Globalization and Governance
Globalization and Governance
Globalization:
Training on Globalization and Democratic Governance for Local Government
Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local
Level
Globalization3
Globalization is a heavily contested concept in terms of its meaning, form, and implication.
Despite a burgeoning literature, no cogent theory of globalization or a systematic analysis of
its primary features has been formulated. What confuses the issue is that while the term
“globalization” is widely used, there is no common language as to what it is. It connotes
different things to different people simply because it is not amenable to a precise definition
(Singh 2004). Often suggested as a buzzword, it has become “a label to cover whatever
strikes our fancy” (Scholte 2000, 15), “a fashionable concept in social sciences, a core dictum
in the prescriptions of management gurus and a catchphrase for journalists and politicians of
every stripe” (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 1). Globalization has grown to be so commonplace;
it is invoked either as the proverbial culprit or panacea. As Held et al. (1999, 1) have
suggested, “globalization is in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliché of
our times: the big idea which encompasses everything from global financial markets to the
Internet but which delivers little substantive insight into the contemporary human condition.”
Indeed, globalization has turned into a slippery and ambiguous term that is subject to
misunderstanding and political manipulation (Helleiner 2001). Littered with traps and cul-de-
sac, globalization has been used repeatedly as a straw man by individuals relying on
obfuscation or normative definition to argue their case against it.
This review of literature surveys the current discourse on globalization, with particular focus
on the three principal issues that constitute the major sources of contention:
• Conceptualization (“What”)
• Periodization (“When”)
• Causation (“Why” or “How”)
No attempt is made to resolve contentious views and issues.
1
Prepared by Sharon Quinsaat, Coordinator for INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT, Training
on Globalization and Democratic Governance for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and
Academic Institutions at the Local Level, with research assistance from Sarah Jane Domingo.
2
University Researcher, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman.
3
This is an expanded version of the section, “Globalization, the State and Civil Society: An Overview,” of
Frago, Perlita M., Sharon M. Quinsaat, and Verna Dinah Q. Viajar, Philippine Civil Society and the
Globalization Discourse published by the Third World Studies Center and United Nations Development
Programme-Philippine Office, 2004.
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THE “WHAT” QUESTION:
Defining Globalization
In order to dispel any misconceptions about globalization, Helleiner (2001) emphasizes the
need to clarify two totally different phenomena that are often linked to the term. The first is
an observable fact or reality, in which it is futile to argue of being “for” or “against” because
it is simply an occurrence: the “shrinkage of space and time that the world has experienced in
the consequence of the technological revolutions in transport, communications and
information processing” (28). The second usage of the term relates to “matters of human
policy choice”: the degree to which one opens and submits oneself mindlessly to this event or
external forces. There is a tendency to conflate or intertwine these two phenomena such that
globalization has become a slogan of technology-driven, uncontrollable incidents (fact) and
policies formulated to take advantage of these external forces (choice).
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5. Deterritorialization, or the spread of supraterritoriality, wherein globalization
entails a reconfiguration of geography so that social space is no longer wholly
mapped in terms of territorial places, distances, and borders.
Although Scholte cautions the use of such redundant terms and opts for “supraterritoriality”
to describe globalization, these characterizations are found in both prevailing and emergent
discourse on globalization from the North and South (see Panitch 1998, Rodrik 1998,
Keohane and Nye 2001, Held and McGrew 2002, Harrison 2005).
A Disciplinary Focus
Beyond the general approach is a tendency to understand globalization in its various and
distinctive respects, depending largely on the disciplinary perspectives that are employed.
In the economic field, for example, the radical transformation and integration of the
economic environment at the local, regional and global levels through the promotion of an
open international economy, is often highlighted. Economists often refer to Adam Smith’s
The Wealth of Nations when explaining the “inspiration” behind the new economic order. In
this classic statement of liberal political economy, Smith posited harmony between private
profit and public interest and claimed that the pursuit of individual interests benefits society
as a whole through the invisible hand of the market. Sachs (2000, 94-96) identifies four
important features or “realities” of economic globalization: (1) increased international trade,
as demonstrated by the rising ratio of either exports or imports to gross domestic product
(GDP) for any economy in the world; (2) increased penetration of markets by capital flows;
(3) internationalization of economic production, often through cross-border production and
trade between multinational companies and their affiliates (“intra-firm”) or fragmentation and
spreading of production across borders, so that the parts, components and accessories
contained in a product are manufactured in several countries (“intra-product”); and (4)
institutional harmonization of economic policies, legislation, and structure. The world-
systems approach, based on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, has often been used to
explain economic globalization. This approach is based on the distinction between core,
semiperipheral, and peripheral countries in terms of their changing roles in the international
division of labor dominated by the capitalist world-system (Sklair 1999). Though the
capitalist world-system has been basically international for centuries, the extent and degree of
trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in decades. An important question,
therefore, is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a
qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave (Chase-Dunn 1999).
Among Philippine economists and civil society organizations, the most prominent facet of
globalization is its economic dimension, often related to the predominance of neoliberalism
(de Dios 1998, Lim 1998, Frago, Quinsaat, Viajar 2004).
By contrast, the literature on the politics of globalization focuses largely on the fortunes of
the nation-state as its unit of analysis, examining the changing relations of state and capital,
the emergence of new international actors and institutions, and the implications of new forms
of regional and global governance. From a liberal internationalist perspective, Ohmae (1995)
contends that the nation-state has been fatally undermined as the key locus of policy authority
by the global system, unable significantly to influence economic activity. Furthermore, the
concept of “national interest” has been more or less used as defense of special interests, not
of people’s interest, and therefore the demise of the state is nothing to be mourned. But such
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positions have not gone unchallenged. Hoogvelt’s (1997) analysis of the political economy of
globalization offers a useful summary of more skeptical analyses of the politics of
globalization and its significance for the state. She notes three models which can be used to
frame the globalization question. One is the realist model, focusing on the autonomy of the
nation-state in the conduct of international relations, with order, stability, and international
balance of power as its main concern. The second is the institutionalist perspective, based on
liberal values of economic interdependence and cooperation and strong support for a system
of global governance. And finally, the structuralist approach which suggests a dominant core
and subordinate periphery in the structures of global economic and political relations. In all
three cases, there is no a priori supposition that the state has or is likely to disappear.
Nonetheless, globalization calls into question the ability of the existing interstate system to
cope with certain fundamental transnational problems (Mittelman 2002).
In the field of cultural studies, there is a tendency to associate globalization with the
destruction of distinctive cultural identities and the creation of a homogenous “global
culture.” In the same manner as weak nations become casualties of unbridled economic
globalization, a common argument is that their cultures are vulnerable to the encroachment of
Westernized ideas, values, and lifestyles (Tomlinson 1991). The driving forces behind this
homogenization—or to be more specific, “Westernization” or “cultural imperialism”—is the
mass media. Marshall McLuhan’s “global village” comes to life as everyone is exposed to the
same images, almost instantaneously. However, promoting mainly Western culture which
market philosophies of consumption or individualism, the developed mass media has become
the weapon of neo-colonialist powers to further advance global capitalism. By contrast, other
scholars have doubted the “homogenization” or “cultural imperialism” theses to explain the
cultural dimensions of globalization. They argue that global communications and markets are
often adapted to fit diverse local contexts, such that cultural diversity is strengthened rather
than undermined (Appadurai 1996). Robertson (1995), for example, suggests that global
media and products breed heterogenization and calls this process of adaptation
“glocalization,” where the perceived means of creating a uniform culture take different forms
and make different impact depending on local particularities. Between these opposite
readings, some scholars speak not of a cultural uniformity or increased cultural diversity, but
the emergence of “hybrid” cultural identities (Pieterse 1995). Intercultural relations are
further intensified with globalization, such that new patterns of meanings and identities—
through combinations or obscurities, are generated.
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Friedman (1999), who welcome the triumph of individual autonomy and the preponderance
of the market over the state, and the radicals—classical Marxists or neo-Gramscians—like
Panitch (1998) and Bello (2002) for whom contemporary globalization represents the triumph
of an oppressive global capitalism. Despite the differences in positions, both breed of
hyperglobalizers share a “set of beliefs that globalization is primarily an economic
phenomenon; that an increasingly integrated global economy exists today; that the needs of
global capital impose a neoliberal economic discipline on all governments such that politics
is no longer the ‘art of the possible’ but rather the practice of ‘sound economic management’”
(Held et al. 1999, 4).
By comparison, skeptics represented by Hirst and Thompson (1996) question the factual
evidence of globalization. At best, what have taken place are heightened levels of
internationalization—or interactions between predominantly national economies. They
further counter the blanket assumption of the beneficial aftershocks of globalization and the
end of the nation-state in a more open world order. While globalization enhances more
pluralistic, diversified and multipolar international economic and political relations, the
authors posit that the state remains a key source of rules and decision-making in regulating
the resulting uncertainties of globalization. They see the nation-state as persisting despite the
changing concept of territoriality resulting from the increasing interdependence of nations.
Hirst and Thompson contend that the rule of law becomes more important rather than less if
we are moving into a more complex and pluralistic social and political system, such that the
state which is the purveyor of “constitutional ordering” will become more central and not
less. Likewise, even if the world economy and polity become increasingly internationalized
in the current era, international regimes and agencies will still be governed by binding rules
and laws emanating from the member-states. Thus, in simple terms, skeptics believe that the
internationalization has not weakened the state, but somehow, strengthened it in the process.
Between the hyperglobalists and skeptics is the transformationalist thesis which argues that
the contemporary processes of globalization are “historically unprecedented such that
governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is
no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs”
(Held et al. 1999). While contemporary globalization processes involve the spatial re-
organization of economic, political, military, and cultural power, the interconnectedness that
is taking place transforms rather than reduces state capacity and control. The power,
functions, and authority of national governments are juxtaposed with the expanding
jurisdiction of institutions of international governance and legal systems. In the process,
globalization becomes highly and inherently uneven in its embrace and impact as it divides at
the same manner that it integrates; thus the presence of winners and losers (Khor 2001,
Nayyar and Court 2002, Singh 2004).
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Is this so-called “globalization” new to contemporary history? Did it start several years ago?
The expression “era of globalization” is now used in everyday language, but is it possible to
establish a globalization “timeline”? Does it have a point of origin? Is it linear or cyclical?
On the other hand, Scholte (2000, 62-88) argues that if globalization is defined in terms of the
spread of supraterritoriality then we can distinguish three phases of globalization: (1) the
emergence of a “global imagination” from the period up to the 18th century, when “global
consciousness began to tease secular imagination” of the planet as a single place but the
concept of globality was mainly a passing rather than a central thought; (2) incipient
globalization from 1850s to 1950s when supraterritoriality and material global relations
began to develop in communications technologies, markets, finance, and institutions; and (3)
full scale globalization from 1960s to present when the pace and scale of the expansion of
transworld relations have become qualitatively immense such that this acceleration has even
brought some growth in transborder solidarities.
The globalization conundrum is further complicated by the thin and loose treatment or
deliberate evasion of most scholars on its possible causes. Did globalization as an “idea
whose time has come” just unfolded fortuitously? What forces generated this trend or
process?
Scholte (2000) argues that globalization transpired owing to (1) the spread of rationalism or
the general configuration of knowledge that has greatly promoted the spread of global
thinking; (2) certain turns in capitalist development, particularly the pursuit of global
markets; (3) technological innovations in data processing and communications, which played
crucial roles in creating transworld social spaces; and (4) the construction of enabling
regulatory frameworks—technical and procedural standardization; liberalization of cross-
border movements of money, investments, goods and services (but not labor); gurantees of
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property rights for global capital; and legalization of global organizations and activities.
These causes of globalization are co-dependent.
On the other hand, Panitch (1998, 12-13) offers three conjunctural facets of globalization: (1)
the collapse of the USSR and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, as well as with the
turn to capitalism of China and Vietnam, which led to the spatial extension of capitalism; (2)
the ideological and cultural sweep of capitalist ideas that mark an era of neoliberalism; and
(3) the transnational integration among the capitalist classes as evidenced by “the national
locus of the owners and boards of directors of the leading multinational corporations.”
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Governance
Current studies on the governance discourse converge on the assertion that globalization
carries with it the exigency of re-examining the concept of “governance” and framing new
governance perspectives as alternatives to the old ones. As peoples and societies witness
remarkable and accelerating changes both in their home fronts and beyond, the need to
problematize traditional views on governance becomes increasingly relevant and of interest
to scholars, state- and other non-state actors alike. Attempts to redefine “governance” are
premised on the contention that there are now new and emerging forms of governance that
our old notions of it are no longer adequate. Because globalization has ushered in changes in
every aspect of life, governance, though a rather old concept, has certainly taken on a new
meaning. As pointed out by Kooiman (1994), “the growing complexity, dynamics and
diversity of our societies as caused by social, technological and scientific developments put
governing systems under such new challenges that new conceptions of governance are
needed” (6). In the same manner, although the governance debate presents different strands
of arguments and analyses, numerous scholars agree that innovative approaches to
governance are essential to capture recent developments in national, regional and global
frontiers. For instance, Rosenau (1992) argue that “given the profound transformations in the
nature and location of authority, legitimacy and compliance, and given the emergent roles
and structures of the modern state, transnational organizations, social movements, common
markets and political parties, the basis for extensive reexamination of government and
governance in an increasingly interdependent world is surely compelling” (4). At the heart of
these claims is therefore the need to come up with a new governance perspective that will
cover new arrangements and new agents in the current type of governance as well as usher in
new or alternative interpretations of it.
Corollary to the creation of a new governance perspective is the abandonment of the long-
standing and archaic views about governance. Central to this is the traditional claim that the
state has the monopoly of governance and as such, it is the only agent who can exercise a
governing function. In contrast, a wide variety of sources on the governance discourse
emphasize that “states are no longer the only actor who initiate and dominate the cascades
which radiate out from the epicentre…[thus], a theory needs to be developed that treats
globalized space as the locale of the epicentre, as a vast arena composed of actors and
processes that are not limited by territorial boundaries of sovereign rights, as a bifurcated
system composed of both state-centric and multi-centric worlds” (Rosenau 2000, 188). In
fact, the emerging pattern of governance is said to position states as only one of the many
actors who play a role in governance and “whose activities cascade erratically across
amorphous ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, technoscapes, and financescapes”
(Rosenau 2000, 172) that affect governance as a whole.
These old notions of governing systems are continuously being challenged as new channels
and processes of governance cascade into and out of national and international policy spaces.
The saliency accorded to the role of states in operating governing structures is now being
disputed by new strands of reasoning within the governance discourse vis-à-vis the
framework of globalization. As a result, new approaches to “governance” have surfaced in
literatures. Although numerous scholars define governance in diverse ways, at the core of
these divergent approaches is the consistent claim that governance, as it should be interpreted
and applied at present, should have the element of democracy. “Governance”, as it has
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evolved, operates within the broad context of the democratic agenda that embraces processes
and principles designed to democratize governance in various layers of political, economic,
social and cultural policy spaces by a wide range of actors and institutions. Although sources
on governance differ in their definition and operationalization of the concept, they emphasize
the importance and utility of democratic structures in defining, shaping and executing
authority in the new form of governance. Falk (1995) even remarks that “governance without
the shaping guidance of democratization in all major arenas is both dangerous to human
survival prospects and oppressive in relation to the quality of life” (133), thus attaching
democracy as an essential value to the present type of governance. Similarly, other authors
advocate for a rethinking not just of our traditional views on governance but also of our old
notions of democracy “on the assumption that [democracy itself] has no primary locus and no
single demos: the nation-state shares power with increasingly salient sub-national
governments, with proliferating forms of network and partnership governance, with a variety
of quasi public and private organizations, with NGOs, with international agencies and other
forms of supra-national governance” (Hirst 2000, 24). In this sense, one can find that central
to the governance debate is the advocacy to appraise the relationship between governance and
democracy where normative issues like transparency, accountability and increased
participation by multi-networked and varied actors must be addressed by and incorporated in
the discourse. The practice and interpretation of governance should thus capture the role of
all the stakeholders that operate within and beyond governing systems. Hence, following the
previous argument that the move to new forms of governance means an equal move to a new
perspective on it, attempts to reinterpret governance have been done in relation to democracy.
Meaning, a governance perspective, as it has evolved, is no less than that which advocates for
and promotes a “democratized governance” that operates within and generates in turn a wider
democratic space for more actors beyond the state. For instance, Pierre argued that “a
governance perspective necessitates an elaboration of the concept of authority in such a way
that it is not confined to vertical hierarchical structures in which subordinates comply with
the directives of superiors. Rather, allowance must be made for authority that is embedded in
horizontal networks and non-governmental collectivities…if globalized space is as
heterogeneous as it appears to be, innovative ways of theorizing about accountability are
needed. The democratic deficit that marks the multi-centric world needs to be approached in
terms of rule systems that are not constrained by the domestic-foreign autonomy” (Rosenau
2000, 188). On the basis of these arguments, considerable amount of studies on the
governance discourse approach “governance” in six major ways that differ in their definitions
of the concept but are rather converging on their discernment on and advocacy for a
“democratized governance”. (See Figure 1, page 14).
SPATIAL-TEMPORAL
The first and usual approach to “governance” emphasizes the dichotomy between ‘old’ and
‘new’ governance and the differences in the principles enshrined in each. Scholars who
ascribe to this method highlight the disparities between old forms of governance and the type
that we have now. The assumption is that the old governance discourse places the state as the
central and only agent performing the role of governing such that “both what makes up the
agenda of political decision and the scope of power of state control are often not matters of
community choice: many issues are imposed from without the political process and many
activities cannot be controlled by political choice” (Hirst 2000, 22). In contrast, advocates of
‘new governance’ argue that “a mixture of the rise of economic liberalism and the rhetoric of
globalization have undermined such beliefs. Together, they have over-diminished our
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expectations as to what political power can accomplish” (Hirst 2000, 23) and what states can
and cannot do in relation to governing, for that matter. Thus, it is not only that new
conceptions of governance highlight the shift, if not the transfer, of power away from the
central government to other societal forces within and beyond national territories. As we
witness the increasing roles of Non-Governmental Organizations and international agencies,
the old practice of the state as the principal runner of governance is now being put to
question. In the same manner, whereas ‘old governance’ relies on the state as sources of
authoritative values, scholars that rally behind the new governance framework claim that
“states are no longer the only sources of legitimacy, accountability and law” (Hirst 2000, 32).
In fact, according to Rhodes (2000), “the [new] governance discourse explores how the
informal authority of networks supplements and supplants the formal authority of
government; it also explores the limits to the state and seeks to develop a more diverse view
of state authority and its exercise” (55). This can be summarized into two contending models
of governance –the ‘state-centric’ vs. the ‘society-centric’. In the words of Hirst (2000),
“while old governance is consistent with state-centric models of explanation in which the
structure of the state is what matters for explaining different levels of performance, new
governance is consistent with the society-centric models of explanation, [the principal
question being] how the social forces are structured so as to both channel the inputs of society
into government and to assist or not in implementation. Depending on the subset of the new
governance literature being discussed, society becomes either a major contributor or a major
hindrance to providing direction and to implementing policies. In either case, an
understanding of governance begins with society and not with government itself” (48).
Hence, the emphasis of ‘new governance’ on providing a wider space for democratic
participation by other societal actors confirms that democracy, or at least some of its
principles, is widely recognized in the discourse and is there as a central value as opposed to
the other model.
KEY ACTORS/PLAYERS
The governance debate is most vibrant in its discussion of the key actors and
institutions performing governance functions. This characterizes the second approach, which
looks at governance in terms of the actors involved in it. Competing views on this aspect are
arrayed in a spectrum where the state is seen as the central actor in defining governance and
governance frameworks on the one end, and where other players such as the civil society,
market and international agencies as new agents of governance occupy the other end. What
could be seen in between, according to literatures, are interactions between and among these
actors, making explicit a tri- or multi-sectoral partnership, which was rather absent in the old
form of governance. One end illustrates the growing role of civil society groups, particularly
NGOs, in performing governance functions. By discussing the positions NGOs and similar
actors have occupied in this new context where governance exists, Keohane and Donahue
(2000) argue “that governance need not necessarily be conducted exclusively by governments
(12)” as NGOs and networks of NGOs also create and shape governance either in
collaboration with or independently of official channels of authority. In fact, they furthered,
“recent research suggests that international NGOs and NGO alliances are helping to
formulate and implement many international decisions and policies, [shaping] international
events in at least the following ways: identifying problematic globalization consequences that
might otherwise be ignored, articulating new values and norms to guide and constrain
international practice, building transnational alliances that advocate for otherwise ignored
alternatives, altering international institutions to respond to unmet needs, disseminating social
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innovations that have international applications, negotiating resolutions to transnational
conflicts and disagreements, mobilizing resources and acting directly on important public
problems. In these activities, international NGOs and NGO alliances have [thus] been
building the attitudes and institutions for a transnational civil society that makes a different
kind of international governance possible” (Brown et al. 2000, 284). On the national front,
civil society groups and people’s organizations have likewise been enthusiastic in pushing for
a ‘democratized governance’, in which people from the marginalized sectors can also have
the opportunity not only to participate but more importantly to shape political, economic and
social decision-making processes, which previously are deemed to be spheres exclusive to the
state. In practice, literatures also highlight how civil society campaigns have influenced
policy direction and formulation. In the Philippines, for instance, Rebullida (2005) describes
that “the government has ceased to be the sole decision-maker and wielder of social and
political power but shares these with civil society [as] represented by NGOs, POs and even
with the private sector” (15). In fact, she added, “the Philippines operationalize governance
by the participation of civil society and business-industry sectors in the policy-making
process, in various ways such as setting the policy agenda, advocacy of policies and
legislation” (15). Similarly, with emphasis on movements operating on the global scale,
Brown et. al. (2000) chronicle that “increasingly during the past decade, transnational civil
society alliances have been central to campaigns to formulate and enforce global public
policies in response to critical problems” (284).
Apart from NGOs, the market, together with transnational corporations, also prove to be
crucial players in today’s form of governance. By placing high premium on the role of private
companies in creating new forms of governance, Keohane and Nye (2000) contend that not
only are TNCs, as examples, developing their own ways of governing but also that they may
replace legislative and even judicial functions of states as they craft their own standards and
codes of conduct in the absence of effective and fair rules enforced by official channels of
governments (22-3). Alongside markets, TNCs and private companies, there rise another key
player with a growing task of governance –international agencies and institutions. Although
their roles in governance are still subject to question, their activeness in offering interventions
to national governance caught the attention of scholars. In fact, Keohane and Nye (2000)
suggest that “…the retreat of the state has led to the extensive discussion of the role of
international agencies and inter-state agreements and common commercial governmental
practices like arbitration as methods of governance” (27).
The evolution of these non-state actors in assuming governance functions, however, has not
totally vanished states according to some literatures. For instance, Hirst (2000) warns that
“although governance is an entirely different phenomenon today [that]…states no longer
have even the appearance of monopolizing governance, it does not mean that governance can
be left to happenstance. [Meaning], the ad hoc pluralization of political authority and of
extra-political power cannon simply be accepted [because] governance requires a relatively
settled institutional architecture if it is to be effective. Gaps in governance and lack of
coordination between levels of governance will underscore the efficiency of the governing
bodies that there are” (24). With the same line of reasoning, Rhodes (2000) maintains that
“though state’s capacities for governance have weakened, it remains a pivotal institution…[in
that it is still] the source of constitutional ordering, providing minimum standards in a world
of interlocking networks of public powers” (57-58). Hence, the debate continues as to
whether the state is to be dismissed as the fulcrum of power and governance or if it has been
replaced by other non-state agents whose influence on governance are ever-increasing.
Nevertheless, what remains certain, and as reiterated in these collections of literatures, is that
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governance as it is practiced and observed today, is now engaged in and shaped by a wide
range of actors with the state, civil society, market and international institutions as the major
ones.
MODES/LEVELS
Modes of governance differ not only in terms of actors. In some literatures, governance is
discussed by virtue of the levels in which it is applied. Steering modes, according to Treib et
al. (2004), can be hierarchical where rule emanates from the top to the bottom, with states
and supra-national institutions as the dominant sources of governance (11). On the other
hand, the non-hierarchical mode of governance entails bargaining across different segments
and actors in society. Rulemaking does not necessarily emanate from the state such that this
latter type of governance places the role of private-public partnerships and networks at its
core. In the same manner, multicentricity is central to horizontal modes of governance with
cross-relations between and among actors across global, regional, national and local levels.
Repeating Keohane and Nye (2000), “rulemaking and rule interpretation in global
governance have become pluralized. Rules are no longer a matter simply for states or
intergovernmental organizations. Private firms, NGOs, subunits of governments, and the
transnational and Trans-governmental networks that result, all play a role…As a result, any
emerging pattern of governance will have to be networked rather than hierarchical” (37).
FUNCTIONAL
On the other hand, some researches on governance approach it on the basis of its usage. This
functional approach to governance traces the nuances in the use of the concept in two main
ways –governance as a process or pattern of interaction and governance as a system. In the
first one, governance is defined “as the emerging pattern or order of a system that is both the
outcome of social processes and interactions as well as the medium through which actors can
act and interpret this pattern” (Kooiman 1994, 3). Perceiving governance as a process through
which actors who engage in it interact and at the same time a pattern of such interaction,
Kooiman (1994) expounds that “governance can be seen as the pattern or structure that
emerges in a social-political system as ‘common result or outcome of the interacting
intervention efforts of all involved actors” (258). Because of the plurality and differentiation
of society, this usage of governance highlights that the diverse yet interrelated activities of
societal actors and institutions result to what is now central to the discourse –governance.
Governance is a process simply because it collates the efforts of various players in society
and integrates it into a system of governing. On the other hand, another paradigm looks at
governance in a more rigid sense as a system of rule. However, rule here is not understood to
be an exclusive property of governments. Governance in its new conception “is a more
encompassing phenomenon than government [such that] it embraces governmental
institutions, and informal non-governmental institutions [alike] whereby those persons and
organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs and perform their wants”
(Rosenau 1992, 4). In addition, this type of usage also underscores the need for a
‘democratized governance’ as a system of rule. In fact, in Rosenau’s (1992) language,
“governance is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority or at least by
the most powerful of those it affects [in opposition] to governments [that] can function even
in the face of widespread opposition to their policies” (4).
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NORMATIVE DESCRIPTIONS
The re-conceptualization of ‘governance’ carries with it the resolve to democratize the old
form of governance. Across literatures, one can find that normative issues are now attached to
the label, describing what ‘type’ of governance and governing structures are needed in this
fast-changing world. Hence, other literatures approach the concept of governance by
concentrating on the moral issues it has to address. These issues then categorize and
distinguish the types of governance according to its emerging themes and the major ones are
as follows: good governance, corporate governance, humane governance, social-political
governance and interdependent/partnership/multilateral governance. Hirst (2000) defines
‘Good Governance’ as a “means of creating effective political framework conducive to
private economic action –stable regimes, rule of law and efficient trade administration-
adapted to the rules that governments can perform and a strong civil society independent of
the state” (14). This type of governance stresses the need for democratic structures in
providing legitimacy to governance itself. Good governance can, in fact, be observed as a
watchword of several international institutions like the World Bank, which incorporates in
their definitions of development and modernization the principles of democracy as important
components of good governance. In Rhodes (2000) chapter on ‘Governance and Public
Administration’, he quoted “Leftwich’s three strands to good governance: the systematic,
which covers the distribution of both internal and external political and economic power; the
political, referring to the state enjoying both legitimacy and authority derived from a
democratic mandate; and the administrative or the efficient, open and accountable and
audited public service. In short, the author argues that “good governance marries with the
new public management to the advocacy of liberal democracy” (57).
Closely related to the good governance framework is ‘Humane Governance’. Although the
principle of ‘humaneness’ is often attached to the concept of ‘geo- or global governance’, it
nevertheless applies to other levels of governance –local, national and regional. According to
Falk (1995), “humane governance emphasizes people-centered criteria of success as
measured by declines in poverty, violence and pollution and by increasing adherents to
human rights and constitutional practices especially in relation to vulnerable segments of
society as well as by axiological shifts away from materialist or consumerist and patriarchal
conceptions of human fulfillment” (14). By defining humane governance as such, Falk
stresses the need for ‘transnational democracy’ and the extension of democratic practices
across various layers of governance. Further, Falk argues that the emergence of this theme,
‘humane governance’, was derived from the experience of peoples and societies under what
he termed as its opposite, ‘inhumane governance’. At the forefront of the transition, he said,
from inhumane to humane governance are civil society groups across the globe, implying the
secondary roles of nation-states in this project. The important components of the normative
project to achieve humane governance are the following: taming war, abolishing war, making
individuals accountable, collective security, rule of law, nonviolent revolutionary politics,
human rights, stewardship of nature, positive citizenship and cosmopolitan democracy (Falk
1995, 241-255).
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Central to the advocacy of corporate governance is to reform public management by applying
the procedures as well as principles used and upheld by private companies in dealing both
with their clientele and material transactions. Further, the same literature explains that
“corporate governance recommends openness or the disclosure of information; integrity or
straightforward dealing and completeness; and accountability or holding of individuals
responsible for their actions by a clear allocation of responsibilities and clearly defined roles”
(Rhodes 2000, 56).
Speaking of interaction and interdependence, the last major theme of governance that has
emerged out of the new approaches, conceptions and analyses of the governance discourse
upholds these two principles as its main components. ‘Interdependent, Partnership or Multi-
lateral Governance’ gives weight to the coordination among a wide variety of actors existing
in any given space. More encompassing than social-political governance, interdependent
governance, as illustrated by Pierre (2000), involves coherence among a broad range of actors
“different purposes and objectives such as political actors, and institutions, corporate
interests, civil society, and transnational organizations” (3-4). Under this type of governance
is the ‘socio-cybernetic’ form of governance conceptualized by Rhodes (2000) “that
highlights the limits to governing by a central actor, claiming that there is no single sovereign
authority” (57). New patterns of interaction such as self- and co-regulation, public-private
partnerships, co-operative management, and joint entrepreneurial ventures are the main facets
characterizing this emerging form of governance (Rhodes 2000, 57). Similarly, Brown et al.
(2000) outlines the emerging trend of multi-sectoral decision-making, where the state, market
and civil society collaborate with each other in defining and shaping political processes. This
is in consonance with the view that “tri-sectoral partnerships are also becoming more explicit
(Keohane and Nye 2000, 24)” in providing some form of governance on a wide array of
issues. Hence, as explained by the aforementioned literatures, there is no doubt that the more
that new set of actors appear in the realm of governance, the more that normative issues,
including democracy, also surface in that shape the direction of future governance.
TRAJECTORIES
The governance debate includes not only questions of who are involved in it nor how it is
supposed to be understood in today’s terms. Other studies approach governance in terms of
the contours it is likely to traverse in the future. For instance, Keohane and Nye envisage a
global governance best described in the form of ‘network minimalism’. Accordingly,
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“network minimalism seeks to preserve national democratic processes and embedded liberal
compromises while allowing the benefits of economic integration” (2000, 37). On the one
hand, it is said that governance is ‘networked’ because it operates within different sets of
connections and arrangements as opposed to rigid and vertical linear structures and on the
other, it is also ‘minimal’ such that it does not replace national governance configurations nor
unnecessarily encroach on state autonomy (Nye and Keohane 2000, 14). Hirst (2000), in
contrast, envisions what he calls as ‘Negotiated Social Governance’, taking governance as
“related to new set of practices of coordinating activities through networks, partnerships and
deliberative forums, … [embracing] a diverse range of actors from labour unions, trade
associations, firms and NGOs to local authority representatives, social entrepreneurs and
community groups” (18-9). Whether or not future governance will assume either of these
forms, it is nevertheless clear that any understanding of the broad trajectory of governance
involves the principles of democracy and democratization.
The above-mentioned studies explicitly point out that the move to new forms of governance
brought about by globalization presents serious implications for how governments
operationalize and practice it in their own home fronts. For this reason, new conceptions on
governance urge the need for democracy and at the same time pose challenges to its
principles as the debate goes on. In the meantime, what remains a crucial task for all studies
on governance is to discuss and articulate how all the stakeholders and the actors in the
governance spectrum can explore the possibilities for enhancing further its new components
and emerging mechanisms in order to accommodate the values needed for democratization.
Figure 1
GOVERNANCE
15
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