COMPLIANCE IN

CIVIL PROCEDURE II

BY:

ANGEMEI P. SANCHEZ

SUBMITTED TO:

HON. DONABEL A. BALOT – ESLLER

PROFESSOR
CASE NO. 0

TERESITA R. GABUCAN VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 219978 | FEBRUARY 13, 2023
PONENTE: SINGH, J.

FACTS:
 The petitioners, Teresita R. Gabucan and others, initiated a complaint on June
11, 1997, against the City of Cebu, seeking forfeiture of improvements and
other reliefs.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 9, interpreted the case as
one for expropriation and subsequently ordered the City to pay just
compensation.
 On January 14, 2000, the RTC rendered a decision mandating the City to pay
PHP34,905,000.00 plus interest. To satisfy this judgment, the City’s deposit
accounts were garnished.
 The City’s subsequent appeals were dismissed, and the decision attained
finality on April 21, 2008.
 Later, the City discovered a convenio from 1940, which it claimed established
its ownership of the lots.
 Consequently, the City filed a Petition for Annulment of the RTC’s decisions,
alleging extrinsic fraud.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss and treated
it as their Answer to the Petition for Annulment.
 Dissatisfied, the petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the CA gravely abuse its discretion in denying the Motion to
Dismiss and treating it as the petitioners' Answer to the Petition for Annulment

HELD:
 YES. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the CA’s resolutions
dated July 16, 2012, and July 20, 2015, and dismissed the City of Cebu’s
Petition for Annulment.
 The Petition is meritorious. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
equity so exceptional in nature that may be availed of only when other remedies
are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to
be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. Given its nature, it is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by
parties aggrieved by final judgments, orders, or resolutions. Thus, the Court has
instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores
or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
 The Supreme Court determined that the City of Cebu’s Petition for Annulment
was defective due to non-compliance with the requirements under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court. Specifically, the City failed to assert that it was unable to
 avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief without fault on its
part, which is a mandatory requirement.
 The first requirement prescribes that a petition for annulment is available only
when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the
petitioner. Thus, the petition, when grounded on extrinsic fraud, must aver that
the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for
relief without fault on his part.
 The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of
judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic where
the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
fraud or deception by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court; or
where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; and other similar cases
which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of
the case.
 The third requirement sets the time for the filing of a Rule 47 Petition. The
action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the
discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be
brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
 Lastly, the fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified and
should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment,
as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be. The need for averring the circumstances
constituting fraud with particularity is essential as a universal requirement in the
rules of pleading.
 The City’s allegation of extrinsic fraud was unsubstantiated, as it did not provide
adequate evidence that the petitioners deliberately suppressed the convenio.
 The Court underscored that the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, binding
on the City despite it not being a named party. The City’s negligence in not
discovering the convenio earlier could not be equated to extrinsic fraud.
 The Supreme Court also highlighted that the case had already reached finality,
and the City had been given ample opportunity to present its case. Allowing the
City to benefit from its own inaction and negligence would contravene the
doctrine of finality of judgment.
 The CA acted arbitrarily and gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion
to Dismiss and entertaining the Petition for Annulment.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, dated July 16, 2012
and July 20, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676
are REVERSED. The Petition (for Annulment of Final Decision/s and Order/s),
dated March 22, 2012, of Cebu City is DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 1

NORTHERN ISLANDS, CO., INC. VS. SPOUSES DENNIS AND

CHERYLIN* GARCIA, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE
"ECOLAMP MULTI RESOURCES"
G.R. NO. 203240 | MARCH 18, 2015
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS:
 On September 23, 2005, the petitioner filed a Complaint with an application for
a writ of preliminary attachment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 215 (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-05-53699).
 The complaint was amended on October 25, 2005. The petitioner alleged that
from March to July 2004, they delivered various appliances worth
P8,040,825.17 to the respondents, who accepted these goods but failed to pay
despite repeated demands. The petitioner also claimed that the respondents
fraudulently asserted that there was no proof of delivery.
 Consequently, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary attachment on November
7, 2005, after the petitioner posted a bond for the same amount.
 Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Proper Pleading and Motion for Discovery on
November 11, 2005, requesting to examine the original invoices and other
documents.
 On January 11, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Excess
Attachment, asserting that the value of the attached properties exceeded the
bond amount by P9,232,564.56.
 The RTC denied this motion on June 21, 2006, stating that the appraisal was
not reflective of the true valuation and that the bond was sufficient security.
 The respondents' subsequent Motion for Partial Reconsideration was also
denied on August 23, 2006. The respondents then filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
97448.
 Meanwhile, the RTC dismissed the petitioner's Amended Complaint on
September 21, 2011, due to a lack of evidence proving the respondents agreed
to the pricing of the goods. The petitioner appealed this decision to the CA on
October 27, 2011, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
 The CA, in its January 19, 2012 Decision, ordered the RTC to appoint a
commissioner to determine the value of the attached properties and discharge
any excess attachment found.
 The petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied on August 24,
2012, leading to the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the RTC lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary
attachment after the petitioner appealed the decision in the Main Case
 2. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the appointment of a commissioner
and the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment found by said
commissioner?
HELD:

 1. Yes, the RTC lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment
after the petitioner appealed the decision in the Main Case.
 The petition is meritorious.
 The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
the RTC loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeal and
the expiration of the time to appeal for the other parties. In this case, the
petitioner perfected its appeal on October 27, 2011, and the RTC confirmed this
by ordering the elevation of the records to the CA on January 25, 2012.
 Since the respondents did not file any appeal, the RTC lost jurisdiction over the
Main Case and all ancillary matters, including the preliminary attachment.
 The Court emphasized that a preliminary attachment is an auxiliary remedy and
cannot exist independently of the main suit. Once the main action is appealed,
the attachment, as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and
removed from the jurisdiction of the lower court.

 2. Yes, the CA erred in ordering the appointment of a commissioner and the

subsequent discharge of any excess attachment found by said commissioner.
 The CA's order to appoint a commissioner to determine the excessiveness of
the attachment was thus rendered moot by the appeal of the Main Case.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the CA's January 19, 2012
Decision and August 24, 2012 Resolution.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 19, 2012
and the Resolution dated August 24, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97448 are hereby SET ASIDE.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 2

WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-

PRESIDENT, ROSARIO E. RANOA, PETITIONERS,
VS.
ALFRED RAYMOND WOLFE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 181721 | SEPTEMBER 9, 2015
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Watercraft Venture Corporation (Watercraft), represented by its Vice-
President Rosario E. Ra oa, is engaged in the business of building, repairing,
storing, and maintaining yachts, boats, and other pleasure crafts at the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone, Subic, Zambales.
 Watercraft charges a boat storage fee of $272 per month with an interest of 4%
per month for unpaid charges.
 In June 1997, Watercraft hired Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national
and resident of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, as its Shipyard Manager. During his
employment, Wolfe stored his sailboat, Knotty Gull, within Watercraft's facilities
but never paid the storage fees.
 Wolfe's employment was terminated on March 7, 2002. In June 2002, Wolfe
pulled out his sailboat after signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance on June 29,
2002, acknowledging an outstanding obligation of $16,324.82 for unpaid
storage fees from June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands, Wolfe
failed to pay the said amount.
 Consequently, on July 7, 2005, Watercraft filed a Complaint for Collection of
Sum of Money with Damages and an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against Wolfe in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 4534-MN.
 Wolfe denied owing the amount and claimed the sailboat was part of an
agreement for repair and sale, with no stipulation for storage fees.
 The RTC granted Watercraft's ex-parte application for a writ of preliminary
attachment on July 15, 2005, leading to the attachment of Wolfe's vehicles and
garnishment of his bank accounts.
 Wolfe's motion to discharge the writ was denied by the RTC, prompting him to
file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
 The CA annulled the RTC's orders and declared the writ of attachment null and
void, directing the return of the attached vehicles.
 Watercraft's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, leading to this
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment by the
trial court in favor of the petitioner is valid.
 2. Whether or not the allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a preliminary writ of attachment by the trial
court in favor of the petitioner.
HELD:
 1. NO. The ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment by the trial court in
favor of the petitioner is not valid.
 The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's Decision dated
September 27, 2007, and its Resolution dated January 24, 2008. The Court
ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment as Watercraft failed to sufficiently establish grounds for the
attachment, and the allegations of fraud and flight risk were unsubstantiated.
 The Court emphasized that a writ of preliminary attachment is a harsh and
extraordinary remedy that must be granted only on concrete and specific
grounds, not merely on general averments quoting the words of the rules. The
affidavit of merit must particularly state the circumstances constituting fraud, as
required by Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
 2. NO. The allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are not sufficient
to warrant the issuance of a preliminary writ of attachment by the trial court in
favor of the petitioner.
 In this case, Watercraft's affidavit of merit did not contain specific allegations of
factual circumstances showing that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the
obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. The mere failure to
pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily amount to fraud without any
showing of insidious machinations and intent to defraud.
 Additionally, the Court found no compelling reason to depart from the CA's
ruling that Wolfe was not a flight risk, as he had been residing in the Philippines
since 1997, with his family, and had ongoing business and legal engagements
in the country.
 The Court concluded that Watercraft failed to meet the requisites for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, and the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the writ.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated September 27, 2007 and its Resolution dated January
24, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97804, are AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 3

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION

VS.
GREAT WALL COMMERCIAL PRESS COMPANY, INC
G.R. NO. 219345 | JANUARY 30, 2017
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
 On May 15, 2013, Security Bank Corporation (Security Bank) filed a Complaint
for Sum of Money with an Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment against Great Wall Commercial Press Company, Inc. (Great Wall)
and its sureties, Alfredo Buriel Atienza, Fredino Cheng Atienza, and Spouses
Frederick Cheng Atienza and Monica Cu Atienza (respondents), before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 59.
 The complaint sought to recover unpaid obligations under a credit facility
covered by several trust receipts and surety agreements, amounting to a
principal sum of P10,000,000.00, plus interests, attorney's fees, and costs.
Despite the maturity dates of the obligations lapsing from December 11, 2012,
to May 7, 2013, the respondents failed to pay.
 On May 31, 2013, the RTC granted Security Bank's application for a writ of
preliminary attachment, which was issued after the bank posted a bond of
P10,000,000.00.
 Respondents filed a Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment Ad Cautelam
on June 3, 2013, claiming that the writ was issued with grave abuse of discretion
and lacked prima facie basis, among other grounds.
 The RTC denied this motion on July 4, 2013, and a subsequent motion for
reconsideration on August 12, 2013.
 Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), which lifted the writ of preliminary attachment on December 12,
2014. The CA ruled that the allegations of Security Bank were insufficient to
warrant the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment.
 Security Bank's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on June 26,
2015.
 Hence, Security Bank filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the writ of preliminary
attachment issued by the trial court.

HELD:
 YES. The Supreme Court found merit in Security Bank's petition and reversed
and set aside the December 12, 2014 Decision and the June 26, 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment by the RTC, pursuant to its May 31, 2013 Order, was upheld.
 The Supreme Court explained that a writ of preliminary attachment is a
provisional remedy issued to prevent the defendant from disposing of property
that may be used to satisfy a judgment.
  Under Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, a writ of preliminary
attachment may be issued in an action against a party who has been guilty of
fraud in contracting the debt or in the performance thereof.
 The Court emphasized that fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from mere non-
payment of the debt but can be inferred from attendant circumstances.
 Security Bank's complaint and supporting documents, including the affidavit of
German Vincent Pulgar IV, detailed how respondents misled the bank by failing
to comply with trust receipt agreements, which required them to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of goods or return the goods if unsold.
 The Court found that Security Bank substantiated its allegations of fraud,
particularly the violation of the trust receipt agreements, which warranted the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment.
 The Court also noted that the CA erred in not considering fraud in the
performance of the obligation, as the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure included
this as a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
 The Court concluded that Security Bank's allegations and evidence were
sufficient to support the issuance of the writ, but clarified that this finding should
not affect the merits of the principal case.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the December 12, 2014 Decision and the June 26, 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131714
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in Civil Case
No. 13-570, pursuant to its May 31, 2013 Order, is upheld.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 4

BERNARDO VALDEVIESO, PETITIONER,

VS.
CANDELARIO DAMALERIO AND AUREA C. DAMALERIO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 133303 | FEBRUARY 17, 2005
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
 On December 5, 1995, Bernardo Valdevieso (petitioner) purchased a 10,000
square meter parcel of land located in Bo. Tambler, General Santos City, from
spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy. The property was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-30586. However, the deed of sale was not
registered, nor was the title transferred to Valdevieso.
 On December 7, 1995, Valdevieso declared the property for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 16205 with the City Assessor's Office.
 Subsequently, on April 19, 1996, spouses Candelario and Aurea Damalerio
(respondents) filed a complaint for a sum of money against the Uys with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No.
5748, and applied for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
 The trial court issued the writ on April 23, 1996, and the property, still under the
name of Lorenzo Uy, was levied.
 The levy was recorded in the Register of Deeds of General Santos City and
annotated on TCT No. T-30586. On June 6, 1996, TCT No. T-30586 was
canceled, and TCT No. T-74439 was issued in Valdevieso's name, carrying the
attachment in favor of the respondents.
 Valdevieso filed a third-party claim on August 14, 1996, to discharge the
attachment, arguing that the property no longer belonged to the Uys. The trial
court ruled in favor of Valdevieso on October 21, 1996, but the respondents'
appeal to the Court of Appeals resulted in a reversal of the trial court's decision
on September 25, 1997.
 The appellate court held that the registered writ of attachment took precedence
over the unregistered deed of sale.
 Valdevieso's motion for reconsideration was denied on February 10, 1998,
leading to this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a registered writ of attachment on the land is a superior lien over
an earlier unregistered deed of sale.

RULING:
 YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding
that the registered writ of attachment takes precedence over the earlier
unregistered deed of sale
 The Court's decision was based on Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
which states that the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned.
 The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference
over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the
 fact that the property involved was duly covered by the Torrens system which
works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act
which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land
 Although Valdevieso purchased the property on December 5, 1995, the
conveyance was not registered until June 6, 1996. During this period, the
property was subjected to a levy on attachment on April 23, 1996, while still
registered under the Uys' name.
 The Court emphasized that registration is the operative act that binds third
parties, and since the writ of attachment was registered before the deed of sale,
it took precedence.
 The Court also noted that an attachment is a proceeding in rem, creating a
specific lien on the attached property enforceable against the whole world. The
lien continues until the debt is paid or the attachment is discharged.
 The Court rejected Valdevieso's reliance on equity, stating that equity cannot
overrule positive provisions of law.
 The Court also found that the cases cited by Valdevieso, Manliguez v. Court of
Appeals and Santos v. Bayhon, were not applicable as they did not address the
issue of registered writs of attachment versus unregistered deeds of sale.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 43082 dated 25 September 1997, and its Resolution dated 10 February
1998, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 5

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER,

VS.
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 175587 | SEPTEMBER 21, 2007
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
 Petitioner filed against respondent a complaint for sum of money with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Said complaint alleged that
on September 10, 1997, respondent, a resident of Hong Kong, executed in
favor of petitioner a promissory note obligating himself to pay P249,828,588.90
plus interest. In view of the fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates which
resulted in the insufficiency of the deposits assigned by respondent as security
for the loan, petitioner requested the latter to put up additional security for the
loan.
 Respondent, however, sought a reconsideration of said request pointing out
petitioner's alleged mishandling of his account due to its failure to carry out his
instruction to close his account as early as April 1997, when the prevailing rate
of exchange of the US Dollar to Japanese yen was US$1.00:JPY127.50.
 It appears that the amount of P249,828,588.90 was the consolidated amount
of a series of yen loans granted by petitioner to respondent during the months
of February and April 1997.
 The trial court issued an order quashing the writ and holding that the withdrawal
of respondent's unassigned deposits was not intended to defraud petitioner. It
also found that the representatives of petitioner personally transacted with
respondent through his home address in Quezon City and/or his office in Makati
City.
 It thus concluded that petitioner misrepresented and suppressed the facts
regarding respondent's residence considering that it has personal and official
knowledge that for purposes of service of summons respondent's residence
and office addresses are located in the Philippines.
 The court granted the Urgent Motion to Quash.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on October 28,
1999.
 On petition with this Court, the case was dismissed for late filing in a minute
resolution
 (G.R. No. 140605) dated January 19, 2000, Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was likewise denied with finality.
 Respondent filed a claim for damages in the amount of P25 Million on the
attachment bond on account of the wrongful garnishment of his deposits.
 Respondent likewise presented witnesses to prove that he is a well-known
lawyer in the business community both in the Philippines and in Hong Kong.
 The trial court awarded damages to respondent in the amount of P25 Million
without specifying the basis thereof
 The trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
 Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings
of the trial court.
  The Court of Appeals, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded to
petitioner and specified their basis. Both parties moved for reconsideration.
 On November 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration but granted that of respondent's by ordering petitioner to pay
additional P5Million as exemplary damages.
 Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitioner bank is liable for damages for the improper
issuance of the writ of attachment against respondent.

HELD:
 YES. The SC rule in the affirmative.
 In actions in personam, such as the instant case for collection of sum of money,
summons must be served by personal or substituted service, otherwise the
court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.
 In case the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines (and
hence personal and substituted service cannot be effected), the remedy of the
plaintiff in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert
the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of
the defendant.
 The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication coupled with
the sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order
to the last known address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction but for compliance with the requirements of due process.
 However, where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of the
Philippines, attachment of his/her property in an action in personam, is not
always necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
 Section 15 which provides for extraterritorial service (a) personal service out of
the Philippines, (b) publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of
the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known address of the
defendant; or (c) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
 Thus, in actions in personam against residents temporarily out of the
Philippines, the court need not always attach the defendant's property in order
to have authority to try the case. .
 In the instant case, it must be stressed that the writ was issued by the trial court
mainly on the representation of petitioner that respondent is not a resident of
the Philippines. Obviously, the trial court's issuance of the writ was for the sole
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
 It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is a
resident temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ
of attachment because the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by
substituted service instead of attaching the property of the defendant.
 The Court upheld that Court of Appeals properly sustained the finding of the
trial court that petitioner is liable for damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ
of attachment against respondent.
 The dispute centers on a garnishment issue where Alejandro's bank deposits
were subjected to a writ of attachment.
 Alejandro sought damages for the anxiety and inconvenience caused by the
garnishment. Initially, the lower court awarded Alejandro nominal damages of
 P50,000.00, moral damages of P500,000.00, attorney's fees of P200,000.00,
and exemplary damages of P500,000.00.
 Dissatisfied with the amounts awarded, Alejandro filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the damages were insufficient given the
circumstances.
 He requested that nominal damages be increased to P2 million, moral damages
to P5 million, and attorney's fees to P1 million, citing his social and professional
standing and the nature of the case.
 Regarding nominal damages, the court explained that these are not intended
as indemnification for any loss suffered but are awarded to vindicate the
violation of a right. The court found that the amount of the bond posted did not
prove the actual sum garnished, and the two-month period during which
Alejandro was prevented from using his bank deposits was the appropriate
measure for determining nominal damages. Thus, the claim for P2 million was
deemed excessive and without basis.
 Lastly, the court held that the award of P500,000.00 in exemplary damages was
reasonable and sufficient to discourage PCIB from resorting to unfounded
assertions in securing writs of attachment. Exemplary damages are meant to
serve as a deterrent against socially deleterious actions, not to enrich one party
or impoverish another.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED

CASE NO. 6

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., PETITIONER,

VS.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 11, RTC-CEBU AND FRANCISCO
TESORERO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 111685 | AUGUST 20, 2001
PONENTE: DE LEON, JR., J.:

FACTS:
 Petitioner filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Cebu City against
private respondent Francisco Tesorero. Private respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The complaint was dismissed on that
ground.
 The tidal court ruled that as alleged in the complaint and which for purposes of
venue is considered, Banilad, Cebu City is the plaintiffs principal place of
business.
 However, in the said motion to dismiss, it is alleged and submitted that the
principal office of plaintiff is at 163-165 P. Reyes Street, Davao City as borne
out by the Contract of Lease (Annex 2 of the motion) and another Contract of
Lease of Generating Equipment (Annex 3 of the motion) executed by the
plaintiff with the NAPOCOR.
 The trial court opined that the principal office of plaintiff is in Davao City which
for purposes of venue is the residence of plaintiff.
 Petitioner’s MR was denied.
 Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari which was denied due course
and dismissed by the CA.
 Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition,
assailing the judgment of the CA.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether the proper venue for the complaint for damages is Cebu City or
Davao City.
 2. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from claiming Cebu City as its
principal place of business due to previous representations.

HELD:
 1. The Supreme Court ruled that the proper venue for the complaint for
damages is Cebu City.
 The Supreme Court distinguished between venue and jurisdiction, Venue and
jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by
consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute
may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the plaintiff
brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the
 defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a
valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or
agreement of the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their
alteration.
 The Court emphasized that the principal office of a corporation, as stated in its
articles of incorporation, determines its residence for venue purposes. The
Court found that the petitioner's principal office is in Cebu City, as per its
amended articles of incorporation and by-laws.

 2. NO. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is not estopped from claiming
Cebu City as its principal place of business.
 Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented before the
Court. He is a complete stranger to the covenants executed between petitioner
and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rather
flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the electric
generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. The
Court is likewise not persuaded by his argument that the allegation or
representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or answers it filed in
several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City should estop it from filing
the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Besides there is no showing that
private respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such
representation by petitioner.
 Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and directed
the RTC-Cebu to proceed with the case.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed

decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 11 is hereby directed to proceed with Civil Case No. CEB-
11578 with all deliberate dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs.
CASE NO. 7

PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC., PETITIONER,

VS.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, PRIMITIVA Y. PALMES, HONORATO BORBON, SR.,
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, PROVINCE OF CEBU, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. L-60887 | NOVEMBER 13, 1991
PONENTE: FELICIANO, J.

FACTS:
 The petitioner, Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. ("Perla"), sought to annul
several orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 3, under
Judge Jose R. Ramolete. These orders included one dated August 6, 1979,
which directed the Provincial Sheriff to garnish a third-party liability insurance
policy issued by Perla in favor of Nelia Enriquez, the judgment debtor in Civil
Case No. R-15391.
 The case stemmed from a vehicular accident on June 1, 1976, in Liloan, Cebu,
involving a Cimarron PUJ owned by Nelia Enriquez and driven by Cosme
Casas, which collided with a private jeep driven by Calixto Palmes, resulting in
Palmes' death and injuries to Adeudatus Borbon.
 Primitiva Palmes, the widow of Calixto, and Honorato Borbon, Sr., father of
Adeudatus, filed a complaint on June 25, 1976, seeking damages.
 The court ruled in favor of Primitiva Palmes on April 4, 1977, awarding various
damages.
 However, the judgment was not satisfied, leading to the garnishment of the
insurance policy.
 Perla contested the garnishment, arguing that it was not a party to the case and
that the court lacked jurisdiction over it.
 The trial court denied Perla's motion for reconsideration and issued an alias writ
of garnishment on April 8, 1980.
 Perla then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court
on June 25, 1982, alleging grave abuse of discretion by Judge Ramolete.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction to bind Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc. through the garnishment of the insurance policy without serving
it with summons or impleading it as a party to the case
 2. Whether or not a separate action is required to establish Perla's liability under
the third-party liability insurance

HELD:
 1. Yes, the trial court had jurisdiction to bind Perla through the garnishment of
the insurance policy without serving it with summons or impleading it as a party.
 The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction
on the part of Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment.
 The Court explained that garnishment is a valid method of reaching property or
credits belonging to a judgment debtor and that service of the writ of
garnishment on the garnishee (Perla) suffices to bind it to the court's orders.
  The Rules of Court do not require that the garnishee be served with summons
or impleaded as a party to the case. By serving the writ of garnishment, the
garnishee becomes a "virtual party" or "forced intervenor," and the court
acquires jurisdiction over it.

 2. No, a separate action was not required to establish Perla's liability under the
third-party liability insurance.
 The Court also noted that Perla did not deny the existence of the insurance
policy or set up any substantive defenses against the insured-judgment debtor.
Since Perla only contested the jurisdictional issue and did not raise any
substantive defenses, the Court held that a separate action was unnecessary.
 The Court emphasized that every interest the judgment debtor may have in
property, including insurance proceeds, can be subjected to execution.
 The garnishment of the insurance policy was thus valid, and Perla's contentions
were deemed waived by laches.
 Consequently, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was dismissed for
being filed out of time and for lack of merit, and the trial court's orders were
affirmed.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED

for having been filed out of time and for lack of merit. The assailed Orders of
the trial court are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. This Decision is
immediately executory
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 8

K.O. GLASS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., PETITIONER,

VS.
THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL, AND ANTONIO D. PINZON, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. L-48756 | SEPTEMBER 11, 1982
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, JR., J.

FACTS:
 The dispute arose when Pinzon filed a verified complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, seeking to recover P37,190.00, which he claimed was owed
for unpaid rentals of his truck and the value of spare parts that were not returned
following the termination of a lease agreement.
 Pinzon requested the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
defendants' properties, arguing that Kenneth O. Glass, being a foreigner, might
leave the Philippines to defraud his creditors and that there was insufficient
security for his claim.
 The trial court granted the issuance of the writ after Pinzon filed a bond.
 However, the defendants contested the writ, asserting that there was no valid
cause of action against Kenneth O. Glass since the transactions were
conducted with the corporation and not with him personally.
 Their motion to quash the writ was denied, and a subsequent counterbond they
filed to discharge the writ was also denied by the respondent judge.
 This led the defendants to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
challenging both the issuance of the writ and the refusal to release the
garnished amount.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment justified
given the circumstances of the case
 2. Whether or not the plaintiff, Antonio D. Pinzon, comply with the legal
requirements necessary for the issuance of the writ
 3. Whether or not the counterbond filed by the defendants should have led to
the discharge of the attachment

HELD:
 1. NO. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of K.O. Glass Construction Co., Inc.
and Kenneth O. Glass, granting the petition for certiorari.
 The Court annulled the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the respondent
judge, stating that it was not justified due to the lack of sufficient grounds.
 The Supreme Court's decision was anchored on several critical legal principles.
Firstly, the Court emphasized that for a writ of preliminary attachment to be
justified, there must be clear evidence that the defendant is about to leave the
Philippines with the intent to defraud creditors or that the defendant is a non-
resident alien. In this case, the Court found that Pinzon's affidavit merely
asserted that Kenneth O. Glass was a foreigner without adequately alleging
any intent to leave the country to defraud creditors.
  2. NO. Antonio D. Pinzon, did not comply with the legal requirements necessary
for the issuance of the writ
 The Court also held that the failure of Pinzon to meet the legal requirements for
the issuance of the writ rendered it fatally defective.
 The Court noted that the affidavit supporting the request for attachment failed
to comply with the requirements set forth in Section 3, Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which mandates that the affidavit must specify sufficient cause
of action, the grounds for attachment, and the absence of other security for the
claim. The absence of these essential elements rendered the writ invalid.

 3. YES. The Court ruled that the counterbond filed by the defendants should
have resulted in the discharge of the attachment, thereby ordering the release
of the garnished amount of P37,190.00 to the petitioner.
 The filing of the counter-bond will serve the purpose of preserving the
defendant's property and at the same time give the plaintiff security for any
judgment that may be obtained against the defendant.
 The Court highlighted that upon the filing of a counterbond by the defendants,
the trial court was obligated to discharge the attachment, as stipulated in
Section 12, Rule 57. The Court concluded that the issuance of the writ and the
subsequent denial of the discharge were acts of grave abuse of discretion by
the respondent judge.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the writ prayed for is issued. The
orders issued by the respondent Judge on October 11, 19719, January 26,
1978, and February 3, 1978 in Civil Case No. 5902-P of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, insofar as they relate to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, should be as they are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the
respondents are hereby ordered to forthwith release the garnished amount of
P37,190.00 to the petitioner. The temporary restraining order, heretofore
issued, is hereby lifted and set aside. Costs against the private respondent
Antonio D. Pinzon.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 9

XELPIDIO JAVELLANA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

VS.
D. O. PLAZA ENTERPRISES, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
RAMON A. GONZALES FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
HERMOSISIMA, MARAMARA AND SOL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
G.R. NO. L-28297 MARCH 30, 1970
PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J.

FACTS:
 The case involves a complaint filed by Elpidion Javellana against D. O. Plaza
Enterprises, Inc. for the collection of a sum of money owed.
 The complaint sought payment of P43,017.32, with legal interest and attorney's
fees. The plaintiff also requested a writ of preliminary attachment.
 The trial court issued a writ of attachment, but the defendant later moved to
discharge it, which was denied.
 The defendant then filed an answer and counterclaimed for damages arising
from the attachment.
 The plaintiff answered and interposed a counterclaim to the counterclaim.
 After several years, the defendant moved for the dissolution of the preliminary
attachment, which was granted.
 The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit an amended complaint, stating that the
defendant had paid P3,900.00, leaving a balance of P39,117.32 unpaid. The
amended complaint also requested an increase in the interest and attorney's
fees.
 The defendant did not answer the amended complaint. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P39,117.32 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of
the original complaint, plus 25% of the principal indebtedness as attorney's fees
and costs of suit.
 The court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim and counterclaim to the
counterclaim.
 The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by the
court.
 The court modified its previous decision by reducing the interest to legal interest
and the attorney's fees to P5,000.00. The court also ordered the plaintiff to pay
the defendant P16,190.00 as damages arising from the attachment.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the reduction of the attorney's fees and interest by the court was
erroneous.

HELD:
 The court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the decision insofar as it
reduced the amount of attorney's fees and interest. However, the court upheld
the grant of damages arising from the attachment.
 The court held that the original complaint, which alleged the higher interest and
attorney's fees, was not formally offered in evidence and therefore did not have
 the character of a judicial admission. The court also noted that the stipulation
for the higher interest and attorney's fees appeared on the invoices themselves,
so the defendant could not claim to have been deceived or misled. The court
further stated that the prayer for relief in the original complaint does not give
character to the cause of action, and the plaintiff is entitled to as much relief as
the facts warrant.
 However, the court upheld the grant of damages arising from the attachment.
The court found that although the defendant was in bad faith in issuing bouncing
checks, this bad faith was not related to the obligation owed to the plaintiff but
to the defendant's failure to perform said obligation. Therefore, the plaintiff was
not entitled to attach the defendant's properties on the ground of fraud. The
court held that the plaintiff's good faith in securing the attachment did not relieve
him from the damages suffered by the defendant.

DECISION:
 FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby reversed
insofar as it reduced the amount of attorney's fees and the interest on the
principal sum adjudged in the original decision dated 15 June 1967; but the
order is affirmed in all other respects.
CASE NO. 10

TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU), INC., PETITIONER

VS
MIS MARITIME CORPORATION, RESPONDENT
APRIL 4, 2018 | G.R. NO. 193572
PONENTE: JARDELEZA, J.:

FACTS:

 On March 22, 2006, MIS contracted Tsuneishi to dry dock and repair its vessel,
M/T MIS-1. The vessel dry docked at Tsuneishi's shipyard on March 23, 2006.
During an engine test conducted about a month later, the vessel's engine
emitted smoke due to a burnt crank journal and hairline cracks in the crankpin,
which Tsuneishi attributed to defective lubrication or deterioration.
 Despite Tsuneishi's insistence that the damage was not its fault, it paid for the
new engine crankshaft, crankpin, and main bearings as a goodwill gesture.
Tsuneishi billed MIS US$318,571.50 for the repair and dry docking services,
but MIS refused to pay, demanding instead that Tsuneishi compensate it
US$471,462.60 for lost income during the six months the vessel was non-
operational.
 MIS proposed setting off this claim against Tsuneishi's bill and demanded an
additional US$152,891.10. Tsuneishi rejected these demands and delivered
the vessel to MIS in September 2006.
 Despite signing an Agreement for Final Price on November 6, 2006, MIS still
refused to pay the billed amount.
 Tsuneishi also claimed that MIS caused another vessel, M/T White Cattleya,
owned by Cattleya Shipping Panama S.A., to stop its payment for services
rendered by Tsuneishi.
 On April 10, 2008, Tsuneishi filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, invoking admiralty jurisdiction to enforce a maritime lien
under Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and alleging MIS'
unjustified refusal to pay. Tsuneishi also sought a writ of preliminary
attachment, which the RTC granted without a hearing, leading to the
attachment of MIS' properties.
 MIS' motion to discharge the attachment was denied by the RTC, prompting
MIS to file a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
 The CA reversed the RTC's orders, finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment.
 Tsuneishi then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, challenging the CA's decision.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not a maritime lien under Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree
may be enforced through a writ of preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court.
 2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Tsuneishi failed to comply with the
requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
HELD:
 1. NO. A maritime lien under Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree may not
be enforced through a writ of preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court.
 The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's decision, which
annulled and set aside the RTC's orders.
 The Supreme Court clarified the legal concepts of lien, maritime lien, and the
provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. A lien is a legal claim on property
as collateral for a debt, and a maritime lien under Section 21 of the Ship
Mortgage Decree provides security for those furnishing repairs or other
necessaries to a vessel. A writ of preliminary attachment, on the other hand, is
a provisional remedy to secure a contingent lien on a debtor's property. The
Court held that a maritime lien is already equivalent to an attachment, and thus,
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment to enforce a maritime lien is
superfluous. The Court found that Tsuneishi's argument was based on a
misunderstanding of these concepts.

 2. YES. The CA correctly ruled that Tsuneishi failed to comply with the
requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

 The Court also agreed with the CA's findings that Tsuneishi failed to comply
with the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
 The Bitera Affidavit did not state that MIS had no other sufficient security for the
claim, a requirement under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Additionally, the Court found no evidence of fraud in MIS' refusal to pay, as
required for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Rule 57.
 The Court emphasized that fraud must be alleged with particularity and cannot
be presumed from a mere failure to pay. The Court concluded that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment
without the necessary requisites, and thus, the CA was correct in annulling the
RTC's orders.

DECISION:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated October 7, 2009 and its Resolution dated August
26, 2010 are AFFIRMED.
CASE NO. 11

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, INC. PETITIONER,

VS.
SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, AND AUGUSTO L. PARDO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 175350 | JUNE 13, 2012
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
 The case revolves around three crossed checks issued by International Copra
Export Corporation (Interco) to SSPI in 1991 as payment for welding electrodes.
These checks, each marked "account payee only," were fraudulently deposited
by Jose Isidoro Uy, an Interco employee and son-in-law of its majority
stockholder, into his personal accounts at Equitable.
 Uy claimed he had good title to the checks, and Equitable, relying on Uy's oral
representations and his close relationship with Interco, allowed the deposits
without verifying his authority.
 SSPI did not receive the checks and only discovered the fraud after demanding
payment from Interco, which had already issued the checks. SSPI and Pardo
filed a complaint for damages against Uy and Equitable, alleging gross
negligence and fraud.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City ruled in favor of SSPI, awarding
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
 Equitable's appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) was denied, leading to the
present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
 1. Does SSPI have a cause of action against Equitable for quasi-delict?
 2. Can SSPI recover, as actual damages, the stipulated 36% per annum interest
from Equitable?
 3. Can speculative fears and imagined scenarios, which cause sleepless nights,
be the basis for the award of moral damages?
 4. Was the attachment of Equitable's personal properties wrongful?

HELD:
 1. Yes, SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable for quasi-delict.
 The Supreme Court affirmed that SSPI's cause of action against Equitable is
based on quasi-delict, not on the checks themselves. The court emphasized
that a crossed check with the notation "account payee only" creates a
reasonable expectation that only the named payee would receive the proceeds.

 2. No, SSPI cannot recover the stipulated 36% per annum interest from
Equitable as actual damages.
 Equitable's failure to verify Uy's authority to deposit the checks constituted
gross negligence. The court rejected SSPI's claim for the stipulated 36% per
annum interest, noting that such interest was not applicable as Interco was not
in delay due to the defendants' actions. Instead, SSPI was entitled to legal
interest at 6% per annum for the period it was deprived of the money.

 3. Yes, speculative fears and imagined scenarios can be the basis for the award
of moral damages, but the amount awarded was reduced.
  The court also found that Pardo's fears and anxieties, although speculative,
were a result of the defendants' actions and warranted moral damages, but
reduced the amount from P3 million to P50,000. The court allowed Equitable's
cross-claim against Uy, recognizing that Uy was unjustly enriched at Equitable's
expense.

 4. Yes, the attachment of Equitable's personal properties was wrongful.

 The court ruled that the preliminary attachment of Equitable's properties was
wrongful, as SSPI's allegations of fraud were not sufficiently specific, and
awarded Equitable actual damages for the wrongful attachment.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The assailed October 13, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62425 is MODIFIED by:

1. REDUCING the award of actual damages to respondents to the rate of 6%

per annum of the value of the three checks from July 1991 to June 1993 or a
period of twenty-three months;

2. REDUCING the award of moral damages in favor of Augusto L. Pardo from

₱3,000,000.00 to ₱ 50,000.00; and

3. REVERSING the dismissal of Equitable Banking Corporation’s cross-claim

against Jose Isidoro Uy, alias Jolly Uy. Jolly Uy is hereby ORDERED to
REIMBURSE Equitable Banking Corporation the amounts that the latter will pay
to respondents.

Additionally, the Court hereby REVERSES the dismissal of Equitable Banking

Corporation’s counterclaim for damages against Special Steel Products, Inc.
This Court ORDERS Special Steel Products, Inc. to PAY Equitable Banking
Corporation actual damages in the total amount of ₱30,204.36, for the wrongful
preliminary attachment of its properties.

The rest of the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 12

SPOUSES JULIETA SALGADO AND JOSE SALGADO, PETITIONERS, V. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
BANK, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 55381 | MARCH 26, 1984
PONENTE: ESCOLIN, J.

FACTS:
 The dispute originated from a complaint filed by the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (the Bank) on May 8, 1978, in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, where the Bank sought to recover the amount of P1,510,905.96 from the
Salgados based on a promissory note.
 The Bank alleged that the Salgados had fraudulently misappropriated sugar
proceeds that were provided as collateral for the loan and claimed that the
Salgados were either concealing or disposing of properties mortgaged to the
Bank. The Bank's verified complaint included an affidavit asserting that there
was no sufficient security for the claim.
 On May 9, 1978, the trial court granted the Bank's request for a writ of
attachment, leading to the seizure of several parcels of land owned by the
Salgados.
 In response, the Salgados filed a motion to quash the writ, arguing that the
Bank had made fraudulent misrepresentations by omitting the term "REM"
(Real Estate Mortgage) from the promissory note, thereby implying that the debt
was unsecured.
 The trial court initially lifted the writ of attachment on January 31, 1979;
however, the Bank appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the trial court's ruling on September 18, 1980.
 This prompted the Salgados to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of attachment against the petitioners'
property justified given that their debt was secured by valid real estate
mortgages
 2. Whether or not the Bank commit fraudulent misrepresentation in its
application for the writ of attachment
 3. Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals authorizing the writ of
attachment be set aside

HELD:
 NO. The issuance of the writ of attachment against the petitioners' property is
not justified given that their debt was secured by valid real estate mortgages
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, Salgado, and set aside the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 18, 1980, which had
authorized the issuance of the writ of attachment. The Court determined that
the debt in question was fully secured by real estate mortgages, thereby
concluding that the grounds for the attachment were not satisfied.
  The Supreme Court explained that the primary objective of a writ of attachment
is to secure a contingent lien on a defendant's property pending the resolution
of a judgment. According to Section 3 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, an order
of attachment can only be granted if it is demonstrated that there is no other
sufficient security for the claim being enforced. The Court emphasized that
since the Salgados' debt was already secured by valid real estate mortgages,
the Bank's claim of insufficient security was unfounded.

 2. YES. The Bank committed fraudulent misrepresentation in its application for

the writ of attachment
 The Court also noted that the Bank's affidavit, which asserted the absence of
sufficient security, was misleading and provided grounds for discharging the
attachment.

 3. YES. The resolution of the Court of Appeals authorizing the writ of attachment
must be set aside

 Furthermore, the Court reinforced the principle that the issuance of attachment
should be strictly interpreted in favor of the defendant, as it is a severe remedy
that can lead to significant prejudice. Since attachment is a harsh and rigorous
remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance, the rule
authorizing its issuance must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. It
should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is the duty of the
court before issuing the writ to ensure that all the requisites of the law has been
complied with.

DECISION:

 Accordingly, the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals, now the

Intermediate Appellate Court, dated September 18, 1980, is hereby set aside.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 13

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

VS.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 158271 | APRIL 8, 2008
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
 On July 24, 1996, China Banking Corporation (China Bank) granted Asian
Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) an Omnibus Credit Line
amounting to PHP 90,000,000. On April 12, 1999, China Bank filed a complaint
for recovery of a sum of money and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-796.
 China Bank alleged that ACDC failed to comply with its obligations under the
Omnibus Credit Line and misappropriated funds that were supposed to be held
in trust for China Bank under several Deeds of Assignment.
 On April 22, 1999, the RTC granted China Bank's prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment, leading to the levy of ACDC's personal properties, including
vehicles, machinery, and office equipment.
 On March 27, 2000, the RTC issued a Summary Judgment in favor of China
Bank, which ACDC appealed. Subsequently, China Bank filed a motion to take
custody of the attached properties for the purpose of selling them in an auction,
which ACDC opposed.
 The RTC's decision was partially appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
denied China Bank's motion to sell the attached properties in resolutions dated
October 14, 2002, and May 16, 2003.
 The CA held that selling the attached properties before a final judgment was
premature and contrary to the intent of preliminary attachment.
 China Bank's motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to the present
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying China Bank's motion
to sell the attached properties before a final judgment.
 2. Whether or not the attached properties are considered "perishable" under
Section 11, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
 1. NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying China Bank's motion to sell
the attached properties before a final judgment.
 The Supreme Court held that the proper remedy for interlocutory orders, such
as the CA's resolutions, should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. However, the Court
opted to treat the petition as one under Rule 65. The Court found no grave
abuse of discretion by the CA in denying the motion to sell the attached
properties. Under Section 11, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, an attached
property may be sold before the entry of judgment if it is perishable or if the
interests of all parties will be subserved by the sale.
  The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated October 14, 2002, and May 16, 2003.

 2. NO. The attached properties are not considered "perishable" under Section
11, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
 The CA determined that the attached properties were not perishable and that
their sale would not serve the interests of all parties. The Supreme Court
agreed, noting that the determination of whether the properties were perishable
or whether their sale would benefit all parties required factual examination,
which is beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari.
 The Court also emphasized that the bond posted by China Bank only covers
damages sustained by ACDC due to wrongful attachment, not damages from
the sale of attached properties before final judgment.
 The Court concluded that the issue of whether the sale of attached properties
is for the convenience of the parties and the preservation of the property is a
factual matter that cannot be resolved in a certiorari proceeding.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court

of Appeals dated October 14, 2002 and May 16, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 72175
are hereby AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 14

ANITA MANGILA, PETITIONER,

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETA GUINA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Anita Mangila, an exporter of seafoods operating under the name
Seafoods Products, engaged the freight forwarding services of private
respondent Loreta Guina, President and General Manager of Air Swift
International, a sole proprietorship.
 The agreement stipulated cash on delivery payments for shipments to Guam,
USA, with an 18% annual interest on overdue accounts and 25% attorney's
fees plus costs of suit in case of litigation.
 Mangila failed to pay for three shipments in March 1988, totaling P109,376.95.
Despite several demands, Mangila did not settle the debt, prompting Guina to
file a collection suit (Civil Case No. 5875) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City on June 10, 1988.
 The sheriff's attempts to serve summons on Mangila were unsuccessful as she
had moved to Pampanga and then left for Guam.
 Guina filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment, which the trial court granted,
issuing a writ on September 27, 1988.
 The writ was implemented on October 28, 1988, but summons was only served
on January 26, 1989.
 Mangila filed motions to discharge the attachment and to dismiss the complaint
for improper venue, both of which were denied by the trial court.
 The trial court declared Mangila in default for failing to appear at the pre-trial
and allowed Guina to present evidence ex-parte, resulting in a decision ordering
Mangila to pay the claimed amount plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, leading to Mangila's
petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the writ of attachment was improperly issued and served.
 2. Whether or not there was a valid declaration of default.
 3. Whether or not the venue was improperly laid.
 4. Whether the petitioner is obliged to pay P109,376.95 plus attorney's fees.

HELD:
 1. YES. The writ of attachment was improperly issued and served.
 The Supreme Court held that the writ of attachment was improperly issued and
served because the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over Mangila's
person before or simultaneously with the writ's implementation.
 The Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the defendant must be obtained
before enforcing a coercive process like a writ of attachment. The alias
summons served months after the writ's implementation did not cure this defect.
 Regarding the venue, the Court found that the case should have been filed
either in San Fernando, Pampanga (Mangila's residence) or Parañaque
(Guina's residence), not in Pasay City where Guina's business was located.
 The Court noted that a sole proprietorship does not have a separate juridical
personality to file a suit, and thus, the residence of the proprietor should
determine the proper venue.

 2. NO. There was no valid declaration of default.

 3. YES. The venue was improperly laid.
 4. NO. The petitioner is not obliged to pay P109,376.95 plus attorney's fees due
to the improper venue and invalid service of the writ of attachment.
 The Court dismissed the case on the grounds of improper venue and invalid
service of the writ of attachment, ordering the return of the attached properties
to Mangila.

DECISION:

 We find no reason to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED on the grounds of improper venue
and invalidity of the service of the writ of attachment. The decision of the Court
of Appeals and the order of respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 5875 is hereby dismissed
without prejudice to refiling it in the proper venue. The attached properties of
petitioner are ordered returned to her immediately.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 15

BAC MANUFACTURING AND SALES CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND WYNNER GARMENTS MANUFACTURING,
INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 96784 | AUGUST 2, 1991
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
 The complaint was filed on October 9, 1986, in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (Branch 145), National Capital Judicial Region. The complaint sought
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
 However, the summons and a copy of the complaint were not served on Wyner
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. On August 11, 1987, the trial court ordered BAC
Manufacturing and Sales Corporation to take the necessary steps to actively
prosecute the case.
 BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation filed a request for an alias
summons, which was issued on September 10, 1987.
 On December 7, 1987, a levy on attachment was made on the machineries of
Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc. by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court.
However, the alias summons, the order granting the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment, and the writ of attachment itself were not served on
Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc.
 On February 16, 1988, Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc. filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the attachment, citing failure to prosecute
for an unreasonable length of time and lack of service of summons.
 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered Wyner Garments
Manufacturing, Inc. to file its answer. Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc. filed
an answer with counterclaim on June 6, 1988.
 The trial court set the pre-trial of the case on July 25, 1988. However, Wyner
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to annul
the orders of the trial court.
 The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc.,
declaring the orders of the trial court null and void, dismissing the complaint,
dissolving the writ of attachment, and ordering the return of the attached
machineries to BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation.
 BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
 BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation then filed a petition for review with
the Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over
Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc. through its voluntary appearance and that
it had diligently tried to serve the summons.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Wyner Garments
Manufacturing, Inc. through its voluntary appearance.
 2. Whether or not the trial court diligently tried to serve the summons on Wyner
Garments Manufacturing, Inc.

HELD:
  1. NO. the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Wyner Garments
Manufacturing, Inc. through its voluntary appearance.
 The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling in favor
of Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc. The Court declared that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc. due to the
failure to serve summons and a copy of the complaint.
 The Court also agreed with the Court of Appeals that the complaint should be
dismissed for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time.
 The implementation of the writ of attachment against the property of Wyner
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. was also declared null and void.

 2. NO. The trial court did not diligently try to serve the summons on Wyner
Garments Manufacturing, Inc.
 The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the duty of the plaintiff to ensure that
the summons is served on the defendant. The plaintiff should not rely on the
defendant or its counsel to provide the necessary information for service of
summons.
 In this case, BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation failed to serve the
summons and a copy of the complaint on Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc.
despite the lapse of a significant amount of time.
 The Court ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering Wyner Garments Manufacturing, Inc. to file its answer without validly
acquiring jurisdiction over its person.
 Therefore, the trial court's orders were declared null and void, and the complaint
was dismissed.
 The writ of attachment was also deemed invalid, and the attached machineries
were ordered to be returned to BAC Manufacturing and Sales Corporation.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit with costs
against petitioner.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 16

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

VS.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA (IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH XI) AND ERNESTO SALAZAR, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. L-50378 | SEPTEMBER 30, 1982
PONENTE: GUERRERO, J.

FACTS:
 This case was initiated on August 2, 1977, in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XI, under the jurisdiction of Judge Benjamin Relova.
 Salazar had executed a promissory note and a deed of chattel mortgage in
favor of RALLYE for a motor vehicle, which RALLYE subsequently assigned to
FILINVEST.
 FILINVEST alleged that both Salazar and RALLYE committed fraud by not
disclosing that the motor vehicle was never delivered to Salazar. Salazar
contended that he was defrauded by RALLYE, which had since disappeared
and could not be located.
 Initially, the presiding judge granted FILINVEST's ex-parte motion for a writ of
attachment against Salazar's property.
 However, over a year later, Judge Relova dissolved the writ, concluding that
there was no fraud on Salazar's part.
 Consequently, FILINVEST filed a special civil action for certiorari, seeking to
annul Judge Relova's orders.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued ex-
parte without notice and hearing
 2. Whether or not respondent Salazar committed fraud justifying the issuance
of the writ of attachment
 3. Whether or not the dissolution of the writ of preliminary attachment by Judge
Relova proper

HELD:
 1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ of preliminary attachment can
be issued ex-parte without notice and hearing.
 The Supreme Court clarified that under the Rules of Court, notice and hearing
are not mandatory for the issuance of a writ of attachment. The Court cited the
case of Blue Green Waters, Inc. v. Hon. Sundiam and Tan, explaining that a writ
of attachment may be issued ex-parte based on an affidavit and bond filed by
the applicant.

 2. YES. The Court found that Salazar committed fraud by failing to disclose the
non-delivery of the motor vehicle.
 The Court held that Salazar's failure to disclose the non-delivery of the motor
vehicle constituted fraud. According to Article 1339 of the New Civil Code, the
failure to disclose material facts when there is a duty to do so is considered
fraud. Salazar's actions, including signing the promissory note and chattel
 mortgage, knowing that the vehicle was not delivered, and consenting to the
assignment of these documents to FILINVEST, were fraudulent. The Court
emphasized that fraud is never presumed and must be proven by the party
alleging it.

 3. NO. The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the orders of Judge Relova,
reinstating the writ of preliminary attachment.
 The Supreme Court found that Judge Relova committed grave abuse of
discretion in dissolving the writ of preliminary attachment. The Court noted that
Salazar's claim of non-delivery of the vehicle made the promissory note and
chattel mortgage fraudulent, and therefore, the writ of attachment was justified.
The Court also pointed out that a hearing must be conducted to determine the
defect in the issuance of the attachment, and the burden of proof lies on the
party making the affirmative allegations.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed Orders of the

lower court dated February 2, 1979 and April 4, 1979 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by Us on July 23, 1979
is hereby made permanent. No costs.
 Petition granted.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 17

JUNE 30, 1987 | G.R. NO. 71917

BELISLE INVESTMENT & FINANCE CO., INC. AND SMITH, BELL & CO.,
INC., PETITIONERS,
VS.
STATE IN INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., THE INTERMEDIATE APPRECIATE
APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION) RESPONDENTS,
PONENTE: PARAS, J.

FACTS:
 The petitioners, Belisle Investment & Finance Co., Inc. (FINANCE) and Smith,
Bell & Co., Inc. (Smith, Bell), sought to reverse the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated April 30, 1985. The appellate
court had denied due course to their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, which
was filed without a certified copy of the order being assailed but referred to an
ex-parte order issued by the lower court to attach petitioners' properties.
 In November 1982 and May 1983, State Investment House, Inc. (HOUSE) and
FINANCE executed agreements where HOUSE agreed to extend financial
assistance to FINANCE. In return, FINANCE executed promissory notes to
evidence its indebtedness.
 Smith, Bell, owning 93% of FINANCE's outstanding stock, guaranteed the
payment of these debts through Comprehensive Surety Agreements.
 Despite these agreements, FINANCE failed to pay its obligations to HOUSE on
May 27 and August 27, 1984, with the outstanding debt amounting to
P6,838,358.00 as of October 10, 1984.
 On December 6, 1984, HOUSE filed a complaint with preliminary attachment
against FINANCE and Smith, Bell in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
 On January 23, 1985, the respondent Judge issued an order for a writ of
preliminary attachment against the properties of the defendants. The writ was
enforced on January 29, 1985, and properties were levied on January 31, 1985.
 Petitioners filed a motion to discharge the attachment and posted a
counterbond, but before the lower court could resolve this motion, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme
Court, which was referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
 The appellate court denied the petition and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in its decision by failing
to timely restrain the enforcement of a writ of attachment pending the approval
of a sufficient counterbond, resulting in an excessive levy
 2. Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings

HELD:

 1. NO. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals correctly denied due
course to the petition. The main issue raised by the petitioners was the alleged
failure of the Intermediate Appellate Court to rule on the lower court's inaction
 to timely resolve the petitioners' motion for a temporary restraining order
pending the resolution of their motion to discharge the writ of preliminary
attachment. The Court clarified that the grant or denial of an injunction rests
upon the sound discretion of the court, and appellate courts will not interfere
except in clear cases of abuse.
 The Court noted that the Rules of Court do not make notice and hearing
indispensable and mandatory requisites in the issuance of a writ of attachment.
Furthermore, the mere posting of a counterbond does not automatically
discharge the writ of attachment. It is only after a hearing and a judge's order
that the writ can be discharged. The petitioners' filing of the petition for certiorari
was deemed premature as the lower court had not yet resolved the motion to
discharge the attachment.

 2. YES. The Supreme Court emphasized that issues which lower courts are
bound to decide should not be summarily taken from them without giving them
the opportunity to dispose of the same with due deliberation. The lower court
was deemed the proper forum to address whether the attachment should be
discharged and whether the respondents should be restrained from enforcing
the attachment order.
 The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals. The case was remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits
and the determination of all pending incidents.

DECISION:

 PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, and (b) this case is
REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits and for the determination
of all pending incidents.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 18

G.R. NO. 107303 FEBRUARY 21, 1994

EMMANUEL C. OÑATE AND ECON HOLDINGS CORPORATION, PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. ZUES C. ABROGAR, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 150 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, AND SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
OF CANADA, RESPONDENTS.
PONENTE: NOCON, J.

FACTS:
 The dispute arose from a transaction where Oñate, in his personal capacity and
as president of Econ, offered to sell treasury bills worth PHP 46,990,000 to Sun
Life at a discounted price of PHP 39,526,500.82.
 Sun Life paid the amount on November 27, 1991, but instead of receiving the
treasury bills, they were given a promissory note by Brunner and its president,
Noel L. Dio, indicating the transaction was a money placement.
 Sun Life filed a complaint, and a writ of attachment was issued against the
properties of the petitioners before the summons and complaint were served.
The attachment included notices of garnishment on various banks and levies
on properties.
 The petitioners argued that the attachment was void as it was done before the
court acquired jurisdiction over them.
 The lower court initially ruled that the subsequent service of summons cured
the invalidity of the attachment, leading to the petitioners seeking
reconsideration.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the attachment of the petitioners' properties before the court
acquired jurisdiction over them valid
 2. Whether or not the examination of the petitioners' bank records justified

HELD:
 1. NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the attachment of the petitioners'
properties before the court acquired jurisdiction over them was void and that
the subsequent service of summons did not cure this invalidity.
 The Court held that while a writ of preliminary attachment can be issued before
the defendant is summoned, it cannot be implemented until the court has
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. This principle ensures that the
defendant is aware of the proceedings and can protect their interests. The Court
cited previous rulings, including Davao Light & Power Co. v. Court of Appeals
and Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, to support this position. The Court
emphasized that the Rules of Court do not require the issuance of the writ to
be kept secret until enforcement, and the defendant has the right to move to
discharge the attachment even before any property is levied upon.

 2. NO. The examination of the petitioners' bank records was deemed invalid as
it was connected to the void attachment.
 The examination of the petitioners' bank records was also invalidated as it was
based on the void attachment. The Court ordered the issuance of an alias writ
of attachment and directed the sheriff to lift the original levy and simultaneously
 levy under the new writ, ensuring no intervening period between the two
actions. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to procedural
rules to uphold the rule of law.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary

restraining order issued on June 28, 1993 is hereby lifted.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 19

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PETITIONER,

VS.
YLLAS LENDING CORPORATION AND JOSE S. LAURAYA, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 158997 | OCTOBER 6, 2008
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

 On April 24, 1998, Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation (FBDC) executed

a lease contract with Tirreno, Inc. (Tirreno) for a unit at the Entertainment Center
Phase 1 of Bonifacio Global City in Taguig, Metro Manila. The lease was
notarized on the same day, and Tirreno used the premises for Savoia Ristorante
and La Strega Bar. The lease contract included two pertinent provisions:
Section 20, which detailed the consequences of default by the lessee, and
Section 22, which established a lien on the lessee's properties.
 Tirreno began defaulting on lease payments in 1999, accumulating arrears of
P5,027,337.91 by July 2000.
 Despite a settlement agreement on August 8, 2000, FBDC terminated the lease
on September 19, 2000, and took possession of the premises on September
29, 2000, appropriating Tirreno's equipment and properties as partial payment
for the outstanding obligations.
 Tirreno filed actions for forcible entry and specific performance, but the latter
was dismissed for forum-shopping.
 On March 4, 2002, Yllas Lending Corporation and its President, Jose S.
Lauraya, caused the sheriff of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City to serve an alias writ of seizure against FBDC.
 FBDC discovered that respondents had filed a complaint for Foreclosure of
Chattel Mortgage with Replevin against Tirreno and its officers, alleging a loan
of P1.5 million secured by a Deed of Chattel Mortgage on Tirreno's properties.
 Despite FBDC's affidavit of title and third-party claim, the sheriff seized and
delivered certain items to respondents without an indemnity bond.
 FBDC's third-party claim and motion to intervene were dismissed by the trial
court, which ruled that Section 22 of the lease contract was void under Article
2088 of the Civil Code for being a pactum commissorium.
 FBDC filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing FBDC's third-party claim by
interpreting Section 22 of the lease contract as void for being a pledge and a
pactum commissorium
 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying FBDC's motion to intervene,
suggesting that FBDC should file a separate action instead
 3. Whether or not FBDC was deprived of its properties without due process
when the trial court dismissed its third-party claim, denied its intervention, and
did not require an indemnity bond for its protection

HELD:
  1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing FBDC's
third-party claim, holding that Section 22 of the lease contract was not a pactum
commissorium but a valid forfeiture clause.
 The Supreme Court found that Section 22 of the lease contract did not
constitute a pactum commissorium, as it did not meet all the requisites of a
pledge under Articles 2085 and 2093 of the Civil Code. Specifically, the fourth
requisite—that the thing pledged is placed in the possession of the creditor—
was absent. Instead, Section 22 was a valid forfeiture clause, allowing FBDC
to retain possession of Tirreno's properties to offset unpaid rentals and charges.
The Court upheld the validity of such clauses, citing precedents that allow for
the termination of lease contracts and forfeiture of deposits or properties without
judicial intervention.

 2. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in denying FBDC's
motion to intervene, allowing FBDC to intervene in the foreclosure case.
 Regarding the intervention, the Court distinguished the present case from
Bayer Phils. v. Agana, noting that FBDC filed its claim during the trial, not during
execution. Under Section 14 of Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
third-party claimant may intervene in a replevin action if they have a legal
interest in the matter. FBDC's intervention was justified as it had a legal interest
in the properties seized by the sheriff and was adversely affected by their
disposition.

 3. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that FBDC was deprived of its properties
without due process, holding the sheriff liable for damages due to the lack of an
indemnity bond.
 The Court held that the sheriff's failure to require an indemnity bond violated
Section 14 of Rule 57, which mandates such a bond to indemnify the sheriff
against claims by third parties. The absence of the bond allowed FBDC to hold
the sheriff liable for damages resulting from the seizure and delivery of the
properties.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Orders dated 7

March 2003 and 3 July 2003 of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City in Civil Case No. 01-1452 dismissing Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation's Third Party Claim and denying Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation's Motion to Intervene and Admit Complaint in Intervention.
We REINSTATE Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation's Third Party Claim
and GRANT its Motion to Intervene and Admit Complaint in Intervention. Fort
Bonifacio Development Corporation may hold the Sheriff liable for the seizure
and delivery of the properties subject of this case because of the lack of an
indemnity bond.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 20

ALFREDO CHING, PETITIONER,

VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO
ASEDILLO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. L-59731 | JANUARY 11, 1990
PONENTE: PARAS, J.

FACTS:
 In August 1960, a portion of the property was transferred to Francisco, Regina,
Perfecta, Constancio, and Matilde Nofuente. By September 1961, the property
was sold to Ching Leng, and a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 91137
was issued in his name.
 Ching Leng passed away in October 1965, and his son Alfredo Ching was
appointed as the administrator of his estate in December 1965.
 Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, Pedro Asedillo filed a suit for
reconveyance and cancellation of TCT No. 91137 in December 1978, claiming
possession of the property.
 The trial court ordered summons by publication, and when no response was
received, it rendered a default judgment in favor of Asedillo in June 1979.
 The decision was also served by publication, and the title was transferred to
Asedillo, who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development,
Inc. Alfredo Ching learned of the decision in October 1979 and filed a petition
to set it aside.
 Initially, the petition was granted but later reconsidered and denied by the trial
court.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, leading to the present
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not a deceased person and/or his estate can be validly served
with summons and decision by publication
 2. Whether or not an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is an
action in personam, and if so, would a deceased person and/or his estate be
bound by service of summons and decision by publication
 3. Whether or not proceedings for reconveyance and cancellation of title can
be held ex-parte
 4. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties
 5. Is the private respondent guilty of laches in instituting the action for
reconveyance after the lapse of 19 years from the time the decree of
registration was issued?

HELD:
 1. NO. A deceased person and/or his estate cannot be validly served with
summons and decision by publication.
 The Supreme Court ruled that an action to recover title to or possession of real
property is an action in personam, which necessitates jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. Given that the action was initiated 13 years after Ching
 Leng's death, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over him or his estate.
The court underscored that a deceased person cannot be validly served with
summons, as his juridical personality ceases upon death. The estate can only
be sued through an executor or administrator, and the misleading statements
by the private respondent regarding Ching Leng's residency and the ongoing
intestate proceedings demonstrated a lack of candor.

 2. YES. An action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is an action in

personam, and a deceased person and/or his estate cannot be bound by
service of summons and decision by publication.

 3. NO. Proceedings for reconveyance and cancellation of title cannot be held

ex-parte.

 4. NO. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.

 5. YES. The private respondent is guilty of laches in instituting the action for
reconveyance after the lapse of 19 years from the time the decree of
registration was issued.
 Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized that the complaint for cancellation
of Ching Leng's Torrens Title should have been filed in the original land
registration case, not in a separate civil case. The court also pointed out that
the private respondent's failure to assert any rights over the disputed land for
19 years constituted laches, which is a ground for dismissing the action. The
Torrens system aims to quiet title to land and provide conclusive evidence of
ownership, and the private respondent's delay in asserting his claim
undermined this purpose.
 In conclusion, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals, declared the trial court's decision and order
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and dismissed the complaint in Civil Case
No. 6888-P.

DECISION:
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2)
the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated
September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID
for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby
DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 21

PEROXIDE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, EASTMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES,

INC., EDMUNDO O. MAPUA AND ROSE U. MAPUA, PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE,
ISLANDS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 92813 | JULY 31, 1991
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.

FACTS:
 On December 6, 1982, the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) initiated a
lawsuit against Peroxide Philippines Corporation (Peroxide), Eastman
Chemical Industries, Inc. (Eastman), and the spouses Edmund O. Mapua and
Rose U. Mapua (Mapuas) in the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila
(Civil Case No. 48849).
 The case sought to collect an indebtedness owed by Peroxide, for which
Eastman and the Mapuas were solidarily liable.
 On January 7, 1983, the trial court, presided over by Judge Gregorio G. Pineda,
issued a writ of preliminary attachment after BPI posted an attachment bond of
P32,700,000.00.
 Eastman and the Mapuas moved to lift the attachment, which Judge Pineda
initially denied but later granted without a hearing. This led BPI to file a motion
for reconsideration.
 The case was subsequently re-raffled to Judge Pastor Reyes, who found the
attachment proper due to the fraudulent disposal of properties by Eastman and
the Mapuas.
 Later, Judge Eficio B. Acosta ordered the immediate execution of the writ, which
the petitioners challenged in the Intermediate Appellate Court (AC-G.R. SP No.
05043).
 The appellate court dismissed the petition, and the Supreme Court denied the
petition for review (G.R. No. 74558).
 Despite these rulings, Judge Acosta issued an ex parte order suspending the
writ, which was later declared void by Judge Fernando L. Gerona, Jr., who
reinstated the attachment.
 The case was re-raffled to Judge Jainal D. Rasul, who issued an order on
August 23, 1988, lifting the attachment and declaring the release of cash
dividends valid.
 BPI then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No.
15672), which ruled in favor of BPI, declaring the attachment valid and
enforceable.
 The petitioners subsequently sought review by the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of
Eastman and the Mapuas valid and enforceable
 2. Whether or not the cash dividends on the garnished shares of stock subject
to attachment
 3. Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in its orders
lifting and suspending the attachment
HELD:
 1. YES. The writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of Eastman
and the Mapuas was valid and enforceable.
 The Supreme Court upheld the validity and enforceability of the writ of
preliminary attachment, emphasizing that the orders lifting and suspending the
attachment were void for lack of due process. The Court noted that when an
attachment is challenged for improper issuance, a hearing is required, and the
attaching creditor must be given an opportunity to present evidence. The ex
parte orders issued by Judge Pineda and Judge Acosta violated this
requirement, rendering them null and void.

 2. YES. The cash dividends on the garnished shares of stock were subject to
attachment.
 The Court also affirmed that the attachment of shares of stock includes the
dividends declared thereon, as dividends are incidents or fruits of the shares.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the writ of preliminary attachment
remained valid and enforceable, and the cash dividends on the garnished
shares were subject to attachment.

 3. YES. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in its orders lifting
and suspending the attachment.
 The Supreme Court further clarified that the trial court's orders were tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, as they were arbitrary and oppressive, and not
merely errors of judgment. The Court emphasized that a writ of preliminary
attachment is a provisional remedy ancillary to the main action and does not
affect the decision on the merits of the case. The judgment in the main action
does not change the nature or determine the validity of the attachment. The
petition for review on certiorari was denied, and the judgment of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed.

DECISION:

 FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition at bar is

DENIED and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 22

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, PETITIONER,

VS.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, ALSO KNOWN AS FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS
OR FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS OR FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
CARLOS, AND TEOFILO CARLOS II, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 179922 | DECEMBER 16, 2008
PONENTE: REYES, R.T., J

FACTS:
 The case revolves around a dispute over inheritance following the deaths of
spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia, who left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
 These properties are situated in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and Manila.
 During Felix Carlos's lifetime, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo to avoid
inheritance taxes, with Teofilo promising to deliver Juan's share.
 Consequently, Teofilo registered three parcels in his name, while Juan
registered one. Teofilo died intestate on May 13, 1992, leaving behind
respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo's
death, two parcels were registered in the names of Felicidad and Teofilo II.
 In 1994, Juan filed a suit against Felicidad and Teofilo II, leading to a partial
compromise agreement and subsequent extrajudicial partition of the properties.
 In 1995, Juan filed another action seeking the nullity of Teofilo and Felicidad's
marriage, the status of Teofilo II, recovery of property, reconveyance, and
damages.
 He claimed that the marriage lacked a license and that Teofilo II was neither a
natural nor adopted child of Teofilo.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted summary judgment in favor of Juan,
declaring the marriage void and Teofilo II not a legitimate child, ordering the
reconveyance of properties and payment of sums.
 However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's decision, remanding
the case for further proceedings, emphasizing the need for a trial on the merits
to determine the validity of the marriage and the filiation of Teofilo II.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not a marriage can be declared void ab initio through a judgment
on the pleadings or a summary judgment without a trial
 2. Whether or not Juan De Dios Carlos have the legal standing to seek the
nullity of the marriage between his deceased brother Teofilo and Felicidad
Sandoval

HELD:
 1. NO. The Supreme Court ruled that a marriage cannot be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment without a
trial.
 The Supreme Court emphasized that the grounds for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage must be proved through a trial, and neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed in such cases.
This principle is enshrined in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC),
 which took effect on March 15, 2003. The Court also highlighted the role of the
State in ensuring that there is no suppression or fabrication of evidence in cases
involving the nullity of marriage.

 2. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine whether
Juan De Dios Carlos has the legal standing to seek the nullity of the marriage,
contingent upon the determination of the filiation of Teofilo Carlos II.
 The Court clarified that only the husband or wife has the standing to file a
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, except in cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. The Court noted that the legal
standing of Juan De Dios Carlos to seek the nullity of the marriage depends on
whether Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
child of Teofilo. If Teofilo II is not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child, Juan
would have the standing to seek the nullity of the marriage as a collateral
relative with successional rights. The case was remanded to the RTC for a trial
on the merits to determine the filiation of Teofilo II and the validity of the
marriage, with instructions to dismiss the nullity of marriage case if Teofilo II is
proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

 1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action
on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or
nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo
Carlos;
 2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of
cause of action;
 3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision
is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
 The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with
dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.
 No costs.
 SO ORDERED.
CASE NO 23.

SPOUSES GREGORIO AND JOSEFA YU, PETITIONERS,

VS.
NGO YET TE, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, ESSENTIAL
MANUFACTURING, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 155868 | FEBRUARY 6, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS:
 The conflict began when Spouses Yu purchased detergent soap worth
P594,240.00 from Te, issuing three postdated checks as payment. These
checks were dishonored upon presentation, marked "ACCOUNT CLOSED."
 Te demanded payment, but Spouses Yu did not comply. Consequently, Te,
through her son and attorney-in-fact Charry Sy, filed a complaint for collection
and damages with a prayer for preliminary attachment in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 4061-V-93).
 Sy's affidavit alleged fraud by Spouses Yu, claiming they never intended to pay
and were disposing of their properties to defraud creditors.
 The RTC issued an order of attachment, leading to the seizure of Spouses Yu's
properties in Cebu City, including a parcel of land and four motor vehicles.
 Spouses Yu counterclaimed for damages due to wrongful attachment, seeking
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
 The RTC discharged some attached properties but maintained custody of
others.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) later lifted the attachment order, finding no factual
basis for fraud.
 Despite this, the RTC ruled in favor of Te for the sum of P549,404.00 plus
interest but denied Spouses Yu's counterclaim, citing the Supreme Court's
pending decision on the attachment issue.
 Spouses Yu appealed, and the CA affirmed the RTC's decision, finding
insufficient evidence for their counterclaim.
 Spouses Yu then brought the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that the writ of
attachment was procured in bad faith, after it was established by final judgment
that there was no true ground therefor.
 2. Whether or not the appellate court erred in refusing to award actual, moral,
and exemplary damages after it was established by final judgment that the writ
of attachment was procured with no true ground for its issuance.

HELD:
 The Supreme Court partly granted the petition. It affirmed the CA's decision but
modified it to award Spouses Yu P50,000.00 in temperate damages and
P30,000.00 in attorney's fees. The counterclaim for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages was dismissed.

 The Supreme Court held that the wrongful attachment did not automatically
entitle Spouses Yu to damages. They needed to prove the nature and extent of
 their loss or injury with reasonable certainty. The evidence presented by
Spouses Yu, such as used and unused ticket stubs and the testimony of Josefa
Yu, was deemed speculative and insufficient to establish actual damages. The
Court found that the passenger bus had been previously attached in another
case, negating the claim of loss due to the wrongful attachment in this case.
Additionally, no evidence was presented regarding damages suffered from the
wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11. However, recognizing some form of
pecuniary loss, the Court awarded temperate damages. The claim for moral
and exemplary damages was denied as there was no proof of malice or bad
faith in procuring the attachment. The testimony of Josefa Yu indicated that
Spouses Yu had transferred funds to another bank, justifying Te's belief that
they never intended to pay. Lastly, attorney's fees were awarded due to the
expenses incurred by Spouses Yu in lifting the wrongful attachment.

DECISION:

 WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The March 21, 2001 Decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners’
counterclaim is PARTLY GRANTED. Gregorio Yu and Josefa Yu are awarded
₱50,000.00 temperate damages and ₱30,000.00 attorney’s fees.
 No costs.
 SO ORDERED.