EODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.

BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR AND WILMA P. PAGADUAN, RESPONDENTS. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents] and
G.R. No. 198742 | 2012-08-10 AGAINST (petitioner):
Related Knowledge Entry
Election Law; Requirement of Filipino Citizenship to run for Public Office 1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of
Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;

REYES, J.: 2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; [and]

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act 3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.
(R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.

The Case SO ORDERED.[9]

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari[1] under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Ruling of the COMELEC
Resolution[2] dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No.
A-442010. The assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order [3] dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its
Division dismissing petitioner’s appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision [4] dated October 22, Order[10] dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On
2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring petitioner Teodora motion for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution[11] dated
Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union. September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course.
The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents. The decretal portion of the resolution
The Undisputed Facts reads:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as follows:
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon. 1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine 2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the “Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.”[5] The application was approved and the petitioner took her 3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
SO ORDERED.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
[6]
The Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the “personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” imposed
oath of office on May 13, 2010. by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan [7] and Luis M. Bautista,[8] (private She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In
respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003
the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
“personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to
administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive merits
an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the RTC’s judgment.
public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The Issues
Ruling of the RTC
Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of
In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of
comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred
by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioner’s
under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship eligibility to run for public office, whether the “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in Section 5(2) of
must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Consequently, the RTC’s decision R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.
disposed as follows:
 The Court’s Ruling

The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy
solved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration. for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the
RTC.
The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition
banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz: questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to
A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit: deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
division which issued the order. before the election; and
Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en banc’s prerogative in (2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the
substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
division that initially dismissed it.
Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after
We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en
the proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours)
banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement.
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within
the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever
Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner
reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the
not only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents [13] to her
proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. [17]
contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable
decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en banc’s exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of
The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78
her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place. of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo
warranto petition under Section 253.
The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed
them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of the petitioner’s appeal. A decision or resolution of
any adjudicating body can be disposed in several
IV. ways.is
Petitioner Todisqualified
sustain petitioner’s argument
from running would
for be virtually
elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en banc’s adjudicatory powers.

More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, have lost their Philippine citizenship[18] by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[14]
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
nary execution of judgment. naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the “I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
issuance of a writ of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin. Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon
view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[15]
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,[16] we stressed the import of the
provision vis-à-vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and
pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. 5, viz:

g petitioner’s eligibility to hold public office. Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they
following conditions: wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
2003” and other existing laws; citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- born Filipinos, who have been
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2)
for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; elections.

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any
license or permit to engage in such practice; and and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act
to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the
by, or extended to, those who: Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.
2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the
citizens; oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;

and/or xxxx

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country [T]he intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their
which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours) Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections,
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship. [23] (Citation omitted and italics and
that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. underlining ours)

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,[24] we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for the
of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American
contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn citizenship.
before an officer authorized to administer oath.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase “sworn
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret renunciation”. The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and
the “sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship” in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. [25] The foreign citizenship must be formally
forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
statement made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of
R.A. No. 9225. It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. [26] Even a resort
to the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is
exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER
Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for
construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. [19] Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos
such instance. and not to naturalized Filipinos.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.
of referring to two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must
admit of two or more possible meanings.[20] Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who
have dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought
[21]
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its clarification as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided that they renounce their foreign
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public citizenship.
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal and
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized public officer.
law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship. Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil
and political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they are
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,[22] when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining required to make a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public
office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular provision. Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues that might Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenships
be raised pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. and later decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.
Rusk, wherein the United States considered a naturalized American still as an American citizen even when
he cast his vote in Israel during one of its elections. Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.
Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not required
to renounce his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens
must renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill. under the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are
not deemed as natural-born citizens.
Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship
and are now entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of
citizens. As such, he likewise inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to run for one’s original nationality and only naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.
the highest elective positions in the country.
On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in
renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that they comply with the residency and registration plenary session will decide on the matter. [27]
requirements as provided for in the Constitution.
The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javier’s statement; she
Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who conveniently disregards the preceding and succeeding discussions in the records.
are citizens at the time of birth without having to perform an act to complete or perfect
his/her citizenship. The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javier’s statement ought to
be understood within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is – whether former natural-born
Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status
The repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-
citizenship. With regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.
decided to include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides
for the accountability of public officers. It was Representative Javier’s position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as
natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship.
citizenship will only become a pro forma requirement. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born citizens
On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who became are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that
foreign citizens and who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.
natural-born citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in
Congress. He also agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a Petitioner’s argument, therefore, loses its point. The “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” must be
citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born
citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of being a natural-born citizen effective at the time Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to
he lost his Filipino citizenship. perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court
to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option
As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino citizens of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
and Filipino citizens by election who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested
that the Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had renounced It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of
their Filipino citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered as the Constitution on public officers’ primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:
repatriated citizens.
Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and
In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latter’s comments on any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
the matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
Justice, and Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of being natural- born citizens those
natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that
Filipino citizenship. one’s statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly
invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to
Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false. [28]
foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking
her oath before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the
prospective public officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and
Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who are loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
not considered natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their
citizenship by pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it
status of being natural-born citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the
that this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship. Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.

On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have
lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree. before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. [36] The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their
[29]
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. To Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any elective office in the Philippines.
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours) WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-201 0 is AFFIRMED in
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for toto.
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal SO ORDERED.
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law Sereno, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., on official Leave.
may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-
law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and _____________________________
states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several
[1]
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity Rollo, pp. 3-54.
regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
[2]
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is Id. at 59-72.
“satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.” Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
[3]
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to Id. at 74-75.
be a competent proof of that law.[30]
[4]
Under the sala of Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim; id. at 76-86.
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods. As
[5]
uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already PERMANENT. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in PURPOSES. Enacted August 29, 2003.
disregarding the same.
[6]
Rollo, p. 79.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said
[7]
letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Docketed as SPL. CV. ACTION CASE No. 78-BG.
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
[8]
Docketed as SPL. CV. ACTION CASE No. 76-BG.
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers
(AASJS) Member v. Datumanong[31] that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern [9]
Rollo, p. 86.
itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.
[10]
Id. at 74-75.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so
[11]
conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Id. at 59-72.
Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying
[12]
not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen Id. at 67-68.
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. [32]
[13]
(1) Photocopy of a Letter addressed to the COMELEC dated November 10, 2010 issued by the
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Department of Immigration and Citizenship of Australia, containing an advise that as of September 27,
Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual 2006, the petitioner is no longer an Australian citizen; and (2) photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, [33] such of the said letter dated November 23, 2010 issued by Grace Anne G. Bulos of the Consular Section of the
ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia. (Id. at 62.)
provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. [34]
[14]
Rule 36, Sec. 15. Preferential Disposition of Quo Warranto Cases. – The courts shall give preference
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most to quo warranto over all other cases, except those of habeas corpus.
number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. [35] [15]
“[I]n the absence of any applicable provision in [said] Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.”
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and
[16]
seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships 468 Phil. 130 (2004).
[17]
Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 389 (1999).
[18]
1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the
law, become citizens of a foreign country.
[19]
Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 492 Phil. 303, 309-310 (2005).
[20]
Id. at 310.
[21]
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 696.
[22]
G.R. No. 179848, November 29, 2008, 572 SCRA 295.
[23]
Id. at 306-308.
[24]
G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 149.
[25]
Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179431-32 and 180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385, 406.
[26]
Id.
[27]
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, June 2 to 5, 2003; rollo, pp. 94-95.
[28]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Ed., p. 1101.
[29]
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, 445 Phil. 770, 777 (2003).
[30]
Asiavest Limited v. CA, 357 Phil 536, 551-552 (1998), citing Jovito Salonga, Private International Law,
101-102, 1995 ed..
[31]
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 108.
[32]
See Parado v. Republic of the Philippines, 86 Phil. 340, 344 (1950).
[33]
Valles v. COMELEC, 392 Phil. 327, 340 (2000); Mercado v. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132, 152-153 (1999).
[34]
Jacot v. Dal, supra note 22, at 308.
[35]
Lopez v. COMELEC, supra note 21, at 701.
[36]
Jacot v. Dal, supra note 22, at 306.
|| consequential damages at the same value (P32,000.00) per hectare for the remaining 1.5095 hectares of
G.R. No. 166259 : Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation the plaintiffs property left and rendered useless by the compulsory coverage or for the total sum of
P931,109.20.19ςrνll (emphasis ours)
SECOND DIVISION Both parties appealed to the CA.
G.R. No. 166259 : November 12, 2012 HFC argued that the RTC erred in its determination of just compensation; the amount of P931,109.20 is
LAND BANK OFTHE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONEYCOMB FARMS CORPORATION, Respondent. not supported by the evidence on record while its presented evidence correctly shows that the market
DECISION value of the land at the time of taking was P113,000.00 per hectare. 20ςrνll
BRION, J.: The LBP raised the threshold issue of whether the SAC had jurisdiction to hear HFCs complaint because of
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, 1ςrνll filed by the petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines the pending DARAB proceedings, emphasizing that the completion of the administrative proceedings
(LBP), assailing the Court of Appeals' (CAs) Amended Decision 2ςrνll and Resolution3ςrνll in C.A.-G.R. CV before the DARAB is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint for the determination of just
No. 69661. The CA amended Decision reinstated with modification the Judgment 4of the Regional Trial compensation before the SAC. The LBP also argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it took
Court (RTC) of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, acting as a Special Agrarian Cow1 (SAC) in Special Civil Case judicial notice of the propertys roadside location, its proximity to a commercial district, its incomplete
No. 4637 for Determination and Payment of Just Compensation under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657. development as coconut and corn land, and its condition as grassland, to determine just compensation;
The Factual Antecedents thereby, it effectively eschewed the formula for fixing just compensation, provided under DAR
Respondent Honeycomb Farms Corporation (HFC) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992.21ςrνll Lastly, the LBP questioned the award of consequential
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2550, with an area of 29.0966 hectares, situated in "Curvada, damages and attorneys fees for lack of legal and factual basis. 22ςrνll
Caintagan, Masbate."5ςrνll Through a letter dated February 5, 1988, HFC voluntarily offered its land to The CA Decision
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian The CA, in its January 28, 2004 Decision, reversed the RTC Judgment and dismissed HFCs complaint for
Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), for P581,932.00 or at P20,000.00 per hectare. 6ςrνll Pursuant to the rules failure to exhaust administrative remedies that Section 16(f) of RA 6657 requires. The CA ruled that the
and regulations governing the CARL, the government, through the DAR and the LBP, determined an LBP "made a procedural shortcut" when it filed the complaint with the SAC without waiting for the DARABs
acquirable and compensable area of 27.5871 hectares, while 1.5095 hectares were excluded for being decision.23ςrνll
hilly and underdeveloped.7ςrνll On the LBPs motion for reconsideration (to which a copy of the May 14, 1998 DARAB Decision was
Subsequently, the LBP, as the agency with the authority to determine land valuation and compensation attached),24ςrνll the CA, in its Amended Decision of September 16, 2004, proceeded to decide the case
under the CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of on the merits and recalled its January 28, 2004 Decision. The dispositive portion of the Amended Decision
1992,8ςrνll fixed the value of the land in the amount of P165,739.44 and sent a Notice of Valuation to reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HFC.9ςrνll WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Our January 28, 2004 Decision is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE
HFC rejected the LBPs valuation and it filed, on January 15, 1996, 10a petition with the DAR Adjudication and a new one entered. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 48 in Civil
Board (DARAB) for a summary administrative determination of just compensation. In its petition, HFC Case No. 4637 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees in favor of
claimed that the just compensation for the land should be in the amount of P25,000.00 per hectare, herein plaintiff-appellant is hereby deleted. No costs. 25ςrνll
considering its location and productivity, or for an aggregate amount of P725,000.00. 11ςrνll The CA ruled that in expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of the
While the DARAB proceedings were still pending, HFC filed a Complaint for Determination and Payment of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. It noted that in order to arrive at the proper market
Just Compensation with the RTC, praying for a just compensation of P725,000.00, plus attorneys fees of value, several factors such as the current value of like properties, their actual or potential uses and their
ten percent (10%) of the just compensation.12ςrνll HFC justified the direct filing with the SAC by what it size, shape and location must be considered. The CA thus concluded that the valuation made by the RTC
saw as unreasonable delay or official inaction. HFC claimed that the DARAB disregarded Section 16 of RA was based on the evidence on record since the latter considered the sketch plan of the property, the
6657 which mandates that the "DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for testimonies of the witnesses and the field reports of both parties. In addition, the CA also deleted the
decision."13ςrνll The LBP meanwhile countered that HFCs petition was "premature and lacks a cause of award of attorneys fees for lack of factual and legal basis. 26ςrνll
action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies." 14ςrνll The Petition
Meanwhile, on May 14, 1998, the DARAB issued a Decision 15ςrνll affirming the LBPs valuation. The The LBPs petition for review on certiorari raised the following errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
dispositive portion states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary First, the CA erred in reinstating the decision of the SAC since it had no jurisdiction to hear HFCs complaint
WHEREFORE, conformably to the foregoing consideration, this Board hereby AFFIRMS the valuation of while the DARAB proceedings were pending. It stressed that the SAC could not acquire jurisdiction over
P165,739.44 fixed by the Land Bank of the Philippines on the subject 27.5871-hectare agricultural the complaint since the DARAB continued to retain jurisdiction over the determination of just
landholding. compensation.
The Petition dated October 7, 1995 for determination and payment of Just Compensation filed by the Second, the CA failed to dismiss the complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
landowner with this forum is hereby DENIED or ordered dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction remedies and forum shopping on the part of HFC. It notes that the HFCs complaint was premature and
over the same on the part of this forum.16ςrνll violative of the forum shopping prohibition since the complaint was filed with the SAC despite the
The RTC Decision pendency of the DARAB proceedings.
On July 27, 2000, the RTC rendered a Judgment17ςrνll whose dispositive portion reads: Lastly, the CA erred when it failed to apply the "basic formula" for determining just compensation
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by: prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order
1.) Fixing the just compensation of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff Honeycomb Farms Corp. under No. 11, series of 1994. It emphasizes that by adopting the values fixed by the SAC, the CAs determination
TCT No. T-2550 which is covered by agrarian reform for an area of 27.5871 hectares at P931,109.20 is contrary to: (1) Section 17 of RA 6657 and (2) the rulings of the Court bearing on the determination of
subject to the lien for the docket fee of the amount in excess of P725,000.00 as pleaded for by herein just compensation, in particular, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal 27ςrνll where the Court
plaintiff in its complaint; categorically held that the formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992,
2.) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an attorneys fee equivalent to 10% of shall be used in the valuation of the land. 28ςrνll
the total just compensation.18ςrνll HFC prays for the dismissal of the LBPs petition on the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Owing to the parties conflicting valuations, the SAC made its own valuation and briefly concluded First, it submits that the pendency of the DARAB proceedings has no bearing on the jurisdiction of the SAC
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary since Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for
A judicious evaluation of the evidence on record shows that the subject area is sporadically planted to (sic) the determination of just compensation. Conformably with the dictates of Section 57, litigants can file a
coconut and corn as is not fully develop (sic) when the government conducted its ocular inspection and case for the determination of just compensation without the necessity of a DARAB determination. Second,
thereafter took over possession of the same although majority of it is a fertile grass land and undisputedly it argues that jurisprudence allows resort to judicial intervention without completing administrative
deemed suitable to agriculture. However, the parcel of land under consideration is located in the side of remedies when there has been unreasonable delay or official inaction, as in this case, on the part of the
the road. It is likewise of judicial notice that it is situated near the commercial district of Curvada, administrative agency. Third, for the same reason, it contends that it cannot be charged with forum
Cataingan, Masbate. In the light of the foregoing premises, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that shopping. Finally, it argues that strict adherence to the formula prescribed by DAR Administrative Order
the just compensation for the land of herein plaintiff corporation under TCT No. T-2550 covered by No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1994, unduly "ties the
agrarian reform is P32,000.00 per hectare or P882,787.20 for the area of 27.58571 hectares plus hands of the SAC" in the determination of just compensation. 29ςrνll
 The Courts Ruling In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as
We find the LBPs petition meritorious. SAC, over all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with Section 57
The SAC properly acquired jurisdiction of RA No. 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco G.R. Nos. 140160 and 146733, January 13,
over HFCs complaint for the determination 2004, 419 SCRA 67, the Court upheld the RTCs jurisdiction over Wycocos petition for determination of just
of just compensation despite the pendency compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings was held before the DARAB which has
of the DARAB proceedings primary jurisdiction over the determination of land valuation. The Court held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At the core of the LBPs lack of jurisdiction theory is the premise that SAC could not acquire jurisdiction In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just
over the complaint since the DARAB continued to retain jurisdiction over the matter of determination of compensation without waiting for the completion of DARABs re-evaluation of the land. This,
just compensation. notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive
The premise is erroneous because the DARAB does not "exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in and original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation, thus
just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature." 30ςrνll It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
"The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC xxx is not a novel issue" 31ςrνll and is in fact,well- jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and
settled. In Republic of the Philippines v. CA,32ςrνll we first ruled that it would subvert the original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions, administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of
viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be
Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore, would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC Special Agrarian Court by
the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial private respondent is valid.
(PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the xxx
value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441, wherein Land
he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for Bank questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek reconsideration of the DARs valuation,
the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private but instead filed a petition to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court
respondents case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory between the
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the
compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional
administrative decisions.33ςrνll (citations omitted) trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative
In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belista, 34ςrνll we extensively discussed the reasons proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.
why the SAC can properly assume jurisdiction over petitions for the determination of just compensation In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to
despite the pendency of administrative proceedings, thus: determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all function.
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural is a function addressed to the courts of justice.
Resources (DENR) x x x In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada [G.R. No. 164876, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 495ςrνll , where
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction the issue was whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondents petition for determination
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all of just compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court
criminal offenses under this Act. x x x stated that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of
(30) days from submission of the case for decision. eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with
matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondents petition for
reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to determination of just compensation.35ςrνll (Italicization supplied; citations omitted)
the DARs original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to Similarly, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 36ςrνll whose factual circumstances mirror
landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the that of the present case, we pointedly ruled that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for determination of just compensation even during the pendency of the DARAB proceedings, for the following
the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts. reason:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Republic v. CA G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996, 263 SCRA 758, the Court It is clear from Sec. 57 x x x that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction excusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials
over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of
landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657." The provisions of 50 administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of
must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and
compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be
which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is
6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valid.37ςrνll (emphasis ours)
valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in To reiterate, the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the States power of eminent domain.
administrative agencies, while in Scotys Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law granting the "The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act. essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative
agencies."38ςrνll Specifically, "when the parties cannot agree on the amount of just compensation, only The LBP maintains that the SAC committed serious error when it failed to apply the "basic formula" for
the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing determining just compensation, prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as
parties."39ςrνll amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994. It emphasizes that by adopting the values
Thus, in the present case, HFC correctly filed a petition for the determination of just compensation with fixed by the SAC, the CAs determination is contrary to Section 17 of RA 6657 and the applicable rulings of
the SAC, which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction in just compensation cases under RA 6657. The the Court bearing on the determination of just compensation, which require that the basic formula
DARABs valuation, being preliminary in nature, could not have attained finality, as only the courts can prescribed by the DAR shall be used in the valuation of the land.
resolve the issue of just compensation. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of HFCs petition We agree with the LBP. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, 48ςrνll a recent
for determination of just compensation. case with substantially the same factual antecedents and the same respondent company, we categorically
We also find no merit in the LBPs argument that the HFC failed to exhaust administrative remedies when it ruled that the CA and the RTC grievously erred when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR,
directly filed a petition for the determination of just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the land in question,
case could be resolved. In Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco, 40ςrνll we held that the doctrine of viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue has been rendered moot and That it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation for parcels of
academic.41ςrνll In the present case, the issue is now moot considering that the valuation made by the land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program, is made clear in Section 57 of RA
LBP had long been affirmed in toto by the DARAB in its May 14, 1998 Decision. 6657, which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HFC is not guilty of forum shopping Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
We do not agree with the LBPs view that HFC committed forum shopping. over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.
same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty
already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. The rationale against forum-shopping is To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors that have to be taken into
that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so consideration to accurately determine just compensation. This provision states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
would constitute abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition
havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by
courts.42ςrνll the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by the
is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether, in the two financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
(or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. 43ςrνll In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we recognized that the DAR, as the administrative agency
In Yu v. Lim,44ςrνll we enumerated the requisites of forum shopping, as follows: tasked with the implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one determine just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. We
case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both These factors enumerated in Section 17 have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued
and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, we emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply the formula
judicata in the other case. provided in the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating
In the present case, HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third element of litis pendentia is that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
lacking. As previously mentioned, the DARABs land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, While the RTC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties,
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. The courts, in this case, the SAC, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the
will still have to review with finality the determination, in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that
function.45ςrνll Thus, it becomes clear that there is no identity between the two cases such that a these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power
judgment by the DARAB, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the case under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the
before the SAC. agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the
It has been held that "what is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation law. The DAR Administrative Orderprecisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by providing
caused the courts and litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The RTCwas at no
on similar or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon the same issues." 46ςrνll In the present case, It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they
the evil sought to be prevented by the prohibition on forum shopping, i.e., the possibility of conflicting are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances
decisions, is lacking since the DARAB determination is merely preliminary and is not binding on the partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot
parties; such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The law, in fact, allows the ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an
landowner to file a case for the determination of just compensation with the SAC without the necessity of administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.
first filing the same with the DARAB. Based on these considerations, it is clear that the HFC cannot be We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the applicable DAR administrative regulations in
charged with forum shopping. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, and Land Bank
To determine just compensation, the SAC of the Philippines v. Barrido. In Barrido, we were explicit in stating that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
must take into consideration the factors While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as
prescribed by Section 17 of RA 6657 and is a Special Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the
obliged to apply the DAR formula factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to
The CA, in affirming the SACs valuation and disregarding that of the LBP, briefly disregard the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative order
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating the
In the instant case, the trial court based its valuation of the property at P32,000.00 per hectare on the agrarian law, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation.
evidence submitted by the parties, such as the sketch plan of the property, the testimonies of witnesses, These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the pertinent DAR
and the field investigation reports of both parties. Hence, herein litigants cannot claim that the valuation administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted with
made by the court was not based on the evidence on record. 47ςrνll
grievous error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to come up SO ORDERED.
with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land. [Italicization supplied; emphases ours] Endnotes:
As the law now stands, it is clear that the SAC is duty bound to take into consideration the factors fixed by
Section 17 of RA 6657 and apply the basic formula prescribed and laid down in the pertinent 1
ςrνll Rollo, pp. 17-55; under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
administrative regulations, in this case, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by 2
ςrνll Dated September 16, 2004; id. at 57-62. Penned Ly Associate Justice Jose L. Sabia (retired), and
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, to determine just compensation. In the present case, we
concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
thus find no difficulty in concluding that the CA and the RTC, acting as a SAC, seriously erred when they 3
ςrνll Dated November 25, 2004; id. at 65-66.
effectively eschewed the basic formula prescribed by the DAR regulations and chose instead to come up 4
ςrνll Dated July 27, 2000; id. at 110-114. Penned by Judge Jacinta S. Tambago.
with their own basis for the valuation of the land in question. 5
ςrνll Id. at 97.
The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the 6
ςrνll Id. at 231.
nature of land in question without the 7
ςrνll Id. at 232.
requisite hearing 8
ςrνll As amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994.
Separately from disregarding the basic formula prescribed by the DAR, it has also not escaped our notice 9
ςrνll Rollo, pp. 232-233.
that the SAC also erred in concluding that the subject land consisting of 29.0966 hectares is commercial in 10
ςrνll HFC alleges in its complaint that it filed the petition on January 4, 1996.
nature, after taking judicial notice that it is "situated near the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, 11
ςrνll Rollo, pp. 232-233.
Masbate."49ςrνll In Land Bank of the Philippines v. 12
ςrνll Id. at 97.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation,50ςrνll we categorically ruled that the parties must be given the 13
ςrνll Id. at 98. Section 16 of RA 6657 pertinently states:
opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before the court a quo can take judicial
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholding, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
determine the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties
While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right
to [submit] evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. 14
ςrνll Id. at 104.
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to 15
ςrνll Id. at 231-235.
take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. 16
ςrνll Id. at 235.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a 17
ςrνll Supra note 4.
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is 18
ςrνll Id. at 114.
decisive of a material issue in the case. 19
ςrνll Ibid.
The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is the 20
ςrνll Id. at 195-209.
very issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the opportunity to present 21
ςrνll Supra note 8.
evidence on the nature of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial 22
ςrνll Rollo, pp. 126-152.
nature of a portion of the subject landholdings. As we said in Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco 464 Phil. 23
ςrνll Id. at 221.
83, 97-98 (2004):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 24
ςrνll Id. at 223-235.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case 25
ςrνll Id. at 60-61.
involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable 26
ςrνll Id. at 59-60.
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial 27
ςrνll 478 Phil. 701 (2004).
notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if 28
ςrνll Rollo, p. 17-55.
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so 29
ςrνll Id. at 243-255.
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal 30
ςrνll Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, April 30,
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
2010, 619 SCRA 609, 625.
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. [Italicization 31
ςrνll Ibid.
supplied] 32
ςrνll 331 Phil. 1070 (1996).
The present case must be remanded to the 33
ςrνll Id. at 1077-1078.
court of origin for the determination of just 34
ςrνll G.R. No. 164631, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 137.
compensation in accordance Section 17 of 35
ςrνll Id. at 143-147.
RA 6657 and applicable DAR regulations 36
ςrνll 376 Phil. 252 (1999).
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, 51ςrνll we remanded the case to the SAC for further 37
ςrνll Id. at 262-263.
reception of evidence because the trial court based its valuation upon a different formula and did not 38
ςrνll Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, 515 Phil. 467, 477 (2006).
conduct any hearing for the reception of evidence. 52ςrνll 39
ςrνll Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra note 30, at 630.
The mandatory application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining just compensation has been 40
ςrνll 464 Phil. 83, 97-98 (2004).
reiterated recently in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, 53ςrνll 41
ςrνll Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, supra note 38, at 476.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, 54ςrνll and Land Bank qf the Philippines v. 42
ςrνll Spouses Daisy and Socrates M. Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, et al., G.R. No. 193415,
Honeycomb Farms Corporation,55ςrνll where we also ordered the remand of the cases to the SAC for the
April 18, 2012.
determination of just compensation, strictly in accordance with the applicable DAR regulations. 56ςrνll 43
ςrνll Jesse Yap v. Court of Appeals, (Special Eleventh 11th Division), et al., G.R. No. 186730, June 13,
As we are not a trier of facts, we thus find that a remand of this case is necessary in order for the SAC to
2012.
determine just compensation, strictly in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 and applicable DAR 44
ςrνll G.R. No. 182291, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 172, 184.
regulations, in particular, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR 45
ςrνll Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra note 30, at 629.
Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994.ςηαοblενιrυαllαωlιbrαr 46
ςrνll Spouses Daisy and Socrates M. Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, et al., supra note 42.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition Is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated 47
ςrνll Rollo, p. 60.
September 16, 2004 and Resolution dated November 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 48
ςrνll G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012.
69661 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Case No. 4637 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court 49
ςrνll Rollo, p. 114.
of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, for the determination of just compensation, based on Section 17 of 50
ςrνll Supra note 48.
Republic Act No. 6657 and the applicable administrative orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform. 51
ςrνll Supra note 27.
No pronouncement as to costs.ςrαlαωlιbrαr 52
ςrνll Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra note 30, at 639.
53
ςrνll G.R. No. 171941, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 129.
54
ςrνll G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 31.
55
ςrνll Supra note 48.
56
ςrνll Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra note 30 at 639.
|| In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by
FIRST DIVISION respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
[G.R. NO. 159507 : April 19, 2006] respondents. The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. laid. It reasoned, thus:
FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents. x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
DECISION Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is
CALLEJO, SR., J.: enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical
and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
assailed decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil.
thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is
No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge 2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, defined as the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one
except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks to intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A
reverse and set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same
reconsideration of the assailed decision. purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991]) 3
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated
(AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging
of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September
court. 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition
in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside
address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
other court processes at their office address. The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides
credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.
some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the
card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident
the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka. thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not
unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 4
period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals 5 where the Court
Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000. x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent
embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents' abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant
manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. xxxx
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the "There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time.
Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means,
executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court
a quo. referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax
Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas.
Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any Under Republic Act No. 7160, 7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located. 8 It also pointed out
the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City.
quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the The foregoing circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required proof.
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district
admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No
thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and
certificate is not determinative of one's residence. actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency
City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the requirement of the rule.
parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was
City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo. not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and
cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court. 9 Further, fundamental certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also
in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was
courts of justice.10 improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court had the
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents' occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:
affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or
wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle 11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the "It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for
court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible
person in the locality. to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads: justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are, with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a
and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount "This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous
of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent [herein stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -
petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode,
petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
SO ORDERED.12 time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any
dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant Petition for means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.'
Review with the Court alleging that: (Italicized for emphasis)
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and "We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring
Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. 'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
said district; "Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return
alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner; there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an action for
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of
andςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ paramount importance is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and even action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of
speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to vex the personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
respondents.13 The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court,
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al.
reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern "2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual
Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint. residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
The petition is meritorious. term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.'
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads: of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as
in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 14 The rule on venue, like other procedural and convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
determination of every action and proceeding. 15 The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place. 16 domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length
is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary." 18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or
of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election
admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels to or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house." 19 residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
as possessing the requirements for the said position, 20 including that he was then a resident of the district personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law. 28
which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus: because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one
the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. 29
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the
to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x 21 time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law." 23 certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that community where it sits.
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." 24 Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a
his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in
also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in which he shall be elected.
another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a
is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time." given this option.
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals 25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding, 26 the Finally, respondents' claim that the instant Petition for Review was not properly verified by petitioner
facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court Saludo deserves scant consideration.
of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein
because although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon
synonyms, imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 27 Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of my
filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes
the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and
to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET
such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin
sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue. City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt: SO ORDERED.
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person
can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C.
Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is
Endnotes:
acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place. 1
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (Chairman)
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. and Rodrigo V. Cosico, concurring; rollo, pp. 24-30.
If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with 2
Honorable Romeo M. Gomez.
his business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries 3
Rollo, pp. 104-105.
and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile 4
Citing Boleyley v. Hon. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999).
can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with 5
G.R. No. L-40428, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 298.
intention to stay there permanently. 6
Id. at 305.
7
Local Government Code of 1991.
8
Id., Section 160 thereof.
9
Citing, among others, Baritua v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 12, 18 (1997).
10
Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra note 5.
11
G.R. No. L-70640, June 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 60.
12
Rollo, p. 30.
13
Id. at 10.
14
Escuerte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 53485, February 6, 1991, 193 SCRA 541.
15
Id. at 544.
16
Id.
17
G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124.
18
Id. at 127-129.
19
CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 26.
20
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
21
Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 430 Phil. 754, 770 (2002).
22
Id..
23
Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106, 1117 (1999).
24
Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, supra note 17, at 129.
25
Supra note 5.
26
In its Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the appellate
court stated that the pertinent facts in the case are similar to Koh; rollo, p. 38.
27
See, for example, Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, supra note 17, at 127.
28
Order dated January 2, 2002 of the court a quo; rollo, p. 116.
29
Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, supra note 17, at 128.
30
Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court.
31
HERRERA, IV REMEDIAL LAW 78 (1999 ed.), citing 5 MORAN 58 (1980 ed.). Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court reads:
Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
32
Id. at 81, citing MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, 4th ed.
33
Id.
|| The evidence presented by Wycoco in support of his claim were the following: (1) Transfer Certificate of
FIRST DIVISION Title No. NT-206422; (2) Notice of Land Valuation dated June 18, 1992; and (3) letter dated July 10, 1992
G.R. No. 140160 - January 13, 2004 rejecting the counter-offer of LBP and DAR.16 On the other hand, DAR and LBP presented the Land
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, Respondent. Valuation Worksheets.17
x------------------------x On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no
G.R. No. 146733 January 13, 2004 need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the
FELICIANO F. WYCOCO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE RODRIGO S. CASPILLO, Pairing Judge of prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00
the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 23, Cabanatuan City and the per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690
Department of Agrarian Reform, Respondents. hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual
DECISION damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. The dispositive portion thereof states:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions, the first seeking the review of the February 9, 1999 1. Ordering the defendants to pay the amount of P13,419,082.00 to plaintiff as just compensation for the
1 2
Decision and the September 22, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 39913, property acquired;
which modified the Decision3 of Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting as a Special 2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,663,235.00 representing the unrealized
Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF); and the second for mandamus to compel the said trial court profits from the time of acquisition of the subject property and the sum of P8,475,210.00 for every
to issue a writ of execution and to direct Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo to inhibit himself from Agrarian Case calendar year, until the amount of compensation is fully paid including legal interest which had accrued
No. 91 (AF). thereon.
The undisputed antecedents show that Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare No pronouncement as to costs.
unirrigated and untenanted rice land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-206422 and situated SO ORDERED.18
in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. 4 The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition brought by DAR on
In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily jurisdictional and procedural issues, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 39234, was dismissed on May 29,
offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. 5 In November 1991, 1997.19 The dismissal became final and executory on June 26, 1997. 20 This prompted Wycoco to file a
after the DARs evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land petition for mandamus before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 146733, praying that the decision of the
Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) be executed, and that
P1,342,667.466 was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo, the now presiding Judge of said court, be compelled to inhibit himself from
review, was modified to P2,280,159.82.7 The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, hearing the case.
river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just 39913, was likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals on February 9, 1999. 21 On September 22, 1999,
compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. 8 The case was docketed as DARAB VOS Case No. however, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due Wycoco the
232 NE 93. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have
deposited the compensation offered by DAR.9 In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer- been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic, thus
beneficiaries. WHEREFORE, and conformably with the above, Our decision of February 9, 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in
On March 29, 1993, DARAB required the parties to submit their respective memoranda or position papers the sense that the value corresponding to the aforesaid 3.3672 hectares and all the awards appertaining
in support of their claim.10 Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings, thereto in the decision a quo are ordered deducted from the totality of the awards granted to the private
and instead filed on April 13, 1993, the instant case for determination of just compensation with the respondent. In all other respects, the decision sought to be reconsidered is hereby RE-AFFIRMED and
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF). 11 Impleaded as REITERATED.
party-defendants therein were DAR and LBP. SO ORDERED.22
On April 30, 1993, Wycoco filed a manifestation in VOS Case No. 232 NE 93, informing the DARAB of the In its petition, LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling:
pendency of Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) with the Cabanatuan court, acting as a special agrarian court. 12 On I
March 9, 1994, the DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give way to the determination of just THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACTING AS A SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT MAY ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER
compensation by the Cabanatuan court. Pertinent portion thereof states: AGRARIAN CASE NO. 91 (AF) AND RENDER JUDGMENT THEREON WITHOUT AN INITIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
Admittedly, this Forum is vested with the jurisdiction to conduct administrative proceeding to determine DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BY THE DARAB PURSUANT TO SECTION 16 OF RA 6657, OVER
compensation. [H]owever, a thorough perusal of petitioners complaint showed that he did not only raise THE TIMELY OBJECTION OF THE PETITIONER, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF
the issue of valuation but such other matters which are beyond the competence of the Board. Besides, the ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND ON FORUM SHOPPING;
petitioner has the option to avail the administrative remedies or bring the matter on just compensation to II
the Special Agrarian Court for final determination. THAT THE JUST COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby dismissed. EVIDENCE, WHEN IT WAS BASED ONLY ON JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE PREVAILING MARKET VALUE OF LAND
SO ORDERED.13 BASED ON THE ALLEGED PRICE OF TRANSFER OF TENURAL RIGHTS, TAKEN WITHOUT NOTICE AND
Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answers before the special agrarian court in Agrarian Case HEARING IN VIOLATION OF RULE 129 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
No. 91 (AF), contending that the valuation of Wycocos property was in accordance with law and that the III
latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary administrative THAT THE TRIAL COURT CAN REQUIRE THE PETITIONER TO COMPENSATE THE PORTIONS OF
proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation. 14 RESPONDENTS PROPERTY WHICH WERE NOT DECLARED BY THE DAR FOR ACQUISITION, NOR SUITABLE
After conducting a pre-trial on October 3, 1994, the trial court issued a pre-trial order as follows: FOR AGRICULTURE NOR CAPABLE OF DISTRIBUTION TO FARMER BENEFICIARIES UNDER THE CARP;
The parties manifested that there is no possibility of amicable settlement, neither are they willing to admit IV
or stipulate on facts, except those contained in the pleadings. THAT THE TRIAL COURT CAN AWARD AS PART OF JUST COMPENSATION LEGAL INTEREST ON THE
The only issue left is for the determination of just compensation or correct valuation of the land owned by PRINCIPAL AND ALLEGED UNREALIZED PROFITS OF P29,663,235.00 FROM THE TIME OF ACQUISITION OF
the plaintiff subject of this case. THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND P8,475,210.00 FOR EVERY CALENDAR YEAR THEREAFTER, CONSIDERING
The parties then prayed to terminate the pre-trial conference. THAT THE SAME HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND THAT THE RESPONDENT RETAINED THE TITLE TO HIS
AS PRAYED FOR, the pre-trial conference is considered terminated, and instead of trial, the parties are PROPERTY DESPITE THE DARS NOTICE OF ACQUISITION;
allowed to submit their respective memoranda. V
WHEREFORE, the parties are given twenty (20) days from today within which to file their simultaneous THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD VALIDLY GRANTED EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL ON THE ALLEGEDLY GOOD
memoranda, and another ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file their Reply/Rejoinder, if any, and REASON OF THE PETITIONERS ADVANCED AGE AND WEAK HEALTH, CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE
thereafter, this case shall be deemed submitted for decision. JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT DESTITUTE. 23
SO ORDERED.15
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) Did the Regional Trial Court, acting as Special Agrarian Court, order limited the issues to those not disposed of by admission or agreements; and the entry thereof
validly acquire jurisdiction over the instant case for determination of just compensation? (2) Assuming that controlled the subsequent course of action.30
it acquired jurisdiction, was the compensation arrived at supported by evidence? (3) Can Wycoco compel Besides, the issue of whether Wycoco violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was
the DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell? (4) Were the awards of interest rendered moot and academic in view of the DARABs dismissal 31 of the administrative case to give way to
and damages for unrealized profits valid? and in recognition of the courts power to determine just compensation. 32
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the laws in point are Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) which, in pertinent part, provide: market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural be heard thereon.
Resources (DENR). After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all decisive of a material issue in the case.
criminal offenses under this Act. Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation
(30) days from submission of the case for decision. without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 it was held that Special Agrarian Courts are given original and exclusive cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size,
compensation; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. Section 50 must be shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. 33 Since these factors were not considered, a
construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the determination of just remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice
compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must
conferred to the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR, as an administrative agency, be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The valuation of resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of
property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the Special Agrarian saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies. 25 In fact, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the New Rules acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
of Procedure of the DARAB acknowledges this power of the court, thus judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just or professionally known, the basis of his action. 34
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Anent the third issue, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the
Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer
Under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which
with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the just was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.
compensation to be paid for their taking.26 Through a notice of voluntary offer to sell (VOS) submitted by We find Wycocos claim for payment of interest partly meritorious. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
the landowner, accompanied by the required documents, the DAR evaluates the application and of Appeals,35 this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, which
determines the lands suitability for agriculture. The LBP likewise reviews the application and the provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in
supporting documents and determines the valuation of the land. Thereafter, the DAR issues the Notice of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657.
Land Valuation to the landowner. In both voluntary and compulsory acquisition, where the landowner "It is very explicit from [Section 16 (e)] that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.
rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were
administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the intention to include a trust account among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made
the Regional Trial Court acting as a special agrarian court. This in essence is the procedure for the express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a
determination of just compensation.27 trust account is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,28 the landowner filed an action for determination of construction of the term deposit.
just compensation without waiting for the completion of DARABs re-evaluation of the land. This, xxx-xxx-xxx
notwithstanding, the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive "In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its powers to enact rules and regulations
and original jurisdiction over determination of just compensation, thus when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e)
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds. In the same vein,
exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations can
original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of not outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in
administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void." 36
adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and Pursuant to the forgoing decision, DAR issued Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1996, converting trust
exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the accounts in the name of landowners into deposit accounts. The transitory provision thereof states
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be VI. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC [Special Agrarian All trust accounts issued pursuant to Administrative Order No. 1, S. 1993 covering landholdings not yet
Court] by private respondent is valid. (Emphasis supplied)29 transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines as of July 5, 1996 shall immediately be
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos complaint for converted to deposit accounts in the name of the landowners concerned.
determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative All Provincial Agrarian Reform Officers and Regional Directors are directed to immediately inventory the
proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining claim folders referred to in the preceding paragraph, wherever they may be found and request the LBP to
the value of Wycocos land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990. What is more, DAR and establish the requisite deposit under this Administrative Order and to issue a new certification to that
LBPs conformity to the pre-trial order which limited the issue only to the determination of just effect. The Original Certificate of Trust Deposit previously issued should be attached to the request of the
compensation estopped them from questioning the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The pre-trial DAR in order that the same may be replaced with a new one.
 18
All previously established Trust Deposits which served as the basis for the transfer of the landowners title Id., p. 46.
19
to the Republic of the Philippines shall likewise be converted to deposits in cash and in bonds. The Bureau Rollo of G.R. No. 146733, p. 37; The Decision was penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz,
of Land Acquisition and Distribution shall coordinate with the LBP for this purpose. and concurred in by Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras and Ricardo P. Galvez.
24
In light of the foregoing, the trust account opened by LBP in the name of Wycoco as the mode of payment 331 Phil. 1071 (1996).
25
of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. Such conversion should be retroactive in Id., p. 1075, citing EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, 4 April 1987, 149 SCRA 305; Sumulong v. Guerrero,
application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the G.R. No. L- 48685, 30 September 1987, 154 SCRA 461.
26
landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds prior to the ruling of the Court Escano, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 20, 27 (2000).
27
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of just and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 (Amended DAR Administrative Order Nos. 12, 14 & 17, Series
valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. 37 The interest earnings of 1989)
accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was further amended by DAR A.O. No. 5, Series of 1992; DAR
compensation. A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993; DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1996; and DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1998.
28
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation 376 Phil. 252 (1999).
29
due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the Id., pp. 262-263.
30
nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the Rule 18, Section 7, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure; Caltex Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
government one of forbearance.38 It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied 97753, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA 448, 462.
31
where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 140.
32
tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. This is because the Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Medalla Jr. v. Sayo, 191 Phil. 170 (1981).
33
replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; B. H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, 14 December 1992, 216 SCRA 584, 587.
for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process. 39 34
State Prosecutor v. Judge Muro, A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, 19 September 1994, 236 SCRA 505, 521-522.
35
Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP 319 Phil. 246 (1995). The Resolution denying LBP and DARs motion for reconsideration was promulgated
opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP on July 5, 1996 (327 Phil. 1084).
36
bonds deposit accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be Id., pp. 257-258.
37
determined by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 9.
38
determined by the Special Agrarian Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, 20 January 2003, citing Republic v. Court of
bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of the taking of the property up to the time of actual payment of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA 611.
39
just compensation. Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 727, 756 (1999).
40
The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted. The amount of loss must not only Magat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124221, 4 August 2000, 337 SCRA 298, 308.
be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The claim must be
premised upon competent proof or upon the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other
documentary proof.40 None having been presented in the instant case, the claim for unrealized profits
cannot be granted.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Wycocos petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 should
be dismissed. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting as Special
Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF), cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the
case to the trial court for determination of just compensation. Likewise, the prayer for the inhibition of
Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo in Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) is denied for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in G.R. No. 140160 is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, for the
determination of just compensation. The petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1
Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez,
Jr. and Teodoro P. Regino. (Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 9.)
2
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 7.
3
Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura. (Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 149.)
4
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 258.
5
Id., p. 113.
6
Id., p. 132; Complaint, p. 125.
7
LBPs petition for review before the Court of Appeals, CA Rollo, p. 12; Land Valuation Worksheet, pp. 71-
79.
8
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 123.
9
CA Rollo, p. 80.
10
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 123.
11
Id., p. 124.
12
CA Rollo, p. 91.
13
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 140.
14
Decision, CA Rollo, p. 40.
15
Rollo of G.R. No. 140160, p. 148.
16
CA Rollo, pp. 88-90.
17
Id., p. 71-79.
|| alleged that in 1988, respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons over a 300-square
SECOND DIVISION meter portion of the subject property, but that respondent refused to partition/subdivide the same
[G.R. No. 201427. March 18, 2015.] even after the Gingoyons paid the taxes, fees and expenses of the sale. For her defense, respondent
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, petitioner,vs.FE T. ADOLFO, respondent. claimed in her Answer 14 that when the sale to the Gingoyons was made, the subject property
DECISION constituted conjugal property of her marriage with petitioner; that as early as 1983, or when the
DEL CASTILLO, J p: Garcias executed the deed of sale in her favor, the subject property became a conjugal asset; since
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set aside: 1) the October 6, 2009 petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time and
Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783 reversing the October 2, 2006 knew nothing about the sale, the sale was null and void.
Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Mandaue City (RTC Mandaue),Branch 55 in On May 15, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision 15 in Civil Case No. MAN-2683,
Civil Case No. MAN-4821; as well as 2) the CA's March 2, 2012 Resolution 4 denying petitioner's declaring that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage. It thus nullified the
Motion for Reconsideration 5 and Supplement 6 thereto. 1988 deed of sale executed by respondent in favor of the Gingoyons for lack of consent on the part of
Civil Case No. MAN-4821 petitioner, citing Article 124 of the Family Code. 16 The trial court likewise awarded moral and
On April 14, 2004, petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition 7 for exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in favor of the respondent in the total
judicial separation of property against his estranged wife, respondent Fe Adolfo, nee Tudtud. amount of P107,000.00.
Docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-4821 and assigned to Branch 55, the petition alleged that the parties The Gingoyons filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971.
were married on November 26, 1966; that the union bore one child; that during the marriage, they Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings in Civil Case No. MAN-4821
acquired through conjugal funds Lot 1087-A-2-E, a 3,652-square meter property in Brgy. Cabancalan, Meanwhile, during the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, petitioner submitted
Mandaue City, Cebu (the subject property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 18368; as part of his evidence and for marking certified true copies of the Gingoyons' Complaint in Civil Case
that later on, the parties separated due to irreconcilable differences; that since reunion was no longer No. MAN-2683, respondent's Answer thereto, and the trial court's May 15, 2002 Decision in said case.
feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of the conjugal property, but respondent adamantly On August 1, 2005, petitioner filed a Request for Admission 17 of 1) the genuineness of the
refused; that respondent denied petitioner's co-ownership of the subject property, claiming the same duly marked certified true copies of the Complaint, Answer, and Decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683
as her paraphernal property; that several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them (Exhibits "F," "G" and "H," respectively);2) respondent's declaration in said Answer that the subject
proved unavailing; and that a judicial separation of property is proper under the circumstances and property constituted conjugal property of the marriage; and 3) the trial court's pronouncement in said
pursuant to Article 135 (6) of the Family Code. 8 Petitioner thus prayed that judgment be rendered case that the subject property forms part of the conjugal estate.
decreeing a separation of the conjugal property and the subdivision or sale thereof, to the end of Respondent failed to file her answer or response to the request for admission.
dividing the same or the proceeds thereof; and ordering respondent to pay petitioner P50,000.00 as On September 5, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the
attorney's fees, appearance fees (P2,000.00 per hearing),and P20,000.00 litigation costs. Pleadings, 18 stating that since respondent failed to answer his request for admission, the matters
In her Answer 9 with counterclaim, respondent contended that while she remained married contained in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of
to petitioner, she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her paraphernal property Civil Procedure 19 (1997 Rules); that as a consequence of the application of the rule, respondent is in
which she inherited from her mother; that petitioner is a lazy bum, gambler, drunkard, wife abuser, effect considered to have admitted that the subject property is a conjugal asset of their subsisting
and neglectful father; that respondent found all means to support the family even as petitioner marriage which may thus be the subject of his petition for judicial separation of property; and that on
neglected it; that respondent bought on installment a tricycle for the petitioner's use in business, but account of said admission, a hearing on the merits becomes unnecessary and, instead, Rule 34 20 of
he kept the proceeds thereof to himself and used the same in his gambling and drinking sprees; that the 1997 Rules on judgments on the pleadings should apply. Petitioner thus prayed that the trial
respondent alone took the initiative to support the family and found ways to take care of the daily court render judgment in his favor based on the pleadings.
needs of her child; that she caused to be built on a portion of her mother's land a house even while Respondent filed an Opposition. 21 In her Opposition to Plaintiff's
petitioner was bumming around; that one day, petitioner destroyed the roof of the house that was Memorandum, 22 respondent argued among others that the request for admission was premature
then being built; that petitioner subsequently abandoned her and their child in 1968, and transferred considering that the decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 was the subject of an appeal, and thus not
to Davao City where he took a mistress and begot four children by her; that in 1986, petitioner yet final.
returned to Cebu City seeking reconciliation with respondent; that respondent took petitioner back, In an October 11, 2005 Order, 23 the trial court directed the transfer of Civil Case No. MAN-
but in 1987 they once more separated; that thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from 4821 to Branch 55 of the RTC Mandaue, since it is said court which decided the closely related Civil
petitioner. Case No. MAN-2683.
Respondent claimed in her Answer that the subject property was a portion of a bigger lot On October 2, 2006, Branch 55 issued an Order 24 granting petitioner's motion for
(mother lot) owned by her mother Petronila Tudtud which was covered by TCT T-15941. On October judgment on the pleadings. It held as follows:
11, 1967, her mother executed a quitclaim deed transferring a portion of the mother lot — the This court has painstakingly exerted effort in going over the record and
subject property — to respondent. The mother title TCT T-15941 was then cancelled and a new one, took serious note of all the pleadings, documents and others on file. After serious
TCT (17216)-5415, was issued in respondent's name. Respondent then sold the subject property to consideration, the court believes and so holds that there is basis in rendering
her brother on January 19, 1968, and a new TCT (17833)-5515 was issued in her brother's name. Her judgment. The Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings though denominated as
brother then mortgaged the property to Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),which foreclosed such but [sic] shall be treated as a move to seek summary judgment. ...
on the same. TCT 18231 was issued in DBP's name. DBP then sold the property to the spouses xxx xxx xxx
Antonio and Lucy Garcia (the Garcias),and TCT 18266 was in turn issued in their name. Finally, on The court in arriving at this resolution was guided by the following
May 25, 1983, the Garcias sold back the subject property to respondent, and a new title — TCT pronouncements by the Supreme Court in the case of Diman vs. Alumbres,G.R. No.
18368 10 — was then issued in the name of respondent "FE M. TUDTUD, ...married to Teofilo Adolfo." 131466, November 27, 1998, 299 SCRA 459 ...:
Respondent argued that she is the sole owner of the subject property, the same being her xxx xxx xxx
paraphernal property which she alone redeemed from the Garcias; that the inclusion of petitioner's In the same case, it was held — IaEScC
name in TCT 18368 does not make him a co-owner of the property, but was merely necessary to "It is also the law which determines when a summary judgment is
describe respondent's civil status; and that under Article 135 11 of the Civil Code, all property proper. It declares that although the pleadings on their face appear to raise
brought by the wife to the marriage as well as all property she acquires during the marriage in issues of fact — e.g.,there are denials of, or a conflict in, factual allegations
accordance with Article 148 12 of the same Code constitutes paraphernal property. aTCAcI — if it is shown by admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues
Respondent thus prayed that the petition be dismissed. By way of counterclaim, she sought are sham, fictitious, or not genuine, or, in the language of the Rules, that
the payment of moral, exemplary, and nominal damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
Civil Case No. MAN-2683 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
In 1996, respondent's sister Florencia Tudtud and her husband Juanito Gingoyon (the matter of law, the Court shall render a summary judgment for the plaintiff
Gingoyons) filed a case for partition with damages against respondent. The case was docketed as or the defendant, as the case may be. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and raffled to Branch 55 of the RTC Mandaue. The Complaint 13 therein
 On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment[,] issues that she inherited the same from her mother although she claimed it as a conjugal
apparently exist — i.e.,facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which property based on the TCT's attached to her answer. Another strong indication that
there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials Lot No. 1087-A-2-E is solely owned by defendant-appellee is the fact that in another
or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer — but the issues case (Civil Case No. MAN-2008) involving the same property and the same parties
thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not genuine, as shown but for a different issue (road right of way),defendant-appellee alone signed the
by [affidavits],depositions or admissions. In other words, as a noted compromise agreement ceding a portion of the subject lot as a right of way
authority remarks, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts perpetually open and unobstructed for the benefit of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-
as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as appellee, their respective heirs, assigns and transferees and guests. The same
summarily proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions." (Italics and compromise agreement which became the decision of the case attained finality
underscoring supplied) without defendant-appellee questioning the absence of her husband's signature.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Defendant 25 did not file any verified answer or a pleading denying under WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing premises, the appeal is
oath the genuineness and authenticity of the documents attached to the Request for hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Admission and of the other matters therein set forth. This failure has far reaching Branch 55, dated 15 May 2002, in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 is REVERSED and SET
implications in that the following are deemed admitted: a) the genuineness of ASIDE.
Exhibits F, G and H, all attached to the Request for Admission; b) that she admitted Let the partition of Lot No. 1087-A-2-E consisting of 300 square meters
in paragraph 10 in her Answer to Civil Case No. MAN-2683 that Lot 1087-A-2-E was bought by plaintiffs-appellants from defendant-appellee be done in accordance
no longer paraphernal property but rather a conjugal property of Spouses Teofilo and to [sic] the sketch plan executed for that purpose.
Fe Adolfo and; c) that RTC, Branch 55, Mandaue City, sustained and/or held the view SO ORDERED. 32
of defendant (Fe Tudtud) that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property of Spouses On June 23, 2007, the above CA decision became final and executory. 33
Teofilo and Fe Adolfo, thus, dismissed Civil Case No. MAN-2683 and awarded Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783
damages to the defendant. In CA-G.R. CV No. 01783, respondent filed her Appellant's Brief, 34 where she argued that
Judicial admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, the trial court erred in issuing its October 2, 2006 Order directing the partition or sale of the subject
(b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, property; that it was error for the trial court to take judicial notice of its own judgment in Civil Case
or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-trial of the case. No. MAN-2683 and thus declare that the subject property is conjugal, since the issue of whether it
Admissions obtained through depositions, written interrogatories or requests for constitutes conjugal or paraphernal property was still pending in the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971;
admission are also considered judicial admissions." Page 686, Remedial Law that since the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 have not been terminated and the issue
Compendium, Vol. II, 9th Rev. Ed.,Regalado. regarding the character of the subject property has not been resolved with finality, then petitioner's
With the admission that Lot 1087-A-2-E is a conjugal property, it follows as resort to a request for admission and motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature; and that
its necessary and logical consequence, that plaintiff 26 is entitled to the relief with the May 30, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner and the trial court should submit
demanded. to the finding therein that the subject property is her paraphernal property.
xxx xxx xxx In his Appellee's Brief, 35 petitioner insisted that the trial court did not err in treating his
A DECISION in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 had already been rendered by RTC, motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment; that respondent's Answer in
Branch 55, on the 15th day of May 2002 with the court finding that Lot 1087-A-2-E is Civil Case No. MAN-2683 constituted a judicial admission that the subject property was a conjugal
a conjugal property ...— asset, which required no further proof; that respondent's failure to reply to his written request for
xxx xxx xxx admission also resulted in the acknowledgment that the subject property is a conjugal asset; that the
For reason[s] of expediency and convenience, the court may even take trial court correctly took judicial notice of the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as they were
judicial notice of its earlier decision finding Lot 1087-A-2-E as a conjugal property. 27 relevant and material to the resolution of Civil Case No. MAN-4821; that since it was not respondent
xxx xxx xxx who appealed the May 15, 2002 decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, then the finding therein that the
Under the circumstances, judicial separation of property is proper. Aware subject property is conjugal should bind her; and that the CA's eventual finding in CA-G.R. CV No.
that the separation has the effect of a dissolution of the conjugal partnership 78971 that the subject lot was respondent's paraphernal property cannot bind him because he was
property regime, the presumptive legitime of Nilo Adolfo (the only common child of not a party to Civil Case No. MAN-2683.
the spouses) has to be delivered in accordance with Article 51 in relation to On October 6, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal
paragraph (8) Article 127 and Article 137 of the Family Code of the Philippines. portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing WHEREFORE, based from the foregoing premises, the Order of the Regional
the partition of Lot 1087-A-2-E between the plaintiff and the defendant in equal share Trial Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City, in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, is hereby
of what remains after allocating to Nilo Adolfo a portion of Nine hundred thirteen REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the records of this case are remanded to RTC (Branch
(913) square meters representing his presumptive legitime. 55),Mandaue City, for further proceedings.
The plaintiff is directed to submit to this court the proposed subdivision SO ORDERED. 36
plan for its consideration before submitting the same for approval to the Bureau of In arriving at the above conclusion, the CA held that the trial court cannot treat petitioner's
Lands. motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment. It stated that in a proper case
In case of disagreement as to their respective location, the same shall be for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at all on account of the defending
done through raffle to be conducted by the sheriff who shall see to it that judgment party's failure to raise an issue in his answer, while in a proper case for summary judgment, such
in this case shall be fully implemented. issues exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by affidavits, depositions or
SO ORDERED. 28 admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while
Respondent instituted an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 01783. a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 admissions. 37 It added that respondent's Answer appeared on its face to tender an issue; it disputed
Meanwhile, on May 30, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision 29 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It petitioner's claim that the subject property is their conjugal property. The next thing to be determined
reversed the May 15, 2002 Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. MAN-2683. It declared, among is whether this issue is fictitious or sham as to justify a summary judgment.
others, that the subject property was respondent's paraphernal property. Thus, it held: ESacHC The CA added that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted by
Proceeding from the foregoing consideration, the finding that Lot No. 1087- her failure to reply to petitioner's request for admission, her claims and documentary exhibits clearly
A-2-E is a conjugal property does not have any basis, hence, does not have any merit contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request; that the trial court disregarded the
at all. On the contrary, plaintiffs-appellants 30 sufficiently proved that the aforesaid fact that the issue of whether the subject property is conjugal was still unresolved as CA-G.R. CV No.
lot was defendant-appellee's 31 paraphernal property as the latter even admitted 78971 was still pending; and that finally, the trial court should have been guided by the principles
that trial courts have but limited authority to render summary judgments and that summary there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called
judgments should not be rendered hastily. 38 EHDCAI for." 48 SaICcT
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in a March 2, 2012 Resolution, he was rebuffed. Hence, In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent's failure to reply to
the present Petition was filed on April 30, 2012. petitioner's request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its May 15,
In a March 20, 2013 Resolution, 39 the Court resolved to give due course to the instant 2002 Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial notice of the
Petition. proceedings in said case. While there is nothing irregular with this — as courts may "take judicial
Issue notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if (1) the parties
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its
substance not in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules, and applicable jurisprudence. 40 discretion, resolves to do so" 49 — the trial court however disregarded the fact that its decision was
Petitioner's Arguments then the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It should have known that until the
In his Petition seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and thus appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would be premature to render judgment on petitioner's
reinstate the October 2, 2006 Order of the trial court, petitioner insists that respondent's failure to motion for judgment on the pleadings; that it would be presumptuous to assume that its own decision
reply to his written request for admission resulted in her admitting that the subject property is a would be affirmed on appeal. One of the issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether the subject
conjugal asset, applying Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules; that the CA grossly erred in property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of resolving petitioner's
disregarding the rule; that with the resulting admission, there remains no genuine issue to be motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It
resolved in Civil Case No. MAN-4821, such that judgment based on the pleadings is proper. Finally, should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in the hasty resolution of his case. In the
petitioner adds that respondent's trifling with the law and rules of procedure — by conveniently first place, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 was transferred to it from Branch 56 precisely for the reason that
claiming in one case that the subject property is conjugal, and then in another that it is paraphernal it was the court which tried the closely related Civil Case No. MAN-2683.
— should not be countenanced; she should be held to her original declaration that the subject Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioner's
property is conjugal. request for admission by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court should have considered the
Respondent's Arguments pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It cannot take judicial notice solely of the proceedings in
In her Comment, 41 respondent counters that, as correctly ruled by the CA, petitioner Civil Case No. MAN-2683, and ignore the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. After all, CA-G.R. CV No.
elected the wrong remedy in filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings when he should have 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. MAN-2683; an appeal is deemed a continuation of
moved for summary judgment; that in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the movant is deemed the same case commenced in the lower court. 50
to admit the truth of all of the opposing party's material and relevant allegations, and rest his motion On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a motion
on those allegations taken together with that of his own as are admitted in the pleadings; 42 that the for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear that under Rules 34 and
effect of this is that petitioner is deemed to have admitted that the subject property is paraphernal, 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a
as claimed in her Answer; that with the final and executory May 30, 2007 Decision of the CA in CA- result of the consequent admission by respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not
G.R. CV No. 78971, the subject property should now be considered as her paraphernal property, and actually the case. Quite the contrary, by invoking the proceedings and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-
petitioner's case for partition on the claim that the subject property is conjugal should be dismissed 2683, petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment while the appeal in said case is pending,
for being moot and academic. because the result thereof determines whether the subject property is indeed conjugal or
Our Ruling paraphernal. He may not preempt the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. CSHEAI
The Court denies the Petition. While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the
Judgment on the pleadings is proper "where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise action, 51 petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to secure
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading." 43 Summary judgment, on the other affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief, be allowed to
hand, will be granted "if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, repudiate or question the CA's ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. The principle of estoppel bars him
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate court, which became final and executory,
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 44 that the subject property is respondent's paraphernal property. "In estoppel, a person, who by his
We have elaborated on the basic distinction between summary judgment and judgment on deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner, is barred from adopting an
the pleadings, thus: inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another. It
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the contemplation of law, become
one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the party himself,
proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a either by conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in pais." 52
proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all Finally, the Court notes that the appellate court overlooked the May 30, 2007 Decision in
because of the failure of the defending party's answer to raise an issue. On the other CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, which became final and executory on June 23, 2007. The respondent included
hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist — i.e.,facts are this development in her appellee's brief, but the CA did not take it into account. As an unfortunate
asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or consequence, the case was not appreciated and resolved completely.
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the Thus, with the development in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 brought upon by the final and
answer — but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner's case is left with no leg to stand on. There
genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. 45 being no conjugal property to be divided between the parties, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 must be
An answer would "fail to tender an issue" if it "does not deny the material allegations in the dismissed.
complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party's pleadings by confessing the WHEREFORE,the Petition is DENIED.The October 6, 2009 Decision and March 2, 2012
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01783 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in
specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses that Civil Case No. MAN-4821 is ordered DISMISSED.
(allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly SO ORDERED.
or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff),a judgment on the pleadings Carpio, * Velasco, Jr., ** Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
would naturally be improper." 46
On the other hand, "whether ...the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux Footnotes
of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. *Per Special Order No. 1945 dated March 12, 2015.
In a case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential **Per Special Order No. 1951 dated March 18, 2015.
question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings." 47 "A 'genuine 1.Rollo,pp. 3-26.
issue' is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, 2.Id. at 182-192; penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by Associate Justices
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then Manuel M. Barrios and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
3.Id. at 151-159; penned by Judge Ulric R. Canete.
4.Id. at 239-241; penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and concurred in by Associate 29.Id. at 135-150; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla and concurred in by Associate
Justices Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Abraham B. Borreta. Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Stephen C. Cruz.
8.Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: 30.The Gingoyons.
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil 31.Herein respondent.
interdiction; 33.Id. at 270; Entry of Judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971.
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; 37.Citing Wood Technology Corporation v. Equitable Banking Corporation,492 Phil. 106 (2005).
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; 38.Citing Excelsa Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,317 Phil. 664 (1995).
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her 42.Citing Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386 (1908); Evangelista v. Dela Rosa,76 Phil. 115
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (1946);and Aquino v. Blanco,79 Phil. 647 (1947).
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that 43.RULES OF COURT, Rule 34, Section 1.
power; and 44.Id., Rule 35, Section 3.
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and 45.Tan v. De la Vega,519 Phil. 515, 527 (2006).Citation omitted.
reconciliation is highly improbable. 46.Id. at 522.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1),(2) and (3),the presentation of the final judgment against the 47.Wood Technology Corporation v. Equitable Banking Corporation,supra note 37 at 114.
guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation 48.Tan v. De la Vega, supra note 45 at 528.
of property. 49.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014, 713
11.Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during SCRA 370, 384.
the marriage, in accordance with article 148, is paraphernal. 50.Guanzon v. Hon. Montesclaros, 208 Phil. 171, 177 (1983);Strachan & Macmurray, Ltd. v. Court of
12.Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: Appeals,159 Phil. 126, 131 (1975); Luzon Rubber and Manufacturing Co. v. Estaris, 152 Phil.
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; 341, 349 (1973).
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title; 51.Bank of Commerce v. Radio Philippines Network, Inc.,G.R. No. 195615, April 21, 2014.
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only 52.Cruz v. Court of Appeals,354 Phil. 1036, 1054 (1998).
one of the spouses; ||| (Adolfo v. Adolfo, G.R. No. 201427, [March 18, 2015], 756 PHIL 325-345)
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
15.Id. at 66-79; penned by Judge Ulric R. Canete.
16.Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
17.Rollo,pp. 55-56.
18.Id. at 80-82.
19.RULE 26 ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen
(15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion,
the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters.
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party requested within
the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the preceding
paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be deferred until such objections are resolved,
which resolution shall be made as early as practicable.
20.RULE 34 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
24.Id. at 151-159; penned by Judge Ulric R. Cañete.
25.Herein respondent.
26.Herein petitioner.
27.In Civil Case No. MAN-2683.
28.Rollo,pp. 153-159.
FIRST DIVISION be sold to third parties without first offering the shares to the other stockholders so that transfers
[G.R. No. 123553. July 13, 1998.] would be limited to and only among the original stockholders.
[CA-G.R. No. 33291. July 13, 1998.] Private respondents also asserted that respondent Eugenia D. Apostol had been informing
NORA A. BITONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) her business partners of her actions as manager, and obtaining their advice and consent.
EUGENIA D. APOSTOL, JOSE A. APOSTOL, MR. & MS. PUBLISHING CO., LETTY Consequently the other stockholders consented, either expressly or impliedly, to her management.
J. MAGSANOC, AND ADORACION G. NUYDA, respondents. They offered no objections. As a result, the business prospered. Thus, as shown in a statement
[CA-G.R. No. 33873. July 13, 1998.] prepared by the accounting firm Punongbayan and Araullo, there were increases from 1976 to 1988
NORA A. BITONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) and in the total assets of Mr. & Ms. from P457,569.00 to P10,143,046.00; in the total stockholders' equity
EDGARDO B. ESPIRITU, respondents. from P203,378.00 to P2,324,954.00; and, in the net sales, from P301,489.00 to P16,325,610.00.
Castillo Zamora & Poblador for petitioner. Likewise, cash dividends were distributed and received by the stockholders.
Private respondents further contended that petitioner, being merely a holder-in-trust
DECISION of JAKA shares, only represented and continued to represent JAKA in the board. In the beginning,
BELLOSILLO, J p: petitioner cooperated with and assisted the management until mid-1986 when relations between her
These twin cases originated from a derivative suit 1 filed by petitioner Nora A. Bitong before and her principals on one hand, and respondent Eugenia D. Apostol on the other, became strained
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC hereafter) allegedly for the benefit of private due to political differences. Hence from mid-1986 to mid-1988 petitioner refused to speak with
respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc. (Mr. & Ms. hereafter), among others, to hold respondent respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, and in 1988 the former became openly critical of the management of
spouses Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol 2 liable for fraud, misrepresentation, disloyalty, the latter. Nevertheless, respondent Eugenia D. Apostol always made available to petitioner and her
evident bad faith, conflict of interest and mismanagement in directing the affairs of Mr. & Ms. to the representatives all the books of the corporation.
damage and prejudice of Mr. & Ms. and its stockholders, including petitioner. LexLib Private respondents averred that all the PDI shares owned by respondents Eugenia and Jose
Alleging before the SEC that she had been the Treasurer and a Member of the Board of Apostol were acquired through their own private funds and that the loan of P750,000.00
Directors of Mr. & Ms. from the time it was incorporated on 29 October 1976 to 11 April 1989, and by PDI from Mr. & Ms. had been fully paid with 20% interest per annum. And, it was PDI, not Mr. &
was the registered owner of 1,000 shares of stock out of the 4,088 total outstanding shares, Ms., which loaned off P250,000.00 each to respondents Magsanoc and Nuyda. Private respondents
petitioner complained of irregularities committed from 1983 to 1987 by Eugenia D. Apostol, President further argued that petitioner was not the true party to this case, the real party being JAKA which
and Chairperson of the Board of Directors. Petitioner claimed that except for the sale of the name continued to be the true stockholder of Mr. & Ms.; hence, petitioner did not have the personality to
Philippine Inquirer to Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI hereafter) all other transactions and agreements initiate and prosecute the derivative suit which, consequently, must be dismissed.
entered into by Mr. & Ms. with PDI were not supported by any bond and/or stockholders' resolution. On 6 December 1990, the SEC Hearing Panel 3 issued a writ of preliminary injunction
And, upon instructions of Eugenia D. Apostol, Mr. & Ms. made several cash advances to PDI on enjoining private respondents from disbursing any money except for the payment of salaries and
various occasions amounting to P3.276 million. On some of these borrowings PDIpaid no interest other similar expenses in the regular course of business. The Hearing Panel also enjoined respondent
whatsoever. Despite the fact that the advances made by Mr. & Ms. to PDI were booked as advances Apostol spouses, Nuyda and Magsanoc from disposing of their PDI shares, and further ruled —
to an affiliate, there existed no board or stockholders' resolution, contract nor any other document . . . respondents' contention that petitioner is not entitled to the
which could legally authorize the creation of and support to an affiliate. provisional reliefs prayed for because she is not the real party in interest . . . is
Petitioner further alleged that respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol were stockholders, bereft of any merit. No less than respondents' Amended Answer, specifically
directors and officers in both Mr. & Ms. and PDI. In fact on 2 May 1986 respondents Eugenia D. paragraph V, No. 8 on Affirmative Allegations/Defenses states that 'The petitioner
Apostol, Leticia J. Magsanoc and Adoracion G. Nuyda subscribed to PDI shares of stock at P50,000.00 being herself a minor stockholder and holder-in-trust of JAKA shares represented
each or a total of P150,000.00. The stock subscriptions were paid for by Mr. & Ms. and initially treated and continues to represent JAKA in the Board.' This statement refers to petitioner
as receivables from officers and employees. But, no payments were ever received from respondents, sitting in the board of directors of Mr. & Ms. in two capacities, one as a minor
Magsanoc and Nuyda. stockholder and the other as the holder in trust of the shares of JAKA in Mr. & Ms.
The petition principally sought to (a) enjoin respondents Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Such reference alluded to by the respondents indicates an admission on
Apostol from further acting as president-director and director, respectively, of Mr. & Ms. and respondents' part of the petitioner's legal personality to file a derivative suit for
disbursing any money or funds except for the payment of salaries and similar expenses in the the benefit of the respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc.
ordinary course of business, and from disposing of their Mr. & Ms. shares; (b) enjoin respondents The Hearing Panel however denied petitioner's prayer for the constitution of a management
Apostol spouses, Magsanoc and Nuyda from disposing of the PDI shares of stock registered in their committee.
names; (c) compel respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol to account for and reconvey all profits and On 25 March 1991 private respondents filed a Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to
benefits accruing to them as a result of their improper and fraudulent acts; (d) compel respondents Evidence alleging that the issue of whether petitioner is the real party-in-interest had been tried by
Magsanoc and Nuyda to account for and reconvey to Mr. & Ms. all shares of stock paid from cash express or implied consent of the parties through the admission of documentary exhibits presented
advances from it and all accessions or fruits thereof; (e) hold respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol by private respondents proving that the real party-in-interest was JAKA, not petitioner Bitong. As
liable for damages suffered by Mr. & Ms. and the other stockholders, including petitioner, by reason such, No. 8, par. V (Affirmative Allegations/Defenses), Answer to the Amended Petition, was
of their improper and fraudulent acts; (f) appoint a management committee for Mr. & Ms. during the stipulated due to inadvertence and excusable mistake and should be amended. On 10 October 1991
pendency of the suit to prevent further dissipation and loss of its assets and funds as well as the Hearing Panel denied the motion for amendment.
paralyzation of business operations; and, (g) direct the management committee for Mr. & Ms. to file Petitioner testified at the trial that she became the registered and beneficial owner of 997
the necessary action to enforce its rights against PDI and other third parties. shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the 4,088 total outstanding shares after she acquired them
Private respondents Apostol spouses, Magsanoc, Nuyda, and Mr. & Ms., on the other hand, from JAKA through a deed of sale executed on 25 July 1983 and recorded in the Stock and Transfer
refuted the allegations of petitioner by starting with a narration of the beginnings of Mr. & Ms. They Book of Mr. & Ms. under Certificate of Shares of Stock No. 008. She pointed out that Senator Enrile
recounted that on 9 March 1976 Ex Libris Publishing Co., Inc. (Ex Libris hereafter) was incorporated decided that JAKA should completely divest itself of its holdings in Mr. & Ms. and this resulted in the
for the purpose of publishing a weekly magazine. Its original principal stockholders were spouses sale to her of JAKA's interest and holdings in that publishing firm.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (then Minister of National Defense) and Cristina Ponce Enrile through Jaka Private respondents refuted the statement of petitioner that she was a stockholder of Mr. &
Investments Corporation (JAKA hereafter), and respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol. When Ex Ms. since 25 July 1983 as respondent Eugenia D. Apostol signed Certificate of Stock No. 008 only on
Libris suffered financial difficulties, JAKA and the Apostols, together with new investors Luis Villafuerte 17 March 1989, and not on 25 July 1983. Respondent Eugenia D. Apostol explained that she stopped
and Ramon Siy, restructured Ex Libris by organizing a new corporation known as Mr. & Ms. using her long signature (Eugenia D. Apostol) in 1987 and changed it to E.D. Apostol, the signature
The original stockholders of Mr. & Ms., i.e., JAKA, Luis Villafuerte, Ramon Siy, the Apostols which appeared on the face of Certificate of Stock No. 008 bearing the date 25 July 1983. And, since
and Ex Libris continued to be virtually the same up to 1989. Thereafter it was agreed among them the Stock and Transfer Book which petitioner presented in evidence was not registered with
that, they being close friends, Mr. & Ms. would be operated as a partnership or a close corporation; the SEC, the entries therein including Certificate of Stock No. 008 were fraudulent. Respondent
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol would manage the affairs of Mr. & Ms.; and, no shares of stock would Eugenia D. Apostol claimed that she had not seen the Stock and Transfer Book at any time until 21
March 1989 when it was delivered by petitioner herself to the office of Mr. & Ms., and that petitioner
repeatedly referred to Senator Enrile as "my principal" during the Mr. & Ms. board meeting of 22 1. Petitioner is the registered owner of 1,000 shares of stock of Mr. & Ms.
September 1988, seven (7) times no less. out of the latter's 4,088 total outstanding shares. Petitioner, at all times material
On 3 August 1993, after trial on the merits, the SEC Hearing Panel dismissed the derivative to this petition, is a member of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. and from the
suit filed by petitioner and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction barring private respondents inception of Mr. & Ms. until 11 April 1989 was its treasurer . . .
from disposing of their PDI shares and any of Mr. & Ms. assets. The Hearing Panel ruled that there On the other hand, the Amended Answer to the Amended Petition states —
was no serious mismanagement of Mr. & Ms. which would warrant drastic corrective measures. It I. PARTIES
gave credence to the assertion of respondent Eugenia D. Apostol that Mr. & Ms., was operated like a 1. Respondents admit the allegations contained in Caption I, pars. 1 to 4
close corporation where important matters were discussed and approved through informal of the Petition referring to the personality, addresses and capacity of the parties to
consultations at breakfast conferences. The Hearing Panel also concluded that while the evidence the petition except . . . but qualify said admission insofar as they are limited,
presented tended to show that the real party-in-interest indeed was JAKA and/or Senator Enrile, it qualified and/or expanded by allegations in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses . .
viewed the real issue to be the alleged mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interest on the part of .
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, and allowed petitioner to prosecute the derivative suit if only to II. THE FACTS
resolve the real issues. Hence, for this purpose, the Hearing Panel considered petitioner to be the real 1. Respondents admit paragraph 1 of the Petition, but qualify said
party-in-interest. admission as to the beneficial ownership of the shares of stock registered in the
On 19 August 1993 respondent Apostol spouses sold the PDI shares registered in the name name of the petitioner, the truth being as stated in the Affirmative
of their holding company, JAED Management Corporation, to Edgardo B. Espiritu. On 25 August 1993 Allegations/Defenses of this Answer . . .
petitioner Bitong appealed to the SEC En Banc. V. AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS/DEFENSES
On 24 January 1994 the SEC En Banc 4 reversed the decision of the Hearing Panel and, Respondents respectfully allege by way of Affirmative
among others, ordered private respondents to account for, return and deliver to Mr. & Ms. any and all Allegations/Defenses, that . . .
funds and assets that they disbursed from the coffers of the corporation including shares of stock, 3. Fortunately, respondent Apostol was able to convince Mr. Luis
profits, dividends and/or fruits that they might have received as a result of their investment in PDI, Villafuerte to take interest in the business and he, together with the original
including those arising from the P150,000.00 advanced to respondents Eugenia D. Apostol, Leticia J. investors, restructured the Ex Libris Publishing Company by organizing a new
Magsanoc and Adoracion G. Nuyda; account for and return any profits and fruits of all amounts corporation known as Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc. . . . Mr. Luis Villafuerte
irregularly or unlawfully advanced to PDI and other third persons; and, cease and desist from contributed his own P100,000.00. JAKA and respondent Jose Z. Apostol, original
managing the affairs of Mr. & Ms. for reasons of fraud, mismanagement, disloyalty and conflict of investors of Ex Libris contributed P100,000.00 each; Ex Libris Publishing Company
interest. was paid 800 shares for the name of Mr. & Ms. magazine and goodwill. Thus, the
The SEC En Banc also declared the 19 August 1993 sale of the PDI shares of JAED original stockholders of respondent Mr. & Ms. were:
Management Corporation to Edgardo B. Espiritu to be tainted with fraud, hence, null and void, and Cert./No./ Name of Stockholder No. of %
considered Mr. & Ms. as the true and lawful owner of all the PDI shares acquired by respondents Date Shares
Eugenia D. Apostol, Magsanoc and Nuyda. It also declared all subsequent transferees of such shares
as trustees for the benefit of Mr. & Ms. and ordered them to forthwith deliver said shares to Mr. & Ms. 001-9-15-76 JAKA Investments 1,000 21
Consequently, respondent Apostol spouses, Magsanoc, Nuyda, and Mr. & Ms. filed a petition Corp. %
for review before respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR No. SP 33291, while respondent 002-9-15-76 Luis Villafuerte 1,000 21
Edgardo B. Espiritu filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition also before respondent Court of %
Appeals, docketed as CA-GR No. SP 33873. On 8 December 1994 the two (2) petitions were 003-9-15-76 Ramon L. Siy 1,000 21
consolidated. %
On 31 August 1995 respondent appellate court rendered a decision reversing the SEC En 004-9-15-76 Jose Z. Apostol 1,000 21
Banc and held that from the evidence on record petitioner was not the owner of any share of stock %
in Mr. & Ms. and therefore not the real party-in-interest to prosecute the complaint she had instituted 005-9-15-76 Ex Libris Publishing 800 16
against private respondents. Accordingly, petitioner alone and by herself as an agent could not file a Co. %
derivative suit in behalf of her principal. For not being the real party-in-interest, petitioner's complaint —— ——
did not state a cause of action, a defense which was never waived; hence, her petition should have
been dismissed. Respondent appellate court ruled that the assailed orders of the SEC were issued in 4,800 96
excess of jurisdiction, or want of it, and thus were null and void. 5 On 18 January 1996, petitioner's %
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. 4. The above-named original stockholders of respondent Mr. & Ms.
Before this Court, petitioner submits that in paragraph 1 under the caption "I. The Parties" continue to be virtually the same stockholders up to this date . . .
of her Amended Petition before the SEC, she stated that she was a stockholder and director of Mr. & 8. The petitioner being herself a minor stockholder and holder-in-trust of
Ms. In par. 1 under the caption "II. The Facts" she declared that she "is the registered owner of 1,000 JAKA shares, represented and continues to represent JAKA in the Board . . .
shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the latter's 4,088 total outstanding shares" and that she was a 21. Petitioner Nora A. Bitong is not the true party to this case, the true
member of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. and treasurer from its inception until 11 April 1989. party being JAKA Investments Corporation which continues to be the true
Petitioner contends that private respondents did not deny the above allegations in their answer and stockholder of respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc., consequently, she does
therefore they are conclusively bound by this judicial admission. Consequently, private respondents' not have the personality to initiate and prosecute this derivative suit, and should
admission that petitioner has 1,000 shares of stock registered in her name in the books of Mr. & Ms. therefore be dismissed . . .
forecloses any question on her status and right to bring a derivative suit on behalf of Mr. & Ms. The answer of private respondents shows that there was no judicial admission that
Not necessarily. A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest is petitioner was a stockholder of Mr. & Ms. to entitle her to file a derivative suit on behalf of the
entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for the party corporation. Where the statements of the private respondents were qualified with phrases such as,
against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were inadvertently made or were "insofar as they are limited, qualified and/or expanded by," "the truth being as stated in
made under a mistake of fact. In addition, a party against whom a single clause or paragraph of a the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses of this Answer" they cannot be considered definite and certain
pleading is offered may have the right to introduce other paragraphs which tend to destroy the enough, cannot be construed as judicial admissions. 7
admission in the paragraph offered by the adversary. 6 More so, the affirmative defenses of private respondents directly refute the representation
The Amended Petitionbefore the SEC alleges — of petitioner that she is a true and genuine stockholder, of Mr. & Ms. by stating unequivocally that
I. THE PARTIES petitioner is not the true party to the case but JAKA which continues to be the true stockholder
1. Petitioner is a stockholder and director of Mr. & Ms. . . . of Mr. & Ms. In fact, one of the reliefs which private respondents prayed for was the dismissal of the
II. THE FACTS petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal interest to initiate and prosecute the
same.
 When taken in its totality, the Amended Answer to the Amended Petition or even This provision above quoted envisions a formal certificate of stock which can be issued only
the Answer to the Amended Petition alone, clearly raises an issue as to the legal personality of upon compliance with certain requisites. First, the certificates must be signed by the president or
petitioner to file the complaint. Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the
makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other corporation. A mere typewritten statement advising a stockholder of the extent of his ownership in a
side. The reason for this is, where part of a statement of a party is used against him as an admission, corporation without qualification and/or authentication cannot be considered as a formal certificate of
the court should weigh any other portion connected with the statement, which tends to neutralize or stock. 11 Second, delivery of the certificate is an essential element of its issuance. Hence, there is no
explain the portion which is against interest. prcd issuance of a stock certificate where it is never detached from the stock books although blanks
In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be therein are properly filled up if the person whose name is inserted therein has no control over the
determined from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected therewith as an books of the company. 12 Third, the par value, as to par value shares, or the full subscription as to no
integrated unit. Although acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, par value shares, must first be fully paid. Fourth, the original certificate must be surrendered where
however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through palpable the person requesting the issuance of a certificate is a transferee from a stockholder.
mistake. 8 The rule is always in favor of liberality in construction of pleadings so that the real matter The certificate of stock itself once issued is a continuing affirmation or representation that
in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court. 9 the stock described therein is valid and genuine and is at least prima facie evidence that it was
Petitioner also argues that since private respondents failed to appeal the 6 December 1990 legally issued in the absence of evidence to the contrary. However this presumption may be
Order and the 3 August 1993 Decision of the SEC Hearing Panel declaring that she was the real party- rebutted. 13 Similarly, books and records of a corporation which include even the stock and transfer
in-interest and had legal personality to sue, they are now estopped from questioning her personality. book are generally admissible in evidence in favor of or against the corporation and its members to
Not quite. The 6 December 1990 Order is clearly an interlocutory order which cannot be prove the corporate acts, its financial status and other matters including one's status as a
considered as having finally resolved on the merits the issue of legal capacity of petitioner. stockholder. They are ordinarily the best evidence of corporate acts and proceedings.
The SEC Hearing Panel discussed the issue of legal capacity solely for the purpose of ruling on the However, the books and records of a corporation are not conclusive even against the
application for writ of preliminary injunction as an incident to the main issues raised in the complaint. corporation but are prima facie evidence only. Parol evidence may be admitted to supply omissions in
Being a mere interlocutory order, it is not appealable. the records, explain ambiguities, or show what transpired where no records were kept, or in some
For, an interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end of the cases where such records were contradicted. 14 The effect of entries in the books of the corporation
suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole which purport to be regular records of the proceedings of its board of directors or stockholders can be
controversy. 10 Thus, even though the 6 December 1990 Order was adverse to private respondents, destroyed by testimony of a more conclusive character than mere suspicion that there was an
they had the legal right and option not to elevate the same to the SEC En Banc but rather to await irregularity in the manner in which the books were kept. 15
the decision which resolves all the issues raised by the parties and to appeal therefrom by assigning The foregoing considerations are founded on the basic principle that stock issued without
all errors that might have been committed by the Hearing Panel. authority and in violation of law is void and confers no rights on the person to whom it is issued and
On the other hand, the 3 August 1993 Decision of the Hearing Panel dismissing the subjects him to no liabilities. 16 Where there is an inherent lack of power in the corporation to issue
derivative suit for failure to prove the charges of mismanagement, fraud, disloyalty and conflict of the stock, neither the corporation nor the person to whom the stock is issued is estopped to question
interest and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, was favorable to private respondents. its validity since an estoppel cannot operate to create stock which under the law cannot have
Hence, they were not expected to appeal therefrom. existence. 17
In fact, in the 3 August 1993 Decision, the Hearing Panel categorically stated that the As found by the Hearing Panel and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, there is
evidence presented showed that the real party-in-interest was not petitioner Bitong but JAKA and/or overwhelming evidence that despite what appears on the certificate of stock and stock and transfer
Senator Enrile. Petitioner was merely allowed to prosecute her complaint so as not to sidetrack "the book, petitioner was not a bona fide stockholder of Mr. & Ms. before March 1989 or at the time the
real issue to be resolved (which) was the allegation of mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interest complained acts were committed to qualify her to institute a stockholder's derivative suit against
allegedly committed by respondent Eugenia D. Apostol." It was only for this reason that petitioner private respondents. Aside from petitioner's own admissions, several corporate documents disclose
was considered to be capacitated and competent to file the petition. that the true party-in-interest is not petitioner but JAKA.
Accordingly, with the dismissal of the complaint of petitioner against private respondents, Thus, while petitioner asserts in her petition that Certificate of Stock No. 008 dated 25 July
there was no compelling reason for, the latter to appeal to the SEC En Banc. It was in fact petitioner's 1983 was issued in her name, private respondents argue that this certificate was signed by
turn as the aggrieved party to exercise her right to appeal from the decision. It is worthy to note that respondent Eugenia D. Apostol as President only in 1989 and was fraudulently antedated by
even during the appeal of petitioner before the SEC En Banc private respondents maintained their petitioner who had possession of the Certificate Book and the Stock and Transfer Book. Private
vigorous objection to the appeal and reiterated petitioner's lack of legal capacity to sue before respondents stress that petitioner's counsel entered into a stipulation on record before the Hearing
the SEC. Panel that the certificate was indeed signed by respondent Apostol only in 1989 and not in 1983.
Petitioner then contends that she was a holder of the proper certificates of shares of stock In her reply, petitioner admits that while respondent Eugenia D. Apostol signed the
and that the transfer was recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of Mr. & Ms. She invokes Sec. 63 Certificate of Stock No. 008 in petitioner's name only in 1989, it was issued by the corporate
of The Corporation Code which provides that no transfer shall be valid except as between the parties secretary in 1983 and that the other certificates covering shares in Mr. & Ms. had not yet been signed
until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation, and upon its recording the corporation is by respondent Eugenia D. Apostol at the time of the filing of the complaint with the SEC although
bound by it and is estopped to deny the fact of transfer of said shares. Petitioner alleges that even in they were issued years before.
the absence of a stock certificate, a stockholder solely on the strength of the recording in the stock Based on the foregoing admission of petitioner, there is no truth to the statement written in
and transfer book can exercise all the rights as stockholder, including the right to file a derivative suit Certificate of Stock No. 008 that the same was issued and signed on 25 July 1983 by its duly
in the name of the corporation. And, she need not present a separate deed of sale or transfer in her authorized officers specifically the President and Corporate Secretary because the actual date of
favor to prove ownership of stock. signing thereof was 17 March 1989. Verily, a formal certificate of stock could not be considered
Section 63 of The Corporation Code expressly provides — issued in contemplation of law unless signed by the president or vice-president and countersigned by
Sec. 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. — The capital stock of the secretary or assistant secretary.
stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificates signed by the In this case, contrary to petitioner's submission, the Certificate of Stock No. 008 was only
president or vice president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, legally issued on 17 March 1989 when it was actually signed by the President of the corporation, and
and sealed with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in accordance with the not before that date. While a certificate of stock is not necessary to make one a stockholder, e.g.,
by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred where he is an incorporator and listed as stockholder in the articles of incorporation although no
by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney- certificate of stock has yet been issued, it is supposed to serve as paper representative of the stock
in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer itself and of the owner's interest therein. Hence, when Certificate of Stock No. 008 was admittedly
however shall be valid except as between the parties until the transfer is recorded signed and issued only on 17 March 1989 and not on 25 July 1983, even as it indicates that petitioner
in the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the owns 997 shares of stock of Mr. & Ms., the certificate has no evidentiary value for the purpose of
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates proving that petitioner was a stockholder since 1983 up to 1989.
and the number of shares transferred . . .
 And even the factual antecedents of the alleged ownership by petitioner in 1983 of shares transfer of shares only if the same is coupled with delivery. The delivery of the stock certificate duly
of stock of Mr. & Ms. are indistinctive if not enshrouded in inconsistencies. In her testimony before endorsed by the owner is the operative act of transfer of shares from the lawful owner to the new
the Hearing Panel, petitioner said that early in 1983, to relieve Mr. & Ms. from political pressure, transferee.
Senator Enrile decided to divest the family holdings in Mr. & Ms. as he was then part of the Thus, for a valid transfer of stocks, the requirements are as follows: (a) There must be
government and Mr. & Ms. was evolving to be an opposition newspaper. The JAKA shares numbering delivery of the stock certificate; (b) The certificate must be endorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-
1,000 covered by Certificate of Stock No. 001 were thus transferred to respondent Eugenia D. Apostol fact or other persons legally authorized to make the transfer; and, (c) to be valid against third parties,
in trust or in blank. 18 the transfer must be recorded in the books of the corporation. 27 At most, in the instant case,
Petitioner now claims that a few days after JAKA's shares were transferred to respondent petitioner has satisfied only the third requirement. Compliance with the first two requisites has not
Eugenia D. Apostol, Senator Enrile sold to petitioner 997 shares of JAKA. For this purpose, a deed of been clearly and sufficiently shown.
sale was executed and antedated to 10 May 1983. 19 This submission of petitioner is however Considering that the requirements provided under Sec. 63 of The Corporation Code should
contradicted by the records which show that a deed of sale was executed by JAKA transferring 1,000 be mandatorily complied with, the rule on presumption of regularity cannot apply. The regularity and
shares of Mr. & Ms. to respondent Apostol on 10 May 1983 and not to petitioner. 20 validity of the transfer must be proved. As it is, even the credibility of the stock and transfer book and
Then Senator Enrile testified that in May or June 1983 he was asked at a media interview if the entries thereon relied upon by petitioner to show compliance with the third requisite to prove that
his family owned shares of stock in Mr. & Ms. Although he and his family were stockholders at that she was a stockholder since 1983 is highly doubtful.
time he denied it so as not to embarrass the magazine. He called up petitioner and instructed her to The records show that the original stock and transfer book and the stock certificate book of
work out the documentation of the transfer of shares from JAKA to respondent Apostol to be covered Mr. & Ms. were in the possession of petitioner before their custody was transferred to the Corporate
by a declaration of trust. His instruction was to transfer the shares of JAKA in Mr. & Ms. and Ex Secretary, Atty. Augusto San Pedro. 28 On 25 May 1988, Assistant Corporate Secretary Renato Jose
Libris to respondent Apostol as a nominal holder. He then finally decided to transfer the shareholdings Unson wrote Mr. & Ms. about the lost stock and transfer book which was also noted by the
to petitioner. 21 corporation's external auditors, Punongbayan and Araullo, in their audit. Atty. Unson even informed
When asked if there was any document or any written evidence of that divestment in favor respondent Eugenia D. Apostol as President of Mr. & Ms. that steps would be undertaken to prepare
of petitioner, Senator Enrile answered that there was an endorsement of the shares of stock. He said and register a new Stock and Transfer Book with the SEC. Incidentally, perhaps strangely, upon
that there was no other document evidencing the assignment to petitioner because the stocks were verification with the SEC, it was discovered that the general file of the corporation with the SEC was
personal property that could be transferred even orally. 22 Contrary to Senator Enrile's testimony, missing. Hence, it was even possible that the original Stock and Transfer Book might not have been
however, petitioner maintains that Senator Enrile executed a deed of sale in her favor. LLphil registered at all.
A careful perusal of the records shows that neither the alleged endorsement of Certificate of On 20 October 1988 respondent Eugenia D. Apostol wrote Atty. Augusto San Pedro noting
Stock No. 001 in the name of JAKA nor the alleged deed of sale executed by Senator Enrile directly in the changes he had made in the Stock and Transfer Book without prior notice to the corporate
favor of petitioner could have legally transferred or assigned on 25 July 1983 the shares of stock in officers. 29 In the 27 October 1988 directors' meeting, respondent Eugenia D. Apostol asked about
favor of petitioner because as of 10 May 1983 Certificate of Stock No. 001 in the name of JAKA was the documentation to support the changes in the Stock and Transfer Book with regard to
already cancelled and a new one, Certificate of Stock No. 007, issued in favor of respondent Apostol the JAKA shares. Petitioner answered that Atty. San Pedro made the changes upon her instructions
by virtue of a Declaration of Trust and Deed of Sale. 23 conformably with established practice. 30
It should be emphasized that on 10 May 1983 JAKA executed a deed of sale over This simply shows that as of 1988 there still existed certain issues affecting the ownership
1,000 Mr. & Ms. shares in favor of respondent Eugenio D. Apostol. On the same day, respondent of the JAKA shares, thus raising doubts whether the alleged transactions recorded in the Stock and
Apostol signed a declaration of trust stating that she was the registered owner of 1,000 Mr. & Ms. Transfer Book were proper, regular and authorized. Then, as if to magnify and compound the
shares covered by Certificate of Stock No. 007. uncertainties in the ownership of the shares of stock in question, when the corporate secretary
The declaration of trust further showed that although respondent Apostol was the registered resigned, the Stock and Transfer Book was delivered not to the corporate office where the book
owner, she held the shares of stock and dividends which might be paid in connection therewith solely should be kept but to petitioner. 31
in trust for the benefit of JAKA, her principal. It was also stated therein that being a trustee, That JAKA retained its ownership of its Mr. & Ms. shares was clearly shown by its receipt of
respondent Apostol agreed, on written request of the principal, to assign and transfer the shares of the dividends issued in December 1986. 32 This only means, very obviously, that Mr. & Ms. shares in
stock and any and all such distributions or dividends unto the principal or such other person as the question still belonged to JAKA and not to petitioner. For, dividends are distributed to stockholders
principal would nominate or appoint. pursuant to their right to share in corporate profits. When a dividend is declared, it belongs to the
Petitioner was well aware of this trust, being the person in charge of this documentation and person who is the substantial and beneficial owner of the stock at the time regardless of when the
being one of the witnesses to the execution of this document. 24 Hence, the mere alleged distribution profit was earned. 33
endorsement of Certificate of Stock No. 001 by Senator Enrile or by a duly authorized officer Finally, this Court takes notice of the glaring and open admissions of petitioner made, not
of JAKA to effect the transfer of shares of JAKA to petitioner could not have been legally feasible just seven (7) but nine (9) times, during the 22 September 1988 meeting of the board of directors
because Certificate of Stock No. 001 was already canceled by virtue of the deed of sale to respondent that the Enriles were her principals or shareholders, as shown by the minutes thereof which she duly
Apostol. signed 34 —
And, there is nothing in the records which shows that JAKA had revoked the trust it reposed 5. Mrs. E. Apostol explained to the Directors that through her efforts, the
on respondent Eugenia D. Apostol. Neither was there any evidence that the principal had requested asset base of the Company has improved and profits were realized. It is for this
her to assign and transfer the shares of stock to petitioner. If it was true that the shares of stock reason that the Company has declared a 100% cash dividend in 1986. She said
covered by Certificate of Stock No. 007 had been transferred to petitioner, the person who could that it is up for the Board to decide based on this performance whether she should
legally endorse the certificate was private respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, she being the registered continue to act as Board Chairman or not. In this regard, Ms. N.A. Bitong
owner and trustee of the shares of stock covered by Certificate of Stock No. 007. It is a settled rule expressed her recollection of how Ex-Libris/Mr. & Ms. were organized and her
that the trustee should endorse the stock certificate to validate the cancellation of her share and to participation for and on behalf of her principals, as follows: She recalled that her
have the transfer recorded in the books of the corporation. 25 principals were invited by Mrs. E. Apostol to invest in Ex-Libris and eventually Mr.
In fine, the records are unclear on how petitioner allegedly acquired the shares of stock & Ms. The relationship between her principals and Mrs. E. Apostol made it possible
of JAKA. Petitioner being the chief executive officer of JAKA and the sole person in charge of all for the latter to have access to several information concerning certain political
business and financial transactions and affairs of JAKA 26 was supposed to be in the best position to events and issues. In many instances, her principals supplied first hand and
show convincing evidence on the alleged transfer of shares to her, if indeed there was a transfer. newsworthy information that made Mr. & Ms. a popular paper . . .
Considering that petitioner's status is being questioned and several factual circumstances have been 6. According to Ms. Bitong, her principals were instrumental in helping
presented by private respondents disproving petitioner's claim, it was incumbent upon her to submit Mr. & Ms. survive during those years that it was cash strapped . . . Ms. N.A. Bitong
rebuttal evidence on the manner by which she allegedly became a stockholder. Her failure to do so pointed out that the practice of using the former Minister's influence and stature in
taken in the light of several substantial inconsistencies in her evidence is fatal to her case. the government is one thing which her principals themselves are strongly against .
The rule is that the endorsement of the certificate of stock by the owner or his attorney-in- ..
fact or any other person legally authorized to make the transfer shall be sufficient to effect the
 7. . . . At this point, Ms. N. Bitong again expressed her recollection of the 10.Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 731.
subject matter as follows: (a) Mrs. E. Apostol, she remembers, brought up the 11.SEC Opinion, 20 October 1970 in Sehwani Investment & Management Co., cited in Lopez, R., The
concept of a cooperative-ran newspaper company in one of her breakfast session Corporation Code of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 1994 Ed.
with her principals sometime during the end of 1985. Her principals when asked 12.Tuason v. La Previsora Filipina, 67 Phil. 36 [1938].
for an opinion, said that they recognized the concept as something very noble and 13.Fletcher, William Meade, Encyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, Vol. V, p. 5768.
visible . . . Then Ms. Bitong asked a very specific question — "When you 14.18 Amjur 2d 706.
conceptualized Ex-Libris and Mr. & Ms., did you not think of my shareholders the 19.Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, p, 10; Rollo, p. 87.
Ponce Enrile as liabilities? How come you associated yourself with them then and 25.Lopez, Rosario, The Corporation Code of the Philippines, vol. II, 1994 ed., p. 824.
not now? What is the difference?" Mrs. Apostol did not answer the question. 33.Agbayani, Aguedo F., Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1988 Ed., p. 409.
The admissions of a party against his interest inscribed upon the record books of a 37.See Note 33, citing RP v. Phil. Resources Development Corp., G.R. No. 10141, 31 January 1958.
corporation are competent and persuasive evidence against him. 35 These admissions render 38.Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82 (1911).
nugatory any argument that petitioner is a bona fide stockholder of Mr. & Ms. at any time before 39.See Note 11, p. 853, citing Mimnaugh v. Atlantic City Electric Co., 7 NJ Super 310, Super 310, 70A
1988 or at the time the acts complained of were committed. There is no doubt that petitioner was an (2d) 904.
employee of JAKA as its managing officer, as testified to by Senator Enrile himself. 36 However, in the 40.Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 728, 80 L Ed 1011, 56 Sup Ct 588.
absence of a special authority from the board of directors of JAKA to institute a derivative suit for and 41.SMC, represented by Eduardo de los Angeles v. Kahn, G.R. No. 85339, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA
in its behalf, petitioner is disqualified by law to sue in her own name. The power to sue and be sued in 461.
any court by a corporation even as a stockholder is lodged in the board of directors that exercises its ||| (Bitong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 123553, CA-G.R. Nos. 33291 & 33873, [July 13, 1998], 354 PHIL
corporate powers and not in the president or officer thereof. 37 516-546)
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that where corporate directors are guilty of a breach of
trust, not of mere error of judgment or abuse of discretion, and intra-corporate remedy is futile or
useless, a stockholder may institute a suit in behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the
benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong inflicted directly upon the
corporation and indirectly upon the stockholders. 38 The stockholder's right to institute a derivative
suit is not based on any express provision of The Corporation Code but is impliedly recognized when
the law makes corporate directors or officers liable for damages suffered by the corporation and its
stockholders for violation of their fiduciary duties.
Hence, a stockholder may sue for mismanagement, waste or dissipation of corporate assets
because of a special injury to him for which he is otherwise without redress. 39 In effect, the suit is an
action for specific performance of an obligation owed by the corporation to the stockholders to assist
its rights of action when the corporation has been put in default by the wrongful refusal of the
directors or management to make suitable measures for its protection. 40
The basis of a stockholder's suit is always one in equity. However, it cannot prosper without
first complying with the legal requisites for its institution. The most important of these is the bona
fide ownership by a stockholder of a stock in his own right at the time of the transaction complained
of which invests him with standing to institute a derivative action for the benefit of the
corporation. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 31 August 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint of petitioner Nora A. Bitong in CA-G.R. No. SP 33291, and granting the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Edgardo B. Espiritu as well as annulling the 5
November 1993, 24 January 1994 and 18 February 1994 Orders of the SEC En Banc in CA-G.R. No. SP
33873, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.
Panganiban, J ., took no part; participated, as a former practising lawyer, in negotiations to
buy subject shares.
Footnotes
1.The derivative suit, docketed as SEC Case No. 03604, was commenced on 5 July 1989 through a
petition for injunction, accounting and damages with prayer for the appointment of a
management committee and for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary retraining
order.
2.The name of respondent Jose Apostol has been interchangeably designated in the records as "Jose A.
Apostol" and as "Jose Z. Apostol." For uniformity, "Jose A. Apostol" or simply "Jose Apostol" is
used in this Decision.
3.The SEC Hearing Panel was composed of hearing Officers Josefina L. Pasay-Paz, Antonio M. Esteves
and Manuel P. Perea.
4.Associate Commissioners Rodolfo L. Samarista, Merle O. Manuel, Fe Eloisa C. Gloria and Perfecto R.
Yasay, Jr., concurred in the Order, while Chairman Rosario N. Lopez did not participate.
5.CA Decision penned by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Chairman of the Eight Division (Division of
Five), with Associate Justices Jaime M. Lantin and Cancio C. Garcia concurring, and Associate
Justices Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and Eugenio S. Labitoria dissenting.
6.29A AmJur 2d, p. 143.
7.Almer v. Hobart Corp. (Mo App) 849 SW2d 135, CCH Prod Liab Rep 13550 cited in 29A Amjur 2d, p.
137.
8.Granada v. PNB, No. L-20745, 2 September 1966, 18 SCRA 1.
9.Gaspar v. Dorado, No. L-17884, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 331.
FIRST DIVISION appointment of a special administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading
[G.R. No. 165987. March 31, 2006.] a copy of the marriage contract 7 which indicated that she and Jose were married on February 1,
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, petitioners, vs. 1956.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina
The Law Firm of Rodolfo Ta-asan for petitioners. presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-Intervention 8 filed by the heirs of the
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. for respondent. deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor
SYLLABUS with that of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956. 9 However, Josefina did not appear in court.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIONS; JUDICIAL ADMISSION; NATURE AND EFFECT Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002. 10 She narrated that she and the
THEREOF, EXPLAINED. — A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that
admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also they were subsequently married in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among
removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina's own relatives-Atty. Margarito Halasan, her brother,
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such and Valentino Halasan, her father. 11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live together as husband
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose's relatives consented to her (Teresita's)
conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent marriage with Jose because there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few
with what was pleaded. months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; INTERVENTION; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED; WHEN PROPER. — Under Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained
this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) unknown. HIaSDc
or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an annulled because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for
officer thereof. Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the more than seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose's sister who was a judge. Teresita also
court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married three
uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United States.
them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order 12 denying the motion
the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which and dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court
such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim. Moreover,
affected by such proceedings." no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an original copy of
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN ALLOWED; EXEMPLIFIED. — Considering this admission of Teresita, the document or any public officer who had custody thereof. According to the court, the
petitioners' mother, the Court rules that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the second marriage
intervene in the partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been previously married. Thus, the
Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of Appeals: . . . [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow the intervention.
in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 13 the RTC ruled that while Josefina submitted a machine copy
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the accompanying testimony on its
judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities required by law could not be equated to proof
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. And this would be against the policy of of its validity and legality.
the law. The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina,
pleaded, one that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint were the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to
without the establishment of which plaintiff could not recover. them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the oppositor
DECISION did not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
CALLEJO, SR., J p: WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision 1 of the Court of through counsel, not sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the Resolution 2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the compliance with the basic rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent and
motion for reconsideration thereof. relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the deceased Jose
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de
filed a Complaint for Partition 3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the oficio.
plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor,
the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case, oppositor through counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of
docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court. Evidence, in accordance with duly supporting and prevailing jurisprudence,
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children, Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria
Intervention, 4 alleging as follows: Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor,
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in
partition between plaintiffs and defendants; accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, testate or intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive
one of the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose such inheritance, they are legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case
intestate estate is subject to herein special proceedings for partition; maybe (sic). 14
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of
her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. the Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita admitted
Alfelor. in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose's previous
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous
and to submit attached Answer in Intervention. 5 marriage. 16 Since the existence of the first marriage was proven in accordance with the basic rules
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention, 6 claiming that she was the of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second marriage was void
surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil
been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present" (thus, the deceased
and Maria Katrina were not her husband's children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second marriage were to be
upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an absurd situation would The petition is dismissed.
arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate spouses. The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners
The trial court denied the motion in its Order 17 dated October 30, 2002. herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply-in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that wit:
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in 1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous
declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married
marriage valid and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also stressed that on February 1, 1956; 20
Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any subsequent Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late
marriage is null and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she had been husband had been previously married to another. To the Court's mind, this admission constitutes a
absent for seven consecutive years before the second marriage. "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings,
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. 21 A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
legal wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; 22 production of evidence is
following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the dispensed with. 23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedding; the birth and controversy. 24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
the baptismal certificates of children during such union, and other subsequent documents mentioning party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
such union. Regarding Teresita's alleged admission of the first marriage in her Reply in Intervention inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. 25 The
dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without probative value, as she allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader.
heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. 26
based on her own personal knowledge. They also pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the pertinent
having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first provision of the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:
time in 1988 during the filing of the case for partition of the latter's share in his parents' estate. They SEC. 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the
further pointed out that Josefina does not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
the allegations of Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she had disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
not been heard of for more than seven years. leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be
the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no fully protected in a separate proceeding.
longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos, 18 the appellate court ruled that an matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties;
admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and is (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made the custody of the court or an officer thereof. 27 Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or action by
the admission should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the other party or not. The CA which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in
concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefina's claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff,
Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not
been issued with grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the
ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings." 28
admit petitioner's complaint in intervention and to forthwith conduct the proper Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners' mother, the Court rules that respondent
proceeding with dispatch. No costs. Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has shown
SO ORDERED. 19 that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the Appeals: 29
appellate court. . . . [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
the admission of private respondent's intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that in character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and
setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were
completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated,
Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof, such admission may be expensive and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The
contradicted by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita's statement words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as
in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting knowledge of the alleged first pleaded, one that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact
marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay. alleged in the complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could not
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under recover. 30
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission which In Uy v. Court of Appeals, 31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving
does not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in her legal spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings
favor. even after the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties of the
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose's previous decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside the
marriage to private respondent in the said Reply-in-Intervention, Teresita also testified during the compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that "in the
hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners' inclusion in the action for partition, given
considered hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate her the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper disposition of the
Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a purported case." 32
marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor. Contrary to petitioners' argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals 33 is not in
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the point, as the Court therein did not discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but
other party who claims to be the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the Court
involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.
 ultimately determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a share
in the subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
respondent Josefina Halasan's Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper
proceedings with dispatch. DScTaC
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis
(Chairman) and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-47.
2.Rollo, p. 48.
3.Id. at 49-59.
4.CA rollo, pp. 40-42.
5.Id. at 41.
6.Id. at 43-47.
7.Id. at 53.
8.Id. at 48-52.
9.Id. at 48.
10.Order dated September 13, 2002, id. at 13.
11.CA rollo, p. 14.
12.Id. at 13-20.
13.G.R. No. 96740, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 138.
14.CA rollo, p. 20.
15.Id. at 21-28.
16.TSN, 13 February 2002, pp. 9-10, 18-19, 22, 27; CA rollo, pp. 23-26.
17.CA rollo, p. 29.
18.G.R. No. L-20241, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 146, 149.
19.Rollo, p. 47.
20.CA rollo, p. 48.
21.In Re Lefkas General Partners No. 1017, 153 B.R. 804 (N.D.Ill. 1993).
22.Sherill v. W.C.A.B. (School Dist. of Philadelphia), 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 492 (1993).
23.Re Marriage of Maupin, 829 S.W.2d 125 (1992).
24.Mobil Oil Co. v. Dodd, 515 S.W.2d 350 (1974).
25.Elayda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49327, July 18, 1999, 199 SCRA 349, 353, citing Joe's Radio
Electric Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 104 Phil. 333 (1958).
26.Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232 (1948), citing McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 Phil 248 (1922).
27.First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 88345, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA
30, 38.
28.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, G.R. No. 89909, September
21, 1990, 189 SCRA 820, 824.
29.451 Phil. 482 (2003).
30.Id. at 492-493.
31.G.R. No. 102726, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 579.
32.Id. at 585.
33.Supra note 13.
||| (Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, [March 31, 2006], 520 PHIL 982-993)
EN BANC Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require
[G.R. No. 79094. June 22, 1988.] that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been
MANOLO P. FULE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or
APPEALS, respondent. reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613 [1928]). cdrep
Balagtas P. Ilagan for petitioner. WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is
The Solicitor General for respondent. hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of
DECISION Lucena City, for further reception of evidence.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p: SO ORDERED.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court, Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Branch LIV, convicting Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
petitioner (the accused-appellant) of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during Paras, J.,took no part.
the pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. The facts stipulated upon read: cdll
"a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of Footnotes
this case; 1.Per Justice Gloria C. Paras; Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Conrado T. Limcaoco, concurring.
"b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on ||| (Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79094, [June 22, 1988], 245 PHIL 403-407)
or before January 21, 1981;
"c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No.
26741, dated January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
"d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy
Nadera;
"e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in
remittance of collection;
"f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but
the same was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already
closed;
"g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly identified as the
accused party in this case."
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant
waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming the
Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the
judgment of conviction. 1
Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that:
"The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite
the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of
facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the
petitioner, nor by his counsel."
Finding the petition meritorious, we resolved to give due course.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985,
applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
"SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. — No agreement or
admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in
evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his
counsel." (Rule 118) [Emphasis supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And more
importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule,
to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado,
No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused
and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of
Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign
the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused
did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the
elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the
Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused
cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.
THIRD DIVISION 4. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA 22; CHECKS DISHONORED;
[G.R. No. 131540. December 2, 1999.] ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 3 of BP 22, "the introduction in evidence of any
BETTY KING, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or
Chua and Associates Law Office for petitioner. attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making
The Solicitor General for respondent. or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and
SYNOPSIS the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or
On April 28, 1993, petitioner Betty King was charged with eleven counts of violation of Batas attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." In the present case, the fact that the checks
Pambansa 22 (B.P. 22). During trial, the prosecution presented evidence to establish that on several were dishonored was sufficiently shown by the checks themselves, which were stamped with the
occasions in January 1992, petitioner discounted with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable words "ACCOUNT CLOSED." This was further supported by the returned check tickets issued by PCI
Bank checks postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the total amount of P1,070,000.00 in exchange for Bank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been dishonored. Clearly, these documents
cash in the amount of P1,000,000.00. When the said checks were deposited for payment, they were constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the checks.
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that they were drawn against an account with 5. ID.;ID,; PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS;
insufficient funds. Petitioner failed to make good the checks despite demand. The prosecution also ISSUER HAS NO SUFFICIENT FUNDS IN OR CREDIT WITH DRAWEE BANK FOR PAYMENT OF CHECK
offered documentary evidence, the genuineness and due execution of which were admitted by the UPON PRESENTMENT. — To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a
petitioner. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without check issued was subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the
leave of court, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. check knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
Subsequently, the trial court denied the Demurrer and rendered judgment convicting the petitioner bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this element involves a
for eleven counts of violation of B.P. 22. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of
trial court. such knowledge, as follows: "Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of Insufficient funds.— The making,
In this petition, the Court ruled that to hold a person liable under BP. 22, it is not enough to drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check,
who issued the check knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in
element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check
facie presumption of such knowledge. aHSTID has not been paid by the drawee." In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is
To prove that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution presented issued.
Exhibits "Q" to "T".However, upon closer examination of the documents, the Court found no 6. ID.;ID.;ID.;ISSUER MUST HAVE RECEIVED NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND WITHIN FIVE
evidentiary basis for the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner received a BANKING DAYS FAILED TO SATISFY THE AMOUNT OF CHECK OR MAKE ARRANGEMENT FOR PAYMENT.
notice that the checks had been dishonored. True, complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as — The law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the
shown in Exhibit "Q",informing the latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving notice that
showed that petitioner did not receive it. In fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarris' letter addressed to such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to
complainant's counsel certified that the "subject registered mail was returned to sender on satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the Court held in Lozano v.
September 22, 1992 ...." Speculations and possibilities cannot take the place of proof. Convictions Martinez,the aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in its application." This
must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrated the opportunity, however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of dishonor. Thus, in
indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must
the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise. be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed
Petitioner Betty King was ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. SEDIaH
of the crimes charged. 7. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — True, complainant sent petitioner a
SYLLABUS registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q",informing the latter that the checks had been dishonored. But
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS;NOT the records show that petitioner did not receive it.In fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri's letter
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — It is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents addressed to complainant's counsel certified that the "subject registered mail was returned to sender
offered and admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule v. Court of on September 22, 1992 ...." Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the
Appeals would not apply to the present controversy. In that case, a hearing was conducted during prosecution failed to adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but
which the prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was "based solely on the unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee bank sent petitioner a
stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that
petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in evidence under Section 4 petitioner actually received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by
of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of his guilt. In the present case, petitioner's staying in different addresses. Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof.
conviction was based on the evidence presented during trial, and not on the stipulations made during Conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrates
the pre-trial. Hence, petitioner's admissions during the trial are governed not by the Fule ruling or by the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had been dishonored.
Section 4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of Rule 129. Necessarily, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22; ELEMENTS. — This Court 8. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE AND LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF
has held that the elements of the crime are as follows: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any ACCUSED. — We must stress that BP 22, like all penal statutes, is construed strictly against the State
check to apply to account or for value. 2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank and liberally in favor of the accused. Likewise, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond
for insufficiency of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Hence, the prosecution's case must rise or fall on the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 3. The accused knows at the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the defense.
time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for DECISION
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. AIDTSE PANGANIBAN, J p:
3. MERCANTILE LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW; CHECKS ISSUED COMPLETE IN Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the
FORM; CASE AT BAR. — The questioned checks, marked as Exhibits "A" to "K",contained the date of accused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused
issue and the amount involved. In fact, petitioner even admitted that she signed those checks. On the was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five banking
other hand, no proof was adduced to show that petitioner merely signed them in blank; or that days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make
complainant filled them up in violation of the former's instructions or their previous agreement. The arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for
evidence on record is clear that petitioner issued eleven checks, all of which were filled up and signed violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper. LibLex
by her. The Case
 Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of amount of P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No.
Court assailing the January 30, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 18226 93-3343;
and its November 5, 1997 Resolution 3 denying reconsideration. The CA affirmed the June 14, 1994 10. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Metro Manila 5 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-3335 P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the
to 93-3345 which convicted petitioner of 11 counts of violation of BP 22, otherwise known as amount of P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No.
the Bouncing Checks Law. 93-3344; and,
On April 28, 1993, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jaime A. Adoc filed against 11. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of
petitioner eleven separate Informations, 6 which are identically worded, except for the check number, P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the
the amount and the date, as follows: amount of P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No.
"That in or about the month of January, 1992 in the Municipality of Las 93-3345." 8
Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, As already stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in this wise: 9
the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously "WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed [I]N TOTO. Costs
make or draw and issue to EILEEN FERNANDEZ herein represented by ________ to against appellant."
apply on account or for value the check described below: Hence, this Petition. 10
EQUITABLE BANK The Facts
Check No. 021711 Evidence for the Prosecution
In the amount of P50,000.00 The Office of the Solicitor General 11 summarized the facts, as viewed by the prosecution,
Postdated July 24, 1992 in this wise:
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he did not have sufficient funds in or "On several occasions in January, 1992, at Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon their petitioner discounted with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable Bank
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof checks postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the total amount of P1,070,000.00 in
were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason 'Account Closed' and despite exchange for cash in the amount of P1,000,000.00. When the checks were deposited
receipt of notice of such dishonor the accused failed to pay the face amount thereof or make for payment, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because they were drawn
arrangement for the full payment thereof within five (5) working days after receiving notice." 7 against an account without sufficient funds. Petitioner failed to make good the
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution checks despite demand. (Memorandum dated April 7, 1993 of Assistant Provincial
presented its evidence and rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of Prosecutor to the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor)
court, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial "During the hearing on the merits of this case on September 17, 1998, the
court denied the Demurrer in its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: prosecution offered in evidence its documentary evidence. Petitioner admitted the
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer to evidence without prior genuineness and due execution of the documents presented." 12
leave of court is DENIED for lack of merit. Evidence for the Defense
Since accused has waived her right to present evidence, judgment is As noted earlier, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. In doing so,
hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation she waived her right to present evidence and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in the eleven (11) above-entitled cases and is ordered documentary exhibits adduced by the prosecution. 13
to: Ruling of the Court of Appeals
1. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals explained that the prosecution proved all
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount the elements of the crime. The CA also pointed out that the failure of petitioner to sign the pretrial
of P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3335; order was not fatal to the prosecution, because her conviction was based on the evidence presented
2. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of during the trial.
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount The Issues
of P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3336; Petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:
3. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of "I
P50,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
of P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3337; admitting in evidence all the documentary evidence of the prosecution though their
4. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of due execution and genuineness were not duly established in evidence pursuant to
P64,200.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount the provisions of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence;
of P64,200.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3338; "II
5. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
P66,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount declaring that Rule 118, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as applied in the case
of P66,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-3339; of Fule vs. Court of Appeals,162 SCRA 446, which states that no agreement or
6. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence
P100,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel, is
amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. inapplicable in the case at bar;
93-3340; prLL "III
7. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
P150,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the ruling that the burden of evidence has already been shifted from the prosecution to
amount of P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. the defense despite the definite factual issues in the pre-trial order; and
93-3341; "IV
8. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
P150,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt albeit
amount of P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. the prosecution did not produce any evidence." 14
93-3342; In the main, the resolution of the Petition hinges on (1) the admissibility and (2) the
9. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of sufficiency of the prosecution evidence. LexLib
P130,000.00, and to pay complainant Eileen Fernandez the This Court's Ruling
 The Petition has merit insofar as it contends that the elements of the crime charged have I think it is already provided. prLL
not all been proven beyond reasonable doubt. COURT:
First Issue: So, admitted.
Admissibility of Documentary Evidence ATTY. MAKALINTAL:
Because the first, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner all refer to the same With the admission of our offer, Your Honor, the prosecution rests." 16
matter, they will be discussed together. She contends that the pieces of documentary evidence From the foregoing, it is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents offered
presented by the prosecution during pretrial are inadmissible, because she did not sign the pretrial and admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule v. Court of
agreement as required under Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. 15 Hence, she argues that Appeals 17 would not apply to the present controversy. In that case, a hearing was conducted during
there is no basis for her conviction. which the prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was "based solely on the
True, a pretrial agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible. However, the conviction of stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the
petitioner was based not on that agreement but on the documents submitted during the trial, all of petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in evidence under Section 4
which were admitted without any objection from her counsel. During the hearing on September 17, of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of his guilt.
1993, the prosecution offered as evidence the dishonored checks, the return check tickets addressed In the present case, petitioner's conviction was based on the evidence presented during
to private complainant, the notice from complainant addressed to petitioner that the checks had been trial, and not on the stipulations made during the pretrial. Hence, petitioner's admissions during the
dishonored, and the postmaster's letter that the notice had been returned to sender. Petitioner's trial are governed not by the Fule ruling or by Section 4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of Rule 129
counsel did not object to their admissibility. This is shown by the transcript of stenographic notes which reads:
taken during the hearing on September 17, 1993: "SEC 4. Judicial Admissions.— An admission, verbal or written, made by a
"COURT: party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
You have no objection to the admissibility, not that the Court will believe it. admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
ATTY. MANGERA mistake or that no such admission was made."
No, Your Honor. Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the said
COURT: documentary evidence.
Exhibits 'A' to 'A' to 'K' are admitted. Second Issue:
ATTY. MAKALINTAL: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We offer Exhibit 'L',the return-check ticket dated July 27, 1992, relative to checks Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
No. 021745 and 021746 indicating that these checks were returned DAIF, elements of the offense. After a careful consideration of the records of this case, we believe and
drawn against insufficient funds; Exh. M, returned check ticket dated July so rule that the totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioner's conviction for
28, 1992, relative to Check No. 021727, 021711 and 021720 likewise violation of BP 22.
indicating the said checks to have been drawn against insufficient funds, Section 1 of BP 22 defines the offense as follows:
Your Honor. Exhibit N, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992, relative to "Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds.— Any person who makes or
Check Nos. 021749 and 021748, having the same indications; draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
Exhibits O, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992 relative to Check Nos. 021750 issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
and 021753, with the same indications; payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
Exhibits P, returned check ticket dated August 4, 1992 relative to Check No. 021752, dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
having the same indication as being drawn against insufficient funds; been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
Exhibit Q, the demand letter sent to the accused by Atty. Horacio Makalintal dated ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
August 3, 1992; than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
Exhibit R, the letter-request for certification addressed to the Postmaster General more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two
sent by the same law office dated 17 September 1992, showing that the hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
said letter was dispatched properly by the Central Post Office of Makati; court.
Exhibit S, 1st Indorsement of the Makati Central Post Office dated 21 September "The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient
1992; funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
Exhibit T, the Philippine Postal Corporation Central Post Office letter dated 24 shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
September 1992, addressed to this representation showing that there were the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
3 notices sent to the herein accused who received the said letter. thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
COURT: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person
Let's go to the third check slip; any objection to the third slip? or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
ATTY. MANGERA: under this Act."
We have no objection as to the due execution and authenticity. Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows: 18
COURT: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
Admitted. value.
ATTY. MAKALINTAL: 2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
We are offering Exhibits Q, R, S and T, for the purpose of showing that there was insufficiency of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same
demand duly made on the accused and that the same had been reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
appropriately served by the Central Post Office Services of Manila. payment.
ATTY. MANGERA: 3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
We admit as to the due execution and authenticity only as to that portion, Your have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in
Honor. full upon its presentment. cdtai
COURT: We shall analyze the evidence, purportedly establishing each of the aforementioned
We are talking of admissibility now, so admitted. In other words, at this point, he elements which the trial and the appellate courts relied upon.
makes an offer and the Court will either grant admission, [admit] it in Issuance of the Questioned Checks
evidence or deny it. It can deny admission if it is not properly identified Contending that the prosecution failed to prove the first element, petitioner maintains that
etcetera. she merely signed the questioned checks without indicating therein the date and the amount
ATTY. MANGERA: involved. She adds that they were improperly filled up by Eileen Fernandez. Thus, she concludes, she
did not "issue" the dishonored checks in the context of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which defines To prove that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution presented
"issue" as the "first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a Exhibits "Q" to "T." Based on these documents, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[p]rivate
holder." 19 complainant sent a demand letter to appellant to make good said checks ....Appellant failed to pay
Petitioner's contentions are not meritorious. The questioned checks, marked as Exhibits "A" the face value of the eleven checks or make arrangement for the full payment thereof within 90 days
to "K," contained the date of issue and the amount involved. In fact, petitioner even admitted that after receiving the notice." 24
she signed those checks. On the other hand, no proof was adduced to show that petitioner merely Upon closer examination of these documents, we find no evidentiary basis for the holding of
signed them in blank, or that complainant filled them up in violation of the former's instructions or the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner received a notice that the checks had been
their previous agreement. The evidence on record is clear that petitioner issued eleven checks, all of dishonored.
which were duly filled up and signed by her. True, complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q" informing the
Checks Dishonored latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not receive it. In
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that "there appears no evidence on fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri's letter addressed to complainant's counsel certified that the
record that the subject checks were unpaid and dishonored." 20 Under Section 3 of BP 22, "the "subject registered mail was returned to sender on September 22, 1992 ...." 25
introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the prosecution failed to
pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but unjustifiably refused to
be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but
drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that petitioner actually received
reason written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by staying in different addresses.
In the present case, the fact that the checks were dishonored was sufficiently shown by the Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof. Conviction must rest on proof
checks themselves, which were stamped with the words "ACCOUNT CLOSED." This was further beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrates the indelible fact that
supported by the returned check tickets issued by PCI Bank, the depository bank, stating that the petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption
checks had been dishonored. that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise. LLpr
Clearly, these documents constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored Be that as it may, the Court must point out that it cannot rule on petitioner's civil liability,
the checks. Again, no evidence was presented to rebut the prosecution's claim. for the issue was not raised in the pleadings submitted before us.
Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds We must stress that BP 22, like all penal statutes, is construed strictly against the State and
To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was liberally in favor of the accused. 26 Likewise, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew "at reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Hence, the prosecution's case must rise or fall on the
the time of issue that that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the defense.
payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this element involves a state of mind WHEREFORE,the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such ASIDE. Petitioner Betty King is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of
knowledge, as follows: 21 the crimes charged. No pronouncement as to costs.
"Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.— The making, drawing SO ORDERED. cdphil
and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such Footnotes
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof 1.Rollo,pp. 52-63.
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee 2.Sixth Division.
of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has 3.Rollo,p. 66.
not been paid by the drawee." 4.Rollo,pp. 94-99; penned by Judge Santiago Ranada Jr.
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also 5.Branch 137.
provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes 6.Records, pp. 21-62.
arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving notice that such check has not 7.Rollo,pp. 10-12.
been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount 8.RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo,pp. 98-99.
indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the Court held in Lozano v. Martinez, the 9.CA Decision, p. 12; rollo,p. 63.
aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in its application." 22 This 10.This case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 19, 1999, upon receipt by the Court of the
opportunity, however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of dishonor. This respondent's Memorandum.
point was underscored by the Court in Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals: 23 11.Through Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Rodolfo G. Urbiztondo and
"It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the Solicitor Procolo M. Olaivar.
violator 'a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to 12.Respondent's Comment, pp. 1-2; rollo,pp. 149-150.
preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated.' This 13.Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
was also compared 'to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain 14.Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 9-10; rollo,pp. 197-198; signed by Attys. Janette Bassig Chua and
period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, Alquin B. Manguera.
without incurring any criminal liability.' In this light, the full payment of the amount 15."Sec. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed.— No agreement or admission made or entered during
appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to
'complete defense.' The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an writing and signed by him and his counsel."
accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural 16.TSN, September 17, 1993; pp. 3-5; rollo,pp. 82-84.
due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. 17.162 SCRA 446, June 22, 1988.
Petitioner has a right to demand — and the basic postulates of fairness require — 18.People v. Laggui,171 SCRA 305, March 16, 1989.
that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the 19.Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 32; rollo,p. 220.
opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22." 20.Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 35; rollo,p. 223.
Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the 21.See also Crisologo-Jose v. Court of Appeals,177 SCRA 594, September 15, 1989; Travel-On, Inc. v.
insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five Court of Appeals,210 SCRA 351, June 26, 1992 and People v. Singson,215 SCRA 534,
banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its November 12, 1992.
payment. 22.146 SCRA 324, December 18, 1986, per Yap, CJ.
23.274 SCRA 572, 594, June 20, 1997, per Panganiban, J.Citations omitted.
 24.CA Decision, p. 11; rollo,p. 62.
25.Exhibit "T," Records, p. 20.
26.Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990),p. 208; Nitafan, Notes and Comments on the Bouncing Checks
Law,p. 21.
||| (King v. People, G.R. No. 131540, [December 2, 1999], 377 PHIL 692-711)
FIRST DIVISION our true agreement that Mr. Ariosto Santos is only my Broker, so far as the
[G.R. No. L-59952. August 31, 1984.] aforedescribed parcels of land are concerned, as can be gleaned from Page 2,
RUBY H. GARDNER and FRANK GARDNER JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement, . . ."
APPEALS, DEOGRACIAS R. NATIVIDAD and JUANITA A. On October 19, 1966 and November 4, 1966, the JUAN CUENCAS and the JOSE CUENCAS,
SANCHEZ, respondents. respectively, transferred the lots to Michael C. VERROYA (Exhibits "P" & "Q", ibid.) an office assistant
Mayor, Manalang, Reyes & Associates for petitioners. of Ariosto SANTOS (the Third Transfer). Titles were issued in VERROYA's name with the Adverse Claim
Joanes Caacbay for private respondents. carried over.
DECISION On March 29, 1967, VERROYA constituted a mortgage on both lots in favor of Anita Nolasco
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p: and Rosario Dalma, which encumbrance was registered on the existing titles.
This is a Petition for the review of the Resolutions, dated April 24, 1980 and December 24, On June 29, 1967, VERROYA executed a deed of transfer of the properties to respondent
1980, respectively, of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52729-R entitled "Ruby H. Gardner, et Deogracias Natividad, married to Juanita Sanchez (the NATIVIDADS) (Exhibits "V", "V-4", ibid.) (the
al. versus Deogracias R. Natividad, et al," whereby the original Decision of said Court, promulgated on Fourth Transfer).
January 11, 1979, affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, On September 30, 1967, the NATIVIDADS transferred the lots to Ignacio Bautista and
Biñan, in Civil Case No. B-774, was reconsidered and the appealed judgment reversed in so far as Encarnacion de los Santos (the BAUTISTAS) (Exhibits "14", "15" [Natividad], "JJ-2", ibid.) (the Fifth
private respondents herein are concerned. Transfer). No titles were issued to the BAUTISTAS. prcd
A chain of successive transfers of real property, five in all, is involved. It should be noted that from the titles of the CUENCAS (the Second Transferees) to the titles
Petitioner Ruby H. GARDNER, married to Frank Gardner, Jr., an American (the GARDNERS, of the NATIVIDADS (the Fourth Transferee), the Adverse Claim of the GARDNERS continued to be
for short), was the registered owner of two adjoining parcels of agricultural land situated at Calamba, carried, and that throughout the successive transfers, or over a span of approximately six years, the
Laguna, designated as Lot No. 1426-new and Lot No. 4748-new, with an aggregate area of 93,688 GARDNERS continued to remain in possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties.
square meters more or less, and covered by TCT Nos. T-20571 and T-20573, respectively, of the Aggrieved by the series of transfers, the GARDNERS filed suit on July 8, 1969 for
Registry of Property of Laguna (Exhibits "A" & "B", Folio of Exhibits). "Declaration of Nullity, Rescission and Damages" against the Five Transferees, including the
On November 27, 1961, the GARDNERS and the spouses Ariosto C. SANTOS and Cirila mortgagees, Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalma, before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I
Serrano (the SANTOSES) entered into an agreement for the subdivision of the two parcels, with the (Civil Case No. B-774), praying for the declaration of nullity of all the Five Transfers and the
SANTOSES binding themselves to advance to the GARDNERS the amount of P93,000.00 in cancellation of all titles issued pursuant thereto on the ground that they were all simulated, fictitious,
installments. For the protection of both parties they executed the following documents all on the and without consideration.
same date and referring to the same parcels of land: (1) Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the In their Answer, the SANTOSES claimed, in brief, that the sale to them was conditional in the
SANTOSES (the First Transfer, considering the nature of the document); (2) Subdivision Joint Venture sense that the properties were to be considered as the investment of the GARDNERS in the
Agreement; and (3) Supplemental Agreement (Exhibits "C", "D" and "E", ibid.). Despite the "sale,", subdivision venture and that in the event that this did not materialize they were to reconvey the lots
the GARDNERS were still denominated in the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and in the to the GARDNERS upon reimbursement by the latter of all sums advanced to them; and that the deed
Supplemental Agreement as "owners" and Ariosto SANTOS merely as "broker". It appears from the of sale was to be registered for the protection of the SANTOSES considering the moneys that the
evidence that the sale to the SANTOSES was one "in trust" for the protection of the SANTOSES who latter would be advancing.
had obligated themselves to give cash advances to the GARDNERS from time to time (Exhibits "E-2" For their part, respondents NATIVIDADS contended that they were purchasers in good faith
to "E-88" incl.). On December 5, 1961, new titles were issued in favor of the SANTOSES (Exhibits "F" & notwithstanding the adverse claim as the titles were not shown to them by VERROYA at the time of
"G", ibid.). the sale, and that they had paid good and valuable consideration.
Unknown to the GARDNERS, on June 10,1964, the SANTOSES transferred Lot No. 1426-New The mortgagees, Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalma, denied the allegations in the Complaint
to Jose Cuenca, married to Amanda Relova (the JOSE CUENCAS) (Exhibit "H", ibid.), and on June 15, and counterclaimed for damages, which the GARDNERS answered.
1964, Lot No. 4748-New to Juan Cuenca, married to Soledad Advincula (the JUAN CUENCAS) (Exhibit After the lifting of the Order of default against them, the CUENCAS filed their Answer
"1", ibid.) (jointly, the Second Transfer). Titles were thereafter issued in their respective names contending that their transfer to VERROYA of the properties in question was not simulated and was
(Exhibits "L" & "M", ibid.). supported by valuable consideration.
Upon learning of the Transfer of the properties to the CUENCAS, petitioner Ruby GARDNER, VERROYA, Juanita Sanchez (wife of Deogracias Natividad), and the BAUTISTAS were
caused the inscription of an Adverse Claim on the titles of the CUENCAS with the Register of Deeds of declared in default for their failure to seasonably file their responsive pleadings. 1
Laguna on December 2, 1965. Her Affidavit stated in part: LLpr The GARDNERS, aside from their documentary evidence, adduced in their favor the
"2. My adverse claim arose from the facts that sometime in the middle testimonies of Ruby GARDNER herself, Jose Infante, an employee of the Register of Deeds of Laguna,
part of 1961, I and Mr. Ariosto Santos of 2162 Apolinario, Bangkal St., Makati, Rizal and defendant Ariosto SANTOS who was presented as an adverse witness. LLphil
had an understanding and have agreed that we would subdivide my Of the eight answering defendants, only respondent Deogracias NATIVIDAD testified on his
aforedescribed properties then covered by TCT Nos. T-20571 and T-20573 for Lot behalf. Defendant Ariosto SANTOS merely adopted as his own evidence the declaration he had given
No. 1426-New and 4748-New, respectively, under the condition that he would as an adverse witness. The JOSE CUENCAS and the JUAN CUENCAS neither presented any testimonial
advance to me a total amount of P93,000.00, which I could withdraw little by little evidence but just adopted the testimony of Ariosto SANTOS. Defendants Anita Nolasco and Rosario
and from time to time; that he would improve the aforesaid land by constructing Dalma, the mortgagees, submitted their case after the genuineness of the deed of mortgage
paved roads sewers, water, other facilities that may be required by the authorities executed in their favor by VERROYA was admitted by the parties. 2
concerned and other requirements of the subdivision laws until he shall have On January 15, 1972, the Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the GARDNERS declaring
invested for these purposes the sum of P234,220.00; that he assured me that the as null and void the five Transfers; rescinding the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement (Exhibit "D")
construction of these paved roads, etc. would commence immediately; as well as the Supplemental Agreement (Exhibits "E"; ordering the GARDNERS to reimburse the
"3. We (I and Mr. Ariosto Santos) have agreed that in order to protect his SANTOSES the total cash advances of P36,712.80 which the GARDNERS had received; authorizing the
(Mr. Santos) interest to the sum of P93,000.00, to be withdrawn by me little by cancellation of the corresponding titles issued pursuant to the deeds of sale and the issuance of new
little and from time to time, I would transfer to his name my aforementioned titles ones in favor of the GARDNERS; ordering the deletion from the titles of the mortgage executed by
in trust; VERROYA; and requiring the Five Transferees but not mortgagees, Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalma,
xxx xxx xxx to pay the GARDNERS P90,000.00 actual damages, P5,000.00 exemplary damages, and to pay the
"5. In the absolute Deed of Sale it was stated that I received from Mr. costs.
Santos the sum of P70,266.00 and in consideration of said amount, I have sold, The respondents NATIVIDADS appealed (notwithstanding that the wife was declared in
transferred and conveyed my aforedescribed parcels of land to Mr. Santos; but default) to the then Court of Appeals, which, on January 11, 1979 affirmed in toto the judgment of the
these statements were and are not true, that is why we have the other two more Trial Court. 3 The NATIVIDADS received the Decision of affirmance on January 16, 1979. On January
documents — the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and the Supplemental 29, 1979, the NATIVIDADS asked for a 30-day extension from January 31, 1979 or up to March 2,
Agreement. It is stated in the Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement, which contains 1979, within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which was granted by respondent Court. 4 On
March 2, 1979, the NATIVIDADS filed their Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied on Upon the facts and the evidence, we rule that respondent Court had lost jurisdiction to
November 7, 1979. 5 entertain the second Motion for Reconsideration because its Decision of January 11, 1979 had already
On December 4, 1979, a "Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File a Second become final and executory as the following chronological data before respondent Court will show:
Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by the NATIVIDADS. The pleading was signed by Deogracias Jan. 16, 1979 Receipt by respondents of CA Decision dated Jan.
NATIVIDAD himself. Respondent Court denied leave on December 28, 1979. 6 However, on the same 11, 1979.
date of December 28, 1979, the NATIVIDADS filed their Second Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 24, 1980, respondent Court reconsidered its Resolution of "January 7, 1980"
denying respondents' "Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration', and admitted said Jan. 29, 1979 Private respondents filed motion for extension of 30
second Motion 7 (The resolution of January 7, 1980 refers to the resolution of December 28, 1979
which was released on January 7, 1980). On December 24, 1980, respondent Court 8 issued the days from Jan. 31, 1979 to file motion for
questioned Resolution reversing its Decision of January 11, 1979 insofar as the NATIVIDADS are reconsideration. This was granted. Due — Mar. 2, 1979.
concerned, declaring as valid the sale of the land to them as well as the titles issued pursuant
thereto. On January 20, 1981, the GARDNERS sought to set aside the questioned Resolution and
moved for entry of judgment averring that said Resolution was null and void for having been issued Mar. 2, 1979 Motion for Reconsideration filed (on the last day).
without jurisdiction as the Decision of January 11, 1979 had already become final and executory. The
Motion was denied for lack of merit on March 4, 1982. 9 Nov. 7, 1979 Reconsideration was denied.
Petitioners now seek to set aside the Appellate Court's Resolutions of April 24, 1980
(granting leave to file a 2nd Motion for Reconsideration) and December 24, 1980 (reversing the
original judgment), and assigning to respondent Court the following errors: cdrep Nov. 19, 1979 Receipt by private respondents of above resolution.
I
"The Court of Appeals erred in promulgating its resolution of April 24,
1980, because it has already lost jurisdiction to act on the case since the decision Nov. 28, 1979 Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Leave to
of January 11, 1979 had already become then final and executory. file Second Motion for Reconsideration with a prayer
II for extension of 30 days from said date, filed by
"The Court of Appeals erred in promulgating its resolution of December respondent Deogracias Natividad himself.
24, 1980, because it had already then lost jurisdiction to act on the case, much
more so, to reverse through its resolution of December 24, 1980 its decision of
January 11, 1979 that has already become final and executory. Dec. 28, 1979 Motion for Leave to file Second Motion for
III Reconsideration denied.
"Assuming arguendo that it has still jurisdiction to promulgate its
resolution of December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that
the defendant-appellant Deogracias Natividad's second motion for reconsideration, Dec. 28, 1979 Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by private
just like the first motion for reconsideration, is unquestionably pro-forma, hence
respondent.
did not suspend the running of the reglementary period of time.
IV
"Assuming arguendo that it has still jurisdiction to promulgate its Jan. 8, 1980 Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution of Dec. 28,
resolution of December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
1979 filed by private respondents.
testimonies of Ariosto Santos under oath on the witness stand cannot prevail over
the allegations in Santos' answer (not verified and only signed by Ariosto Santos'
counsel) and, regarding which there is no substantial conflict or variance. April 24, 1980 Resolution reconsidering denial of Motion for Leave,
V
"Assuming arguendo, it has still jurisdiction to promulgate its resolution and Second Motion for Reconsideration admitted. This
of December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing absolutely without is one of the disputed Resolutions.
valid justification, its findings in its decision of January 11, 1979 and resolution of
November 7, 1979, both holding that defendant-appellant Deogracias Natividad
was not a buyer in good faith and for value. Dec. 24, 1980 Resolution reversing Decision of January 11, 1979.
VI This is the other Resolution assailed.
"Assuming arguendo that it has still jurisdiction to promulgate its
resolution of December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing,
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, provides:
absolutely without valid justification, its findings in its decision of January 11, 1979
"Section 1. Motion for re-hearing. A motion for re-hearing or
and resolution of November 7, 1979 both holding that the sales of the questioned
reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from
properties from Ruby Gardner and spouse Frank Gardner, Jr., to Ariosto Santos and
notice of final order or judgment. No more than one motion for re-hearing or
spouse Cirila Serrano, to Jose Cuenca and Juan Cuenca and their spouses Amanda
reconsideration shall be filed without express leave of court. A second motion for
Relova and Soledad Advincula, respectively, to Michael Verroya, to Deogracias
reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order
Natividad and spouse Juanita Sanchez, to Ignacio Bautista and spouse Encarnacion
or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has been pending."
delos Santos are null and void ab initio.
Evidently, the Second Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period.
VII
The NATIVIDADS erroneously thought that they had another 15-day period from the date of receipt of
"The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it will not hesitate to consider
denial of the first Motion for Reconsideration on November 7, 1979 within which to file a second
and hear defendant-appellant Deogracias Natividad's second motion for
Motion for Reconsideration. That would be the rule for appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court
reconsideration (even if it was received when the decision of January 11, 1979 was
from an Appellate Court judgment pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 45. 10 However, under the
already final and executory) upon the groundless claim that Deogracias Natividad
aforequoted provision, which is the applicable rule, the time in which the first Motion has been
was abandoned by his counsel, who received the resolution denying Natividad's
pending has to be deducted. As it was, all of the fifteen days had been used up when the first Motion
first motion for reconsideration."
for Reconsideration was filed on March 2, 1979. The Decision of January 11, 1979, therefore, had
already attained finality on March 3, 1979 so that respondent Court no longer had jurisdiction to act
on the "Very Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration" submitted by the VERROYA's telegram to the Register of Deeds of Laguna to dishonor any transaction involving the
NATIVIDADS on November 28, 1979, much less to grant the same. subject properties. 18
It is well settled that once a Decision has become final and executory, it is removed from The Fifth Transfer to the BAUTISTAS partook of the same nature — a simulated and fictitious
the power and jurisdiction of the Court which rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less to transaction, for being without consideration, as shown by the evidence. They too, were declared in
revoke it. The subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the default and made no attempt to answer or dispute the allegations in the Complaint against
judgment, nor restore jurisdiction to the court. 11 them. LLjur
Although the granting or denial of a motion for reconsideration involves the exercise of The mortgage of the properties by VERROYA in favor of Anita Nolasco and Rosario Dalma
discretion, 12 the same should not be exercised whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but prudently was executed after the inscription of the adverse claim on the titles so that they can neither be
in conformity with law, justice, reason and equity. LLjur considered as innocent mortgagees for value.
We likewise find reversible error in the reversal of respondent Court's original Decision of Added proof of the fictitiousness of the chain of transfers is that fact that, notwithstanding
January 11, 1979. In its Resolution of reversal, dated December 24, 1980, respondent Court had the same, the GARDNERS remained in actual possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed
stated in part: lots throughout the entire series of transactions.
"The presence of the adverse claim in appellant's (Deogracias Natividad) As concluded in the original Decision of respondent Court, all Five Transfers starting from
title does not make him a buyer in bad faith. The validity of the adverse claim has that of the SANTOSES down to the NATIVIDADS, were absolutely simulated and fictitious and were,
to be determined by the Court. Until the validity of such claim is determined therefore, void ab initio and inexistent. 19 Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect
judicially, the same cannot be considered as a flaw in his vendor's title. The whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as paid, has, in fact, never been paid by the
adverse claim first appeared in the titles of the Cuencas, the second buyers. It was purchaser to the vendor. 20 Such sales are inexistent and cannot be considered consummated. 21
carried on to the titles of subsequent transferees. The title of Santos appeared In its Resolution reversing the original Decision, respondent Court discredited the testimony
clean. This makes the title of Santos' vendee clean. The subsequent annotation of of Ariosto SANTOS for being at variance with the allegations in his Answer. The fact, however, that the
the adverse claim therein would not make the Cuencas buyers in bad faith. If the allegations made by Ariosto SANTOS in his pleadings and in his declarations in open Court differed
Cuencas were buyers in good faith, we do not see any reason why subsequent will not militate against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent Court. As a
buyers could not enjoy the same status. Good faith is presumed while bad faith general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding
must be proved . . ." 13 upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. 22 An Answer is a mere statement of fact which
However, as set forth in the original Decision of the Appellate Court, upholding the findings the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. 23 As Ariosto SANTOS himself, in open
of the Trial Court, the evidence preponderantly shows that all Five Transfer were null and void for Court, had repudiated the defenses he had raised in his Answer and against his own interest, his
having been simulated and fictitious. testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed
The First Transfer in favor of the SANTOSES was "indubitably established" to have been in his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their findings thereon.
without consideration and is, therefore, void and inexistent. 14 That sale was executed merely as a Lastly, the statement of respondent Court in its Resolution of reversal that "until the validity
means of protection to the SANTOSES for their promised cash advances to the GARDNERS in one year of an adverse claim is determined judicially it cannot be considered a flaw in the vendor's title,
in the sum of P93,000.00. Added to this is the admission against his own interest by Ariosto SANTOS contradicts the very essence of adverse claims. The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
that the GARDNERS did not receive from him any consideration, 15 thereby corroborating the designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and
declarations of the GARDNERS. The Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement (Exhibit "D") and the warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same
Supplemental Agreement (Exhibit "E") eloquently express that the true and real nature of the or has a better right than the registered owner thereof. 24 A subsequent sale of the property cannot
agreement between the GARDNERS and the SANTOSES was for a subdivision and not a sale prevail over the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the certificate of title of the
transaction. LibLex property. 25
The evidence also establishes that the Second Transfer to the CUENCAS was fictitious and While one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate
simulated for not having been supported with any consideration. By his own admission, Ariosto of title, 26 he is nevertheless bound by the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. 27 One who
SANTOS transferred to the CUENCAS, who are his "compadres", the disputed properties, together buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. 28
with others that he owned, merely to conceal his ownership and "to protect them from persons who WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals (now the
had filed suits against him and were running after the properties registered in his name." It was Intermediate Appellate Court), dated April 24, 1980 and December 24, 1980, respectively, are hereby
SANTOS who had caused the execution of those deeds of sale (Exhibits "H" & "I") and had them REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and its Decision of January 11, 1979 affirming in toto the judgment of the
notarized by his own counsel. 16 No wonder then that the CUENCAS did not even dispute the validity then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I, in Civil Case No. B-774, is hereby reinstated. Costs
of the adverse claim pursuant to Section 110 of the Land Registration Act,and during the trial, they against private respondents.
merely adopted SANTOS' testimony. Under the circumstances surrounding their transaction they SO ORDERED.
knew that their title was flawed and they were not, and cannot be considered, buyers in good faith, Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
having paid no consideration for the sale. The subsequent registration of the adverse claim on their Relova, J., took no part.
titles, therefore, could not but serve as notice and warning to all subsequent buyers that someone
was claiming an interest in the properties or a better right than the registered owners. Footnotes
The Third Transfer in favor of VERROYA was similarly without consideration and, therefore, 1.Rollo, pp. 109-110.
void ab initio. The evidence on record shows that Ariosto SANTOS himself caused the execution of the 2.Ibid., p. 110.
deeds of sale (Exhibits "P" & "Q") in favor of VERROYA, who is SANTOS' office manager in his 3.Penned by Samuel F. Reyes, J. and concurred in by Pacifico P. de Castro and Carlos S. Sundiam, JJ.
brokerage business. The only purpose of the transfer was to enable VERROYA to secure for SANTOS a 4.Composed of Andres Reyes, P.J., Samuel F. Reyes and Guillermo Villasor, JJ., p. 147, Rollo.
loan with the Veterans Bank so much so that when the documents of sale were signed by the 5.By Samuel F. Reyes, Jose B. Jimenez and Carlos S. Sundiam, JJ., p. 162, ibid.
CUENCAS in their respective houses in favor of VERROYA, the latter was not even present. 17 Also 6.By Samuel F. Reyes, Jose B. Jimenez and Carlos S. Sundiam, JJ., p. 166, ibid.
significant is the fact that Verroya was declared in default and had not even bothered to resist the 7.Division of Five, composed of Crisolito Pascual, Mama D. Busran, Simeon M. Gopengco, Carlos S.
suit, which he would have done if the sale transaction were genuine. Sundiam, ponente, JJs., with Samuel F. Reyes, J. dissenting, pp. 187-197, ibid.
On equal footing is the Fourth Transfer from VERROYA to private respondents NATIVIDADS. 8.The same Division of Five, pp. 199-213, ibid.
It was SANTOS who had caused the preparation of the deed of sale in favor of the NATIVIDADS after 9.Division of Five composed of Mama D. Busran, ponente, Crisolito Pascual, Simeon M. Gopengco,
sensing that VERROYA was not inclined to return the title to the properties. Deogracias NATIVIDAD Carolina Griño-Aquino & Lino Patajo, JJ., pp. 219-233, ibid.
was SANTOS' close and trusted "compadre", who agreed to put the titles in his (NATIVIDAD's) name 10."Appeal From Court of Appeals to Supreme Court "Section I, Rule 45.
because of the pending cases against SANTOS. The amount of P80,000.00 stated in the document of "Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party may appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of the
sale was not actually paid by the NATIVIDADS to VERROYA, according to SANTOS' own testimony. The Court of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, within fifteen (15)
latter further declared that VERROYA was only coerced to sign the deeds (Exhibits "V" & "V-4") after days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due
he was boxed by NATIVIDAD in SANTOS' office at the Escolta. That coercion did exist is shown by time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee.
 The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Appeals."
11.Heirs of Patriaca vs. CA, 124 SCRA 410 (1983).
12.Lucero vs. Dacayo, 22 SCRA 1004 (1963).
13.Rollo, p. 210.
14.Article 1409 (3), Civil Code.
15.T.s.n., May 18, 1971, pp. 5-6.
16.Original Decision, p. 27.
17.T.s.n., May 16, 1971, pp. 19-23; September 15, 1971, pp. 10-11, Ariosto Santos' testimony, p. 29,
Original Decision.
18.T.s.n., May 18, 1971, pp. 25-29; pp. 3-9, September 15, 1971, pp. 5-7 and 15, Ariosto Santos'
testimony, pp. 31-32, Original Decision.
19.Article 1409(2), Civil Code.
20.Meneses Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque , 74 SCRA 83 (1976); Mapalo vs. Mapalo, 123
Phil. 979 (1966).
21.Garanciang vs. Garanciang, 28 SCRA 229 (1969).
22.Granada vs. PNB, 18 SCRA 1 (1966).
23.Tumalad vs. Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143 (1971).
24.L.P. Leviste & Co., Inc. vs. Noblejas, 89 SCRA 520 (1979).
25.PNB vs. CA, 94 SCRA 357 (1979).
26.Barrios vs. CA, 78 SCRA 427 (1977).
27.Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 476 (1983).
28.Caram, Jr. vs. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7 (1981).
||| (Gardner v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59952, [August 31, 1984], 216 PHIL 542-558)
SECOND DIVISION On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC initially denied
[G.R. No. 178925. June 1, 2011.] the motion in the Order dated December 23, 2004. 13 Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration,
MANUEL YBIERNAS, VICENTE YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON ANGELES, the RTC granted the motion for summary judgment in the decision 14 dated December 27, 2005. The
VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and VALENTIN YBIERNAS, petitioners, vs. ESTER TANCO- RTC made the following pronouncement:
GABALDON, MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC., and THE SHERIFF OF THE A consideration of the issues defined by the parties during the pre-trial . . .
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 163, respondents. shows quite clearly that they are issues that may already be properly resolved now
DECISION at this stage of the proceedings in this case, as they, other than the amount of
NACHURA, J p: damages, are quite apparently pure questions of law, the factual antecedents for
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions 1 dated these issues having already been admitted by the parties. aAHISE
January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007. The assailed Resolutions granted respondents' motion for new As to issue No. 1 [whether ownership has been transferred to petitioners], it
trial of a case for quieting of title and damages, decided in petitioners' favor by the trial court in a is a fact well-established, as admitted by the parties and shown by the annotation as
summary judgment. CTaSEI Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-8[39]76, that the said Deed of Absolute Sale,
The facts of the case are, as follows: dated April 28, 1988 over the subject property by Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas in
Estrella Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas (Estrella) owned a parcel of land located in Talisay, Negros favor of Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, Manuel Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y.
Occidental, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-83976. On April 28, 1988, Estrella Angeles, was validly annotated as such Entry No. 334151, inscribed on July 5, 1989,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 2 over the property in favor of her heirs, Dionisio Ybiernas on said TCT No. T-83976 registered in the name of Estrella M. Ybiernas.
(Dionisio) and petitioners Manuel Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, and Maria Corazon Angeles. Neither the defendants nor anyone else has challenged the validity of the
On June 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Bacolod City issued an Order in judicial proceedings before RTC, Branch 47, Bacolod City, which issued in Cadastral
Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC (G.L.R.O.) Rec. No. 97, Lot 713-C-B, Psd-220027, Talisay Cadastre, Case No. 10, the said Order dated June 30, 1989, which directed the registration and
directing the registration and annotation of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the title. Thus, on July 5, annotation of the said Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1988 on said TCT No. T-
1989, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the said RTC Order were annotated on the title, as follows: 83976, and which led to the annotation under said Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No.
Entry No. 334150; Order; Dionisio M. Ybiernas; Order issued by the RTC of T-83976. 15
Negros Occ. to register and annotate the deed of sale on this title without need of Thus, the dispositive portion of the December 27, 2005 RTC decision reads:
presenting the owner's duplicate. Date of order-June 30, 1989; Date of prescription- WHEREFORE, except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is
July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m. hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and as prayed
Entry No. 334151; Sale; Dionisio Ybiernas, et al.; Deed of absolute sale of for by the plaintiffs in their complaint:
this property for the sum of P650,000.00 in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente M. 1. The levy on attachment made by herein defendant Sheriff of
Ybiernas, Manuel M. Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles in undivided equal share RTC, Branch 163, Pasig City on said TCT No. T-83976, issued by the
to each; doc. no. 437, page 89, book VI, series of 1988 of the not. reg. of Mr. Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Negros Occidental, covering the
Indalecio P. Arriola of Iloilo City. Date of instrument-April 28, 1988; Date of Subject Property, is hereby DECLARED INVALID; and, consequently,
inscription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m. 3 2. Entry No. 346816 on the same TCT No. T-83976 is hereby
On October 29, 1991, respondents Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. CANCELLED and DISSOLVED.
filed with the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint 4 for sum of money and damages, amounting to SO ORDERED. 16
P6,000,000.00, against Estrella and three other individuals. The Complaint alleged that the Respondents filed a notice of appeal, 17 and it was granted by the RTC.
defendants were guilty of fraud when they misrepresented to herein respondents that they own a While the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed a motion for new
parcel of land in Quezon City, and that the title over the said property is free from liens and trial, 18 claiming that they have discovered on May 9, 2006 that Cadastral Case No. 10 did not exist
encumbrances. IcTEaC and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was simulated. Attached to the motion were the affidavit 19 of
Upon respondents' motion, the Pasig City RTC, in an Order 5 dated November 6, 1991, Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who conducted the research in Bacolod City in behalf of the law office
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon filing of a bond. The sheriff issued the representing respondents, and the following certifications:
corresponding writ of attachment and levied the subject property. 6 On November 13, 1991, the a. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Ildefonso M. Villanueva, Jr.,
notice of attachment was annotated on TCT No. T-83976 as Entry No. 346816. 7 Clerk of Court VI of the RTC of Bacolod City, stating that: "no cadastral case
When Estrella's heirs learned about the levy, Dionisio filed, on January 14, 1992, an Affidavit involving Lot 713-C-1-B, Psd-220027, Talisay Cadastre, was filed with this office
of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to them. 8 Respondents, however, filed an sometime on 30 June 1989 and raffled to Branch 47 of this court which was then
indemnity bond; thus, the sheriff refused to lift the levy. presided by Judge Enrique T. Jocson." 20
The Pasig City RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of respondents, and b. Certification dated 09 May 2006 isssued by Atty. Mehafee G. Sideno,
Estrella, et al., were ordered to pay P6,000,000.00, plus legal interest and damages. Respondents, Clerk of Court V of the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 47, stating that: "as per
however, elevated the case all the way up to this Court, questioning the interest rate. This Court records of this court, no Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC, GLRO Rec. 97, Lot No. 713-C-
eventually denied the appeal in a Minute Resolution dated November 20, 2002, which became final 1-B, Psd 220027, filed by Dionisio Ybiernas was filed and docketed in this
and executory on April 14, 2003. 9 office." 21
In the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs, petitioners Valentin c. Certification dated 11 July 2006 issued by Estrella M. Domingo, OIC
Ybiernas and Violeta Ybiernas. Archives Division of the National Archives Office, stating that: "no copy is on file
On November 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a Complaint for with this Office of a DEED OF SALE allegedly executed by and among ESTRELLA
Quieting of Title and Damages, 10 claiming that the levy was invalid because the property is not MAPA VDA. DE YBIERNAS, DIONISIO YBIERNAS, VICENTE M. YBIERNAS, JR., MANUEL
owned by any of the defendants in the Pasig City RTC case. They averred that the annotation of the YBIERNAS and MARIA CORAZON ANGELES, ratified on April 28, 1988 before
RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute Sale on TCT No. T-83976 serves as notice to the whole world that INDALECIO P. ARRIOLA, a notary public for and within Iloilo City and acknowledged
the property is no longer owned by Estrella. as Doc. No. 437; Page No. 89; Book No. VI; Series of 1988." 22 HESCcA
In their Answer with Counterclaims, 11 respondents contended that (a) the case constituted Respondents argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the grant of a new trial
an interference in the proceeding of the Pasig City RTC, a co-equal court; (b) petitioners should have based on newly discovered evidence: (1) they discovered the evidence after the trial court rendered
filed their claims against the indemnity bond filed by respondents; and (c) petitioners were guilty of its judgment on December 27, 2005; (2) they could not have discovered and produced the evidence
forum-shopping, considering that the case actually sought a relief similar to the third-party claim. during the trial with reasonable diligence; and (3) the evidence was material, not merely cumulative,
During pre-trial, the parties admitted, among others, the "[e]xistence of the Order dated corroborative, or impeaching, and was of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
June 30, 1989 by RTC Branch 47, Bacolod City, in Cad. Case No. 10 concerning the same TCT No. T- judgment. On the second requisite, respondents explained that they could not have discovered the
83976." 12 evidence with reasonable diligence because they relied in good faith on the veracity of the RTC Order
dated June 30, 1989, based on the principle that the issuance of a court order, as an act of a public
officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity. On the third requisite, respondents pointed out that, if whether they had the authority to issue such certifications and whether they had personal knowledge
the nonexistence of Cadastral Case No. 10 and the invalidity of the Order dated June 30, 1989 were of the documents archived during the year that the deed of sale was executed. According to
allowed to be proven by the newly discovered evidence, the action for quieting of title would probably petitioners, the certifications cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the
be dismissed, as respondents' levy would be declared superior to petitioners' claim. 23 Order dated June 30, 1989. At most, the certifications would simply show that the records of
In their Comment/Opposition, petitioners argued that (a) the questioned decision was a Cadastral Case No. 10 could no longer be found in the records; hence, they would have no bearing on
partial summary judgment which could not be the subject of a motion for new trial; (b) the existence the result of the case.
of Cadastral Case No. 10 was an admitted fact which could not be questioned in a motion for new Petitioners also emphasize that respondents failed to meet the burden of proving that the
trial; and (c) there was no newly discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial. 24 newly discovered pieces of evidence presented comply with the requisites to justify the holding of a
The CA did not agree with petitioners. Hence, on January 31, 2007, it granted respondents' new trial. They contend that respondents could have discovered and presented in court the
motion for new trial, thus: certifications during trial had they exercised reasonable diligence. HScCEa
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants-appellants having Petitioners' arguments are untenable.
satisfied all the elements necessary to justify the filing of a Motion for New Trial The issue of whether the RTC judgment is a final judgment is indeed crucial. If the judgment
which appears to be meritorious and in the higher interest of substantial justice, the were not final, it would be an improper subject of an appeal. Hence, no appeal would have been
said motion is GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, let a new trial of the Quieting of Title case perfected before the CA, and the latter would not have acquired jurisdiction over the entire case,
be held and let said case be REMANDED to the Court a quo for said purpose. including the motion for new trial. But more importantly, only a final judgment or order, as opposed to
SO ORDERED. 25 an interlocutory order, may be the subject of a motion for new trial.
At the outset, the CA noted that the RTC summary judgment was a proper subject of an A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
appeal because it was a final adjudication on the merits of the case, having completely disposed of all court to do in respect thereto, such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
the issues except as to the amount of damages. The CA concluded that respondents properly availed evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
of a motion for new trial because such remedy could be availed of at any time after the appeal from are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground
the lower court had been perfected and before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case. According to of res judicata or prescription, for instance. 32 Just like any other judgment, a summary judgment
the CA, respondents were able to show that they obtained the new evidence only after the trial of the that satisfies the requirements of a final judgment will be considered as such.
case and after the summary judgment had been rendered. The CA also held that respondents never A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party,
admitted during the pre-trial the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10; they only admitted the there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of
existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989 in Cadastral Case No. 10. fact are involved, except the amount of damages. 33 The RTC judgment in this case fully determined
On July 16, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 26 the rights and obligations of the parties relative to the case for quieting of title and left no other issue
Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following unresolved, except the amount of damages. Hence, it is a final judgment.
issues: In leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, the RTC did not remove its
A. summary judgment from the category of final judgments. In fact, under Section 3, 34 Rule 35 of
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may not be rendered on the amount of damages, although
QUESTIONED DECISION OF THE RTC IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL AND A such judgment may be rendered on the issue of the right to damages. 35
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 53 OF THE RULES OF COURT. In Jugador v. De Vera, 36 the Court distinguished between the determination of the amount
B. of damages and the issue of the right to damages itself in case of a summary judgment. The Court
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING elucidated on this point, thus:
TO RULE THAT A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION [A] summary judgment may be rendered except as to the amount of
ADMITTED FACTS. STHDAc damages. In other words, such judgment may be entered on the issue relating to the
C. existence of the right to damages. Chief Justice Moran pertinently observes that "if
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING there is any real issue as to the amount of damages, the c[o]urt, after rendering
TO RULE THAT NO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED TO WARRANT A summary judgment, may proceed to assess the amount recoverable." 37
NEW TRIAL. 27 It is therefore reasonable to distinguish the present case from GSIS v. Philippine Village
Petitioners posit that no appeal could be taken from the trial court's decision because it did Hotel, Inc. 38 In that case, the summary judgment specifically stated that "[t]rial on the issu[e] of
not completely dispose of all the issues in the case; it failed to settle the issue on damages. damages shall resume." Evidently, there remained an unresolved issue on the right to damages.
Petitioners categorize the decision as a partial summary judgment, which in Guevarra, et al. v. Hon. Here, the trial court, in stating that "except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is
Court of Appeals, et al., 28 reiterated in GSIS v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc., 29 the Court hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants," had, in effect, resolved all
pronounced as not a final and an appealable judgment, hence, interlocutory and clearly an improper issues, including the light to damages in favor of the plaintiffs (petitioners). What remained
subject of an appeal. Petitioners theorize then that the appeal could not have been perfected and the undetermined was only the amount of damages. DACIHc
CA could not have acquired jurisdiction over the case, including the motion for new trial. Accordingly, On the issue of whether respondents are proscribed from presenting evidence that would
they conclude that the motion for new trial should have been denied outright for being violative of disprove the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, we likewise sustain the CA.
Section 1, 30 Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the motion for new trial may be filed A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
after the appeal has been perfected. Petitioners argue that, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 35 of proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the matter or
the Rules of Court, trial should proceed instead to settle the issue on damages. Petitioners point out fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that the case cited by the CA in its Decision, Bell Carpets International Trading Corporation v. Court of that no such admission was made. 39
Appeals, 31 is not applicable to the case because, unlike in the present case, the trial court's ruling During the pre-trial, respondents categorically admitted the existence of the Order dated
completely disposed of all the issues in that case. June 30, 1989 only. The Court cannot extend such admission to the existence of Cadastral Case No.
In addition, petitioners insist that respondents already admitted the existence of Cadastral 10, considering the circumstances under which the admission was made. In construing an admission,
Case No. 10 by its admission of the existence of the Order dated June 30, 1989. They maintain that the court should consider the purpose for which the admission is used and the surrounding
respondents cannot admit the existence of an order and yet deny the existence of the proceedings circumstances and statements. 40 Respondents have constantly insisted that, in making the
from which the order emanates. Respondents' judicial admission that the court Order existed admission, they relied in good faith on the veracity of the Order which was presented by petitioners.
necessarily carried with it the admission that the cadastral proceedings where the Order was issued Moreover, they relied on the presumption that the Order has been issued by Judge Enrique T. Jocson
likewise existed. Petitioners aver that respondents are bound by their judicial admission and they in the regular performance of his duties. It would therefore be prejudicial and unfair to respondents if
cannot be allowed to present evidence to contradict the same. they would be prevented from proving that the Order is in fact spurious by showing that there was no
Petitioners next argue that the purported newly discovered pieces of evidence have no Cadastral Case No. 10 before the RTC, Branch 47, of Bacolod City.
probative value. Petitioners say that the certifications are self-serving and inconclusive opinions of Finally, we find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is warranted. New trial
court employees, who did not even indicate the period when they occupied their positions and state is a remedy that seeks to "temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice." Thus,
the Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities 33.Cotabato Timberland Co., Inc., v. C. Alcantara and Sons, Inc ., G.R. No. 145469, May 28, 2004, 430
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists SCRA 227, 233.
newly discovered evidence. 41 The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking, addressed to 34.Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days
the sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
shown. 42 depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and a matter of law.
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the 35.FLORENZ D. REGALADO, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, 368 (Eighth Revised Edition 2002).
alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the 36.94 Phil. 704 (1954).
exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered. 43 37.Id. at 710.
The only contentious element in the case is whether the evidence could have been 38.Supra note 29.
discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence. In Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, 44 the Court 39.Camitan v. Fidelity Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 163684, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 540, 549.
expounded on the due diligence requirement, thus: 40.Harmon v. Christy Lumber, Inc., 402 NW2D 690 (1987); see Moffett v. Arabian American Oil Co., Inc.,
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly 85 F. Supp. 174 (1949).
discovered evidence is whether the [proffered] evidence is in fact a "newly 41.Brig. Gen. Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, 493 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2005).
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence." The 42.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 157264,
question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 329, 340.
i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or 43.Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 204-205.
could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence 44.Id.
has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be 45.Id. at 206.
properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so ||| (Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, [June 1, 2011], 665 PHIL 297-312)
much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time
when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential
is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate
such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the
movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of
each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with
"reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the
concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith
component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in
gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good
faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in
good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
facts known to him. 45
As previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the Order dated
June 30, 1989 which petitioners presented in court. It was only practical for them to do so, if only to
expedite the proceedings. Given this circumstance, we hold that respondents exercised reasonable
diligence in obtaining the evidence. The certifications therefore qualify as newly discovered
evidence. CaSHAc
The question of whether the certifications presented by respondents have any probative
value is left to the judgment and discretion of the trial court which will be hearing the case anew.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Resolutions dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Francisco
P. Acosta, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-47, 61.
28.209 Phil. 241 (1983).
29.482 Phil. 47 (2004).
30.Section 1. Period for filing; ground. — At any time after the appeal from the lower court has been
perfected and before the Court of Appeals loses jurisdiction over the case, a party may file a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence and which is of
such character as would probably change the result. The motion shall be accompanied by
affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered
evidence.
31.G.R. No. 75315, May 7, 1990, 185 SCRA 35.
32.Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Philippine Tourism Authority , 395 Phil. 278, 293 (2000).
THIRD DIVISION The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
[G.R. No. 205472. January 25, 2016.] paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1) possession or
AMADO I. SARAUM,1 petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for
DECISION smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the
PERALTA, J p: body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law. 10 In this case, the prosecution has
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia, particularly aluminum
reverse the Decision 2 dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated December 19, 2012 of the tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and admitted in evidence.
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01199, which affirmed the judgment of conviction Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a
against petitioner Amado I. Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 57, warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 11 In
Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737. arrest in flagrante delicto,the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To
Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
2002.The accusatory portion of the Information reads: must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M.,in attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the arresting officer. 12
said accused, with deliberate intent, and without being authorized by law, did then Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum's statement that he was not committing a
and there have in his possession the following: crime at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him,
1 = One (1) lighter who was then holding a disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in
2 = One (1) rolled tissue paper his left hand, 13 while they were in the course of arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of hot
3 = One (1) aluminum tin foil pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza were
which are instruments and/or equipments (sic) fit or intended for smoking, incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory
consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of
body. the seized items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 witnesses have adequately explained the respective uses of the items to prove that they were indeed
In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded not guilty to the drug paraphernalia. 14 There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination and finding as
offense charged. 5 Trial ensued. Meantime, Saraum was released on bail. 6 to the presence or absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said
PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon testified for the prosecution while the defense items since possession itself is the punishable act.
presented no witness other than Saraum. The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects
According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3 relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful
Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible,
team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta. Ana, PO1 Roy the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraum's arrest was legal, the
Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Aniñon against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was designated as the poseur- search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the
buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having
the team as the perimeter security. PO1 Aniñon coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the
Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation. After preparing all the necessary documents, such as the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of
pre-operation report and submitting the same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject area. conviction.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection
house, which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter thereto when he did not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an
Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing
session. They recovered from Saraum's possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the
foil (tooter).PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
and made initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza).At the police station, PO3 Larrobis made before he enters his plea;otherwise the objection is deemed waived." 15 In this case, counsel
marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed, the for Saraum manifested its objection to the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking
subject items were turned over to the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor. illegal arrest and search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution. 16
By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. presented in court
on the date and time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his as the ones actually seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed
parents-in-law when he was held by men with firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata," procedure under Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the
both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted saving clause provided in Section 21 (a), Article II, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court. R.A. No. 9165;17 and (b) there was an unbroken link (not perfect link) in the chain of custody with
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision, 7 the dispositive portion of which states: respect to the confiscated items. 18
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable Although Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team must
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. 9165 and he is immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph them, non-compliance
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day to two therewith is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as long as the integrity and the
(2) years and to pay a fine of Php20,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
of insolvency. team. 19 While nowhere in the prosecution evidence show the "justifiable ground" which may excuse
The drug paraphernalias (sic) are ordered forfeited in favor of the the police operatives involved in the buy-bust operation from making the physical inventory and
government. taking a photograph of the drug paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized, such omission shall not
SO ORDERED. 8 render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him as inadmissible in evidence.
On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction; hence, this petition. Said "justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of the apparent failure of Saraum to
We deny. specifically challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the
Considering that Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness subject drug paraphernalia before the trial court. He cannot be allowed too late in the day to question
on the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts, such findings deserve great weight and are the police officers' alleged non-compliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal. 20
deemed conclusive and binding. 9 Besides, a review of the records reveals that the CA did not err in The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
affirming his conviction. CAIHTE confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are merit consideration, it has to be substantiated by strong, clear and convincing evidence, which
presented in court. 21 Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, Saraum failed to do for presenting no corroborative evidence. 32
implementing R.A. No. 9165, defines chain of custody as follows: Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusion of
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment and manner
to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for of testifying. 33 The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include by the CA as in this case. 34 In this case, the quantum of evidence necessary to prove Saraum's guilt
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized beyond reasonable doubt had been sufficiently met since the prosecution stood on its own strength
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of and did not rely on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution was able to overcome the
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. DETACa constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items should WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition is DENIED.The Decision dated September
be established, thus: 8, 2011 and Resolution dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of 01199, which sustained the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57,
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737, is AFFIRMED.
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent SO ORDERED.
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the Velasco, Jr.,Del Castillo, * Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from Footnotes
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' *Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it October 13, 2014.
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe 1.Rollo,pp. 73-74, 84.
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of 2.Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.,with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of Gabriel T. Ingles concurring, rollo,pp. 53-59.
the same. 23 3.Rollo,pp. 67-68.
While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is 4.Records, p. 1.
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. 24 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 5.Id. at 22.
21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's arrest illegal or the 6.Id. at 19.
items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. 25 7.Rollo,pp. 34-36.
. . . Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is 8.Id. at 35-36.
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or 9.See People v. Bontuyan,G.R. No. 206912, September 10, 2014, 735 SCRA 49, 59-60.
these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which 10.People v. Mariano,698 Phil. 772, 785 (2012),as cited in Avila v. People,G.R. No. 195934, November
forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted 27, 2013 (Third Division Resolution) and People v. Saulo,G.R. No. 201450, April 7, 2014
subject only to the evidentiary weight that will be accorded it by the courts. . . . (First Division Resolution).
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that 11.Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to warrant, arrest a person:
non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight — attempting to commit an offense;
evidentiary merit or probative value — to be given the evidence. The weight to be b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
each case. 26 committed it; and
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
seized items. 27 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised because it pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were first 12.Ambre v. People,692 Phil. 681, 694 (2012) and Zalameda v. People,614 Phil. 710, 729 (2009).
discovered until they were brought to the court for examination. Even though the prosecution failed 13.TSN, July 9, 2008, pp. 15-16.
to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia, this will not 14.Id. at 9; TSN, February 27, 2008, pp. 17-18, 20-23.
render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible. There is substantial 15.Zalameda v. People,supra note 12, at 729.
compliance by the police as to the required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated 16.TSN, July 9, 2008, p. 22.
items. The succession of events established by evidence and the overall handling of the seized items 17.The requirements are imposed by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
by specified individuals all show that the evidence seized were the same evidence subsequently whose pertinent portion reads as follows:
identified and testified to in open court. Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Certainly, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation are Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
generally accorded full faith and credit in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge
official duties and especially so in the absence of ill-motive that could be attributed to them. 28 The and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
defense failed to show any odious intent on the part of the police officers to impute such a serious precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person. 29 Saraum's mere denial laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification and declarations of the police officers. the following manner:
The defense of denial, frame-up or extortion, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30 As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. 31 To Justice (DOJ),and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
 xxx xxx xxx
To implement the requirements of Republic Act No. 9165, Section 21 (a), Article II of
the IRR relevantly states:
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ),and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items;
...(See People v. Bartolome,G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013, 690 SCRA 159, 175-176).
18.People v. Alivio, et al.,664 Phil. 565, 576-577 (2011).
19.People v. Campomanes, et al.,641 Phil. 610, 622 (2010).
20.Id. at 623.
21.People v. Alivio, et al., supra note 18, at 577-578.
22.576 Phil. 576 (2008).
23.Mallillin v. People, supra,at 587.
24.Ambre v. People, supra note 12, at 695.
25.Zalameda v. People, supra note 12, at 741.
26.Id. at 741-742.
27.Id. at 741; and Ambre v. People, supra note 12, at 695.
28.See People v. Posada, et al.,684 Phil. 20, 34 (2012).
29.See People v. Bontuyan, supra note 9, at 64.
30.People v. Mariano, supra note 10, at 785; Ambre v. People, supra note 12, at 697; People v.
Villahermosa,665 Phil. 399, 418 (2011);and Zalameda v. People, supra note 12, at 733.
31.Zalameda v. People, supra note 12, at 733.
32.Id.;People v. Mariano, supra note 10; People v. Villahermosa, supra note 30; and People v. Saulo,
supra note 10.
33.People v. Villahermosa, supra note 30, at 420; People v. Campomanes, et al.,supra;note 19, at
621; and People v. Canaya,G.R. No. 212173, February 25, 2015 (Third Division
Resolution).
34.People v. Villahermosa, supra note 30, at 420.
||| (Saraum v. People, G.R. No. 205472, [January 25, 2016], 779 PHIL 122-135)
 SECOND DIVISION when a fire broke out between 2:00 to [2:30] o'clock early morning of the said
[G.R. No. 218702. October 17, 2018.] date. He heard that the door on the terrace (second floor) was opened by
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO y someone and he thought that it was [either] his deceased Aunt Alice Mercado or
ANTICLA, accused-appellant. Evelyn Santos who usually collects the laundry hanging on the terrace very early
DECISION in the morning. Afterwards, he heard some noises and a commotion ensued that
CAGUIOA, J p: prompted him to rush upstairs where a fire had suddenly ignited and he saw a
Before this Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by the accused-appellant Patrick John man coming out from the terrace. He went down and summoned for help from two
Mercado y Anticla (Mercado) assailing the Decision 2 dated June 20, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (2) women. When he rushed back to render assistance, he saw Evelyn about to
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05604, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated February 24, 2012 of Regional jump from the terrace. Thus, he pulled her back while he continued shouting for
Trial Court of Malolos City, Third Judicial Region, Branch 78 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 3222-M-2007, help. A ladder was [then] provided by the neighbors. He then positioned himself at
finding Mercado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder. the ladder while he was assisting Evelyn in going down. Evelyn was boarded into a
The Facts van en route to a hospital. He did not leave the place and stayed in a nearby
An Information was filed against Mercado for the murders of his aunt Alicia Mercado- house while watching their house being engulfed by fire. While watching, a person
Lusuriaga (Alicia) and her live-in partner, Evelyn Santos (Evelyn), the accusatory portion of which approached and handcuffed him.
reads: On October 15, 2007, Dan Dacallos, a neighbor of Patrick John testified
"That on or about the 15th day of October, 2007, in the municipality of that, he was sleeping when he heard someone shouting "sunog." He checked and
Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this saw a smoke coming out from the house of Patrick John and also saw an
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a baseball bat and with unidentified bloodied man coming out. He then saw Patrick John throwing water on
intent to kill Alicia Mercado-Lusuriaga and Evelyn Santos, live-in partners, with the burning house while at the terrace. He did not report having seen the bloodied
evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and man to the authorities because of his minority and since his parents did not want
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit them with the said him to get involved. 8
baseball bat and pour gasoline into their bodies and light them thereby causing Mercado was arraigned on November 22, 2007, in which he pleaded "not guilty" to the
upon them third degree burns which directly caused their instantaneous death and crime charged. 9 Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
the burning of [the] victim's house. Ruling of the RTC
Contrary to law." 4 After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated February 24, 2012 the RTC convicted Mercado
The version of the prosecution, as summarized in its Appellee's Brief, 5 is as follows: of the crime of Double Murder. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads: cTDaEH
The victims, Evelyn Santos ("Evelyn") and Alicia Mercado ("Alicia"), are WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused
partners who lived together in a house located at Block 6 Lot 2, Belmont Parc Patrick John Mercado GUILTY of the crime of Double Murder penalized under the
Subdivision, Purok 4, Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Appellant was the nephew of provisions of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
Alicia. He was enrolled at the nearby STI College in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and used suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of each
to live in the same house. of the two victims: a. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for their death and b.
It appears that around 11:00 PM of October 14, 2007, appellant was P50,000.00 as moral damages and c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
already inside the house, having come home from school. Records show that In the service of his sentence accused who is a detention prisoner shall
around 2:00 AM of October 15, 2007, the house of Evelyn and Alicia was reported be credited with the entire period he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
to be on fire. While the house was burning, Evelyn and appellant were observed on SO ORDERED. 10
the terrace supposedly trying to find a way to escape the blaze. The RTC held that although the evidence of the prosecution relied heavily on what appears
Eventually, through the help of neighbors, Evelyn and appellant were to be hearsay evidence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were still admissible because
brought out of the burning house. Evelyn looked weak and unable to walk as she they were the dying declarations of Evelyn, and these were admissible under Section 37, Rule 130 of
was badly burnt. She also had blood oozing out of the right side of her the Rules of Court. The RTC added that assuming that the testimonies were inadmissible under
head. cDHAES the rule on dying declaration, the same would nevertheless be admissible as it was part of the res
Witnesses declared that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to safety, she gestae, allowed in evidence by virtue of Rule 130, Section 42 of the Rules of Court.
promptly accused and pointed to appellant as the person responsible for attacking The RTC further held that the crime committed was Double Murder, as the killing was
her and Alicia as well as for setting the house on fire. Specifically, Evelyn claimed attended by the qualifying circumstance of the use of fire. The RTC ruled that the crime committed
that appellant hit her and [Alicia] with a baseball [bat] then set them on fire. One was the complex crime of Double Murder — instead of two counts of Murder — and sentenced him
witness heard Evelyn say: "ilayo ninyo sa akin yang si Patrick [Mercado] dahil siya with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ang pumalo sa aking ulo at nagsunog ng bahay." Another witness stated hearing Aggrieved, Mercado appealed to the CA.
the following utterances from Evelyn: "Kuya, wag mo akong iwan papatayin ako Ruling of the CA
ng pamangkin ko," referring to appellant, and "ilayo nyo sa akin si In the assailed Decision dated June 20, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that
Patrick [Mercado] dahil yan ang papatay sa amin." Still, another witness claimed to Mercado was the perpetrator of the crime.
have heard Evelyn say: "Ilayo nyo sa akin yan bata na yan. Yan ang papatay sa The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling that the evidence of the prosecution were admissible
akin. Yan ang sumunog sa amin. Yan ang pumalo sa ulo namin." under the rule on dying declaration or, in any case, under the rule on res gestae. 11 Further, the CA
While on board the ambulance on the way to the hospital, Evelyn ruled that Mercado's defense of denial — anchored on the testimony of Dan Dacallos (Dacallos) that
repeated the name of appellant as the culprit who caused their injuries and burned there was a bloodied man who came out of the house while it was on fire — could not overcome the
the house. Thus, she uttered: "Te, si Patrick [Mercado] ang may gawa," "Si probative value of the dying declaration of Evelyn. 12
Patrick [Mercado] sinunog kami," and "Si Patrick ang pumalo sa akin. Si As Mercado put in issue the fact that the RTC did not consider in his favor the mitigating
Patrick [Mercado] ang sumunog sa amin, pati sa bahay." circumstance of voluntary surrender, the CA ruled that the RTC was correct in doing so. The CA
Despite medical attention, Evelyn succumbed to her injuries and died on ratiocinated that Mercado failed to show that there was a voluntary and conscious effort on his end to
November 2, 2007 at the UST Hospital. Based on the declarations of Evelyn, surrender. 13
appellant was charged for the killing of Evelyn and Alicia. 6 Mercado also questioned the RTC's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of use of fire
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized in the Appellant's Brief, 7 is in raising the offense to Murder. He argued that the same was not alleged in the Information, and that
as follows: only the circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation were
Patrick John Mercado, vehemently denied the charge against him. raised therein. To this, however, the CA held that the RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying
He averred that on October 15, 2007, he was inside his room at the first circumstance of the use of fire as it was sufficiently alleged in the Information. 14
floor reviewing for his quarterly final examination and preparing his school project
 Finally, Mercado questioned his conviction as the prosecution supposedly failed to prove his wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He averred that the prosecution's failure to present the baseball bat surrounding circumstances of such death.
he supposedly used, or prove the presence of gasoline used to set the fire, amounted to reasonable For a "dying declaration" to be admissible in court, the following requisites must concur:
doubt that necessitated his acquittal. As regards this issue, the CA held that the aforementioned (a) That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
pieces of evidence were unnecessary or immaterial to his conviction, as the dying declarations of the declarant's death;
Evelyn, as proved by the testimonies of the numerous prosecution witnesses, were more than (b) That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 15 consciousness of an impending death;
The CA, however, modified the penalty imposed on Mercado from a single count of reclusion (c) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
perpetua imposed by the RTC to two counts of reclusion perpetua for each of the murders he (d) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
committed. cSaATC parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. 19
Hence, the instant appeal. The Court, in People v. Umapas, 20 explained and expounded on how each of the four
Issue requisites is to be understood. Thus:
For resolution of this Court are the following issues submitted by Mercado: Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be
(1) Whether the CA erred in convicting Mercado despite the prosecution's failure to admissible, thus: First, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the
(2) Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's appreciation of the qualifying assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct
circumstance of use of fire; causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarant's injury
(3) Whether the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack,
voluntary surrender. 16 indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused;
The Court's Ruling or indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible. Second, at the time
The appeal is unmeritorious. The Court, however, modifies the penalty imposed on Mercado the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
to a single penalty of reclusion perpetua only. impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible,
First Issue: On whether the a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant.
prosecution proved Mercado's guilt It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of
beyond reasonable doubt fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the
In questioning his conviction, Mercado harps on his defense of denial, and the supposed approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test
weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. He argues that the testimony of Dacallos that there was is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death
a bloodied man who came out of the house as it was on fire should be believed over the testimonies as certainly impending. Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is
of the prosecution witnesses as to Evelyn's dying declarations. He likewise reiterates his plea that the that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he
prosecution's failure to present the baseball bat and to prove the presence of gasoline amounts to survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in the absence of
reasonable doubt that requires his acquittal. evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a
The arguments fail to convince. witness had he survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have
With regard to this issue, the Court quotes with approval the following disquisitions by the been competent. Fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for
CA: CHTAIc homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. 21
Accused-appellant desperately tried to anchor his defense on denial but The first and fourth requisites are undoubtedly present in this case. With regard to the third
failed to prove the same despite the presentation of an alleged eyewitness, Dan requisite, since there was no evidence presented to show that Evelyn could not have been competent
Emmanuel Dacallos. His testimony failed to overcome the credibility and probative to be a witness had she survived, the presumption that she would have been competent would be
value of the dying declarations and/or part of the res gestae of Evelyn Santos sustained in accordance with the foregoing rule discussed in Umapas. The Court holds, therefore, that
which were recounted by several witnesses. the third requisite is sufficiently met.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all With regard to the second requisite, the Court in Umapas considered the severity of the
defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of positive identification of the declarant's wounds to reasonably presume that she uttered her words under the belief that her own
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A denial, like other defenses, death was already imminent. The Court therein held that "[t]here is ample authority for the view that
remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is the declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be shown by the declarant's own statements
independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of her wounds, statements made in her
convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of presence, or by the opinion of her physician." 22 Dealing with a declarant that was similarly severely
the denial is negligible. burnt in a fire, the Court reasoned:
xxx xxx xxx x x x. While more than 12 hours has lapsed from the time of the incident
The failure of the prosecution to present the baseball bat allegedly used until her declaration, it must be noted that Gemma was in severe pain during the
and to prove the presence of the gasoline is of no moment. The evidence early hours of her admission. Dr. Tamayo even testified that when she saw
presented and the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were more Gemma in the hospital, she was restless, in pain and incoherent considering that
than sufficient to establish accused-appellant's guilt for the crime not only was she mauled, but 57% of her body was also burned. She also
charged. These testimonies specifically recounted the dying declarations/part of underwent operation and treatment, and was under medication during the said
the res gestae of Evelyn Santos which prove that accused-appellant hit the victims period. Given the circumstances Gemma was in, even if there was sufficient lapse
with a baseball bat before placing them and the house on fire. Furthermore, the of time, we could only conclude that at the time of her declaration, she feared that
failure to present the baseball bat actually did not, in any way affect[,] the her death was already imminent. While suffering in pain due to thermal
strength of the prosecution's evidence. 17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) burns, she could not have used said time to contrive her identification of
In this connection, both the RTC and CA correctly held that the evidence of the prosecution Umapas as her assailant. There was, thus, no opportunity for Gemma to
— as independently assessed — sufficiently established the guilt of Mercado. deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 23 (Emphasis and
As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence because underscoring supplied)
it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his In the present case, Evelyn made the declarations just as she was pulled out of the fire, with
impending death would make a careless and false accusation." 18 Accordingly, Section 37, Rule 130 blood coming out of her forehead, when she was having difficulty breathing, and with second and
of the Rules of Court provides: third degree burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her body. 24 Considering the
SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made foregoing facts — along with the principle enunciated in Umapas that the declarant's belief in the
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case
imminence of her death can be shown by the nature and severity of the declarant's wounds — then Mercado faults both the RTC and the CA for raising the crime to Murder by appreciating the
the Court is convinced that the second requisite for a dying declaration is sufficiently met. EATCcI qualifying circumstance of use of fire. He asserts that only the qualifying circumstances of treachery,
Without doubt, therefore, the dying declarations of Evelyn to numerous witnesses that it abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation were alleged in the Information. Thus, the
was Mercado who had attacked her and her partner and eventually set their house on fire are courts erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of fire.
admissible in evidence. The argument deserves scant consideration.
In any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying declarations, they The test of sufficiency of an Information is whether it enables a person of common
are nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are part of the res gestae. Section 42, Rule 130 understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
of the Rules of Court provides: properly. 32 The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the Information in
SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a order not to violate the accused's constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto of the accusation against him. 33 The Information is sufficient as long as the qualifying circumstance
with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of is recited in the Information, regardless of whether designated as aggravating or qualifying, or
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to whether written separately in another paragraph or lumped together with the general averments in a
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res single paragraph. 34 The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding
gestae. surprises during the trial. 35
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res With the foregoing legal principles in mind, it is necessary then to determine whether the
gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were Information in this case sufficiently informed the accused of the accusation against him. To recall, the
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the accusatory portion of the Information states:
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. 25 The Court, in the early case "That on or about the 15th day of October, 2007, in the municipality of
of People v. Nartea, 26 clarified when a statement may be deemed part of the res gestae: Sta. Maria, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a baseball bat and with
startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive intent to kill Alicia Mercado-Lusuriaga and Evelyn Santos, live-in partners, with
reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and
circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit them with the said
formulation of their content. Whether a declaration is a part of the res baseball bat and pour gasoline into their bodies and light them thereby
gestae depends upon whether the declaration was the facts talking through the causing upon them third degree burns which directly caused their
party or the party talking about the facts. (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, sec. 662, pp. instantaneous death and the burning of [the] victim's house.
553, 556.) While as a general rule the declaration sought to be proved as part of Contrary to law." 36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the res gestae must be contemporaneous with the event established as the A reading of the afore-quoted portion of the Information readily reveals that while the "use
principal act, no fixed time from the main occurrence can be arbitrarily set in order of fire" was not explicitly mentioned as a qualifying circumstance, the Information nevertheless
to determine what shall be part of the res gestae. The factual situation in each narrate with sufficiency that Mercado was being accused of "causing x x x third degree burns [against
instance will set its own pattern of time in this respect. (Id., sec. 669; see the victims] which directly caused their instantaneous death." It escapes the mind of the Court how
also Moran, Law of Evidence, revised and enlarged edition, pp. 295-296.) "The one could be accused of "causing x x x third degree burns" without necessarily saying that he or she
marked trend of decisions is to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the used fire in the process.
doctrine admitting declarations as part of the res gestae. Whether specific The RTC and the CA thus correctly held that the crime committed was Murder instead of
statements are admissible as part of the res gestae is a matter within the sound merely Homicide. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides: cEaSHC
discretion of the trial court, the determination of which is ordinarily conclusive ART. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." (20 Am. Jur., sec. 663, article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
p. 557.) 27 by reclusión perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the circumstances:
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 28 The test of 2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship,
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 29 means involving great waste and ruin.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part of 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
the res gestae. The fire — which caused severe injuries on her body, destroyed her house, and killed paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
her live-in partner — was undeniably a startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made cyclone, epidemic, or other public calamity.
immediately after she was rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from the pain caused by her 5. With evident premeditation.
injuries, thereby negating any possibility of her contriving or manufacturing a lie. The statements 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of
were also undoubtedly about the startling occurrence as Evelyn repeatedly claimed that Mercado was the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
the one who attacked her and Alicia, and thereafter set the house on fire. The statements were thus (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
certainly part of the res gestae. DHITCc The crime was therefore correctly qualified to Murder.
Bearing in mind that a dying declaration is considered as "evidence of the highest order," Third Issue: Appreciation of the
and that, in any event, the statements were part of the res gestae, as well as the principle that denial Mitigating Circumstance of
is an inherently weak defense, 30 the Court thus holds that the CA did not err in affirming Mercado's Voluntary Surrender
conviction, as his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is well to stress that the positive Mercado asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in not appreciating in his favor the
identification of the eyewitnesses carries more weight than an accused's defense of mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He argues that because he did not resist when he
denial. 31 Mercado must thus be held liable for the killing of Evelyn and Alicia. was arrested by the barangay tanod shortly after Evelyn was brought to the hospital, then the
Second Issue: Appreciation of the mitigating circumstance should have been appreciated in his favor.
Qualifying Circumstance of Use of Mercado's argument is misplaced. Relevant is the ruling of the Court in People v. Saul: 37
Fire
 x x x For voluntary surrender to mitigate the offense, the following persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple
elements must be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the murder and attempted murder. Also, in People v. Comadre, we held: SaCIDT
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code,
be voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary must be spontaneous, i.e., there must which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a
be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the
guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser
him. x x x 38 perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several
In the present case, Mercado did not actually surrender. Instead, he simply did not offer any criminal resolutions.
resistance when so arrested. The records of the case reveal that when Evelyn was transported to the The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may
hospital, Mercado stayed in a nearby house where he watched as their house was engulfed in quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet
flames. 39 While he was observing the fire, someone approached him and handcuffed him — to these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in
which act he did not resist. 40 In this connection, the Court quotes with approval the following law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a
ratiocination by the CA: "single criminal impulse" which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
Indeed, there was no spontaneity in the alleged surrender. It will be In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of
observed that accused-appellant had no conscious effort to surrender. In fact, had accused-appellant — burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the
accused-appellant not been arrested, he would not have surrendered himself to main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador,
the authorities. The mere fact that accused-appellant did not resist his arrest resulting in their deaths — resulted in the complex crime of double
cannot be equated with voluntary surrender. For, as the Supreme Court has ruled, murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed by means of fire.
to be voluntary, a surrender must be spontaneous and deliberate; that is, there Since the maximum penalty imposed for murder was death, when the case was
must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities. 41 CTIEac pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of death for the complex
Imposable Penalty on Mercado crime of double murder instead of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for
Although the Court affirms the conviction of Mercado, it nevertheless deems it proper to two counts of murder. In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346
modify the penalty to be imposed on him. The RTC convicted him of the complex crime of Double (otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Murder and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 42 The CA, on the other hand, Philippines"), we reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no
modified the penalty and reasoned as follows: eligibility for parole. 45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
We, however, find that the penalty imposed by the trial court is Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the CA thus incorrectly modified the penalty to
inaccurate with the offense committed by the accused-appellant. He was impose on Mercado two counts of reclusion perpetua because there were two victims. The Court must
convicted of the crime of Double Murder but the sanction, particularly the perforce modify the penalty once again to conform with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
imprisonment imposed by the trial court, is only for a single crime of murder. Mercado is thus liable only for a single count of reclusion perpetua for both of the deaths of Evelyn
Hence, We modify the penalty and sentence accused-appellant Patrick John and Alicia.
Mercado to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each Murder he Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta, 46 the damages awarded in the
committed. 43 questioned Decision are hereby modified to P100,000.00 each representing civil indemnity, moral
The ruling of the CA is erroneous. The correct penalty on Mercado was imposed by the RTC damages, and exemplary damages, in addition to P50,000.00 representing temperate damages for
as the crime committed is a complex crime, there being only a single criminal act that resulted in the each of the deaths of Evelyn and Alicia. cHECAS
commission of multiple crimes. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes Court DECLARES accused-appellant Patrick John Mercado y Anticla GUILTY of DOUBLE MURDER,
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the eligibility for
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, parole. 47 He is further ordered to pay each of the heirs of Evelyn Santos and Alicia Mercado-
the same to be applied in its maximum period. Lusuriaga the amounts of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as civil indemnity, One
In People v. Gaffud, Jr., 44 the accused therein burned the house of another person, thereby Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages, One Hundred Thousand Pesos
killing the latter and the latter's daughter. The Court therein held that the accused was guilty of the (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate
complex crime of Double Murder and ratiocinated as follows: damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well SO ORDERED.
as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, A.B. Reyes, Jr. and J.C Reyes, Jr., * JJ., concur.
imposed for the commission of a complex crime.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound Footnotes
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. *Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.
The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary 1.See Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2014; rollo, pp. 24-25.
means for committing the other. 2.Rollo, pp. 2-23. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De
The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in Leon and Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.
the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and 3.CA rollo, pp. 49-61. Penned by Judge Gregorio S. Sampaga.
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when 4.Rollo, p. 3.
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and 5.CA rollo, pp. 68-91.
distinct crimes. 6.Id. at 74-75.
In the landmark case People v. Guillen, the Court held that the single 7.Id. at 25-48.
act of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the death of another 8.Id. at 30.
person and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder and 9.Rollo, p. 3.
multiple attempted murders. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed 10.CA rollo, p. 61.
when a person is killed by means of explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the 11.Rollo, pp. 8-13.
penalty for the crime committed is death, the maximum penalty for murder, which 12.Id. at 13-14.
is the graver offense. 13.Id. at 14-16.
More recently, in People v. Carpo, et al., we held that the single act of 14.Id. at 16-18.
hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three 15.Id. at 20-21.
 16.Id. at 7-8.
17.Id. at 13-20.
18.People v. Maglian, 662 Phil. 338, 346 (2011).
19.People v. Elizaga, 249 Phil. 470, 474-475 (1988).
20.807 Phil. 975 (2017).
21.Id. at 985-986.
22.Id. at 987, citing People v. Salafranca, 682 Phil. 470, 482 (2012), which, in turn, cited M. Graham,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 7074, Interim Edition, Vol. 30B, 2000, West Group,
St. Paul, Minnesota, citing Shepard v. United States, 290 US 96, 100; Mattox v. United States,
146 US 140, 151 (sense of impending death may be made to appear "from the nature
and extent of the wounds inflicted, being obviously such that he must have felt or
known that he could not survive."); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395-396 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Mobley, 491 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1970); emphasis supplied.
23.Id.
24.CA rollo, p. 58.
25.People v. Peña, 427 Phil. 129, 137 (2002).
26.74 Phil. 8 (1942).
27.Id. at 10.
28.People v. Salafranca, supra note 22, at 483-484.
29.Id. at 484.
30.People v. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581, 596 (2016).
31.Id.
32.People of the Philippines v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 497 (2002).
33.Id.
34.Id. at 488.
35.Id. at 497.
36.Rollo, p. 3.
37.423 Phil. 924 (2001).
38.Id. at 936.
39.Rollo, p. 15.
40.Id.
41.Id. at 15-16.
42.CA rollo, p. 61.
43.Rollo, p. 21.
44.587 Phil. 521 (2008).
45.Id. at 533-535.
46.783 Phil. 806 (2016).
47.Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason
of this act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
||| (People v. Mercado y Anticla, G.R. No. 218702, [October 17, 2018])
SECOND DIVISION COURT:
[G.R. No. 93980. June 27, 1994.] Witness may answer.
CLEMENTE CALDE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN 'A: Yes, sir.
and DOMYAAN APED, respondents. "For his part, Obanan Ticangan likewise admitted during cross-examination
DECISION in regard to the codicil that:
PUNO, J p: "Q: When you signed Exhibit 'D' and 'D-1', did you all sign with the same
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision, dated March 27, 1990, of the Court of ballpen?
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071, disallowing probate of the Last Will and Codicil executed by Calibia 'A: One.'
Lingdan Bulanglang, who died on March 20, 1976. "Such admissions from instrumental witnesses are indeed significant since
The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. they point to no other conclusion than that the documents were not signed by them
She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, in their presence but on different occasions since the same ballpen used by them
1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed by three (3) supposedly in succession could not have produced a different color from blue to
attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary black and from black to blue. In fact, the attestation clause followed the same
Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province. pattern. The absurd sequence was repeated when they signed the codicil, for which
Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of reason, We have no other alternative but to disallow the Last Will and Codicil. Verily,
Bontoc, Mt. Province, Br. 36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted if the witnesses and testatrix used the same ballpen, then their signatures would
by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petition filed by Calde, on the have been in only one color, not in various ones as shown in the documents.
following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that decedent did not know; Moreover, the signatures, in different colors as they are, appear to be of different
that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her advanced age, broadness, some being finer than the others, indicating that, contrary to what the
illness and deafness; that decedent's thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and testamentary witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only one ballpen was
that the codicil was not executed in accordance with law. cdrep used, and, therefore, showing that the documents were not signed by the testatrix
On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing and instrumental witnesses in the presence of one another. . . ." (Rollo, pp. 44-46.
decedent's will and its codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent Court of Citations omitted.) LexLib
Appeals. It held: Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the impugned Decision. His motion was denied
". . . (T)he will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of by the respondent court in its Order, dated May 24, 1990.
the New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink when Thus, this appeal by petitioner who now puts in issue the correctness of the respondent court's
the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When subjected to conclusion that both decedent's will and codicil were not subscribed by the witnesses in the presence of
cross-examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as follows: the testator and of one another, contrary to the requirements of Article 805 of the Civil Code.He contends
'Q: And all of you signed on the same table? that:
'A: Yes, sir. "1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
'Q: And when you were all signing this Exhibit 'B' and Exhibit 'B-1', Exhibit SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
'B' and 'B-1' which is the testament was passed around all of you DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY CONCLUDING BASED ON PURE SPECULATION
so that each of you will sign consecutively? OR SURMISES AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF JUDGE TOLETE WHICH
'A: Yes, sir. IS AN EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANCE THAT THE WILL AND THE CODICIL OF THE LATE
'Q: Who was the first to sign? CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG WERE SIGNED BY HER AND BY HER INSTRUMENTAL
'A: Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang. WITNESSES ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS;
'Q: After Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang was made to sign — I withdraw the "2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
question. How did Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang sign the last will SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
and testament? DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY DISREGARDING THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF
'A: She asked Judge Tolete the place where she will affix her thumbmark so THE ATTESTATION CLAUSES OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT AND THE CODICIL
Judge Tolete directed her hand or her thumb to her name. OF THE LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG."
'Q: After she signed, who was the second to sign allegedly all of you there The petition must fail.
present? The question in the case at bench is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence
'A: Jose Becyagen. submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both decedent's Last Will and Testament,
'Q: With what did Jose Becyagen sign the testament, Exhibit 'B' and 'B-1'? and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate occasions. As a general rule,
'A: Ballpen. factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on
'Q: And after Jose Becyagen signed his name with the ballpen, who was the appeal to this court. In the present instance, however, there is reason to make an exception to that rule,
next to sign? LLjur since the finding of the respondent court is contrary to that of the trial court, viz.:
'A: Me, sir. ". . . (Private respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of
'Q: And Jose Becyagen passed you the paper and the ballpen, Exhibit 'B' petitioner's witnesses are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that the
and 'B-1' plus the ballpen which used to sign so that you could latter's signatures on the documents in issue appear to have been written in ballpens
sign your name, is that correct? of different colors contrary to the statements of said witnesses that all of them
'A: Yes, sir. signed with only one ballpen. The implication is that the subscribing witnesses to the
'Q: And then after you signed, who was the next to sign the document, Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did not simultaneously sign each of the documents
Exhibit 'B' and 'B-1'? in one sitting but did it piecemeal — a violation of Art. 805 of the Code. This
'A: Hilario Coto-ong. conclusion of the (private respondents) is purely circumstantial. From this particular
'Q: So you passed also to Hilario Coto-ong the same Exhibit 'B' and 'B-1' set of facts, numerous inferences without limits can be drawn depending on which
and the ballpen so that he could sign his name as witness to the side of the fence one is on. For instance, considering the time interval that elapsed
document, is it not? between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of the petition for
'A: Yes, sir. probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the attesting witnesses may
'Q: And that is the truth and you swear that to be the truth before the have forgotten certain details that transpired when they attested the documents in
Honorable Court? question. . . ." (Rollo, pp. 36-37.) LLphil
ATTY. DALOG:
He already testified under oath, Your Honor.
 A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its ||| (Calde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93980, [June 27, 1994], 303 PHIL 389-397)
impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in question were
subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion.
As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in
decedent's will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This discrepancy was
not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two pens were used by the
signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioner's witnesses even testified that only one (1)
ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents.
It is accepted that there are three sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire knowledge
for making its decisions, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, and real evidence or
autoptic proference. Wigmore explains these sources as follows:
"If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused has lost his
right hand and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the subject
would be the testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in believing this
testimonial evidence, there is an inference from the human assertion to the fact
asserted. A second source of belief would be the mark left on some substance
grasped or carried by the accused; in believing this circumstantial evidence, there is
an inference from the circumstance to the thing producing it. A third source of belief
remains, namely, the inspection by the tribunal of the accused's arm. This source
differs from the other two in committing any step of conscious inference or
reasoning, and in proceeding by direct self-perception, or autopsy.
"It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not, after all,
a third source of inference, i.e., an inference from the impressions or perceptions of
the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing perceived. The law does not need
and does not attempt to consider theories of psychology as to the subjectivity of
knowledge or the mediateness of perception. It assumes the objectivity of external
nature; and, for the purposes of judicial investigation, a thing perceived by the
tribunal as existing does exist.
"There are indeed genuine cases of inference by the tribunal from things
perceived to other things unperceived — as, for example, from a person's size,
complexion, and features, to his age; these cases of a real use of inference can be
later more fully distinguished . . . . But we are here concerned with nothing more
than matters directly perceived — for example, that a person is of small height or is
of dark complexion; as to such matters, the perception by the tribunal that the
person is small or large, or that he has a dark or light complexion, is a mode of
acquiring belief which is independent of inference from either testimonial or
circumstantial evidence. It is the tribunal's self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing
itself.
"From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of belief,
it may be termed Autoptic Proference." 3 (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by
petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and white — or
more accurately, in black and blue — that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it
was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioner's claim that both
testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of
the Civil Code.
Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge
Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary documents
were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent's thumbmarking thereof, to the alleged signing of
the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Tolete's
testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored signatures on the testaments. LLpr
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of respondent Court
of Appeals, dated March 27, 1988, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071 disallowing the Last Will and Testament, and
the Codicil thereto, of the decedent Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ , concur.

Footnotes
1.Through its Second Division, composed of Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo (ponente and chairman),
Antonio M. Martinez, and Nicolas P. Lapeña.
2.Presided by Judge Artemio B. Marrero. The case was docketed as SPL. PROC. CASE NO. 295.
3.J.H. WIGMORE, A Treatise On The Anglo-American System of Evidence In Trials At Common Law, Vol.
4, Sec. 1150, pp. 237-8 (1940).
 THIRD DIVISION d. Coordination Letter for the Philippine National Police (PNP) Director, Southern
[G.R. No. 237209. April 10, 2019.] Police District.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MOHAMAD DAMPAK y 4. The buy-bust team, along with the CI, arrived in Alabang, Muntinlupa City at around 4:30
DISALO @ "Lando" and JAMIL DAMPAK y MIMBALAWAG @ p.m. of February 20, 2010. After some time, the CI received a cellphone call from
"Jamil", accused, CATHERINE ROMOROSA y OSTOY @ "Lyn", accused-appellant. Omar who told him to go to a house with a wooden fence in Grabador St., Purok 7-
DECISION C. The CI relayed this information to the buy bust team. Once the team was able
PERALTA, J p: to locate the house described by Omar, SI Fernandez and the CI approached the
At bench is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated September 25, 2017 of the Court of same. The other operatives, on the other hand, positioned themselves within the
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08319, affirming the conviction of herein appellant Catherine O. house's vicinity. 10
Romorosa for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, punished under Section 5, 3 Article II of Republic Act 5. Inside the house, SI Fernandez and the CI were met by a woman who introduced herself
(R.A.) No. 9165. as "Lyn." Also inside such house were two (2) male individuals. After some
The antecedents. conversation, Lyn handed two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing white
On February 20, 2010, the appellant, along with a certain Mohamad D. crystalline substance to SI Fernandez. SI Fernandez, in turn, and in the presence of
Dampak (Mohamad) and one Jamil M. Dampak (Jamil), were arrested in Muntinlupa City during a buy- the two male individuals, gave Lyn the marked money. At this point, SI Fernandez
bust operation conducted by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The arrests led to did the pre-arranged signal of ringing the phone of his commander, Supervising
the filing of five (5) criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, to wit: Agent Gregorio S. Zuñiga. In seconds, the other members of the buy-bust team
1. Criminal Case No. 10-111 — which charged Mohamad with possession of 1.0937 grams of rushed inside the house and declared a buy-bust operation. 11
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, in violation of 6. The buy bust team arrested Lyn, who was later identified as the appellant. The team,
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165; likewise, arrested and effected body searches on the two male individuals who
2. Criminal Case No. 10-112 — which charged Jamil with possession of 1.1095 grams were inside the house with the appellant. The two male individuals were identified
of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165; as Mohamad and Jamil, and they were found to be each in possession of one (1)
3. Criminal Case No. 10-113 — which charged Jamil with the sale of 1.0646 and 0.9822 transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. 12
grams of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165; 7. All arrestees were informed of their constitutional rights and then brought to the NBI
4. Criminal Case No. 10-114 — which charged Mohamad with the sale of 1.0646 and 0.9822 office in Manila. In transit, SI Fernandez took custody of the two plastic sachets
grams of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165; CAIHTE seized from the appellant, 13 while those from Mohamad and Jamil were returned
5. Criminal Case No. 10-115 — which charged the appellant with the sale of 1.0646 and to their respective pockets to avoid confusion. 14
0.9822 grams of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The 8. Upon arrival at the NBI Office, SI Fernandez marked the two sachets purchased from the
accusatory portion of the Information filed against appellant reads: appellant with "COR-1a CID-NBI 2-20-2010" and "COR-1b CID-NBI 2-20-2010." The
That on or about February 20, 2010, in Muntinlupa City, Metro sachet taken from Mohamad was marked "MDD CID-NBI 2-20-2010," while that
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, seized from Jamil with "JMD CID-NBI 2-20-2010." 15 SI Fernandez explained that
[Romorosa] without having been authorized by law, did then and there, since a crowd started to gather in the scene of the buy-bust operation, the buy-
knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give bust team promptly left lest they be exposed to danger. Consequently, the
away to another and distribute 1.0646 grams and 0.9822 gram quantity markings, inventory and taking of the pictures were done at the NBI
of white crystalline substance of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a Office. 16 aDSIHc
dangerous drug. 9. Thereafter, SI Fernandez forwarded the marked sachets to SI Regalario who prepared an
The above cases were consolidated before Branch 203 of the Muntinlupa City RTC. 4 inventory of the seized items. At the same time, photographs of the appellant,
During arraignment, the appellant, Mohamad and Jamil all pleaded not guilty to the Mohamad and Jamil with the respective sachets retrieved from each were also
respective charges against them. Pre-trial followed and was terminated on May 26, 2011. Trial taken. Present during the execution of the inventory and taking of photographs
thereafter ensued. were the appellant, Mohamad, Jamil, SI Fernandez and a media representative.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Special Investigator Rolan Fernandez (SI SI Fernandez clarified that, prior to the inventory and photograph-taking of the
Fernandez) and Senior Forensic Chemist Edwin C. Purificando (SFC Purificando) of the NBI. SI seized items, the NBI also contacted barangay officials as well as the Department
Fernandez was the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation that resulted in the arrest of the appellant, of Justice (DOJ) for them to send representatives to witness such inventory and
Mohamad and Jamil. SFC Purificando, on the other hand, was the chemist who tested the sachets of photograph taking. 17 However, none came. 18 Hence, in view of the time limit
white crystalline substance confiscated during such operation and who confirmed them positive for inquest proceedings, he and SI Regalario were constrained to commence with
for shabu. the inventory and picture-taking without the presence of an elected official or a
Taken together, the testimonies of SI Fernandez and SFC Purificando tell the following story: representative from the DOJ.
1. On February 2, 2010, SI Fernandez received information from a confidential 10. The confiscated plastic sachets were then submitted by SI Regalario to SFC Purificando
informant (CI) that a certain "Omar Macabuat" (Omar) is engaged in illegal drug for laboratory examination. The examination revealed the contents of the plastic
operations. Acting on such information, SI Fernandez requested Atty. Ruel sachets to be positive for shabu, a dangerous drug. Meanwhile, the appellant also
Lasala (Atty. Lasala) — the NBI Deputy Director for Intelligence Services and Anti- underwent ultra-violet light examination, and yellow fluorescent smudges had
Illegal Drugs Task Force Commander — for an authority to investigate. Atty. Lasala been found in both of her hands.
granted such request. 5 11. SFC Purificando then took custody of the confiscated plastic sachets and kept them in
2. On February 19, 2010, the same CI returned to the NBI Office and told SI Fernandez that his steel cabinet, until the time he was summoned to produce the same in court.
he (the CI) was able to arrange a shabu deal worth P12,000.00 with Omar that is After the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence and rested its case, Mohamad and
due for delivery in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. 6 The NBI decided to form a team of Jamil filed, without leave of court, a Demurrer to the prosecution's evidence. 19
operatives, 7 headed by SI Fernandez, to conduct a buy-bust operation. DETACa On September 1, 2014, the RTC issued an Order granting Mohamad and Jamil's demurrer
3. Prior to the buy-bust operation, SI Fernandez marked two P100 and six P50 bills by with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 10-113 and 10-114 for illegal sale of shabu, but denying the same
writing "RSF" on the said bills. He also photocopied the bills and had them dusted with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 10-111 and 10-112 for illegal possession of shabu. 20 Since they
by the NBI Forensic Chemist Division. 8 SI Fernandez then prepared the following filed their demurrer without leave of court, however, Mohamad and Jamil were deemed to have
documents: 9 waived their right to present their evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 10-111 and 10-
a. Authority to Operate, 112. 21 Consequently, trial continued only as regards Criminal Case No. 10-115 — the case for illegal
b. Pre-operation Report, sale of shabu against the appellant. ATICcS
c. Coordination Form with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and
 The appellant testified on her behalf. In substance, the appellant denied being caught, in We find no error on the part of the RTC and the CA in upholding the prosecution's version of
flagrante, of selling shabu and claimed that she was merely a victim of a police frame-up. She events. SI Fernandez's account of how the shabu deal was forged did not suffer from any
professed the following version of events: 22 inconsistency.
1. On the date and time of the supposed buy-bust, she was in Alabang to visit a friend. On The details of how the shabu deal with Omar came about was revealed by SI Fernandez in
her way to such friend, however, she noticed a commotion in an alley prompting his testimony. Therein, SI Fernandez stated, quite clearly, that it was the CI who originally contacted
her to stand by a nearby store. Omar and arranged for the purchase of shabu, to wit:
2. An unknown man then approached her. The former mentioned to her the name of three PROS. ROMAQUIN, JR.:
Muslim men and asked her if she knew any of them. She replied in the negative. Q So after your Authority to Investigate or after you have been granted Authority to
3. The unknown man then dragged her into a parked white car, which is boarded by four Investigate, what did you do?
other men. She was brought to the NBI office where she was detained inside a A So, on February 19, 2010, sir, again, the same [CI] came to our office and
room. informed me that he was able to transact a drug deal with alias
4. The next day, or on February 21, 2010, she woke up seeing two men — which turned out Omar for the purchase of methamphetamine hydrochloride worth
to be Mohamad and Jamil — inside the room with her. An NBI agent, later twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00) and it will be delivered at
identified to be SI Fernandez, came inside the room and showed to her a plastic Alabang, Muntinlupa City. 29
sachet with white crystalline substance. SI Fernandez then instructed her to point SI Fernandez's narration further discloses that it was only after such arrangement has been
at the sachet and the former took pictures of her. made and then relayed to him that the NBI decided to organize the buy-bust operation which would
5. On February 22, 2010, a certain "Atty. Rosemarie" informed her that she is being eventually result in the arrest of the appellant. AIDSTE
criminally charged unless she pays SI Fernandez the sum of P500,000.00. Contrary to the appellant's claim, the foregoing narration is not inconsistent with the Joint
On March 14, 2016, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision 23 in Criminal Case Nos. 10-111, 10- Affidavit of Arrest 30 co-executed by SI Fernandez. True, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest contained a
112 and 10-115. Therein, the trial court found both Mohamad and Jamil guilty of illegal possession statement that SI Fernandez "close[d] the deal" for the purchase of shabu — but a closer look at
of shabu, and also found the appellant guilty of illegal sale of shabu. In arriving at such findings, the the context in which such statement is made would show that there is really no inconsistency
RTC gave full faith and credence to the version of the prosecution as established by the testimonies between it and the testimony of SI Fernandez, thus:
of SI Fernandez and SFC Purificando. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision accordingly reads: 7. The undersigned positioned themselves strategically around the target area. SI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds: FERNANDEZ, who acted as poseur-buyer was accompanied by an asset
(a) accused Catherine Romorosa y Ostoy @ "Lyn" GUILTY beyond inside the house located at Grabador St., Purok 7-C, Alabang, Muntinlupa
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal City. After a brief transaction, SI FERNANDEZ was able to close a
Case No. 10-115, and hereby sentences her to life imprisonment and a fine of deal for the purchase of shabu for Php12,000.00 from a female
P500,000.00; and subject, who was later identified as [the appellant], a known
(b) accused Mohamad Dampak y Disalo @ Lando and Jamil Dampak y affiliate of [Omar]. 31
Mimbalawag @ "Jamil" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Section 11, Article II As can be seen, the affidavit referenced to SI Fernandez as being able to "close a deal" for
of R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal Case Nos. 10-111 and 10-112, and hereby sentences the purchase of shabu during the conduct of the buy-bust operation itself. This implies that the
them to imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years affidavit's use of the phrase "close a deal" was not to connote that it was SI Fernandez who contacted
and a fine of P300,000.00 each. Omar and made prior arrangements for the sale of shabu in Alabang. Rather, the phrase was used in
xxx xxx xxx the sense that it was only SI Fernandez who was able to consummate the sale of shabu which had
SO ORDERED. 24 been pre-arranged by the CI. This is practically what SI Fernandez was trying to explain when he was
The appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. confronted with this apparent inconsistency during his cross-examination: SDAaTC
On September 25, 2017, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the ATTY. MOLDEZ:
appellant in toto. Hence, this appeal. TIADCc Q In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest that you have read, it was you who close[d] the
In this appeal, the appellant claims that the RTC and the CA erred in giving full faith and deal, am I correct?
credence to the version of the prosecution. She particularly questions the credibility of SI Fernandez, A Yes, ma'am.
whom she says gave an inconsistent account as to how the alleged deal for the purchase Q And in your direct examination that I've read, it was the [CI] who was able to
of shabu was actually brokered. The appellant points out that in SI Fernandez's testimony, he close the deal, yes or no?
mentioned that it was the CI who was able to "transact a drug deal" worth P12,000.00 with A Prior to the operation . . .
Omar. 25 However, in the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 26 co-signed by SI Fernandez after the alleged buy- Q Just yes or no. Mr. Witness. Yes or no?
bust operation, it was categorically stated that it was SI Fernandez himself who was able to "close a A Pardon, ma'am.
deal" for the purchase of shabu worth P12,000.00. 27 Q If I may read again your Honor, please: "So after your Authority to Investigate or
The appellant believes that the above inconsistency is detrimental to the credibility of the after you have been granted Authority to Investigate, what did you do?"
prosecution story that the NBI really undertook a genuine buy-bust operation; it proving that SI Your answer was, "So on February 19, 2010, sir, again the same [CI] came
Fernandez cannot be relied upon as a credible witness. Consequently, she urges the Court to take a to our office and informed me that he was able to transact a drug deal with
second look at her version of events and to consider the same to be the truth of what happened in alias Omar for the purchase of methamphetamine hydrochloride worth
this case. P12,000.00 and it will be delivered at Alabang, Muntinlupa City." [S]o in this
At any rate, the appellant argues that her acquittal may still be justified in light of the particular answer of yours, it was the [CI] who was able to close a deal of
prosecution's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged against her. The appellant P12,000.00?
claims that the identity of the shabu that was presented by the prosecution in that regard is suspect xxx xxx xxx
for the same was never forwarded to the evidence custodian of the NBI. She highlights the fact that A Excuse me, I'm sorry ma'am, because the answer is to close a deal
such shabu, prior to its presentation in court, was only kept by SFC Purificando in his steel cabinet. meaning it's open. During the buy-bust operation, ma'am, hindi
The appellant argues that the failure of SFC Purificando to turn-over the shabu he examined naman lahat close yan e. Pag sinabi ng informant sa amin na
to the evidence custodian is a violation of the "standard procedure" of the NBI and, as such, renders nakapag-transact siya ibig sabihin ma'am, hindi pa close yan so
doubtful the very integrity of the shabu presented by the prosecution in court. 28 ibig sabihin kami pa rin ang mag-aano dyan, mag co-confirm sa
OUR RULING subject namin. 32
We dismiss the appeal. Verily, the claimed contradiction in SI Fernandez's account is more imagined than real.
The RTC and the CA did not err in With the credibility of SI Fernandez intact, the appellant is, thus, left with only her denial to
giving full faith and credence to the fend off the serious accusations against her. Such denial, by itself, however, cannot overcome the
version of the prosecution weight traditionally accorded to affirmative testimonies of law enforcement officers with unsullied
credibility. 33 We find that the RTC and the CA are, therefore, correct in giving full faith and credit to above, the submission of the seized illegal drug by the forensic chemist to the court was recognized
the open court narration of SI Fernandez and, ultimately, to the version of the prosecution. as the last link needed to complete an unbroken chain of custody over such drug:
Corpus delicti of the offense We applied this ruling in People v. Garcia, People v. Gum-Oyen, People v.
proven beyond reasonable doubt Denoman and People v. Coreche where we recognized the following links that
We also find that the corpus delicti of the offense charged against the appellant was must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the
adequately proven in this case. A. review of the evidence on record would reveal that the prosecution seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the shabu that it claims was sold by the by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
appellant. apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
In People v. Kamad, 34 We enumerated the essential links that must be proven by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
prosecution in order to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the drugs seized in a buy-bust examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
situation: acEHCD drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 47
x x x: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered The foregoing pronouncement in Kamad, in turn, went on to be reiterated in a number of
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal subsequent cases, including People v. Marcelino, Jr., 48 Ampatuan v. People, 49 People v.
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the Mendoza, 50 People v. Arriola, 51 People v. Almodiel, 52 People v. Llanita 53 and People v.
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for Langcua, 54 to name a few.
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked Third. Since neither law nor jurisprudence specifically condemns a direct submission of drug
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. 35 evidence by the forensic chemist to the court, We cannot ipso facto make the conclusion that
In the case at bench, it is apparent that the narrations of SI Fernandez and SFC Purificando, the shabu submitted by SFC Purificando is no longer reliable solely on the ground that he by-passed
as supplemented by the prosecution's other evidence, were able to cover all the essential links the evidence custodian of the NBI. This holds true even though such action by SFC Purificando may
identified in Kamad. We may recall: have constituted a deviation from a "standard practice" of the NBI. Again, there is simply no law or
1. After the buy-bust has been declared, it was testified that SI Fernandez took possession jurisprudence that renders a drug evidence inadmissible just because it was not forwarded to an
of the two plastic sachets sold to him by the appellant. 36 SI Fernandez explained "evidence custodian" and was instead submitted directly to the court by the forensic
that since a crowd started to gather in the scene of the buy-bust operation, chemist. AScHCD
however, the buy-bust team promptly left for the NBI Office lest they be exposed Fourth. The integrity of the illegal drug presented to the court, to Our mind, has less to do
to danger. 37 Consequently, the markings, inventory and photograph-taking with the title of the law enforcement officer that made the submission than it does with evidence of
required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were done at the NBI Office. how such officer, in truth, performed his duty as safekeeper of the drug in question. And, in this case,
At the NBI Office, SI Fernandez immediately marked the two sachets sold to him there is actual ample evidence to show that SFC Purificando had taken proper precautions to ensure
by the appellant with "COR-1a CID-NBI 2-20-2010" and "COR-1b CID-NBI 2-20- that the shabu it examined was protected from any possibility of contamination or substitution while
2010." 38 in his custody. The testimony of SFC Purificando, in this regard, is compelling:
2. SI Fernandez forwarded the marked sachets to SI Regalario, who prepared the DIRECT EXAMINATION [OF SFC PURIFICANDO] BY PROS. ROMAQUIN, JR.:
inventory. 39 Photographs were also taken of the appellant with the marked xxx xxx xxx
sachets. 40 Present during the execution of the inventory and taking of Q So aside from the fact that you acted as the Forensic Chemist, you were the one
photographs were the appellant, SI Fernandez and a media representative. who also acted as the Evidence Custodian?
SI Fernandez clarified that, prior to the conduct of inventory and photograph- A Yes.
taking, the NBI also contacted barangay officials as well as the DOJ for them to xxx xxx xxx
send representatives to witness such inventory and photograph- Q So after you conducted the examination, where did you place the substance?
taking. 41 However, after some time waiting, none came. 42 Hence, in view of the A At the NBI office, we are being furnished our individual steel cabinet wherein we
time limit for inquest proceedings, he and SI Regalario were constrained to are only the one in-charge of the key and it's there that I placed the
commence with the inventory and photograph-taking without the presence of an evidence regarding this case.
elected official and a representative from the DOJ. 43 Q And can you please tell this Honorable Court the security features of that steel
3. The marked sachets were, thereafter, submitted by SI Regalario to SFC Purificando for cabinet?
laboratory examination. The examination revealed the contents of the marked A It is a steel cabinet like the one over there, the green-colored cabinet, (witness
sachets to be positive for shabu, a dangerous drug. 44 Meanwhile, the appellant pointing to the steel cabinet inside the Courtroom) inside my office.
also underwent ultra-violet light examination, and yellow fluorescent smudges had Q How about the lock?
been found in both of her hands. 45 A The lock is very doubled and the key is in my possession.
4. SFC Purificando then took custody of the marked sachets and their contents and kept Q So apart from you, is there any other person who has the key to that lock?
them in his steel cabinet, until the time he was summoned to produce the same in A No one else, sir.
court. 46 SDHTEC Q And where is this steel cabinet situated?
Contrary to appellant's assertion, the failure of SFC Purificando to turn-over the shabu he A Right inside my office, at the back of my office table, sir.
examined to an "evidence custodian," prior to submitting the same to the court, did not render Q So can you tell the Honorable Court or describe to the Honorable Court the safety
doubtful the integrity of the shabu so submitted. We find that such failure did not create a gap in the features of your office?
chain of custody of the shabu retrieved from the appellant: A It is a closed-room office, typical, with a lock.
First. The act of SFC Purificando in taking custody of the specimen he examined and Q And who has access to that room?
submitting the same to the court himself did not, strictly speaking, violate any mandatory provision of A Only members of my section and me.
law pertaining to the custody of illegal drugs seized in an entrapment operation. Indeed, Section 21 Q But with regard to that cabinet, who has access?
of R.A. No. 9165 — the leading law governing the custody and disposition of confiscated drugs and A I am the only one in-charge.
contrabands — actually prescribed no particular intermediary between the forensic chemist who Q Now at the time when you retrieved, by the way[,] can you please tell the
examined the specimens seized from the buy-bust operation and the court to whom such specimens Honorable Court who delivered the substance to the Honorable Court?
must be submitted. The provision also did not specifically prohibit the forensic chemist from acting as A I was the one last time, during the hearing of this Honorable Court last August 9,
the safekeeper of the specimens he examined pending their transmission to the court. 2011. AcICHD
Second. From the perspective of case law, on the other hand, it would seem that — for the Q Anyways, at the time when you retrieved the substance, can you please tell the
purpose of establishing the chain of custody over an illegal drug — a direct submission of such drug Honorable Court or describe to the Honorable Court the security seals and
from the forensic chemist to the court may be allowed. If we may remember, in the Kamad case cited markings that you placed?
 A The security seal has the same appearance when I turned over the same to the 31.Id. at 12. (Emphasis supplied).
Honorable Court. 32.TSN, June 18, 2018, pp. 24-25. (Emphasis supplied).
Q In short, the seals are all intact? 33.People v. Balaquit, 741 Phil. 343, 353 (2014).
A Yes, sir. 34.624 Phil. 289 (2010).
Q How about the markings? 35.Id. at 304, citing People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416 (2009); People v. Gum-Oyen, 603 Phil. 665
A All the evidence bears my markings. (2009); People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165 (2014); People v. Coreche, 612 Phil. 665 (2009).
Q So can you give the Honorable Court an assurance that the substance was never 36.TSN, February 7, 2012, p. 31.
changed, altered or adulterated while under your custody until the time 37.Id. at 35.
you turned over the same to the Honorable Court? 38.Id. at 25-26, 35.
A Yes, sir. 55 39.Id. at 32-34.
In view of the foregoing, We are satisfied that the corpus delicti of the offense charged 40.TSN, February 8, 2013, pp. 6-11
against the appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt. 41.TSN, June 18, 2013, pp. 39-40.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 42.Id. at 40.
September 25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08319 is hereby AFFIRMED. 43.Id. at 35.
SO ORDERED. 44.Records, p. 37. See also TSN, August 9, 2011, pp. 4-6.
Leonen, A.B. Reyes, Jr., Hernando and Carandang, * JJ., concur. 45.Records, p. 34.
46.TSN, September 30, 2011, pp. 4-11.
Footnotes 47.People v. Kamad, supra note 34, at 304. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied).
*Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018. 48.667 Phil. 495 (2011).
1.By way of a notice of appeal pursuant to Section 13 (c) of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. 49.667 Phil. 747 (2011).
2.Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez for the Fourteenth (14th) Division of the CA, with 50.672 Phil. 264 (2011).
Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Ramon A. Cruz concurring, rollo, pp. 2-23. 51.681 Phil. 578 (2012).
3.Known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 provides: 52.694 Phil. 449 (2012).
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of 53.696 Phil. 167 (2012).
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life 54.703 Phil. 115 (2013).
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to 55.TSN, September 30, 2011, pp. 5-7.
Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized ||| (People v. Romorosa y Ostoy, G.R. No. 237209, [April 10, 2019])
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
4.Records, pp. 48-49.
5.TSN, February 7, 2012, pp. 7-10.
6.Id. at 10.
7.Namely, Supervising Agent Gregorio Zuñiga, Jr., SI Alan Glen Acal, SI Don Emmanuel R. Regalario and
SI Jimmy De Leon. See Joint Affidavit of Arrest; records pp. 12-14.
8.TSN, February 7, 2012, pp. 10-14.
9.Id. at 14.
10.Id. at 20-21.
11.Id. at 21-22.
12.Aside from the appellant, Mohamad and Jamil, the buy-bust team also apprehended two fourteen-
year-old minors present within the compound during the operation. (Records, p. 13) One of
them was found to be in possession of two (2) white crystalline substance. (Id.) Later, upon
being interviewed by the buy-bust team, the two minors admitted to working as couriers or
spotters of Omar (TSN, February 7, 2012, p. 35).
13.TSN, February 7, 2012, p. 31.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 32.
16.Id. at 35.
17.TSN, June 18, 2013, pp. 39-40.
18.Id. at 40.
19.Rollo, p. 4.
20.Id.
21.Rules of Court, Rule 119, Sec. 23.
22.See TSN, February 25, 2015; TSN, August 26, 2015.
23.Penned by Presiding Judge Myra B. Quiambao; CA rollo, pp. 64-84.
24.Id. at 83.
25.TSN, February 7, 2012, p. 10.
26.Records, pp. 12-14.
27.Id. at 12.
28.CA rollo, p. 54.
29.TSN, February 7, 2012, p. 10. (Emphasis supplied).
30.Records, pp. 12-14.
|| Chief Accountant, Comptroller or any such officer, to bring before this Honorable
THIRD DIVISION Court for inspection and copying the following documents: TcCEDS
[G.R. No. 164805. April 30, 2008.] a) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all documents pertaining to,
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, NOW KNOWN AS METROPOLITAN BANK AND arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services
TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, Agreement of defendant GEC and Alliance Semiconductors;
JAIME M. HIDALGO AND ISRAEL MADUCDOC, respondents. b) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all books of account, financial
DECISION statements, receipts, checks, vouchers, invoices, ledgers and
NACHURA, J p: other financial/accounting records and documents pertaining to or
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision dated June 2, evidencing financial and money transactions arising from, in connection
2004 and the Resolution dated July 29, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73684. ADcEST with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement of defendant GEC and
The Facts Alliance Semiconductors; and
In May and June 1997, Gateway Electronics Corporation (Gateway) obtained from Solidbank c) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all documents from whatever
Corporation (Solidbank) four (4) foreign currency denominated loans to be used as working capital for source pertaining to the proceeds/payments received by GEC from Alliance
its manufacturing operations. 2 The loans were covered by promissory notes 3 (PNs) which provided Semiconductors. HCSAIa
an interest of eight and 75/100 percent (8.75%), but was allegedly increased to ten percent (10%) d) Documents, as used in this section, means all writings of any kind, including the
per annum, and a penalty of two percent (2%) per month based on the total amount due computed originals and all non-identical copies, whether different from the originals
from the date of default until full payment of the total amount due. 4 The particulars of the loans are: by reason of any notation made on such copies or otherwise, including
Promissor without limitation, correspondence, memoranda, notes diaries, statistics,
y letters, telegrams, minutes, contracts, reports, studies, checks, statements,
Date of Amount of receipts, returns, summaries, pamphlets, books, inter-office and intra-office
Note No. Date Due
Loan Loan communications, notations of any sort of conversations, telephone calls,
meetings or other communications, bulletins, printed matter, computer
a 20 May 11 Nov. records, diskettes or print-outs, teletypes, telefax, e-mail, invoices,
PN 97-375 US$190,000.00
) 1997 1998 worksheets, all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes and amendments
b 29 May 11 Nov. of any of the foregoing, graphic or oral records or representations of any
PN 97-408 US$570,000.00
) 1997 1998 kind (including, without limitation, photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche,
c 09 June US$1,150,000. 04 June microfilm, videotapes, recordings, motion pictures, CD-ROM's), and any
PN 97-435
) 1997 00 1998 electronic, mechanical or electric records or representations (including,
d 15 June 15 June without limitation, tapes, cassettes, discs, recordings and computer or
PN 97-458 US$130,000.00
) 1997 1998 computer-related memories). aCSHDI
To secure the loans covered by PN 97-375 5 and PN 97-408, 6 Gateway assigned to 9. Furthermore, plaintiffs request that said Order to the Treasurer/Chief
Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement 7 dated June 25, 2000 with Alliance Financial Officer, Chief Accountant, Comptroller of defendant GEC include the
Semiconductor Corporation (Alliance). The following stipulations are common in both PNs: CSaHDT following instructions:
3. This Note or Loan shall be paid from the foreign exchange proceeds of a. If the response is that the documents are not in defendant GEC's or the officers'
Our/My Letter(s) of Credit, Purchase Order or Sales Contract described as follows: . possession or custody, said officer should describe in detail the efforts
. . Back-end Services Agreement dated 06-25-96 by and between Gateway made to locate said records or documents;
Electronics Corporation and Alliance Semiconductor Corporation. b. If the documents are not in defendant GEC's or the officer's possession and
4. We/I assign, transfer and convey to Solidbank all title and interest to control, said officer should identify who has control and the location of said
the proceeds of the foregoing Letter(s) of Credit to the extent necessary to satisfy documents or records;
all amounts and obligations due or which may arise under this Note or Loan, and c. If the request for production seeks a specific document or itemized category that
to any extension, renewal, or amendments of this Note or Loan. We/I agree that in is not in defendant GEC's or the officer's possession, control or custody, the
case the proceeds of the foregoing Letter(s) of Credit prove insufficient to pay officer should provide any documents he has that contain all or part of the
Our/My outstanding liabilities under this Note or Loan, We/I shall continue to be information contained in the requested document or category;
liable for the deficiency. SEIDAC d. If the officer cannot furnish the originals of the documents requested, he should
5. We/I irrevocably undertake to course the foreign exchange proceeds explain in detail the reasons therefore; and
of the Letter(s) of Credit directly with Solidbank. Our/My failure to comply with the e. The officer should identify the source within or outside GEC of each of the
above would render Us or Me in default of the loan or credit facility without need documents he produces. 13
of demand. 8 On January 30, 2001, the trial court issued an Order 14 granting the motion for production
Gateway failed to comply with its loan obligations. By January 31, 2000, Gateway's and inspection of documents, viz.:
outstanding debt amounted to US$1,975,835.58. Solidbank's numerous demands to pay were not WHEREFORE, the defendant GEC is hereby ordered to bring all the
heeded by Gateway. Thus, on February 21, 2000, Solidbank filed a Complaint 9 for collection of sum records and documents, not privileged, arising from, in connection with and/or
of money against Gateway. involving the Back-end Services Agreement between defendant GEC and Alliance
On June 16, 2002, Solidbank filed an Amended Complaint 10 to implead the Semiconductor Corporation, particularly to those pertaining to all payments made
officers/stockholders of Gateway, namely, Nand K. Prasad, Andrew S. Delos Reyes, Israel F. by Alliance Semiconductor Corporation to GEC pursuant to said Agreement,
Maducdoc, Jaime M. Hidalgo and Alejandro S. Calderon — who signed in their personal capacity a incorporating the instructions enumerated in par. 9 of the instant motion, for
Continuing Guaranty 11 to become sureties for any and all existing indebtedness of Gateway to inspection and copying by the plaintiff, the same to be made before the Officer-In-
Solidbank. On June 20, 2002, the trial court admitted the amended complaint and impleaded the Charge, Office of the Branch Clerk of Court on February 27, 2001 at 9:00 a.m.
additional defendants. TCaEIc SO ORDERED. 15
Earlier, on October 11, 2000, Solidbank filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Gateway filed a motion to reset the production and inspection of documents to March 29,
Documents 12 on the basis of an information received from Mr. David Eichler, Chief Financial Officer 2001 in order to give them enough time to gather and collate the documents in their possession. The
of Alliance, that Gateway has already received from Alliance the proceeds/payment of the Back-end trial court granted the motion. 16
Services Agreement. The pertinent portions of the motion read: On April 30, 2001, Solidbank filed a motion for issuance of a show cause order for Gateway's
8. Therefore, plaintiffs request that this Honorable Court issue failure to comply with the January 30, 2001 Order of the trial court. 17 In response, Gateway filed a
an Order requiring defendant GEC, through its Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer, manifestation that they appeared before the trial court on March 29, 2001 to present the documents
in their possession, however, Solidbank's counsel failed to appear on the said date. 18 In the SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. — Upon motion of
manifestation, Gateway also expressed their willingness to make available for inspection at any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
Gateway's offices any requested document. 19 may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
On May 31, 2001, the trial court issued an Order setting the production and inspection of photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
documents on June 7, 2001 in the premises of Gateway. 20 It was subsequently moved to July 24, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
2001. On the said date, Gateway presented the invoices representing the billings sent by Gateway to privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in
Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement. 21 the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any
Solidbank was not satisfied with the documents produced by Gateway. Thus, on December party or permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or
13, 2001, Solidbank filed a motion to cite Gateway and its responsible officers in contempt for their control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
refusal to produce the documents subject of the January 30, 2001 Order. In opposition thereto, property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall
Gateway claimed that they had complied with the January 30, 2001 Order and that the billings sent to specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies
Alliance are the only documents that they have pertaining to the Back-end Services Agreement. 22 and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
On April 15, 2002, the trial court issued an Order 23 denying the motion to cite Gateway for The aforecited rule provides the mechanics for the production of documents and the
contempt. However, the trial court chastised Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to produce the inspection of things during the pendency of a case. It also deals with the inspection of sources of
documents evidencing the payments received by Gateway from Alliance in relation to the Back-end evidence other than documents, such as land or other property in the possession or control of the
Services Agreement, viz.: other party. 30 This remedial measure is intended to assist in the administration of justice by
Before this Court is a Motion to Cite Defendant GEC In Contempt For facilitating and expediting the preparation of cases for trial and guarding against undesirable surprise
Refusing To Produce Documents Pursuant to the Order Dated 30 January and delay; and it is designed to simplify procedure and obtain admissions of facts and evidence,
2001 filed by plaintiff dated December 12, 2001, together with defendant GEC's thereby shortening costly and time-consuming trials. It is based on ancient principles of equity. More
Opposition thereto dated January 14, 2002, as well as plaintiff's Reply dated specifically, the purpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigant to discover material information
February 6, 2002 and GEC's Rejoinder dated February 27, 2002. TcIHDa which, by reason of an opponent's control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial scrutiny, and to
As Courts are cautioned to utilize the power to punish for contempt on provide a convenient and summary method of obtaining material and competent documentary
the preservative and not on the vindictive, contempt being drastic and evidence in the custody or under the control of an adversary. It is a further extension of the concept
extraordinary in nature (Wicker vs. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444; Paredes-Garcia vs. of pretrial. 31
CA, 261 SCRA 693), this Court is inclined to DENY the present motion. The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. 32 Rule 27 of the
However, as no diligent effort was shown to have been exerted by Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents,
defendant GEC to produce the documents enumerated in the Order dated January papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party
30, 2001, this Court hereby orders, in accordance with Sec. 3(a), Rule 29 of the ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in the action. 33 The
Rules of Court, that the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought lament against a fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying
to be produced but which were not otherwise produced by GEC, shall be taken to his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
be established in accordance with plaintiff's claim, but only for the purpose of this proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in
action. his possession. 34 However, fishing for evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without
SO ORDERED. 24 IEHDAT limitations. In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the requisites in
Gateway filed a partial motion for reconsideration of the April 15, 2002 Order. However, the order that a party may compel the other party to produce or allow the inspection of documents or
same was denied in an Order 25 dated August 27, 2002. things, viz.:
On November 5, 2002, Gateway filed a petition for certiorari 26 before the Court of Appeals (a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or
(CA) seeking to nullify the Orders of the trial court dated April 15, 2002 and August 27, 2002. things, showing good cause therefor;
On June 2, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision 27 nullifying the Orders of the trial court dated (b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;
April 15, 2002 and August 27, 2002. The CA ruled that both the Motion for Production of Documents (c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
and the January 30, 2001 Order of the trial court failed to comply with the provisions of Section 1, photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to be
Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion produced and inspected;
in ruling that the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be produced but which (d) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;
were not produced by Gateway shall be deemed established in accordance with Solidbank's claim. (e) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
The fallo of the Decision reads: involved in the action, and
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the (f) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or control of the other
assailed portion of the Order dated April 15, 2002 and Order dated August 27, party. 35
2002, both issued by public respondent, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET In the case at bench, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end Services
ASIDE without prejudice to the filing by private respondent of a new Motion for Agreement with Alliance in PN Nos. 97-375 and 97-408. By virtue of the assignment, Gateway was
Production and Inspection of Documents in accordance with the requirements of obligated to remit to Solidbank all payments received from Alliance under the agreement. In this
the Rules. CIDcHA regard, Solidbank claims that they have received information from the Chief Financial Officer of
SO ORDERED. 28 Alliance that Gateway had already received payments under the agreement. In order to ascertain the
Solidbank filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the CA. On July 29, 2004, the veracity of the information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under Rule 27. The purpose
CA rendered a Resolution 29 denying the same. Thus, this petition. of Solidbank's motion is to compel Gateway to produce the documents evidencing payments received
The Issues from Alliance in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement.
I. Whether Solidbank's motion for production and inspection of documents and the Order of the trial Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the documents. It had also
court dated January 30, 2001 failed to comply with Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court; and shown that the said documents are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the
II. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the matters subject of action. However, Solidbank's motion was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its
the documents sought to be produced but which were not produced by Gateway shall be deemed failure to specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Solidbank's motion
established in accordance with Solidbank's claim. DEAaIS for production and inspection of documents called for a blanket inspection. Solidbank's request for
The Ruling of the Court inspection of "all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end
We resolve to deny the petition. Services Agreement" 36 was simply too broad and too generalized in scope.
I A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides: of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents
designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify 26.RULES OF COURT, Rule 65.
the documents he is required to produce. 37 27.Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the proceeds of the Back-end Magdangal M. De Leon concurring; rollo, pp. 6-26.
Services Agreement were already received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the instant case. 28.Rollo, p. 26.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish 29.Id. at 28.
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. 38 Throughout the trial, the burden 30.Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 8th ed., p. 650.
of proof remains with the party upon whom it is imposed, 39 until he shall have discharged the same. 31.27 C.J.S. Discovery Section 71 (2008).
II 32.Rosseau v. Langley, 7 F.R.D. 170 (1945).
The trial court held that as a consequence of Gateway's failure to exert diligent effort in 33.Supra note 30.
producing the documents subject of the Order dated January 30, 2001, in accordance with Section 3 34.Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135874, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA
(a), Rule 29 40 of the Rules of Court, the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to 330. EHCDSI
be produced but which were not produced by Gateway, shall be considered as having been 35.Id.
established in accordance with Solidbank's claim. 36.Supra note 12.
We hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforesaid 37.In Archer v. Cornillaud [41 F.Supp. 435 (1941)], an action was filed to recover wages allegedly due
Order. It is not fair to penalize Gateway for not complying with the request of Solidbank for the from employer under Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, plaintiff's motion to require defendant
production and inspection of documents, considering that the documents sought were not particularly to produce and to permit plaintiff to inspect, copy and photograph all records, papers, books,
described. Gateway and its officers can only be held liable for unjust refusal to comply with the etc., pertaining to nature and extent of defendant's business and his wholesale and retail
modes of discovery if it is shown that the documents sought to be produced were specifically transactions and interstate and intrastate transactions, and names and addresses of those
described, material to the action and in the possession, custody or control of Gateway. with whom the transactions were had was too broad. The plaintiff's motion does not ask for
Neither can it be said that Gateway did not exert effort in complying with the order for designated documents but demands "all records, papers, books," etc. The motion goes far
production and inspection of documents since it presented the invoices representing the billings sent beyond the scope and purpose of the rule on discovery. It is well settled by numerous
by Gateway to Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement. Good faith effort to produce decisions that the rule was never intended to permit a party to engage in a "fishing
the required documents must be accorded to Gateway, absent a finding that it acted willfully, in bad expedition" among the books and papers of the adverse party.
faith or was at fault in failing to produce the documents sought to be produced. 41 In Dickie v. Austin [4 N.Y.Civ.Proc.R. 123, 65 How. Pr. 420 (1883)], plaintiff claimed that he
One final note. The CA decision nullifying the orders of the trial court was without prejudice was to receive one-third of the gross profits on certain sales made by him for the defendants;
to the filing by herein petitioner of a new motion for Production and Inspection of Documents in that settlements were had from time to time on statements furnished by the defendants, and
accordance with the Rules. It would have been in the best interest of the parties, and it would have defendants unlawfully deducted from the plaintiffs share of the profits "certain sums",
saved valuable time and effort, if the petitioner simply heeded the advice of the CA. amounting in the aggregate to $2,000, for which action was brought; that plaintiff was "unable
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of to name specifically all the books which would be necessary", and desired an inspection of any
merit. CIaDTE books which defendants might have relating to the transactions in which plaintiff was
SO ORDERED. interested. Held that, the discovery sought being unusually broad and sweeping, and not such
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur. as courts are in the habit of granting in aid of common-law actions for the recovery of a
specific sum of money, the application should be refused. DHSEcI
Footnotes 38.RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 1.
1.RULES OF COURT, RULE 45. cAaETS 39.Bautista v. Sarmiento, No. L-45137, September 23, 1985.
2.Rollo, pp. 117-136. 40.SEC. 3. Other consequences. — If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to
3.Id. at 208-211. obey an order made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated
4.Id. at 9. questions, or an order under Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection
5.Id. at 208. copying or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other
6.Id. at 209. property, or an order made under Rule 28 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental
7.The Back-end Services Agreement is a business venture entered into by Gateway and Alliance examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among
wherein Gateway for consideration, agreed to perform services on integrated circuit devices others the following:
owned by Alliance. It contains provisions on wafer sort, burn-in, test, engineering, marking, (a) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked, or the character or
assembly, packaging and associated services on integrated circuit devices; rollo, pp. 212- description of the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or the physical or mental
227. DcCHTa condition of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
8.Rollo, pp. 208-209. purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
9.Id. at 200-206. (b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
10.Id. at 117-136. defenses or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents or things or
11.Id. at 312-313. items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or mental condition;
12.Id. at 127-132. (c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the
13.Id. order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
14.Penned by Judge Renato G. Quilala of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57; rollo, p. judgment by default against the disobedient party; and
133. cDAITS (d) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order directing the arrest of
15.Id. any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a
16.Id. at 16. physical or mental examination.
17.Id. 41.GOOD-FAITH EFFORT
18.Id. at 1317. "We do not, however, completely rest our holding on this factor of 'control.' We find instead
19.Id. at 16. that the primary dispositive issue is whether Stripling made a good faith effort to obtain the
20.Id. at 17. documents over which he may have indicated he had 'control' in whatever sense, and whether
21.Id. at 17; 1318. after making such a good faith effort he was unable to obtain and thus produce them. . . .
22.Id. at 17. There is no evidence Stripling acted willfully, in bad faith or was at fault in failing to produce
23.Id. at 114. the documents which he attempted and was unable to obtain. Since Stripling's noncompliance
24.Id. at 114. with the production order was due to his inability, after a good faith effort, to obtain these
25.Id. at 116. documents, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his counterclaim." Federal
 Practice and Procedure, 8A FPF Section 2210, citing Searock v. Stripling, C.A. 11th, 1984, 736
F.2d 650, 654. caSEAH
||| (Solidbank v. Gateway Electronics Corp., G.R. No. 164805, [April 30, 2008], 576 PHIL 250-265)
|| 5. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. — The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had
EN BANC carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. As shown in the
[G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003.] previous discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y doubt. The same is true with respect to the second element. ESDcIA
GUINTO, accused-appellant. 6. ID.; ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; MINORITY OF VICTIM; MAY BE APPRECIATED AS AN
The Solicitor General for accused-appellant. ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OR AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE. — The victim's age is relevant in
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
SYNOPSIS as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides: Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape
Ronnie Rullepa was accused of sexually assaulting 3-year old Cyra May Buenafe on is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: . . .
November 17, 1995. During the trial, Cyra May narrated at the witness stand how the accused 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age . . . . . . The crime of rape shall be punished
committed the dastardly act. Her testimony was corroborated by the findings of the examining by reclusion perpetua . . . . Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circumstance,
physician that there were abrasions on the labia minora, which he opined could have been caused by warranting the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article states: The death penalty shall
friction with an erect penis. Accused, however, denied having anything to do with the abrasions found also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
in the victim's genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, Cyra May was already 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
suffering from pain urinating. He surmised that she could have scratched herself which caused the parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law
abrasions. Finding for the prosecution, the trial court subsequently rendered judgment convicting the spouse of the parent of the victim. . . . . 4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7)
accused and accordingly sentenced him to death. years old. . . .
Hence, this automatic review. 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDELINES. — Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions
In affirming the guilt of the appellant, the Supreme Court found the plain, matter-of-fact regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victim's age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently
manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of the appellant an eloquent testament decided case of People v. Pruna, established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of
to the truth of her accusations. It cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May's age could concoct a tale the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial. Thus, it accorded great weight to the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
assessment of the trial court regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness. The school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the
Court further ruled that the crime committed by appellant was not merely acts of lasciviousness but certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
statutory rape. The examining physician's finding of abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family
beneath the labia majora," proved that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
rubbing or "scrubbing" of the penis against its surface. Nonetheless, the Court reduced the penalty the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
to reclusion perpetua for failure of the prosecution to establish with moral certainty that the victim Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3
was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense. years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is
SYLLABUS alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; A VICTIM OF MINOR AGE WOULD old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
NOT CONCOCT A TALE OF DEFLORATION, ALLOW THE EXAMINATION OF HER PRIVATE PARTS, AND is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the,
UNDERGO THE EXPENSE, TROUBLE AND INCONVENIENCE, NOT TO MENTION THE TRAUMA OF PUBLIC testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
TRIAL. — Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is testimony will suffice provide that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the
accused, perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is true that "the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
ordinary child is a 'great weaver of romances,"' and her "imagination may induce (her) to relate to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court
something she has heard or read in a story as personal experience." But Cyra May's account is hardly should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
the stuff of romance or fairy tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all. This Court cannot believe that 8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; PROCESS BY WHICH TRIER OF FACTS
a victim of Cyra May's age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private JUDGES A PERSON'S AGE FROM HER APPEARANCE CANNOT BE CATEGORIZED AS JUDICIAL NOTICE. —
parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial. Judicial notice signifies that there are certain "facta probanda," or propositions in a party's case, as to
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in her which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without the
labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction with an erect penis. need of evidence. Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover some
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO MOTHER IN HER RIGHT MIND WOULD SUBJECT HER CHILD TO THE other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently
HUMILIATION, DISGRACE AND TRAUMA ATTENDANT TO A PROSECUTION FOR RAPE IF SHE WERE NOT referred to in terms of judicial notice. The process by which the trier of facts judges a person's age
MOTIVATED SOLELY BY THE DESIRE TO INCARCERATE THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHILD'S from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon
DEFILEMENT. — Accused-appellant's imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both
mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to to parties and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to
a prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person courts. As Tundag puts it, it "is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and
responsible for the child's defilement. Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would act on without proof because they already know them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the
stoop so low as to subject her daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape provisions governing judicial notice are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved." When the trier
prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings. of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial
3. CRIMINAL LAW; STATUTORY RAPE; INFLICTION OF FORCE IS IMMATERIAL. — That the notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
Medical-Legal Officer found "no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the
of the examination" does not preclude accused-appellant's conviction since the infliction of force is object of which is to do away with the presentation of evidence.
immaterial in statutory rape. 9. ID.; ID.; OBJECT EVIDENCE; PERSON'S APPEARANCE, WHERE RELEVANT, IS ADMISSIBLE AS
4. ID.; ID.; ABRASIONS IN THE LABIA MINORA PROVED THAT THERE WAS PENETRATION OF OBJECT EVIDENCE IN DETERMINING HER AGE. — This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned
THE VICTIM'S SEXUAL ORGAN; CASE AT BAR. — Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible
liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the testimony of Cyra May, as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court.
that he merely "scrubbed" his penis against her vagina: . . . Dr. Preyra, however, found abrasions in 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OUTWARD PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF AN ALLEGED MINOR MAY BE
the labia minora, which is "directly beneath the labia majora," proving that there was indeed CONSIDERED IN JUDGING HER AGE. — A person's appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of
penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or "scrubbing" of the penis against its surface. In infancy, or of being under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if
fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory so, the tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it. Experience teaches that corporal
rape. appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked
 extremes of old age and youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted and weighed for vagina and thereafter rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner portion
what it may be in each case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor of the vagina of the undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her
may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically will and without her consent. 1
over-cautious. Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. 2
age of persons in court by observation of such persons. The formal offer of the person as evidence is From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May, 3 her mother Gloria Francisco
not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the following
exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused. facts:
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDELINES. — There can be no question, therefore, as to the On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in
admissibility of a person's appearance in determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, "Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay
appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko."
hereunder: 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or "Kuya Ronnie" is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes' house boy, who was
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to which
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section she answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May
40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Gloria's husband Col.
years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that Buenafe, 4 she waited until their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on
she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought an errand and informed her husband about their daughter's plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. Under the above guideline, the testimony of a May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra
in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of May had told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m.
age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-
the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative's testimony. appellant several times.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE PROVED WITH EQUAL CERTAINTY AND CLEARNESS AS THE Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring
CRIME ITSELF. — As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against him, on account of
appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age — which he was detained. Gloria's sworn statement 5 was then taken. 6
becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victim's mere physical appearance is stand: "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga," thus causing her pain and
not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science
Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Cyra May, came up with her
and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim's age in the present report dated November 21, 1995, 7 containing the following findings and conclusions:
case spells the difference between life and death. cIECTH FINDINGS:
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE TRUE AGE OF THE VICTIM GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
EXISTS, APPEARANCE OF VICTIM, AS OBJECT EVIDENCE, CANNOT BE ACCORDED MUCH WEIGHT AND Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE MOTHER, BY ITSELF, INSUFFICIENT. — In the present case, the prosecution Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
did not offer the victim's certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence. The GENITAL:
victim and her mother, however, testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be with congested and abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the
proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim's age same is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact
from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the examining index finger.
rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, xxx xxx xxx
is present. Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, CONCLUSION:
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an Subject is in virgin state physically.
underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at
accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient. the time of examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
14. CRIMINAL LAW; STATUTORY RAPE; DEATH PENALTY; CANNOT BE IMPOSED WHERE By Dr. Preyra's explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by
PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH WITH MORAL CERTAINTY THAT THE VICTIM IS BELOW SEVEN friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the
YEARS OLD AT TIME OF COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. — As it has not been established with moral injuries. 8
certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, The defense's sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he
accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions found in
perpetua can be imposed upon him. Cyra May's genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to buy
15. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AWARD OF CIVIL INDEMNITY AND MORAL DAMAGES, PROPER IN medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer
CASE AT BAR. — In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is Gloria's queries if her husband Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the
increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral damages in the house, was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was behind
amount of P50,000.00. the filing of the complaint. Thus:
DECISION q According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?
CARPIO MORALES, J p: a That is not true, sir,
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto q If that is not true, what is the truth?
was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as a As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent
follows: to Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because she had difficulty in
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, urinating.
Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and q Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing her parity, kissing her lips and a No, I do not know, sir.
 q And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by the a When my mother was asleep, he put — he removed my panty and inserted his
mother of the victim? penis inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
a I did not do it, sir. xxx xxx xxx
q What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against you? q After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
a As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was a "Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak
going with her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband with a former po ako".
marriage. 9 q Did you cry because of hurt?
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the a Yes.
dispositive portion of which reads: q What part of your body hurt?
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE a "Pepe ko po." When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ,
RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sir. 13
sentenced to death. Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of details of her ordeal:
P40,000.00 as civil indemnity. q So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on
Costs to be paid by the accused. 10 (Italics in the original.) November 17, 1995?
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the trial a "Sinaksak nga yong titi nya". He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth,
court: sir.
I xxx xxx xxx
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE q When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ADMISSION. mouth, and into your anus, would you describe what — his penis?
II a It is a round object, sir.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S Court:
SILENCE DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT. Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
III a Opo.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT q Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. a No, sir.
IV q Which part of his body that titi located?
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH (Witness pointing to her groin area)
UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 11 (Italics supplied.) Court:
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of its Continue
decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May: xxx xxx xxx
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]'s q Why were you in that room?
complaint during the confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, a Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
the admission was even expressly qualified by Rullepa's insistence that he had q When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
committed the sexual assault only once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of a "Hinubo po niya ang panty ko."
November 17, 1995. That qualification proved that the admission was voluntary and q And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
true. An uncoerced and truthful admission like this should be absolutely admissible a He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
and competent. q Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing
xxx xxx xxx any clothing?
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial a Still had his clothing on, sir.
despite his freedom to deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive q So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
upon him. 12 (Italics supplied.) a Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were xxx xxx xxx
made out of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra May's parents "bullied and questioned him." He q So, that's the — and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help?
thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements during the a Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from
trial as an admission of guilt. sleep.
Accused-appellant's submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his admission q How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
merely as an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as a Matagal po.
the implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish q After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. a After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of q You did not complain and you did not shout?
her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus she testified on direct a I cried, sir. 14
examination: Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in the
q Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you? house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her testimony:
a Yes, sir. q Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house, he
q What did he do to you? [was] usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a "Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga" a Opo.
q How many times did he do that to you? q Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when your father left the house at that
a Twice, sir. time, on November 17?
xxx xxx xxx a He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q Do you remember when he did these things to you? q So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because
a Opo. your kuya Ronnie [was] always with your Papa?
q When was that? a Yes, sir. 15
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father Col. Buenafe left a Yes, Sir.
their house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and, thus, does not preclude accused- q And when — he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
appellant's commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a young child is vulnerable to a Yes, sir. 26
suggestion, hence, her affirmative response to the defense counsel's above-quoted leading questions. Dr. Preyra, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is "directly beneath the labia
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria majora," 27 proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or
having testified that she learned of it on November 20, 1995 16 while Cyra May said that immediately "scrubbing" of the penis against its surface.
after the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and reported it: 17 This is In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but
a minor matter that does not detract from Cyra May's categorical, material testimony that accused- statutory rape.
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the following woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age. 28 As shown in the previous
portion of her testimony: discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The
q "Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo," where did you get that phrase? same is true with respect to the second element.
a It was the word of my Mama, sir. 18 The victim's age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense.
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 29 provides:
of hearing her mother utter "sinira niya ang buhay mo." Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
Accused-appellant's suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
accused, perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is true that "the xxx xxx xxx.
ordinary child is a 'great weaver of romances,'" and her "imagination may induce (her) to relate 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age . . .
something she has heard or read in a story as personal experience." 19 But Cyra May's account is xxx xxx xxx.
hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May's age could concoct a tale of defloration, xxx xxx xxx.
allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to Furthermore, the victim's age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of
mention the trauma of public trial." 20 the death sentence. The same Article states:
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction with an erect with any of the following attendant circumstances:
penis. 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court regarding parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with
the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness: the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to xxx xxx xxx.
possess the necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with 4. when the victim is . . . a child below seven (7) years old.
the competence to testify about her experience. She might have been an xxx xxx xxx.
impressionable child — as all others of her age are — but her narration Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the
of Kuya Ronnie's placing his "titi" in her "pepe" was certainly one which could not be victim's age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna, 30 established
considered as a common child's tale. Her responses during the examination of a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to
counsel and of the Court established her consciousness of wit:
the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable for her to 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
describe a "bad" act of the accused unless it really happened to her. Needless to certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
state, she described the act of the accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness — 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
manifested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses to such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the
questions — further enhanced her claim to credit and trustworthiness. 21 (Italics in victim would suffice to prove age.
the original.) 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible,
incident Cyra May was already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
scratched herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out this who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
possibility. She stated categorically that that part of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
scratching it is painful. 22 The abrasions could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted. Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
That the Medical-Legal Officer found "no external signs of recent application of any form of a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
trauma at the time of the examination" does not preclude accused-appellant's conviction since the sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape. 23 b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
that accused-appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
possible that accused-appellant's penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina, sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
the former being more resistant to extreme forces than the latter. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
Accused-appellant's imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the
right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the by the accused.
child's defilement. 24 Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
subject her daughter to physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
assuage her own hurt feelings. 25 regarding age shall not be taken against him.
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the following testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that the victim.
he merely "scrubbed" his penis against her vagina: Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein
q Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your accused-appellant could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua since:
vagina?
 . . . no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a already know them." Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing judicial notice
baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. . . . . are found, is entitled "What Need Not Be Proved." When the trier of facts observes the appearance of
xxx xxx xxx. a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a
any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the
her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE's age. Her presentation of evidence.
mother, Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old at the time of the This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it
commission of the crime). does. A person's appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
xxx xxx xxx addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after SECTION 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those
the incident, that she was 5 years old. However, when the defense counsel asked her addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue,
how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
was 5 years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not "To be sure," one author writes, "this practice of inspection by the court of objects, things
answer. or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure." 39 The author
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the proceeds to quote from another authority:
supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was "Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries
below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed than the submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of
that the severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once objects which furnish evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a
carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to wound by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to
the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. be an infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE's exact age, corroborative evidence examination of writings, to determine, whether they are (`)blemished,(') the
such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document implements with which a crime was committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy
should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of "below proceeding, to be the child of another, are few illustrations of what may be found
seven (7) years old" is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven centuries
the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from past." 40 (Italics supplied.)
discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE's tender age for purposes A person's appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under the
of questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly
was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the observe the person brought before it. 41 Experience teaches that corporal appearances are
case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty approximately an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age
cannot be imposed on him. and youth. In every case such evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in
testimony of LIZETTE's mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-
commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for cautious. 42 Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the
statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph age of persons in court by observation of such persons. 43 The formal offer of the person as evidence
of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to
paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused. 44
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an alien's age from his appearance.
be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.) In Braca v. Collector of Customs, 45 this Court ruled that:
Several cases 31 suggest that courts may take "judicial notice" of the appearance of the The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance
victim in determining her age. For example, the Court, in People v. Tipay, 32 qualified the ruling of the immigrant what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission
in People v. Javier, 33 which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the board of special
victim's age, with the following pronouncement: inquiry to determine his right to enter; and such body may take into consideration
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of his appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the
birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender applicant is not a minor based upon such appearance is not without evidence to
age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take support it.
judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus,
where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance. In this in United States v. Agadas, 46 this Court held:
situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never
victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula the following
the imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited provision. (Italics January. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these questions: "You are a
supplied.) pretty big boy for seventeen." Answer: "I cannot tell exactly because I do not
On the other hand, a handful of cases 34 holds that courts, without the requisite hearing remember when I was born, but 17 years is my guess." Court: "If you are going to
prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, 35 cannot take judicial notice of the victim's take advantage of that excuse, you had better get some positive evidence to that
age. effect." Answer: "I do not remember, as I already stated on what date and in what
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain "facta probanda," or propositions in a party's year I was born." The court, in determining the question of the age of the defendant,
case, as to which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal Rosario Sabacahan, said:
without the need of evidence. 36 Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way "The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that
to cover some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are he was about 17 years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth
frequently referred to in terms of judicial notice. 37 18 or 19 years old. He has shown that he has no positive information on the
The process by which the trier of facts judges a person's age from his or her appearance subject and no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact that he is
cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and expediency for entitled to the mitigating circumstance of Article 9, paragraph 2, of
it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to require the Penal code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon the defense to
proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts. 38 As Tundag puts it, it "is the establish by satisfactory evidence in order to enable the court to give an
cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they accused person the benefit of the mitigating circumstance."
 In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
testified, when the case was tried in the court below, that he then was only 16 years A 3 and 1/2 years old.
of age. There was no other testimony in the record with reference to his age. But the Q When was she born?
trial judge said: "The accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age A In Manila, May 10, 1992. 49
as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20." This court, in passing upon the Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought
age of Estavillo, held: to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the
"We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with victim's age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of
reference to the age of Estavillo from the latter's personal appearance. statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of
There is no proof in the record, as we have said, which even tends to the offense, is present. DaHcAS
establish the assertion that this appellant understated his age. . . . It is true Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
that the trial court had an opportunity to note the personal appearance of reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an
Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so doing reached underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be
the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over 18. This accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
appellant testified that he was only 16, and this testimony stands As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years
uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked difference in the old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the
penalties to be imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
(resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the appellants' ages In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased
were 16 and 14 respectively." to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 P50,000.00. 50
years of age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the personal WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, is
appearance of Rosario, that "he is a youth 18 or 19 years old." Applying AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of
the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must conclude that there exists a Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to the question whether Rosario was, in is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant,
fact 18 years of age at the time the robbery was committed. This doubt must be Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six months damages.
of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor. . . . . SO ORDERED.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a person's appearance in Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-
determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder: IDSaTE Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., are on leave.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have
been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, Footnotes
of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity 1.Records at 1.
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or 2.Id. at 12.
date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on 3.Also appears in the records as Cyra "Mae."
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: 4.Col. Buenafe's first name is not indicated in the records.
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is 5.Exhibit "A."
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; 6.TSN, May 20, 1996 at 5-11.
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is 7.Exhibit "C".
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; 8.TSN, March 13, 1997 at 4-11.
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is 9.TSN, June 6, 1997 at 6-7.
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 10.Records at 104.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim 11.Rollo at 49-50.
is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such 12.Records at 103.
cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily 13.TSN, November 15, 1996 at 5-8.
determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance 14.TSN, January 7, 1997 at 7-10.
corroborates the relative's testimony. 15.Id. at 6.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person's appearance, as 16.TSN, May 20, 1996 at 6.
object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, 17.TSN, January 7, 1997 at 11-12.
following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. 18.Id. at 14.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victim's 19.SALONGA, J.R., PHILIPPINE LAW ON EVIDENCE (3rd ED.) 193.
mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme 20.People v. Baygar, 318 SCRA 358 (1999).
penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every 21.Records at 100.
fact necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of 22.TSN, March 13, 1997 at 10.
the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and 23.People v. Somodio, G.R. Nos. 134139-40, February 15, 2002.
clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim's age in 24.People v. Perez, 319 SCRA 622 (1999).
the present case spells the difference between life and death. 47 25.People v. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105 (1999).
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victim's certificate of live birth or 26.TSN, January 7, 1997 at 11.
similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she was 27.People v. Marcelo, supra, Note 25.
only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra May's testimony goes: 28.People v. Bato, 325 SCRA 671 (2000).
q Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct? 29.AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
a Yes, sir. PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR
q And you are 3 years old? OTHER PURPOSES.
a Yes, sir. 48 30.G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002.
That of her mother goes:
 31.Vide People v. Bali-balita, 340 SCRA 450 (2000); People v. Rivera, 362 SCRA 153 (2001); People v.
Abaño, G.R. No. 142728, January 23, 2002.
32.329 SCRA 52 (2000).
33.311 SCRA 122 (1999).
34.Vide People v. Tundag, 342 SCRA 704 (2000); People v. Liban, 345 SCRA 453 (2000); People v.
Lachica, G.R. No. 143677, May 9, 2002.
35.SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or an appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
36.9 WIGMORE, J. H., A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW (3rd ED.) §2565.
37.Id. at §2566.
38.5 MORAN M.V., COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT (1980 ED.) 38.
39.SALONGA, supra, NOTE 19, AT 89.
40.Ibid. citing THAYER, CASES ON EVIDENCE (2nd) 720.
41.4 WIGMORE AT §1154.
42.2 WIGMORE AT §222, cited in People v. Montalvo (482 P. 2d 205), Watson v. State (140 N.E.2d 109),
and State v. Fries (17 N.W.2d 578).
43.32 C.J.S. Evidence §609.
44.Ibid., cited in Watson v. State, supra, Note 42.
45.36 Phil. 930 (1917). Vide also Tan Beko vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 26 Phil. 254 (1913); Lim
Cheng vs. Collector of Customs, 42 Phil. 876 (1920).
46.36 Phil. 246 (1917).
47.People v. Quezada, G.R. No. 135551-58, January 30, 2002.
48.TSN, January 7, 1997 at 4.
49.TSN, May 20, 1996 at 11.
50.People v. Rafales, 323 SCRA 13 (2000).
||| (People v. Rullepa y Guinto, G.R. No. 131516, [March 5, 2003], 446 PHIL 745-774)
|| to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from
SECOND DIVISION them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on
[G.R. Nos. 108280-83. November 16, 1995.] the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and as he was already fallen. 3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of
JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan.
OF APPEALS, respondents. Patayin!" 5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused
[G.R. No. 114931-33. November 16, 1995.] Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANNIE accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison
FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE repeatedly boxed him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice
LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants. what he did. 7
M.M. Lazaro and Associates & Lazaro Law Firm for petitioners in 108280-83 and appellants Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his
in 114931-33. face. He sat on some cement steps 8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary
The Solicitor General for respondents in 108280-83 and for plaintiff-appellee in 114931-33. of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
DECISION process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He
PUNO, J p: cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until
1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic
C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between the to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions,
Salcedo, a known "Coryista." abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem findings:
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven "Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right
86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86- side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm.,
47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No. face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0. left
86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
as Annie Ferrer charging them in accomplices to the murder of Salcedo. Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All temporal region; occipital region, right side.
of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right
presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and anterior cranial fossa.
the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the Other visceral organs, congested.
incident and various photographs taken during the mauling. Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid." 10
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local
Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the
was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police district to investigate the incident. A reward of
Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for
impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. 11 Several persons, including
Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their
their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and investigated.
disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the
towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of
"Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to the photographs presented by the prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in
disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the Quezon City. 13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the
police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. 1 incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta
At about 4:00 P.M., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia
the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos
jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said that he
Ferrer angrily ordered them. "Gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the
around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a
Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According
was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti tayo ngayon!" A commotion to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting
color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. 2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo, the
being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t- maulers however ignored him. 21
shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to
and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced testify in their defense.
on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo
saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, murder qualified by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion
boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED
the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver as follows:
Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: 1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are hereby found GUILTY beyond
follows: reasonable doubt of Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
1. In 'People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery,' Criminal Case No. 86- of Reclusion Perpetua;
47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) 2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY
Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating
said charge; circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an indeterminate
2. In 'People versus Romeo Sison, et al.,' Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS
Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond of reclusion temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of 3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an
the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating or aggravating accomplice to the crime of Murder.
circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed in
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion the instant consolidated cases, the said cases are now hereby certified to the
Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS OF Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum; Honorable Supreme Court for review." 24
3. In 'People versus Richard de los Santos,' Criminal Case No. 86-47790, Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch
the Court finds the Accused Richard de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us
principal for the crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal for automatic review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants
Code and, there being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) Before this Court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
MONTHS and TWENTY(20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) "I
YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum; THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT NOTED
4. In 'People versus Joselito Tamayo,' Criminal Case No. 86-48538, the THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR
Court finds the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO
'Murder' defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on him IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS AND II
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum; CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE
5. In 'People versus Rolando Fernandez,' Criminal Case No. 86-48931, the TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO SUMILANG.
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime III
charged beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge; THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE
6. In 'People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.,' Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE
reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge; HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
7. In 'People versus Annie Ferrer,' Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court IV
finds the said Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
Murder under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) V
MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum. THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY." 25
Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and "I
the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A
the costs of suit. CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, AND NON-
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during the TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO
pendency of these cases shall be credited to them provided that they agreed in THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail. II
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D,"
Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless "G," "O," "P," "V," TO "V-48," "W" TO "W-13," ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY
they are being detained for another cause or charge. IDENTIFIED.
The petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot III
and academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING
Tamayo is denied for lack of merit. THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
are hereby cancelled." 22 IV
On Appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS
Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE
abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information INCIDENT." 26
against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two
reads: prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable,
doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other
are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 53
Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper
case as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting identification. 54 However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas,
the trial court to reprimand him several times. 28 counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of
General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. the victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri
On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused
his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At
reward. 29 He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who
assailants if he saw them again. 30 took the witness stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty.
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. 57
testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact
apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's death. 31 that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an
witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations
testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel
his testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 58
instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of
credence of witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in
witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison
witness' testimony. LLpr appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia, is shown merely running after the
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him victim. 60 Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two
an entirely untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire
mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison
persons with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and
believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others. 34 Banculo. 61 Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification. LexLibris
We sustain the appellate and trial court's findings that the witnesses' testimonies Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among
corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive the principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not
identification of all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by death in tumultuous affray.
the medical and documentary evidence on record. Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified "Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When, while several
that the victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
more than one hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
punches, kicks and blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot
result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who
object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37 inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact punished by prision mayor.
testified that Salcedo was pummelled by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38 If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
"D," "G," and "P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W- shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the
1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police victim."
intelligence operatives who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not
properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained
the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand. who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at injuries or who used violence can be identified. 62
the Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
Boulevard, 41 — as he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. 63
local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group
Daily Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but
appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took the same. this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him.
they were produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at
reproduction of the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the this stage of the incident. 64
scene at the time of the crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in
identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation number 65 and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their
of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free
or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away
and hit him mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time Salcedo
was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his 15.TSN of Oct. 3, 1988, pp. 33, 53.
attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find 16.Id., pp. 40, 47-48; Exhibit "2"; Records, p. 227.
means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they continued beating 17.TSN of November 9, 1988, p. 25.
him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he 18.Id., pp. 25-27.
finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless 19.TSN of November 14, 1988, pp. 5-7.
victim qualifies the killing to murder. 20.Id., pp. 7-8; Records, pp. 297, 299.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is 21.TSN of November 14, 1988, pp. 10-11.
no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' 22.Records, pp. 426-428; Decision, pp. 59-61.
safety from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and 23.CA-G.R. CR Nos. 10501-10502, 10130-10131.
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because 24.Rollo, G.R. Nos. 114931-33, pp. 654-655; Decision, Court of Appeals, pp. 48-49.
he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the 25.Rollo, G.R. Nos. 114931-33, pp. 15-16; Petition, pp. 5-6.
appellate court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run 26.Rollo, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, p. 207; Additional Brief for Appellants, p. 2.
away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the 27.TSN of April 13, 1988, pp. 32-33.
sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being 28.Rollo, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, pp. 44, 67, 77; Petition, pp. 34, 57, 67.
attacked. 66 29.Exhibit "I," Records, p. 258.
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against 30.TSN of March 7, 1988, pp. 50-51, 77-78.
Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against 31.Exhibits "L," "M," and "N"; Records, pp. 262-265.
Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called 32.TSN of December 1, 1987, p. 70; TSN of March 14, 1988, pp. 9, 29-30.
"Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection. dctai 33.TSN of April 13, 1988, pp. 32-33.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were 34.People v. Cañeja, 235 SCRA 328 [1994]; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 596 [1994]; People
committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted v. Dulay, 217 SCRA 103 [1993].
effort to bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to 35.TSN of February 13, 1987, pp. 55-56.
who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. 67 Each 36.Id., pp. 48-49.
of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their 37.Id., pp. 42-44.
participation, because the act of one is the act of all. 68 38.Exhibit "I"; Records, p. 258.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as 39.Rollo, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, pp. 220-221; Additional Brief for Appellants, pp. 15-16.
moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 40.TSN of April 20, 1988, pp. 4-15; Exhibit "O"; Records, pp. 276-278.
1986, Salcedo was twenty-three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in 41.Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-23"; Records, pp. 292-301.
Saudi Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his 42.Exhibit "V-25"; Records, p. 302.
widow and three small children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to 43.Exhibit "V-24," "V-26," and "V-28"; Records, pp. 302-304.
P100,000.00. The indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71 44.Exhibits "W" and "W-6"; Records, pp. 313 and 319;
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows: 45.Exhibit "W-2"; Records, pp. 314-315.
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los Santos are 46.Exhibit "W-1"; Records, p. 316.
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating 47.Exhibit "W-4"; Records, p. 317.
circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; 48.City of Manila v. Cabangis, 10 Phil. 151 [1908]; 4 Martin, Revised Rules on Evidence, 61 [1989].
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime 49.The Chamberlayne Trial Evidence, p. 617 cited in 4 Martin, supra; Tan v. Sun Insurance, 51 Phil. 212
of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a [1927].
consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as 50.1 Underhill, A Treatise on the Law on Criminal Evidence, 216-217 [1956].
minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum; 51.Underhill, supra; VII Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Part I, 107 [1973].
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of 52.Francisco, supra.
Stephen Salcedo the following amounts: 53.City of Manila v. Cabangis, supra; cf. Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978].
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages; 54.TSN of July 29, 1988, p. 33.
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and 55.TSN of September 26, 1988, pp. 2-3, 5-6.
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim. 56.Id., pp. 114-123; TSN of November 9, 1988, pp. 42-50.
4. Costs against accused-appellants. 57.TSN of November 9, 1988, p. 35.
SO ORDERED. 58.Id., pp. 38-50; TSN of November 14, 1988, pp. 6-10, 10-13.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur. 59.Exhibits "V-1," "V-2," "V-8," "V-9," "V-12," "V-13,""V-15" to "V-18."
Francisco, J., is on leave. LLjur 60.Exhibit "W-3"; Records, p. 314.
61.Exhibits "E" and "L," "K" and "F"; Records, pp. 254 and 262, 255 and 260; TSN of April 13, 1988, pp.
Footnotes 25-26; TSN of December 1, 1987, pp. 23-26.
1.TSN of April 20, 1988, pp. 7-10. 62.II Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 436 [1993].
2.TSN of April 13, 1988, pp. 22-23. 63.United States v. Tandoc, 40 Phil. 954, 957 [1920].
3.Exhibits "NN" and "SS"; Records, pp. 295, 296-A. 64.People v. Ribadajo, 142 SCRA 637 [1986].
4.Exhibit "LL;" Records, p. 298. 65.Exhibit "E," Records, p. 253.
5.Exhibits "OO" and "PP"; Records, pp. 296-A, 297. 66.People v. Abapo, 239 SCRA 469 [1994]; People v. Buela, 227 SCRA 534 [1993]; People v. Alcantara,
6.Exhibit "E"; Records, p. 254. 206 SCRA 662 [1992].
7.TSN of December 1, 1987, pp. 17-39. 67.People v. Galit, 230 SCRA 486 [1994]; People v. Pandiano, 232 SCRA 619 [1994].
8.Exhibit "QQ"; Records, p. 302. 68.People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 [1994]; People v. Cobre, 239 SCRA 159 [1994]; People v.
9.Exhibit "X-5"; Records, p. 329. Magalang, 217 SCRA 571 [1993].
10.Exhibit "B"; Records, p. 249. 69.TSN of June 25, 1987, pp. 12-15.
11.Exhibit "4"; Records, p. 319. 70.TSN of June 25, 1987, pp. 10-13.
12.TSN of September 26, 1988, pp. 5-6. 71.Civil Code, Article 2206; People v. Dasig, 221 SCRA 550 [1993].
13.Id., p. 15. ||| (Sison v. People, G.R. Nos. 108280-83 & 114931-33, [November 16, 1995], 320 PHIL 112-137)
14.Id., pp. 83, 90.
|| Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI)
SECOND DIVISION and was at that time the assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime
[G.R. No. 153699. August 22, 2005.] during the Marcos administration, petitioner Torralba sought TMSI's sponsorship of his radio program. This
CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE request was approved by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI.
PHILIPPINES, respondent. During the existence of said sponsorship agreement, the management of TMSI noticed that petitioner
Loreto M. Durano for petitioner. Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and
The Solicitor General for respondent. his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI was
DECISION behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI decided to cease sponsoring
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p: petitioner Torralba's radio show. In effect, the TMSI sponsored "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" for only a month at
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the the cost of P500.00.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with modification, the trial court's 2 decision Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim testified that
finding petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107. petitioner Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage law and that said corporation was
Culled from the records are the following facts: charging higher handling rates than what it was supposed to collect.
Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" which was On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in petitioner Torralba's
aired over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September 1994, an information for libel was filed radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said incident, however, petitioner Torralba
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information states: resumed his assault on TMSI and its management. It was petitioner Torralba's relentless badgering of TMSI
The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralba's radio broadcasts. Three of the tape
accuses CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as recordings were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit:
follows: Exhibit B tape recording of 19 January 1994 8
That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran, Exhibit C tape recording of 25 January 1994 9
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Exhibit D tape recording of 11 April 1994 10
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and that
malicious intent of maligning, impeaching and discrediting the honesty, integrity, he asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record petitioner Torralba's radio
reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and had
during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and a man of good reputation and social actually heard petitioner Torralba's radio program while it was being taped. This prompted petitioner
standing in the community and for the purpose of exposing him to public hatred, Torralba to pose a continuing objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper
contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his radio program "TUG-ANI AND authentication by the person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the subject tape recordings,
LUNGSOD" (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station DYFX, openly, publicly and Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court provisionally admitted the tape
repeatedly announce[d] the following: "KINING MGA HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO recordings subject to the presentation by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of
HONTANOSAS UG CASTOR HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA said pieces of evidence. Despite petitioner Torralba's objection to the formal offer of these pieces of
GUERRA. SA ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA YUTANG NATAWHAN." . . . . "DUNAY DUGO NGA evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the three tape recordings into evidence. 11
PAGKATRAYDOR ANG AMAHAN NI MANOLING HONTANOSAS," which in English It was revealed during Lim's cross-examination 12 that petitioner Torralba previously instituted a
means: "THESE HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR HONTANOSAS, criminal action for libel 13 against the former arising from an article published in the Sunday Post, a
ARE COLLABORATORS DURING THE WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE TRAITORS TO newspaper of general circulation in the provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found guilty as
THE LAND OF THEIR BIRTH." . . . . "THE FATHER OF MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD charged by the trial court 14 and this decision was subsequently affirmed, with modification, by the Court
TREACHEROUS BLOOD," and other words of similar import, thereby maliciously of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413 entitled, "People of the
exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L. Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing." 15 In our resolution of 04 December 1996, we denied
Hontanosas, 3 one of the legitimate children of [the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Lim's petition for review on certiorari. 16
Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the
latter to suffer social humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and mental chairman and manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape recording of
anguish, to the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas in the petitioner Torralba's radio program aired on 18 January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly
amount to be proved during the trial of the case. criticized him and stated that he was a person who could not be trusted; that in his radio show on 25
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised January 1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that "he was now [wary] to interview any one because he had
Penal Code in relation to Article 355 of the same Code. a sad experience with someone who betrayed him and this 'someone' was like his father who was a
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994. collaborator"; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording of petitioner Torralba's
(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES radio program of 11 April 1994 during which petitioner Torralba averred that the Hontanosas were traitors
City Prosecutor II to the land of their birth; that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were collaborators during
APPROVED: the Japanese occupation; and that after he informed his siblings regarding this, they asked him to institute
(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS a case against petitioner Torralba. 17
City Prosecutor 4 When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralba's counsel, private complainant Atty.
Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to the crime he was Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralba's radio broadcasts and he merely
charged with. 5 relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine. 18
On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City, where Crim. Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC, Branch 3,
Case No. 9107 was raffled off, a motion for consolidation 6 alleging therein that private complainant Atty. Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the tape recordings in 1994 upon the request of
Manuel Hontanosas (Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4) criminal cases for libel against petitioner private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.
Torralba, three of which — Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 — were then pending with the The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself. Petitioner Torralba
RTC, Branch III, Tagbilaran City. As the evidence for the prosecution as well as the defense were maintained that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and other civic
substantially the same, petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be consolidated with the three organizations in Cebu. In the course of his profession as a radio broadcaster, he allegedly received
other cases so as to save time, effort, and to facilitate the early disposition of these cases. HEaCcD complaints regarding the services of TMSI particularly with respect to the laborers' low pay and exorbitant
In its order dated 25 May 1998, 7 the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner Torralba was rates being charged for the arrastre services. As he was in favor of balanced programming, petitioner
granted by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City. Torralba requested TMSI to send a representative to his radio show in order to give the corporation an
During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as witnesses opportunity to address the issues leveled against it; thus, the radio interview of private complainant Atty.
Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento. Hontanosas on 17 December 1993.
 When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, 19 he ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] WHO ACTED
denied having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor during his 11 April 1994 radio broadcast. WITH UBERIMA FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE
Petitioner Torralba admitted, though, that during the 17 December 1993 appearance of private CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW CIVIL
complainant Atty. Hontanosas in his radio program, he did ask the latter if he was in any way related to CODE). 23
the late CFI Judge Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as mere This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the lower court's
backgrounder on his interviewee. admission in evidence of the 11 April 1994 tape recording. Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on
On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision 20 acquitting petitioner by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment.
Torralba in Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 but holding him guilty of the crime of libel in Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given considerable
Crim. Case No. 9107. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads: weight on the tape recording in question as it was not duly authenticated by Lim's adopted daughter,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from Shirly Lim. Without said authentication, petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is incompetent
criminal liability herein accused Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded and inadmissible evidence. We agree.
in Criminal Cases Nos. 8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of legitimate self- It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form 24 where a
defense, as afore-discussed. Consequently, the corresponding cash bonds of the proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. 25 In our jurisdiction, it is
accused in said cases as shown by OR No. 5301156, No. 5301157, and No. 5301158, a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative
all dated February 23, 2000, issued by the Clerk of Court of Multiple Salas in the value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:
amount of P4,200.00 each representing cash deposits therefore are hereby cancelled (1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
and released. (2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable (3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
doubt in Crim. Case No. 9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory of the (4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
late Hon. CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his radio program (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
resulting to the dishonor and wounded feelings of his children, grandchildren, (6) identification of the speakers; and
relatives, friends, and close associates. For this, the Court hereby sentences the (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of
accused to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of FOUR MONTHS of Arresto inducement. 26
Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision Correccional medium period pursuant to Art. 353 in In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards its
relation to Art. 354 and Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under which the instant operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the persons
case falls. Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings. 27 Likewise, a witness'
Y. Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS declaration that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies
(P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering their good reputation and high social the requirement of authentication. 28 The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording
standing in the community and the gravity of the dishonor and public humiliation bears the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate
caused. 21 reproduction of the conversation recorded. 29
Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which, in the These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering
challenged decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a quo, thus: of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the
the modification that accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment recording and for its protection against tampering. 30
of four (4) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the
(10) days of prision correccional and to pay moral damages in the amount of tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand
P100,000.00. 22 that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape recording 31 and that he had to instruct his
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following issues: adopted daughter to record petitioner Torralba's radio broadcasts, thus:
I ATTY. HONTANOSAS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS SPECIAL q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?
FIFTEENTH DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER a Yes, sir.
COURT A QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?
[TORRALBA] FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio program of
353 AND 355 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED Choy Torralba. 32
TESTIMONY OF SEGUNDO LIM . . . AS BORNE OUT BY THE STENOGRAPHIC NOTES Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralba's radio show on 11 April
WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS 1994, should have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper foundation for the
IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] IN admission of the purported tape recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107. no basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording — Exhibit "D" — in evidence.
II In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are constrained to examine
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN ERROR IN the records of this case in order to determine the sufficiency of evidence stacked against petitioner
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AN UNAUTHENTICATED AND SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A Torralba, bearing in mind that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon proof
RADIO BROADCAST (EXHIBIT "D") ALLEGEDLY BY HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT beyond reasonable doubt.
[TORRALBA] ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR THE CRIME In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco, wrote
OF LIBEL. that "[e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when
III the identity of the speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] message or speech, or by the witness' recognition of the voice of the speaker." 33
MADE UTTERANCES CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD MARKED AS EXHIBIT "D," THE The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba broadcast
HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] the alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that while petitioner Torralba's radio
NATURE OF HIS ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERENCE TO THE LANDMARK program on that date was being tape recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio that he
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 could even touch the same. 34 In effect, Lim was implying that he was listening to "Tug-Ani ang
(JAN. 14, 1999). Lungsod" at that time. In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was by any
IV other evidence, fails to meet the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the voice of the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AWARDING speaker." Being near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD FAITH voice of the speaker is another. Indeed, a person may be in close proximity to said device without
necessarily listening to the contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio commentator is saying over 27.58 ALR2d §4, citing Monroe v. United States, 98 App DC 228, 234 F2d 49.
the airwaves. 28.Ibid., citing Commonwealth v. Roller, 100 Pa Super 125.
What further undermines the credibility of Lim's testimony is the fact that he had an ax to grind 29.29A Am Jur 2d §1233.
against petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused by the latter with the crime of libel and for which 30.58 ALR 2d 1034, citing State v. Alleman, 218 La 821, 51 So2d 83.
he was found guilty as charged by the court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an 31.TSN, 07 August 1997, pp. 27-28.
"uninterested witness" whose testimony merits significance from this Court. 32.TSN, 03 September 1998, p. 6.
33.Evidence, Ricardo J. Francisco, p. 13 (1996 edition).
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private complainant Atty. 34.Supra, note 28.
Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that he did not listen to petitioner Torralba's radio 35.People of the Philippines v. Isidro Clores, et al ., G.R. No. L-61408, 12 October 1983, 210 Phil 51.
show subject of this petition. He simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim. 36.Amelita dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 150439, 29 July 2005, p. 32; People v.
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, 29 October 1971, 42 SCRA 59.
presumption of innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt — one
which requires moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those ||| (Torralba v. People, G.R. No. 153699, [August 22, 2005], 505 PHIL 71-87)
who are to act upon it. 35 As we have so stated in the past —
. . . Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt, the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the most
careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. 36
Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against petitioner Torralba, this
Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence
meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24 August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Tagbilaran City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner
Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba of the crime of libel. The cash bond posted by said petitioner is ordered
released to him subject to the usual auditing and accounting procedures. No costs. CTEacH
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. with Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and
Danilo B. Pine concurring.
2.Per Presiding Judge Venancio J. Amila of Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City.
3.Private complainant.
4.Records, pp. 1-2.
5.Records, p. 31.
6.Records, pp. 74-74-a.
7.Records, p. 77.
8.For Crim. Case No. 8958.
9.For Crim. Cases No. 8956 and No. 8957.
10.For Crim. Case No. 9107; Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
11.Records, p. 97.
12.TSN, 03 September 1998, pp. 9-11.
13.Docketed as Crim. Case No. CBU-26582 in Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City.
14.Exhibit "1" for petitioner Torralba; Folder of Exhibits, pp. 37-46.
15.Exhibit "2," Id. at 47-61.
16.Exhibit "2-A," Id. at 67-68.
17.TSN, 12 October 1998, pp. 2-4.
18.Id. at 6.
19.TSN, 29 July 1999, pp. 39-42.
20.Rollo, pp. 64-75.
21.Id. at 75.
22.Rollo, pp. 62-63.
23.Rollo, pp. 9-10.
24.29 Am Jur 2d §583.
25.VII The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Ricardo J. Francisco, p. 121 (1997 edition).
26.Ibid., citing 20 Am. Jur. 1961 Supplement 43; People v. Orpilla, CA-G.R. No. L-06591, 22 July 1971;
XXXVI L.J. 284.
|| In another report dated May 2, 2001 (Second Report), Gomez observed that the
THIRD DIVISION thumbmarks on the standard documents appeared to be "faint, blurred and lacking the necessary
[G.R. No. 202612. January 17, 2018.] ridge characteristics to warrant positive identification." 18 During a subsequent hearing, however, he
TEODORO C. TORTONA, RODRIGO C. TORTONA, PEDRO C. TORTONA, clarified that "while the standard thumbmarks lack the 'necessary ridge characteristics to warrant
ERNESTO C. TORTONA, AND PATRICIO C. TORTONA, petitioners, vs. JULIAN C. positive identification,['] 'all the standard are all in the same finger print pattern' and 'they are also in
GREGORIO, FLORENTINO GREGORIO, JR., ISAGANI C. GREGORIO, CELEDONIA agreement of the flow of ridges of all the standard. '" 19
G. IGNACIO, TEODOCIA G. CHAN, LEONILA G. CAAMPUED, CONCORDIA G. In its May 31, 2005 Decision, 20 the Regional Trial Court concluded that the Deed of
MIJARES, ROMEO C. GREGORIO, EDNA S. TAN, NELIA S. REYES, CECILIA S. Absolute Sale was a forgery and ruled in favor of the petitioners. It found as credible the First Report,
FRIEDMAN, LAMBERTO SUANTE, JULIUS SUANTE, ENRICO SUANTE, FELIPE which positively showed that the questioned thumbmarks in the Deed of Absolute Sale were not
SUANTE, CESAR SUANTE, CORAZON YASAY-GREGORIO, DONALDO Y. Rufina's:
GREGORIO, ELMER Y. GREGORIO, AND ROY JOHN Y. GREGORIO, respondents. This Court has examined the said thumbmarks and is convinced and
DECISION satisfied that they are very different from her standard thumbmarks in the
LEONEN, J p: documents Exhibits "F", "G", and "H". This difference is further enhanced in the
Documents acknowledged before a notary public are presumed to have been duly executed. enlarged photographs of these thumbmarks (Exhibit "J"). It is clear by the naked
This presumption may be contradicted by clear and convincing evidence. A notarized Deed of eyes that Rufina's thumbmarks in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit
Absolute Sale where the thumbmark of a party is shown to be a forgery is void. "D") are really the "circle type" while those of the standard thumbmarks in Exhibits
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil "F", "G" and "H" are the loop type as the NBI expert technically described them. As
Procedure praying that the assailed Court of Appeals July 9, 2012 Decision 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91767 the Supreme Court ruled in People vs. Abatayo, 87 Phil. 794, 798, "Thumbmarks
be reversed and set aside. This assailed Decision reversed and set aside the May 31, 2005 never lie." "A comparison of both the differences and similarities in the questioned
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, which ruled in favor of then plaintiffs, now thumbmarks (signatures) should have been made to satisfy the demands of
petitioners, in their action for recovery of real property with damages against then defendants, now evidence" (Licarte vs. CA, G.R. No. 128899; June 8, 1995). 21
respondents. The dispositive portion of its Decision read:
This case is an offshoot of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly entered into by sisters Rufina WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Casimiro (Rufina), the purported seller, and Rafaela Casimiro (Rafaela), the purported buyer. 1. Declaring the thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the Deed of Absolute
Petitioners are the heirs of Rufina, while respondents are the heirs of Rafaela. 4 Sale dated February 14, 1974, Doc. No. 73, Page 16, Book 1, Series of 1974 of the
During their lifetime, Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with their other siblings two (2) parcels notarial registry of Atty. Arcadio Espiritu of Bacoor, Cavite (Exhibit "D") as forged
of land. 5 They shared in equal, undivided 1/10 shares of a parcel located in Longos, Bacoor, Cavite, and hence, null and void and inexistent.
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-923. They also shared in equal, undivided 1/5 2. Declaring the Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial
shares of a second parcel in Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. Partition dated August 15, 1996 (Exhibit "E") null and void insofar as the
T-10058. 6 adjudication of the one-tenth (1/10) share of Rufina Casimiro over the lot situated
When Rufina was still alive, she regularly collected her respective 1/10 and 1/5 shares in the in Longos, Bacoor, Cavite, covered by OCT No. O-923; and the one-fifths (1/5)
income of the two (2) properties. After her death, petitioners continued to collect and receive their share of Rufina Casimiro in the lot situated in Talaba, Bacoor, Cavite, covered by
mother's share. 7 TCT No. T-10058 both of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite (Exhibits
Sometime in 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of real property with damages. "A" and "B"), both in favor of the Heirs of Rafaela Casimiro.
They alleged that their cousin Emilio Casimiro (Emilio) offered them a balato 8 of P50,000.00 for the 3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is hereby ordered to
sale of the first parcel to the Department of Public Works and Highways. Surprised, they asked why cancel TCT No. T-741726, and to revert to the cancelled OCT No. O-923 and to
they were not instead given their 1/10 share in the proceeds of the sale. To this, Emilio allegedly cancel Entry No. 8449-75 appearing on TCT No. T-10058, which is the annotation
replied that according to respondents, 9 the two (2) properties had already been sold by Rufina to of the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "D") that has been declared
Rafaela during their lifetime. 10 herein as null and void and inexistent.
Petitioners proceeded to the Office of the Registry of Deeds to verify the supposed sale. The claim for damages is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
They learned that OCT No. O-923, covering the first parcel, had already been cancelled on account of SO ORDERED. 22
a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Rufina and Rafaela on February 14, 1974. It appeared The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. 23 It
that Rufina also sold her 1/5 share over the second parcel covered by TCT No. T-10058. It also found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the presumption
became apparent that some time after the sales of the two (2) parcels, respondents executed a of regularity. It also emphasized Gomez's second examination, which appeared to indicate that the
Declaration of Heirship and Extrajudicial Partition. Consequently, Rufina's 1/10 and 1/5 shares in the thumbmarks in the standard documents prevent "positive identification." 24 Thus, according to the
first and second parcels were added to the shares of the respondents, as Rafaela's heirs, thereby Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court's conclusions were suspect. It held that, ultimately,
increasing their shares to 2/10 and 2/5, respectively. 11 petitioners failed to prove "by clear and convincing evidence" that the thumbmarks found on the
Petitioners underscored that their mother was illiterate, not even knowing how to write her Deed of Absolute Sale were forged. 25
own name. They alleged that she only affixed her thumbmark on documents, and whenever she did The Heirs of Rufina then filed the present Petition.
so, she was always assisted by at least one (1) of her children. Thus, they asserted that if the sales to For resolution is the sole issue of whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly
Rafaela were genuine, they should have known about them. 12 executed by Rufina Casimiro, as seller, and Rafaela Casimiro, as buyer, is void, as Rufina Casimiro
In support of their allegations, they presented during trial some documents, 13 collectively never consented to it and with her apparent thumbmarks on it being fake.
identified as the standard documents, supposedly bearing the authentic thumbmarks of their mother. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. The
These standard documents also showed that at least one (1) of them assisted her in executing each Petition must be granted and the Regional Trial Court May 31, 2005 Decision must be reinstated.
document. 14 I
Petitioners likewise presented as witness National Bureau of Investigation fingerprint The matter of the authenticity of Rufina Casimiro's thumbmarks is a factual issue resting on
examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez), who conducted an examination to determine the the evidence presented during trial. Factual issues are normally improper in Rule 45 petitions as,
genuineness of the questioned thumbmarks in the Deed of Absolute Sale. 15 He noted that he under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 only questions of law may be raised in a
compared the questioned thumbmarks with the genuine thumbmarks of Rufina in the standard petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of exceptions. In Pascual v. Burgos: 27
documents. In his Technical Investigation/Identification Report FP Case No. 2000-182-A dated July 13, The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in
2000 (First Report), 16 Gomez noted that "the purported thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the petitions filed under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale . . . [were] not identical with her standard thumbmarks in [the standard questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,]
documents]" and concluded that "the thumbmarks appearing in the . . . Deed of Absolute Sale . . . or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt" when supported by substantial
were not impressed by Rufina Casimiro." 17
 evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina's apparent thumbmarks on the
disturbed on appeal to this court. Deed of Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks on authentic documents. They demonstrated
However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to disparities that lead to no other conclusion than that the thumbmarks on the contentious Deed of
these rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that Absolute Sale are forged. In contrast, respondents merely harped on a disputable presumption, and
were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.: sought to affirm this presumption through the self-serving testimony of the notary public, whose very
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely act of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale is the bone of contention, whose credibility was shown to
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference be wanting, and who is himself potentially liable for notarizing a simulated document. They also
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where endeavored to undermine petitioners' expert witness by dismissively characterizing him as "just an
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is ordinary employee." 36
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of III
fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making Rule 130, Section 49 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that courts may admit the
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is testimonies of expert witnesses or of individuals possessing "special knowledge, skill, experience or
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) training":
The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When to possess, may be received in evidence.
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and exercise a wide latitude of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking into consideration
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the factual circumstances of the case:
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may
evidence on record. place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
court involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal cases. 28 (Citations omitted) peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability
Several exceptions exist in this case. Most evident is how the findings and conclusions of and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and
the Court of Appeals conflict with those of the Regional Trial Court. More significant than these process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
conflicting findings, this Court finds the Court of Appeals' appreciation of evidence to be grossly in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the
misguided. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, a more circumspect consideration of the relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters about which he
evidence sustains the conclusion that Rufina's purported thumbmarks were false and merely testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements. The
simulated to make it appear that she had consented to the alleged sale to her sister, Rafaela. opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the
II court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
Notarization enables a notary public to ascertain the voluntariness of the party's act and to knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am.
verify the genuineness of his or her signature. 29 Through notarization, the public and the courts may Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
rely on the face of the instrument, without need of further examining its authenticity and due evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling
execution. It is an act that is imbued with public interest. In Nunga v. Atty. Viray: 30 thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested discretion. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or This analysis applies in the examination of forged documents:
authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily Due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from forged documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is usually
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It helpful. These handwriting experts can help determine fundamental, significant
must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard or
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence sample specimen signatures, as well as the movement and manner of execution
without further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law strokes. 38
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must Respondents here assail the qualification of National Bureau of Investigation fingerprint
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their examiner Gomez, pejoratively branding him as "just an ordinary employee." 39 In support of this
duties. 31 dismissive casting of Gomez, respondents noted that he performed such functions as securing
Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are accorded evidentiary fingerprints from applicants for National Bureau of Investigation clearances and taking fingerprints of
weight as regards their due execution: people involved in crimes. 40
Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred Evidence is concerned with "ascertaining . . . the truth respecting a matter of fact." 41 It is
upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a concerned with what can be objectively established and relies on verifiable actualities. Opinions are,
notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. 32 by definition, subjective. They proceed from impressions, depend on perception, and are products of
However, any such presumption is disputable. It can be refuted by clear and convincing personal interpretation and belief. Hence, opinions are generally inadmissible as evidence. 42
evidence to the contrary: Opinions, when admissible, must have proper factual basis. They must be supported by
It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as facts or circumstances from which they draw logical inferences. An opinion bereft of factual basis
regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the merits no probative value. People v. Malejana 43 stated the following regarding expert opinions:
presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely statement of the theory or opinion of the expert, but rather in the aid that he can
preponderant. 33 (Citations omitted) render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for his criterion
The contentious Deed of Absolute Sale in this case is a notarized document. 34 Thus, it and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. 44 (Emphasis
benefits from the presumption of regularity. The burden of proving that thumbmarks affixed on it by supplied, citation omitted)
an ostensible party is false and simulated lies on the party assailing its execution. 35 It is then The witness rendering an opinion must be credible, 45 in addition to possessing all the
incumbent upon petitioners to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the seller's thumbmarks, qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the Revised Rules on Evidence. 46 In the
as appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale, are forged and are not their mother's. case of an expert witness, he or she must be shown to possess knowledge, skill, experience, or
Petitioners successfully discharged this burden. training on the subject matter of his or her testimony. 47 On the other hand, an ordinary witness may
give an opinion on matters which are within his or her knowledge or with which he or she has A: After number 2, the last is the most important one because you must locate the
sufficient familiarity. 48 number of ridges of characteristics and their relationship with each other
The testimony, too, must be credible in itself. In Borguilla v. Court of Appeals, 49 this Court because it is the basis of identification of the fingerprint.
said: Q: Meaning the description of the ridges?
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a A: Yes, sir, the identification features appearing on the fingerprint.
credible witness, it must be credible in itself — such as the common experience Q: What did you see?
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We A: I found that there were 13 identical points to warrant the positive identification.
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our Q: [Those] 13 points [are] more than enough to determine whether those
knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs thumbmark[s] [are] done by one and the same person?
to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance. 50 A: Yes, sir.
The availability of direct evidence affects the viability of opinions. If there is a direct xxx xxx xxx
evidence to prove the fact in issue, an opinion may be rendered unnecessary. For instance, in Cebu Q: Where did you base your conclusion that the thumbprint on the Pacto de
Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, 51 where the origin of a fire was at issue, this Retro Sale over and above the name Juana Vda. de Rojales is genuine
Court held that there was no need for the judge to consider expert opinion: thumbprint of the same person?
[T]here is no need for the judge to resort to expert opinion evidence. In A: Well, we only respon[d]ed to the request of the court to compare with the
the case under consideration, the testimonies of the fire experts were not the only thumbprint appearing on the Pacto de Retro Sale to that of the fingerprint
available evidence on the probable cause and origin of the fire. There were appearing on the thumbprint form.
witnesses who were actually on board the vessel when the fire occurred. Between Q: You mean to say you were provided with the standard fingerprint of the subject?
the testimonies of the fire experts who merely based their findings and opinions A: Yes, sir.
on interviews and the testimonies of those present during the fire, the latter are of xxx xxx xxx
more probative value. 52 COURT:
Contrary to respondents' dismissiveness towards Gomez, his performance of such tasks as Q: Now, with this photograph blown-up, you have here 13 points, will you please
taking fingerprints, even if, for a time it was his main duty, does not, per se, discount competence. A explain to the court how these 13 points agree from that standard to that
history of performing this function does not negate any "special knowledge, skill, experience or questioned document?
training" that Gomez possesses. Despite respondents' protestations, it remains that Gomez A: I found 2x4 bifurcation, it means that single rage splitting into two branches.
personally scrutinized and compared Rufina's disputed thumbmarks in the contested Deed of Q: You pointed out?
Absolute Sale with her authentic thumbmarks in the standard documents and detailed his findings in A: I found the bifurcation on the standard that corresponds exactly to the bifurcation
the First Report to which he testified before the Regional Trial Court. He expounded on his findings in which I marked number 1 in both photograph[s].
the Second Report and clarified, contrary to what respondents and the Court of Appeals harp on, that Q: From the center?
the findings detailed in it are not in conflict with or otherwise discount the conclusions stated in the A: As to the number and location with respect to the core, I found that both
First Report. questioned and standard coincide.
Incidentally, this case is not the first instance that this Court sustained Gomez's competence xxx xxx xxx
and credibility. In Rojales v. Dime, 53 this Court relied on the examination conducted by Gomez to Q: Now, but the layer does not change in point 1, how many layer from the core?
determine the genuineness of the thumbmark appearing on the pacto de retro subject of that A: From the core, there are 4 intervening layers from number 1 to number 2 and it
case. Rojales' demonstration of Gomez's competence and credibility is worth reproducing at length: appears also the questioned 4 intervening layers between number 1 and
Petitioner avers that the [Court of Appeals] erred in relying on the NBI number 2, so, the intervening rages between ends of th[ese] characteristics
Fingerprint Examination. She alleges that the opinion of one claiming to be an are all both in agreement.
expert is not binding upon the court. xxx xxx xxx
There is nothing on record that would compel this Court to believe that ATTY. SALANGUIT:
said witness, Fingerprint Examiner Gomez, has improper motive to falsely testify Q: Can you say that based on the questioned thumbmark, you would be able to
against the petitioner nor was his testimony not very certain. His testimony is arrive an accurate evaluation between the questioned thumbmark and
worthy of full faith and credit in the absence of evidence of an improper motive. standard thumbmark?
His straightforward and consistent testimonies bear the earmarks of credibility. A: Yes, [ma'am].
Gomez testified during direct and cross examination, the process of Q: Even if the questioned thumbmark is a little bit blurred as to the standard
examination of the fingerprints and his conclusion: thumbmark?
ATTY. BELMI: A: [Even though] the questioned thumbmark is a little bit blurred but still the ridge
Q: Will you kindly tell the court what was the result of your examination? characteristics [are] still discernible.
A: After having thorough examination, comparison and analysis, the thumbmark Q: You are telling us that among many people here in the world, nobody have the
appearing on the [Pacto] de Retro and the right thumbmark appearing on same thumbmark as another person and that include the thumbmark of a
the original copy of PC/INP Fingerprint form taken by SPO3 Marcelo Quintin twins?
Sosing were impressed by one and the same person. A: Yes, [ma'am]. 54
xxx xxx xxx This Court finds no reason to favorably consider respondents' attempt at undermining
Q: How do you go about this comparison to determine whether that thumbmark Gomez's competence.
[was] impressed by the same person? The credibility of an expert witness does not inhere in his or her person. Rather, he or she
A: We must locate the three elements of comparing, the number 1 is type of must be shown to possess knowledge, skill, experience, or training on the subject matter of his or her
fingerprint pattern. testimony. 55 In First Nationwide Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 56 where the identity of the
xxx xxx xxx vehicle in question was in issue, this Court considered these factors in assessing the credibility of the
A: There are three elements, after knowing the fingerprint pattern and they are of expert witness:
the same fingerprint the next step is to know the flow of the rages of the We note that Sergeant Agadulin is a police officer who has adequate
fingerprint pattern or the shape. knowledge, training and experience to perform macro-etching examinations. His
xxx xxx xxx assertions on this technical matter are, as the [Court of Appeals] noted, in the
Q: Then what is next? nature of expert testimony. Additionally, as a public officer, he is presumed to
have regularly performed his duty. In the absence of controverting evidence, his
testimony is entitled to great weight and credence. 57 (Citation omitted)
 Standards outlined in American jurisprudence illustrate frameworks and standards for Thus, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case for the application of its
appraising expert testimonies. enumerated standards.
In the 1923 case of Frye v. United States, 58 James Alfonso Frye was convicted of second- In this case, the Regional Trial Court's May 31, 2005 Decision detailed the circumstances
degree murder by the lower court after he was disallowed to introduce expert testimony relating to leading to the National Bureau of Investigation's examination of the contentious Deed of Absolute
the results of systolic blood pressure deception test. The United States Supreme Court, in sustaining Sale, respondents' incessant attempts at preventing the examination, and how Gomez took the
the lower court, explained: witness stand and presented his findings. The Regional Trial Court's recollection indicates, most
The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled notably, that Gomez was not handpicked by petitioners. Rather, following petitioners' request, Gomez
witnesses are admissible in evidence in those cases in which appeared to have been designated by the National Bureau of Investigation itself to conduct the
the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are examination. Thus, any such determination of Gomez's expertise was not borne by petitioners' innate
unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, preference for him or of their insistence upon him, but by the National Bureau of Investigation's own
for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a confidence in him. This institutional reposition of confidence can only bolster Gomez's credibility:
science, art, or trade as to require a previous habit or To prove that their mother's thumbmarks on the disputed deed of
experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it. absolute sale were forged, plaintiffs filed a motion to refer the questioned
When the question involved does not lie within the range of document to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. An Order
common experience or common knowledge, but requires was issued by this Court directing the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the
special experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of Province of Cavite to submit to this Court the original copy of the said title and
witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to upon receipt of the same ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the same
which the question relates are admissible in evidence. to the NBI. An Omnibus Motion was filed by the defendants informing this Court
Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just when a scientific that the questioned document was already lost and/or missing pursuant to the
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and Certification dated April 5, 2000 issued by the Office of the Registry of Deeds for
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the the Province of Cavite (Exh. 8). Hence, the order to transmit the questioned
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long document became unavailing and academic. That notwithstanding, the Branch
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific Clerk of Court transmitted the questioned document to the NBI. Defendants
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be insinuated that the original questioned document came from an illegitimate and
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in spurious source. However, it was explained by a representative of the registry, Mr.
which it belongs. Agusto Vasquez, that the registrar asked him to bring the questioned document to
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained the Court and the same was received by one of the employees of the Court.
such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological Further, the said issue has been resolved by this Court in its Order dated August
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from 14, 2000, pertinent portion of which states that:
the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made. 59 (Emphasis "Therefore, the allegations (sic) of the defendants that
supplied) the said document came from a spurious [source] is without
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, any basis. This Court assures the defendants and/or any litigant
Inc. departed from the Frye standard and articulated a new framework for assessing the admission of for that matter that this Court will not allow spurious
expert testimony. 60 In that case, plaintiffs Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller attributed their serious document[s] to be admitted by this Court.
birth defects to the drug Bendectin, manufactured by defendant Dow Chemical Company. They WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion filed by the
submitted expert testimonies on animal studies showing a link between Bendectin and defendants is hereby DENIED for lack of merit."
malformations, pharmacological studies, and reanalysis of previously published epidemiological As basis of the comparison[,] plaintiffs presented, the Kasulatan sa
studies. The district court ruled in favor of the defendant and stated that scientific evidence is Bilihan ng Lote dated February 19, 1979 (Exhibit "F"); Kasulatang Paghahati sa
admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is "sufficiently established to have general Labas ng Hukuman na may Lakip na Bilihan ng Lupa dated March 31, 1982
acceptance in the field to which it belongs." 61 The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed this Decision after (Exhibit "G"); and the Residence Certificate of Rufina Casimiro dated July 21, 1971
finding that the plaintiffs' evidence had not yet been accepted as reliable technique by scientists who (Exhibit "H") and a receipt issued by the Rural Bank of Zapote (Exhibit "H-1"),
had an opportunity to scrutinize and verify the methods. which documents contained the genuine thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro.
However, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case after finding the Frye A fingerprint examiner of the NBI, Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr., took the witness
standard to be mooted by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, which stated: stand. He testified that pursuant to the order of this Court he conducted an
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier examination to determine the genuineness of Rufina Casimiro's thumbmarks on
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale by comparing them with her genuine
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may thumbmarks as appearing on Exhibits "F", "G" and "H". These documents,
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. containing the genuine thumb marks of Rufina Casimiro were executed on the
The United States Supreme Court observed that Rule 702 did not require "general dates prior to and after the execution of the questioned documents. Mr. Gomez
acceptance" of the Frye standard before expert testimony is admitted. Instead of following the strict prepared enlarged photographs of the questioned and standard thumbmarks of
Frye standard, it placed on the judge the duty to act as "gatekeeper" when faced with a proffer of Rufina Casimiro for better examination and comparison (Exhibit "J"). After
expert scientific testimony. Thus, the judge must make a preliminary determination of whether or not examining these thumbmarks, Mr. Gomez concluded in his Technical
the offered testimony is scientific knowledge and whether or not it will assist the trier of fact to Investigation/Identification Report FP Case No. 2000-182-A (Exh. "I") that the
understand or determine a fact in issue. The following are the standards that should be considered by purported thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
the judge: (Exhibit "D") are not identical with her standard thumbmarks in Exhibits "F", "G"
Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the and "H" and that the thumbmarks appearing in the said Deed of Absolute Sale
theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been (Exhibit "D") were not impressed by Rufina Casimiro. 64
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, and the IV
existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 65 outlined standards for establishing forgery:
has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. 62 As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,
However, the standards are not exclusive: positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus must be solely on principles forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be
judge should also be mindful of other applicable Rules. 63 established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the
 authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon Q Would you say that this standard thumbmark, what can you say about the general
to have been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged forged pattern of the thumbmark?
signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery. WITNESS
A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under A All the standard are all in the same finger print pattern, sir.
controversy cannot produce reliable results. 66 (Citation omitted) ATTY. CORTEZ
Here, petitioners submitted for comparison three (3) standard documents bearing the Q How about the second requirements (sic) which is the flow of the ridges, what can
genuine thumbmarks of Rufina: (1) Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lote (Exhibit "F"); (2) Kasulatang you say about this standard?
Paghahati sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Lakip na Bilihan ng Lupa (Exhibit "G"); and (3) the Residence WITNESS
Certificate of Rufina (Exhibit "H"). 67 After examination, Gomez submitted to the Regional Trial Court A Well, they are also in agreement of the flow [of] ridges of all the standard, sir.
his Technical Investigation/Identification Report FP Case No. 2000-182 dated July 13, 2000: ATTY. CORTEZ
6. RESULT OF EXAMINATION: After having a thorough examination, Q And how about the third requirements, the number of ridge characteristics?
comparison and analysis, questioned thumbmarks mentioned in item nos. 5A and WITNESS
5B are found not identical with the standard thumbmarks mentioned in item nos. A The number of the ridge characteristics because [of] the none clarity (sic) of
5C, 5D[,] and 5E. th[ese] characteristics. I only locate[d] one or two points and it is not
7. OPINION: In view of the foregoing result of the examination, sufficient for positive identification. I must locate seven or more ridge
questioned thumbmark mentioned in item nos. 5A and 5B were not impressed by characteristics to warrant positive identification, sir.
Rufina Casimiro. 68 ATTY. CORTEZ
This Report could not be any clearer. The questioned thumbmarks on the Deed of Absolute Q But will you agree, Mr. Witness that with respect to this point, there is no
Sale do not belong to Rufina. The questioned thumbmarks were of the "circle type" while the genuine discrepancy among the standard thumbmark?
thumbmarks of Rufina were of the "loop type." 69 WITNESS
Upon personally perusing the documents, Regional Trial Court Judge Novato T. Cajigal A Well, if I have not meet (sic) all the requirements then I cannot make an opinion
(Judge Cajigal) reached a similar conclusion: regarding the identification of the standard finger print, sir.
This Court has examined the said thumbmarks and is convinced and ATTY. CORTEZ
satisfied that they are very different from her standard thumbmarks in the Q My question is not about the identity. My question is pertaining to any discrepancy
documents Exhibits "F", "G"[,] and "H". This difference is further enhanced in the or any disagreement?
enlarged photographs of these thumbmarks (Exhibit "J"). It is clear by the naked WITNESS
eyes that Rufina's thumbmarks in the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit A There is none, sir. 77 (Emphasis supplied)
"D") are really the "circle type" while those of the standard thumbmarks in Exhibits The faint and blurred features of the thumbmarks appearing on the standard documents
"F", "G"[,] and "H" are the loop type as the NBI expert technically described them. may have made them less than ideal. Still, Gomez explained that they remained to be sufficiently
As the Supreme Court ruled in People vs. Abatayo, 87 Phil. 794, 798, consistent, and therefore, suitable for a comparison with the thumbmarks appearing on the disputed
"Thumbmarks never lie." "A comparison of both the differences and similarities in Deed of Absolute Sale. Gomez, too, was particular in rejecting respondents' counsel's suggestion that
the questioned thumbmarks (signatures) should have been made to satisfy the the Second Report should "supersede" 78 the First Report:
demands of evidence" (Licarte vs. CA, G.R. No. 128899; June 8, 1995). 70 ATTY. DELA CUEVA
Judge Cajigal's observations and conclusions are in keeping with the settled principle that Q Mr. Witness, this document now marked as Exh. "K" which we are adopting as our
judges exercise independent judgment in appraising the authenticity of a signature, or of a fingerprint Exh. "6" was prepared by you subsequently to a previous report which is
placed in a signature's stead: now marked as Exh. "I", does this report supersede your previous report,
A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the Mr. Witness?
signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity WITNESS
and this cannot be done without the original copy being produced in court. 71 A No, Sir. 79
V Thus, Gomez was steadfast on the findings he detailed in his First Report. The First Report
In reversing the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals emphasized Gomez's Second already established that the questioned thumbmarks appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale were
Report, which indicated that faint and blurred features of the thumbmarks appearing on the standard not Rufina's, as their genuineness is belied by thumbmarks appearing on the authentic, standard
documents prevented "positive identification." 72 Thus, it concluded that "no comparison may be documents. Despite the flaws in the thumbmarks appearing in the standard documents, the inherent
made between the thumbmarks found in the Deed [Absolute of Sale] and those found in the standard deficiencies of the thumbmarks affixed in the Deed of Absolute Sale remain.
documents." 73 VI
However, the Court of Appeals failed to consider that Gomez clarified that all the requisites Respondents' lone witness was Atty. Arcadio Espiritu (Atty. Espiritu), the notary public who
for comparing the thumbmarks — 1) fingerprint patterns, (2) flow of ridges, and (3) location and notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. 80 Atty. Espiritu asserted that the parties to the Deed of
relationship of their characteristics — had been satisfied. He specifically stated that first, "[a]ll the Absolute Sale personally appeared before him and that Rufina affixed her thumbmarks in his
standard [thumbmarks] are all in the same fingerprint pattern"; 74 second, "they are also in presence. 81
agreement [as to] the flow [of] ridges"; 75 and third, there is no discrepancy as to their ridge However, Atty. Espiritu's credibility is highly questionable. It was established during trial
characteristics: 76 that he notarized an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of a certain Victor Guinto (Guinto), where
ATTY. CORTEZ Guinto declared that he was the sole heir of his deceased sister, to the exclusion of their other
Q Can you tell us, Mr. Witness, the requirements before you can render an opinion in siblings. 82 This was despite Atty. Espiritu's personal knowledge, as a longtime neighbor of Guinto's
the identity of the standard thumbmark? family, that there were other brothers and sisters. 83 During trial, he even admitted that "he was not
WITNESS 'concerned about the truth and falsities of entries in the document.'" 84
A Well, in comparing the prints there are three requirements, (1) to determine the The Regional Trial Court's observations are on point. It was right to not lend credence to
type of the finger prints pattern; (2) the flow of the ridges; (3) the location Atty. Espiritu's testimony:
of each characteristics and their relationship to each other, sir. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the execution of notarial
ATTY. CORTEZ documents [cannot] apply in this case, despite the testimony of the notary public
Q Now with respect to the first requirements (sic) that you mentioned "the general who notarized the said Deed of Absolute Sale, whose credibility is in itself doubtful
pattern"? considering his admission that he prepared and notarized an affidavit of self-
xxx xxx xxx adjudication of inherited properties from a deceased sister (Exhibit "M")
ATTY. CORTEZ inspite (sic) of his personal knowledge that the affiant was not the sole heir of the
said deceased, who has other surviving brothers and sisters as they were once his
 neighbors in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite. No amount of testimonial evidence could ever verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
alter or detract from the cold physical fact that the questioned thumbmarks are must be distinctly set forth.
not identical with the standard thumbmarks. Testimonial evidence cannot prevail 27.Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016
over physical facts. 85 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/
VII january2016/171722.pdf> 10-11 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
Petitioners were able to discharge their burden of proving forgery by clear and convincing 28.Id. at 10-11.
evidence. Petitioners themselves recounted in a straightforward manner that their mother, being 29.Aquino v. Manese, 448 Phil. 555 (2003) [J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
illiterate, never dealt with her properties without the assistance of any of her children. 86 To attest to 30.366 Phil. 155 (1999) [J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
this, they presented documents bearing the thumbmarks of their mother, where it appeared that at 31.Id. at 160-161.
least one (1) of them was present to assist her. 87 These same documents, when compared with the 32.Basilio v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 120, 124 (2000) [J. Pardo, First Division] citing Loyola v. Court of
contentious Deed of Absolute Sale, demonstrated the falsity of the thumbmarks appearing on the Appeals, 383 Phil. 171 (2000) [J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
latter. Respondents' cause may have been supported by the general presumption that notarized 33.Heirs of Trazona v. Heirs of Cañada, 723 Phil. 388, 397 (2013) [C.J. Sereno, First Division].
documents were duly executed; however, this presumption must crumble in light of the significantly 34.Rollo, p. 46.
more compelling evidence presented by petitioners. As against petitioners' evidence, all that 35.Basilio v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 120, 124 (2000) [J. Pardo, First Division] citing Sumbad v. Court
respondents presented was the testimony of the notarizing lawyer, whose own acts are clouded with of Appeals, 368 Phil. 52 (1999) [J. Mendoza, Second Division].
suspicion. 36.Rollo, p. 98.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The July 9, 2012 Decision 37.Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 263 Phil. 1068, 1077 (1999) [J. Medialdea, First Division].
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91767 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 31, 2005 38.Spouses Ulep v. Court of Appeals, 509 Phil. 227, 240 (2005) [J. Garcia, Third Division].
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite in Civil Case No. BCV 97-183 39.Rollo, p. 98.
is REINSTATED. 40.Id.
SO ORDERED. 41.RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, sec. 1.
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Martires and Gesmundo, JJ., concur. 42.RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 48-50:
Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the
Footnotes following sections.
1. Rollo, pp. 7-30. Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
2. Id. at 31-43. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino and concurred in by knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Abraham B. Borreta of the Seventeenth Division, evidence.
Court of Appeals, Manila. Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given,
3. Id. at 44-49. The Decision, docketed as Civil Case No. BCV 97-183, was penned by Judge Novato T. may be received in evidence regarding —
Cajigal. (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
4. Id. at 45. (b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
5. Id. at 111-112, Memorandum for the Petitioners. (c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
6. Id. at 44. The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of
7. Id. at 111-112. a person.
8. Id. at 112, Petitioners' Memorandum. "Vicassan's Tagalog-English Dictionary defines the 43.515 Phil. 584 (2006) [J. Azcuna, Second Division].
word 'balato' 'as a small amount of money given away in goodwill'." 44.Id. at 596.
9. The Heirs of Rafaela are Julian C. Gregorio, Florentino Gregorio, Jr., Isagani C. Gregorio, Celedonia G. 45.See Borguilla v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 9 (1987) [J. Paras, Second Division].
Ignacio, Teodocia G. Chan, Leonila G. Caampued, Concordia G. Mijares, Romeo C. Gregorio, 46.See Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic, 707
Edna S. Tan, Nelia S. Reyes, Cecilia S. Friedman, Lamberto Suante, Julius Suante, Enrico Phil. 109 (2013) [J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
Suante, Felipe Suante, Cesar Suante, Corazon Yasay-Gregorio, Donaldo Y. Gregorio, Elmer Y. 47.RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 49.
Gregorio, and Roy John Y. Gregorio. See rollo, p. 7. 48.RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 50.
10. Rollo, pp. 44-45. 49.231 Phil. 9 (1987) [J. Paras, Second Division].
11. Id. at 45. 50.Borguilla v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 9, 22 (1987) [J. Paras, Second Division].
12. Id. 51.366 Phil. 439 (1999) [J. Purisima, Third Division].
13. Id. at 47. These documents were: Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lote dated February 19, 1979; Kasulatang 52.Id. at 454-455.
Paghahati sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Lakip na Bilihan ng Lupa dated March 31, 1982; 53.G.R. No. 194548, February 10, 2016
Rufina Casimiro's Residence Certificate dated July 21, 1971; and a receipt issued by the Rural <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/
Bank of Zapote. february2016/194548.pdf> [J. Peralta, Third Division].
14. Id. at 45. 54.Id. at 9-11.
15. Id. at 46-47. 55.RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 49.
16. Id. at 15. 56.376 Phil. 701 (1999) [J. Panganiban, Third Division].
17. Id. at 47. 57.Id. at 712.
18. Id. at 16-17. 58.54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
19. Id. at 17. Petition for Review on Certiorari. 59.Id.
20. Id. at 44-49. 60.509 US 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
21. Id. at 47. 61.Id.
22. Id. at 48-49. 62.Id.
23. Id. at 31-43. 63.Id.
24. Id. at 128. 64.Rollo, pp. 46-47.
25.Id. at 42. 65.360 Phil. 753 (1998) [J. Purisima, Third Division].
26.RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1: 66.Id. at 763.
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a 67.Rollo, p. 47.
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional 68.Id. at 15-16.
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a 69.Id. at 47.
 70.Id.
71.Mendoza v. Fermin, 738 Phil. 429, 442 (2014) [J. Peralta, Third Division].
72.Rollo, p. 127.
73.Id. at 38 and 40.
74.Id. at 127.
75.Id. at 128.
76.Id. at 128-129.
77.Id. at 127-129.
78.Id. at 129.
79.Id. at 129-130.
80.Id. at 45-46.
81.Id. at 93-97.
82.Id. at 21-22.
83.Id.
84.Id. at 22.
85.Id. at 47-48.
86.Id. at 114-115.
87.Id. at 45.
||| (Tortona v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 202612, [January 17, 2018])
|| graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered
FIRST DIVISION in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether
[G.R. Nos. 116196-97. June 23, 1999.] the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.PABLO ADOVISO, defendant- attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception.
appellant. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel,stating that much faith and credit
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not
Romulo B. Macalintal for accused-appellant. advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to him.
SYNOPSIS 6. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; APPRECIATED. —
Adoviso was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of murder for feloniously Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of murder. Treachery qualified the
shooting Agunos and Vasquez several times with the use of a firearm in the latter's "camalig" on the killings to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
night of February 18, 1990. Eyewitnesses said they were able to identify Adoviso from the light person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
emanating from the gas lamp inside the "camalig" at the time. specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
Appellant was correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of murder qualified by treachery party might make. In other words, there is treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim who has
because the victims at the time were totally unaware of an impending assault. Appellant was properly not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without warning. The victims in this
identified by the eyewitnesses because of the two gas lamps sufficiently illuminating the place at the case were totally unaware of an impending assault — Rufino was sleeping and Emeterio was going
time of the crime. Further, the bamboo slats in the "camalig" could not have effectively obstructed down the stairs when they were shot. AICHaS
the eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four meters apart. Hence, DECISION
appellant's alibi crumbled in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the KAPUNAN, J p:
crimes. Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines
SYLLABUS Sur 2 declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Murder.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY; IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED; Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU),was
PROPER ILLUMINATION FOR THE SAME; UPHELD. — Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the originally charged with four unidentified persons who have, however, remained at large. The
determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. information 3 charging appellant with the Murder of Rufino Agunos under Criminal Case No. P-2079
However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear alleges:
to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 o'clock [sic]
Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. in the evening at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of
Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. In above-named accused, while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring,
this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place — the one placed inside confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
gunfire. CTHaSD feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several times with said firearms hitting the
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;UPHELD. — The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively latter on the different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause
obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four (4) meters of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino Agunos.
apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and That the crime complained of against the accused is not service connected.
appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the manner in which the crime is ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
committed. A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction Except for the name of the victim, the information in Criminal Case No. P-2080 with respect
to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s).It must remembered that appellant was not a to the killing of Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations. 4
complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years while Elmer had Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079
been acquainted with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant used to join the rabuz at and P-2080, the prosecution presented their version of the events that transpired on the evening of
the barracks. Familiarity with appellant's face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility February 18, 1990, as follows:
that they could have been mistaken as to his identity. The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan,
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;NOT AFFECTED BY FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFY ACCUSED. — Barangay Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a camalig where they stored
Appellant also considers as a "positive sign," Bonifacio's failure to immediately identify him as the harvested rice. The spouses preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living area of
perpetrator of the crime to the police. The delay in reporting his participation to the police was the camalig had walls of bamboo called salsag.This area was elevated from the ground. Three steps
however sufficiently explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was a led down to an awning (suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These slats were placed horizontally
member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen but another
appellant immediately lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of portion had a papag where the Vasquez’ grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their daughter Virginia,
the law. The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the would sleep whenever he tended the irrigation pump. The spouses' son Bonifacio occupied the other
perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a witness. The general house eight (8) meters from the camalig with his own son Elmer.
or common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in different ways. There is no standard form of At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee
human behavioral response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule as his wife was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in
by which witnesses to a crime must react. the papag.Anastacia had just finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four
4. ID.;ID.;ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED. — gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, "Why
Appellant's alibi crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the should you not be hit when in fact there are guns in front of you." Anastacia saw the "protruding edge
crimes. For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof that the defendant was not only of the gun" on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where
somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present at the Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who fired
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Appellant did not prove the their guns at her husband.
physical impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote from Sitio Palsong The Vasquez' son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots. Earlier
where he claimed to be when the incident happened. that evening, Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio
5. ID.;ID.;POLYGRAPH; NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. — A polygraph is an electromechanical was still talking when he noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latter's back against the bamboo
instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human wall. Bonifacio left Rufino snoring in the papag and went to the other house. Only a minute had
body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee's conscious attempt to deceive the passed after he had gone up when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer
questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lies deliberately immediately went down the front yard to investigate.
will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the
 Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a distance four (4) companions. He did not mention to Lopez and Canabe appellant's identity because he was
of eight (8) meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig,being shot by several persons "confused" about what had happened in their house.
from the outside. Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
the assailants, with a large built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder and disposing of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-
that was lighted inside the camalig.Of Rufino's assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask. 2080 as follows:
Appellant was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, joint judgment is hereby
where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his rendered:
father Emeterio shout "Pino," (referring to his grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding the accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty
carrying a gas lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach. beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him the
For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of Rufino Agunos,
persons aiming their firearms at the camalig.Except for appellant, each of these persons had a cover consisting of the widow, Evelyn T. Agunos and their four (4) children the sum of FIFTY
over their faces. Three (3) of them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while two (2) others THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency;
were near its door. Elmer saw these five (5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise finding said accused PABLO ADOVISO
the papag.Although his back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag.Elmer's grandfather guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him
was also hit on the stomach but he managed to go up the camalig.When appellant and his companion another penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of the late
by the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three others at the ditch, escaped to EMETERIO VASQUEZ, consisting of Anastacia Vasquez and Bonifacio Vasquez,
the banana plantation. Elmer, on the other hand, fled towards the coconut plantation. another sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency with all the
Upon returning to the camalig,Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He accessory penalties provided therefore in both cases and to pay the costs in both
also found Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his side with his body curled. instances.
Rufino told Elmer that he had been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took SO ORDERED. 9
Elmer's hand and put it on his back. Elmer then moved Rufino "sidewise." Upon returning to Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two
the camalig,Elmer carried his grandfather and bandaged his stomach with diapers. (2) eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and
In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Elmer Vasquez presented an "incredible" story because it is "highly improbable" that they could have
Inspector Antonio Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime "distinctly and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
with him. The police brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol crimes." 10 According to appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a
Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning. coconut tree, could not have identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside
The certification 5 dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the incident.
physician of the Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-year-old Rufino Agunos died of Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that he saw his grandfather shot by appellant, could have
four (4) gunshot wounds: at the inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh and the abdomen. The identified appellant because of the poor lighting coming from the gas lamp being carried by his
wounds at the inguinal area and the thigh bore contusion collars. The same physician certified that grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's grandfather was "a small can
Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age, sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical area, about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette" and the lamp inside
lumbar area, hypogastrium, anterior aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the right the camalig "was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light emanating therefrom
forearm, anteromedial aspect left arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm. Four (4) of these was upwards and not sidewise." 11
gunshot wounds had contusion collars — at the paraumbilical area, the hypogastrium, the right Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could
forearm and the left arm. 6 have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are
Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense. favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose headquarters was located in malefactor should normally be accepted. 12 Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is
Barangay Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, he was sufficient to allow identification of persons. 13 Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight
in Sitio Burabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of
Francisco Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr. and PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks in the store of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. 14
Honoria Tragante until around 11:00 p.m. LLjur In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place — the one placed inside
Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of
likewise testified that from 7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18, 1990, he and appellant gunfire. Appellant's contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the
had a drinking spree at the Tragante store. He distinctly remembered that date because it was the place because it was placed inside a can is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not describing either of the
fiesta of Balatan. gas lamps during the incident. The defense counsel at the trial and appellant's counsel
To support his denial, appellant presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of police and misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his grandmother on that matter. Thus, Elmer testified:
SPO2 Claro Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a police certification 7 prepared ATTY. CORTES:
by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated "by unidentified Q Is it not that the lamp you said placed along the door, which is already marked as
armed men." Lopez said that he (Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital lamp, is that not this lamp was placed inside a kerosene can as testified to
who were then still conscious. The victims told him that they did not know who shot them or why they by your grandmother so that the cat could not cause it to fall?
were shot. A It was placed just on the floor not inside the can." 15 (Emphasis supplied.)
SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up investigation he conducted For her part, Anastacia testified as follows:
several days after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him that he (Bonifacio) "vividly saw the ATTY. CORTES:
incident and recognized" appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that the killings had xxx xxx xxx.
some something to do with land dispute between Bonifacio's parents and the Galicia family. Q Because you were already about to retire, the doors and windows were already
The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph closed, is that correct?
Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on A Yes, sir.
appellant. In Polygraph Report No. 900175, 8 Lucena opined that appellant's "polygrams revealed Q That you also shut down or closed the light, is that correct?
that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant" to the A No, sir, we even placed the kerosene lamp inside a can.
investigation of the crimes. Q You said, you placed the lamp inside a can so that the light is going up, is that
In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the police, he correct?
did not identify appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of appellant who was a A Yes, sir.
member of the CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that he recognized appellant Q So, the light was not illuminating sidewise because it was inside a can?
as one of the perpetrators of the crime although he told them that he did not recognize appellant's A When we left, I got the kerosene lamp and brought it with me.
 ATTY. CORTES: subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. 31 However, American courts
I think, the witness did not get the question right, Your Honor. almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of
COURT: cdll establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution
Repeat the question. seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a
ATTY. CORTES: reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. 32 The rule is no different in this
Q My question Madam Witness is,when you were about to retire? jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, 33 stating that much faith and credit should not be vested upon
A The lamp was placed on the floor where my husband was drinking coffee. a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why
COURT: this rule should not apply to him.
Q Who are the persons you are referring to as having left when you placed the light Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery
inside the can? qualified the killings to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
A My son, Bonifacio, and the policemen, Your Honor, when the(y) brought Emeterio against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and Rufino to the hospital. 16 (emphasis supplied). and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a can was placed over offended party might make. 34 In other words, there is treachery when the attack on an unarmed
it only after the incident when Anastacia left with her son and the police to bring the victims to the victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without
hospital. warning. 35 The victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault — Rufino was
The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' sleeping and Emeterio was going down the stairs when they were shot.
view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four (4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural WHEREFORE,the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. llcd
reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not SO ORDERED.
ascertain their identities, and the manner in which the crime is committed. 17 A relative will naturally Davide, Jr.,C.J.,Melo, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of
his relative(s). 18 It must be remembered that appellant was not a complete stranger to the Footnotes
eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years 19 while Elmer had been acquainted with 1.Penned by Judge Martin P. Badong, Jr.
him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant used to join the rabuz at the 12.People v. Cogonon,262 SCRA 693 (1996).
barracks. 20 Familiarity with appellant's face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility 13.People v. Fabrigas, Jr.,261 DVTS 436 (1996);People v. Penillos,205 SCRA 546 (1992);People
that they could have been mistaken as to his identity. v. Loste,210 SCRA 614 (1992).
Appellant's allegation that it was "improbable" for him to have committed the crimes 14.People v. Villaruel,330 Phil. 79, 89 (1996).
without a mask, unlike the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not contrary to 17.People v. Ramos,260 SCRA 402 (1996).
human experience for a person to commit a crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to 18.People v. Sotes,260 SCRA 353 (1996).
them. Indeed, some may even take pride in their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act. 22.People v. Mendoza,223 SCRA 108, (1993).
Appellant also considers as a "positive sign," Bonifacio's failure to immediately identify him 23.People v. Paynor,261 SCRA 615 (1996).
as the perpetrator of the crime to the police. 21 The delay in reporting his participation to the police 24.People v. Teves,321 Phil. 837 (1995).
was however sufficiently explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was 25.People v. Santos,270 SCRA 650 (1997).
a member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying 26.People v. Alshaika,261 SCRA 637 (1996).
appellant immediately lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of 30.WEST’S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY, Special Deluxe Edition (1986).
the law. The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the 31.WORDS AND PHRASES, "Lie Detector."
perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a witness. 22 The 32.29A Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 1007.
general or common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in different ways. 23 There is no standard 33.86 SCRA 511 (1978).
form of human behavioral response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no 34.Art. 14 (16), Revised Penal Code.
standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react. 24 35.People v. Abapo,239 SCRA 469 (1994).
There is no merit in appellant's contention that Bonifacio had a motive in implicating him. ||| (People v. Adoviso, G.R. Nos. 116196-97, [June 23, 1999], 368 PHIL 297-312)
According to appellant, Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia family to kill Bonifacio's
father who had earlier won in a land dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk of motive on
the part of Bonifacio inasmuch as two credible witnesses had positively identified appellant as one of
the participants in the killing of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos.
Appellant's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes. 25 For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof that the
defendant was not only somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he could not be
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. 26 Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which
is not exactly remote from Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the incident happened. Both
places are within the Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance between the
two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even without any means of transportation. 27 On the
other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong, Antero Esteron, testified that the distance could
be traveled in thirty-five (35) minutes by "trimobile" or private vehicle. 28
Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was not even sure where
he was and who were his companions at the time the crimes were committed. We quote the
observation of the trial court on this point:
On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of
"mere conjectures and speculations," 29 appellant argues that the negative result of the polygraph
test should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records
certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an
examinee's conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. 30 The theory behind a polygraph or lie
detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a
|| hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even
THIRD DIVISION assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from
[G.R. No. 109775. November 14, 1996.] appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE ENCARNACION appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.
MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused- appellant. 6. ID.; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CONVICTION BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. EVIDENCE; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES. — Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain
SYLLABUS which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; NON-PRESENTATION OF THE POLICE BLOTTER IN COURT AS others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
EVIDENCE IS NOT FATAL TO THE PROSECUTION'S CASE; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant derided the non- convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one
presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
implicated right away by Batin to the crime. We do not believe, however, that it was necessary for the of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non- 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — In this case, there were at least five
presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's case. Entries in the police blotter are merely (5) circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events which by their "concordant combination
corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as and cumulative effect," satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the appellant, specifically: (1)
the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his
indispensable. cdasia right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; (2) Malaki
2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL NOTICE; NATURAL RETICENCE OF MOST PEOPLE TO GET INVOLVED IN sustained multiple stab wounds and he died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to severe external
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS. — Even assuming arguendo that Rondon hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds"; (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6,
and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from 1991, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a stone at the seashore
commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony less credible. The non- in Barangay Hingatungan; (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he
disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the accompanied several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; and (5) appellant's
occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of flight and his subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident. CAcIES
most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is 8. ID.; ID.; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; THAT A PERSON FOUND IN POSSESSION OF A THING
of judicial notice. SDHCac TAKEN IN THE DOING OF A RECENT WRONGFUL ACT IS THE TAKER AND DOER OF THE WHOLE ACT;
3. ID.; ID.; THE MATTER OF ASSIGNING VALUES TO THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES IS A APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance
FUNCTION BEST PERFORMED BY THE TRIAL COURT. — The consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which
that the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial
highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the established rule of evidence, as the court was, as to why appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found
matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from appellant's purported apprehension other
court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness' demeanor, conduct and attitude at than the logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is
the trial. And although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same.
in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at 9. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; MUST FAIL IN VIEW OF THE
are clearly unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case. DEFENSE'S FAILURE TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE NEGATING THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED AT
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; NOT THE PLACE OF THE CRIME OR IN ITS VICINITY AT THE TIME OF ITS COMMISSION; CASE AT BAR. — As
APPLICABLE WHERE THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE EXCLUDED IS NOT AN INCRIMINATING STATEMENT the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution
BUT AN OBJECT EVIDENCE. — The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental witnesses, it becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to present any
law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, corroboration. Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when the crime was committed is
". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at
." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his the place of the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. In this case, appellant himself
will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be admitted that his house was just about eighty (80) meters away from the house of Malaki. It was,
excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question therefore, not impossible for him to have been physically present at the place of the commission of
now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said: "If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility was ever adduced by him at the
not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in trial. ETDSAc
whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, DECISION
with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence FRANCISCO, J p:
anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with 1 and convicted of the special complex
surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely crime of robbery with homicide, 2 was meted by the trial court 3 the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, but testimonial compulsion." CHTcSE He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
5. ID.; ID.; INFRACTIONS OF THE SO-CALLED "MIRANDA RIGHTS" WILL RENDER (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. 4
INADMISSIBLE ONLY THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OR ADMISSION MADE DURING CUSTODIAL In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court committed the
INVESTIGATION. — Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of following errors, to wit:
evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, the so-called "I
"Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC)
by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. THEY REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED 'KNOWLEDGE' OF THE CRIME MORE THAN FIVE
Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.
the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written II
waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE WALLET AND ITS
constitutional shortcuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS
certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the III
robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE against immediate neighbors, as in this case, 16 is of judicial notice. 17 At any rate, the consistent
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of
DOUBT. 5 witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. 18 This is the
The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee in its Brief, and duly established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a
supported by the evidence on record: function best performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness'
"On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. 19 And although the rule admits of certain exceptions,
attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was namely: when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or
busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence, 20 we found none in
June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14). this case.
"Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of
Rondon was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Malaki's wallet 21 together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; 22 (2) his
Rondon came from his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters identification card; 23 and (3) bunch of keys, 24 violates his right against self-
distant from Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24). incrimination. 25 Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because during the custodial
"Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's
proceeded directly to the store, to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our
appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs.
boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor 'struggling' for his life' United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
(hovering between life and death) (Ibid.). communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
"Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27 It does not apply to the instant case
also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or 'Manolo') rushing out through the front door of where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
illumination coming from a pressure lamp ('petromax') inside the store, Rondon "If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical
clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22). control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever
"Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his
met Rondon (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to
Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a
went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the
lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion." 28
and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16- Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence
17)." 6 pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz:
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in revealing what they knew have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
about the incident. He posits that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
September 17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit. services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly concluded that Rondon except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
and Batin implicated the appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The xxx xxx xxx
aforementioned date however, was merely the date 7 when Rondon and Batin executed their "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17
respective affidavits, 8 narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." (Italics ours.)
bolo stained with blood and rushing out of Malaki's store. As to appellant's claim of delay suffice it to xxx xxx xxx"
state that extant from the records are ample testimonial evidence negating appellant's protestation, These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform.
to wit. (1) after having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant was the only during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the
person they saw running away from the crime scene; 9 (2) Beloy and Batin reported the crime with issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, 29 is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
the CAFGU detachment in their barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent
Malaki on that fateful night; 10 and (3) Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation.
Station. 11 Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional
Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's
could prove, if appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime. 12 We do not wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts
believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet
aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys
case. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to
of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the
such, its presentation as evidence is not indispensable. 13 Besides, if appellant believed that he was same will not detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and
not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.
utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach Batin's credibility as witness. 14 Having We now come to appellant's third assignment of error where he demurs on the
failed to do so appellant cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which prosecution's evidence, contending that they are insufficient to sustain his conviction.
appellant himself should have done. Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we ruled that there can
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an
15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the
render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. 30 In order that circumstantial evidence
appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is
experience. 15 In fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable 15.People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 (1985); See also People v. Danico, 208 SCRA 472 (1992),
doubt. 31 In this case, there were at least five (5) circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of and People v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991).
events which by their "concordant combination and cumulative effect", satisfy the requirements for 16.The house of Malaki is just 80 meters away from appellant's house; while the house of witness
the conviction of the appellant, 32 specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose Rondon is 150 meters away from Malaki's house.
credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store 17.People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 118315, June 20, 1996; People v . Sabellano, 198 SCRA 196 (1991); People
seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; 33 (2) Malaki sustained multiple stab wounds 34 and he v. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991).
died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab 18.People v. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 (1994); People v. Nimo, 227 SCRA 69 (1993); People v. de la
wounds"; 35 (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991, accompanied by some Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 (1993); People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 (1993); People v. Caraig, 202
policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a stone at the seashore in Barangay SCRA 357 (1991); People v. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125 (1985).
Hingatungan; 36 (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he 19.See People v. Bondoc, 232 SCRA 478 (1994); People v. Ocampo, 226 SCRA 1 (1993); People v. Juma,
accompanied several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; 37 and (5) appellant's 220 SCRA 432 (1993); People v. Bañez, 214 SCRA 109 (1992) citing People v. Abrogar, 73
flight and his subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident. 38 SCRA 466 (1979),
On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not inspire belief. He maintains that 20.See People v. Gumahin, 21 SCRA 729 (1967); People v. Secapuri, et. al., 16 SCRA 199 (1966).
on that fateful night he was in his house together with his wife. He claims that they had just arrived 25.Constitution, Article III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
from a gambling spree allegedly in the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the 26.218 U.S. 245.
defense did not bother to call appellant's wife to the witness stand to corroborate appellant' s alibi. 27.U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145, 152.
Neither did it present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the 28.4 Wigmore 2263.
appellant in the said place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the defense of 29.Rule 128, Sec 3, Revised Rules of Court.
alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses, 39 it 30.People v. Adriano, 226 SCRA 131, 135 (1993), citing People v. Galendez, 210 SCRA 360 (1992);
becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to present any See People v. Alvero, Jr., 224 SCRA 16 (1993); People v. Briones, 219 SCRA 134 (1993); People
corroboration. 40 Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when the crime was committed v. Ocampo, 218 SCRA 609 (1993); People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 (1991) People v. Ganohon,
is not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at 196 SCRA 431 (1991); People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942).
the place of the crime on in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. 41 In this case, appellant 31.Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
himself admitted that his house was just about eighty (80) meters away from the house of 32.People v. Alvero, Jr., 224 SCRA 16, 28 (1993).
Malaki. 42 It was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been physically present at the place of 33.TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, pp. 15, 18, 23; TSN, Florencio Ronton, May 22, 1992, pp. 20-22,
the commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility was ever adduced by 31.
him at the trial. 34.Exhibit "C-l", Bill of Exhibits, p. 3.
Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance while gathering shells 35.Exhibit "B-l", Bill of Exhibits, p. l; See also Exhibit "C", Bill of Exhibits, p. 3.
along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the 36.TSN, Elmer Ladica, June 9, 1992, pp. 4-5.
wallet underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to 37.TSN, Jose Malimit, September 23, 1992, p. 8-9.
why appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found Malaki's wallet by 38.TSN, Florencio Rondon, May 22, 1992, p. 22; TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, p. 22.
chance. No inference can be drawn from appellant's purported apprehension other than the logical 39.People v. John Jenn Porras, G.R. No. 114263-64, March 29, 1996; People v. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620
conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession (1995), citing People v. Claudio, 216 SCRA 647 (1992); People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675
of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same. 43 (1993)
In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery, appellant was correctly 40.People v. Malonzo, 212 SCRA 85 (1992); People v. Paciente (1992); See People v. Lazo, 198 SCRA
convicted by the trial court of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and 274 (1991).
penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. 41.People v. John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo, G.R. 114263-64, March 29, 1996; People v. Manero, Jr.,
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 218 SCRA 89 (1993), citing People v. Pugal, 215 SCRA 247 (1992).
SO ORDERED. 42.TSN, Jose Malimit, July 2, 1992, p. 10.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ ., concur. 43.People v. Alhambra, 233 SCRA 604, 613 (1994).
||| (People v. Malimit, G.R. No. 109775, [November 14, 1996], 332 PHIL 190-206)
Footnotes
1.Information dated 28 November 1991; Record, p. 10.
2.Punishable under Article 294 (1), Revised Penal Code.
3.Regional Trial Court, Southern Leyte, Branch 26.
4.RTC decision dated 18 January 1993; Rollo, pp. 57-67.
5.Rollo, p. 44.
6.Rollo, pp. 79-81.
7.Exhibit "2-B", Bill of Exhibits, p. 5; Exhibit "3-B", Bill of Exhibits, p. 6.
8.Exhibit "2", Bill of Exhibits, p. S; Exhibit "3", Bill of Exhibits, p. 6.
9.TSN, Eutiquio Beloy, May 22, 1992, p. 10.
10.TSN, Edilberto Batin, June 9, 1992, p. 19.
11.Id., pp. 20-21.
12.Brief for the Appellant, p. 8; Rollo, p. 51.
13.See People v. Comia, 236 SCRA 185 (1994); See also People v. Watson, 278 Ala. 425, 178 So. 2d
819, 821 (1965).
14.Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 11. Impeachment of the adverse party's witness. — A witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by
evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad, or by evidence that
he has made at some other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not
by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of
the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
(Emphasis ours)
|| The police discovered the victim's panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside
EN BANC her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
[G.R. No. 150224. May 19, 2004.] within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns's
"KAWIT", appellant. death, 11 however, he was placed under police custody.
DECISION On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer
PER CURIAM p: Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He's running away!).
Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running
Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in recaptured him. 12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21,
the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation. 1 After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information: penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting I
upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will. II
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2 THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
The facts are: OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Appellant's contentions are unmeritorious.
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn's friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
appellant earlier that morning. 3 influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to
their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the
Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of
leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. 14 Absent
Kathylyn was left alone in the house. 4 any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge's assessment of
of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect. 15 Where there is nothing to show that the
door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full
replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. 5 faith and credit. 16
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant The weight of the prosecution's evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-
descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as
the house. 6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife the accused committed the crime. 17
used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang. 7 Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he (5) incised, were found on the victim's abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to
was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be spill out of her body. 18 Rigor mortis of the victim's body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined
getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant's eyes the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated
were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis. 19 In other words,
important to tell him. Judilyn's husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This
the back of the house of Isabel. 8 was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician,
open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted
empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She on the victim, 20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim.
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. 9 only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. 21 In addition, it is apparent from the
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a
body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant's assault on her
given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, virtue. 22
with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police. 10 specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant's gene
At 9:00 that evening, SPO4 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was type. ESHcTD
found in Isabel Dawang's house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A
found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds. person's DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person's lifetime; the DNA
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down in a person's blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair,
the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m. earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. 24 Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant
exception of identical twins. 25 escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to indicative of guilt. 35
link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken
been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 36
from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. 26 Incidents involving sexual assault In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample
would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as
the victim's body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
could also be transferred to the victim's body during the assault. 27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected against testimonial compulsion. 37 The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal
from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
suspect at the scene of the crime. 28 evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this We ruled in People v. Rondero 38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair
case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method. from the accused under duress.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, 39 where
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The
who conducted the tests. 29 accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the offense of which he is accused.
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. 30 Based on Dr. de It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which
Ungria's testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
that of the extracts subject of examination. 31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
which are identical with semen taken from the victim's vaginal canal. 32 Verily, a DNA match exists facto law.
between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of
during the course of the trial. DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has Appellant's twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence
developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive. and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang's
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. barangay. 40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. 34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the alibi.
DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on
human genetics and molecular biology. reasonable doubt.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant's semen found in the victim's vaginal Appellant's assertion cannot be sustained.
canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than
Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant's wife left the house a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from value." 41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from
down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 its admission.
p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from
was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the
pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond
Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) reasonable doubt. 42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim's vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one
or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide,
else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, SO ORDERED.
we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty. Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ ., concur.
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of Davide, Jr., C .J . and Puno, J ., are on official leave.
the culprit. 44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she Footnotes
last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She 1.Decision penned by Judge Milnar T. Lammawin on 27 August 2001.
witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel's house and proceeding to the back of the 2.Original Records, p. 1.
same house. 46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter 3.TSN, Direct Examination of Isabel Dawang, 30 September 1998, pp. 296–306.
revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The victim 4.Id. at 317–319.
told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and 5.TSN, Direct Examination of Beverly Deneng, 27 January 1999, pp. 531–540, 568–576. See also Exhibit
violated body was found dead in her grandmother's house on June 25, 1998. 48 In addition, Judilyn "W", Joint Affidavit of Anita Wania and Beverly Deneng executed on 3 July 1998, Original
also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, Records, p. 17.
"this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family." 49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present 6.TSN, Cross Examination of Judilyn Pas-a, 30 September 1998, p. 377.
during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his 7.Id. at 275–324. See also TSN, supra note 7 at 356–358.
wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your 8.Id. at 314–323, 339–344.
relatives . . ." 50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant. 9.Id. at 267–270.
Thus, appellant's motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant 10.Id. at 271–273.
case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of 11.TSN, Direct Examination of SPO4 Melchor Faniswa, 9 September 1998, pp. 9–20. See also TSN, Cross-
witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of Examination of SPO4 Melchor Faniswa, 9 September 1998, pp. 21–38.
the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it 12.TSN, Cross-Examination and Re-Direct Examination of Police Officer Orlando Manuel, 9 September
may be inferred. 51 1998, pp. 76–84. See also TSN, Direct and Cross-Examination of SPO1 Felix Turingan, 9
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the September 1998, pp. 88–96.
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by 13.People v. Remudo, G.R. No. 127905, 30 August 2001, 364 SCRA 71.
reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the 14.People v. Santos, G.R. No. 137993, 11 April 2002, 380 SCRA 608, 613.
victim's lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise. 15.Id.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had 16.People v. Payot, G.R. No. 119352, 8 June 1999, 308 SCRA 43, 62–63.
carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, 17.People v. Cabug, G.R. No. 123149, 27 March 2001, 355 SCRA 391.
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of 18.See TSN, Direct Examination of Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, 16 September 1998, pp. 106–157.
force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman. 52 However, in rape committed by close kin, 19.TSN, Direct Examination of Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, 16 September 1998, pp. 116–118.
such as the victim's father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not 20.See TSN, Direct Examination of Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, 16 September 1998, pp. 266–304.
necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. 53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the 21.Id. at 266–304.
place of violence and intimidation. 54 The fact that the victim's hymen is intact does not negate a 22.See Exhibits "F-1", "G", "H", Original Records, pp. 6A-6C.
finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, 23.Peter Sudbery, Human Molecular Genetics (2nd ed. 2002); 1999–2000 Pocket Part, p. 51.
even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. 55 The strength and 24.K.M. Turman, "Understanding DNA Evidence: A Guide for Victim Service Providers," OVC Bulletin
dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during (U.S. Department of Justice, April 2001), p. 1.
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the 25.84 ALR 4th 313.
victim is of tender age. 56 26.Id.
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim's aunt. He is seven years older 27.Id.
than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his 28.Id. at 1–2.
mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the 29.People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209.
house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law's house. Being 30.Dr. de Ungria is Head of the Genetic Engineering Laboratory, University of the Philippines, Assistant
a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral Supervisor of the DNA Analysis Laboratory, University of the Philippines, and Assistant
ascendancy over the victim. Professor at the Ateneo de Manila University. In December 1999, Dr. de Ungria was a 1999
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by Jose Rizal Young Awardee for the Professional Sector for her participation in the identification
reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court of the body of a victim of the Paco fire. She commenced working as Assistant Supervisor of the
maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, U.P. DNA Laboratory in February 1999 after returning from Sydney, Australia. Prior to February
they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that 1999, she worked as a DNA Analyst. An alumna of the Philippine Science High School, Dr. de
the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar. Ungria obtained a Bachelor of Science (Honours) degree in Biology at Macquarie University,
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00, 57 actual damages incurred by and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Molecular Microbiology at the University of New South
the family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00, 58 and moral Wales, in Australia. She is a member of the Philippine Society of Microbiology and an associate
damages of P75,000.00 59 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. member of the National Research Council of the Philippines. See TSN, Direct Examination of
Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not Dr. Ma. Corazon Abogado de Ungria, 18 February 2000, pp. 739–743.
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 60 31.TSN, 18 February 2000, pp. 789–790. See Exhibits "XX" and "YY-1", Original Records, p. 144, 149–
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, 150. See also TSN, Continuation of Direct Examination of Dr. de Ungria, 18 April 2000, p. 842.
Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the 32.TSN, 18 April 2000, p. 842. See also Exhibits "Z", "ZZ" and "ZZ-1", Original Records, pp. 152–154.
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be 33.509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L.Ed. 2d 469.
ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 34.Rules of Court, Rule 128, sec. 4.
P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of 35.Decision, pp. 46–48. See Rollo, pp. 300–302.
exemplary damages is DELETED. 36.Rules of Court, Rule 133, sec. 4.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, 37.Alih v. Gastro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987, 151 SCRA 279.
as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to 38.G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383.
the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power. 39.G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835.
Costs de oficio. 40.See People v. Manguera, G.R. No. 139906, 5 March 2003.
 41.I Wigmore on Evidence §28, at 409–410.
42.R.J. Francisco, Evidence (3d Ed., 1996), p. 577, citing Shaw, C.J., Commonwealth v. Webster, Benis'
Rep. Of the Trial, 469; Com. V. Costley, 118 Mass. 1.
43.Words and Phrases, "Moral Certainty", citing Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 55, 57.
44.People v. Verzo, G.R. No. L-22517, 26 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1403.
45.TSN, Cross Examination of Judilyn Pas-a, 30 September 1998, pp. 376–380.
46.Id., p. 324.
47.Id. at 332. See Exhibits "Q," "Q-1" and "Q-2," Original Records, pp. 13–14.
48.Id. at 334.
49.Id. at 333.
50.Id. at 336–338.
51.Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 649 (1949).
52.Articles 266-A and 266-B, Revised Penal Code.
53.People v. Remudo, supra.
54.People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 137480, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 161, 172.
55.People v. Añonuevo, G.R. No. 137843, 12 October 2001, 367 SCRA 249.
56.People v. Llanita, G.R. No. 134101, 5 September 2001, 364 SCRA 519.
57.People v. Manguera, supra; People v. Seranilla, G.R. Nos. 113022-24, 15 December 2000, 348 SCRA
227; People v. Payot, G.R. No. 119352, 8 June 1999, 308 SCRA 43.
58.Arts. 2199 and 2202, Civil Code, Art. 2199, states that "[e]xcept as provided by law or by stipulation,
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved." Art. 2202 provides that "[i]n crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall
be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant."
59.People v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 136299, 29 August 2003.
60.Article 2230, Civil Code.

||| (People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, [May 19, 2004], 472 PHIL 556-576)
|| In the service of his sentence, accused who is a detention prisoner shall be
FIRST DIVISION credited with the entire period during which he had undergone preventive
[G.R. No. 182417. April 3, 2013.] imprisonment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby forfeited in favor of the
GONZALES y SANTOS, also known as TAKYO, accused-appellant. government. The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over the same to
DECISION the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposal thereof.
BERSAMIN, J p: SO ORDERED. 7
The State, and no other party, has the responsibility to explain the lapses in the procedures Ruling of the CA
taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the explanation by the State, the Gonzales appealed, insisting that the RTC erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the
evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground Prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Finding no error on the part of the RTC, however, the CA affirmed the conviction of
The Case Gonzales, 8 to wit:
Alberto S. Gonzales, also known as Takyo, appeals the affirmance by the Court of Appeal (CA) of The sale of illegal drugs having been established beyond reasonable doubt,
his conviction for violating Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs We are constrained to uphold petitioners' conviction. Evidently, the errors assigned
Act of 2002) handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Malolos, Bulacan. and the arguments in support thereof turn on the issue of credibility. It is an
Antecedents entrenched rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
On June 16, 2003, Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who, unlike
II, of Republic Act No. 9165 under the following information, to wit: appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant's
That on or about the 13th day of June, 2003, in the Municipality of San demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more
Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. There is nothing
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did on record to justify the deviation from this rule. Moreover, the allegation of appellant
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, that his constitutional right was violated cannot overcome the presumption of
dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed regularity in the performance of official duties enjoyed by the officers tasked to
transparent plastic sachet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.194 enforce the law. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of
gram. the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 EcIDaA performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to the operation deserve full
At arraignment, Gonzales entered a plea of not guilty. 2 faith and credit. AIDSTE
Version of the Prosecution WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the APPEALED decision
On June 12, 2003, an informant reported to the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group (PDEG) based is AFFIRMED.
in Camp General Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan, that Gonzales was engaging in illegal drug pushing. On SO ORDERED.
June 13, 2003, Police Chief Inspector Celedonio I. Morales planned to mount a buy-bust operation against Issues
Gonzales, and designated PO1 Eduardo B. Dimla, Jr. to act as the poseur buyer and PO2 Roel S. Chan to Hence, Gonzales has appealed, 9 still insisting that the Prosecution did not prove his guilt for
serve as the back-up/arresting officer. PO1 Dimla marked with his own initials "ED" each of the two violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 beyond reasonable doubt. 10
P100.00 bills to be used as the buy-bust money, and then recorded the marked bills in the police blotter. Ruling
At noontime of that same day, PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chan met with the informant at Krus na Daan, San The appeal has merit.
Rafael, Bulacan, and the three of them proceeded to Banca-Banca, San Rafael, Bulacan, where the house To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined
of Gonzales was located. After PO2 Chan posted himself beyond possible view of the suspect, PO1 Dimla and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the State must establish the concurrence of
and the informant approached Gonzales, with the informant introducing PO1 Dimla to Gonzales as a buyer the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the
of shabu worth P200.00. Gonzales handed to PO1 Dimla a plastic sachet containing white substances, and poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as
in turn PO1 Dimla handed the two marked P100.00 bills to Gonzales. At that point, PO1 Dimla removed his evidence of the corpus delicti. 11
cap, the pre-arranged signal, in reaction to which PO2 Chan then rushed forward and arrested Gonzales. Anent the second element, it is indispensable for the State to establish that the dangerous drugs
PO1 Dimla then immediately marked the plastic sachet with his initials "ED." 3 subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous
The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office certified that the contents the plastic sachet drugs presented in court as evidence. The identity of the dangerous drugs is essential to proving
were 0.194 gram of shabu. 4 the corpus delicti. 12 To achieve that end, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21 (a) of
Version of the Defense the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) define the procedures to be
Gonzales denied the accusation. He attested that he was only resting in front of his house in the followed by the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs.
afternoon of June 13, 2003, when five armed men approached and forced him inside his house; that they Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 relevantly provides:
queried him on the whereabouts of his father, but he told them he did not know; that they prevented his Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
mother from leaving the house to seek help from barangay officials; and that after searching his house, Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
they brought him to Camp General Alejo Santos. 5 Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Almarie, Gonzales' sister, corroborated his version. She narrated that in the afternoon of June 13, Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
2003, five armed men entered their house; that when she tried to follow them inside, they shut the door plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
at her; that, however, she was able to see inside through the window; that she heard the men querying well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
her brother on the whereabouts of their father; and that she reported the incident to seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: HcSETI
the barangay chairman, but when she and the barangay chairman reached the house, the men and her (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
brother were no longer there. 6 aCTHDA shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
Ruling of the RTC photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
Giving credence to the narrative of PO1 Dimla as the Prosecution's sole witness, the RTC such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
convicted Gonzales of the crime charged, viz.: representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court finds accused Alberto public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
Gonzales y Santos @ Takyo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of a copy thereof;
Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive xxx xxx xxx
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE Similarly, Section 21 (a), IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently states:
IMPRISONMENT AND A FINE OF P500,000.00. xxx xxx xxx
 (a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the Although PO1 Dimla, the State's lone witness, 22 testified that he had marked the sachet
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and of shabu with his own initials of "ED" following Gonzales' arrest, 23 he did not explain, either in his court
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had been done in the presence of
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a Gonzales, or done immediately upon the arrest of Gonzales. Nor did he show by testimony or otherwise
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected who had taken custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and who had subsequently
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still later on, to the laboratory. Given the possibility
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to the laboratory for examination, there is now no assurance
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police that the quantity presented here as evidence was the same article that had been the subject of the sale
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is by Gonzales. The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance of shabu after PO1 Dimla's marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court. We hardly need to reiterate that the chain of
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending custody, which Section 1 (b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, supra, explicitly describes as "the
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources
items; of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt
xxx xxx xxx in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction," demands such record of
These provisions obviously demand strict compliance, for only by such strict compliance may be movements and custody of seized items to include the identities and signatures of the persons who held
eliminated the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution of evidence and the unlawful and malicious temporary custody of the seized item, the dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in
prosecution of the weak and unwary that they are intended to prevent. Such strict compliance is also the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
consistent with the doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the Government and A further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer PO1 Dimla nowhere recalled in
liberally in favor of the accused. 13 court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the physical inventory and photographing of the shabu subject
The procedures underscore the value of establishing the chain of custody vis-Ã -vis the of the sale by Gonzales. In fact, in their joint affidavit of arrest, 24 PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chua did not
dangerous drugs. The Prosecution does not prove the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 either mention any inventory and photographing. The omission can only mean that no such inventory and
when the dangerous drugs are missing, or when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the photographing were done by them. The omission of the inventory and photographing exposed another
seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and photographing to be made in the
court. 14 Accordingly, the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) — the policy-making and strategy-formulating presence of the accused or his representative, or within the presence of any representative from the
body in the planning and formulation of policies and programs on drug prevention and control tasked to media, Department of Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of
develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced national drug abuse prevention and the inventory, were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR.
control strategy 15 — has expressly defined chain of custody involving the dangerous drugs and other By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-compliance with
substances in the following terms in Section 1 (b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 16 to the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the
wit: AaEcDS dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. But the non-compliance with the procedures,
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of to be excusable, must have to be justified by the State's agents themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of tendered no justification in court for the non-compliance with the procedures, the exception did not apply
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to herein. The absolution of Gonzales should then follow, 25 for we cannot deny that the observance of the
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of chain of custody as defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very
seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of Court states that the unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower
the final disposition; courts. 26 IDSEAH
Given the high concern for the due recording of the authorized movements and custody of the WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the decision promulgated on September 28, 2007 by the Court of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the Appeals; and ACQUIT appellant ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS, a.k.a. TAKYO, due to the failure of
presentation as evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and recovered during the illegal sale the Prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. 17 Without such dangerous drugs ACCORDINGLY, we DIRECT the immediate release from detention of ALBERTO
being presented as evidence, the State does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translated GONZALES y SANTOS, a.k.a. TAKYO, unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
from Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by someone of the particular offense The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith implement this decision, and
charged. 18 Corpus delicti, as the Court puts it in People v. Roluna, 19 is: to report his action hereon to this Court within 10 days from receipt hereof.
. . . the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact No pronouncement on costs of suit.
that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it SO ORDERED.
means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
charged. The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2)
things, viz.: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of Footnotes
the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause 1.Records, p. 2.
of this act or result. 20 2.Id. at 20.
The first stage in the chain of custody is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. 3.Id. at 49-55.
Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the 4.Id. at 8.
poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the 5.Id. at 123-132.
apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, 6.Id. at 147-158.
because succeeding handlers of the dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. 7.CA rollo, p. 15.
Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other 8.Rollo, pp. 2-11; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, and concurred in by Associate
material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario.
proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. 21 In short, the 9.Id. at 88.
marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is 10.Id. at 37.
indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. STaIHc 11.People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295, 303.
12.Mallillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 631-632.
 13.People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257, 267-268.
14.People v. Coreche, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350, 356-357.
15.Section 77, Republic Act No. 9165.
16.Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment pursuant to Section 21, Article II of the IRR of
RA No. 9165 in relation to Section 81 (b), Article IX of RA No. 9165.
17.People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 718.
18.9A Words & Phrases, p. 517, citing Hilyard v. State, 214 P. 2d 953, 28 A.L.R. 2d 961.
19.G.R. No. 101797, March 24, 1994, 231 SCRA 446, 452.
20.Citing 23 C.J.S. 623-624 (italicized portions are found in the original text, but bold emphasis is
supplied).
21.People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 176350, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 279, 289-290.
22.Records, pp. 47-58.
23.Id. at 54.
24.Records, pp. 5-6.
25.People v. Relato, G.R. No. 173794, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 260, 270-271.
26.See, e.g., People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647; People v. Alejandro,
supra, note 21; People v. Salonga, G.R. No. 186390, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 783; People
v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92; People v. Cantalejo, G.R. No.
182790, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 777.
||| (People v. Gonzales y Santos, G.R. No. 182417, [April 3, 2013], 708 PHIL 121-133)
|| WHEREAS, On 23 January 2002, the said Office returned said
SECOND DIVISION copies of Municipal Ordinance No. 2001-013 for suppose
[G.R. No. 228610. March 20, 2019.] transmittal to the [Sangguniang Panlalawigan] by the
FLORO T. TADENA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. [Sangguniang Bayan] Secretary, however, it was observed that
DECISION page one of such was substituted and the provisions contained
J.C. REYES, JR., J p: at paragraph 5 thereof was changed into: "The position
A municipal mayor, who changed the wordings of a municipal ordinance, is guilty of [']MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR['] shall be created and the 2% of
falsification by a public officer of a public document. the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2002 be implemented. x
The Facts x x"
The Court adopts the concise narration of facts of the Sandiganbayan (SB), which is based Thereafter, the [Sangguniang Bayan] enacted and implemented the Final
on documentary and testimonial evidence and stipulations of the parties. Version. 1 [The Final Version contained the same matters as the Second Version
On 17 October 2001, the accused [Floro T. Tadena], then the Municipal except the alleged falsified details. The First and Second Versions were not
Mayor of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, wrote a letter to the members of the implemented by the municipality but were kept in its records.] 2
[Sangguniang Bayan] requesting for the creation of the position of a Municipal This notwithstanding, [Sangguniang Bayan] Secretary Tagorda filed a
Administrator. complaint for Falsification of Public Document against [Tadena] with the Office of
On 10 December 2001, the [Sangguniang Bayan] adopted the First the Ombudsman. Initially, the Ombudsman dismissed the case. Upon Motion for
Version, for the appropriation of the annual budget of the Municipality of Sto. Reconsideration, the latter reversed its resolution in an Order dated 28 August
Domingo, Ilocos Sur, for the fiscal year of 2002. Paragraph (a) of the 4th "Whereas 2002 and directed the filing of an Information against [Tadena]. 3
Clause" of said municipal ordinance addressed [Tadena's] request and provided On July 4, 2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) of the Office of the Ombudsman
for the creation of the position of a Municipal Administrator as follows: (Ombudsman) filed an Information 4 against accused-petitioner (Tadena) and charged him of
"(a) The position "MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR" shall not be falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 5 On
created unless the proposed needs of all the Offices of the arraignment, Tadena pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 6
municipality will be satisfied through Supplemental Budgets During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:
and provided further that the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 1. That at the time material to the allegations in the Information, accused Tadena
2001 be implemented." was a high-ranking public official, being then the Municipal Mayor of Sto.
[Tadena vetoed the First Version]. In his veto message to the Domingo, Ilocos Sur[; and]
[Sangguniang Bayan], [Tadena] declared that the conditions given for the creation 2. That the private complainant, Rodel Tagorda, was (and still is) the Secretary of the
of the Office of the Municipal Administrator were unrealistic and demanding. He [Sangguniang Bayan] of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, at the time of the
relayed to them, among others, that the only condition agreed upon during a incident. 7
previous conference of the municipality's heads of offices was that the office of the The parties also proposed the following issues for resolution:
Municipal Administrator would be created at a later date. Hence, he returned the 1. Whether or not accused Floro T. Tadena changed, altered or intercalated
First Version unacted upon, with a request for the deletion of the conditions paragraph (a) of the 4th Whereas Clause of the original Municipal
imposed therein and to be substituted by the agreement set during the heads of Ordinance No. 2001-013 which was duly enacted by the [Sangguniang
offices conference. Bayan] of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, thus changing its meaning[; and]
On 11 January 2002, the [Sangguniang Bayan] deliberated on [Tadena's] 2. Whether or not the accused falsified Municipal Ordinance No. 2001-013 dated
request and passed the Second Version. Paragraph (a) of the 4th "Whereas January 11, 2002. 8
Clause" thereof stated that: cSaATC On September 15, 2016, the SB rendered a Decision 9 in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-
"(a) The position "MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR" shall not be 0327, finding Tadena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The SB discussed that
created unless 2% of the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for all the elements of the offense were present in this case; thus, a conviction is in order. 10 Tadena
2002 be implemented." moved for reconsideration, which the SB denied in its December 7, 2016 Resolution. 11 cHDAIS
On 14 January 2002, the [Sangguniang Bayan's] Secretary, [Rodel M.] The Issues Presented
Tagorda [(Tagorda)], transmitted a copy of the Second Version to [Tadena] for his Unconvinced, Tadena filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari 12 before the Court
information, approval and appropriate action. On 15 January 2002, the transmittal and assigned the following errors:
letter as well as the copy of the Second Version was received by the Office of the I. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
Municipal Mayor. THE CASE DESPITE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR INORDINATE
On 23 January 2002, the Office of the Municipal Mayor returned the copy DELAY IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE CASE.
of the Second Version with the [Tadena's] signature but the first page thereof was II. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN DISREGARDING
substituted and an apparent change in paragraph (a) of the 4th "Whereas Clause" THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT HE LOST INTEREST
was noted, to wit: IN PROSECUTING HIS COMPLAINT AFTER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
"(a) The position "MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR" shall be DISMISSED THE SAME, BUT WAS LATER REVIVED UPON FILING OF A
created and the 2% of the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY A LAWYER NOT AUTHORIZED BY SAID
2002 be implemented." COMPLAINANT TO FILE THE SAME AND DESPITE COMPLAINANT'S
On 25 January 2002, the [Sangguniang Bayan] issued Resolution No. 007 DECLARATION THAT THE RESPONDENT IN HIS COMPLAINT, HEREIN
deleting paragraph (a) of the 4th "Whereas Clause" of Municipal Ordinance No. PETITIONER, HAS NOT COMMITTED ANY FALSIFICATION AS CHARGED.
2001-013. In the same resolution, the [Sangguniang Bayan] put on record the III. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING IN
changes they observed in the Second Version thereof, thus: EFFECT, THAT THE DOCUMENT FALSIFIED BY PETITIONER WAS A GENUINE
"x x x WHEREAS, On 11 January 2002, during our 2nd Special DOCUMENT WHEN IT WAS NOT.
Session, we unanimously approved said Mun. Ordinance No. IV. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT FINDING
2001-013 with modification contained at page one thereof as THAT THE CHANGES WHICH PETITIONER MADE IN THE SUBJECT ALLEGED
follows "a) The position 'MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR' shall not DOCUMENT WERE DONE WITH THE ACTUAL PARTICIPATION AND
be created unless the 2% of the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase CONCURRENCE OF THE MAJORITY MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
for 2002 be implemented." The same was transmitted at the OF STO. DOMINGO, ILOCOS SUR.
Office of the Hon. Mayor FLORO T. TADENA on January 15,
2002;
 V. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE PETITIONER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH NO based solely on Tadena's contentions. The records contain pieces of evidence that prove Tadena's
CRIMINAL INTENT IN MAKING THE CHANGES HE MADE IN SAID ALLEGED guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCUMENT. II.
VI. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE PETITIONER MADE THE CHANGES BEING A PART OF THE In the prosecution of falsification by a public officer, employee, or notary public under Article
LOCAL LEGISLATION PROCESS AND AS SUCH HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO 171 of the RPC, the following are the elements:
MAKE THE CHANGES BEFORE THE ORDINANCE WAS FINALLY ENACTED a. The offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
INTO LAW. b. The offender takes advantage of his/her official position;
VII. WITH DUE RESPECT, IF THERE WAS ANY DOUBT THE SAME SHOULD HAVE BEEN c. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
VIII. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO OVERCOME THE 2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE USUALLY ACCORDED BY LAW TO THE proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES. 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
IX. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN FAILED TO APPRECIATE statements other than those in fact made by them;
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. 13 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
In its Comment, 14 the People of the Philippines, as represented by the OSP of the 5. Altering true dates;
Ombudsman, alleged that the SB correctly ruled that Tadena's right to speedy disposition of his case 6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
was not violated. This issue was first raised in Tadena's Motion to Quash/Motion to Dismiss. After the which changes its meaning;
SB denied the motion, Tadena did not pursue further relief. Thus, the resolution had attained 7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of
finality. 15 an original document when no such original exists, or including in
The OSP recounted that the Ombudsman completed the preliminary investigation with such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
dispatch, and that the prosecutor acted promptly in filing the Information against Tadena. 16 The genuine original; or
OSP averred that the prosecution of the case was not attended with inordinate delay. 17 ISHCcT 8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a
The OSP asserted that Tadena is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public protocol, registry, or official book. (Emphasis supplied) 26
document because all the elements of the offense are present, and he admitted on record that he The first element, that the offender is a public officer, is indisputably present as the parties
made the changes on the municipal ordinance. 18 stipulated during pre-trial that Tadena was the municipal mayor of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur when the
Lastly, the OSP maintained that the SB was correct to disregard Tadena's voluntary falsification took place.
surrender as a mitigating circumstance since a warrant of arrest had been issued before he posted The second element is taking advantage of official position in falsifying a document, when
bail. The OSP argued that the essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity, and the intent to give (1) the offender has the duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of a document, or (2)
oneself up and submit to the authorities because one acknowledges his/her guilt and wishes to save he/she has the official custody of the document which he/she falsifies. 27 These two aspects are
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for the search and capture. However, evident in this case.
when the reason for the surrender is the inevitability of the arrest and to ensure safety, the surrender As for the first aspect, the SB correctly pointed out that Section 54 28 of the Local
is not spontaneous and voluntary. Hence, it is not a mitigating circumstance. 19 Government Code (LGC) states that a local chief executive participates in the enactment of an
In its Reply, 20 Tadena essentially reiterated his arguments in the petition. ordinance either by approval or veto. 29 Either of the acts are connected with the performance of his
The issues to be resolved by the Court can be summarized as: duties as municipal mayor, and constitute as intervention in enacting an ordinance. IAETDc
I. Whether or not the SB erred in ruling that Tadena's right to speedy disposition of his case Tadena justifies that he made the changes as part of the local legislation process. The Court
was not violated; strongly disagrees. Section 54 of the LGC limits the participation of a local chief executive in the
II. Whether or not the SB erred in finding Tadena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of enactment of ordinance to two acts, either approval or veto. The provision does not include the power
falsification under Article 171, Paragraph 6 of the RPC; and to make changes on an ordinance. At most, the local chief executive may veto the ordinance and
III. Whether or not the SB imposed the proper penalty. submit his objections to the sanggunian. However, Tadena neither approved nor vetoed the
The Court's Ruling ordinance. He intervened in the process by changing the wordings of the 4th Whereas Clause of the
The petition is denied. municipal ordinance.
I. As for the second aspect, Tadena has official custody of the Second Version of Municipal
Tadena contends that the SB should have dismissed the case because (1) of inordinate Ordinance 2001-013, because Tagorda transmitted it to his office for appropriate action. Tadena
delay, and (2) private complainant Tagorda desisted from pursuing the case after it was dismissed by admitted receiving the municipal ordinance in the Statement of Facts in his petition:
the Ombudsman. 21 3. The SECOND Municipal Ordinance No. 2001-013 x x x which was
The issue of whether or not there was inordinate delay in the prosecution of the case raises deliberated and transmitted to the Mayor for his APPROVAL WAS NOT
a question of fact, which is not a proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of ACTUALLY ADOPTED AND FINALLY ENACTED BY THE SANGGUNIANG
the Rules of Court. Although there are exceptions found in jurisprudence, none of them apply in this BAYAN BECAUSE HEREIN PETITIONER TEMPORARILY HELD IT IN HIS
case as Tadena did not allege and substantiate its application. Thus, the Court shall not entertain a OFFICE AND CALLED FOR A CONFERENCE OR MEETING WITH THE
factual issue. MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN REGARDING SOME CHANGES HE
As to the issue of Tagorda's desistance as a ground for dismissal of the case, it is conceded MADE IN THE ORDINANCE. 30
that the State has the sovereign right to prosecute criminal offenses under the full control of the fiscal With the two aspects both evident in this case, it is unmistakable that Tadena took
and that the dismissal of criminal cases by the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the advantage of his position as municipal mayor when he falsified the municipal ordinance.
complainant is not looked upon with favor. 22 An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional The third element is falsification of a document by making any alteration or intercalation in
ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. a genuine document which changes its meaning. The case of Typoco, Jr. v. People 31 dissected this
There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create element and required the following:
doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the 1. An alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;
judge. 23 CAacTH 2. It was made on a genuine document;
The OSP commented that in Tagorda's affidavit of desistance, he did not repudiate the 3. The alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and
material points in the Information referring to the offense of falsification. 24 His main reason for the 4. The change made the document speak something false.
desistance was to keep the peace in the municipality. 25 Notably, in his Reply, Tadena did not object The first requirement is crystal clear with the following alteration or intercalation on the
or offer counter arguments to the OSP's observations. Thus, the charges in the Information were municipal ordinance:
intact and unaffected by the desistance. The Court concurs with the SB in not dismissing the case
ORIGINAL SECOND VERSION ALTERED SECOND VERSION
 (a) The position MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR (a) The position MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR Here, Tadena's actuations cannot be considered as done in good faith. The records show
shall not be created unless 2% of the shall be created and the 2% of the that Tadena initiated the creation of the municipal administrator's office. The sanggunian convened
Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2002 be Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2002 be and included the creation of the municipal administrator's office in the First Version of the municipal
implemented. (Emphasis supplied.) 32 implemented. (Emphasis supplied.) 33 ordinance. Tadena vetoed the ordinance and wrote the sanggunian expressing his objections.
The sanggunian again convened and issued the Second Version. This time, instead of expressing his
As for the second requirement, Section 31, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence objections in a veto, Tadena took it upon himself to change the wordings of the municipal ordinance,
provides how to present alteration in a document. and returned it to the sanggunian. At this point, the vice mayor noticed that the first page was
Sec. 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. — The party producing a substituted and the wordings of the ordinance were altered. SCaITA
document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered From the narration of facts, it is obvious that Tadena took advantage of his position as
after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for municipal mayor to alter the wordings of the municipal ordinance, create the municipal
the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his administrator's office without condition/s, and pass it as though it was the original version of
concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was the sanggunian.
otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the The Court also observed that Tadena had inconsistent defenses. During trial in the SB, he
meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall averred that he inadvertently signed the Second Version due to volume of work, but he later called
not be admissible in evidence. for a meeting with the Sangguniang Bayan members to correct the errors. 42 In this petition, he
Here, the prosecution presented the original Second Version of the municipal ordinance alleges that the changes he made were with the concurrence of the majority of the sanggunian
(Exhibit E), the altered Second Version (Exhibit F), and Resolution 007 (Exhibit G), which contains members. 43 He also asserts good faith as he was trying to save his constituents from expenses
the Sangguniang Bayan's observation that the first page of the municipal ordinance was substituted which could not be funded by the municipality's budget. 44 The Court finds that Tadena's conduct in
and the Whereas Clause was altered. The defense admitted the existence, due execution and taking advantage of his position and his varying defenses show that his state of mind is inconsistent
truthfulness of Exhibits E to G. 34 with good faith.
The prosecution also presented Tagorda and his judicial affidavit. Tagorda testified that it is Therefore, the Court resolves to affirm the SB decision convicting Tadena of the offense
his duty as Sangguniang Bayan Secretary to: (1) attend sessions and meetings of the Sangguniang charged. The pieces of evidence presented support a conviction for falsification by a public officer of
Bayan; (2) keep minutes and journal of the proceedings; (3) attest approved Resolutions and a public document.
Ordinances; (4) act as custodian of records of the Sangguniang Bayan; and (5) other functions as III.
provided by the Local Government Code, laws, and ordinances. 35 DcHSEa Tadena claims that the SB erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
The SB narrated that [w]hen the signed Second Version was returned to the Sangguniang voluntary surrender, which he did before the First Division Clerk of Court upon learning of the criminal
Bayan, Vice-Mayor Anthony Que x x x noticed that the first page was substituted and paragraph (a) of case against him. 45
the 4th "Whereas Clause" was changed. x x x. [T]he alteration was made known to the Sangguniang For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1)
Bayan, [and] they decided to adopt Resolution No. 007 to delete the provision on the creation of [the] the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
Municipal Administrator. 36 (Italics supplied) authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary
The combined testimonial and documentary evidence prove that alteration and intercalation surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused is give oneself up and submit to the authorities
were made on the Second Version of the municipal ordinance. Hence, the second requirement was either because he/she acknowledges his/her guilt or he/she wishes to save the authorities the trouble
complied with. and expense that may be incurred for his/her search and capture. Without these elements, and where
Further, the SB correctly explained that Section 19, 37 Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his
Evidence identifies public documents, and one of them includes written official acts, or records of the safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers whether of the surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance. 46
Philippines or a foreign country. Here, the Second Version of the municipal ordinance is undoubtedly Here, the records disclose that a warrant of arrest had been issued on August 1, 2014,
a written official act of the Sangguniang Bayan members, who were in the lawful exercise of their before Tadena posted bail on August 20, 2014. 47 He also admitted in this petition that upon learning
mandated official function. 38 The records reveal that a genuine copy of the Second Version was of the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, he surrendered to the First Division Clerk of
transmitted to the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Tadena admitted to receiving and changing the Court. 48 With Tadena's arrest being inevitable, his surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary or
wordings of the Second Version. Thus, an alteration or intercalation was made on a genuine copy of a spontaneous. Therefore, his claim of mitigating circumstance does not deserve merit.
public document. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September
Lastly, the alteration changed the meaning of the Second Version of the municipal 15, 2016 and the December 7, 2016 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-CRM-0327
ordinance and represented a false intention of the local legislative body. The SB correctly observed are AFFIRMED. aTHCSE
that the Sangguniang Bayan originally wanted the creation of the municipal administrator's office to SO ORDERED.
be dependent on the implementation of the 2% of the 5% mandatory salary increase for 2002. Carpio, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
However, after the alteration, Tadena made it appear that the creation of the municipal
administrator's office was independent from the implementation of the mandatory salary Footnotes
increase. 39 Clearly, the alteration departed from the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan, removed 1. Rollo, pp. 70-72.
the condition imposed, and conveyed an untruthful idea. 2. Id. at 65.
The Court disputes Tadena's excuse that he acted with the concurrence of the majority of 3. Id. at 72.
the Sangguniang Bayan members. The SB found that Tadena did not offer proof that 4. That on or about January 15, 2002, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
the Sangguniang Bayan members agreed with the changes he made. 40 His bare and self-serving Sto. Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
claim is insufficient to reverse his conviction. Court, accused FLORO T. TADENA, a high-ranking public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
The Court also rejects Tadena's justification that he acted in good faith in changing the Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur received a copy of the Municipal Ordinance No. 2001-013 enacted by
wordings of the municipal ordinance. the [Sangguniang Bayan] of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur which was officially forwarded to him, for
In Civil Service Commission v. Maala, 41 the Court explained that good faith is a state of his information, approval and/or appropriate action by reason of or in relation to the
mind denoting honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to performance of his official duties as Mayor and, while in possession of said ordinance, taking
put the holder upon inquiry. It is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of his official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, or cause to be falsified the said Municipal Ordinance No. 2001-013 by changing, altering,
notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is intercalating and making it appear in paragraph (a) of the 4th Whereas Clause thereof
actually a question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a person's that: "(a) The position "MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR" shall be created and the 2% of the
intention by relying not on his own protestations of good faith, which is self-serving, but on evidence Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2002 be implemented."; when in truth and in fact, as
of his conduct and outward acts. accused knew fully well that the afore-quoted paragraph (a) of the said 4th Whereas Clause of
 the said Municipal Ordinance reads as: "(a) The position "MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR" shall 48.Id. at 58.
not be created unless 2% of the Mandatory 5% Salary Increase for 2002 be implemented."; ||| (Tadena v. People, G.R. No. 228610, [March 20, 2019])
thereby changing the import and meaning of the said Municipal Ordinance without any
authority to do so, to the prejudice of public interest. Id. at 94-95.
5. Id. at 94.
6. Id. at 63.
7. Id. at 63-64.
8. Id. at 64.
9. Penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Michael
Frederick L. Musngi, concurring; id. at 62-79.
10. Id. at 73.
11. Id. at 90-93.
12. Id. at 8-61.
13. Id. at 8-9.
14. Id. at 197-217.
15. Id. at 204-205.
16. Id. at 205-206.
17. Id. at 206.
18. Id. at 210-212.
19. Id. at 213.
20. Id. at 236-239-A.
21. Id. at 53-54.
22. People v. Ballabare, 332 Phil. 384-410 (1996).
23. Id. at 399.
24. Rollo, p. 207.
25. Id.
26. Art. 171, REVISED PENAL CODE.
27. Typoco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 221857; Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 222020, August 16, 2017.
28. SEC. 54. Approval of Ordinances. — (a) Every ordinance enacted by the [sangguniang
panlalawigan], [sangguniang panlungsod], or [sangguniang bayan] shall be presented to the
provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive
concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the [sanggunian], which
may proceed to reconsider the same. The [sanggunian] concerned may override the veto of
the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the
ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. x x x LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, October 10, 1991.
29. Rollo, p. 74.
30. Id. at 51.
31. Supra note 27.
32. Id. at 95.
33. Id.
34.Pre-Trial Order, id. at 120.
35.Id. at 64.
36.Id. at 65.
37.Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
38.Rollo, p. 75.
39.Id. at 78.
40.Id. at 77-78.
41.504 Phil. 646, 654 (2005).
42.Rollo at p. 69.
43.Id. at 55.
44.Id. at 56.
45.Id. at 58.
46.Belbis, Jr. v. People, 698 Phil. 706, 724 (2012).
47.Rollo, p. 213.
|| 2008 2009
THIRD DIVISION ECSCO, Inc. 26 Dec 25 Dec 206 450 4,445 440 234
[G.R. No. 204719. December 5, 2016.] 2005 2010
POWER SECTOR ASSETS and LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
Lipa Ice Plant 26 Jan. 25 Jan. 220 400 4,650 520 245
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SEM-CALACA POWER
2005 2010
CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION BCFTPP Contractor
PERALTA, J p: Semirara Mining NA NA 291 1450 NA NA Actual
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Consumption
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated September 4, 2012 and PozzoIanic Industrie NA NA 11 50 NA NA Actual
Resolution 2 dated November 27, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 123997, which affirmed the rulings of the s, Inc. Consumption
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) specifying respondent's capacity allocation as a power TOTAL MWh 703,506 3,236,945 129,056
producer. MW 295 322
The facts of the case follow.
The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136,
which was signed into law by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 8, 2001, was intended Notes:
to provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization • All figures mentioned above are only indicative and will be based on the
of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to the desired competitive hourly/daily/monthly nominated volume as per average monthly
structure and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private contract level. A typical hourly customer's load profile for Calaca
entities with respect to the reform of the electric power industry. 3 is demonstrated in the attached Figure 1 of this Schedule J (sic)
The EPIRA also provided for the creation of petitioner Power Sector Assets and Liabilities (Power Supply Contract).
Management Corporation (PSALM), a government-owned and controlled corporation which took over • The special conditions governing the assumption by the Buyer of the
ownership of the generation assets, liabilities, independent power producer (IPP) contracts, real assignment of a portion of the Contract Energy under Meralco TSC
estate and other disposable assets of the NPC. 4 PSALM's principal purpose under the law is to are contained in Part II of this Schedule J (sic) (Power Supply
"manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and Contract).
other disposable assets, and IPP contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial xxx xxx xxx
obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner." 5 Furthermore, in the event that the Purchased Assets (sic) is not able to
Among the assets put on sale by PSALM was the 600-MW Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal supply the contracted power under the aforesaid contracts due to the
Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas (Calaca Power Plant). 6 In July 2009, DMCI Holdings, Inc. (DMCI) was unavailability of coal or other causes, the Buyer may enter into a back-to-back
declared the highest bidder in the sale. 7 The sale was effected through an Asset Purchase supply contract with other generators or buy directly from the market for the
Agreement (APA) executed by PSALM and DMCI on July 29, 2009, and became effective on August 3, deficiency.
2009. 8 Part II: Special Conditions of the MERALCO TSC
On December 2, 2009, DMCI transferred all of its rights and obligations under the APA and The following conditions, unique to the MERALCO-NPC contract, shall apply to the assigned
the Land Lease Agreement (also called Final Transaction Documents) to herein respondent SEM- portion of the Contract Energy from the MERALCO TSC.
Calaca Power Corporation (SCPC) by entering into an Amendment, Accession and Assumption 1. Neither the MERALCO TSC nor any portion thereof shall be assigned to
Agreement that was signed by PSALM, DMCI and SCPC. 9 Under the agreement, SCPC took over all the Buyer. It is the Contract Energy specified in part I that is the subject of the
the rights and obligations of DMCI under the said documents. SCPC also alleged that on that same assignment.
date, it took over the physical possession, operation and maintenance of the Calaca Power Plant. 10 xxx xxx xxx
Also on the same date, SCPC started providing electricity to customers listed in Schedule W SCPC contends that it is obliged to supply 10.841% of MERALCO's total requirement but not
of the APA, among which is MERALCO. 11 to exceed 169,000 kW in any hourly interval. 13 However, PSALM holds a different view and contends
Schedule W is partially reproduced hereunder: cHDAIS that SCPC is bound to supply the entire 10.841% of what MERALCO requires, without regard to any
SCHEDULE W 12 POWER SUPPLY CONTRACTS cap or limit. 14
Part I: Description of the PSC Thus, during a period of high demand, specifically in the summer of the year 2010, when
SCPC fell short of supplying the entire 10.841% of MERALCO's requirements, the deficiency was filled
by supply from the Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM). 15 SCPC contends that this was the
CUSTOMERS POWER SUPPLY CONTRACT REMAINING CONTRACT VOLUME as of consequence of NPC's and PSALM's nominations in excess of what SCPC claims to be the 169,000 kW
26 June 2009 cap or limit in its supply. 16 PSALM disputes that there is such a cap or limit, noting that SCPC was
Contract Duration Monthly Average obligated to supply the entire 10.841% under Schedule W of the APA. 17 Thus, NPC and PSALM, who
contend that they were merely following the Transition Supply Contract (TSC) with MERALCO, billed
Effectivity Expiration Energy Demand Energy Demand Average the latter for the electricity delivered by SCPC and that supplied through WESM. 18 SCPC claims,
(MWh) (kW) (Mwh) (kW) (MWh/mo) however, that PSALM withheld MERALCO's payments even for the electricity that SCPC supplied
Meralco (10.841%) 6 Nov 25 Nov 69,256 169,000 1,517,414 169,000 69,256 without the latter's knowledge nor consent. 19 NPC also allegedly replaced SCPC Power Bills to
2006 2011 MERALCO with PSALM Power Bills, with instructions that payments be remitted directly to PSALM
PEZA-Cavite 26 June 25 June 34,038 55,420 623,320 80,800 24,933 instead of SCPC. 20 ISHCcT
Ecozone 2006 2011 On March 16, 2010, SCPC wrote a letter to PSALM insisting that the 169,000 kW supplied to
BATELEC I 26 Dec 25 Dec. 16,450 42,000 334,586 42,000 17,610 MERALCO "should be treated as the maximum limit of the MERALCO allocation which SCPC is bound
2006 2010 to supply under the APA in accordance with Schedule W." 21 On April 20, 2010, SCPC wrote a
Sunpower 18 Aug 17 Aug 5,500 8,955 676,500 8,970 5,500 demand letter formally asking both PSALM and NPC to release MERALCO's payments for the period of
Philippines 2004 2019 January 26, 2010 to February 25, 2010 amounting to Php451,450,889.13 and to directly remit to
SCPC all subsequent amounts due from MERALCO. 22
Steel Asia 26 Mar 25 Dec 5,263 8,000 57,770 10,000 8,253
On May 13, 2010, PSALM replied through a letter reiterating that SCPC assumed the
2008 2009
obligation to supply 10.841% of MERALCO's TSC and that the latter's payments would be remitted to
SteelCorp 26 June 25 Dec 2,500 8,000 15,000 8,320 2,500 SCPC only after deducting the cost of power supplied by WESM. 23
2009 2009 Thus, PSALM proceeded to deduct from its remittances to SCPC the cost of the power that
Puyat Steel Corp. 26 Nov 25 Nov 194 1,300 3,260 2,150 543 NPC allegedly purchased from WESM. 24 SCPC claims that for the months of January 2010 to June
2010, the amounts due it was Php1,894,028,305.00. Instead, PSALM paid it the amount of only PSALM filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. However, in an
Php934,114,678.04, or short of Php959,913,626.96, which allegedly represents the cost of electricity Order 32 dated February 13, 2012, the ERC denied the said motion.
that PSALM charged against SCPC representing the power NPC supposedly obtained from WESM to fill Aggrieved, PSALM filed a Petition for Review of the ERC decision to the Court of
the alleged deficiency in SCPC's supply to MERALCO. 25 Appeals (CA). 33
Eventually, following negotiations between the parties, PSALM agreed, through a letter In its assailed Decision 34 dated September 4, 2012, the CA denied PSALM's petition and
dated June 21, 2010, to cap MERALCO's nominations from the Calaca Power Plant "in any hour up to upheld the findings of the ERC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
169MWh or 10.841% of each hourly energy nomination submitted by MERALCO to NPC under the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
MERALCO TSC effective June 26, 2010." 26 dated July 6, 2011 and the Order dated February 13, 2012 of the Energy
However, as SCPC was insisting that the MERALCO cap should have taken effect much Regulatory Commission in ERC Case No. 2010-058 are hereby AFFIRMED.
earlier, or on December 2, 2009, i.e., the date of effectivity of the APA, and as the parties failed to SO ORDERED. 35
execute the Implementation, Agreement and Protocol (Implementation Agreement) covering the The CA sustained the ERC's interpretation of the APA that SCPC's obligation was to supply
parties' responsibilities with regards to the supply of power to MERALCO, SCPC made an offer to 10.841% of MERALCO's energy requirement, but not to exceed 169,000 kW at any given hour, as
PSALM for the issues to be brought to the ERC for arbitration. 27 The proposal, however, was rejected such interpretation would reconcile the presence of the two figures in Schedule W and harmonize the
by PSALM. 28 provisions of the said contract. 36 Likewise, the appellate court upheld ERC in explaining why a cap
Hence, SCPC initiated the instant case by filing a Petition for Dispute Resolution (with Prayer of 169,000 kW is placed on SCPC's obligation to supply electricity to MERALCO, the explanation being:
for Provisional Remedies) before the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) against NPC and unlike before the privatization when NPC, with all its generation assets, was the sole supplier of
PSALM. 29 MERALCO and, therefore, could obtain electricity from any of those assets, in the current situation,
In its Decision 30 dated July 6, 2011, the ERC ruled in favor of SCPC and against NPC and SCPC is just one of many suppliers and SCPC's asset is only the Calaca Power Plant, which has a
PSALM, with the following dispositive portion: limited capacity. 37 The CA likewise stated that the findings of administrative or regulatory agencies
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby on matters within their technical area of expertise are generally accorded not only respect but finality
resolves the issues raised in this instant dispute as follows: if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 38
1. SCPC's obligation under Schedule W of the APA is to deliver 10.841% PSALM filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision above, but the same was likewise
of MERALCO's energy requirements but not to exceed 169,000 kW capacity denied in a Resolution of the CA, dated November 27, 2012. 39
allocation, at any given hour; Hence, PSALM goes to this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
2. The obligation to deliver 10.841% of MERALCO's energy requirements, PSALM contends that the CA erred in placing a cap of 169,000 kW on SCPC's obligation to
but not to exceed 169,000 kW capacity, at any given hour, shall commence from supply 10.841% of MERALCO's requirement. It insists that SCPC stepped into the shoes of NPC and
December 2, 2009 when the physical possession, occupation and operation of the PSALM in terms of the fulfillment of the obligation of the latter to supply 10.841% of MERALCO's
Calaca Power Plant was formally turned over to SCPC; nominated volume. 40 In PSALM's view, SCPC is deemed to have assumed PSALM's rights and
3. The NPC and PSALM have no basis, in fact and in law, to charge obligations under the Power Supply Contracts (PSCs) subject to the conditions specified in Schedule
against SCPC the nominations beyond the 169,000 kW capacity which NPC W. 41 IAETDc
allegedly purchased for MERALCO from the WESM. There being no basis to charge Further, it adds that Schedule W is unambiguous and requires no construction or
SCPC, PSALM must return all the payments of MERALCO which were withheld by interpretation. 42 Allegedly, the figure 169,000 kW is not meant to qualify the 10.841% of MERALCO's
PSALM, including the amount representing the cost of electricity nominated and energy requirement; instead, Schedule W's "Notes" portion supposedly explains that 169,000 kW and
purchased by NPC beyond the 169,000 kW from the WESM for the period January all the other figures mentioned therein are only "indicative" and the supply of MERALCO's energy
2010 to June 25, 2010; requirement "will still be based on the hourly/daily/monthly nominated volume per average monthly
4. The payment of interests on the amount to be returned by PSALM to contract level." 43 Thus, for PSALM, it was error for the ERC and CA to conclude that a cap exists as
SCPC is in order. However, in the absence of a stipulation, the amount of interest to the 10.841% energy requirement of MERALCO. 44
shall be pegged at 6% per annum; and CAacTH Petitioner PSALM additionally holds that the ERC erred in harmonizing only two figures in
5. NPC shall continue to nominate for MERALCO's energy requirements, Schedule W: the 10.841% and the 169,000 kW, since it claims that such figures are not the only
in accordance with the TSC between them. However, in nominating for MERALCO's stipulations in the said Schedule, there being special conditions such as the Notes which, had it been
contract energy under the APA, NPC shall consider the 169,000 kW capacity limit, read together with the rest of the conditions, should have led the ERC to a different
in accordance with Schedule W of the APA, considering the generating capacity of conclusion. 45 PSALM also cites additional stipulations such as the so-called Special Conditions of the
the Calaca Power Plant. In the absence of an Implementation Agreement and MERALCO TSC, the Calaca Typical Hourly Customer's Load Profile and the Nomination Protocol
Protocol, all nominations made for MERALCO by SCPC in accordance with the APA, between MERALCO and NPC of TSC Contract Energy. 46 Then, there is also a provision supposedly in
shall henceforth be billed through NPC and payment thereof shall be collected Schedule W in which SCPC has the option to enter into back-to-back supply contracts with other
directly from MERALCO by SCPC. generators or purchase directly from the market should it become unable to supply the contracted
Accordingly, the NPC is hereby enjoined from making nominations power under the contracts in Schedule W. 47 According to PSALM, these are clear indications that a
beyond the 169,000 kW of MERALCO's allocation. On the other hand, PSALM is cap on SCPC's supply had not been intended by the parties. 48
hereby directed to (1) refrain from charging against SCPC the cost of power PSALM also poses that even granting that Schedule W is ambiguous, the CA's and ERC's
beyond the 169,000 kW of MERALCO's allocation and to (2) refrain from interpretations were restrictive and incorrect. 49 It also accuses the ERC of erroneously resorting to
withholding all MERALCO payments for electricity supplied by SCPC. extrinsic evidence in its interpretation, a method also erroneously concurred in by the
The NPC, PSALM and SCPC are further directed to account for and CA. 50 Allegedly, this was done when the ERC cited the testimony of a witness in interpreting
reconcile the amounts charged against the SCPC by PSALM, on account of the Schedule W. 51 From the testimony, the ERC supposedly inferred that "prior to privatization, NPC did
NPC's nominations and purchases from the WESM beyond the 169,000 kW not take into account the capacities of its assets" in relation to its supply contract with MERALCO,
capacity allocation during the period January 2010 to June 25, 2010. Thereafter, meaning that before, NPC was the sole supplier and could make its various assets generate the
the parties are directed to submit to the Commission the reconciled computation supply needed, unlike at present, where SCPC is just one of many suppliers with a single generating
of the over-nominations and other MERALCO payments withheld by PSALM for the asset, with a limited capacity. 52 Allegedly, this led the ERC and the CA to erroneously conclude that
said period, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. Further, PSALM is a cap of 169,000 kW in SCPC's supply obligations was indeed intended. 53
hereby directed to return to SCPC, the amount as computed and reconciled, Thus, according to PSALM, given the allegedly erroneous rulings, the CA should not have
including the interests thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, within ten (10) days relied on the principle of upholding the findings of fact of administrative agencies, like the ERC, and
from the parties' submission of the reconciled computation to the Commission. instead, should have reversed the latter's findings. 54
Finally, the parties are directed to submit their Compliance with the foregoing In its Comment, SCPC writes that PSALM's own interpretation, while also self-serving and
dispositions within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision. inconsistent, would render the implementation of Schedule W impossible and absurd. 55 For one,
SO ORDERED. 31 SCPC posits that the figure 10.841%, when observed alone and literally applied, provides no
meaningful reference, because Schedule W itself does not state that the figure refers to 10.841% of affirmed by the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
the actual volume nominated for MERALCO. 56 It has no base value and is an incomplete Court. 74 Although there are instances when such a practice is not applied, such as when the board
mathematical statement. 57 Further, SCPC claims that observing the figure 10.841% alone or official has gone beyond its/his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly
disregards all the other figures that appear in Schedule W, including the 169,000 kW which in fact acted arbitrarily without regard to its/his duty or with grave abuse of discretion, or when the actuation
appears twice in the said schedule. 58 And finally, it argues that mainly relying on the Notes and its of the administrative official or administrative board or agency is tainted by a failure to abide by the
statement that the figures in the schedule are "indicative" would render all the figures in Schedule W command of the law, 75 none of such instances obtain in the present case which would prompt this
insignificant, as if concluding that SCPC's supply obligations are unlimited. 59 Court to reverse the findings of the tribunal below.
SCPC maintains that such interpretation by PSALM has no support from any principle of On the contrary, We find the ERC to have acted within its statutory powers as defined in
contract interpretation, while it was the ERC and the CA that applied the correct rule of interpretation, Section 43 (u), RA 9136, or the EPIRA Law, which grants it original and exclusive jurisdiction "over all
such as one found in the Civil Code, to wit: 60 cases involving disputes between and among participants or players in the energy
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted sector." 76 Jurisprudence also states that administrative agencies like the ERC, which were created to
together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of address the complexities of settling disputes in a modern and diverse society and economy, count
them taken jointly. among their functions the interpretation of contracts and the determination of the rights of parties,
SCPC also touts the ERC's reason for not applying the Notes' statement that the figures which traditionally were the exclusive domain of the judicial branch. 77 Such broadened quasi-judicial
were "indicative," or mere estimates of the true value. The reason is that such would lead to an powers of administrative agencies are explained in the case of Antipolo Realty Corporation v.
absurdity as it would allocate more than 169,000 kW for MERALCO despite the limited actual NHA, 78 which states:
generating capacity of the Calaca Power Plant. 61 Instead, the ERC allegedly employed the principle
of "reasonableness of results" in contract interpretation to avoid an unreasonable or absurd In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
outcome. 62 administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and
As for the other clause in the Notes which grants SCPC the option to enter into back-to-back capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
supply contracts with other suppliers in order to fulfill its MERALCO obligations, SCPC again quotes essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
the ERC in stating that it is, in fact, NPC's responsibility to fill any shortfall in supply to MERALCO, and discretion, has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted
that the back-to-back supply contracts to be entered into by SCPC only refer to when the latter is that "between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the
unable to supply MERALCO to the extent of 169,000 kW, which is the cap in its obligation; shortages unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. . . . ." SCaITA
due to nominations by NPC in excess of 169,000 kW are no longer the contractual obligation of xxx xxx xxx
SCPC. 63 DcHSEa
Further, SCPC states that the ERC sufficiently explained the implications of the Special In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an
Conditions of the MERALCO TSC, clarifying that "NPC's and PSALM's obligation to supply the entire administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency.
energy contract to MERALCO, including the obligation to replace any curtailed energy, was not passed In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such
on or assigned to SCPC," rather, only such portion as defined in Part I of Schedule W was assigned to powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
SCPC, as clearly provided for under Part II of Schedule W. 64 As for the Calaca Typical Hourly empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency
Customer's Load Profile and Nomination Protocol, ERC explained that previously, when NPC was the concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine
sole supplier and had other existing assets, even if a particular allocation exceeded a plant's the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the
capacity, NPC could obtain supply from its other generating assets. 65 ERC stated that such is no multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of
longer the situation in the case at bar, where supply is supposed to come from a specific plant — the contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer
Calaca Power Plant — which has a limited capacity. 66 a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
SCPC argues that the CA correctly considered the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the APA in interpreting Schedule W, i.e., the poor condition of the Calaca Power Plant which, at that As the foregoing imply, the ERC merely performed its statutory function of resolving
time only had a dependable capacity of 330 MW out of its 600 MW rated capacity. 67 SCPC narrates disputes among the parties who are players in the industry, and exercised its quasi-judicial and
that the low dependable capacity is the reason why the contracted demand levels for various administrative powers as outlined in jurisprudence by interpreting the contract between the parties in
customers listed in Schedule W were pegged at 322 MW only and, with a reserve of only eight (8) the present dispute, the so-called APA and specifically its Schedule W.
MW, the plant is well short of providing NPC's excess nominations which allegedly went up to As for the correctness of the ERC's interpretation and finding, this Court examined the
25,531.93 kWh (25MW) during one billing period. 68 SCPC asserts that DMCI, the original purchaser records and found no reason to depart from the rule that especially when supported by substantial
of the Calaca Power Plant, then knew of the plant's dependable capacity, which it saw as consistent evidence and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the findings of a quasi-judicial body like the ERC
with the total demand listed in Schedule W, which was what prompted it to naturally assume only the deserve the highest respect, if not finality. 79
obligations spelled out in the said APA and Schedule W. 69 Thus, SCPC states that PSALM's claim that The petitioner PSALM assails ERC's holding that SCPC's obligation is "to deliver 10.841% of
the buyer also assumed "the risk of supplying energy considering the diminishing capacity of the MERALCO's energy requirements but not to exceed 169,000 kW capacity allocation, at any given
other plants" is absurd and unreasonable, as these could not have been known despite the buyer's hour," which the ERC based on its interpretation of the figures 169,000 kW and 10.841% found in
due diligence. 70 Besides, SCPC argues that any ambiguity should be interpreted against PSALM, the three columns of Schedule W.
seller and the party who prepared the APA. 71 We affirm the ERC's interpretation, as upheld by the CA.
Lastly, SCPC contends that the witness, whose testimony was considered by the ERC in Among the key principles in the interpretation of contracts is that espoused in Article 1370,
ruling that the actual capacity of a power plant is material in determining its allocation, was PSALM's paragraph 1, of the Civil Code, quoted as follows: cHECAS
own witness, therefore, the latter party may not disavow her testimony. 72 Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
The singular issue now before the Court is: whether there was error in the CA's affirmation the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
of the ERC's interpretation of Schedule W of the so-called Asset Purchase Agreement (APA), i.e., the control.
contract between the parties PSALM and SCPC, to mean that SCPC's obligation thereunder is to The rule means that the contract's meaning should be determined from its clear terms
deliver 10.841% of MERALCO's energy requirements but not to exceed 169,000 kW capacity without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. 80 The intention of the parties must be gathered from the
allocation, at any given hour. contract's language, and from that language alone. 81 Stated differently, where the language of a
We resolve to deny the petition. No error attended the CA's affirmation of the ruling of the written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its
ERC. face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be
It is general practice among the courts that the rulings of administrative agencies like the understood in a different sense. 82
ERC are accorded great respect, owing to a traditional deference given to such administrative Thus, conversely, when the terms of the contract are unclear or are ambiguous,
agencies equipped with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine interpretation must proceed beyond the words' literal meaning. Paragraph 2 of the same Article 1370
promptly disputes on technical matters. 73 Factual findings of administrative agencies that are provides:
 If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the limited generating capacity of the Calaca Power Plant, the supplier's sole generating asset, is
the latter shall prevail over the former. beyond the subject of this review, what is certain is that there is an ambiguity that, if left to stand or
Discerning the parties' true intent requires the application of other principles of contract to remain unresolved, would inevitably lead to interminable disputes. Thus, the Court sustains the
interpretation. Jurisprudence dictates that when the intention of the parties cannot be discerned from ERC's decision to interpret the contract as well as its resulting interpretation and explanation.
the plain and literal language of the contract, or where there is more than just one way of reading it The ERC correctly cited another principle under the Civil Code in contract interpretation
for its meaning, the court must make a preliminary inquiry of whether the contract before it is an which states,
ambiguous one. 83 A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable alternative Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
interpretations. 84 In such case, its interpretation is left to the court, or another tribunal with together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of
jurisdiction over it. 85 More simply, "interpretation" is defined as the act of making intelligible what them taken jointly. 89
was before not understood, ambiguous, or not obvious; it is a method by which the meaning of Additionally, under the Rules on Evidence, it is required that:
language is ascertained. 86 The "interpretation" of a contract is the determination of the meaning RULE 130 xxx xxx xxx
attached to the words written or spoken which make the contract. 87 Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In
In the case at bar, the Court finds that ambiguity indeed surrounds the figures 10.841% and the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
169,000 kW found in the contract, the former because it does not indicate a base value with a particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to
specific quantity and a definite unit of measurement and the latter because there is uncertainty as to all.
whether it is a cap or limit on the party's obligation or not. These were similarly the findings of both Then, case law is also settled on the rule that contracts should be so construed as to
the ERC and the appellate court. Even to the casual observer, it is obvious that the plain language harmonize and give effect to its different provisions. 90 The legal effect of a contract is not
alone of Schedule W does not shed light on these figures. determined alone by any particular provision disconnected from all others, but from the whole read
The ERC correctly explained and interpreted these provisions, in this wise: together. 91
It is worthy to note that Schedule W of the APA indicates the value Following the above rules and principles, the ERC correctly interpreted the ambiguity in
"10.841%," which is enclosed in parenthesis, under the name of MERALCO in the Schedule W in a way that would render all of the contracts' provisions effectual. Although there was
first column, without any reference as to its base value. The figure 10.841% simply ambiguity, as earlier stated, in the figures 10.841% and 169,000 kW that appear on the said
written as it is (without reference on the base value), is an incomplete schedule, the ERC properly harmonized both provisions. It did not just disregard or dispense with
mathematical sentence and, therefore, is susceptible to several interpretations. either of the figures as such would have violated the principles that the "various stipulations of the
For instance, it can be construed as 10.841% of the entire SCPC capacity contract shall be interpreted together" and that the "doubtful provisions shall be attributed with the
(10.841% of 322 MW) or it can also be taken to mean that 169,000 kW represents sense which may result from all of them taken jointly." Instead, it interpreted both in a way that they
10.841% of MERALCO's contract energy. A close scrutiny of Schedule W, however, would be preserved and work together. The parties clearly intended for the figures to be in the
indicates that 10.841% is not synonymous to 169,000 kW, i.e., 169,000 kW does contract and bestowed such with meanings which the ERC had no power to just ignore or remove.
not represent 10.841% of MERALCO's energy requirement. To complete its As stated by the ERC, the 10.841% without any base reference is mathematically
meaning, the figure 10.841% should have been followed by a reference value and incomplete and therefore opens itself up to various interpretations; thus, it is ambiguous. On the
should have been written as "10.841% of . . ." a specific base reference. Thus, to other hand, the 169,000 kW, which appears twice in Schedule W, if treated as merely "indicative" or
use 10.841% as the reference value alone for MERALCO's contract energy at any just an "estimate," as PSALM alleges, would be rendered insignificant or as if it was not even written
given hour would not be appropriate under the circumstances because SCPC in the contract, and the same could be said of all the other figures in the schedule including the
would not have an idea of how much energy MERALCO would need at any given 10.841%. Clearly, this was not the intention of the parties. The parties clearly assigned a common
time and the capacity that the power plant can generate may not match with it. meaning to the figures and they were not mere estimates nor insignificant because, otherwise, the
On the other hand, to use the nominal figure 169,000 kW alone in contract would be ineffectual and without these figures, the contract would not have even been
reference to MERALCO's contract energy would likewise not be appropriate under signed in the first place.
the circumstances because the "10.841%" value written in parenthesis underneath It bears emphasis as well that the contract APA and its Schedule W appear to have been
the name "MERALCO" in the first column of Schedule W cannot just simply be prepared by PSALM, so that the interpretation of any obscure or ambiguous words or stipulations
ignored. therein should not favor it, as it is presumed to have caused such obscurity or ambiguity. 92
To synthesize, the Commission believes that neither of the figures Moreover, overturning the ERC's and the CA's interpretation would result in the absurd
(10.841% or 169,000 kW) taken alone should be controlling in reference to scenario of requiring SCPC to supply more than 169,000kW for MERALCO despite the fact that its
MERALCO's contract energy under the APA. The 10.841% value should be read and contracted demand levels for various customers listed in Schedule W were pegged at 322 MW only
harmonized with the nominal figure 169,000 kW in order to give meaning to both, and its dependable capacity is only 330 MW. As this Court has verified in the records, the ERC
consistent with and in relation to the APA. In giving meaning to the words and correctly explained that the Calaca Power Plant only produces up to 322 MW in electricity net of plant
intention of Schedule W, the Commission abides by the law stipulated under use; out of such produced, MERALCO obtains the biggest allocation of 169,000 kW (169 MW), whereas
Article 1374 of the New Civil Code, which provides: AHDacC the rest of the customers share 153,000 kW (153MW). 93 It would be highly unreasonable to require
ART. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall SCPC to allocate even a marginal increase from 169,000 kW for MERALCO when such would cause it
be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that to renege on its obligations to supply its other customers. Such an interpretation that would lead to
sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. 88 an unreasonableness which is frowned upon, for another oft-cited rule in the interpretation of
The ambiguity in Schedule W partly lies in the figure "10.841%," which lacks a base value contracts is that "the reasonableness of the result obtained, after analysis and construction of the
and is bereft of any specific quantity or number (in kilowatts or any other unit) to represent the contract, must also be carefully considered." 94
generated electricity that SCPC was obliged to deliver to MERALCO. A mere percentage below PSALM also contends that other stipulations in the contract such as the Special Conditions of
MERALCO's name without indicating what it is and what its base value is amounts to an incomplete the MERALCO TSC, as well as SCPC's option to enter into back-to-back supply contracts with other
numerical statement. Then, on the right columns, specific quantities, including the "160,000 kW," are generators (or to purchase directly from the market), should it become unable to supply the
laid down which seem to correspond or add up to SCPC's generating capacity but which, in the contracted power under Schedule W, clearly are indications that there is no cap in SCPC's supply
"Notes" section of the schedule, are confusingly referred to as merely "indicative," i.e., estimates, obligations. The contention, however, has no merit and, upon this Court's own examination of the
which do not help reduce the uncertainty. contracts, affirms as correct the ERC's explanation in its Order 95 dated March 12, 2012 dismissing
Such a lack of clarity results in a perplexing situation wherein the obligation to deliver could PSALM's motion for reconsideration, to wit:
be interpreted as open-ended by one party — the obligee, but could be argued as "capped" or A. NPC/PSALM's OBLIGATION UNDER THE TSC
"limited" by the other party — the obligor. Obviously, such divergence needed to be addressed by a Under the TSC contracted between MERALCO and NPC, the latter is
disinterested third party like the ERC. obliged to deliver MERALCO's total energy requirements. As such, NPC is required
Although how such confusion came about despite the presumed knowledge of both parties to exhaust all means to find other sources of power to replace any curtailed
of both the high and low ranges of MERALCO's projected requirements, at any given time, as well as energy at no extra cost to MERALCO. Simply put, NPC is directly responsible
 to make up for any shortfall under the MERALCO TSC. In fact, in its "Motion An "Electric Power Industry Participant" is defined in Section 4 of the same law as referring to "any
for Reconsideration," PSALM mentioned that "Undeniably, Respondent PSALM person or entity engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution or supply of
under the MERALCO TSC is obligated to deliver the entire contracted energy as electricity.
stated therein. . . ." and that "Respondent PSALM's obligation is to keep MERALCO 77.Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Spouses Ignacio , 613 Phil. 629, 640-641 (2009); Philippine
whole." International Trading Corporation v. Presiding Judge Angeles, 331 Phil. 723, 748 (1996).
It must be emphasized that NPC and PSALM's obligation to supply 78.237 Phil. 389, 396-398 (1987). (Emphasis ours; citations omitted)
the entire energy contract to MERALCO, including the obligation to 79.Mount Carmel College Employees Union (MCCEU) v. Mount Carmel College, Inc ., G.R. No. 187621,
replace any curtailed energy, was not passed on or assigned to SCPC. September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 381, 389.
Only the portion of the contract energy as defined in Part I of Schedule W was 80.Magoyag, et al. v. Maruhom, 640 Phil. 289, 298 (2010).
assigned to SCPC. Such is clear under Part II of Schedule W, which states: HCaDIS 83.Law Firm of Tungol v. Court of Appeals, 579 Phil. 717, 726 (2008), citing Abad v. Goldloop
"Part II. Special Conditions of the MERALCO TSC Properties, Inc., 549 Phil. 641, 654 (2007).
The following conditions, unique to the MERALCO-NPC contract, shall 86.National Irrigation Administration v. Gamit, G.R. No. 85869, November 6, 1992, 215 SCRA 436,
apply to the assigned portion of the Contract Energy from the MERALCO TSC. 453, citing Martin, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. V, 1986 ed., p. 124, citing Dick
1. Neither the MERALCO TSC nor any portion thereof shall be assigned to vs. King, 236 P. 1059, 73 Mont. 465.
the Buyer. It is the Contract Energy specified in part I that is the subject of the 87.Id. at 453-454, citing Dent v. Industrial Oil & Gas Co., Ark. 122 2d. 162, 164.
assignment." 89.See also Licaros v. Gatmaitan, 414 Phil. 857 (2001); China Banking Corporation v. Court of
B. SCPC's OBLIGATION UNDER SCHEDULE W OF THE APA Appeals, 333 Phil. 158 (1996).
On the other hand, under Schedule W of the APA, SCPC is legally 90.Mendros, Jr. v. Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corporation (MMPC), 599 Phil. 1, 18 (2009),
obligated to deliver 10.841% of MERALCO's energy requirements but not to citing Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., et al., 145 Phil. 24, 33 (1970).
exceed 169,000 kW capacity allocation at any given hour. Accordingly, SCPC is 92.CIVIL CODE, Art. 1377; Horrigan v. Troika Commercial, Inc., 512 Phil. 782, 785 (2005).
responsible for any shortfall and is under obligation to provide and make up for 94.JMA House Incorporated v. Sta. Monica Industrial Dev. Corp ., 532 Phil. 233, 254 (2006), citing RP
curtailed energy if it fails to produce up to 169,000 kW capacity, at any given v. David, 480 Phil. 258, 266-267 (2004); Carceller v. CA, 362 Phil. 332, 340 (1994).
hour. 96 100.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 353 Phil. 676, 685 (1998).
The above explanation by the ERC states, in simple terms, that SCPC is not accountable for | (Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp. v. Sem-Calaca Power Corp., G.R.
any shortfall once it had delivered 169,000 kW at any given hour, the same being the responsibility of No. 204719, [December 5, 2016], 801 PHIL 938-967)
NPC. SCPC becomes liable only whenever it fails to deliver whichever is lower of 169,000 kW or
10.841% of MERALCO's requirements, at any given hour. The Court has exhaustively examined the
contract between the parties, including the so-called Special Conditions of the MERALCO TSC, 97 the
Calaca Typical Hourly Customer's Load Profile 98 and the Nomination Protocol between MERALCO
and NPC of TSC Contract Energy, 99 as cited by PSALM in its petition, and specifically the provisions
thereof quoted by the ERC, and found the same to be consistent with the above conclusions of the
said agency. As such, the Court will not interfere with the same, mindful of the principle that actions
of an administrative agency may not be disturbed nor set aside by the judicial department sans any
error of law, grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law. 100
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 4,
2012 and Resolution dated November 27, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 123997 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Normandie B.
Pizarro and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; rollo, pp. 59-73.
2.Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Normandie B.
Pizarro and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; id. at 74-75.
3.RA 9136, Sec. 3.
7.Id. The parties differ as to the actual date of the declaration of DMCI as winning bidder. Petitioners
state the date as July 8, 2009, while respondents put it on July 3, 2009.
29.The petition was docketed as ERC Case No. 2010-058MC and entitled In the Matter of the Petition
for Dispute Resolution, with Application for the Issuance of Provisional Remedies, Sem-
Calaca Power Corporation, petitioner, vs. National Power Corporation and Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, respondents; id. at 13, 463, 490-508.
30.Signed by Chairperson Zenaida G. Cruz-Ducut and Commissioners Rauf A. Tan, Alejandro Z. Barin
and Jose C. Reyes; id. at 295-318.
32.Signed by Chairperson Zenaida Cruz-Ducut and Commissioners Jose C. Reyes, Maria Teresa A.R.
Castañeda and Gloria Victoria C. Yap-Taruc; id. at 337-350.
73.Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission , 479 Phil. 1, 11 (2004).
74.Herida v. F&C Pawnshop and Jewelry Store, 603 Phil. 385, 390 (2006).
75.Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 480, 492 (1998).
76.Sec. 43. Functions of the ERC. —
xxx xxx xxx
(u) The ERC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates,
fees, fines and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of the above mentioned
powers, functions and responsibilities and over all cases involving disputes between
and among participants or players in the energy sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
|| EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF
EN BANC THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
[G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.] REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary,
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health;
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON.
INC., petitioners,vs.HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary, HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, Government, respondents.
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. [G.R. No. 205003. April 8, 2014.]
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER
Government, respondents. OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
[G.R. No. 204934. April 8, 2014.] GENERAL, respondents.
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], [G.R. No. 205043. April 8, 2014.]
represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, Fernand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol LUISTRO, respondents.
Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, [G.R. No. 205138. April 8, 2014.]
Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX),herein represented by
Fernando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. its National President, Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty.
Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z.
and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal,
Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr.,Landrito M. Diokno and
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Baldomero Falcone, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive
Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON.
& Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General,
David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO,
minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R. COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, respondents.
Laws, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary, [G.R. No. 205478. April 8, 2014.]
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D.,JACQUELINE H. KING M.D.,CYNTHIA T.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. DOMINGO, M.D.,AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D.,collectively
CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and known as Doctors for Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
Development, HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos for
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Life, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary; HON.
Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Remedios Ignacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education;
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior
OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso and Local Government, respondents.
Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its [G.R. No. 205491. April 8, 2014.]
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F.
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, respondents. PAGUIA, fox themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
[G.R. No. 204957. April 8, 2014.] posterity, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. Philippines, respondent.
AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary; [G.R. No. 205720. April 8, 2014.]
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc.,represented by Lorna Melegrito,
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO,
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA
Local Government, respondents. A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
[G.R. No. 204988. April 8, 2014.] RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC.,represented by Dr. Nestor B. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO
Lumicao, M.D.,as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
FOUNDATION, INC.,represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D.,as member Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIA P. NACES, Phd.,ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
 Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
Interior and Local Government, respondents. sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
[G.R. No. 206355. April 8, 2014.] strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy,as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and
BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLA ACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUÑA two (2) petitions-in-intervention, to wit:
CAUSING, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of
EDUCATION, respondents. their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Learning Center, Inc.,a domestic, privately-owned
[G.R. No. 207111. April 8, 2014.] educational institution (Imbong);
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, (2) Petition for Prohibition, 6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines,
JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT- Inc.,through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and several others 8 in their personal
GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and (3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc.,and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and (4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City,
Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several
Interior and Local Government, respondents. others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
[G.R. No. 207172. April 8, 2014.] (5) Petition, 14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC.,SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI (6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. (7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians,
RODRIGO, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary, Inc.,18 and several others 19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX); AHcaDC
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and (8) Petition, 20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and (9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny
Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet
Interior and Local Government, respondents. unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
[G.R. No. 207563. April 8, 2014.] (10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation,
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. Inc. 24 and several others, 25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its
KASHIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,Executive Secretary, associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. (11) Petition for Prohibition, 26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Cataluña Causing, in their capacities as
Management, respondents. citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
DECISION (12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
MENDOZA, J p: others, 29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat);
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. (13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to and several others, 31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience (14) Petition for Prohibition 32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah);and
others and with the common good." 1 (15) Petition-In-Intervention, 33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara);and
developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and (16) Petition-In-Intervention, 34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (BUHAY),an accredited
unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the political party. acHETI
economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development GROUNDS:
of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, • The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of
is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of
governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of
to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 35
solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-à-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds • The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
Philippine society together — the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution. AECDHS hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on it causes cancer and other health problems. 36
the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television • The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that
debates 2 to sticker campaigns, 3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it
organized by members of the clergy 4 — the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives.
the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to
society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),was enacted by ensuring religious freedom. 37 CHATEa
Congress on December 21, 2012. It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
 compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on • The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of Legislative
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA
correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be
it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38 included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
In this connection, Section 5.23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations • The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26 (1),
of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals Article VI of the Constitution. 52
who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or • The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health • The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement Mindanao (ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40 reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM,
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an Government Code and R.A. No. 9054. 54 HcDATC
affront to their religious beliefs. 41 Various parties also sought and were granted Leave to file their respective comments-in-
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents, 55 Congressman
present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to Edcel C. Lagman, 56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberta G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
free speech. 42 Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, 59 and Atty. Joan de Venecia 60 also filed their
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene. 61
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray
program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
bono services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.;2] same petitioners
imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43 lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation took effect.
would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued
of the practitioners' services. 44 ESIcaC the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties
target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13,
the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45 extended until further orders of the Court. 63 IaESCH
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty
the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of
"any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct the parties. 64
to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46 The Status Quo Ante
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the (Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to Prior to the RH Law)
manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation
shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It ignores the and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment. Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech.To compel a person to explain a full could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that practitioner." 65 aTEHIC
although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to
religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof,
healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48 it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to
the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population,
raise their children in accordance with their beliefs. 49 cCSDTI which recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to
undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365,approved on August
dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on
mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their Population and for Other Purposes." The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a
family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or
has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
whether their child should use contraceptives. 50 To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made
"family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part 10] Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM SETaHC
of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except DISCUSSION
abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies." Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to controversy.
one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its The Power of Judicial Review
adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should
Development. 70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the
Carta for Women," which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and
services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education. 71 "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the authority of the
The RH Law Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political
at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling
population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
2010. 72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature. 79
rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering
marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government
ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot
it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80 TADCSE
full range of modern family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power
carry out its mandates. ScCIaA and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
current laws on contraception, women's health and population control. of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Prayer of the Petitioners — Maintain the Status Quo Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. supreme within its own sphere. 81 Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the executive power shall be vested
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante — the situation prior and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with
to the passage of the RH Law — must be maintained." 73 It explains: deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85
. . . . The instant Petition does not question contraception and In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of
contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of
4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the
a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies — the entire caution. 86 CITaSA
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political
remotest areas of the country — is made to play in the implementation of the instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same
and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, time, allows it to cross the line of separation — but only at a very limited and specific point — to
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
supplies. 74 undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
ISSUES wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues: IHCSTE protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
I. PROCEDURAL:Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be
the controversy. limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to
1] Power of Judicial Review judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes
2] Actual Case or Controversy back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and
3] Facial Challenge the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make
4] Locus Standi sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of
5] Declaratory Relief them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
6] One Subject/One Title Rule then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90 This is in line with Article
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional: VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
1] Right to Life Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
2] Right to Health such lower courts as may be established by law.
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
4] The Family controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom enforceable,and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
6] Due Process of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
7] Equal Protection branch or instrumentality of the Government.[Emphases supplied] AEDCHc
8] Involuntary Servitude As far back as Tañada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA that certiorari,prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC, 93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
In Tañada,the Court wrote: service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.They must, at least, be heard on the
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it matter NOW. STaAcC
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable Facial Challenge
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is measure. 105
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the The Court is not persuaded.
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge,also known as a First
or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional only protected speech,but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied] include religious freedom, freedom of the press,and the right of the people to peaceably
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial assemble,and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial thoughts are externalized.
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation — or instrument of intervention — of the In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
judiciary in that balancing operation." 95 maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled challenges to strictly penal statutes, 108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with regulating free speech,but also those involving religious freedom,and other fundamental
the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz.:(a) there must be rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;(c) the question of U.S.,this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
be the lis mota of the case. 96 IcDHaT determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Actual Case or Controversy excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. 97 They claim that the questions vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. DICcTa
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
Law is premature. these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has
an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable — Locus Standi
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions.
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed
hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the government has yet to distribute
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100 and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
adverse effect an the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 102 challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to third-party standing. 115 STaIHc
pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate Transcendental Importance
the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. importance,of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
public. pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
"as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus foundation. 127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive
or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural Women." 128 TcDHSI
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non- Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero,it was written:
interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119 ACIDTE Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.One cannot deny that the issues effect,and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to binder or delay, In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Section 2 of the RH Law:
(Emphasis supplied) SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes and guarantees the
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health,the freedom of includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental parenthood. cEDaTS
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so
right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment
to be taken away before taking action. aSTAIH or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129 Considering the close intimacy between
mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences. "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
Declaratory Relief achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120 Suffice it to state that most of legislation.
the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching 1-The Right to Life
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition Position of the Petitioners
under Rule 65. 121 The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the
One Subject-One Title unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130 HcDSaT
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, 122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4 (a) of
to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent — to act as a the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take
population control measure. 123 effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
control measure, 124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125 THCSAE contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131 As it opposes the
the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
range of modern family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the
modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that
manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not
well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive Position of the Respondents
health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy. For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not
violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive Plain and Legal Meaning
health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be
public. 134 interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives and Bar Council: 144
are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where
various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135 principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of
fertilized ovum are allowed. 136 the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
The Court's Position what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum — from the words of a statute there
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to should be no departure.
life. 137 Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent The raison d' être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
and transcends any authority or the laws of men. objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
of the Constitution provides: consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without to prevail. TCEaDI
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
laws. cDHAaT which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the fertilization.
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act to Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" on June 18, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a
1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the being like its parents. 145
promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, maturation under normal conditions. 146
the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montaño,147 it was
reproductive health. 140 written:
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine conception,that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no- unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As will be discussed later, these principles are delivered, qualifies as death.[Emphases in the original]
not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom. that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and
When Life Begins * substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper Intent of the Framers
hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
members of the Court could express their own views on this matter. CASIEa regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
In this regard, the ponente,is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization. deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
phrase of Section 12 which reads: "The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect of the unborn from the moment of conception."
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally When is the moment of conception?
protect the life of the mother and the life of the xxx xxx xxx
unborn from conception.The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life.....150
receive the support of the Government. xxx xxx xxx
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no life, it was explained: aTHCSE
surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The
The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living
begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins. organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On the other side of the spectrum are multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All
those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. 143
 these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
the fertilized ovum has life. that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical constitutionally permissible.
"yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of xxx xxx xxx
the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found Mr. Gascon: ....As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-
only — and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human. life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term
be human life. Its nature is human. 151 "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of
moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because: Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical
Mr. Tingson: ...the phrase from the moment of "conception" was answer. CHIScD
described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from
beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
the moment of conception." 152 contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
the Constitution, it was discussed: Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about
conception." EHTADa some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from
according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives
define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after will have to be unconstitutionalized.
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156
about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153 The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted
Upon further inquiry, it was asked: by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157 ESCTIA
point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of Atty. Noche:
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
now states: Justice Bersamin:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life There is no life.
of the unborn from the moment of conception. Atty. Noche:
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this So, there is no life to be protected.
mean when the egg meets the sperm? Justice Bersamin:
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm. To be protected.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to Atty. Noche:
determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or Under Section 12, yes.
not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of Justice Bersamin:
the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for So you have no objection to condoms?
the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens Atty. Noche:
with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the Not under Section 12, Article II. EaCDAT
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it Justice Bersamin:
is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned. Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is Atty. Noche:
called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am
under this provision. discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress Justice Bersamin:
to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are Alright.
abortifacient.Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they Atty. Noche:
are already considered abortifacient. 154 ESDcIA And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of Medical Meaning
the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby's Medical,
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life,that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken
the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159 It describes
the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
determine when life begins. develops." 160
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual,
whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue. TDCaSE
courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155 From the discussions above, contraceptives Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development
that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as
fertilization (conception).Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment
This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody
primordium, of a human being." 162 the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote: uterus for implantation. 170
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed. ...The combination of Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus: HEDCAS
23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote.Thus the 1]....
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic Section 4. Definition of Terms. — For the purpose of this Act, the following
unity." terms shall be defined as follows:
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on xxx xxx xxx.
the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that: (q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of
CONCLUSION methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new xxx xxx xxx.
lives is never licit,no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms (3) Proscription of abortion and management
of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at of abortion complications; cTACIa
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human xxx xxx xxx.
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any 2]....
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective Section 4.....
scientific fact. (s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information
the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164 DTAcIa reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not
Conclusion: The Moment include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
of Conception is Reckoned from 3]....
Fertilization SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. — Except for prevailing laws against
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with
conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as
at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman The RH Law and Abortifacients
that life begins at implantation. 165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To
and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and be clear, Section 4 (a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the Section 4. Definition of Terms. — ...
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167 destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized FDA. SEHTAC
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object — it is a living human being complete with DNA As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment
and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those of fertilization. By using the word "or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
Law but also to the Constitution. CSTEHI inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position. (a) Induces abortion;or
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug (b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or aTADcH
or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative (c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness. womb,
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes — abortion and abortifacients. upon determination of the FDA.
The RH Law and Abortion Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise.This intent of the Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind),which, as discussed
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum,
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
conception, explained: mother's womb (third kind).
The intention ...is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach
laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to
the Supreme Court.169 mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one,there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for
which already has life, and two,the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
becomes existent — all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb.After conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification
all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants — in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation. DTAHEC implantation of the fertilized ovum. aEcHCD
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. 174
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under
as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do
the mother's womb, is an abortifacient. not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the
said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd.The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the
drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every word "primarily" in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171 validity of Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
second paragraph of the same section that provides: 2-The Right to Health
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the
by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and
be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent. supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing various studies on the matter,
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that
follows: the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. — For the purpose of this Act, the following use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
terms shall be defined as follows: thromboembolism,a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke,and an indeterminate effect on
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health"
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention under Sections 4 (p) 178 and (w) 179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180 CaSHAc
womb upon determination of the FDA. ECcaDT The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-
Section 3.01 (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as: executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-
Section 3.01.For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger
follows: to the health of women. 181
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces The Court's Position
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard,
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15,
the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Article II of the Constitution provides:
Administration (FDA).[Emphasis supplied] Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
Again in Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz.: people and instill health consciousness among them.
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health
modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or of the people, viz.:
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized HEALTH
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
Administration (FDA). health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women,
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and
womb. 172 drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
This cannot be done. and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled persons
they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH- for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into
IRR 173 must be struck down for being ultra vires. the mainstream of society.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH- Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides: CTIEac
IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be
 Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and "Approved: June 18, 1966"
from substandard or hazardous products. 111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless 5921 provides:
the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered "Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and
self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing devices. — No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and
provisions. 182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated: kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise
...Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are provisions of this Act."
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature 112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that
fundamental law.This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives,
has always been, that — whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing baseless. 186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or provides: CacEID
whether, they shall be effective.These provisions would be subordinated to the SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. — The
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied) supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution
question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo — program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the
under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited current levels and projections of the following:
when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician — be (a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space
maintained. 185 ETCcSa or limit their children;
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the (b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its (c) Cost of family planning supplies.
requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will guidelines of the DOH.
still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
available to the public.As aptly explained by respondent Lagman: procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
D. Contraceptives cannot be dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
dispensed and used without medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately
prescription done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
cannot be dispensed and used without prescription. contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that
repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court
the RH Law. finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature.Indeed, the various
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded
drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full: herein, to be determined as the case presents itself. SICaDA
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
practitioner. contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
"Sec. 2. For the purpose of this Act: concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
"(a)" Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or the EDL supports this construction.
portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
of the female ovum: and contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
"(b)" Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-
purpose of preventing conception. abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination
"Sec. 3. Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five without the proper scientific examination.
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more 3-Freedom of Religion
than one year or both in the discretion of the Court. HATICc and the Right to Free Speech
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Position of the Petitioners:
 1. On Contraception and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive
the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of against his free will. 199 AHacIS
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed,
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking the
spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize
life." 188 CacEID only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that citizenry. 201 CAETcH
the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189 constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the
2. On Religious Accommodation and interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer
The Duty to Refer — and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession
sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is given by the State under Section 7 and 23 (a) (3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely
nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202 Whatever burden
the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious location and impact. 203
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15, the respondents claim
beliefs. 190 that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a) (3) that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required
the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information — no escape is seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject
afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a) (1) and (2),i.e.,against a patient seeking any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously without intervention of the State. 204
object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers For their part, respondents De Venecia et al.,dispute the notion that natural family planning
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23 (b); and c) teachers in public is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and
schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognized. 191 aTEHIC surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a followers in planning their families. HEcTAI
compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the The Church and The State
act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 17 of At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up
the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that
contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards
required. 192 all — the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the
religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin present Constitution reads:
under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in
acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall
public. 193 embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions this Constitution. TSEcAD
according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As
freedom. 194 ISCHET this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. 205 Moreover, in
attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in
penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners public schools.
claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and
guarantee of religious freedom. State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
The Respondents' Positions Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith
sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the
citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only
good for the country. cADTSH by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over religious belief, limitless and without bounds.One may believe in most
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia,or any other house of God which metaphorically others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is
collectively. quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can
protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution: is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." 213
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, Legislative Acts and the
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious Free Exercise Clause
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Section 29. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
xxx xxx xxx. mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or Constitution." 215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. ASaTHc remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: religion." 216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among courts." 217 EcSaHA
religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion. interest test is proper. 218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited scrutiny. 219 In Escritor,it was written:
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining the Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits.
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote: Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society,the
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty.
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom
worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153),but also assures the free is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law.
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as
It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test.
live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any After Victoriano, German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the "clear and present danger" test in
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. the maiden case of American Bible Society.Not surprisingly, all the cases which
(Sherbert v. Verner,374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger"
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite used in cases on freedom of expression.On the other hand,
its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L ed. over established institutions of society and law. Gerona,however, which was the
2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449). authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed
As expounded in Escritor, the "grave and immediate danger" test. Victoriano was the only case that
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal — to promote freedom of individual use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society,
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine,aside from having been
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. 210 appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano,the present case involves purely
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct
act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
Education:211 SacTCA immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching.A test that
would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether
 immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them
would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions.
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most [Section 3(f)]
inalienable and sacred of all human rights",in the words of Jefferson. This right is 5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family
sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various
an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a 6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs),women's
government." As held in Sherbert,only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population
balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a 7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to
heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a
to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide.The "compelling aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state.This (Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.,refusal to work an While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an
paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining respected. cHESAD
supplied.] The Establishment Clause
The Court's Position and Contraceptives
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modern reproductive health measures is religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not
belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church . . . are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. CcAITa cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the unto God the things that are God's. 221
tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
Law respecting religious freedom are the following: While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
convictions,ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy] legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the
2. The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law,
thereto, the State shall defend: unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny. CHEDAc
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy] THDIaC In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his
methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his
support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the will, refers a patient seeking information on modern reproductive health products, services,
Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
religious convictions.[Section 3(e),Declaration of Policy] perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the conscience. 222
 Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law.
a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free
by indirect participation. exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the
free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or
right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus,
should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in
simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition,
mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide and freedom of association. 229
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH
conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting
practice of one's religion. 224 respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one prevail. ISHaCD
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive Justice Mendoza:
health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, I'll go to another point. The RH law . . . in your Comment-in-Intervention on page 52,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this
a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. Congressman Lagman:
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could Justice Mendoza:
not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But
abortions. 226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the in the IRR it says: ". . . skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or
person was taking part 'directly' or 'indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
uncertainty." 227 midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and
— they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will. these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you
Institutional Health Providers agree with this?
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned Congressman Lagman:
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer Justice Mendoza:
under Section 7 and Section 23 (a) (3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can
violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23 (a) (1) and (a) (2) in relation to be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
providers should be respected. Congressman Lagman:
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
Secretary 228 it was stressed: prevail. 230
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers Compelling State Interest
of our fundamental law.And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense
status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
with the liberty of others and with the common good." 10 Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his
be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion.
law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following: EHITaS
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or Justice De Castro:
who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow. HTSAEa Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR) Yes, Justice.
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads: Justice De Castro:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or ...which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling
municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
considered as conscientious objectors. Ahh, Your Honor, ...
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious Justice De Castro:
objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
 Senior State Solicitor Hilbay: (7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling complications;
State interest,this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. (8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children
This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive
regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical,
their patients. 231 and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery,
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free and empowerment;
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,however few in number. Only the prevention of an (9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of (10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232 (11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are
means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented strategies in the prevention of diseases. ICaDHT
from acting according to one's belief. 233 HDIATS (b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. — The State shall
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate
individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given (1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed youth and the development of moral character and the right of
upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
consultation on reproductive health matters. rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the (2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest (3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including
abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right fertility awareness.
to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling
show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering pregnancies, lives changed, ...." 235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts
that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of and figures from reputable sources.
religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the
undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest. aSTAcH
say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms. programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A. No. 4729 or the Exception: Life Threatening Cases
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law.
otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
services and programs for women, in fact, reads: threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. — (a) Comprehensive Health right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
Services. — The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture- practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested:
a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due not contemplate an emergency." 237
respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
devices, interventions, and substances. DcaCSE Principle of Double-Effect. — May we please remind the principal author
Access to the following services shall be ensured: of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified
pregnancy and infant health and nutrition; to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding; the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family lives.However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it
planning; is medically impossible to save both,provided that no direct harm is intended to
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the
services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable.Hence, the doctor
parents to educate their children; would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS; Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As
and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been
disorders; more than justified considering the life he would be able to save. EScAHT
Family Planning Seminars population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a inviolable social institution. 241
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the private right.Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State
required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-de Castro, Section 19 (c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
life without the intervention of the State. known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23 (a) (2) (i) thereof violates the their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3 (v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it responsibility between parents. Section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the
development. 240 absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242 TaCDcE
The Court cannot but agree. The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by
social institution.In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family. the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Morfe v.
ARTICLE XV Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy
THE FAMILY as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of deserving of constitutional protection." 244 Morfe adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
total development. We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights — older than our
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
the family and shall be protected by the State. better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
Section 3. The State shall defend: is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
parenthood; DcTaEH Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; couples. Justice Douglas in Griswold wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
The right of families or family associations to participate in the Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 246
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide. aEHASI
them. The Family and Parental Consent
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH
father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It law provides:
likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. — ....
already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage. No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
The Family and Spousal Consent services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed
Section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states: access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their
The following acts are prohibited: parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ... miscarriage. HIaAED
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the
authorization of the following persons in the following instances: CTEaDc minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
procedures shall prevail.[Emphasis supplied] guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-
vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect
husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural
family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this regard,
programs that affect them" is equally recognized. Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over
their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the
very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the the youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that Section 14 provides not
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly- only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
of the family and society. physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4 (t) of the RH Law itself provides for the
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes
authority. among adolescents — the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
First Exception: Access to Information supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second their children.
paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23 (a) (2) (i),a Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health
distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations,
planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3 (1) of the Constitution is without
exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own merit. 254 aDSHCc
body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH
to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they 6-Due Process
are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. SAHITC process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a) (1) mentions a "private health
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life- health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of reference to a "private health care institution."
the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life. methods.It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) 249 should be struck down. health information under Section 23 (a) (1),or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it Section 23 (a) (2).
denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of
procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
provided in the first sentence of Section 23 (a) (2) (ii),the parents should not be deprived of their The arguments fail to persuade. AHCTEa
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family. standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
5-Academic Freedom application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
teaching of Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom. According to the petitioners, these flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute
provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing various studies relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts
the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty";the As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251 ScCEIA provider," reference must be made to Section 4 (n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH service provider," viz.:
Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a (n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention,
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care;
validity. (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midwife;
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4)
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health
parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role (DOH). ACIDTE
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead
State. 252 of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral that they are used synonymously.
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing
 The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
obligated to render reproductive health service and modern family planning methods, includes those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is
be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modern family planning taken. DHCSTa
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures. among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
quoted as follows: the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. — The following acts are prohibited: members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: classification."
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
and/or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
programs and services on reproductive health including the right classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically- similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that
methods; STaCcA the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by
model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
relation to Section 23 (a) (1),they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the law to him." IECAaD
the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations
and safety. The public deserves no less. excluded]
7-Equal Protection To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively people. Thus:
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms 260 of the law. approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional. ScTIAH shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on disabled, women, and children.The State shall endeavor to provide free
the concept of equal protection. Thus: medical care to paupers.
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more Section 3 (l) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the the advancement of reproductive health."
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise
partiality on prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise
clause. them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as basic reproductive health care.
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental teaching of reproductive health education.
objective." 8-Involuntary Servitude
 The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the "(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight efficacy, purity, and quality;
(48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude "(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262 wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has
hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the patient, or any person; TDEASC
OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of "(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint
medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right. for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for
The point of the OSG is well-taken. EIcSTD registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public and may be extended for sixty (60) days only after due process has been observed;
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect "(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal
and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori,this serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive,and to require all concerned
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such the appropriate authorization;
right altogether. 264 xxx xxx xxx.
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole
reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non- with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of
of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a explained in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows: cDEICH
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and
interest. EAICTS the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bono or otherwise. reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266 required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power 10-Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes
understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
what is ordinarily understood as "health products." In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3720, as Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads: delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. —
office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
Health (DOH).Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently
have the following functions, powers and duties: TcaAID vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same; government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient
products; and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the herein. HcSCED
implementation of this Act; (b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, ....
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect
efficacy, quality and fill of container; of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA; services funded by the National Government under the annual General
"xxx xxx xxx Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly
or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
 designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that
and services. [Emphases supplied] what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution
an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general remains in the hands of the very few. cACTaI
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
of the LGU. 269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago, are now
basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse
it. 270 effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled health professionals, 272 or the reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is
training of barangay health workers, 273 it will be the national government that will provide for the failing.
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas
say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would
implement like the RH Law. happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LGUs are merely encouraged to provide generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use
Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve
the local governments. EHSTDA it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law. SDHITE
The ARMM . . . . But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the
equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom
petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch.
refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to
government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as
enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing
notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
governments. 274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275 Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation
11-Natural Law and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the
the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural family planning method should be maintained.
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and WHEREFORE,the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A.
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are
than in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: SCEDAI
written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the 1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
where no law is applicable. 279 aCHcIE minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program 2] Section 23 (a) (1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
readily available to the public, especially to the poor. disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
Facts and Fallacies her religious beliefs.
and the Wisdom of the Law 3] Section 23 (a) (2) (i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, 4] Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man 5] Section 23 (a) (3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modern society leaves another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so regardless of his or her religious beliefs; SDAaTC
that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
 6] Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 16.Through its vice president and co-founder, Eduardo B. Olaguer.
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health 17.With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, docketed as G.R. No. 205138; rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 3-50.
regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 18.Through and together with its president Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo.
7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro 19.Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C.
PhilHealth accreditation; and Miguel, Jr.,Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone.
8] Section 3.01 (a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" 20.With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction; The
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for petition fails to provide any description as to nature of the suit under the Rules of Court;
contravening Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. docketed as G.R. No. 205478; rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 3-26.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, 21.Jacqueline H. King, M.D.,Cynthia T. Domingo, M.D.,Josephine Millado-Lumitao, M.D.,Anthony Perez,
dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been Michael Anthony G. Mapa, Carlos Antonio Palad, Wilfredo Jose, Claire Navarro, Anna Cosio,
herein declared as constitutional. Gabriel Dy Liacco.
SO ORDERED. 22.With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
Velasco, Jr.,Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur. docketed as G.R. No. 205491; rollo (G.R. No. 205491),pp. 3-13.
Sereno, C.J., tingnan ang aking opinyong sumasang-ayon at sumasalungat. 23.With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
Carpio and Abad, JJ., see concurring opinion. docketed as G.R. No. 205720; rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 3-90.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., with separate concurring opinion. 24.Through and together with its executive director, Lorna Melegrito.
Brion, J., see: separate concurring opinion. 25.Joselyn B. Basilio, Robert Z. Cortes, Ariel A. Crisostomo, Jeremy I. Gatdula, Cristina A. Montes, Raul
Del Castillo, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., see concurring and dissenting opinion. Antonio A. Nidoy, Winston Conrad B. Padojinog, Rufino L. Policarpio III.
Leonen, J., see separate dissent. 26.Docketed as G.R. No. 206355, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 3-32.
Separate Opinions 27.Through and together with its co-petitioners, Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella
Footnotes Acedera, and Berteni Cataluña Causing.
1.Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary ,G.R. No. 153888, 28.With prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207111; rollo (G.R. No.
July 9, 2003; 405 SCRA 497, 504. 207111),pp. 3-51.
2.See , last visited on November 5, 2013; See also tatad-debate-rh-bill>, last visited on November 5, 29.Mary M. Imbong, Anthony Victorio B. Lumicao, Joseph Martin Q. Verdejo, Antonio Emma R. Roxas and
2013. Lota Lat-Guerrero.
3.See ,last visited on November 5, 2013; See also ,last visited on November 5, 2013. 30.With prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 207172; rollo (G.R. No.
4.See ,last visited November 5, 2013; See also ,last visited November 5, 2013. 207172),pp. 3-56.
5.With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed 31.Spouses Juan Carlos Artadi Sarmiento and Francesca Isabelle Besinga-Sarmiento, and Spouses Luis
as G.R. No. 204819; rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 3-32. Francis A. Rodrigo, Jr. and Deborah Marie Veronica N. Rodrigo.
6.With Prayer for the Urgent Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary 32.Docketed as G.R. No. 207563; rollo (G.R. No. 207563),pp. 3-15.
Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204934; rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 3-76. 33.Rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 138-155.
7.Also proceeding in her personal capacity a citizen and as a member of the Bar. 34.Rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 1248-1260.
8.Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. 35.Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 8-10; Petition,Alliance for the Family
Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life
Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, Fernand Antonio A. Tansingco & Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 13-15; Petition, Olaguer v.
Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043),pp. 10-11; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v.
Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen 205478),pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President,
Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo(G.R. No. 207111),pp. 17-18;
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and Petition, Buhay Partylist (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 1255-1256.
on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. 36.Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 26-28;
Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 15-16;
on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 13-14; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 30-35.
their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho 37.Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 26-27;
& Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 39-44;
their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 205491),pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-Life
General Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 59-67; Petition, Millennium
& Katrina R. Laws. Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 25-26.
9.With Prayer for Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204957. 38.Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 20-22; Petition, Alliance for the Family
10.With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction; Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 34-38; Petition, Task Force for the
docketed as G.R. No. 204988; rollo (G.R. No. 204988),pp. 5-35. Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 26-27; Petition, Echavez v.
11.Through and together with its president Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 6-7; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa,
12.Through and together with its representative/member of the school board Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 56-75; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the
M.D. President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 16-22; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
13.Rosemarie R. Alenton, Imelda G. Ibarra, Cpa, Lovenia P. Naces, Phd.,Anthony G. Nagac, Earl Anthony 207111),pp. 28-33; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
C. Gambe and Marlon I. Yap. 207172),pp. 12-16.
14.Docketed as G.R. No. 205003; Petition is entitled "Petition (To Declare as Unconstitutional Republic 39.Section 5.23. Skilled Health Professional as a Conscientious Objector. — In order to be considered a
Act No. 10354)." The petition fails to provide any description as to nature of the suit under conscientious objector, a skilled health professional shall comply with the following
the Rules of Court; rollo (G.R. No. 205003),pp. 3-40. requirements:
15.With prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order; docketed as G.R. No. a) Submission to the DOH of an affidavit stating the modern family planning methods that he
205043; rollo (G.R. No. 205043),pp. 3-16. or she refuses to provide and his or her reasons for objection;
 b) Posting of a notice at the entrance of the clinic or place of practice, in a prominent location 3061-3070. On November 26, 2013, Senator Pilar Juliana S. Cayetano filed her separate
and using a clear/legible font, enumerating the reproductive health services he or she refuses Memorandum; see, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 3032-3059.
to provide; and 62.Resolution dated March 15, 2013.
c) Other requirements as determined by the DOH. .... 63.Resolution, dated July 16, 2013.
Provided, That skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited 64.In its Resolution, dated August 27, 2013, the Court required the parties to also include the following
to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural in their respective memoranda:
health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are 1. What is the relation of the first portion of Section 7 on Access to Family Planning to the
specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules cannot be considered as theory that R.A. No. 10354 is an anti-poor program that seeks to reduce the population of the
conscientious objectors....(Emphases Ours) poor?
40.Joint Memorandum, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 2617-2619. 2. How is the second paragraph of the same section related to the proposition that R.A. No.
41.Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),p. 40; 10354 encourages sex among minors?
Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 6-7; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines 3. In relation to Section 23 on Prohibited Acts, where in the law can you find the definition of
Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),p. 81. the term 'health care service provider'? Is the definition of a 'public health care service
42.Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 63-64; provider' found in Section 4, paragraph (n) of the law sufficient for the Court to understand the
Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),pp. 20-23. meaning of a 'private health care service provider' or should the Court refer to the
43.Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 16-48; Implementing Rules and Regulations which refer to 'health care providers'?
Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 7-9. 4. With respect to 'health care providers' under the Implementing Rules and Regulations, does
44.Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 16-48; it make a difference that they are called 'health care providers' and not 'health care service
Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 7-9. providers'? Does the fact that there is a missing word indicate that there is a difference or that
45.Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 30-31; the tautology being proposed actually refers to different objects? If in the affirmative, is there
Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 1247-1250; Petition, Millennium enough basis to say that the law is a criminal statute that has sufficient definitions for
Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 25; purposes of punitive action?
Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),pp. 43-45. 5. In relation to Section 23 (a) (1),how will the State be able to locate the programs and
46.Joint Memorandum, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 2626-2637; Petition, Alcantara, pp. services on which the health care service provider has the duty to give information? If the
9-13; rollo,(G.R. No. 204934),pp. 146-150; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. terminology of 'health care service provider' includes 'private health care service
Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 78-81. provider',which includes private hospitals and private doctors, is the State duty-bound to
47.Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),pp. 32-34. consequently provide these providers with information on the programs and services that
48.Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 2623-2626; Petition, Alcantara, pp. 5-9; rollo, these providers should give information on?
(G.R. No. 204934),pp. 142-148; Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo, 6. As regards programs, is there a duty on the part of the State to provide a way by which
(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 20-21; Petition, Bugarin v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. private health care service providers can have access to information on reproductive health
205003),pp. 14-16; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, care programs as defined in Section 4, paragraph (r)? What is the implication of the fact that
rollo (G.R. No. 206355),p. 16; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. the law requires even private parties with the duty to provide information on government
No. 207172),pp. 16-20. programs on the criminal liability of private health care service providers?
49.Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 14-19; Petition, Alliance for the Family 7. As regards services, what is the distinction between 'information' and 'services' considering
Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 42-44; Petition, Task Force for the that 'services' in different portions of the statute include providing of information?
Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 21-25; Petition, Millennium 8. What are the specific elements of every sub-group of crime in Section 23 and what are the
Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 23-25; legal bases for the determination of each element?
Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),pp. 23-28. 9. Are there existing provisions in other statutes relevant to the legal definitions found in R.A.
50.Joint Memorandum, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 2571-2574; Petition, Olaguer v. No. 10354?
Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043),pp. 11-12; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. 10. Why is there an exemption for the religious or conscientious objector in paragraph (3) of
No. 205491),pp. 7-8; Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. Section 23 and not in paragraphs (1) and (2)? What is the distinction between paragraph (3)
207172),pp. 28-32. and paragraphs (1) and (2)?
51.Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 28-33; 11. Section 23 (a) (3) penalizes refusal to extend quality health care services and information
Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 37-38. 'on account of the person's marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal
52.Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be circumstances, or nature of work.' What if the refusal is not on account of one's marital status,
expressed in the title thereof; Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work, or what if the
rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 6-10; Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 9-10. refuser simply does not state the reason for the refusal? Will there still be a criminal liability
53.Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 14-30. under Section 23 (a) (3)?
54.Memorandum, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 894-900; Petition, Couples for Christ 12. Still on Section (23) (a) (3) on referring a person to another facility or provider, is this the
Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),pp. 45-48; Petition, Tillah v. Executive same or analogous to referral of a person to seek second opinion? What is the medical
Secretary, rollo (G.R. No. 207563) pp. 6-12. standard for the provision of a second opinion? In referring to another professional or service
55.Rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 362-480. provider for a second opinion, is it the patient who is not comfortable with the opinion given by
56.Rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 195-353. the first doctor that triggers the duty or option to refer? How is it different with the situation in
57.Rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 487-528. Section 23 (a) (3) when it is the doctor who is not comfortable about giving an opinion? Is the
58.Rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 871-1007. difference legally material?
59.Rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 1306-1334; rollo,(G.R. No. 204934),pp. 98-132. 13. How does Section 23, paragraph (c) relate to Article 134 the Labor Code which requires
60.Rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 736-780. employers to provide family planning services?
61.In her Motion for Leave to Intervene, Senator Pilar Juliana S. Cayetano manifested that she was 14. Section 24 provides that in case the offender is a juridical person, the penalties in the
adopting as her own the arguments raised by respondents Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie statute shall be imposed on the president or any responsible officer. For each offense in
Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez in their Petition for Intervention; See rollo (G.R. Section 23, how will the corporate officer be made responsible if there is no actual
No. 204819), pp. 1731-1783. After being directed by the Court to file their respective participation by the hospital board directors or officers of such action? Does Section 24 in
memoranda, intervenors Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto relation to Section 23 require corporate action? What is the situation being contemplated in
G. Romualdez manifested on November 18, 2013, that they were adopting the arguments the second paragraph of Section 24 before there can be accountability for criminal violations?
raised by Congressman Lagman in his Joint Memorandum; See rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp.
 15. Section 7 provides that access of minors to information and family planning services must 106.See United States v. Salerno,481 U.S. 739 (1987).
be with the written consent of parents or guardians. Is there a penalty in the law for those who 107.The First Amendment of the US Constitution reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an
will make these information and services (e.g.,contraceptives) available to minors without the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
parent's consent? How does this relate to Section 14 which requires the Department of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Education to formulate a curriculum which 'shall be used by public schools' and 'may be government for a redress of grievances.
adopted by private schools'? Is there a penalty for teaching sex education without the parents' 108.Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,576 Phil. 357 (2008);Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,479
or guardians' written consent? Correlatively, is there a penalty for private schools which do not Phil. 265 (2004); Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,421 Phil. 290 (2001).
teach sex education as formulated by the DepEd considering the use of the word 'may'? 109.Resolution, Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,594 Phil. 305, 316 (2008).
65.Section 1, R.A. No. 4729. 110.Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
66.Entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical 111.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 375-376.
Education in the Philippines." 112.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 384.
67.See http://www.pop.org/content/coercive-population-ploys-in-philippines-1428, last visited October 113.Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary ,558 Phil. 338, 350 (2007).
17, 2013. 114.Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,392 Phil. 618, 633 (2000),citing Baker v. Carr,369 U.S.
68.Entitled "Revising the Population Act of Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-One." 186 (1962).
69.<http://www.senate.gov.ph/publications/PB%202009-03%20-%20Promoting%20Reproductive 115.Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio; Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,576 Phil. 357, 406 (2008).
%20Health.pdf>,last visited October 17, 2013. 116.Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency ,591
70.Held in Cairo, Egypt from September 5-13, 1994. Phil. 393, 404 (2008); Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,346 Phil. 321
71.Section 17, R.A. 9710. (1997); De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420, 422.
72.See ;last accessed February 20, 2014. 117.503 Phil. 42, 53 (2005).
73.Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),p. 1408. 118.84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).
74.Id. 119.464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
75.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 376. 120.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 388-389.
76.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 377. 121.The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines , supra note
77.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 378. 102; Ortega v. Quezon City Government,506 Phil. 373, 380 (2005);and Gonzales v.
78.G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 166. Comelec,137 Phil. 471 (1969).
79.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 385, 387-388. 122.Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
80.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 381-384. expressed in the title thereof.
81.Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936). 123.Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 6-10;
82.Constitution, Art.VI, Sec. 1. Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 9-10.
83.Constitution, Art.VII, Sec. 1. 124.Joint Memorandum, Lagman, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 212-214.
84.Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1. 125.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 389-393.
85.Supra note 81. 126.ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),p. 1396.
86.See Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc., et al. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,256 Phil. 127.ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),p. 1396.
777, 799 (1989). 128.ALFI Memorandum, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),p. 1396.
87.Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives , G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, citing Angara 129.Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 Edition, pp. 157-158; citing 82 CJS 365.
v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936). 130.Petition, Imbong v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 8-10; Petition, Alliance for the Family
88.Garcia v. Executive Secretary,602 Phil. 64, 77-78 (2009). Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 15-25; Petition, Serve Life
89.Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270, 326-327. Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 13-15; Petition, Olaguer v.
90.Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission,G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043),pp. 10-11; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v.
637 SCRA 78, 177. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
91.Tañada v. Angara,338 Phil. 546, 575 (1997). 205478),pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President,
92.453 Phil. 586 (2003). rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo(G.R. No. 207111),pp. 17-18;
93.G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 137. Petition, Buhay Partylist (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 1255-1256.
94.G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476. 131.Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 15-25;
95.Francisco v. House of Representatives ,460 Phil. 830, 882-883 (2003),citing Florentino P. Feliciano, Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 13-15;
The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects of the Process of Judicial Review and Decision Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043),pp. 10-11; Petition, Philippine Alliance of
Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992). XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa,
96.Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the
148; Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
178552, October 5, 2010, 632 SCRA 146, 166-167; Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita,522 207111),pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Partylist (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp.
Phil. 1, 27 (2006); Francisco v. House of Representatives,460 Phil. 830, 892 (2003). 1255-1256.
97.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 375-376. 132.Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 14-30.
98.Comment-In-Intervention, Hontiveros, et al.,rollo,(G.R. No. 204934),pp. 106-109; Comment-In- 133.Memorandum, Alcantara, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2133; Reply, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No.
Intervention, Cabral, et al.,rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 500-501. 205043),pp. 339-340.
99.Republic Telecommunications Holding, Inc. v. Santiago ,556 Phil. 83, 91-92 (2007). 134.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 393-396; Comment-In-Intervention,
100.Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections ,499 Phil. 281, Lagman, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 230-233; Comment-In-Intervention, C4RH, rollo (G.R.
304-305 (2005). No. 204819),pp. 1091-1192; Hontiveros, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 111-116; Memorandum,
101.Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management ,G.R. Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 3038-3041.
No. 164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373, 383. 135.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 396-410.
102.The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines ,589 Phil. 387, 136.Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 225-342.
481 (2008). 137.Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
103.Id. at 483. 138.See Republic Act No. 4729, dated June 18, 1966.
104.Tañada v. Angara,338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997). 139.See http://www.pop.org/content/coercive-population-ploys-in-philippines-1428, last visited October
105.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 381. 17, 2013.
140.,last visited October 17, 2013. 176.Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 26-28;
141.. Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 15-16;
*During the deliberation, it was agreed that the individual members of the Court can express their own Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 13-14; Petition, Pro-Life Philippines
views on this matter. Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 30-35.
142.Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 15-25; 177.Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, rollo,(G.R. No. 204934),pp. 1419-1445.
Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 13-15; 178.Section 4. Definition of Terms. — For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
Petition, Olaguer v. Ona, rollo (G.R. No. 205043),pp. 10-11; Petition, Philippine Alliance of follows:
XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 8-36; Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, xxx xxx xxx
rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 10-13; Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the (p) Reproductive Health (RH) refers to the state of complete physical, mental and social well-
President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp. 11-15; Petition, Juat v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the
207111),pp. 17-18; Petition, Buhay Partylist (BUHAY) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. reproductive system and to its functions and processes. This implies that people are able to
1255-1256. have a responsible, safe, consensual and satisfying sex life, that they have the capability to
143.Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 225-342. reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so. This further implies
144.G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579. that women and men attain equal relationships in matters related to sexual relations and
145.Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 469. reproduction.
146.Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 262. 179.Section 4. Definition of Terms. — For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
147.G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009, 618 Phil. 634 (2009). follows:
148.Gonzales v. Carhart (Nos. 05-380 and 05-1382),No. 05-380, 413 F. 3d 791; 05-1382, 435 F. 3d xxx xxx xxx
1163. (w) Sexual health refers to a state of physical, mental and social well-being in relation to
149.http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-380.ZO.html,last visited February 15, 2014. sexuality. It requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships,
150.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 16, 1986, p. 668. as well as the possibility of having pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free from
151.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 596. coercion, discrimination and violence.
152.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 12, 1986, p. 669. 180.Memorandum, Alcantara, rollo,(G.R. No. 204934),p. 2135; Memorandum, PAX, rollo (G.R. No.
153.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 19, 1986, p. 800. 205138),pp. 2154-2155.
154.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711. 181.Consolidated Comment, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 415-416.
155.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 711. 182.Gamboa v. Finance Secretary,G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690, 738-739.
156.Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 4, September 17, 1986, p. 745. 183.335 Phil. 82 (1997).
157.TSN, July 9, 2013, pp. 23-24. 184.Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),p.
158.Id. 1408.
159.4th Edition, p. 375. 185.Id.
160.Id.,p. 609. 186.Memorandum, Lagman, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 2359-2361.
161.Sumpaico, Gutierrez, Luna, Pareja, Ramos and Baja-Panlilio, 2nd Edition, (2002),pp. 76-77. 187.Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-de Castro) p. 54.
162.Moore, Persaud, Torchia, The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology, International 188.Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp. 40-41.
Edition, 9th Edition (2013),pp. 1-5, 13. 189.Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 26-
163.O'Rahilly, Ronan and Muller, Fabiola, Human Embryology & Teratology. 2nd edition. New York: 27; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205138),pp.
Wiley-Liss, 1996, pp. 8, 29, cited 39-44; Petition, Tatad v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 205491),pp. 8-9; Petition, Pro-
at: http://www.princeton.edu/~prolife/articles/embryoquotes2.html,last visited February 15, Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 59-67;
2014. Petition,Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No. 206355),pp.
164.From https://www.philippinemedicalassociation.org/downloads/circular-forms/Position-Paper-on-the- 25-26.
Republic-Health-Bill-%28Responsible-Parenthood-Bill%29.pdf, last visited March 26, 2014. 190.Joint Memorandum, Imbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2615.
165.Comment-In-Intervention, Lagman, rollo,(G.R. No. 204819),pp. 225-342. 191.Joint Memorandum, Imbong/Luat, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),pp. 2616-2621.
166.Id. 192.Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 6-7.
167.Id. 193.Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),pp. 20-23.
168.See <http://americanpregnancy.org/duringpregnancy/fetaldevelopmentl.htm>,last visited April 7, 194.Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),pp. 20-23.
2014. 195.Petition, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp. 35-37;
169.Joint Memorandum of the House of Representatives and Respondent-Intervenor Rep. Edcel C. Petition, Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc. v. Office of the President, rollo (G.R. No.
Lagman),Section 40, Rollo,G.R. No. 204819, p. 2343. 206355),pp. 17-18.
170.Concurring Opinion (Justice Carpio),p. 3. 196.Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 3050; Comment-in-Intervention,
171.See TSN, July 9, 2013, p. 100. Cabral, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 511.
172.Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo),pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion),p. 25. 197.Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2677.
173.Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows: 198.Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 3050.
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the 199.Joint Memorandum Lagman, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2361.
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to 200.Memorandum, C4RH, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2189; Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R.
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug No. 204819),pp. 3050-3051.
Administration (FDA). 201.Memorandum, Cayetano, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 3050.
xxx xxx xxx 202.Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2677.
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family 203.Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2679.
planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents 204.Memorandum, OSG, rollo (G.R. No. 204819),p. 2679.
pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from 205.Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2000 ed.,p. 179, citing Justice Laurel in Engel v. Vitale,370 US 421
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by 206.Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 1007.
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 207.Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., p. 330.
174.Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo),pp. 17-19; Separate Opinion (Justice Brion),p. 25. 208.Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 1066.
175.Separate Opinion (Justice Del Castillo),p. 19. 209.59 SCRA 54 (1974).
210.Escritor v. Estrada,A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 525 Phil. 110, 140-141 (2006).
211.106 Phil. 2 (1959). the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
212.Gerona v. Secretary of Education,106 Phil. 2, 9-10 (1959). persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in
213.Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools ,219 SCRA 256 (1993),March 1, 1993. elective surgical procedures and in no case shall consent be required in emergency or
214.525 Phil. 110 (2006). serious cases as defined in Republic Act No. 8344.
215.Id. at 137. 250.Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 15-16.
216.Id. at 148. 251.Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),pp.
217.Id. at 149. 1453-1496.
218.Id. at 175. 252.Records, 1986 Constitutional Convention, Volume IV, pp. 401-402.
219.Id. at 168-169. 253.Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution.
220.Estrada v. Escritor,455 Phil. 411, 560 (2003). 254.Petition, Task Force for the Family and Life Visayas, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204957),pp. 24-
221.Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2000 edition, pp. 178-179. 25.
222.Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., p. 330. 255.Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council , G.R. No. 178552,
223.Separate Opinion, Cruz, Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools,219 SCRA 256 October 5, 2010; People v. Nazario,No. L-44143, August 31, 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195.
(1993),March 1, 1993. 256.Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA ,G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 461,
224.Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 220, at 537. 469.
225.20130 CSIH 36. 257.Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1145.
226.http://www.skepticink.com/tippling/2013/05/05/conscientious-objection-to-abortion-catholic- 258.Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 Edition, p. 1252.
midwives-win-appeal/;last visited February 22, 2014. 259.SEC. 3. Guiding Principles for Implementation. — This Act declares the following as guiding
227.http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/05/03/conscientious-objection-to-abortion-catholic-midwives- principles:
win-appeal;last visited February 22, 2014. xxx xxx xxx
228.453 Phil. 440 (2003). (d) The provision of ethical and medically safe, legal, accessible, affordable, non-abortifacient,
229.Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed., p. 565; See Dissenting Opinion Makasiar, Garcia effective and quality reproductive health care services and supplies is essential in the
v. The Faculty Admission Committee,G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975. promotion of people's right to health, especially those of women, the poor,and the
230.TSN, August 13, 2013, pp. 52-54. marginalized, and shall be incorporated as a component of basic health care;
231.TSN, August 27, 2013, pp. 71-72. (e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods
232.Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines v. Office of the Executive Secretary of the Office of the of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven
President of the Philippines, supra note 228 at 450. medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
233.http:/fatherbernasblogs.blogspot.com/2011_02_01_archive.html; last visited February 15, 2014. evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
234.Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 210. FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
235.TSN, August 27, 2013, p. 130. measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding
236.http:/www.lifenews.com/2011/09/01/philippines-sees-maternal-mortality-decline-without- support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
abortion;last visited March 9, 2014 [Researchers from the Institute for Health Metrics and Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions;
Evaluation of the University of Washington in Seattle examined maternal mortality rates in (f) The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the
181 countries and found the rate (the number of women's deaths per 100,000) dropped by number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women,
81 percent in the Philippines between 1980 and 2008.The decrease comes as the and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws,
largely Catholic nation has resister efforts to legalize abortions, even though the United public morals and their religious convictions: Provided, That no one shall be deprived, for
Nations and pro-abortion groups claim women will supposedly die in illegal abortions and economic reasons, of the rights to have children;(2) achieve equitable allocation and
increase the maternal mortality rate if abortion is prohibited. utilization of resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among national government, local
The 2010 study, published in Lancet, shows the Philippines outpaced first-world government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design, implementation, coordination,
nations like Germany, Russia and Israel — where abortions are legal — in cutting integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered programs to enhance the quality of
maternal mortality rates. life and environmental protection; (4) conduct studies to analyze demographic trends
Meanwhile, the National Statistical Coordination Board in the Philippines, according to Spero including demographic dividends from sound population policies towards sustainable human
Forum, has shown the same results. From 1990-2010, the daily maternal mortality rate development in keeping with the principles of gender equality, protection of mothers and
dropped 21 percent, its figures indicated. The World Health Organization also found that children, born and unborn and the promotion and protection of women's reproductive rights
the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped 48 percent from 1990 to 2008. and health; and (5) conduct scientific studies to determine the safety and efficacy of
237.TSN, July 23, 2013, p. 23. alternative medicines and methods for reproductive health care development;
238.Memorandum, Alliance for the Family Foundation, Inc. (ALFI) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 204934),p. xxx xxx xxx
1407. (g) The provision of reproductive health care, information and supplies giving priority
239.SEC. 15. Certificate of Compliance. — No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil to poor beneficiaries as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
Registrar unless the applicants present a Certificate of Compliance issued for free by the local identifying marginalization must be the primary responsibility of the national government
Family Planning Office certifying that they had duly received adequate instructions and consistent with its obligation to respect, protect and promote the right to health and the right
information on responsible parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. to life;
240.Petition, Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 207172),p. 29. xxx xxx xxx
241.80 CONST. Art. XV, §2. (i) Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs),women's and people's
242.Separate Opinion (Justice Leonardo-de Castro),pp. 42-43. organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is
243.130 Phil. 415 (1968). crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and
244.Id. at 436. programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor,and the marginalized;
245.81 Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, June 7, 1965. xxx xxx xxx
246.Id. (l) There shall be no demographic or population targets and the mitigation, promotion and/or
247.Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution. stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive
248.Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., p. 85. health;
249.(ii) Parental consent or that of the person exercising parental authority in the case of abused xxx xxx xxx
minors, where the parent or the person exercising parental authority is the respondent,
accused or convicted perpetrator as certified by the proper prosecutorial office of the court. In
 (n) The resources of the country must be made to serve the entire population, especially
the poor,and allocations thereof must be adequate and effective: Provided, That the life of the
unborn is protected;
(o) Development is a multi-faceted process that calls for the harmonization and integration of
policies, plans, programs and projects that seek to uplift the quality of life of the people, more
particularly the poor,the needy and the marginalized;
260.SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. — For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(r) Reproductive health care program refers to the systematic and integrated provision of
reproductive health care to all citizens prioritizing women, the poor,marginalized and those
invulnerable or crisis situations.
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) Sustainable human development refers to bringing people, particularly the poor and
vulnerable, to the center of development process, the central purpose of which is the creation
of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy long, healthy and productive lives, done in
the manner that promotes their rights and protects the life opportunities of future generations
and the natural ecosystem on which all life depends.
261.Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, supra note 90.
262.Petition, Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo,(G.R. No. 204988),pp. 16-48;
Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),pp. 7-9.
263.Except the practice of law which is under the supervision of the Supreme Court.
264.United States v. Jesus,31 Phil. 218, 230 (1915).
265.Petition, Echavez v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205478),p. 8.
266.With reference to Section 2, 3 (E), 4 (L), 9 and 19 (C) of the RH Law; Petition, ALFI, rollo (G.R. No.
204934),pp. 28-33; Petition, Philippine Alliance of XSeminarians (PAX) v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No.
205138),pp. 37-38.
267.358 Phil. 410 (1998).
268.Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary,G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 551, 559.
269.Id. at 559-560.
270.Id. at 561.
271.See Section 6, R.A. No. 10354.
272.See Section 5, R.A. No. 10354.
273.See Section 16, R.A. No. 1354.
274.Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 270, 306.
275.Id. at 305.
276.Petition, Pro-Life Philippines Foundation, Inc. v. Ochoa, rollo (G.R. No. 205720),pp. 14-30.
277.Gettel, Political Science, Revised Edition, p. 180.
278.454 Phil. 504 (2003).
279.Separate Opinion, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504 (2003).
280.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html ;last visited
March 21, 2014.
281.St. Joseph's College v. St. Joseph's College Workers' Association (Samahan) ,489 Phil. 559, 572-573
(2005);and Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870, 18 December 1987, 156
SCRA 629.
SERENO, C.J.,opinyong sumasang-ayon at sumasalungat:
||| (Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138,
205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563, [April 8, 2014], 732 PHIL 1-99)