Petitioner - Labour Law Psda
Petitioner - Labour Law Psda
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
SADANAND………………………………...……………………………..……...APPLICANT
V.
CAPITAL CORPORATION UNDERTAKING .…..……….
………..........................RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. ISSUES RAISED
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
7(A). ISSUE 1
WHETHER THIS WILL BE DEEMED TO BE A REGISTERED TRADE
UNION OR NOT?
7(B). ISSUE 2
WILL SADANAND GET THE BENEFITS UNDER THE TRADE UNION
ACT, 1926 AND WHETHER THE IMMUNITY WILL BE GRANTED
TO HIM OR NOT?
7(C). ISSUE 3
WHETHER IT IS AN INDIVIDUAL DISPUTE OR AN INDUSTRIAL
DISPUTE? GIVE RELEVANT REASONING WITH LANDMARK
JUDGEMENTS AND DECIDE THE APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION.
7(D). ISSUE 4
DECIDE WHETHER THE ‘CAPITAL CORPORATION
UNDERTAKING’ IS AN INDUSTRY OR NOT AND WHETHER MR.
SADANAND WILL FALL UNDER THE CATEGORY OF WORKMAN
OR NOT?
8. PRAYER
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
S. ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION
No.
1. ¶ Paragraph
2. § Section
4. Co. Company
5. Engg. Engineering
6. E,g Example
7. Govt. Government
8. Co. Company
9. Hon’ble Honourable
19. ¶ Paragraph
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES:
S. No. STATUTES
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS:
S. No. CASES
1. Balmer Lawrie Workers' Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. and Ors.
(1985) 1 SCC 234
5. Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.,
(1996) 1 SCC 642
7. Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCC OnLine
SC 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner, Sadanand, humbly submits that this Hon'ble Tribunal has the jurisdiction to
entertain and adjudicate the present matter under the following provisions:
Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The dispute pertains to an alleged unfair dismissal, which qualifies as an "industrial dispute"
under Section 2(k), as it involves a matter affecting the terms of employment and conditions
of service of a workman.
Section 10 and Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The Petitioner has sought reference of the matter for adjudication to this Hon'ble Tribunal,
and the appropriate government has the authority to refer such disputes to this Tribunal for
resolution.
Fifth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The Petitioner alleges that his dismissal falls under the category of "unfair labor practices" as
defined under the Fifth Schedule, which empowers this Hon'ble Tribunal to adjudicate upon
such matters.
Trade Union Act, 1926:
The Petitioner seeks relief related to the registration status of the trade union and the benefits
under the Trade Union Act, 1926, which grants this Hon'ble Tribunal the authority to
interpret and apply relevant provisions of the Act.
The Petitioner submits that, in light of these provisions, this Hon'ble Tribunal is vested with
the jurisdiction to hear and decide the present dispute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
-Employment Background-
Sadanand was employed by Capital Corporation Undertaking ("the Company") as a
supervisor on a contractual basis in 2021, earning Rs. 15,000 per month. In June 2022, he
received a wage raise of Rs. 2,200 and was made a permanent employee, conditional on not
joining a trade union. Although aware of a trade union formation effort among workmen,
Sadanand did not join. The union itself was unregistered and unrecognized by the Company.
-Incident and Consequences-
On April 2, 2023, while Sadanand was operating machinery, a scuffle broke out between two
laborers. He intervened to resolve the conflict but left the machine running with sensitive raw
materials inside. The machine remained unattended for about 22 minutes, resulting in
material damage of Rs. 50,000. The incident also caused the Company to lose a Rs.
10,00,000 contract due to the unavailability of materials.
-Disciplinary Action and Dismissal-
Following the incident, the Company initiated disciplinary proceedings against Sadanand,
during which he allegedly verbally abused the management and slapped a manager. As a
result, he was suspended for one month on June 22, 2023. However, on June 24, 2023, while
at work, he received a sudden dismissal letter from his supervisor, without any further
hearing or notice.
-Efforts for Reinstatement-
Sadanand sought support from the trade union, claiming his dismissal was an unjust response
to an honest mistake. The union's intervention failed, leading him to file a case before the
Industrial Tribunal, citing unfair dismissal under Section 2(k) and the Fifth Schedule of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After unsuccessful conciliation attempts, the matter was
referred back to the appropriate government for further adjudication.
-Relief Sought-
Sadanand requests reinstatement, back wages, and a declaration of his termination as
unlawful and arbitrary under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He argues that the Company's
actions were disproportionate and violated principles of natural justice, given that his
intentions were not malicious.
ISSUES RAISED
-I-
-II-
WILL SADANAND GET THE BENEFITS UNDER THE TRADE UNION ACT, 1926
AND WHETHER THE IMMUNITY WILL BE GRANTED TO HIM OR NOT?
-III-
-IV-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE II - WILL SADANAND GET THE BENEFITS UNDER THE TRADE UNION
ACT, 1926 & IMMUNITY WILL BE GRANTED TO HIM OR NOT?
Sadanand’s role was upgraded to a supervisory position, which likely excludes him from
being classified as a "workman" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as clarified in H.R.
Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994). Since his duties involved managing staff, he may
not qualify for the Act’s protections. Additionally, as he was not a union member, he cannot
claim immunity under the Trade Union Act, of 1926, which protects only union members
involved in trade disputes, as established in J.P. Mody v. Tata Engineering & Locomotive
Co. Ltd. (1964).
Sadanand’s gross negligence and misconduct, which led to significant financial losses and an
altercation during disciplinary proceedings, justify his dismissal under precedents like The
Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (1973) and Lalla Ram v. D.C.M.
Chemical Works Ltd. (1978). Moreover, Sadanand’s voluntary agreement not to join a union
when he became permanent weakens his claim to union-based protections, supported by Tata
Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1981).
The petitioner argues that Capital Corporation qualifies as an industry under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, based on its organized production activities involving employer-
employee relationships, supported by precedents like Bangalore Water Supply (1978).
Furthermore, Mr. Sadanand, as a supervisor directly involved in machinery and production,
falls within the definition of a workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. His permanent
employment status strengthens his classification, entitling him to protections against unfair
treatment. Judicial precedents such as D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries (1993) support his
claims, urging recognition of his workman status and legal rights.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
It is respectfully submitted that the Petitioners' union should be deemed registered under the
doctrine of substantial compliance, as it has fulfilled the essential requirements under the
Trade Union Act, 1926. While a few members withdrew before the issuance of the
registration certificate, the union had the requisite number of members at the time of
application, satisfying the core statutory purpose. Rigid adherence to formalities, as argued
by the Respondents, would frustrate the workers’ rights to form associations under Article
19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Therefore, the Petitioners respectfully request this Hon'ble Court
to recognize the union's status as a registered trade union.
1.1. The Substantial Compliance Doctrine Justifies the Deemed Registration of the Trade Union
1.1.1. Substantial Compliance Satisfies the Objectives of the Trade Union Act, 1926
It is respectfully submitted that the registration process under the Trade Union Act, 1926,
aims to facilitate the formation of unions to protect and promote workers' rights. The
legislative intent behind Sections 4 to 81 of the Act is not to create hurdles but to ensure that
trade unions are formed with a genuine interest in protecting labor rights. In the present case,
the union's initial compliance with Section 4, 2 which requires seven members, demonstrates
its bona fide intent. The subsequent reduction in membership should not invalidate the
registration process as the essential objective of the statute is fulfilled—ensuring a legitimate
collective body for negotiation.
Indian courts have consistently held that beneficial legislation should not be interpreted in a
manner that defeats its purpose. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raja Kulkarni v. State of
Bombay,3 emphasized that substantial compliance with statutory provisions, especially in the
context of welfare legislation, is sufficient to satisfy procedural requirements. The Petitioners
submit that applying this doctrine, the Court should recognize that the minor reduction in
membership does not undermine the legitimacy or the purpose of the trade union, as the
formation of a collective bargaining body remains intact.
1 The Trade Unions Act, 1926, §4-8, No. 16, Acts of Parliament, 1926.
2 The Trade Unions Act, 1926, §4, No. 16, Acts of Parliament, 1926.
3 Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay, (1953) 2 SCC 552
1.2. The Registrar’s Inaction Constitutes Deemed Approval of the Trade Union’s Application
1.3. The Trade Union Act, 1926, Requires a Liberal Interpretation Favoring Workers’ Rights
4 The Trade Unions Act, 1926, §8, No. 16, Acts of Parliament, 1926.
5 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87
1.4. The Employer's Refusal to Recognize the Trade Union is Arbitrary and Unreasonable:
6 Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 4
7 Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1996) 1 SCC 642
8 INDIA CONST, Art. 19 cl. (1) sub cl. (c)
9 Balmer Lawrie Workers' Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. and Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 234
10 Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1
11 Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Workmen (represented by Chemicals Kamdar Sangh), (1978) 3 SCC 42
union's effectiveness is rooted in its support base among workers, not merely its formal
registration status.
ISSUE II - WILL SADANAND GET THE BENEFITS UNDER THE TRADE UNION
ACT, 1926 AND WHETHER THE IMMUNITY WILL BE GRANTED TO HIM OR
NOT?
2.1 Status as a Permanent Employee and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Protections:
2.1.1 Sadanand falls within the definition of a "workman" under the Industrial
Disputes Act, of 1947:
2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, allowing him to pursue remedies through conciliation or
tribunal proceedings under Sections 10 and 11 of the Act. His case, arising from what could
be considered a minor, possibly excusable mistake, is further strengthened by landmark
judgments such as
2.1.2 Case Law on clarifying the Definition of “Industry” and “Workman” under the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) 14, This landmark
judgment clarified the definition of "industry" and "workman" under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. The Court held that even supervisory employees like Sadanand could be
considered workmen, provided they are involved in technical or operational work. This case
strengthens Sadanand’s claim as a "workman" under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
allowing him to seek relief under the Act.
Additionally, Section 18 of the Trade Union Act, of 1926, grants immunity to trade union
members from civil or criminal liability for actions taken in furtherance of a trade dispute.
While Sadanand was not a union member, if the union takes up his case, their actions could
theoretically be immune under this section. His dismissal could also be viewed as an attempt
to suppress unionizing efforts, giving the case broader implications for workers’ rights.
In the case of Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union (1976) 15 the Supreme
Court emphasized the right of unions to represent workers in disputes with management.
Although Sadanand was not a union member, his case could be supported by the union, as
unions are empowered to protect employees in labour disputes. The union could take up his
case, arguing that his dismissal sets a negative precedent for all workers and compromises
their collective bargaining rights.
In the Case Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1958) 16The Supreme Court
held that the dismissal of an employee for minor or inadvertent mistakes must be assessed
based on the gravity of the offence and its consequences. In Sadanand’s case, while the
damage was significant, it could be argued that it was an honest mistake, and dismissal was
too harsh a punishment. The proportionality of the penalty should be examined, and the
Industrial Tribunal can provide relief if it deems the dismissal excessive.
In case of P. Mukundan and others vs. Mohan Kandy Pavitharan 17 it was held that only the
members of the registered trade unions are immune against the legal proceedings by the
provision of Section 18 of Trade Union Act.Since Sadanand is not a member of the trade
union, he would not enjoy this immunity. Therefore, actions taken by him during the incident
leading to his dismissal do not fall under the protection of the Trade Union Act
Moreover, the dismissal raises questions of procedural fairness, as Sadanand had already
been suspended for one month for his misconduct, but was later dismissed without proper
notice or hearing, indicating a lack of due process. This mirrors the principles established in
Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863)18, which was upheld in Indian cases such as
D. K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (1993)19, where the courts emphasized the right to a
fair hearing before dismissal. The company’s refusal to engage with Sadanand or the union
further underscores the procedural unfairness, strengthening his case for reinstatement.
The decision in Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management
(1973)20 also supports Sadanand’s claim, as it established that employers must provide
employees a fair opportunity to defend themselves against allegations of misconduct,
something that was denied to Sadanand, who was abruptly dismissed after his initial
suspension.
In conclusion, Sadanand will receive benefits or immunity under the Trade Union Act, of
1926.
3.1.1. Dismissal of Sabanand satisfies the requirements of section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947
It is respectfully submitted that Section 2-A serves as an exception to the general rule that a
dispute involving only one worker cannot be classified as an industrial dispute unless it is
supported by a union or a body of workers.
In Sadanand's case, his dismissal involves a direct termination of his employment, which falls
squarely within the purview of Section 2-A. The section specifically covers disputes
concerning the dismissal or termination of individual employees, declaring that such disputes
are to be deemed industrial disputes irrespective of whether they are taken up by other
workmen or the union. Thus, Sadanand’s dismissal alone qualifies the case as an industrial
dispute under Section 2-A, even if no other workman from the company or the trade union
had initially intervened or formally supported his claim at the outset.
Additionally, Section 2-A safeguards against situations where an employer might dismiss an
individual in bad faith or through arbitrary action. It places the onus on the employer to
justify the termination and provides a framework for legal intervention through labor courts
or industrial tribunals. In Sadanand’s case, where the dismissal followed a disciplinary
proceeding and led to the union’s involvement after the fact, Section 2-A becomes even more
relevant. Even though the union's involvement came at a later stage, the existence of the
dispute surrounding his dismissal, which relates to employment rights and conditions, fulfills
the conditions set forth in Section 2-A for the matter to be treated as an industrial dispute.
It is humbly submitted that an individual dispute even though not sponsored by other
workmen or espoused by the union would by deemed to be an industrial dispute if it covers
any of the matters mentioned in Section 2-A. So far as the subject matter of the dispute is
concerned 2-A does not bring about any change. The provisions of Section 2(K) alone
determine that question.
The only change introduced by Section 2-A is that before its introduction, a dispute even
though was an industril dispute from the perspective of subjects referred to in Section 2 (k)
would not have- become an industrial dispute if it were only an individual dispute and it was
not taken up either by the union or by a substantial body or workmen. But after the
introduction of Section 2-A such a dispute would be an industrial dispute in respect of those
matters specified in that Section even though it is not sponsored by a union or a considerable
number of workmen. Section 2-A can be treated as an explanation to Section 2 (k).
3.2. The involvement of the trade union in the case supports its classification as an
industrial dispute.
workmen irrespective of the reason the union espousing the cause of workman was not the
majority of the union. this precedent, the Petitioners submit that the Registrar’s silence, in
this case, amounts to a deemed approval of the registration application. Whereas in Express
Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. First Labour Court, West Bengal and Others (1958), it was
established that a dispute can be classified as an industrial dispute even if it is supported by
an unregistered union. However, it is essential that the trade union be affiliated with the
employer or the specific industry in question. This ruling highlights the importance of the
union’s connection to the relevant employer or industry in determining whether a dispute
qualifies as an industrial dispute. Additionally in Workmen of Indian Express Newspapers
Ltd. v. Management Indian Express Newspapers (1970): This case reiterated that a dispute
involving the dismissal of an individual workman, if espoused by a union with a
representative character, transforms into an industrial dispute. In Sadanand’s case, even
though his dispute already qualifies as an industrial dispute under Section 2-A, the union’s
involvement bolsters its standing.
Under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the term "industry" has been
expansively defined to encompass a wide variety of systematic activities involving an
employer-employee relationship. The key element in determining whether an entity qualifies
as an industry is the existence of organized activity directed toward the production of goods
or services. The judicial interpretation of the term "industry" was significantly expanded
through various rulings, most notably in the landmark case Bangalore Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978 AIR 1978 SC 548), where the Supreme Court provided
a broad, inclusive definition of what constitutes an industry.
In the case of Capital Corporation, the entity clearly engages in organized activities involving
the use of machinery and production processes. These activities are commercial in nature,
with a well-defined employer-employee relationship where workers, including supervisors
like Mr. Sadanand, contribute to the overall production cycle. The systematic nature of these
operations is evident from the machinery-based production framework and the
interdependence of labor and capital to achieve organizational objectives, which involves
creating goods. The regular coordination between employees and machinery for the purpose
of production fits squarely within the ambit of an industrial undertaking as defined by law.
This argument is further strengthened by the petitioner’s emphasis on the organized nature of
Capital Corporation’s operations. The production processes involve the systematic use of
labor to ensure smooth operations, efficiency, and safety. These activities align with the legal
and judicial interpretation of an industrial undertaking. Therefore, Capital Corporation fulfills
the criteria to be considered an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and any
argument that it does not would be contrary to established legal precedents.
Whether Mr. Sadanand Will Fall Under the Category of Workman or Not:
The second major aspect of this case concerns the classification of Mr. Sadanand as a
workman. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under Section 2(s), provides a clear definition
of a "workman." According to this section, a workman is any person employed in an industry
to perform skilled, unskilled, manual, technical, operational, or clerical work. The role and
responsibilities of Mr. Sadanand as a supervisor who oversees machinery and ensures the
proper functioning of production processes place him squarely within this legal definition.
One of the key factors in determining whether Mr. Sadanand qualifies as a workman is his
direct involvement in the production process. As a supervisor, he not only oversees the
functioning of the machinery but also ensures the safety and efficiency of the production
cycle. His responsibilities are integral to the smooth functioning of the production line,
making him a vital part of the labor process. Supervisory roles like Mr. Sadanand often
involve operational and technical oversight, linking them directly to the ongoing production,
which is one of the criteria under the definition of a workman.
Moreover, the role of a supervisor in ensuring machinery efficiency and worker safety aligns
with the workman’s duties as outlined in the Act. Supervisors are not merely administrative
or managerial figures, but they often perform technical or operational tasks essential to the
functioning of the organization. This involvement in operational work makes them part of the
production cycle, justifying their classification as workmen. In Mr. Sadanand’s case, his
engagement with the machinery and production processes demonstrates that his role is not
purely supervisory but is operational, further justifying his status as a workman under the
Act.
Another critical aspect supporting the classification of Mr. Sadanand as a workman is his
transition from a contractual to a permanent employment position. This transition reflects the
employer’s recognition of his importance to the company’s operations and his long-term
engagement with the production process. Permanent employment status generally strengthens
the argument that the individual is integral to the organization’s functioning and is entitled to
the protections offered under labor laws. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provides
significant protections for individuals who fall under the category of workmen, ensuring that
they have recourse in cases of disputes, wrongful termination, or unfair treatment.
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s ruling in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. (AIR 1993
SC 857) reinforces the importance of adherence to proper disciplinary procedures in cases
involving workmen. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that any action taken by an
employer without following the proper procedures, including disciplinary action, is invalid.
This precedent is significant in Mr. Sadanand’s case, as it underscores his right to be treated
fairly under the law. If he is classified as a workman, any unfair dismissal or improper
treatment by Capital Corporation would be subject to scrutiny under the Industrial Disputes
Act, entitling him to seek legal recourse for his grievances.
Furthermore, the principle of equal treatment for workers engaged in similar capacities
reinforces Mr. Sadanand’s classification as a workman. The Act ensures that all workers
engaged in operational or technical roles are granted the same rights and protections, ensuring
uniformity in the application of labor laws. Denying Mr. Sadanand’s classification as a
workman would undermine this principle and create an inconsistency in the application of the
law, as others in similar roles would be entitled to protections that he would be denied.
In conclusion, the arguments presented by the petitioner convincingly establish that Capital
Corporation qualifies as an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that Mr.
Sadanand falls within the definition of a workman. Capital Corporation’s organized activities
aimed at producing goods, coupled with the presence of a well-defined employer-employee
relationship, meet the legal criteria for an industrial undertaking. Similarly, Mr. Sadanand’s
role as a supervisor, his direct involvement in production processes, and his permanent
employment status align him with the definition of a workman. Denying his classification as
a workman would contravene established legal principles and precedents, particularly those
emphasizing the protection of workers' rights under the Industrial Disputes Act.
Consequently, the court is urged to recognize Capital Corporation as an industry and Mr.
Sadanand as a workman, entitling him to the protections and remedies provided by the Act.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities
cited, the Petitioner, Sadanand, most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be
pleased to:
1. DECLARE that the trade union formed by the workmen is deemed a registered trade
union under the Trade Union Act, of 1926, considering the steps taken toward
registration and the workmen's intentions.
2. GRANT Sadanand the benefits and protections available under the Trade Union Act,
1926, and provide immunity for actions carried out in good faith as part of the union,
even though he was not a member.
3. HOLD that the dispute between Sadanand and the Respondent is an "industrial
dispute" under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and direct that it be
adjudicated accordingly.
4. DECLARE that Capital Corporation Undertaking qualifies as an "industry" under
Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that Sadanand is a "workman" as
per the provisions of the Act.
5. ORDER the reinstatement of Sadanand with full back wages, along with
compensation for the period of unemployment due to the unfair dismissal.
6. PASS any other order(s) that this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the
interests of justice, equity, and good conscience.