Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests

by Contessa Almeyda 2024

San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

1. Prospective Effect of the Rules of Court/ Retroactive Application of Rules of Court;

Applicability to pending actions
IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON
DATUMANONG GR150274

FACTS: The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative case for dishonesty, falsification of documents, grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the
service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others, relative to the anomalous payment of
PHP 553,900 for Bailey bridge components owned by the government.

In March 1994, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau found the respondents guilty and ordered
their dismissal from the service with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule XIV, Book
V of E.O. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After the denial of
motions for reconsideration, petitions were referred to the CA.

In March 2000, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the Administrative Adjudication
Board, dismissing Tel-Equen and two accused from service while exonerating other respondents.
Tel-Equen and his co-accused appealed the decision. While the appeal was pending, Secretary
Datumanong issued a memorandum order dismissing Tel-Equen from service, citing the
Ombudsman and CA's order. Tel-Equen contended that the act was contumacious and filed a
petition for contempt of court against the Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of administrative cases or procedural laws and E.O. 292
allow decisions pending appeal under the Office of the Ombudsman.

RULING: The SC held that the Secretary's act was not contumacious as there was no intent to
cause injustice. The court distinguished executive decisions under the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), which are immediately executory, and those by the Ombudsman, which are not executory
until final.
Tel-equen's case stayed the execution. However, key events supported the dismissal:
- The affirmation of Tel-equen's dismissal
- The amendment of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, effectively making decisions
executory pending appeal, amending its rules.

COLMENAR V. COLMENAR GR 252467

FACTS: Frank Colmenar, Francisco's legitimate son, discovered that Apollo Colmenar, Jeannie
Colmenar Mendoza, and Victoria Jet Colmenar falsely claimed to be heirs and executed
extrajudicial settlements. These led to the sale of Francisco's properties in Cavite to several
companies, including Philippine Estates Corporation, Amaia Land Corporation, Crisanta Realty
Development Corporation, and Property Company of Friends. Frank filed a complaint in 2018 to
nullify the deeds and titles and claim damages. However, the RTC dismissed the complaint in
2020, citing the lack of a cause of action against the companies and applying the 2019
Amendments to the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which Frank challenged.

ISSUES:
1. Does the petition raise pure questions of law?
2. Did the RTC commit a reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve
the affirmative defenses of the respondents?
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

3. Did the court commit a reversible error when it dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action?

RULING:
1. Yes, the petition raises pure questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt
hinges on when the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances. On the other hand,
there is a question of fact when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity
of facts. Here, the issue of whether the RTC correctly applied the 2019 amendments to
the Rules is a question of law, as it pertains to the proper application of the rule in the
case.
2. The RTC gravely erred when it applied the 2019 amendments to resolve the affirmative
defenses pleaded by the respondents.
Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules provides that: The amendments shall govern all cases filed
after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and pending proceedings only to the extent that, in
the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice. In
such cases, the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.
3. The complaint stated a cause of action against the companies.**
Petitioner’s cause of action hinged on the averment that the individual respondents were
not the owners of the properties and, therefore, could not validly sell them to the
companies, nor convey any title to the land by reason of the invalid sale. The RTC cannot
inject its own theory to take the place of the actual allegations in the complaint.

Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court

LABAO vs FLORES GR 187984

FACTS: Petitioner Labao is the proprietor and general manager of a licensed security
service contractor. Respondents were security guards assigned to Mutl Power Corp.
Mindanao. Petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their
updated data files, security guard professional licenses, and other pertinent documents.
When the respondents failed to comply with the petitioner’s directive despite several
notices, the petitioner relieved them of their duties.
Respondents filed individual complaints with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and
money claims, asserting that they were constructively dismissed when they were not
given new assignments for over six months despite their repeated requests. Petitioner
countered that the respondents' removal from duty was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative. Furthermore, the petitioner issued a notice directing them to
report to the main office for new assignments, but they failed or refused to comply without
any valid reasons.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's decision. Counsel for respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) outside
the reglementary period, yet the ruling was in favor of the respondents. The petitioner
moved for reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have dismissed the petition
outright for late filing and that there was no compelling reason for the reversal of the LA
and the NLRC’s factual findings. The CA considered the respondents' petition as timely
filed and opined that disregarding any procedural lapses best served substantial justice.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in acting on the respondents' petition despite its late
filing.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the LA and NLRC ruling.
RULING:
1. . Yes, late filing should not be allowed. Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for certiorari must be filed within a period of
60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed.
The 60-day period is unextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would
violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; they were
established primarily to provide order and enhance the efficiency of our judicial
system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, as they are indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and necessary for the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. The timely filing of a pleading is a jurisdictional
caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.
2. Yes, the NLRC's resolution became final ten days after counsel received it, and
the respondents' failure to file the petition within the required 60-day period
rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. The
general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even the mistakes, of their
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when
the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of their day in court. The failure of a party's counsel to notify them on
time of the adverse judgment, to enable them to appeal therefrom, is negligence
that is not excusable. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the
resolution. A decision that has acquired finality is immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
GIOS-SAMAR vs DOTC GR 217158

FACTS: Gios-Samar, represented by Chairperson Gerardo Malinao, filed a petition for prohibition
against the DOTC and the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) in 2015. The case
arose from an invitation to prequalify and bid posted by the DOTC-CAAP in 2014, for the
development, operation, and maintenance of six regional airports: Bacolod-Silay, Iloilo, Davao,
Laguindingan, New Bohol, and Puerto Princesa. The total cost of these projects was P116.25
billion. The projects were bundled into two groups: Bundle 1 (Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo) and Bundle
2 (Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol), with costs of P50.66 billion and P59.60 billion,
respectively.

Gios-Samar, a non-governmental organization composed of subsistence farmers and fisherfolk

from Samar, challenged the constitutionality of the bundling, arguing that it violated constitutional
provisions on monopolies, anti-dummy laws, and public bidding. The DOTC and CAAP countered
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

that the petition was premature, lacked legal standing, and violated the principle of hierarchy of
courts. The case was brought directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing lower courts.

ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court take cognizance of the issues raised by Gios-Samar, taking into
account the principle of transcendental importance?

RULING: No. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts indicates that the Supreme Court is a court of
last resort and should only exercise its original jurisdiction in exceptional cases. The doctrine aims
to prevent the Supreme Court from being burdened with cases that can be resolved by lower
courts. There are exceptions to this doctrine, which include cases involving genuine issues of
constitutionality and cases of transcendental importance, among others. However, the nature of
the question raised, whether it is purely legal or involves factual issues is the determining factor.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

COMMISSION ON AUDIT vs FERRER GR 218870

FACTS: The case involves the COA challenging the orders of the Camarines Sur RTC, which
denied petitions filed by then-Governor Villafuerte. The controversy began during said governor's
term, wherein several disbursements for provincial projects were audited by the COA and found
to be deficient, non-compliant with the government procurement act, and categorized as
unnecessary expenditures.

The COA issued Notices of Disallowance (NDS) for various transactions ranging from
engagements for services to mobilization fees paid to contractors. Villafuerte did not contest these
NDS, which led to Notices of Finality of Decision (NFDs). Subsequently, Villafuerte filed petitions
for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC, which issued an extended TRO against the COA's
implementation of the NDS. Petitioners, represented by the OSG, opposed the issuance of a writ
of injunction, arguing the RTC's lack of jurisdiction, the finality of the NDS, failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, and the absence of requisites for the writ. Despite opposing motions, the
RTC proceeded, leading the petitioners to escalate the matter to the SC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of
petitions challenging COA's NDS.
2. Whether or not there was a failure to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
judicial intervention.
3. Whether or not it was proper for Villafuerte to assail the provincial auditor's NDS without
first appealing to the COA Commission Proper.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, highlighting the COA's primary jurisdiction
over audit matters and the procedural error of resorting to the RTC. The principle of
primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training, and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first
be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts,
even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. The objective of this doctrine
is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
until after any administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

2. Yes. The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution
and the law. The matter of allowing or disallowing requests for payments is within the
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

primary power of COA to decide. Likewise, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction
over money claims against government agencies or instrumentalities.

3. Yes. The private respondent committed a procedural blunder by raising COA's supposed
grave abuse of discretion with the RTC. Section 7 of Article IX is clear:

“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before it within 60 days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 60 days from receipt of a copy thereof.” Jurisprudence has interpreted this
constitutional provision as a grant of authority to the COA to decide on specialized
matters.”

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MALOLOS vs HEIRS OF MARCOS GR 225971
FACTS: The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. (RCBMI) is the registered owner of
a parcel of land. In 1972, upon the enactment of P.D. 27, otherwise known as the “Tenants
Emancipation Decree,” portions of said land, were awarded to Mariano Marcos (Marcos),
now represented by his heirs. RCBMI sought the cancellation of this award in 1980,
arguing that the land was not used for rice production but for social and humanitarian
programs. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) granted this petition in 1982, but the
Heirs of Marcos refused to surrender possession.
RCBMI filed a complaint for a writ of preliminary injunction and damages in 1994, which
was ruled in their favor by the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) in 1995.The Heirs of Marcos appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), which affirmed the PARAD's decision in 2001.
The Heirs of Marcos then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which denied their
petition in 2004. Despite the finality of the CA decision, the execution of the order was
delayed. RCBMI filed multiple motions for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was
finally granted by the PARAD in 2012. The Heirs of Marcos filed a motion to quash the
writ, arguing that the five-year period for execution had lapsed. The PARAD granted this
motion in 2015, leading RCBMI to file a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA,
which was dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. RCBMI then brought
the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing RCBMI’s petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65 for its non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; and
2. Whether the PARAD acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the Heirs of
Marcos’ Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and denied RCBMI’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing RCBMI’s petition outright on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as the narrative clearly
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

illustrates how RCBMI’s action falls within the exemptions to the said principle. The
CA, in dismissing RCBMI’s petition, harked back to Section 5, Rule II of the 1989
DARAB Rules and concluded that as provided therein, RCBMI should have first
appealed the PARAD’s quashal of the writ of execution before the DARAB, for the
exhaustion of the administrative remedies available to it. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on practical reasons, including
allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct
its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy
relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and
costly resort to courts. However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of
several exceptions that include situations where the very rationale of the doctrine
has been defeated. As applied to the factual backdrop of this case, with the
peculiar length of time with which this case has lasted, this Court concludes that
RCBMI’s action falls within the temporal exempting circumstance, or where there
is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant. Specifically, the exempting circumstance is the suspension of
RCBMI’s enjoyment of its legal victory, which was awarded to it by the MAR in
1982, but to date, 37 years later, remains to be executed.
2. Yes. PARAD committed a grave abuse of discretion through unjustified delay. The
CA’s Decision which upheld RCBMI’s right to recover possession of the subject
property became final and executory with an Entry of Judgment on June 19, 2004.
RCBMI sought the execution of this final decision in 2008. In turn, PARAD, contrary
to the immediacy of execution as provided for in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule XII of
the 1989 DARAB Rules, failed to immediately issue a writ of execution but instead
ordered the Heirs of Marcos to file a comment or opposition, and thereby patently
prolonged the life of this litigation which should have already terminated then. This
unfounded extension and delay of the issuance of the Writ of Execution dragged
on until February 17, 2012, by which time, the five-year period to execute had
already long lapsed, which in turn gave rise to the ground for the Motion to Quash
the execution writ. The stalling of execution is therefore attributable to both the
PARAD’s inaction and the Heirs of Marcos’ serial oppositions. The long delay, with
no knowable basis in the records, is both unexplained and unacceptable, and may
not be taken against RCBMI, which did not fall short in seeking the execution of
the award in its favor through efforts within the permits of the law.
Doctrine of Non-Interference or Doctrine of Judicial Stability
TAN vs CINCO GR 213054

FACTS: In 2001, Simon Lori Holdings, Inc. (SLHI) and others extended a PHP
50,000,000.00 loan to Dante Tan. The loan was secured by Dante's shares in Best
World Resources Corporation (BWRC) and facilitated by PentaCapital Investment
Corporation. Dante defaulted on the loan and proposed to settle it by selling his BWRC
shares but disappeared before executing the deeds of assignment. Respondents filed
a collection case against Dante in the Makati RTC. In 2002, the Makati RTC ordered
Dante to pay PHP 100,100,000.00 plus legal interest, attorney's fees, and costs. A
Writ of Execution was issued in 2005, and the Deputy Sheriff levied a property
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

registered in Dante's name. The auction sale was conducted. Dante's wife, Teresita
Tan, claimed the property was conjugal and a family home, thus exempt from
execution. The Makati RTC denied Dante's motion to quash the writ and issued a writ
of possession in favor of the respondents; the decision became final. In 2007, Teresita
filed a nullification case in the Parañaque RTC against the respondents, the Sheriff,
and the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City. The Parañaque RTC initially dismissed
the case on res judicata grounds but later nullified the auction sale and related
documents. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied, and their
subsequent Notice of Appeal was filed late, leading respondents to file a petition for
certiorari with the CA.
The CA directed the Parañaque RTC to allow the appeal, citing judicial stability and
avoiding technicalities allowing Dante to evade obligations. Teresita's motion for
reconsideration was denied, leading to this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability
when it took cognizance of the nullification case filed by Teresita and declared as null
and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of
respondents.
RULING: Yes. The petition is devoid of merit. The SC denied Teresita’s petition,
stating the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability by addressing the
nullification case, which was effectively challenging a final judgment by the Makati
RTC, a co-equal court. The SC emphasized that courts of equal jurisdiction cannot
interfere with each other’s judgments/orders, declaring the Parañaque RTC’s
proceedings null and void due to lack of jurisdiction. The rationale for the rule is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case
and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all
other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this
judgment.
ERICE vs SISON, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407
FACTS: Erice, Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, lodged an administrative complaint
against Judge Sison of Caloocan City. The complaint originated from charges Erice
filed against Mayor Echiverri and city officials for alleged Government Service
Insurance System Act violations. In 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Preventive Suspension Order against Echiverri and other officials. Echiverri and co-
respondents sought relief from the CA, which initially granted a TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction but later affirmed the suspension on January 2, 2012. On
January 9, 2012, Echiverri and others filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with a plea
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the. RTC Executive Judge Kwong
issued a 72-hour ex-parte TRO; the case was then raffled to Judge Bordios, who
inhibited herself, and it was re-raffled to Judge Sison.
Despite objections from Erice and the DILG, Judge Sison extended the TRO and
issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman's suspension order.
Judge Sison faced allegations of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended finding Judge Sison guilty of gross ignorance of the law and proposed
a fine equivalent to one month's salary. The basis for the OCA's recommendation,
among others was Sison's act constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 6770, which provides:
SEC. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there
is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is valid.
RULING: No. In Carpio Morales, the Court: (1) declared as unconstitutional Section
14(2) of RA 6770, and (2) declared as ineffective the policy in Section 14(1) of RA
6770 against the issuance of a provisional injunctive writ by courts other than the
Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor. Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in
disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution
of the Ombudsman’s decisions in disciplinary cases, more so, because at the time
Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10, 2012 and proceeded with the writ of
preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012 against the enforcement of the
Ombudsman Order of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very same Order
of Suspension in its Decision dated January 2, 2012.
In any event, Judge Sison should have at the very least, been aware that court orders
or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a Petition for Declaratory Relief. They are
not included within the purview of the words “other written instrument” in Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court governing petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies
to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is anchored on
the principle of res judicata.
Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction, Continuity of Jurisdiction
VDA. de BALLESTEROS vs RURAL BANK of CANAMAN, INC., G.R. No. 176260
FACTS: Lucia Barrameda vda de Ballasteros (Lucia) instituted a suit against the Rural
Bank of Canaman, Inc. (RBCI) for the annulment of the foreclosure sale it instituted
against the lot occupied by the petitioner, which the latter claims to involve a mortgage
acquired through fraud. Her children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition without
her consent, allotting the parcels to Rico Ballesteros, who mortgaged one parcel to
RBCI. While the case was pending in the RTC-Iriga, RBCI was closed and was placed
under the receivership of Philippine Deposit Insurance (PDIC). Subsequently, PDIC
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC-Iriga has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action, since by virtue of R.A. No. 7653, jurisdiction is vested with
RTC-Makati, being the liquidation court assisting PDIC in the liquidation of RBCI.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

RTC-Iriga granted the motion and dismissed the case, which was subsequently
affirmed by the CA. The CA ordered the consolidation of the case with the liquidation
proceedings in RTC-Makati. Lucia's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to
a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether a liquidation court can take cognizance of a case wherein the main
cause of action is not a simple money claim against a bank ordered closed, placed
under receivership of the PDIC, and undergoing a liquidation proceeding.
RULING: Yes. Lucia’s complaint involving an annulment of deed of mortgage and
damages falls within the purview of a disputed claim in contemplation of Section 30 of
R.A. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) which refers to all claims, whether they be
against the assets of the insolvent bank, for specific performance, breach of contract,
damages, or whatever. As a consequence, jurisdiction should be lodged with the
liquidation court. It has been held that after the Monetary Board has declared that a
bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the
trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. And
after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by
an attachment, execution or otherwise. Thus, to allow Lucias’s case to proceed
independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of favorable judgment and
execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other
creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation
court was constituted as well.
Jurisdiction: Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
CANG vs CA G.R. No. 105308

FACTS: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married in 1973, and had three
children: Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony. Their marriage deteriorated after
Anna Marie discovered Herbert's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie filed for legal
separation, which was granted, allowing her to live separately and receive monthly
support for the children. Herbert then moved to the U.S., obtained a divorce in Nevada,
and remarried. He later became a naturalized American citizen. While in the U.S.,
Herbert sent financial support to his children in the Philippines.
In 1987, Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano, Anna Marie's brother and sister-in-law, filed
a petition for the adoption of the three Cang children at the RTC. The petition included
the consent of 14-year-old Keith and an affidavit from Anna Marie, who claimed
Herbert had abandoned his children. Herbert opposed the adoption, arguing he had
not abandoned his children and had been providing financial support. Despite his
opposition, the RTC granted the adoption, citing the children's close ties with the
Clavanos and Herbert's alleged moral unfitness. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision,
leading Herbert to seek relief from the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in acquiring jurisdiction of the special
proceedings for adoption.
RULING: Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

jurisdiction of the court. As such, when respondents filed the petition for adoption on
September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 91. The provision on consent for adoption on Art.
188, provides that consent of the parents by nature of the child shall be necessary.
Such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court providing
that there shall be a written consent to the adoption signed by each of its known living
parents who has not abandoned the child. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the
case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided
that the petition for adoption alleged facts sufficient to warrant exemption from
compliance there with. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court
treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Jurisdiction of the various Philippine Courts: RTCS
HEIRS OF DOLLETON vs. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT, INC. GR 170750

FACTS: The Petitioners Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, Heirs of Bernardo Millama, Heirs of
Agapito Villanueva, Heirs of Hilarion Garcia, Serafina SP Argana, and Heirs of
Mariano Villanueva filed separate complaints against Respondents Fil-Estate
Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty
Development, Inc., and the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas for Quieting of Title and/or
Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order
and Damages before the RTC. These complaints were later consolidated. The
petitioners claimed continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the subject
properties for over 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by the
respondents in 1991. They alleged that the respondents' TCTs were spurious and did
not cover the subject properties. The RTC dismissed the complaints on the grounds
of prescription, laches, lack of cause of action, and res judicata.
The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, leading to the petitioners' appeal to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Complaints filed by petitioners stated a cause of action.
2. Whether or not the decree of title to Eduardo C. Guico was wrongfully issued.
3. Whether or not the steps taken by the petitioners for its annulment were timely
in the light of Section 38 of Act No. 496.
RULING:
1. Yes. The test in determining whether there existed a cause of action in a
complaint is when it alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.
The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
Thus, if the complaint contains a sufficient basis on which it can be maintained,
it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by
the defendant. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the
subject properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the
right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived
thereof, they may recover the same.
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by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

2. The SC affirmed that the petitioners’ claim is without basis because the said lot
is admittedly a portion of Lot 9, which had been adjudicated by final judgment
in favor of the heirs of Mayuga, herein a private respondent.
3. The SC refused to consider said decree as null and void on the strength of
section 38 of Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act
PHILIPPINE-JAPAN ACTIVE CARBON vs BORGAILLY GR 197022
FACTS: On July 17, 2002, Philippine-Japan Active Carbon Corporation (petitioner) leased
two apartment units from Habib Borgaily (respondent) in Davao City for P15,000.00 per
unit monthly. The Security deposit required was P45,000.00 per unit, totaling P90,000.00.
The Lease was not renewed after expiration, but petitioner continued occupancy. Upon
vacating, petitioner requested the return of the security deposit, claiming no outstanding
obligations. Respondent claimed damages of P79,534.00 due to petitioner's failure to
maintain the units, justifying withholding the security deposit. MTCC ruled in favor of
petitioner, ordering return of the deposit with interest and attorney's fees. RTC reversed
the MTCC decision, validating respondent's claim for repair costs and offsetting the
deposit. CA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, stating it was a matter of specific
performance.
Petitioner sought review from the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the MTCC has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether the RTC was correct when it offset the amount of the security deposit for
the cost of the repairs made by the respondent, plus the amount of nominal
damages awarded to respondent.
RULING:
1. Yes. The CA was mistaken in appreciating the facts of the case. Contrary to its
ruling, a perusal of the complaint filed by petitioner makes out a case for collection
of sum of money and not for breach of contract, the latter of which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. It is to be noted that the lease agreement had already
expired when petitioner filed an action for the return of the security deposit. Since
the lease had already expired, there is no more contract to breach.
2. Yes. The Petitioner shouldered all expenses for repairs of the apartment units,
regardless of its nature, and that upon termination of the lease, petitioner must
surrender the premises, also in the same good and tenantable condition when
taken, with the exception of ordinary wear and tear. The failure of petitioner to
inspect the repairs undertaken by respondent, despite notice of the same, bars
petitioner to question the propriety of the repairs on the apartment units. Therefore,
the RTC was correct when it ordered the offsetting of the security deposit to the
expenses of the repairs.
However, the award of nominal damages has no basis. It has been settled that
nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual damages. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Since respondent has
already been indemnified for the damages made on the leased premises, there is
no more reason to further grant nominal damages.

Jurisdiction of the various Philippine Courts: Family Courts

THORNTON vs THORNTON GR 154598

FACTS: Petitioner was the American husband, respondent was the Filipino wife, who
were married to each other and had one daughter. After 3 years, the wife grew restless
and bored as a plain. One day, the wife left the family home together with their daughter
and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for
habeas corpus at the Family Court of Makati but was dismissed because the child was in
Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a
certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition
for habeas corpus at the CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the
entire country. The petition was denied by the CA on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.
RULING: Yes. Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus
in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) provides
that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the SC, the CA, or with any of its members
and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The SC ruled
that the CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
Docket and Filing fees
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. v. ASUNCION, G.R. NOS. 79937-38
FACTS: On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity)
filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a
fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Respondent was declared in default for failure to file the
required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, respondent filed a complaint at the RTC for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment initially against
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional
defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation and
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of
damages sought, said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about
P50,000,000.00. Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by respondent as docket fee
which prompted petitioners’ counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded
by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. The
complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-
assessments of the amount of damages sought, as well as the corresponding docket
fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.
ISSUE: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if respondent did not pay
the correct or sufficient docket fees?
RULING: Yes. the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORP. v. ALONZO-LEGASTO, GR 169108
FACTS: Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13), represented by President
Renato Bello, and Antonio Salvador, was in conflict over the payment of docket fees
related to a Compromise Agreement dated May 22, 1998, intended to settle a monetary
suit before the RTC. The agreement required IBC-13 to pay Salvador P2,000,000.00 with
25% payable immediately and the balance in three installments. IBC-13 also agreed to
offset airtime spots against a marketing fee under a separate Marketing Agreement. The
case was dismissed on July 4, 1998, after the Compromise Agreement and a joint motion
to dismiss were submitted.
On December 18, 2000, IBC-13, now privatized and under new management, filed an
action to declare the Compromise Agreement null and void, claiming it lacked PCGG
approval and demanded a refund of the P2,000,000.00 it paid to Salvador. Salvador filed
a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages on January 5, 2001, seeking
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

compliance with the Compromise Agreement and additional damages. The two cases
were consolidated, and Salvador filed motions for a writ of attachment and summary
judgment. IBC-13 moved to dismiss or suspend proceedings, arguing Salvador had not
paid the correct docket fees, which should be P5,452,237.50 based on his claims. The
RTC denied the motion, stating IBC-13 was estopped from raising the issue due to its
active participation in the proceedings and that the deficiency in docket fees did not divest
the court of jurisdiction. The CA upheld this decision, leading IBC-13 to file a petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the insufficient
payment of docket fees as a result of the clerk’s incorrect assessment.

RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, the respondent relied on the assessment made by the
docket clerk which turned out to be incorrect. The payment of the docket fees, as
assessed, negates any imputation of bad faith or an intent to defraud the government by
the respondent. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the respondent
and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not
apply. Hence, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the instant suit.

FORONDA-CRYSTAL v. SON, GR 221815

FACTS: Foronda-Crystal is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Cebu. Son instituted
an action for reconveyance against Foronda-Crystal before the RTC, alleging that, for
twelve and a half years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot,
having purchased the same for P200,000.00.The complaint did not contain any allegation
on the assessed value of the property but a Tax Declaration under Son’s name was
attached thereto, which valued the disputed property at P2,826.00. Foronda-Crystal filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction arguing that the jurisdiction lies
with the MCTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: No, the RTC does not have jurisdiction. In determining the assessed value of a
real property for purposes of jurisdiction, the court has developed a two-tiered approach:
First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real
property as alleged in the complaint; and Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the
assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the complaint, could still be identified
through a facial examination of the documents already attached to the complaint. In this
instance, the complaint attached a Tax Declaration which contained the assessed value
of the property – P2,826.00. On the basis of this, it is the MCTC that has jurisdiction. The
decision of the RTC is declared null and void for want of jurisdiction. A void judgment for
lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right neither can it
be the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. This is without prejudice to the filing of the parties of the proper
action before the proper court.
Aspects of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
1. Conferred by law; determined by the allegations in the complaint
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs CA GR 136109

FACTS: In 1997, petitioner Manuel Dulawon filed with the RTC, a complaint for breach of
contract of lease with damages against respondent Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction contending that it is the MTC which has jurisdiction as the complaint is
basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does not
exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for RTCs. The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss, as well as respondent-appellee’s motion for reconsideration. Hence,
respondent-appellee went to the CA on a petition for certiorari. In 1998, the CA dismissed
the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private
respondent.
RULING: Yes. The SC says that it is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly
show that petitioner’s cause of action is breach of contract and not for a collection of sum
of money as the respondent claims. Clearly, the action is for a specific performance,
irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, it is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the RTC. The RTC, therefore,
did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
HEIRS OF ALFREDO BAUTISTA vs LINDO, GR 208232
FACTS: Alfredo R. Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land.
A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees. Two months
later TCTs were issued in favor of the vendees.
In 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC,
anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141,
otherwise known as the “Public Land Act,” which reads:
“SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of
the conveyance.”
During the pendency of the action, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner,
Epifania. Respondents, Sps. Lindo entered into a Compromise Agreement with petitioner,
whereby they agree to cede to Epifania 3,230 sqm portion of the property as well as to
waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each
other. The RTC approved the Compromise Agreement on January 2011.
Other respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss in February 2013 alleging lack of jurisdiction
of the RTC on the ground that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought
to be recovered and alleges that the total value of the properties in issue is only P16,500
pesos. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent dismissing the case.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2. Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real
property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RULING:
1. Yes. Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Jurisdiction of RTCs, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.―Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
a. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
b. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.

2. Yes. The SC ruled that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is
a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is a well-settled rule that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote
that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would
depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.

HEIRS OF JULAO v. DE JESUS GR 176020

FACTS: In the 1960s, Telesforo Julao filed two Townsite Sales Applications (TSA) with
the DENR TSA No. V-2132 and TSA No. V-6667. Following his death, the applications
were transferred to his heirs. In 1979, Solito Julao, purportedly one of the heirs,
transferred his hereditary share in the property to the respondent Sps. De Jesus. In 1983,
the respondent spouses built a house on the acquired property. Solito went missing in
1986.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

On March 15, 1996, the DENR issued an Order rejecting TSA No. V-6667 and transferring
TSA No. V-2132 to the heirs of Telesforo. Consequently, an OCT was issued to
Telesforo’s heirs on December 21, 1998, covering a 641-square meter property.

On March 2, 1999, the petitioners, positioning themselves as the heirs of Telesforo, filed
a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property against respondent spouses,
disputing the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights executed by Solito and challenging
the legitimacy of Solito as Telesforo’s son. The respondent spouses filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of prescription, which was denied. They then filed an Answer
claiming true ownership. The heirs of Solito filed an Answer-In-Intervention, claiming that
Solito sold his hereditary share legitimately. The respondents also presented letters from
the DENR to suggest that TSA No. V-2132 and TSA No. V-6667 pertained to the same
property.

The RTC decided in favor of the petitioners, stating that while Solito’s status as heir was
not disproven, the property in question arose from TSA No. V-2132, which was different
from the TSA No. V-6667 from which the respondents derived their claim.

The CA reversed this decision, citing the failure to identify the property sought to be
recovered and lack of jurisdiction, as the assessed value of the property was not alleged,
leaving it unclear which court had jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the complaint.

RULING: No. The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which
court has jurisdiction over the action. Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and
is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which contains the concise statement
of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs cause of action. In this case, for the RTC to exercise
jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed ₱20,000.00. Since
petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property,
the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC
had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged,
it cannot be determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case.
Furthermore, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu
proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists.
2.Jurisdiction over the parties
PALMIANO-SALVADOR vs ANGELES GR 171219

FACTS: Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila, evidenced
by a TCT. The subject parcel of land was occupied by Jelly Galiga from 1979 up to 1993,
as a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador alleged that she bought on
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

September 7, 1993, the subject parcel of land from Galiga who represented that he was
the owner, being one in possession. Salvador remained in possession of said subject
property from November 1993 up to the present.
On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, Angeles, sent a letter to Salvador
demanding that the latter vacate the subject property, which was not heeded Salvador.
Angeles, thru one Rosauro Diaz, Jr., filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994
with the MeTC.
In the appeal filed by Salvador she alleged, among others, that Diaz, who filed the
complaint for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from Angeles at the time of filing of
the suit. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salvador was denied.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA but said petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
The CA affirmed the factual findings of the lower court that Galiga, the person who
supposedly sold the subject property to petitioner, was a mere lessee of respondent, the
registered owner of the land in question. Such being the case, the CA ruled that Galiga
could not have validly transferred ownership of subject property to herein petitioner. It
was ruled by the CA that there were no significant facts or circumstances that the trial
court overlooked or misinterpreted, thus, it found no reason to overturn the factual findings
of the MeTC and the RTC. A motion for reconsideration of said Decision was. Hence, the
present petition,
ISSUE: Does Diaz’s failure to present proof of his authority to file the complaint for
Angeles, affect the MeTC’s jurisdiction over the complaint?
RULING: Yes. As there is nothing on record to show that Diaz had been authorized by
respondent to initiate the action against petitioner, the complaint is not deemed filed. An
unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the
plaintiff. This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper
Insurance Company, where the Court went on to say that in order for the court to have
authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court’s
jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the MeTC, the same did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent plaintiff before the lower court.
Jurisdiction over the issues
DENILA vs REPUBLIC GR 206077

FACTS: Helen Perez Denila seeks to overturn the Decision of the CA, which granted the
Republic of the Philippines petition for relief from judgment and reinstated the Decision of
the RTC for the reconstitution of several OCTs initially registered in the name of
Constancio S. Guzman. Constancio and his common-law wife, Isabel Luna, had several
parcels of land registered under their names. Following their deaths, the Heirs of
Constancio Guzman, Inc. (HCGI) filed petitions for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed
OCTs, which were dismissed by the RTC and denied by the SC in a previous case.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

Denila later filed an amended petition for reconstitution, which the RTC initially granted
but was later contested by the Republic. The CA found that Denila did not comply with
jurisdictional requirements, such as notifying actual occupants of the land, and ruled in
favor of the Republic. Multiple parties, including the City Government of Davao and
various neighborhood associations, intervened due to their interest in the properties.
The OSG, representing the Republic of the Philippines, intervened and filed motions
seeking relief from the reconstitution judgment, arguing it was out of time, but the RTC,
presided over by Judge Omelio, summarily denied these motions. The OSG then filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA to annul RTC’s orders. The CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order followed by a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to prevent the execution of
the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Can subsequent occupants of the lots in question intervene in the certiorari
proceedings initiated by the Republic?
RULING: Yes. The CA did not err in allowing the intervention as the intervenors, being
actual occupants, had a direct legal interest which might be affected by the outcome of
the reconstitution proceedings.
Jurisdiction over the res
DE JOYA vs MARQUEZ GR 162416

FACTS: Manuel Dy Awiten filed a complaint against Mina Tan Hao, Victor Ngo, and later
included Chester De Joya, among others, alleging that he was induced to invest over a
hundred million pesos in State Resources Development Management Corporation
(SRDMC). De Joya, along with the others, were then implicated as an incorporator and
director of SRDMC.
Following the investigation by the NBI, State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao issued a resolution
finding probable cause to indict the accused for syndicated estafa, leading to the filing of
Criminal Case. The respondent judge, Judge Placido C. Marquez, issued a warrant of
arrest against De Joya and his co-accused, which De Joya challenged before the SC
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the respondent judge had
erred in finding probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether the trial judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause warranting
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Chester De Joya and his co-accused for the
offense of syndicated estafa.
RULING: No. The SC dismissed De Joya’s petition. It held that the documents reviewed
by the respondent judge provided sufficient basis to establish probable cause for issuing
the warrant of arrest against the petitioner and his co-accused. The Court emphasized
that probable cause for arrest is not the same as the standard used to convict an accused;
instead, it requires the showing of a prima facie case that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested.
Furthermore, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case as long as it has jurisdiction
over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in
the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

Jurisdiction over the remedy

PLDT vs CITI APPLIANCE MC CORP GR 214546

FACTS: Citi Appliance, since 1992, has been the owner of the land where installations
(telephone lines, cables, and manholes) by PLDT were discovered while preparing for
construction in 2003. PLDT claimed the installations were within a public sidewalk area
and did not encroach upon Citi Appliance’s property.
Following a series of demands and PLDT’s refusal to remove or pay for the installations,
Citi Appliance filed a complaint for ejectment against PLDT, which contended that the
forcible entry action had prescribed because it should be reckoned from the discovery of
the encroachment, not the last demand to vacate. The MTCC ruled in favor of Citi
Appliance, prompting PLDT to elevate the matter to the CA, which also ruled in favor of
Citi Appliance. PLDT then brought the case to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether PLDT waived the issue of jurisdiction by participating in the lower court
proceedings.
2. Whether the MTCC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry case and whether the
one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the time of discovery or the last
demand to vacate.
3. Whether PLDT may exercise its right of eminent domain or rights as a builder in
good faith.
RULING:
1. PLDT did not waive the jurisdiction issue since it was raised seasonably in their
Amended Answer before the MTCC. Also, the delay in raising the jurisdictional
question did not cause the kind of long and drawn-out litigation that would lead to
estoppel.
2. Citi Appliance failed to adequately allege prior physical possession of the
property, which is a requirement for a forcible entry suit. Furthermore, the one-year
prescriptive period for a forcible entry case had elapsed by the time the complaint
was filed. Consequently, the MTCC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
3. PLDT cannot assert rights as a builder in good faith under Article 448 of the Civil
Code since it neither claimed possession of the land in the concept of an owner
nor acted in good faith under the belief that the land was public. Additionally, the
right to expropriate property cannot rightly be resolved within a forcible entry or
unlawful detainer suit.
Estoppel Jurisdiction
TIJAM vs SIBANGHANOY GR L-21450

FACTS: The spouses Tijam initiated a civil case in 1948, against the spouses
Sibanghanoy to recover P1,908.00 plus legal interest and costs. A writ of attachment
against the defendants’ properties was issued then dissolved upon the defendants’
counter-bond filed by the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety). After trial, a
judgment favored the plaintiffs. When the writ of execution against the Sibanghanoys
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved to execute against the Surety’s counter-bond.
The Surety opposed this, alleging failure to prosecute and absence of demand for
payment. The Court denied this motion for lack of demand only, which was then followed,
but the Surety still did not satisfy the judgment.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

After several back-and-forth motions between the plaintiffs and the Surety, involving
objections and requests for reconsideration regarding the execution against the Surety’s
bond, the CA resolved this by setting aside its decision and certified the case to the SC.
The Surety, in its motion entitled “MOTION TO DISMISS”, for the first time raised the
issue that the CFI lacked jurisdiction due to the amount involved being within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts after the Judiciary Act of 1948 — an issue not raised
in the CA or the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Surety is barred by laches from raising the issue of jurisdiction at this
advanced stage.
2. Whether the CFI had original jurisdiction over the action.
3. Whether the Surety should be liable on the counter-bond after the writ of execution
against the Sps. Sibonghanoy returned unsatisfied.
RULING:
1. Yes. The SC denied the Surety’s motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the Surety was barred by laches from invoking this plea after
active participation in the case for almost fifteen years without raising such objection.
The SC affirmed the rulings of the CA and the actions of the CFI, and directed that the
Surety is liable to pay under the counter-bond.
2. No. However, the facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts, It failed to do Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals,
it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.
3.Yes. In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs’ motion for
execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In
fact, the surety’s counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was
upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to
file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection.
The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
Doctrine:
The doctrine established is that a party who actively participates in the proceedings of a
case and submits its case for decision without objecting to the court’s jurisdiction cannot
later repudiate or question that same jurisdiction on account of an adverse decision. This
is an illustration of the doctrine of estoppel by laches which bars a party from asserting a
right that it has neglected to invoke in a timely manner, especially when it has led the
other party to believe that the right has been abandoned.
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by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

VELASQUEZ vs LISONDRA GR 231290

FACTS: In 1998, Perfecto Velasquez, Jr. entered into a joint venture agreement with
Lisondra Land Incorporated to develop a memorial park. The project faced delays
attributed to Lisondra Land’s failure to secure the necessary HLURB permit, provide
insurance coverage, and settle its share of realty taxes. It was also found that Lisondra
Land engaged in unsound real estate practices, such as giving away lots for services
instead of financing the project as agreed. Velasquez filed a breach of contract case
against Lisondra Land at the RTC, which Lisondra Land contested on grounds of
jurisdiction, suggesting that the matter fell under HLURB’s scope. The CA agreed with
Lisondra Land, leading Velasquez to file a complaint with the HLURB, which ruled in his
favor. This decision was reversed by the HLURB Board of Commissioners but then
reinstated upon reconsideration. Lisondra Land took the matter to the Office of the
President, which upheld the HLURB decision. Undeterred, Lisondra Land challenged the
jurisdiction of the HLURB and the CA, which found in its favor, dismissing Velasquez’s
complaint. This led Velasquez to raise the issue to the SC, citing the contradictory
decisions of appellate courts as mockery of the judicial system.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over the dispute.
2. Does the application of the principle of estoppel apply against Lisondra Land for its
inconsistent positions on jurisdiction?

RULING:
1. No. The scope and limitation of the HLURB’s jurisdiction is well-defined. The cases
before the HLURB must involve a subdivision project, subdivision lot, condominium
project or condominium unit. Here, it is undisputed that Perfecto is a business partner
of Lisondra Land and is not a buyer of land involved in development. Applying the
above case doctrines, Perfecto has no personality to sue Lisondra Land for unsound
real estate business practices before the HLURB. The regular courts have authority to
decide their dispute.
2. Yes. To conclude, the law apportioned the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals for the
orderly administration of justice. Thus, the doctrine of estoppel must be applied with
great care and only when strong equitable considerations are present. Here, the
unfairness is not only patent but revolting. Lisondra Land should not be allowed to
declare as useless all the proceedings had between the parties and compel Perfecto
to go up to his Calvary once more. We ruled that petitioners are now estopped
considering that they have actively participated in the proceedings before the HLURB
and appellate courts.

Katarungang Pambarangay (Sec. 399- 422, Local Government Code)

1. Civil Code, Art. 2041
LANSANGAN vs CAISIP GR 212987
FACTS: Petitioner Elizabeth M. Lansangan filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages against respondent Antonio S. Caisip at the MCTC, following respondent’s
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

failure to pay installments per a promissory note worth €2,522.00. Upon respondent’s
failure to file any response, petitioner moved to declare him in default, which the MCTC
granted. The case was submitted for resolution. However, in 2012, the MCTC, motu
proprio, dismissed the complaint for failure to undergo barangay conciliation proceedings
as required under RA 7160, or “The Local Government Code of 1991.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Aggrieved, she filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC upheld the MCTC’s dismissal,
emphasizing the jurisdictional nature of barangay conciliation. Petitioner’s subsequent
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Unyielding, petitioner appealed to the CA,
which affirmed the RTC’s decision. Subsequent motions for reconsideration were also
denied, leading to a petition before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint due to failure to undergo barangay conciliation proceedings before filing the
complaint in court.
RULING: Yes. The SC found the petition meritorious, stating that non-compliance with
barangay conciliation requirements does not affect a court’s jurisdiction and can be
deemed waived if not timely raised by the defendant. SC emphasized that while failure to
comply with a condition precedent may lead to dismissal for lack of cause of action or
prematurity, it does not strip the court of its jurisdiction if the defense fails to object
properly.
Since respondent was declared in default for failing to respond and did not raise any
objection to the court’s jurisdiction, the courts a quo erred in dismissing the case on the
grounds of non-compliance with barangay conciliation. Accordingly, the SC reversed and
set aside the CA’s decisions and remanded case back to the MCTC for resolution on the
merits.
ABAGATNAN vs SPS. CLARITO GR 211966
FACTS: Sps Abagatnan acquired a parcel of land, through a Deed of Absolute Sale in
1967. After Lydia’s death in October 1999, her children, petitioners in this case,
succeeded to her share of the property. In 1990, respondents Jonathan and Elsa Clarito,
being distant relatives, were granted permission by Wenceslao to build a house on a
portion of the lot, with the condition they vacate upon Wenceslao’s request.
In September 2006, petitioners’ intent to sell included the portion occupied by
respondents. A refusal to purchase and a subsequent demand to vacate resulted in
respondents’ non-compliance. In November 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer and Damages before the MTCC, claiming unlawful deprivation. The
complaint stated prior barangay conciliation was not required as not all petitioners resided
in Roxas City, with two residing elsewhere but having authorized a sister, Josephine, who
was a Roxas City resident, via a SPA.
Respondents countered, asserting the necessity of barangay conciliation since
Josephine, holding an SPA, resided in Roxas City and additionally claimed ownership of
said property owned by Jonathan’s predecessors.
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by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

The MTCC ruled in petitioners’ favor, affirming their material possession and the validity
of their documents. Respondents appealed to the RTC, which upheld the MTCC’s
decision, stating ownership questions were resolved in favor of the petitioners. The RTC
also declared the barangay conciliation issue could not be raised on appeal as it wasn’t
listed in the pre-trial order.
Respondents then escalated the case to the CA, which dismissed the petitioners’
complaint, stressing the absence of barangay conciliation, and dismissed the case
without prejudice. Petitioners sought reconsideration, were denied, and thus elevated the
matter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to comply with
the barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, considering the
residency of the real parties in interest.
RULING: The SC found merit in the petition, highlighting that barangay conciliation as a
precondition to court action applies only when the real parties in interest actually reside
in the same city or municipality. The Court ruled that the two petitioners residing outside
Roxas City rendered the barangay conciliation step unnecessary. Additionally, the
authority of the attorney-in-fact was irrelevant to the actual residency requirement of the
parties involved. Furthermore, the SC rebuked the CA’s reversal based on an issue not
included in the pre-trial order. The SC reinstated the RTC’s decision.
CHAVEZ vs CA GR 159411
FACTS: In 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into
a contract of lease whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at Taliptip,
Bulacan, Bulacan, for six years for two million two hundred forty thousand
(P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one million (P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon
signing of the contract. The balance was payable in specific terms stipulated in their
contract.

In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond.
Petitioner undertook unauthorized repairs, leading to a dispute.

In September 1996, respondent filed a complaint. Conciliation resulted in an amicable

settlement (Kasundunan), wherein petitioner agreed to return PHP 150,000 to respondent
(or PHP 100,000 by a set date).
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing
“Kasunduan,” respondent filed a complaint in 1997 against petitioner before the RTC.
Respondent prayed for certain amounts be awarded him.

Petitioner filed his answer but failed to submit the required pre-trial brief and to attend the
pre-trial conference. RTC ordered petitioner to pay various amounts to respondent,
including advance rentals, unrealized profits, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.

Petitioner appealed to the CA which modified the decision of the RTC by deleting the
award of P500,000.00 for unrealized profits for lack of basis, and by reducing the award
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

for attorney’s fees to P50,000.00. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent
considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease contract with
respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Taliptip. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for
enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. Petitioner also disputed the awarded amounts.

ISSUE: Whether RTC Valenzuela City had jurisdiction given the amicable settlement at
the Barangay level.
RULING: RTC had jurisdiction. Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, an aggrieved party
could regard the compromise as rescinded and pursue the original demand. The
respondent validly filed the lawsuit in RTC, choosing to regard the compromise as
rescinded after petitioner’s non-compliance. While an amicable settlement has the force
and effect of a final judgment, the option to rescind under Article 2041 is available if the
settlement is breached.

I. Rule 1 General Provisions; Actions

a. Ordinary Civil Actions, Special Civil Actions, Criminal Actions, Special
Proceedings
b. Personal actions and Real Actions
• Jurisdiciton of real actions
SPS. VELOSO vs BDO GR 256924

FACTS: In 2010, petitioner Sps. Veloso executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement in favor
of respondent BDO to secure the payment of a P5,184,900.00 real estate loan obtained
with the bank; and they constituted a real estate mortgage over their real properties. After
the spouses defaulted on their obligations, respondent BDO filed before the RTC, a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioner Sps filed the instant Complaint
against respondent BDO for "Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage, Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, Certificate of Sale, Registration of Certificate of
Sale, and All Related Entries." They asserted that the stipulations in the parties' mortgage
agreement are null and void for being unconscionable and illegal; hence, the extrajudicial
foreclosure and all proceedings subsequently made pursuant thereto are likewise a nullity
and produce no legal effect whatsoever. BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint involves title to or
possession of real property or interest therein; being a real action, the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the assessed value of the property which petitioner spouses failed
to allege in their complaint. In their Opposition to the motion, petitioner-spouses argued
that their complaint partakes of the nature of a personal action being based on privity of
contract; the primary relief sought is the nullification of their mortgage contract with
respondent BDO and not the recovery of possession of the mortgaged properties
because they are still in possession thereof.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

RULING: No. BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil
cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. (1) In all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Petitioner spouses
contend that their complaint for the annulment of their real estate mortgage contract with
respondent BDO has a subject incapable of pecuniary estimation because it was not
intended to recover ownership and/or possession of the mortgaged properties sold to
respondent BDO during the auction sale. Respondent BDO counters that, as evident from
the complaint, the primary purpose of the causes of action of petitioner-spouses involves
title to or possession of real property; and that the complaint seeks to allow petitioner-
spouses to exercise their right to redeem the mortgaged properties and maintain their
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the same, among others. The Court agrees with
respondent BDO. From the petitoners’ allegations, it becomes apparent that while Sps.
Veloso assert that their complaint does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession
of the mortgaged properties, the relief sought is closely intertwined with the issue of the
ownership of the mortgaged properties, the recovery of which is the petitioners’ primary
objective. In real actions, the assessed value of the realty as alleged in the complaint
determines the trial court's jurisdiction. Petitioner Spouses do not dispute their failure to
allege the assessed value of the mortgaged properties in their complaint. Consequently,
for failure of the Sps. Veloso to reflect the assessed value of the mortgage properties in
the complaint, or in the annexes thereto, the dismissal of the instant case is in order.
Actions in rem, in personam, and quasi in rem
MACASAET vs CO, JR. GR 156759

FACTS: Francisco R. Co, Jr., a retired police officer, filed a libel suit against the publisher
and staff of the Abante Tonite tabloid, alleging a defamatory article was published on June
6, 2000. When the RTC Sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons, the
defendants were unavailable, leading to substituted service through their secretary and
an editorial assistant.

The defendants sought to dismiss the case, claiming that the substituted service was
improper and argued that Abante Tonite, as a non-legal entity, could not be sued. The
RTC rejected the motion, upheld the substituted service, and required the defendants to
respond. The CA affirmed this decision, leading the defendants to escalate the matter to
the SC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision that jurisdiction over the
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

defendants was acquired through the substituted service of summons.

2. Whether the CA erred in sustaining the inclusion of Abante Tonite as a party in
the case despite it not being a natural or juridical person.

RULING:

1. The SC upheld the lower courts' decisions, dismissing the petitioners' arguments.
The Court emphasized the importance of personal jurisdiction in actions in personam,
which can be established through proper service of summons or the defendant’s
voluntary appearance. It found that the sheriff’s attempts to serve the summons twice
in one day, followed by substituted service after learning that the defendants were
consistently unavailable, met the standard for reasonable effort before resorting to
substituted service.

In reality, petitioners’ insistence on personal service by the serving officer was

demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through
their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including
an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam.
They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules
of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.

2. The Court also dismissed the objections to include Abante Tonite as a party, citing
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel, which grants certain legal capacities to an
entity that presents itself as a corporation this is even assuming arguendo that “Abante
Tonite” is not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Module 2 Rule 2: Cause of Action
HEIRS OF DOLLETON vs. FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT, INC. GR 170750

FACTS: The petitioners, including the Heirs of Tomas Dolleton and others, filed separate
complaints against Fil-Estate Management Inc., the Dy spouses, Megatop Realty
Development, Inc., and the Las Piñas Registry of Deeds for quieting of title, recovery of
ownership, and possession, along with damages and injunctive relief. These complaints
were consolidated. The petitioners claimed they had held continuous, open, and exclusive
possession of the properties for over 90 years until being forcibly removed by armed men
hired by the respondents in 1991. They argued that the respondents' titles were fraudulent
and did not cover the disputed properties. The RTC dismissed the complaints based on
prescription, laches, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. The CA upheld this decision,
prompting the petitioners to appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Complaints filed by petitioners stated a cause of action.

RULING: Yes. The test for determining if a complaint has a cause of action is whether it
alleges facts that, if true, would justify the relief requested. The focus is on the sufficiency,
not the truth, of the material allegations. Therefore, if the complaint provides a sufficient
basis for the claim, it should not be dismissed, regardless of the defendant's defenses.
The complaints in this case asserted that the petitioners are the rightful owners of the
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

properties through acquisitive prescription. As owners, they have the right to peaceful
possession of the properties and can seek to recover them if deprived.

MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs THE MAKATI TUSCANY

CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION GR 146726
FACTS: In 1977, under Republic Act No. 4726, also known as the Condominium Act,
Multi-Realty established Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation (MATUSCO) to
manage and hold the title to Makati Tuscany's common areas. That same year, Multi-
Realty executed a Deed of Transfer, transferring ownership of these common areas to
MATUSCO.

In 1990, Multi-Realty filed a complaint against MATUSCO for damages and reformation
of the Master Deed, claiming ownership of the 98 slots. The issue emerged when
MATUSCO denied access to two of these slots. MATUSCO contended that Multi-Realty
had no grounds for reformation, having sold the slots despite knowing they belonged to
MATUSCO. MATUSCO sought dismissal of the complaint, damages, and an accounting
of the sales proceeds from the disputed slots.
ISSUE: Is there a need to revise the Master Deed and the Deed of Transfer?
RULING: The SC, through Justice Leonen, ruled that MATUSCO did not sufficiently
demonstrate a good faith mistake to justify its seeming acceptance of the respondent's
ownership of the remaining 72 parking slots. This was evident in MATUSCO's approval
of the respondent's sale of 26 parking slots and its issuance of Certificates of
Management for the sold condominium units and parking slots. The SC cited Philippine
National Bank vs CA, noting that the doctrine of estoppel is rooted in public policy, fair
dealing, good faith, and justice, preventing a party from contradicting their own actions or
commitments to the detriment of those who relied on them. In this case, the respondent's
actions consistently supported its claim, aside from the contractual language. For these
reasons, the SC decided that the petitioner could not invoke the doctrine of estoppel.

CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs CASANOVA GR 202618

FACTS: Petitioner filed a prohibition with a plea for a TRO and injunction against the
respondents, aiming to stop the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA)
from demolishing structures in the Joint US Military Army Group (JUSMAG) Area in Fort
Bonifacio. The JUSMAG Area, now being developed by as McKinley West, had housed
military officers and their families. In 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued
a Certificate of Compliance on Demolition, affirming that the BCDA met the requirements
for "Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction" under the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992. The petitioner argued that their structures were in the Diplomatic
and Consular Area, not JUSMAG, and could not be demolished without a court order.
The respondents contended that the demolition only covered the JUSMAG area, where
the petitioner's structures were located, and that demolition was permissible under RA
7279 for government infrastructure projects even without a court order.
ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Prohibition enjoining the demolition shall be issued in favor
of the petitioner.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

RULING: No. Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the
petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right
to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent
act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear
legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative
remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to
protect contingent or future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.
In this case, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to prove that the structures for which
they seek protection against demolition fall within the Diplomatic and Consular Area.

DANFOSS INC. vs CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP. GR 143788

FACTS: Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) is the agent of Danfoss,
Inc. in the Philippines. In September 1997, Continental Cement Corporation (CCC)
ordered two 132 KW Danfoss Frequency Converters/Inverters from MINCI for its Cement
Plant in Bulacan. The original purchase order specified delivery within 8 to 10 weeks of
the letter of credit's opening on September 9, 1997.

On September 17, 1997, MINCI notified CCC that the order was ready for shipment and
requested a change in the letter of credit from Singapore to Denmark, the head office of
Danfoss. CCC complied with this request. Despite this, CCC became concerned about
potential delivery delays due to a lack of confirmation from Danfoss and MINCI.
Consequently, CCC decided to cancel the order on November 13, 1997. CCC then filed
a complaint for damages against Danfoss and MINCI with the RTC on November 5, 1998.
Danfoss responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing that CCC's
complaint failed to state a cause of action as the cancellation was premature. The RTC
denied the motion, prompting Danfoss to appeal to the CA, which also denied the appeal.
Danfoss then elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of Danfoss' motion to dismiss
the complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.

RULING: Yes. After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent’s complaint for
damages against petitioner, we rule that the same failed to state a cause of action. When
respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not violated any right of
respondent from which a cause of action had arisen. Respondent only surmised that
petitioner would not be able to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter on the
date agreed upon by them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order six days
prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold petitioner liable for
damages:
1. when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver the goods and
2. after respondent made it impossible for petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its order
even before the agreed delivery date?
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by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

B. Failure to state cause of action distinguished from lack of cause of action

COLMENAR vs COLMENAR, ET AL. GR 252467

FACTS: Petitioner Frank Colmenar, the legitimate son of the late Francisco Jesus
Colmenar, brought a lawsuit against Apollo A. Colmenar, Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza,
Victoria Jet Colmenar, and several corporations where Respondents made it appear that
they were the surviving heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, and by virtue thereof,
allocated unto themselves the interests of his late father in the aforesaid properties. The
case concerned the validity of extrajudicial settlements, deeds of sale, title cancellations,
and damages related to transactions involving his late father's estate. Frank alleged that
the respondents executed settlements that excluded him from his rightful inheritance and
facilitated property sales to the corporations without his knowledge or consent. The RTC
dismissed the case, stating it lacked a cause of action against the corporations. Frank
Colmenar then sought a review on certiorari by the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint lacked a cause of action.

RULING: Yes. Essentially, the petitioner claims that: (a) he is the legitimate son and
rightful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar; (b) his father’s real properties in the Philippines
should legally pass to his heirs upon his death; (c) the individual respondents are not
lawful heirs and thus have no claim to the properties; (d) despite lacking authority, the
individual respondents executed invalid extrajudicial settlements and sales of his father's
properties to respondent companies, which did not acquire valid titles.

The issue is not whether the respondent companies were aware of the title defects or
acted in bad faith. Instead, the complaint asserts that the individual respondents had no
right to sell the properties, making any titles transferred invalid. The trial court should not
substitute its own theory for the allegations in the complaint. Furthermore, the good or
bad faith of the buyers is a defense they can present in their answers and prove at trial,
not a basis for the petitioner’s claims.

TOCOMS PHILIPPINES INC. vs PHILIPS ELECTRONICS AND LIGHTING INC. GR

214046

FACTS: Tocoms was the distributor of Philips Singapore and its agent in the Philippines,
Philips Electronics and Lighting, Inc. (PELI), under a Distributorship Agreement that was
renewed regularly from 2001 to 2008. Tocoms successfully introduced and established
Philips Domestic Appliance in the Philippine market, consistently exceeding its annual
sales targets. In 2012, Tocoms disclosed its marketing plans to Philips representatives
and fulfilled all requirements in preparation for renewing the Distributorship Agreement.

However, on January 2, 2013, PELI’s General Manager delivered a letter to Tocoms,

signed by PELI’s Asia Pacific VP Manager, stating that they would not renew the
agreement. It was revealed that PELI had already contracted with a new distributor,
Fabriano, as early as December 2012, to sell Philips products at much lower prices,
severely disadvantaging Tocoms. Fabriano also encouraged Western Marketing to return
its existing inventory, promising to supply the same products at a lower price, which could
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

result in a loss of millions for Tocoms. PELI's demand for Tocoms to buy back all
remaining inventory would further lead to a loss of PHP 12 million.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

RULING: Yes. In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the test is, whether or
not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the
court may validly grant the relief prayed for in the complaint. As correctly pointed out by
the Senior Associate Justice during the deliberations of this case, if the foregoing
allegations in Tocoms’ complaint are hypothetically admitted, these acts constitute bad
faith on the part of respondent PELI in the exercise of its rights under the Distributorship
Agreement, in violation of Article 19, and as punished by Article 21. Consequently, the
court may validly award damages in favor of Tocoms as prayed for in its Complaint.

Test of sufficiency of cause of action

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC. V. DAVID GR 129928

FACTS: Virgilio S. David, an electrical hardware supplier, filed a lawsuit for specific
performance and damages against Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(MOELCI II) at the RTC. The dispute revolved around a document David claimed was a
contract for selling a 10 MVA Transformer to MOELCI II. MOELCI II argued that no
enforceable contract existed under the Statute of Frauds and that the venue was
improper, asserting that the document was merely a quotation letter. After the trial court
denied MOELCI II’s motions, MOELCI II appealed to the CA which dismissed the petition,
stating that the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action should
not involve evidence beyond the complaint's allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

RULING: No. It has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered into a
contract sale David bound himself to supply a 10 MVA Power transformer with
accessories for a total price of P5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total
price of P2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed to
pay the price thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of P272,722.27; and
that apart from the previously stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various
electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite demands, has an outstanding balance of
P281,939.76. The SC believes all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action.

Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects

MARILAG V. MARTINEZ GR 201892

FACTS: Rafael Martinez borrowed P160,000 from Norlinda Marilag on July 30, 1992,
secured by a real estate mortgage with a 5% monthly interest, to be repaid within six
months. When Rafael defaulted, Marilag initiated a judicial foreclosure proceeding at the
RTC. Rafael defaulted, and on January 30, 1998, the RTC reduced the interest rate to
12% per annum, setting the total amount due at P229,200, a decision that had not yet
attained finality.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

Meanwhile, Rafael’s son, Marcelino Martinez, agreed to settle the loan and paid a total of
P400,000. After learning about the RTC decision, Marcelino stopped further payments,
prompting Marilag to file a complaint for the remaining amount and damages. Marcelino
claimed he had overpaid and sought a refund. The RTC initially ruled in Marcelino's favor,
but after reconsideration, it ruled in favor of Marilag, ordering Marcelino to pay the balance
plus interest. Marcelino appealed to the CA, which reinstated the RTC's initial decision,
citing the principle of res judicata. Marilag then took the case to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether principles of litis pendentia and res judicata can be applied to this case.

RULING: The SC ruled that res judicata was not applicable because there was no
evidence proving that the RTC decision was final. However, the SC found that the
principle of litis pendentia applied, preventing Marilag from pursuing the collection case.
The SC clarified that Marcelino’s agreement to settle Rafael’s debt did not amount to a
novation. Since the foreclosure action precluded a later collection suit for the same debt,
the CA’s decision was upheld, with modifications concerning the return of excess
payments and the removal of attorney’s fees awarded to Marcelino.

UMALE vs CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT CORP. GR 167246

FACTS: In 2000, George Leonard S. Umale and Canoga Park Development Corporation
entered into a two-year lease for an 860-square-meter lot in Pasig City, with specific-use
restrictions. Umale violated these restrictions by constructing unauthorized structures and
subleasing the property, leading the respondent to file an unlawful detainer case on
October 10, 2000. The MTC ruled in favor of the respondent, and the RTC upheld this
decision. However, upon reconsideration, the RTC Judge inhibited himself, thus it was
re-raffled to another RTC branch which reversed the ruling, citing premature filing.

After the lease expired in 2002, the respondent filed a second unlawful detainer suit. The
MTC ruled again in favor of the respondent, but RTC-Branch 68 later reversed the
decision, citing litis pendentia, as it was seen as a repetition of the earlier case. The
respondent then appealed to the CA, which reinstated the MTC's decision. Umale
subsequently brought the case to the SC for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of litis pendentia applies, thus warranting the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 9210 under the grounds that it replicated the cause and claims
of Civil Case No. 8084.

RULING: No. The SC determined that there was no litis pendentia, as the two cases
involved distinct causes of action—the first related to violations of the lease agreement
and the second to the expiration of the lease. The Court emphasized that the cause of
action in the second case did not exist when the first case was filed, thereby ruling out
any substantial identity between them. Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites
are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of
action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and the identity between the two actions
should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action

PEREZ vs HERMANO GR 147417
FACTS: In 1998, Sps Perez together with others filed a civil suit against Zescon Land,
Inc., its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele, and Antonio Hermano at
the RTC for enforcement of contract and damages, along with a request for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. Hermano responded with an answer and
compulsory counterclaim. In 2000, Hermano moved to dismiss the complaint or request
a separate trial, which the RTC granted. The petitioners received the order, and filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the RTC. However,
the CA dismissed the petition, for being filed late, and their motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Consequently, the petitioners brought the case to the SC through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Hermano by the RTC
constituted grave abuse of discretion due to alleged misjoinder of causes of action.

RULING: The SC ruled that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion by
dismissing the complaint against Hermano based on an alleged misjoinder of causes of
action. The SC recognized a conceptual unity in the issues raised by the petitioners
against the respondents, which involved claims of fraud and contractual obligations
intertwined within the same transaction. Therefore, it determined that the causes of action
were appropriately part of a single judicial proceeding and should not have been
separated.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS INC vs STANDARD INSURANCE CO GR 140746

FACTS: On October 28, 1984, a Pantranco bus driven by Alexander Bucan collided with
Martina Gicale's jeepney. Standard Insurance, the jeepney's insurer, paid only P8,000.00,
leaving Martina to cover the remaining P13,415.00. Both Martina and Standard Insurance
sought reimbursement from Pantranco and Bucan, but were refused, leading them to file
a complaint for a sum of money with the RTC. Pantranco and Bucan denied the
allegations, arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction. The RTC ruled against them, and
the Court of Appeals upheld the decision. Pantranco and Bucan then filed a petition for
certiorari with the SC, arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction since the respondents'
claims did not arise from the same transaction.

ISSUE: Whether there was a misjoinder of parties.

RULING: No. Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out
of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact
common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed
by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

To establish whether causes of action are identical, one must determine if the same
evidence would support both cases. In this instance, if the respondents had filed separate
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

suits, the same evidence would have been used for the same cause of action. Therefore,
the joint filing by the respondents was appropriate, as it prevents multiple lawsuits and
promotes efficient and orderly justice.

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDTN vs MABALACAT INSTITUTE GR 211563

FACTS: Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI) claimed ownership of land in
Mabalacat, Pampanga, which had been occupied rent-free by Mabalacat Institute, Inc.
(MII), now Don Teodoro V. Santos Institute, since 1983. In March 2002, SVHFI demanded
rent from MII, who refused to pay. SVHFI then filed a collection case at the RTC. MII’s
motion to dismiss the case was denied and appeals to the CA and Supreme Court were
also unsuccessful due to procedural issues. Meanwhile, SVHFI also filed an ejectment
case against MII at the MCTC. MII’s motion to dismiss the ejectment case, alleging forum
shopping, led to the RTC dismissing the collection case. SVHFI’s appeal was affirmed by
the CA, prompting a further appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not SVHFI was guilty of forum shopping when it filed two different
actions, i.e., the Collection and Ejectment Cases, in two different courts.

RULING: The SC granted SVHFI’s petition, overturning the CA' decision. The SC found
no evidence of forum shopping, noting that the cases involved different issues: collection
of unpaid rent and ejectment for possession. The criteria for forum shopping—identity of
parties, claims, relief sought, and res judicata—were not met. The SC clarified that
collection and ejectment actions are distinct, with collection focusing on recovering unpaid
rent through a trial and ejectment dealing with possession in a summary manner. Thus,
the cases did not overlap in rights or relief sought, and concerns about contradictory
judgments were not applicable here.

Rule 3 Parties to Civil Actions

A. Who may be parties

GAFFNEY vs BUTLER GR 219408

FACTS: Between 2006 and 2007, Gina V. Butler and her late husband Anthony
persuaded Donald Francis Gaffney to invest PHP 12,500,000.00 in ActiveFun
Corporation. After Anthony's death in December 2009, the deal fell through. Although
Gina promised to repay the investment with interest, she only paid PHP 1,000,000.00 on
October 15, 2010, and failed to settle the remaining balance despite multiple demands.
Gina denied knowledge of the investment in her response to a formal demand letter,
leading Donald to file a complaint for the outstanding amount on September 21, 2011.

Gaffney sought to amend his complaint to include Anthony Richard Butler’s estate, and
the RTC approved this, serving an Alias Summons to Gina as the representative. Gina
then filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that a deceased estate couldn't be sued in civil
court. Donald responded with a Motion to Declare Gina in Default for failing to timely
address the amended complaint. The RTC denied both motions and upheld this decision
after Gina’s Motion for Reconsideration. Gina appealed to the CA, which overturned the
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

RTC's orders and dismissed the case. Donald’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied
by the CA, prompting him to file an appeal with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in overturning the RTC’s decision allowing the estate of
Anthony Butler to be named as an additional defendant.

RULING: No. A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be
made a defendant in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
unequivocally states that “only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action.” Any cause of action arising from the herein alleged debt
against the estate of Anthony may be brought as a claim against said estate in the proper
settlement proceedings. The SC furthered that the case against Gina Butler should
remain with the RTC on the merits.

Parties in interest
EVANGELISTA V. SANTIAGO GR 157447

FACTS: Evangelista and others claimed ownership of land in Montalban, Rizal, based on
Deeds of Assignment from Ismael Favila, which stated the land was originally part of
"Hacienda Quibiga," granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain.
When they learned Santiago was planning to evict them, they disputed the legitimacy of
Santiago’s title, OCT No. 670, which was derived from a Court of Land Registration
decision and a Deed of Donation from Santiago’s mother, Isabel. They sought to nullify
Santiago’s title due to alleged irregularities.

Santiago denied the claims, argued that the plaintiffs lacked legal standing, questioned
the validity of their titles, and contended that the case was barred by prescription. At a
preliminary hearing, an expert testified that if the title was fraudulently obtained, it should
be annulled by the State through the Solicitor General. The trial court dismissed the
complaint based on this testimony and Santiago’s defenses. Evangelista and others’
Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and their subsequent appeal to the CA was also
rejected.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs have legal standing and are a parties in interest to
this case.

RULING: Evangelista, et al. failed to establish in their complaint that they had any legal
or equitable title to the subject property. Their claims of possession since time immemorial
and reliance on a Spanish title were contradictory and insufficient. Furthermore, PD 892
rendered Spanish titles ineffective as proof of ownership over real property. Since
Evangelista, et al. lacked the necessary legal or equitable title required for an action to
remove a cloud on or to quiet title, they did not have the legal standing or personality to
sue in such an action. Consequently, their complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Therefore, the court ruled that the case should be dismissed based on this deficiency in
the complaint.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

TREYES vs LARLAR GR 232579

FACTS: Rosie Larlar Treyes died intestate and without children. Her siblings invited Dr.
Nixon Treyes, her husband, to discuss the estate settlement, but he ignored their request.
Instead, Treyes executed two affidavits of self-adjudication, transferring 14 properties to
himself as the sole heir, and registered them in Marikina and San Carlos. When the
siblings discovered this, they filed a lawsuit before the RTC seeking annulment of the
affidavits, cancellation of titles, reconveyance, partition, and damages.

Treyes first challenged the lawsuit by claiming lack of jurisdiction over him and later
argued improper venue, prescription, and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
RTC denied his motions, leading Treyes to petition the CA under Rule 65, which was also
denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the action has prescribed.
2. Whether or not the respondents have locus standi and is prior determination of
heirship in a special proceeding prior to filing an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of property.
RULING:
1. No, the defense of prescription of the complaint has no merit. Treyes invoked
prescription on the basis of Rule 74 is inconsistent with his main theory that the
complaint is an ordinary civil action and not a special proceeding. The provisions
of Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial
partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition is
applicable only:
a. to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and
b. when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with,
i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.
The court held that both requirements are absent in this case; thus, the
prescriptive period on constructive trust under the Civil Code, particularly under
implied constructive trust, applies, and not the prescription on Special
Proceedings.
2. Yes. The court held that the establishment of right of the heirs is conferred by law
and there is no need for judicial confirmation to establish petitioners as heirs. It
was already established by the petitioners that they are heirs ipso facto jure, thus
there is no need for any judicial confirmation. The complaint alleges that their
rights over the properties is by virtue of their being siblings of the decedent.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

In Article 777 of the Civil Code, it substantially provides that rights of succession
is transmitted upon the moment of death of the decedent. This much to say that
the title or rights is immediately passed to the heirs upon death. Thus, the heirs
have legally been deemed to have acquired ownership over the estate of the
decedent, without need of any declaration.

In partition, even before a property is judicially partitioned, heirs are already

deemed owners and without need for prior separate judicial declaration of their
heirship.
In a summary settlement of estates, heirs may undertake the extrajudicial
settlement of estate of decedent amongst themselves through execution of a
public instrument without prior declaration in separate judicial proceeding that they
are heirs of the decedent.
Representatives as parties
V-GENT, INC. vs MORNING STAR TRAVEL & TOURS, INC. GR 186305

FACTS: V-Gent, Inc. (V-Gent) purchased 26 round-trip plane tickets from Morning Star
Travel and Tours, Inc. (Morning Star). V-Gent returned 15 unused tickets, but Morning
Star refunded only 6 and refused to refund the remaining 9 despite multiple requests. V-
Gent then filed a money claim for the unrefunded tickets. Morning Star argued that the
tickets were part of a "buy one, take one" promo and claimed there were only 14 unused
tickets, with only 7 being refundable. They also contested V-Gent's standing to file the
suit, asserting that the passengers, not V-Gent, were the real parties in interest. The
MeTC ruled that V-Gent, as the agent of the passengers, was indeed the real party in
interest but dismissed the case due to insufficient evidence. The RTC overturned this
decision in favor of V-Gent. However, the CA granted Morning Star's petition for review,
dismissing V-Gent’s complaint on the grounds that V-Gent was not the real party in
interest, as it only acted on behalf of the passengers who purchased the tickets.

ISSUE: Whether V-Gent is the real party in interest in the case.

RULING: The court determined that V-Gent lacked legal standing to file the complaint
because it acted as an agent for an undisclosed principal, and the requirements for such
an action were not met. According to the Supreme Court, a lawsuit must be filed by the
real party-in-interest, who is the one who will benefit or be harmed by the judgment.
Although agents can sometimes sue on behalf of a principal under specific conditions
outlined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, these conditions were not satisfied in
this case. V-Gent, as the agent, could not sue in its own name because the tickets were
purchased in the passengers' names, and the payment was made with the passengers'
money. Thus, Morning Star's recognition of V-Gent's authority to handle refunds did not
extend to allowing V-Gent to file a lawsuit on the passengers' behalf.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

OPOSA V. FACTORAN GR 101083

FACTS: The case was brought by minors Juan Antonio, Anna Rosario, and Jose Alfonso
Oposa, along with other minors represented by their parents, against the Secretary of the
DENR, Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and the Presiding Judge of the RTC Makati, Judge
Rosario. The lawsuit addressed concerns over severe deforestation and environmental
damage in the Philippines. The plaintiffs sought to annul all Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to halt further environmental harm, arguing that the TLAs had led to significant
loss of forest cover, which infringes on the constitutional right to a healthy environment
and the state’s duty to safeguard this right for current and future generations.

The RTC dismissed the case, stating that the complaint lacked legal grounds and involved
a political question not suitable for judicial review. Additionally, the court noted that
granting the requested relief would breach the principle of non-impairment of contracts.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioners, including minors represented by their parents, possess
the legal standing to file the case.
2. Whether the complaint embodied sufficient allegations to establish a cause of
action.

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court, in its landmark decision, reversed the RTC’s order, granting
the petitioners’ claims. The Court recognized the legal standing of the petitioners,
including minors advocating not only for their generation but for future ones, based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility.
2. Furthermore, it determined that the complaint adequately stated a cause of action
grounded on the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, thereby
surpassing the political question doctrine. Furthermore, it clarified that Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) are not contracts protected by the non-impairment
clause and can thus be revoked or revised in the interest of public welfare and
environmental preservation.

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF TANON STRAIT vs REYES GR 180771

FACTS: This consolidated case involves two petitions related to Service Contract No. 46,
which permits the exploration and extraction of petroleum resources in Tañon Strait,
situated between Negros and Cebu islands. The first petition, aimed to invalidate SC-46,
alleging violations of the 1987 Constitution and other legal statutes. The second petition,
sought to annul the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR for SC-46. Initially, a contract
for geophysical and geological studies with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.
(JAPEX) was converted into SC-46 for petroleum exploration. Procedural actions
included objections to the respondents' conduct, filing of motions, and attempts to implead
JAPEX Philippines and former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the case.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have locus standi to file the petition.

RULING: Regarding locus standi, the Court recognized the generally permissive
approach to standing in environmental cases, which allows for the representation of
broader, collective interests. In the case of the Resident Marine Mammals, however, the
Court found that the animals themselves did not have standing. Nevertheless, the human
representatives were granted legal standing because they were alleging violations of
environmental laws.

Class Suit
D. Indispensable Parties
IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ GR
182645

FACTS: Henry, Certeza, and Rosalina claimed the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez, arguing that
Hermogenes, who died without heirs in 1910, was the brother of Antonio, their ancestor. With no
opposition, the RTC allowed them to present evidence, eventually recognizing them as heirs and
appointing Henry as the administrator. However, Jaime Robles and other opponents later
contested the decision, leading to various legal challenges. Although the RTC initially sided with
Henry's group, it reversed its decision regarding Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs but
maintained Henry, Certeza, and Rosalina as Hermogenes' heirs. The case went through appeals,
culminating in a final petition filed on May 13, 2008.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rene Pascual, the buyer of the Rodriguez party has locus standi to
intervene in the case.

RULING: No. The requirement for legal standing in filing a petition for certiorari is outlined in
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This rule specifies that only an "aggrieved party,"
someone who was involved in the original proceedings, can file such a petition against actions by
a tribunal, board, or officer that were made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion. The term "aggrieved party" does not include just anyone who feels wronged by a
lower court's decision but refers specifically to parties from the original case. Non-parties to the
original proceedings lack the legal standing to challenge the court's decisions through certiorari.
In this case, the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings in the RTC or CA and only acquired
interest in the disputed properties after the original case had concluded, thus lacking standing to
maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed
for lack of merit.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

FOSTER-GALLEGO vs SPOUSES GALANG GR 130228

FACTS: VRC acquired properties at a public auction by the Municipal Treasurer of Parañaque,
with the RTC ordering new titles in VRC's name. The Spouses Galang later purchased one of
these properties and took possession. Upon returning from Saudi Arabia, Romeo Galang found
a fence built by Gallego around the property. Efforts to resolve the issue through the Barangay
Lupon failed, leading the Spouses Galang to file a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages.

Gallego denied any tax delinquency and later failed to attend the pre-trial. Bernabe Foster-Gallego
intervened in the case, with the RTC allowing his participation. The case was delayed by further
motions, and evidence was eventually presented against Gallego ex parte. Gallego and the
petitioner sought relief through the Court of Appeals, but the RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses
Galang, quieting the title. The Court of Appeals later determined that the petitioner lacked standing
to join Gallego's appeal.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is an indispensable party to the action for quieting of title.

RULING: No. The petitioner, whose title was canceled by RTC-Branch 138, is not an
indispensable party in the action to quiet title. The decision in favor of the Spouses Galang does
not affect the petitioner's title, which could still be canceled regardless of the court's declaration
of ownership. Moreover, the decision does not bind the petitioner, as suits to quiet title only affect
the parties involved. Since the petitioner's intervention was denied and removed from the record,
they are not a party to the case, and the ruling is only conclusive between the parties in the action.
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
A person is not an indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is
separable from the interest of the other parties, so that he will not necessarily be injuriously
affected by a decree that does complete justice between the other parties.

E. Necessary Parties
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs ABEJAR, GR 170631

FACTS: On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes was hit by a Mitsubishi L-300 van driven by
Jimmy Bautista, who swerved to avoid another vehicle. Although witness Alex Espinosa advised
Bautista to take Reyes to the hospital, Bautista instead left her in a subdivision, where a bystander
later helped her get medical care. Reyes died two days later. The van was registered to Caravan
Travel and Tours International, Inc., where Bautista worked. Reyes’ aunt, Ermilinda R. Abejar,
filed a damage claim against Bautista and Caravan at the RTC of Parañaque City. The RTC found
Bautista negligent and held both Bautista and Caravan jointly liable, awarding damages to Abejar.

Caravan contends that Abejar lacks standing to file the lawsuit because she is not a real party-in-
interest. They argue that she does not have legal or substitute parental authority, is not the
judicially appointed guardian, nor the sole living relative of the deceased, and is not the executor
or administrator of the deceased’s estate.

Caravan's appeal was upheld with modified damages by the Court of Appeals, and its subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to a petition to the Supreme Court.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUE: Whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party-in-interest who may bring an
action for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of
her niece, Jesmariane R. Reyes’ death.

RULING: Yes. Reyes’ custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized
rights and duties of a parent, consistent with Article 220. Individuals with substitute parental
authority have the same rights as actual parents, including the right to seek compensation for the
death of their ward. Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual
loss and is, thus, a real party-in-interest in this case.

Indigent Party
SPOUSES ALGURA V. CITY OF NAGA G.R. NO. 150135

FACTS: In 1999, Sps. Algura filed a lawsuit against the City of Naga and its officials for damages
due to the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house, which resulted in a
PHP 7,000.00 monthly loss of rental income. They also requested to be treated as indigent
litigants, providing evidence of low income and lack of property. This request was initially granted,
exempting them from filing fees. However, the defendants contested the complaint and sought to
disqualify the Alguras for not paying the fees, arguing that they had additional income. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) later disqualified the Alguras as indigent and ordered them to pay the
fees. After their Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Alguras appealed to the Supreme
Court, challenging the RTC's decision on indigency.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption
from paying filing fees.

RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner
Lorencita Algura and neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura
showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00, and a Certification of the Naga City assessor
stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for taxation. Since the
applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule
141, then the grant of the application as pauper litigants is mandatory.

Nominal Pro-forma Party

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 232724-27

FACTS: The case stems from “People v. P/Dir. General Jesus Versoza”, where former First
Gentleman Jose Miguel T. Arroyo was accused of plunder in connection with the PNP's purchase
of two second-hand helicopters falsely presented as new. Archibald L. Po, president of Lionair,
testified that Arroyo owned the helicopters and had made partial payments into Lionair's Union
Bank account. The Office of the Special Prosecutor sought to verify these payments and called
on Katrina Cruz-Dizon, the Union Bank branch manager, who revealed that the account records
had been disposed of. The Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena to the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) to produce Lionair's bank records. The AMLC sought to quash the subpoena,
citing confidentiality under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (Republic Act No. 9160). When the
Sandiganbayan denied this motion, the AMLC filed a Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the law
prohibited them from disclosing the bank records.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUE: Whether the AMLC, being a non-covered institution under the Anti-Money Laundering
Act, is prohibited by law to disclose confidential bank records.

RULING: The Court held that the AMLC is not a nominal party and must comply with the Rules of
Court, including furnishing the respondent a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration to ensure due
process. Section 9 (c) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act applies to covered institutions and their
officers, not to the AMLC, which is mandated to investigate and prosecute money laundering
offenses. The AMLC's role as an investigatory body necessitates the disclosure of information to
fulfill its functions.

H. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

DIVINAGRACIA V. PARILLA GR 196750

FACTS: After Conrado Sr.'s death, his children from his marriage to Lolita, along with others, sold
their interests in a piece of land to petitioner Santiago Divinagracia. However, respondents
Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude did not sell their shares, preventing Santiago from canceling the
title (TCT No.) and registering the sale. Santiago filed a complaint for judicial partition and
receivership due to the respondents' refusal to partition the land and surrender the title. The
respondents argued that Santiago had no legal right to the partition since he allegedly did not fully
pay for the shares and because the land was a conjugal asset, only to be inherited by legitimate
heirs.

The RTC ruled in Santiago's favor, recognizing him as a co-owner entitled to demand partition,
but excluded Mateo Sr.'s share, as Felcon lacked authority to sell it on behalf of his siblings. The
CA reversed the RTC's decision, stating that the non-inclusion of indispensable parties (Felcon’s
siblings and Maude’s children) in Santiago’s complaint warranted its dismissal. The case was
then brought before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are indispensable
parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition; and
2. Whether or not Santiago’s complaint should be dismissed for his failure to implead said
omitted heirs.

RULING:
1. Yes. An indispensable party is one whose involvement is crucial to the case because their
interest is directly tied to the subject matter and relief sought. Their participation is
necessary for a complete, fair, and effective resolution of the dispute. Without them, the
court cannot make a final determination, and any actions taken by the court in their
absence are considered null and void, affecting both the absent and present parties.
2. No. In this case, Santiago, having purchased the interests of most of Conrado Sr.'s heirs,
steps into their position as co-owners of the land. Since his interest is derived from the
heirs, the involvement of all heirs with vested interests is necessary in Santiago's
complaint. The absence of these indispensable parties makes the actions of the RTC null
and void due to lack of authority. However, the CA erred by dismissing the complaint solely
because Santiago failed to include all indispensable parties. The non-joinder of such
parties is not grounds for dismissal; instead, the court should order their inclusion. If
Santiago refuses to comply, then the court may dismiss the complaint. The proper remedy
is to include the indispensable parties in the proceedings.
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by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

I. Effect of death of party litigant

SPS DE LA CRUZ vs JOAQUIN GR 162788

FACTS: Pedro Joaquin filed a complaint against the Sps De la Cruz at the RTC, seeking recovery
of possession, ownership, cancellation of title, and damages. Joaquin claimed that he borrowed
₱9,000 from the petitioners on June 29, 1974, due on June 29, 1979, and to secure the loan,
executed a Deed of Sale. He alleged that this Deed was actually an equitable mortgage, as
indicated by a document called "Kasunduan."

The Spouses De la Cruz argued that the Kasunduan merely allowed Joaquin to repurchase the
property by June 29, 1979, a right he failed to exercise. On April 23, 1990, the RTC ruled in favor
of Joaquin, determining that the transaction was a sale with a right of repurchase. The court found
that Joaquin had validly tendered payment twice to exercise his repurchase right, thus ordering
the petitioners to reconvey the property upon receipt of payment.

The CA denied petitioner’s MR and ordered a substitution by legal representatives, in view of

respondent’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court loses jurisdiction when respondent dies during the pendency of
the case and and there being no substitution by the heirs.

RULING: When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of
Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section
16 of Rule 3. The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to
due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against
the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied. Mere failure to
substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision

GAFFNEY vs BUTLER GR 219408

FACTS: Gina V. Butler and her late husband Anthony persuaded Donald Francis Gaffney to invest
PHP 12,500,000.00 in ActiveFun Corporation. After Anthony's death in December 2009, the
investment deal fell apart. Gina only repaid PHP 1,000,000.00 and did not settle the remaining
amount despite repeated demands. Gina claimed she was unaware of the investment, leading
Donald to file a complaint.

Donald later amended his complaint to include Anthony's estate, and the RTC issued an Alias
Summons to Gina as the estate's representative. Gina filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that a
deceased estate could not be sued, while Donald sought to declare Gina in Default for not
addressing the amended complaint. The RTC denied both motions and upheld its decision after
an MR. Gina appealed to the CA, which overturned the RTC’s decisions and dismissed the case.
Donald's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA, leading him to appeal to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Can the estate of Anthony Butler be impleaded in a case?

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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

RULING: No, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Anthony or his estate. Summons is
required to notify a defendant of an action and give the court jurisdiction over that person. Since
Anthony had already passed away before the complaint was filed, no valid service of summons
could be made on him. Any claim related to the alleged debt against Anthony must be filed as a
claim against his estate in the appropriate settlement proceedings.

UY VS DEL CASTILLO GR 223610

FACTS: Crispulo filed a lawsuit for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees
against Jaime Uy. However, since Jaime had died six years before the case was initiated, the
complaint was amended to include Jaime's children, the petitioners in this case. After Crispulo
passed away, his heirs, the respondents, were substituted in his place. The RTC ruled in favor of
the respondents, declaring them the rightful owners. The petitioners appealed to the CA, but their
appeal was denied, making the ruling final and executory. When a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution was filed, the petitioners opposed it, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over them in the quieting of title case because they were not served with a summons. They
contended that they were merely substituted for their deceased father, Jaime, and that the action
should have been directed against his estate.

ISSUES:
1. Were the Uy siblings properly served with summons in the Quieting of Title Case?
2. Should the Uy siblings' liability be limited to the value of their inheritance from Jaime Uy?

RULING:
1. Yes. It is established that a party actively participating in a case effectively invokes the
court's jurisdiction and agrees to its authority. Therefore, such a party cannot later
challenge the court’s jurisdiction. Even if the petitioners did not receive summons for the
amended complaint, their filing of an Answer and active participation, including presenting
Ericson Uy as a witness for the defense, meant they had voluntarily submitted to the
RTC’s jurisdiction.
2. While the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy siblings may be held answerable to the
monetary awards in the Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot exceed whatever
value they inherited from their late father, Jaime.
IV. Rule 4 – Venue
A. Venue vs. Jurisdiction
NOCUM vs LUCIO TAN GR 145022

FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP, and the
Inquirer in the RTC of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for allegedly defamatory
statements made in a news article. The petitioners responded with a joint answer, arguing that
the complaint lacked a valid cause of action, the statements were general conclusions, the report
was accurate and fair, and malice was negated by including Tan's perspective. ALPAP and Umali
also filed a joint answer, raising similar defenses, challenging the venue, and questioning Tan's
interest. The RTC initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice due to improper venue. Tan
then filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration and the admission of an amended complaint,
which the RTC granted, overturning the dismissal. The petitioners and other defendants appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the RTC's decision. After their motion for reconsideration
was denied, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.
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by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUE: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original
complaint for damages?

RULING: The amended complaint was intended solely to establish the correct venue for the case,
not to grant jurisdiction to the lower court. Venue issues are procedural and do not affect the
court's jurisdiction, except in criminal cases. Even if the venue was initially incorrect, it is a
procedural matter that can be waived in civil cases. Therefore, the lower court retained jurisdiction
over the case despite the dismissal for improper venue.

B. Venue in civil cases vs. Criminal cases

NOCUM vs LUCIO TAN GR 145022

FACTS: Lucio Tan sued Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP, and the Inquirer for damages
related to allegedly defamatory statements in a news article. The defendants argued the complaint
was baseless, the statements were general, the report was accurate, and malice was negated by
including Tan's side. The RTC initially dismissed the case due to improper venue, but Tan's
Omnibus Motion for reconsideration and an amended complaint was granted, reversing the
dismissal. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the RTC's decision.
After their reconsideration motion was denied, the defendants escalated the case to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not improper venue is grounds for dismissal on civil cases.

RULING: No. Objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they
do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive,
relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.

In contrast, in CRIMINAL ACTIONS, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an

essential element of jurisdiction.

C. When the rules on venue do not apply

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO., INC. vs PINEDA, JR. GR 227147

FACTS: Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. filed a complaint alleging that it had extended a loan of
PHP 557,808.00 to the respondents, secured by a Chattel Mortgage on a vehicle. The loan,
payable in 24 monthly installments, was to be enforced in the National Capital Judicial Region or
at a Radiowealth branch.

After the respondents defaulted, Radiowealth demanded the remaining balance of PHP
510,132.00, excluding penalties, and filed a lawsuit for the amount due and damages, requesting
a Writ of Replevin. The RTC initially issued the Writ but later recalled it and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction, citing that Radiowealth's principal office is in Mandaluyong City and the
respondents live in Porac, Pampanga. Radiowealth's motion for reconsideration was denied,
leading to the current petition.

ISSUE:
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction.
2. Whether the venue was improperly laid by the petitioner.

RULING:
1. Yes. Jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to hear and decide a case, which is
established by the Constitution, laws, and the nature of the relief sought in the complaint.
It depends on the allegations in the complaint, the applicable laws at the time of filing, and
the type of relief requested. In contrast, venue concerns the specific geographical location
where a case is filed and does not affect a court's jurisdiction.
2. No. Sec 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

• Waiver on Improper Venue

• Stipulation on Venue
ODILAO vs UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 254787

FACTS: Petitioner, represented by her son Ariel Odilao, filed a complaint asking the court to
declare that the loan and mortgage agreements executed with the respondent bank are contracts
of adhesion and should be reformed to reflect their true intentions. The bank, however, argued
that the complaint should be dismissed because the loan documents specified that any legal
action must be filed in the courts of Pasig City. Therefore, the bank contended that the complaint
was improperly filed based on venue, as per Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the venue was improperly laid.

RULING: No. Clearly, the aforesaid venue stipulation is not permissive but restrictive in nature,
considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a)
Pasig City; or (b) in the place where any of the Mortgaged properties are located. Such being the
case, petitioner's complaint, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where
the mortgaged property is located, should not have been dismissed as the same complied with
the venue stipulation stated in the Real Estate Mortgage.
Module 3- B. Complaint
1. Actionable Document, Rule 8, Sec. 7; How to contest, Rule 8, Sec. 8
MEMITA vs MASONGSONG GR 150912

FACTS: Ricardo Masongsong, operating RM Integrated Services, supplied Magnolia chicken

products to Memita on a 25-day credit basis, accumulating a debt of P603,520.50. Despite
repeated demands, Memita failed to settle the debt. Masongsong filed a complaint, seeking
payment and a writ of attachment, which the RTC granted.

Memita admitted to the credit purchases but refused to pay, alleging issues with deliveries and
potential manipulation of delivery receipts. However, the RTC found that the transactions were
properly documented with sales invoices, many signed by Memita or his representative. The court
ruled in favor of Masongsong, ordering Memita to pay the outstanding amount with interest,
attorney's fees, and costs. The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's decision, leading Memita to
seek further review from the Supreme Court.
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUE: Did the trial court err in admitting the sales invoices as evidence despite the alleged lack
of proof of their due execution and authenticity?

RULING: No. Memita failed to explicitly deny or contest the genuineness and due execution of
the receipts or any of the signatures on the receipts. Sec 8 of Rule 8 explains that when a legal
action or defense is based on a written document that is included or attached to the relevant
pleading, the authenticity and proper execution of that document are considered admitted unless
the opposing party explicitly denies them under oath and provides the facts they believe to be
true. Memita’s evidence reveal that Memita failed to prove fraud on Masongsong’s part. Therefore
the trial court and CA were correct.

C. Answer
1. Actionable Document, Rule 8, Sec. 7
RIDAO vs HANDMADE CREDIT AND LOANS, INC., GR 236920

FACTS: Ridao took out a loan from Handmade Credit and Loans, Inc., secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage on a parcel of land. After Ridao defaulted, the lender initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Ridao challenged the foreclosure, claiming the loan agreement was invalid due to alleged defects
in the contract and mortgage execution.

The trial court and CA ruled in favor of Handmade Credit and Loans, Inc., validating the loan and
foreclosure. Ridao then appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn the lower courts' decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in ordering Ridao to pay the
sum of $3,200.00 or its peso equivalent, with interest.

RULING: No. Since the copy of the ledger is not an actionable document, Handmade Credit’s
non-filing of a reply, specifically denying the genuineness and due execution of the ledger, cannot
be considered as an implied admission. Nevertheless, even if the ledger is not an actionable
document, it is admissible as evidence and is sufficient to prove that Ridao made payments for
her loan obligation and that such payments were received by Handmade Credit.
The Promissory Notes were the principal evidence submitted by the loan. Because of the material
alterations, tampering and superimpositions, the CA correctly declared the Promissory Notes as
void and one that cannot be a source of any obligation. Thus, weighing these findings with the
non-presentation of other competent evidence to prove that Ridao had not fully paid for her loan
obligation, we cannot sustain Handmade Credit’s claim.

2. Defenses a. Negative Defenses

i. Specific Denial Rule 8, Sec. 10
GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. V. BPI FAMILY BANK, INC., G R 187487

FACTS: Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. secured a loan from BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.,
backed by a Real Estate Mortgage on its properties. After Go Tong defaulted on the loan, BPI
Family initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Go Tong contested the foreclosure,
claiming it was premature and arguing that partial payments had not been properly credited. They
also alleged that the foreclosure was conducted in bad faith and sought to annul the proceedings
and sale. BPI Family countered that Go Tong failed to meet its payment obligations, justifying the
foreclosure, which they argued was legally conducted. The courts ruled in favor of BPI Family,
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by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

with the trial court and Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the foreclosure, leading Go Tong
to bring the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Are the promissory notes executed by Go Tong Electrical considered genuine and duly
executed?

RULING: In this case, the petitioners failed to meet the "specific denial under oath" requirement
under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, leading to an implied admission of the genuineness and due
execution of the documents related to their loan obligation. As a result, the petitioners could not
challenge the authenticity of the documents. Additionally, although the petitioners claimed they
had partially paid the loan, they failed to prove this payment. Jurisprudence dictates that in civil
cases, the burden of proving payment lies with the defendant. Since the respondent retained
possession of the loan documents, it was presumed that the obligation had not been fulfilled,
further solidifying the respondent's claim.

Documents, Rule 8, Sec. 8;

Reply, Rule 6, Sec. 10;
Rejoinder, Rule 6, Sec. 10
TRANS INDUSTRIAL UTILITIES, INC. V. METROBANK GR 227095

FACTS: Trans Industrial obtained a loan from Metrobank secured by a Real Estate Mortgage.
After Trans Industrial defaulted, Metrobank commenced extrajudicial foreclosure. Trans Industrial
challenged the foreclosure, alleging that it was mishandled and that Metrobank failed to accurately
account for payments made, claiming bad faith in the process. The trial court upheld the
foreclosure as valid, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, prompting Trans Industrial to
appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings initiated by Metrobank were valid,
alleging Metrobank had not accurately accounted for payments made.

RULING: Yes. Petitioners already admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Secretary’s
Certificate and the Debt Settlement Agreement when they failed to specifically deny under oath
their genuineness and due execution. Their argument that the stockholders’ resolution is null and
void because of a lack of quorum has no legal basis because the Secretary’s Certificate speaks
otherwise. Sec 8, Rule 8 explains that when a legal action or defense is based on a written
document included in or attached to a pleading, the authenticity and proper execution of the
document are assumed to be accepted unless the opposing party explicitly denies them under
oath and provides specific facts to support the denial.

RIDAO vs HANDMADE CREDIT AND LOANS, INC., GR 236920

FACTS: On February 20, 2004, Gemma A. Ridao took a $4,000 loan from Handmade Credit and
Loans, Inc., with an additional loan of $6,167 and P40,000 borrowed separately by August 24,
2004. Both loans had a 4% monthly interest rate and were due within a year. Ridao failed to repay
despite several demands, leading Handmade Credit to file a complaint for collection and damages
in July 2013.

Ridao admitted the $4,000 loan but argued it was given as a personal favor, claimed her late
husband had fully repaid the $4,300 debt, and contested the additional loans due to alleged
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

alterations and forgery. The RTC ruled in her favor, accepting her ledger as proof of payment and
voiding the P40,000 loan. Handmade Credit’s appeal led the Court of Appeals to partly grant the
appeal, ordering Ridao to pay $3,200 plus interest, finding the promissory notes void due to
alterations but concluding Ridao did not prove full repayment of the $4,300 loan. Ridao’s motion
for reconsideration was denied, resulting in the petition for review on certiorari.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the loan and foreclosure. Ridao
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking to reverse the lower courts' rulings.

ISSUE: Whether Handmade Credit’s failure to file a reply specifically denying under oath the
ledger which Ridao attached to her Answer, is an admission to said actionable document.

RULING: No. A copy of a page of a ledger is not an actionable document. The ledger merely
indicates that money was received as payment, but it is not an evidence of the transaction
between the parties. The ledger does not provide for the terms and conditions of the loan
transaction from which a right or obligation may be established. Thus, since the copy of the ledger
is not an actionable document, Handmade Credit’s non-filing of a reply, specifically denying the
genuineness and due execution of the ledger, cannot be considered as an implied admission.

iv. Negative Pregnant

SERRANO MAHILUM vs SPOUSES ILANO GR 197923

FACTS: In September 2003, Mahilum entrusted her property title to Teresa Perez intending to
use it as collateral for a loan, however, it was declared lost by Perez. Mahilum filed an Affidavit of
Loss in October 2004. In June 2006, she discovered that Spouses Edilberto and Lourdes Ilano
claimed to have purchased the property from Perez and presented the title, despite no registered
sale.

Mahilum confronted the Ilanos, who showed a notarized repurchase agreement and an
unnotarized deed of sale with allegedly forged signatures. The Ilanos refused to return the title,
asserting they bought the property from Perez and another party. Since the sale wasn't registered,
the title remained in Mahilum's name.

Mahilum then filed a complaint in June 2007 with the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
seeking to annul the agreement and deed of sale, as well as demanding specific performance
and damages. The Ilanos responded with an Amended Answer, defending the validity of their
purchase and seeking damages.

ISSUE: Whether the identification of the impostor who signed the subject agreement and deed
of absolute sale should determine the nullity of the documents and the good faith of the
respondents.

RULING: No. The respondents’ pleadings reveal that they knew the petitioner’s identity and
appearance before filing the complaint, as they had previously met her when she confronted them
with the agreement and deed of sale. Therefore, their reference to the seller as “Jane Doe” or as
“the person who introduced herself as Ruby Ruth Serrano” is ambiguous and misleading,
especially if the petitioner herself was involved in the transaction. Their vague denial amounts to
a "negative pregnant," a type of denial that implicitly admits the core facts of the allegation. In
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

legal terms, a negative pregnant implies an admission of the substantial facts that were not clearly
denied, as it indirectly acknowledges the essence of the allegations.

v. Remedies – Rule 8, Sec. 12(e); Rule 15, Sec. 12(c)

COLMENAR V. COLMENAR GR 252467

FACTS: Frank Colmenar, the legitimate son of Francisco, found out that Apollo Colmenar,
Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza, and Victoria Jet Colmenar falsely claimed to be heirs and executed
extrajudicial settlements. These actions resulted in the sale of Francisco's properties in Cavite to
several companies, including Philippine Estates Corporation, Amaia Land Corporation, Crisanta
Realty Development Corporation, and Property Company of Friends. Frank filed a complaint in
2018 to annul the deeds and titles and seek damages. However, in 2020, the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint, stating there was no valid cause of action against the companies and
applying the 2019 Amendments to the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which Frank contested.

ISSUE: Does the failure to allege that corporation buyers were in bad faith tantamount to failure
to state a cause of action?

RULING: No. Whether respondent companies were buyers in bad faith or had knowledge of the
defect in the title of the seller is not the issue nor the trigger that gave rise to the complaint.
Petitioner's causes of action hinged on his averment that the individual respondents are not the
owners of the properties, hence, they cannot validly sell the same to respondent companies, nor
convey any title to the latter by reason of the invalid sale. The spring cannot rise above its source.
Needless to state, the trial court cannot inject its own theory to take the place of the actual
allegations in the complaint. Besides, where petitioner in this case has no actual or personal
knowledge of the good faith or bad faith of the buyers in the purchase of the properties, how could
he possibly allege it in the complaint? In any event, good faith or lack of bad faith is a matter of
defense for the buyers in this case. It can be pleaded in the answer and proved during the trial.

4. Omitted counterclaim or crossclaim, Rule 11, Sec. 10

METROPOLITAN BANK V. CPR PROMOTIONS GR 200567

FACTS: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) extended a loan to CPR Promotions,
a company involved in organizing and managing entertainment events, with the loan secured by
a real estate mortgage on the company's property. When CPR Promotions failed to meet the loan
terms, Metrobank began foreclosure on the mortgaged property. CPR Promotions challenged the
foreclosure, arguing that it was premature and that they had not received adequate notice or an
opportunity to address the default. They also alleged that Metrobank acted in bad faith and
breached their agreement.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the MBTC failed to prove that a deficiency balance resulted after
conducting the extrajudicial foreclosure sales of the mortgaged properties.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in awarding a refund when respondent did not set up a
counterclaim for refund of any amount.
RULING:
1. The court found that petitioner failed to prove that there was a deficiency, since the records
failed to corroborate the claimed amount. As noted by the CA, “[Petitioner] did not even
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

introduce the continuing surety agreement on which the trial court gratuitously based its
decision, thus omitting it on its counterclaim.
2. Yes. The SC ruled that respondents were not able to timely set up their claim for refund.
A compulsory counterclaim is one that arises from or is related to the same transaction or
event that is the subject of the opposing party’s claim and can be resolved without
involving third parties beyond the court's jurisdiction. This counterclaim must fall within the
court’s authority in terms of both amount and nature, except in cases before the Regional
Trial Court, where the amount is not a limiting factor.

TIONGSON V. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY GR 166964

FACTS: The case involves a dispute between the National Housing Authority (NHA) and several
lot owners in Tondo, Manila, over the expropriation of 66,783.40 square meters of land, valued at
P21,024,136.50. Filed by the NHA on April 3, 1987, the expropriation complaint was met with a
counter-motion from the lot owners, represented by Rosa R. Manotok and including Patricia L.
Tiongson, Pacita L. Go, and Roberto Laperal III, who sought to dismiss the complaint and claimed
damages.

In response, the NHA deposited P21,107,485.07 as provisional compensation. Despite this, the
RTC dismissed both the NHA’s complaint and the petitioners' counterclaims in 1991. The CA
upheld this dismissal in 1993, and the Supreme Court later terminated the case due to the NHA’s
failure to file a timely petition.

ISSUE: Whether the termination of the expropriation case and the dismissal of both the NHA's
complaint and the petitioners' counterclaims affected the NHA’s right to withdraw the deposit.

RULING: The CA correctly held that this counterclaim for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees is compulsory. As such, it is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and
derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim
against the party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the
counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the
complaint is dismissed at the instance of the counterclaimant.

CARPIO V. RURAL BANK OF STO. TOMAS (BATANGAS), INC. GR 153171

FACTS: Carlos Carpio and his family secured a loan from the Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas
(Batangas), Inc., using their property as collateral. When Carpio and his family defaulted, the bank
began foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property.

Carpio contested the foreclosure, claiming it was improper due to lack of prior demand or notice
and alleging that the sale was not published correctly since the sheriff’s notice was in a newspaper
not of general circulation.

In response, the Rural Bank filed a counterclaim seeking damages for a total of P750,0000.
Carpio filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, arguing that it lacked a certification against
forum shopping. The bank opposed this motion, asserting that the counterclaim, being
compulsory in nature, did not require such a certification since it was not an initiatory pleading.
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San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

ISSUE: Whether respondent bank’s counterclaim need not be accompanied by a certification

against forum shopping.

RULING: The petitioners' argument regarding the lack of a certification against forum shopping is
flawed. The rule specifies that the certification is required for "initiatory pleadings," which are
filings that start a legal action or claim for relief. The Rural Bank's Answer with Counterclaim is a
responsive pleading, meant to address and counter the petitioners' initial complaint. Therefore, it
does not fall under the rule requiring such certification. If a plaintiff fails to provide this certification,
the rule mandates the dismissal of the case without prejudice, not the dismissal of the defendant's
counterclaim.

SY-VARGAS vs ESTATE OF OGSOS GR 221062

FACTS: This case revolves around a lease contract for five parcels of land in Negros Oriental,
signed on February 10, 1994. Originally set to expire in 2001, the lease was extended to 2004
due to improvements by the lessee, Ogsos, Sr. The rental terms were changed in 1996 from
payment in sugar to ₱150,000 per crop year. Petitioners sought unpaid rent from 1994 to 1999
and filed a lawsuit in 2000. Respondents, after filing a late response, faced a default judgment,
which was later overturned by the Court of Appeals.

Respondents countered, claiming unlawful dispossession in 1998, which caused them financial
loss. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint due to a procedural error but
ruled in favor of respondents on their counterclaim. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision but
removed damages and fees. Petitioners' late motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to
the current petition.

ISSUES:
1. Was the petitioners' motion for reconsideration filed out of time?
2. Is the respondents' counterclaim for damages compulsory or permissive in nature, and
thus, is the payment of docket fees required?
3. Are the respondents entitled to their counterclaim for damages?

RULING:
1. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was not filed out of time. The Supreme Court
found that the CA erred in considering the motion for reconsideration as filed out of time.
March 29, 2014, was a Saturday, and per Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the
deadline extends to the next working day if the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday. Thus, the March 31, 2014, filing was timely.
2. Yes. The requirement to pay docket fees for a counterclaim depends on its nature. For
permissive counterclaims, which are independent claims not related to the opposing
party’s claim, the counterclaimant must pay docket fees for the trial court to have
jurisdiction. In contrast, no filing fees are needed for compulsory counterclaims, which
arise from the same transaction as the main action and must be raised in that action. A
compulsory counterclaim is barred if not filed in the same case.
Based on the above, the Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in
nature. This is because: (a) the issue in the main case, i.e., whether or not respondents
are liable to pay lease rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e.,
whether or not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for taking over the possession
of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating respondents’ crops planted
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

therein; (b) since petitioner and respondents’ respective causes of action arose from
completely different occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata had they
opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to
prove petitioner’s claim that respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise different
from the evidence required to prove respondents’ counterclaim that petitioner and Kathryn
are liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith; and (d) the recovery of petitioner’s
claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents’ counterclaim, such that
conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort
of the court and the parties.
However, it must be clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees, per
se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim.
3. The respondents are entitled to their counterclaim for damages, but the amount awarded
should be reduced by the unpaid lease rentals of P900,000. The Court upheld the RTC
and CA findings that petitioners unlawfully dispossessed respondents, resulting in lost
profits. However, it was fair to deduct unpaid lease rentals from the counterclaim.
Respondents' entitlement to lost profits presupposed a valid lease contract requiring them
to pay lease rentals.

G. Reply, Rejoinder
CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS PHILBANKING CORPORATION GR
150731

FACTS: Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare
Realty Corporation for ₱300,000 and ₱681,500, with interest rates of 36% and 18% per annum,
and a 12% penalty for late payment. These notes were later assigned to Philbanking Corporation.
Despite demands, Casent Realty failed to pay upon maturity, prompting Philbanking to file a
complaint in 1993 for ₱5,673,303.90.

In its defense, Casent Realty claimed that a *Dacion en Pago* agreement in 1986 had
extinguished its obligations and cited a 1989 confirmation statement showing no loans as of
December 31, 1988. It also argued overpayment and sought damages. The RTC dismissed
Philbanking’s complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, ruling that the promissory
notes were not covered by the *Dacion en Pago* and that Philbanking was entitled to collect on
them.
ISSUES:
1. Does the respondent’s failure to submit a Reply and deny the *Dacion* and Confirmation
Statement under oath amount to a judicial admission of the authenticity and proper
execution of these documents?
2. Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence? If yes, are
the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the complaint?
3. Is Casent Realty Development Corporation liable to pay Philbanking Corporation under
the promissory notes?
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath constitutes a judicial admission of the genuineness
and due execution of these documents. This admission should have been considered by
the appellate court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. However, the Court also found
that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents does not
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory
notes.
2. Judicial admissions should be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence. However,
the admissions in this case were not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
3. Casent Realty Development Corporation is liable to pay Philbanking Corporation under
the promissory notes. The Dacion en Pago was intended to settle a separate loan of
PhP3,921,750 obtained directly from Philbanking, not the obligations arising from the
promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty.
Therefore, the promissory notes were not covered by the Dacion, and Casent Realty
remains liable for the amounts stipulated in the notes.

II. Rule 7 Parts and Contents of a Pleading

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS vs BF HOMES, INC. GR 228239

FACTS: On August 23, 2013, BF Homes, Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition
against the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Banco Filipino, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the RTC Las Piñas sheriff. BF Homes claimed that Tierra Grande Farms, Inc.
had taken loans from Banco Filipino and mortgaged BF Homes’ properties under a special power
of attorney. Banco Filipino later assigned the mortgage to BSP as security for a liquidity loan. In
2013, BF Homes discovered BSP had applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties.

BSP moved to dismiss, claiming BF Homes lacked proper authorization and that their petition
contained errors. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of authority. However, the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the decision, ruling that BF Homes substantially complied with the verification and
certification requirements after amending the petition. The BSP’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that there was substantial compliance by BF Homes as
regards the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping.

RULING: Yes. Rule 7, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court establish the requirements for
verification and certification against forum shopping. Verification assures that the affiant has
personal knowledge of the allegations, while certification against forum shopping ensures that no
similar case has been filed elsewhere.

In corporate cases, an authorized corporate officer must sign these documents. BF Homes, a
corporation, attached the wrong secretary's certificate, signed by an officer of a different
corporation (BF Town Corporation). This error, along with further mistakes in subsequent filings,
resulted in the dismissal of the petition. The Court emphasized the need for strict compliance with
procedural rules, allowing leniency only in exceptional cases where there is substantial
compliance.

JORGENETICS SWINE IMPROVEMENT CORP vs THICK & THIN AGRI-PRODUCTS,

INC. GR 201044 & 222691

FACTS: In 2008, Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc. (TTAI)I filed a complaint for replevin with
damages against Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corporation (Jorgenetics) to seize 4,765 hogs
under a chattel mortgage. TTAI claimed that Jorgenetics owed them Php 20 million for unpaid
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

supplies. The RTC issued a writ of replevin, requiring Jorgenetics to post a Php 40 million bond,
and the hogs were seized. Jorgenetics contested the case, claiming invalid service of summons.
After several reassignments, the RTC dismissed the complaint, for lack of jurisdiction. TTAI's
motion for reconsideration was denied, and Jorgenetics sought a writ of execution and damages
from the replevin bond.

TTAI filed a Petition for Certiorari, and the CA nullified the trial court’s dismissal, reinstating the
complaint. Despite ongoing legal battles, the CA eventually ruled in favor of TTAI, prompting
Jorgenetics to file petitions for review before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the Petitions should be dismissed for failure of Jorgenetics to comply with the
rules on verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court affirmed that corporate officials like the chairman and president
do not need a board resolution to sign verification and certification. Subsequent ratification
validates the action. The variance in the date of the verification with the date of the petition was
trivial and did not contravene the purpose of good faith and veracity in pleadings.

C. Certification Against Forum Shopping

TANYAG VS TANYAG GR 231319

FACTS: Arturo and Dolores were married under the conjugal partnership of gains regime. In 2004,
Dolores sought to declare their marriage null and void due to Arturo's psychological incapacity.
Concurrently, she filed a separate petition to claim two parcels of land as her exclusive property
and compel Arturo to surrender the titles. Arturo challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court in the
Property Case, on grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. The RTC declared the marriage
null and void, and Dolores moved to liquidate, partition, and distribute their properties, which was
initially denied. Arturo's appeal regarding the Property Case was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, prompting him to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property must be dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia.
2. Whether Dolores committed forum shopping by filing the Property Case.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Dolores's Property Case is barred by litis pendentia
as it involves the same parties and cause of action as the Nullity Case. The court
explained that property ownership determination is incidental to the nullity of marriage,
which the trial court handling the Nullity Case is already authorized to resolve.
2. Dolores was found to have engaged in forum shopping by filing a separate petition for
property declaration, thereby splitting her causes of action. The court noted that forum
shopping occurs when a party institutes multiple suits in different courts to obtain
favorable rulings on the same or related causes of action.
The court concluded that the Property Case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

VICTORY LINER, INC. V. MALINIAS, GR 151170

FACTS: A collision occurred between a Victory Liner bus and a truck owned by Michael Malinias.
Malinias filed for damages, claiming P47,180 for truck repairs, P15,000 for lost income, and
additional claims for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. After pre-trial, the bus driver was
dropped from the case. Victory Liner's counsel withdrew, and when the company failed to present
evidence, the court declared the case submitted for judgment. Victory Liner’s petition for
annulment of judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals due to a procedural error—the
Certification Against Forum Shopping was signed by counsel instead of the petitioner. A Motion
for Reconsideration was denied despite Victory Liner submitting a Certificate of Authority after the
filing, as the original was reported misplaced.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment due to
procedural defects in the verification and certification against forum shopping?

RULING: The Court stated that the subsequent submission of the certificate of authority should
have been considered substantial compliance. The rule on substantial compliance should apply
to the contents of the certification against forum shopping. We hold and so rule that the appellate
court’s utilization on petitioner’s belated submission of the complete verification and certification
requirements as anchor for the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment does not merit
affirmance.

HEIRS OF GABRIEL vs. CEBRERO G.R. NO. 222737

FACTS: A real estate mortgage was executed by Secundina Cebrero through her attorney-in-fact
to secure an amicable settlement involving ₱8 million. After Cebrero failed to pay, Gabriel initiated
foreclosure proceedings in 1993. The RTC ruled in Gabriel's favor, and the property was sold at
auction, with Gabriel as the winning bidder. However, Gabriel did not register the Final Deed of
Sale due to tax issues. Later, Gabriel learned that Cebrero’s attorney-in-fact sold the property to
another party. Gabriel’s heirs challenged this sale, but after a favorable RTC ruling, the Court of
Appeals reversed it, citing a lack of authority for Gabriel's representative, Eduardo Ceniza, to file
the complaint. The heirs then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the RTC's decision based on the technicality
that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were not supported by a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) for Eduardo Caniza?

RULING: The Supreme Court denied the Heirs of Josefina Gabriel's petition for review, affirming
the Court of Appeals' decision that reversed the Regional Trial Court's ruling. The complaint was
dismissed because Eduardo Caniza, who filed it, lacked a SPA to prove his authority to act on
behalf of Gabriel. The Supreme Court emphasized that only the principal party or someone with
proper authority can file and certify against forum shopping. Since Caniza did not provide an SPA,
the RTC never acquired jurisdiction, and the complaint had no legal effect. The substitution of
heirs did not remedy this defect, and the petition was ultimately dismissed.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

QUIAMBAO v. SUMBILLA, G.R. NO. 192901

FACTS: Petitioners Cezar Quiambao, et al., were involved in a dispute with respondents Bonifacio
C. Sumbilla with another member of the Board of Directors of Pacifica, Inc. The respondents filed
three separate cases in different Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) due to confusion over Pacifica’s
principal place of business. These cases aimed to stop Pacifica's Annual Stockholders' Meeting
(ASM) on August 23, 2007, which they claimed violated the by-laws and Corporation Code.

The conflicting corporate records led the respondents to file multiple cases while awaiting
clarification from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which later confirmed
Pacifica’s principal address as Makati City. Following this, the respondents withdrew the Pasig
and Manila cases, leaving only the Makati case.

Petitioners argued there was improper service of summons and accused the respondents of
forum shopping. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, leading to a Petition for CertiorarI at
the CA. The CA acknowledged improper service of summons but ruled there was no forum
shopping. Dissatisfied, the petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in declaring that the respondents are not guilty of forum
shopping?

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the respondents' act of filing three separate cases was
justified and reasonable given the circumstances.
Definition of Forum Shopping: Involves filing multiple suits with the same parties for the same
cause of action to obtain a favorable judgment.
Elements of Forum Shopping: Identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
and the possibility of conflicting decisions.
Reason for Multiple Filings: Respondents filed cases in different courts due to uncertainty about
the proper venue, as Pacifica's corporate records indicated different addresses for its principal
place of business.
SEC Clarification and Withdrawal: Respondents sought clarification from the SEC and withdrew
the Pasig and Manila cases upon receiving the SEC's response, leaving only the Makati case.

D. Names of Witnesses, Summary of Testimonies, Judicial Affidavits, Documentary and

object evidence 1. Judicial Affidavit Rule, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

LARA’S GIFTS AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB GENERAL INSURERS, CO., GR 230429

FACTS: LGDI, a manufacturer and exporter of handicrafts, leased buildings in Taguig City for
production and storage, which were insured with PNB General Insurers Co., Inc. (PNB Gen) and
UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (UCPB). On February 19, 2008, a fire destroyed some of the
insured buildings. When LGDI filed an insurance claim, the insurers denied it, citing policy
violations and inadequate documentation.

LGDI then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages in the Regional Trial Court.
During the trial, the RTC allowed LGDI to present additional documents and a supplemental
judicial affidavit. The respondents objected and filed motions to remove the additional exhibits,
but the RTC denied these motions.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

Respondents sought relief through a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). While
the CA initially sided with the RTC, it later reversed its decision upon reconsideration. LGDI
subsequently filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary
exhibits during the trial?
2. Was the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte proper?

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of **LGDI**, reinstating the Court of Appeals' decision
which upheld the RTC's allowance of additional documentary exhibits and a 2nd Supplemental
Judicial Affidavit. The Court found that the RTC did not abuse its discretion by permitting these
documents, as the Judicial Affidavit Rule and Pre-Trial Guidelines allow for additional evidence
under valid grounds. The RTC's decision was deemed appropriate since the additional evidence
complemented cross-examination responses. Both parties had agreed to present additional
evidence during the trial, and respondents waived objections by not amending the Pre-Trial Order.
The Court concluded that the trial court acted justly without unnecessarily delaying the case.

Rule 8 Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings A. Distinguish Ultimate from Evidentiary

Facts
LAZARO v. BREWMASTER INTL, INC., G.R. NO. 182779

FACTS: Brewmaster International, Inc. sued Victorina (Victoria) Alice Lim Lazaro and Prescillo G.
Lazaro for non-payment of Php138,502.92 for goods purchased on credit between February and
May 2002. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the case, noting that Brewmaster failed
to prove its claim as the invoices indicated the goods were sold to "Total" and received by
someone else. Brewmaster's appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was denied, as the RTC
found that accepting additional evidence would be unfair. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
this decision, ordering payment based on the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The
petitioners sought a Supreme Court review, claiming the CA misinterpreted the procedural rule
and that the complaint did not have a valid cause of action against them.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in giving relief to Brewmaster despite the alleged lack of
cause of action in its complaint against the petitioner?

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the complaint against Victoria sufficiently stated a cause
of action. The allegations that the Lazaro defendants obtained goods on credit from Brewmaster
and failed to pay, despite demand, were enough for a claim for the collection of a sum of money.
The attached sales invoices were considered evidentiary rather than actionable documents and
did not absolve the Lazaro defendants of potential liability. The Court emphasized that the test for
a cause of action is based on the sufficiency of the allegations, not their truth. The Court agreed
with the Court of Appeals’ decision to rely on the complaint’s allegations and upheld the relief
granted to Brewmaster.
Civil Procedure 1 Rules 1-7 Case Digests
by Contessa Almeyda 2024
San Beda College Alabang School of Law
Prof Atty Monica Yap

Fraud, Mistake, Condition of Mind

REYES V. RTC OF MAKATI, G.R. NO. 165744

FACTS: Oscar and Rodrigo owned shares in Zenith Insurance Corporation. After their father,
Pedro's death, his estate was settled, but their mother Anastacia's shares were not accounted
for. Zenith Corporation and Rodrigo accused Oscar of fraudulently appropriating Anastacia’s
shares and failing to account for company assets. Oscar claimed the shares were lawfully
acquired and that the SEC lacked jurisdiction, as the matter involved Anastacia's estate. The RTC
denied his motion to dismiss the case as a nuisance suit, and his petition for relief to the Court of
Appeals was also denied.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that should be
dismissed under the Interim Rules of Procedure of Intra-Corporate Controversies;
2. Whether or not the complaint is a derivative suit within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting
as a special commercial court.

RULING:
1. Yes. A complaint must clearly state the facts of the plaintiff’s case and detail any claims
of fraud with specificity. Allegations of fraud, without supporting facts, are insufficient. In
this case, the fraud claims against Oscar were vague, lacking the required factual details,
and were deemed mere legal conclusions. As a result, the complaint did not meet the
legal standard to establish a cause of action, leading to its dismissal.
2. The complaint did not qualify as a derivative suit because Rodrigo, as an unrecorded
transferee-heir, lacked shareholder status. He also failed to demonstrate that he had
exhausted corporate remedies, as required for a derivative suit. Additionally, the alleged
fraudulent transfer of shares harmed Rodrigo and other heirs, not the corporation. The
court ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction, as the issue involved the distribution of
Anastacia's estate. Rodrigo's appropriate course of action is to file a special proceeding
for the settlement of Anastacia's estate, not a corporate suit.