2nd National Moot Court Competition TC-30

2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

S.L.P. No.____________/2013

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION INVOKED UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE

CONSTITUTION

------IN MATTER OF------

Sohal (APPELLANT)

v.

UNION OF INDICA (RESPONDENT)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

COMPANION JUSTICE OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

MEMORIAL SUBMISSION ON THE BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR ALL Indian Reporter

Ibid Ibidium

Const. Constitutional

Cl. Clause

Ed. Edition

Hon'ble Honourable

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

Sec. Section

u/s Under Section

Art Article

IPC Indian Penal Code

No. Number

Ors Others

Anr Another

V Versus

& And

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TABLE OF CONTENT

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………………2
TABLE OF CONTENT……………………………….…………………………………………3
INDEX Of AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………………..4
 BOOKS REFERRED
 LEGAL DICTIONARIES
 STATUES INVOLVED
 TABLE OF CASES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………………………………..7
STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………………………..8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES……………………………………………………………………...10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………………...11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED……………………………………………………………………13
1. WHETHER SLP IS MAINTAINABLE?.......................................................................13

2. WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT?..............................................................................................16

3. WHETHER THE OLD OR NEW LAW SHALL APPLY IN PRESENT CASE? ...22

4. WHETHER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF NEW CRIMINAL LAW ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?.................................................................................26

PRAYER………………………………………………………………………………………..31

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS REFERRED
1. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Kamal Law House, Calcutta, 8th, edn., 2018).
2. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India (Eastern Book Company,14th,ed , 2023).
3. V.P Sarathi, Law of Evidence (Eastern Book Company, 8th, ed., 2021).
4. Batuk Lal, The Law of Evidence (Central Law Agency, 2023).
5. Ratanlal& Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (Lexis Nexus,27th ed., 2019).
6. S.K.P. Srinivas, A Handbook on New Criminal Laws (Vinod Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1st
Ed., 2024).

LEGAL DICTIONARIES
1. Black Law Dictionary, (West Publishing Group 7th ed.) (1999)
2. 2. P. Ramanatha Aiyar's, “Advanced law lexicon,” vol-i to iv, (Wadhwa and company, 3rd
ed., Nagpur) (2005)

STATUES INVOLVED
1. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
2. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
3. INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
4. BHARTIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023
5. BHARTIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA,2023
6. BHRTIYA SAKSHAYA ADHINIYAM, 2023

JOURNALS
1. ALL INDIA REPORTER
2. MANUPATRA
3. SUPREME COURT CASES
4. SUPREME COURT REPORTER

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TABLE OF CASES

S.NO. NAME OF THE CASE & CITATION

 Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169

 Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, 1954 AIR 520
 Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1954 SC 520
 N. Suriyakala v A. Mohandoss & Ors, 2007 (9) SCC 196
 Nihal Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 26
 State Bank of India v. Sunara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822
 Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, 2002 2 S.C.R. 1006
 K. Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2012 SC 2955
 M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 AIR 1548
 Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, 1978 AIR 597
 Zahira Habibulla H. Shiekh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158
 State of Manipur v. Surajkumar Okram, AIRONLINE 2020 MPR 55.
 Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, 1976 1 SCC 828
 Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, 1966 AIR 119
 Charandas Swami v. State of Gujarat, 2017 7 SCC 177
 State (NCT of Delhi) vs Navjot Sandhu, 2005 11 SCC 600
 Pulukuri Kotayya vs King Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67
 State v. Jitender, 2013 (III) AD (Delhi) 369
 In Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 2002 SC 316
 Javed Alam v state of Chhattisgarh, AIR SC 3918
 Ranganayaki v. state by inspector of police, Air 2004 SCW 6613
 Murarilal Sharma v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1593
 Lakhan Sao v. State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2063
 Sajjan singh v. state of Punjab, 1964 AIR 464, 1964 SCR (4) 630.
 Chief inspector of mines v. karam chand thapra, 1961 AIR 838, 1962 SCR (1) 9.
 Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1995(1) WLC180

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 R. Rajagopal Reddy by Lrs. & Ors. v. Padmini Chandrasekharan, 1995 (2) SCC 630.
 Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24
 kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 536.
 XXX v. State of UT of Chandigarh, CRM-M-31808-2024
 Charan lal Sahu v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 1480, 1988 SCR SUPL. (2) 597
 State of Madras v. V.G. Row, 1952 AIR 196, 1952 SCR 597.
 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569
 Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263
 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC (SUPP) 1841, 2019 (1) SCC 1.
 S. Pratap Singh v The State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 72, 1964 SCR (4) 733
 Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (1) S.C.Cr.R.473
 Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, AIR 2015 SCC 180.
 Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Jhulka, AIR 2020 DELHI 156.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica under Article 136 of the
Constitution of Indica. The article 136 of the Constitution of Indica reads as hereunder:

“136. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT.

(1) Notwithstanding Anything In This Chapter, The Supreme Court May, In Its Discretion,
Grant Special Leave To Appeal From Any Judgment, Decree, Determination, Sentence Or
Order In Any Cause Or Matter Passed Or Made By Any Court Or Tribunal In The Territory Of
India.

(2) Nothing In Clause (1) Shall Apply To Any Judgment, Determination, Sentence Or Order
Passed Or Made By Any Court Or Tribunal Constituted By Or Under Any Law Relating To The
Armed Forces.”

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STATEMENT OF FACT

1. A 24-year-old man named Sohal was accused of strangling his live-in partner, Minni, with
a mobile phone cable on June 30, 2013, in Mitra village, 50 km away from Prime City.
Minni wanted Sohal to fulfill his promise to marry her, and he had been preparing for his
SSC exams at a coaching center in Prime City. The couple met while traveling in the same
bus, and their friendship blossomed.
2. Sohal was admitted to a college in Prime City, and Minni followed suit, enrolling in the
BA (English Honors) course. They started living together in a rented house in Prime City,
but Sohal did not inform his family members about his relationship. Later, his family
pressured him to get married and fixed his wedding. Minni got to know that Sohal's
engagement had been fixed, and his wedding was on the following day.
3. On June 30, 2013, Sohal reached the Krishna area, and the couple left home in his car. They
fought for almost an hour inside the car. Infuriated, Sohal strangled her with the data cable
of his mobile phone in his white Verna car on the night of June 30, 2013. He panicked and
roamed the area for a few hours, not knowing what to do with the body, and eventually
carried it in his car to his dhaba.
4. On reaching the dhaba, Sohal stuffed her body in a blue-colored single-door fridge and
closed it using cable wires. Since it was his wedding, the dhaba remained closed for the
next couple of days. The police investigated the matter, and Sohal was arrested on July 1,
2013. A case of murder, destruction of evidence, and a false promise to marry was added
on July 2, and the police invoked Sections 103 of BNS (Murder), 238 (Disappearance of
evidence), and Section 69 (False promise to marry) of the new criminal laws.
5. The police took custody of Sohal beyond the period of 15 days, handcuffed him, and asked
him to sign his statements. They seized the phone and laptop of the accused and his father,
who objected to it being against their right to privacy. Investigations into the murder
revealed that hours after allegedly killing Minni, Sohal deleted all the data from his cell
phone. The police also analyzed the personal diary of the deceased, which was about her
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sadness and depression due to Sohal's inability to convince his parents about their
relationship and wedding. The mobile tower location of the accused was found near the
dhaba on that day, and the trial court sentenced Sohal to death for murder and other offenses
based on electronic evidence, medical evidence, testimony from the father and sister of the
deceased, police witnesses, and statements recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. The High
Court later converted the death sentence to life imprisonment.
6. The accused filed an SLP in the Supreme Court averred for acquittal, vitiation of trial for
application of new criminal laws, and challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions
of the new criminal laws. The parents requested the death sentence for the well-planned
heinous crime.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUE

The respondent very respectfully put forth before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica the
following issue:

-ISSUE 1-

WHETHER SLP IS MAINTAINABLE?

-ISSUE 2-

WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT?

-ISSUE 3-

WHETHER THE OLD OR NEW LAW SHALL APPLY IN PRESENT CASE?

-ISSUE 4-

WHETHER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF NEW CRIMINAL LAW ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1)WHETHER SLP IS MAINTAINABLE?

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the Special Leave Petition
(SLP) in question is not maintainable, as Article 136 of the Constitution of India grants the
Supreme Court discretionary power to intervene only in exceptional cases of grave injustice or
violation of principles of natural justice. The cases cited establish that this power is not a matter of
right, emphasizing that the Court should exercise it sparingly and only when lower courts’ findings
are perverse or legally erroneous. Here, both the trial court and the High Court followed due
process and delivered reasoned judgments; the High Court even reduced the sentence, addressing
the evidentiary concerns. Moreover, there are no procedural irregularities or claims of unfair trial
to substantiate the grounds for SLP. Additionally, the absence of substantial questions of law or
significant legal issues further weakens the need for Supreme Court intervention, as the matter has
been thoroughly addressed by the lower courts. Therefore, given the adherence to fair trial
standards and the lack of miscarriage of justice, the SLP lacks the merit required for
maintainability.

2)WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT?
It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Sohal's confession under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which led to the recovery of Minni’s body and the data
cable, lending evidentiary value as it facilitated new discoveries. The chain of circumstantial
evidence establishes Sohal’s presence at the crime scene, corroborated by forensic findings, mobile
location data, and his subsequent actions, such as deleting phone data. Medical evidence supports
the cause and time of death, aligning with the prosecution’s timeline. Testimonies and Sohal's
behavior indicate premeditation and intent, shown by his efforts to conceal the crime. Collectively,
these elements create a comprehensive narrative of Sohal’s guilt, proved the guilt reasonable
doubt.

3)WHETHER THE OLD OR NEW LAW SHALL APPLY IN PRESENT CASE?

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It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the present case should be governed by the
new criminal laws that came into force on July 1,2013. As the new criminal laws enacted by the
government of Indica with an intent of immediate and prospective application within the territory
of Indica. In the present case, the offense committed by Sohal straddles the transitional period of
the new laws, but significant legal processes, such as his arrest, investigation, and trial, occurred
after July 1, 2013. Therefore, the Respondent contends that the new laws are appropriately
applied to actions occurring after they came into force.

4)WHETHER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF NEW CRIMINAL LAW ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court the provisions of new criminal laws are
constitutionally valid as they laws were designed to address the evolving nature of crime and
justice in contemporary society. They aim to modernize outdated provisions from colonial-era
that no longer serve their intended purpose.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER SLP IS MAINTAINABLE?

It is humbly submitted that the present SLP is not maintainable as it is only a discretionary power
and not a matter of right. There is no substantiate ground as there is no miscarriage of justice or
violation of principle of natural justice. Moreover, the principle of fair trial and due procedure is
followed.

1.1 DISCRETIONARY POWER NOT A RIGHT

1. Article 1361 of Constitution of Indica provides the right to special leave in SC in certain cases.
It is not a matter of right but only a discretionary power. It is established principle that the SC
will grant SLP in exceptional cases, where grave and substantial injustice or violation of natural
rights has been done. 2 In the case of Pritam Singh v. State 3 it was held, “The wide discretionary
power with which this Court is invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional
cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in
granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this
article. The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid down in the circumstances
is that Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special
circumstances are shown to exist.”
2. In another case of Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, this court held, “The powers given by Art.
136 of the Constitution however are in the nature of special or residuary powers which are
exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law, in cases where the needs of justice demand
interference by the Supreme Court of the land.”
This principle was again reiterated in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT, 4 where it was held
that, it is an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and
with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. Further, the SC will not interfere

1
Constitution of Indica, A.136
2
AIR 1950 SC 169: 1950 SCR 453.
3
AIR 1950 SC 169.
4
AIR 1954 SC 520.
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with the concurrent finding of the court below, unless, the findings are perverse or vitiated by
error of law, or there is gross miscarriage of justice. 5
3. Further, Art. 136 does not grant a right to appeal. In the case of N. Suriyakala v A. Mohandoss
& Ors,6 the court held that Article 136 does not grant a right to appeal to a party, but rather
gives the Supreme Court the power to exercise discretion to satisfy the demands of justice. In
the Constitutional Assemble Debate this principle was supported. 7
4. It is a general principle that the Supreme Court does not interfere with the sentence passed by
the lower courts unless there is an illegality in it, or it is harsh or unjust in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or it is unduly lenient, or it involves any question of principle, or
where the High Court does not exercise its discretion judicially on the question of sentence. 8
In the present case, the trial court convicted the accused by taking into consideration all the
evidences9 and the High Court has already mitigated the sentence, so, there is no basis for the
Supreme Court's discretion to intervene further.

1.2 LACK OF SUBSTANTIATE GROUND

5. It is a well-settled principle that the Court does not interfere with concurrent findings “unless
the findings are vitiated by errors of law, or the conclusions reached by the courts below are so
patently opposed to well-established principles as to amount to miscarriage of justice,” 10 or
where the interest of justice so requires. In the case of Nihal Singh v. State of Punjab,11 the
court while discussing the scope of A.136 observed,
“If the trial is vitiated by some illegality or irregularity of procedure, if it “shocks the
conscience of the Court,” or if “by disregard to the forms of legal process or some violation
of the principles of natural justice or otherwise” substantial and grave injustice has been done,
or there is no evidence to support the findings of fact, or the conclusions of the High Court are

5
AIR 1955 SC 65.
6
2007 (9) SCC 196.
7
Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, Sixth Reprint, Vol. VIII, pp. 593, 634-642. See also Vijay Hansaria,
The Chronicles of Indian Constitution, Mohan Law House Publishing Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, Edn. 2019, pp. 227,228.
8
State of Maharashtra v. M.H. George, AIR 1965 SC 722 ; Nathusingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC
2783.
9
Moot proposition
10
Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1321; State of U.P. v. Sheo Ram, AIR 1974 SC 2267; Dulichand v.
Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 1960.
11
AIR 1965 SC 26.
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manifestly perverse, are based on surmises and conjectures and are unsupportable by
evidence, the Supreme Court may go behind the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below.”
6. There is no substantial question of law or grave injustice in the present appeal. The High Court
has thoroughly examined the question of sufficiency of evidence and the death sentence. Trial
Court sentenced the accused on the basis of electronic evidence, medical evidence, testimony
from the father and sister of the deceased, police witnesses, and statements recorded by the
Judicial Magistrate. After considering all the evidences HC converted the death sentence into
life imprisonment. The absence of any demonstrable miscarriage of justice further undermines
the need for Supreme Court intervention. Therefore, there is no grave injustice or violation of
right that has been done.
7. A substantial question of law of general importance is a sine qua non to certify fitness for
hearing by the Supreme Court. Nay, more; the question, however important and substantial,
must be of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the High Court’s judgment it
imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highest Bench.12 In the case of
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra,13 it was held that the Court should exercise its jurisdiction
under Article 136 only in exceptional cases involving a substantial question of law or a
manifest injustice. Additionally, in K. Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh,14 the
Supreme Court held that only those appeals presenting significant legal questions are
maintainable. However, the present SLP is just a reiteration of arguments previously
considered in detail by the High Court. Hence, it is not maintainable.

1.3 FAIR TRIAL AND NO PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITY

8. In M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra 15, the Supreme Court held that not every procedural
error warrant interference; only grave errors that affect the trial's outcome do. The absence of
such errors here weakens the SLP's maintainability. In the present case, the authorities followed
the due procedure. The petitioner’s right to a fair trial has been upheld throughout the
proceedings. The police followed the proper procedure of investigation. There is no plea or

12
State Bank of India v. Sunara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822.
13
2002 2 S.C.R. 1006
14
AIR 2012 SC 2955.
15
1978 AIR 1548.
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claim raised for the violation of any right to fair trial or non-adherence of due procedure.
Therefore, the trial was fair and due procedure was followed. Further, no claim of violation of
custodial rights or inquiry procedure is raised which shows the compliance of due procedure.
9. Right to fair trial is a fundamental right but there must be a substantive claim of its
infringement. 16 Supreme Court has defined fair trial as a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair
prosecutor and atmosphere of judicial calm. 17 The present case does not raise any question on
the trial conducted by the court. It simply adds new grounds for the vitiation of trial.
10. The offence was reported after the enactment of the law. 18 Art. 20 19 of the constitution states
that a person must be convict for any offence other than the law in force. Therefore, the new
criminal laws would be applicable in the present case. The trail was conducted in adherence to
the new criminal laws. The chargesheet was filed according to the provisions of BNS and
BNSS. It is a general principle that a law will be presumed constitutional unless declared
unconstitutional by the competent court or till it is repealed. 20 Hence, the trial was fair and
cannot be vitiated for the application of new criminal laws as it is the valid law in force at the
time of trial.

Hence, SLP is not maintainable as it is only a discretionary power and not a matter of right.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN PROVED

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

It is humbly submitted that the prosecution establishes Sohal’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
the confession statement leads to the discovery of crucial evidence and a chain of circumstantial
evidence establishes Sohal’s presence at the crime scene proved a guilt beyond the reasonable
doubt.

16
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, 1978 AIR 597.
17
Zahira Habibulla H. Shiekh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158.
18
Moot proposition
19
Constitution of Indica, Art.20.
20
State of Manipur v. Surajkumar Okram
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2.1 ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION LEADING TO DISCOVERY

11. The confession statement given by the accused Sohal, led to the recovery of crucial evidence—
the deceased’s body and the data cable allegedly used for the murder, which is admissible
under section 27 of the Indian Evidence act corresponding to section 23 of Bhartiya sakshay
adhiniyam.
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act - How much information received from the accused may
be proved.
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offense in the custody of a police officer, so much of
such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered, may be proved.21
12. In the case of Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra 22, the significance of the section
starting with the expression “Provided that” and the phrase “whether it amounts to confession
or not” were discussed in some detail; the conditions necessary for bringing the section into
operation were explained- the first condition being discovery of a fact; second being that
discovery of such fact must be deposed to; third being that at the time of receipt of such
information, the accused must be police custody; fourth, that only so much of the information
as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The meaning of the word
'distinctly’ was also discussed in the context of the section. After discussing various facets, it
was held that the “fact discovered” is not restricted to the physical or material facts which can
be perceived by the senses, but it also includes a mental fact. Referring to the decision
of Pulukuri Kottya, it was held that the expression “fact discovered” includes not only the
physical object but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused
as to this.
13. Although the defense claims Sohal never gave a confession, the prosecution submits that the
confession led to the recovery of Minni's body from the fridge at Sohal's dhaba and the data
cable from his car. Under the law, a confession that leads to the discovery of relevant facts can

21
Indian Evidence Act, section 27
22
1976 1 SCC 828
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hold evidentiary value (Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act)—linking the confession to the
subsequent discoveries. According to Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, even if a
confession is given to a police officer, the part of it that leads to the discovery of new facts is
admissible. The ruling in Emperor v. Moti Ram reinforced the principle that the portion of a
statement that actually leads to a discovery is admissible, as it is seen as inherently reliable and
corroborative.
14. In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar 23 the Supreme Court held that a confession made to a
police officer is inadmissible as per Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, except when it leads
to the discovery of a fact (under Section 27). However, the part of the confession leading to
the discovery of relevant facts (like the dead body in this case) can be admitted. The
prosecution can rely on this case to argue that Sohal’s alleged confession leading to the
recovery of the body and the data cable is admissible in evidence. Supreme Court in the
case Charandas Swami v. State of Gujarat24. It was held that a fact discovered within the
meaning of section 27 need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated by
section 27 is not limited to “actual physical material object” and that the discovery of fact arises
by reason of the fact that information given by the accused exhibits knowledge or mental
awareness of the informant as to its existence
15. State (NCT of Delhi) vs Navjot Sandhu 25, the Supreme Court adverted to previous decisions
and restated the legal position on the point in issue with regard to the fact discovered.
Reference was made to the decision in Pulukuri Kotayya vs King Emperor26, wherein the
Privy Council observed that usually the section is brought into operation when a person in
police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a
weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused.
16. In State v. Jitender27, was sentenced to death by the trial court for causing the death of his
father. The accused had killed his father as mark of human sacrifice and severed the head from
the body and cut off various parts of the body. The factum of chopping of organs being post
mortem and the cause of death being asphyxia was discovered pursuant to the disclosure given

23
(1966 AIR 119),
24
2017 7 SCC 177
25
2005 11 SCC 600
26
AIR 1947 PC 67
27
2013 (III) AD (Delhi) 369
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by the accused, which information was subsequently confirmed when the post mortem was
done. The prosecution argued it was the accused who disclosed on 14.03.2008 that the time of
killing/ death of his father was the morning of 13.03.2008 and that the death had taken place
by pressing the throat of his father and decapitation and chopping of the organs was done after
the death, i.e., was postmortem in nature. Both these facts were subsequently confirmed
through the postmortem, which was conducted on 15.03.2008. It was held that the disclosure
statement of the accused recorded on 14.03.2008 revealed that the he had killed his father by
strangulation (and not by decapitation). The said facts, having been discovered pursuant to the
disclosure by the accused, being mental condition of which the accused was conscious, were
held to be admissible by virtue of section 27 IEA.
17. From the conspectus of the decisions rendered by the Courts, it can be concluded that the fact
discovered, as contemplated under section 27 IEA, includes not only the physical or corporeal
object that can be perceived by the senses but also includes the mental condition of which a
person is conscious, which may lead to a discovery of a fact which was not in the knowledge
of the investigating agency prior to its disclosure or through some other source. In this case,
the recovery of Minni’s body from the refrigerator and the data cable used in her strangulation
were found based on Sohal’s statement, which strengthens the argument that this evidence was
not just hearsay but confirmed by tangible discovery.

2.2 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FORMING A COMPLETE CHAIN

18. In Bodh Raj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir28, the Supreme Court held that the circumstantial
evidence could be the sole basis of conviction provided the conditions precedent before
conviction on circumstantial evidence is fully established. The conditions are:

28
AIR 2002 SC 316
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 The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. The circumstances concerned ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘maybe’
establishes
 The fact so established should be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused.
 Circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
 They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved.
 There must be the chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused an must
show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused
19. Circumstantial evidence in the case establishes a coherent and unbroken chain pointing
towards the guilt of the accused. However, recent studies have shown that the reluctance to
rely on circumstantial evidence is powerful even when an alternative, exculpatory scenario is
virtually unimaginable. 29 Sohal’s mobile tower location was traced to the dhaba on the night
of the incident. Additionally, forensic evidence, such as the recovery of Minni’s body from
Sohal’s dhaba and the matching data cable, indicate his direct involvement. Sohal’s action of
deleting phone data, forms a chain of evidence and is admissible under Section 4 of Bhartiya
Sakshay Sanhita. In the case of Khem Karan v State of Uttar Pradesh, the court declared that
if all the circumstances and evidence lead to the accused’s guilt and there is no chance of any
other alternative hypothesis, then the accused can be convicted solely on the basis of
circumstantial evidence in such a situation.
20. In Javed Alam v state of Chhattisgarh30, the Supreme Court has held that section 6 of
the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to the hearsay evidence, and if facts are forming a
chain of events, then it is relevant under section 6 of Indian Evidence Act.
21. In the wedding photographs analyzed by the police, Sohal did not appear anxious. 'He partied
and danced with his family members. His lack of anxiety or remorse and his active participation
in the celebrations do not negate his motive as he may be doing that to act normally between
people, in the case Ranganayaki v. state by inspector of police 31, the court held that the mere

29
See, e.g., Eyal Zamir et al., Seeing is Believing: The Anti-Inference Bias, 89 IND. L.J. 195, 204–15 (2014).
30
AIR SC 3918
31
Air 2004 SCW 6613
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fact that the prosecution failed to translate the mental disposition of the accused into evidence
does not mean that no such mental condition existed in the mind of the assailant.
22. Also, Sohal’s actions after the crime reveal his guilty state of mind under section 14 of the
Indian Evidence Act, which says that state of mind, body, or bodily injury is also relevant.
Sohal’s actions indicated premeditation, as he not only killed Minni but also concealed her
body in a refrigerator, demonstrating deliberate intent to hide the crime. The fact that he kept
the dhaba closed for the next few days indicates an intention to conceal the crime. In Murarilal
Sharma v State of Maharashtra 32, the Court held that when considering circumstantial
evidence, evidence of motive plays a fundamental role.
23. Sohal's deletion of phone data shows his awareness of potential evidence against him, aligning
with Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, which considers subsequent conduct as relevant.
Investigations into the murder revealed that hours after allegedly killing her, Sohal deleted all
the data from his cell phone. The accused was aware that phone conversations could be used
as evidence against him, deleting data from his phone hours after the murder, demonstrating
an effort to destroy potential evidence of his guilt, and this shows his conduct after committing
a murder of forming a chain of evidence.

2.3 MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND PREMEDITATION CORROBORATING THE FACTS

24. Sohal's actions show the motive behind the crime, suggesting that Sohal killed Mini to prevent
the disclosure of their relationship, which could disrupt his upcoming marriage. His actions
indicated premeditation, as he not only killed minni but also concealed her body in a
refrigerator, demonstrating deliberate intent to hide the crime.
25. The post-mortem report confirmed that the cause of death was suffocation due to strangulation,
with a transverse ligature mark indicative of manual strangulation. This aligns with the
prosecution’s narrative of Sohal using a data cable to strangle Minni inside the car. The time
of death stated in the report falls between 10 p.m. and 12 a.m., matching the timeline
established through witness testimonies and Sohal’s movements.

32
AIR 1997 SC 1593
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26. The statements of the sister and friend of the deceased's sister were recorded before a Judicial
Magistrate under Section 183 of BNSS. They stated that, in their presence, the deceased and
accused left the room where they lived together.
27. In Lakhan Sao v. State of Bihar 33, where the court held that when medical evidence
corroborates other facts, it forms a crucial link in proving the prosecution’s case beyond
reasonable doubt.

Hence, guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of a confession, which leads to
discovery and circumstantial evidence.

ISSUE3- WHETHER THE OLD OR NEW LAW SHALL APPLY IN PRESENT CASE?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the present case should be governed by the
new criminal laws that came into force on July 1,2013.

3.1 THAT THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS ARE APPLICABLE IN PRESENT CASE

28. The new criminal laws should be applicable in the present as they were enacted with legislative
intent of immediate effect and to address the contemporary issues with more effectiveness and
transparency. The government’s psychology and societal needs may dictate that crimes like
domestic violence and murder receive more stringent penalties under updated statutes. The
new criminal laws came into effect on July 1, 2013, ushering the significant changes to the
country’s criminal justice system and ending colonial era legislation.

3.1.1 DOCTRINE OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION

29. The respondent acknowledges the well-established legal principle that new laws generally have
prospective effect unless expressly stated otherwise. However, in the present case, the offense
occurred before the enactment of the new laws but all the subsequent legal actions such as

33
AIR 2000 SC 2063
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arrest, investigation, and the trial were took place after the enactment i.e. July 1, 2013 under
the new legal regime.
30. It has been contended that in the case of Sajjan singh v. state of Punjab 34, it was stated by
the court that any statue cannot be stated as a retrospective law because a particular part of that
statute is existing from a time preceding to the enactment of the new law and the person who
claimed the protection under article 20(1) contending that a new enactment cannot make him
liable to be punished, but the court clarified that the substance of the new law had been brought
under the new statute which was present at the time of the omission of the act.
31. Chief inspector of mines v. karam chand thapra35, where the court opined that when a law
was made in 1923, was replaced by a new statute in 1952, but many of the old rules were
formulated under the new statute as well. As these rules had been functioning since then, it did
not constitute retrospective legislation, an offence committed in 1955 could be still punishable
under the new enactment as those laws and rules were in existence by the fact at the date of
the commission of the offence.
32. In the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan 36 involving the Narcotics, Drugs, and
Psychotropic Substances Act, the court opined that Article 20 prohibits only conviction and
punishment under an ex post facto law, not the trial or prosecution itself. Furthermore, a trial
conducted under a different procedure from the one existing at the time of the offense does not
fall within the scope of this provision and cannot be deemed unconstitutional.
33. In R. Rajagopal Reddy (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. v. Padmini Chandrasekharan 37, it was held
thus: “Declaratory enactment declares and clarifies the real intention of the legislature in
connection with an earlier existing transaction or enactment, it does not create new rights or
obligations. If a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective
operation is generally intended. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have
retrospective effect and therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the Constitution
came into force the amending Act also will be part of the existing law. If a new Act is to explain
an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act

34
1964 AIR 464, 1964 SCR (4) 630.
35
1961 AIR 838, 1962 SCR (1) 9.
36
1995(1) WLC180.
37
1995 (2) SCC 630.
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is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of

the previous Act.”
34. Relying upon the aforesaid judgements of the supreme court, the Respondent contends that the
substantive law applicable at the time of the offense governs the determination of guilt. Still,
procedural laws, such as those governing evidence, investigation, and trial conduct, are applied
prospectively and must be followed as per the laws in effect during the trial and subsequent
legal proceedings.
35. Further, it has been contented by the respondent that the new laws have prospective effect in
the present case and as it is given under provisions of BNSS and BNS act.

3.2 TRANSITION PROVISION IN NEW CRIMINAL LAWS

36. It is humbly submitted by the respondent that it is well established in legal jurisprudence that
there is a distinction between substantive law and procedural law where the former describes
the rights and duties, the latter describes the mechanism for enforcing rights or addressing
wrongs. The general principle states that under the substantive law, the retrospective law are
generally applied to either increase or decrease the punishment for any particular crime,
however, the procedural laws are generally does not have a retrospective effect.
37. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Sunder v. Ram
Kumar 38 , has held “Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than thus –
that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or
obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be
avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed
in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as
prospective only”.
38. It has been contented by the respondent that since Sohal’s arrest and investigation occurred
after the enactment of new laws i.e. July 1, 2013. The new procedural laws governing evidence
collection, custody and investigation methods should be applicable.

38
(2001) 8 SCC 24
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39. It was further contended that the BNSS borrows its repeal provision from the CrPC and at
Section 531 states that the CrPC stands repealed. It further goes on to say that notwithstanding
such repeal if, immediately before the date on which the BNSS comes into force, there is any
appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then, such appeal, application, trial,
inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in
accordance with the provisions of the CrPC as in force immediately before the commencement
of the BNSS 39.
40. In kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India 40, the Supreme Court held that the
normal act of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute book
as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as law that
never existed.Recently, in the XXX v. State of UT of Chandigarh 41, the Punjab and Haryana
High Court relied on the language given under Section 358 of the BNS and Section 531 of the
BNSS, it proceeded to hold that once the BNSS was brought into effect, it would apply to
offences committed under the IPC, thus recognizing that the IPC can continue to be the
substantive criminal law while the BNSS becomes the new procedural criminal law.
41. This interpretation is supported by the section 6(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which
states that the repeal of an act would not affect anything duly done or suffered thereunder. As
a result, only the IPC may be used to prosecute an offense committed during the period when
it was in effect. Therefore, the new procedural legislation (BNSS) will govern the registration,
investigation, and future procedural processes; nonetheless, the IPC will remain the applicable
substantive penal code.
3.2.1 THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE UNDER NEW CRMINAL LAWS
42. The Respondent contends that the investigative measures taken, including the seizure of
Sohal’s phone and laptop, comply with the new procedural standards. It is further contended,
the admissibility and collection of evidence, such as Sohal’s confession, mobile tower location
data, and forensic analysis of his devices, should be assessed under the new procedural laws.
The fact that Sohal deleted evidence from his phone further justifies the application of stringent

39
Abhijnan jha, Bhagya K Yadav, Chetan Chawla, (2024, July 2024). Confusion at the midnight hour: Can the IPC
and the BNSS co-exist? Bar and Bench. https://www.barandbench.com/columns/confusion-at-the-midnight-hour-
can-the-ipc-and-the-bnss-co-exist
40
(2000) 2 SCC 536.
41
CRM-M-31808-2024.
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investigative procedures. Therefore, the forensic analysis and the admissibility of electronic
evidence must be governed by the new laws, as they were collected and analysed after the
enactment date.

Hence, it is humbly submitted by the respondent that the new criminal laws should applicable
in the present case.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF NEW CRIMINAL LAW ARE

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court the provisions of new criminal laws are
constitutionally valid as they laws were designed to address the evolving nature of crime and
justice in contemporary society.

4.1 THAT THE PROVISIONS OF NEW LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID

43. There is a presumption of legality attached to all statutes, including the new criminal laws that
the government passed on July 1, 2013. Legislative actions must be assumed to be legitimate
unless proven otherwise, according to a consistent ruling by courts.
44. The new criminal laws enacted by the government aim to improve the administration of justice
and address the challenges of modern crime. Relying upon judgement of Charan lal Sahu v.
Union of India42, the Supreme Court held that laws made by the legislature enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality. The Court emphasized that the judiciary should exercise
restraint while questioning the constitutionality of legislative provisions and should not
interfere unless there is a clear violation of constitutional principles.
45. It is further argued that the laws aim to ensure that investigations are thorough, evidence is
appropriately preserved, and justice is delivered efficiently in serious cases such as murder.
Any alleged infringement of individual rights is justified by the need to protect society and

42
1990 AIR 1480, 1988 SCR SUPL. (2) 597.
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maintain law and order. In the case of State of Madras v. V.G. Row43, the Supreme Court held
that the reasonableness of restrictions imposed by a law must be judged in the context of the
rights it seeks to safeguard. The Court emphasized that public interest is a legitimate ground
for imposing restrictions on fundamental rights. In the present case the provisions allowing
extended custody, seizure of electronic devices, and the admissibility of electronic evidence
are reasonable restrictions necessary to address serious crimes. The public interest in ensuring
justice for the victim and maintaining societal order outweighs any perceived infringement of
the accused's rights.
46. The Respondent contends that these laws provide adequate checks and balances to prevent
abuse and protect the rights of the accused, thus adhering to the principles of natural justice
and due process. The new criminal laws include procedural safeguards to ensure that
investigations are conducted lawfully and transparently. The procedural provisions in the new
laws, such as the requirement for judicial oversight in extending custody and the admissibility
of electronic evidence, align with the principles laid down in Maneka Gandhi case where the
court held that any law affecting personal liberty must adhere to the principles of natural justice
and ensures fairness. The laws are designed to protect the accused’s rights while ensuring an
effective investigation.

4.1.1 EXTENSION OF CUSTODY AND RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

47. It is submitted that the extension of Sohal’s custody beyond 15 days is challenged as
unconstitutional. The Respondent contends that the new laws provide for such extensions
under judicial oversight in cases involving heinous crimes. The extension is necessary to
complete the investigation and gather crucial evidence. In the case of Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab44, the Supreme Court upheld provisions allowing extended detention in cases involving
terrorism, emphasizing that such measures are necessary for national security and public safety.
The Court acknowledged that the state has a duty to protect its citizens and investigate serious
crimes thoroughly.

43
1952 AIR 196, 1952 SCR 597.
44
(1994) 3 SCC 569
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48. While Kartar Singh dealt with terrorism, the principle that the state can impose reasonable
restrictions on personal liberty for public safety applies here. The extended custody in Sohal’s
case is justified by the need to ensure a comprehensive investigation into a heinous murder.

4.1.2 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REFUSAL TO SIGN STATEMENT

49. The provision under Section 215 of BNS, which penalizes the refusal to sign statements, is
challenged. The Respondent submits that this provision is constitutional and serves to prevent
the obstruction of justice. The law ensures that statements made during the investigation are
properly recorded and authenticated. Selvi v. State of Karnataka45,
The Supreme Court ruled that any statement made by an accused must be voluntary and that
coercion is unconstitutional. However, the Court also recognized the importance of proper
documentation and authentication of statements for the integrity of the investigation. The
provision under Section 215 of BNS does not violate constitutional rights but seeks to ensure
the authenticity of statements made during the investigation. Sohal’s refusal to sign his
statements raises concerns about obstructing the investigation, justifying the application of this
provision.

4.2 THAT THERE IS NO INFRINGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

50. It was contended that there is no infringement of the fundamental rights of the accused as the
seizure of Sohal’s phone and laptop is challenged on the grounds of violating the right to
privacy. The Respondent submits that while the right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is not
absolute and can be restricted for legitimate state interests, such as preventing and investigating
crime.
51. In the case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India 46, the supreme court recognized the
right to privacy as a fundamental right but also acknowledged that it is subject to reasonable

45
(2010) 7 SCC 263
46
AIR 2018 SC (SUPP) 1841, 2019 (1) SCC 1.
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restrictions. The Court held that any invasion of privacy must satisfy the tests of legality,
necessity, and proportionality. Relying on the aforesaid judgement by the supreme court, it
further contended by the respondent that the seizure of electronic devices and the investigation
into Sohal’s digital communications are necessary and proportionate measures to gather
evidence in a murder case. The actions are justified under the new criminal laws, which
mandate that the state’s duty to investigate crime takes precedence over individual privacy in
cases involving serious offenses.

4.3 ADMISSIBILITY OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

52. The provisions relating to the admissibility of electronic evidence, as per the new laws, are
crucial for modern investigations. The accused’s deletion of data from his phone indicates an
attempt to destroy evidence, justifying the use of advanced forensic techniques to retrieve and
present electronic evidence in court. The Information Technology Act, 1872 defines electronic
record to include sound stored, received, or sent in electronic form and Section 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with electronic evidence, including call recordings and lays
down the conditions for the admissibility of electronic evidence in legal proceedings.
Moreover, Section 85B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 pertains to the law on modifying
recorded electronic evidence. To ensure authenticity and integrity, a digital signature must be
affixed to sign the record.
53. The admissibility of recorded electronic evidence in Court was examined in the case of S.
Pratap Singh v The State of Punjab 47, where the Supreme Court accepted a tape-recorded
conversation between two parties despite being obtained illegally. The Court evaluated the
evidentiary value of the tape-recorded conversation and accepted it as evidence only because
it was essential to resolving the case. The conversation was claimed to have occurred between
the parties but was obtained illegally. Similarly, in the case of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of
Himachal Pradesh 48, which extensively dealt with the admissibility and authentication of
secondary electronic evidence. The Apex Court upheld the admission of electronic and oral
evidence even in the absence of an authenticating certificate.

47
1964 AIR 72, 1964 SCR (4) 733
48
2018 (1) S.C.Cr.R.473.
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54. In the case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer49, the Supreme Court clarified the standards for the
admissibility of electronic evidence and emphasized the importance of adhering to proper
procedures. The Court recognized the significance of electronic evidence in establishing the
truth in criminal cases. However, the use of forensic analysis to recover data from Sohal’s
phone is consistent with the standards set in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer. The new laws provide
a framework for the proper collection and presentation of electronic evidence, ensuring that it
is admissible and reliable.
55. Further, in the case of Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Jhulka 50, the court of the opinion that any
evidence collected with breach of the fundamental right would not make evidence inadmissible
in the court of law. The court observed that the “ right to privacy must yield the right to a fair
trial.”

Hence, the provisions of new criminal laws are constitutionally valid

49
AIR 2015 SCC 180.
50
AIR 2020 DELHI 156.
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PRAYER

In light of issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given, and authorities cited, it is most
humbly and respectfully requested that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare
on behalf of:

1. The present appeal is not maintainable in this court.

2. The guilt of the accused is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. The new criminal laws which came into force on July 1, 2013, are applicable in the present
case.
4. Provisions of new criminal laws are constitutionally valid.

AND/OR

Pass any other Order, Direction, or Relief that it may deem fit in the Best Interests of Justice,
Fairness, Equity, and Good Conscience.
For this Act of Kindness, The respondent, as in duty bound, shall forever pray.

All of which is respectfully submitted

__________________________
Sd/-
Counsel for respondent

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