajipe in his Salaysay that there was cash in the
amount of Php4,730.00 considering that the Motion was
processed by three (3) persons, namely, Veluz, Santos, and
Almira herself, before it was delivered to the Special Cases
Section; if it were true that the cash amount of Php4,730.00
was inserted in the sealed small mailing envelope, together
with the Motion as alleged by Cajipe, then the personnel of the
Receiving Section could have readily seen the contents thereof
and found the cash; however, none was found; prudence
dictates that Cajipe should have photocopied the paper bills
representing the total amount of cash payment for docket fees
so that there would be proof that the cash amount was actually
mailed together with the Motion; and having failed to exercise
due diligence on the part of Cajipe in ensuring that the cash
payment would remain intact, their office reiterates its stand
that no cash was actually remitted to this Court together with
the Motion that was placed inside the sealed envelope. The
Affidavits dated 19 January 2018 of Veluz and Santos
corroborated the same.
xxxx
Further, it bears to note that petitioner stated in her Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration that she was allegedly willing to
pay again the docket and other lawful fees. However, contrary
to her pretense of good faith, she failed to enclose in the said
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration the corresponding postal
money orders, as payment for the docket and other lawful fees.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit; the letter-
compliance dated 19 January 2018 of Myrna D. Almira,
Records Officer III/Officer-in-Charge of the Receiving Section
of this Court is NOTED; the Petition for Review (Rule 42, Rules
of Court) with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction is merely NOTED; and it
is hereby reiterated that CA-G.R. SP No. 152427- UDK is
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse. Ligaya contends that the CA acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it denied her motion for
extension of time and refused to admit her petition for review
for non-payment of the required docket and other lawful fees.
Ligaya maintains that she fully paid the required fees and
prays for liberal interpretation of the rules.
Whether the appellate docket fees were duly paid

RULING
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. One who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply strictly with the requirements of the rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal. Specifically, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides the
requirements in appealing the Decision of the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to wit:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. — A party
desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding
docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and
the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall
be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
xxxx
Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The
failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
xxxx
Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — (a) Upon the
timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the petitioner. x x x" (Emphases
Supplied.)
Notably, the grant of any extension for the filing of a Petition
for Review under Rule 42 is discretionary and subject to the
condition that the full amount of the docket and lawful fees are
paid before the expiration of the reglementary period. Indeed,
the full payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory and necessary to perfect the appeal. Corollarily, the
non-payment of docket lees is a ground to dismiss the
appeal. In Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, however, we qualified
this rule, and declared, first, that the failure to pay the
appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period
warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal
of the appeal; and second, that the court shall exercise its
power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play and with a great deal of circumspection considering
all attendant circumstances. In that case, the postal money
orders intended for the payment of appellate docket fees were
actually delivered to the trial court. The fact that the money
orders were made payable to the clerks of court of the
Supreme Court and the CA and not the clerk of court of the
trial court, was a minor defect and should not be construed as
a failure to pay the docket fees.
In American Express International, Inc. v. Sison,25 this Court
observed that the there is no specific manner of paying the
docket or appeal fees. In that case, however, we upheld the
dismissal of the notice of appeal because the petitioner failed
to substantiate the claim that it sent the letter containing the
docket fees, viz.:
There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court prescribing
the manner by which docket or appeal fees should be paid.
However, as a matter of convention, litigants invariably opt to
use the postal money order system to pay such fees not only
for its expediency but also for the official nature of
transactions coursed through this system. The controversy
spawned by the question of whether Amex had, in fact, paid
the appeal fees within the reglementary period could have
been avoided entirely had it chosen to pay such fees through
postal money order and not by enclosing its payment in a
letter. After all, Amex's counsel's messenger could easily have
procured a postal money order while he was already at the
Ayala Post Office filing the Notice of Appeal by registered mail.
xxxx
Amex professed that it had paid the docket fee on the same
day that it filed a Notice of Appeal. It presented as proof of
payment a photocopy of the January 29, 2001 letter in which
was supposedly enclosed the docket fee of P600.00, with the
superimposed photocopy of Ayala Post Office Postal Registry
Receipt No. 1860, under which the letter was allegedly
mailed. Based on the proof required under Sec. 12 above, the
registry receipt presented by Amex does not suffice as proof of
payment of the docket fee in this case. For one, filed with the
Court are mere photocopies of the letter and the registry
receipt and even if the original of the registry receipt was
submitted, there is no indication therein that it refers to the
letter or the alleged docket fee payment. For another, Amex
should have also submitted in evidence the affidavit of the
person who did the mailing, containing a full statement of the
details of mailing. As the party to whom the burden of proof to
show that the letter was mailed and received by the addressee
lay, Amex could have easily presented the affidavit of its
messenger to satisfy the requirement of the Rules of Court.
Unfortunately, Amex offered no explanation for its failure to
discharge its burden.
Similarly, we find that Ligaya failed to establish that the
appellate docket fees were duly paid. Foremost, the
messenger's affidavit is insufficient to establish payment. The
affidavit merely stated the reason why the messenger opted to
enclose the docket fees together with the motion for extension.
Yet, there is no evidence such as photocopies of the money
bills to prove that the envelope containing the motion has the
actual cash payment. The affidavit is likewise suspect since it
was executed only after the CA denied the motion. At any rate,
the CA had conducted an investigation and confirmed that no
payment was actually remitted. The personnel assigned to the
appellate court's receiving section corroborated this finding.
Moreover, Ligaya's manifestation to pay again the docket fees
is inconsistent with her claim of payment. In Mendoza v. Court
of Appeals, the petitioner's insistence that he enclosed in the
mailing envelope the docket fees was unpersuasive. This Court
even questioned why petitioner prayed in his motion for
reconsideration that he be allowed to pay once more the
docket fees if his allegations were true. Lastly, Ligaya has not
shown any compelling reason to warrant a liberal application
of the rules. The alleged theft is speculative. The justifications
that the messenger panicked because he was unable to
purchase postal money orders and that he might not be able to
file the motion on time if he would transfer to another post
office are neither convincing nor adequate to merit leniency.
Ligaya's counsel could have asked the messenger to buy postal
money orders in advance instead of waiting for the last minute
in filing the motion.
All told, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
it denied Ligaya's motion for extension of time and refused to
admit her petition for review for non-payment of the required
docket fees. It is only when persuasive reasons exist that the
rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure. In this case, Ligaya is under no threat of suffering
an injustice if her prayer is not granted. Quite the contrary, it
will be unfair if we reinstate Ligaya's appeal as this would
mean further waiting on the part of the private respondent
who has long been deprived of the right to possess the
property he owns.
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.