LEGISLATIVE

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No.

196271, 18 October 2011

Facts:
The case began with the passing of Republic Act No. 10153, which postponed
the ARMM regional elections from August 8, 2011, to May 13, 2013. The law allowed
the President to appoint OICs to temporarily fill positions of elected officials whose
terms were ending, until the rescheduled elections. Petitioners, led by Datu Michael
Abas Kida, challenged the constitutionality of this law, raising important issues
about the election process and the President’s powers.

Issue: Did the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution?

Ruling: No, the passage of RA 10153 does not violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.

The President sent a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, certifying the urgent
need for the immediate passage of a law to synchronize the ARMM elections with national and
local elections. This certification exempts Congress from the requirement of holding three
separate readings on different days, as outlined in Section 26(2). As a result, the petitions
challenging the validity of RA 10153 were dismissed for lack of merit, and the constitutionality
of the law was upheld.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078, 07 March 1919

Facts:
The Provincial Board of Mindoro passed Resolution No. 25 on February 1, 1917, designating 800
hectares of public land in Sitio Tigbao, Naujan Lake, for Mangyan settlement. The resolution, approved
by the Secretary of Interior on February 21, 1917, followed Section 2077 of the Administrative Code.
Governor Juan Morente Jr., under Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, ordered all
Mangyans in specific areas to move to the Tigbao site by December 31, 1917. Mangyans who refused
faced up to 60 days in prison per Section 2759 of the Revised Administrative Code. Rubi and others
claimed they were unlawfully detained for not complying with this order.

Issue:
Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code violates the right to liberty of abode and
whether it is constitutional.

Ruling:
Yes, Section 2145 is constitutional and does not deprive liberty of abode. It allows provincial
governors to direct non-Christian inhabitants to designated public land for the sake of law and
order, with imprisonment for refusal. The Court ruled this measure was valid under the police
power of the state, aimed at advancing and protecting the Mangyans and managing public
forests. Therefore, Rubi and his companions were not unlawfully detained.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, 03 November 2008

Facts: The case involved consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of

Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165, known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. This provision mandated drug testing for several groups, including candidates for public
office, students in secondary and tertiary schools, and employees in both public and private
sectors5. The petitioners argued that the requirement for mandatory drug testing violated their
rights to privacy and due process, and constituted an improper delegation of legislative
authority6. The Supreme Court considered multiple cases, including those filed by Social Justice
Society, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., and Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.

Issue:
Here are the answers to each issue with "yes" or "no" responses along with
their legal basis:

1. **Whether specific provisions of Section 36 requiring mandatory drug

testing were constitutional, particularly concerning students, employees, and
candidates for public office.**
**Answer:** Yes.
**Legal Basis:** The Court found Sections 36(c) and 36(d) (random drug
testing of students and employees) constitutional due to the state’s compelling
interest in promoting safety and deterring drug use, as long as they do not infringe
on individual rights.

2. **Infringement of Rights: Whether the mandatory drug testing

requirements violated the constitutional rights to privacy, protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and due process.**
**Answer:** No, for students and employees; Yes, for individuals charged
with serious crimes.
**Legal Basis:** The Court upheld the constitutionality of mandatory drug
testing for students and employees, recognizing the state's interest; however, it
deemed Section 36(f) unconstitutional for violating rights against self-incrimination
and privacy for those charged with serious crimes.

3. **Additional Qualifications for Public Office: Whether Section 36(g), which

required drug testing for candidates for public office, imposed additional
qualifications beyond those stipulated in the Constitution.**
**Answer:** Yes.
**Legal Basis:** The Court ruled that Section 36(g) imposed additional
qualifications not provided for in the Constitution, making it unconstitutional as it
violated due process rights of candidates.

Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No.
227670, 03 May 2019

Facts: Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. (ABP), represented by Evelyn V.

Jallorina and Noel Villones, filed a petition against the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), the Department of Energy (DOE), and Meralco on June 11, 2015.
The petition seeks to annul ERC Resolution No. 1, Series of 2016 (ERC Clarificatory
Resolution), and compel the ERC to reject Power Supply Agreements (PSAs)
submitted after November 7, 2015, for failing to conduct a Competitive Selection
Process (CSP). This petition arises from a DOE circular issued on June 30, 2015,
requiring all Distribution Utilities (DUs) to undergo CSP to secure PSAs. However, the
ERC's guidelines and resolutions postponed the CSP's implementation, allowing DUs
to enter into PSAs without it. ABP contends that the ERC's actions violate the DOE's
circular and constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Issue and Ruling

Issue 1: Whether the ERC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
ERC Clarificatory Resolution.

Answer: Yes.
Legal Basis: The Supreme Court ruled that the ERC lacks the authority to postpone the
effectivity of the Competitive Selection Process (CSP) as mandated by the 2015 DOE Circular.
This ruling is supported by the provisions of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA)
and the implementing rules set by the Department of Energy (DOE), which emphasize the
necessity of transparency and competition in power supply procurement.

Issue 2: Whether the separate PSAs of Meralco with respondent generation

companies should be disapproved for failing to comply with the 2015 DOE
Circular and CSP Guidelines.

Answer: Yes.
Legal Basis: The Court determined that all Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) submitted to the
ERC after the CSP’s effectivity date of June 30, 2015, cannot be used to pass on power costs to
consumers. This ruling is based on the interpretation of the EPIRA and the DOE Circular, which
requires compliance with CSP guidelines to ensure fair pricing and competition in the electricity
market.

This reflects the Court's position that the ERC's postponement of the CSP was a grave abuse of
discretion, compromising the framework designed to protect consumer interests.

La Suerte Cigar v. CA, G.R. No. 125346, 11 November 2014

**FACTS:** The case G.R. No. 125346 concerns the taxability of stemmed leaf
tobacco imported and purchased by La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory, Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, and Sterling Tobacco Corporation. The manufacturers argued
that stemmed leaf tobacco should not be subject to excise tax under Section 141 of
the National Internal Revenue Code because it does not qualify as partially prepared
tobacco. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted that stemmed
leaf tobacco is taxable as partially prepared tobacco. The Court of Appeals agreed
with the Commissioner, and the Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming the
Commissioner’s authority to impose excise tax based on the National Internal
Revenue Code.
 **ISSUES:**
 Whether Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39, related to RR No. 17-67, is a valid exercise of the
Department of Finance's rule-making power regarding stemmed leaf tobacco tax exemptions for
L-7 permittee manufacturers.

 Whether the August 31, 1990 ruling of Bureau of Internal Revenue Commissioner Jose U.
Ong violates the principle of non-retroactivity of administrative rulings.

 Whether the excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco under Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code
amounts to double taxation.

**RULING:**
1. **Yes.** Section 20(a) of RR No. V-39 is a valid exercise of the Department
of Finance’s authority. The 1987 Philippine Constitution grants the executive branch
the power to enforce laws, and under Section 244 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC), the Secretary of Finance can create necessary regulations for tax law
enforcement. This section limits tax exemptions to transactions between L-7
permittee manufacturers, which is within the Secretary’s power to interpret tax
exemptions.

2. **No.** The August 31, 1990 ruling does not violate the non-retroactivity
principle. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that judicial decisions are part of the legal
system, and the principle of non-retroactivity applies unless correcting an earlier
error. Commissioner Ong’s ruling corrected a prior misinterpretation of the law, and
the government can rectify its mistakes regarding tax interpretations.

3. **No.** The excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco under Section 141 of the
1986 Tax Code does not constitute double taxation. The NIRC states that double
taxation occurs only when the same taxpayer is taxed twice for the same purpose.
In this case, stemmed leaf tobacco and finished tobacco products are different
items. The excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco is distinct from that on finished
products, as they are separate stages in the manufacturing process. Therefore, the
tax on both does not amount to double taxation.

Department of Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association, G.R.

No. 230107, 24 July 2018

**FACTS:** The case G.R. No. 230107 concerns the constitutionality of the "Oil
Pollution Management Fund" established under Republic Act No. 9483 (RA 9483).
This law requires contributions from owners and operators of tankers and barges
transporting oil to finance oil pollution containment and cleanup efforts by the
Philippine Coast Guard. The Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association and
other shipping companies challenged the fund, claiming violations of their rights to
equal protection and due process and arguing that it represented an undue
delegation of legislative power. The Supreme Court ruled that the case was
justiciable, stating that claims of due process and equal protection warrant judicial
review. The Court found the classification of tankers and barges appropriate due to
their higher environmental risk and upheld the provision as essential for enforcing
international conventions on oil pollution liability. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the Oil Pollution Management Fund, finding it
compliant with constitutional standards and not in violation of legislative delegation
principles.

**ISSUES:**
1. Whether Section 22(a) of RA 9483 and Section 1, Rule X of its IRR violate the
equal protection clause.
2. Whether the ten-centavo (10c) impost is confiscatory and violates the due
process clause.
3. Whether Section 22(a) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

**RULINGS:**
1. **No.** The Supreme Court ruled that Section 22(a) of RA 9483 and Section 1,
Rule X of its IRR do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection
clause mandates that individuals in similar situations be treated equally under the
law. The Court found that classifying oil and petroleum tankers and barges as
distinct from other vessels is reasonable due to their higher risk of causing oil
pollution, serving a legitimate governmental interest in protecting the marine
environment.

2. **No.** The Supreme Court determined that the ten-centavo (10c) impost is not
confiscatory and does not violate the due process clause. The due process clause
protects against arbitrary deprivation of property. The Court concluded that the ten-
centavo impost is a valid administrative charge for funding essential environmental
protection measures, not excessively burdensome on operators, and serves a
legitimate public purpose.

3. **No.** The Supreme Court held that Section 22(a) does not represent an undue
delegation of legislative power. The law provides sufficient standards and guidelines
for the Oil Pollution Management Fund Committee to determine the impost rate for
future years. This delegation aligns with the objectives of the 1992 Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions, which aim to compensate for oil pollution damage. Thus, Section
22(a) is a valid exercise of legislative power.

ABAKADA v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, 14 August 2008

**FACTS:** RA 9337 amends certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1997 and is challenged by petitioners as unconstitutional. The procedural issues
raised include the legality of bicameral proceedings, the exclusive origination of
revenue measures, and the Senate's powers related to these matters. Additionally,
a substantive issue concerns the alleged undue delegation of legislative power to
the President to increase the value-added tax rate to 12%.

**ISSUES:**
1. Whether there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether there is an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article
VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether there is a violation of due process and equal protection under Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution.
**RULING:**
1. **No.** The revenue bill originated exclusively in the House of Representatives,
and the Senate acted within its constitutional authority to amend the House bill,
including provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 that revised corporate income taxes,
excise taxes, and franchise taxes. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not
prohibit or limit the extent of amendments the Senate can introduce to a House
revenue bill.

2. **No.** There is no undue delegation of legislative power, only a permissible

delegation of discretion in executing the law. Congress does not relinquish its
functions when it specifies the tasks to be performed, the individuals responsible,
and the scope of their authority. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative
power but rather a delegation of the authority to ascertain facts necessary for the
enforcement and administration of the increased tax rate under the law.

3. **No.** The state has the authority to make reasonable classifications for
taxation purposes, including the subject of taxation, property types, and tax rates.
This power is presumed valid, and the judiciary will typically refrain from interfering
unless there is clear evidence of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, 25 November 2005

**FACTS:** Republic Act No. 7719, known as the National Service Act of 1994, was
enacted on April 2, 1994, to ensure a safe supply of blood by promoting voluntary
donations and regulating blood banks in the Philippines. The Act took effect on
August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, the Secretary of the Department of Health
promulgated Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1995, which implemented the
Act. Section 7 of RA 7719 mandates the phasing out of commercial blood banks
over two years, while Section 23 of AO 9 outlines the phasing-out process. Prior to
the National Blood Services Act, the petitioners operated commercial blood banks
under Republic Act No. 1517, which regulated blood collection, processing, and
sales. The petitioners argued that the Act was incomplete upon passage, lacking
standards for the Secretary of Health’s performance. They also claimed that the
two-year extension for phasing out commercial blood banks constrained the
Secretary and constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.

**ISSUE:** Whether Section 7 of RA No. 7719 constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative power.

**RULING:** **No.** RA No. 7719 does not constitute an undue delegation of

legislative power. To determine if a statute unduly delegates legislative authority, it
is essential to assess whether the statute was complete in its terms and provisions
when it was passed, leaving no further judgment to the administrative body.

RA No. 7719 is comprehensive in itself and demonstrates the legislature's intent to

safeguard public health, mandating measures to achieve this goal, including the
phase-out of commercial blood banks. The law provides a clear standard to guide
the Secretary of Health in its implementation, specifically promoting public health
by ensuring a safe and adequate blood supply through voluntary donations. The Act
empowers the Secretary of Health to execute these provisions, adhering to the
law’s intent.

Cut

Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC

GR 118577, 242 SCRA 211 [Mar 7, 1995]

Facts. RA 7854 is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati in Into a Highly
Urbanized City xxx”. Sec 52 thereof provides that Makati, upon conversion
into a Highly Urbanized City, shall have at least 2 legislative districts xxx.
The petitioners contend, among others, that the reapportionment cannot
be made by a special law (it can only be made by a general
reapportionment law), and that Makati’s population xxx stands at only
450k hence it allegedly violates Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the Constitution.

Issues.
(1) May Sec 52 of RA 7854, a special law, make reapportionment of the
legislative districts?
(2) Does Sec 53 of RA 7854 violate Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the Constitution?
Held.

(1) Yes. As thus worded [in Art VI, Sec 5(1)], the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was
done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing an increase in
Makati’s legislative district.

(2) No. Art VI, Sec 5(3) provides that a city with a population of at least
250k shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati xxx stood at 450k, its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250k.

Montejo v. COMELEC
GR 118702, 242 SCRA 415 [Mar 16, 1995]
Facts. Biliran was originally a municipality of the 3rd District of the province of
Leyte. It was later converted into a sub-province then a regular province.
COMELEC sought to remedy the consequent inequality of the distribution
of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte by
promulgating Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred (in Sec 1 thereof)
the municipality of Capoocan of its 2nd District and Palompon of its 4th
District to its 3rd District. Cong. Montejo of the 1st District of Leyte sought
to annul said Sec of Res. No. 2736 on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, he
prays to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd
District of the province.

Issue. May this Court transfer the Municipality of Tolosa of the 1st District to
the 2nd District of Leyte as prayed for?

Held. No. The court held Sec 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void and conceded that
the conversion of Biliran to a regular province brought about an imbalance
in the distribution of voters in the legislative districts and, as such, could
devalue a citizen’s vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. However, what is prayed for involves an issue of
reapportionment of legislative districts and remedy for such lies with
Congress in accordance to Art VI, Sec 5(4). While this Court can strike
down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as Montejo would want the Court to do by directing
COMELEC to transfer Tolosa from the 1st District to the 2nd District.
Transferring a municipality from one district to another is a substantive
(not minor) change.

Aquino III v. COMELEC

GR 189793 [April 7, 2010]

Facts. There were originally 4 legislative districts in the Province of Camarines

Sur, each having populations well over 250k. RA 9716 was enacted which
reconfigured Cam Sur’s first and second districts. Certain municipalities of
the original first and second districts were combined form a new additional
legislative district. Having resulted in a decrease in the population of the
first district to 176,383, petitioners argue that RA 9716 is unconstitutional
alleging that the minimum population of 250k is required for the creation
of a new legislative district.

Issue. Is the population of 250k an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province?

Ruling: No. In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995), the Court clarified
that while Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Const. requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250k to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250k to be entitled to an additional district. There is no
reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district
within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an
additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250k in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for
an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled
to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population

BANAT v. COMELEC
GR 179271 [Apr 21, 2009]

Facts. Following the May 2007 elections, petitioner Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before respondent
COMELEC a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list
representatives provided by the Constitution, i.e. 20% of the total number
of representatives (55 seats in the current Congress). Meanwhile,
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 07-60 proclaiming all party-list
candidates garnering at least 2% of the total party-list votes (13 party-list
candidates). COMELEC en banc thus declared the BANAT’s petition moot
and academic and declared further that the total number of seats of each
winning party-list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling.65 BANAT then
filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
In the other petition, petitioners party-list candidates Bayan Muna,
Abono, and A Teacher assail the validity of the Veterans formula.

Issues.
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5(2),
Art VI of the Const. mandatory?
(2) Is the three-seat limit provided in Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Is the 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to congressional seats
prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(4) How shall the seats for party-list representatives be allocated?
(5) May major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Held.
 No. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is a ceiling, meaning they
cannot exceed 20% of the House, and there is no mandate to fill the entire
allocation.
 Yes. The three-seat cap is a valid limit to prevent domination by any party in the
party-list elections.
 Yes, for guaranteed seats; no, for additional seats. The 2% threshold for
additional seats is unconstitutional as it prevents reaching the full 20% party-list
representation.
 Yes. The allocation of party-list seats follows a ranking system, with parties
getting guaranteed seats if they have at least 2% of the vote, and additional seats
are distributed proportionally until all are filled, subject to the three-seat cap.
 No. Major political parties are still disallowed from participating in party-list
elections, despite no explicit prohibition in the Constitution or RA 7941.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC

GR 190582 [Apr 8, 2010]

Facts. Petitioner Ang Ladlad represented itself as a national lesbian, gay,

bisexual and transgender (LGBT) umbrella organization with affiliates
around the Phils. composed of numerous LGBT networks throughout the
country. It alleged that the LGBT community in the Phils. was estimated to
constitute at least 670k persons. It applied for accreditation as a party-list
organization with respondent COMELEC in 2006 but was denied, and again
in 2009—also denied.
In its resolution denying the latter application, COMELEC cited the
following grounds: Ang Ladlad tolerates sexual immorality, citing
provisions of the Bible and the Koran. Ang Ladlad collides with Arts 695,75
130676 and 140977 of the Civ Code, and Art 201 of the RPC.78 The LGBT
sector is not enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941. To accredit Ang
Ladlad would be to expose our youth to an environment that does not
conform to the teachings of our faith.
Ang Ladlad claims compliance with the 8-point guidelines enunciated
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. Ang Ladlad argues
that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector
that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity.

Issue. Should Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation be denied?

Ruling: No. Ang Ladlad met the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The
list of marginalized sectors in the Constitution and RA 7941 is not exclusive, and
given the size of the LGBT sector and Ang Ladlad’s affiliations, they sufficiently
complied with accreditation requirements.

The COMELEC’s use of religious texts (the Bible and Koran) to exclude Ang Ladlad
violated the non-establishment clause. Morality in law is public and secular, not
religious. Relying on religious beliefs to shape public policies forces non-believers to
conform, which violates religious freedom. The government would also implicitly
endorse one belief while disapproving others.

COMELEC failed to justify what societal harm or special protection was needed, and
why Ang Ladlad’s inclusion would damage the moral fabric of society. Their
references to violations of penal and civil laws were weak, and the correct remedies
are legal actions, not denial of accreditation.

The Court also cited the equal protection clause, freedom of expression and
association, and international human rights obligations in ruling for Ang Ladlad’s
accreditation.

Romuldez-Marcos v. COMELEC
GR 119976, 248 SCRA 300 [Sept 18, 1995]

Facts. Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban,

Leyte, ran for Congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her
adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her candidacy on the ground that,
among others, she is not a resident of at least 1 year of Tacloban and
therefore she did not satisfy the residency requirement mandated by Art
VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution as she in fact wrote in her Certificate of
Candidacy that she resided “in the constituency where” she sought “to be
elected” for only “seven months”. She later claimed it to be an honest
mistake brought about by confusion and asserted that it is in fact her
domicile “since childhood”. However, COMELEC resolved in favor of
Montejo and contended that Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place
where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban. In its resolution,
COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro Mla. and San Miguel, Mla. as places where
she resided and served certain positions. Mention was even made of her
residence in Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.

Issue. Is Tacloban, Leyte the legal residence of Imelda thereby satisfying the
residence requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution?

Held. Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the
period of residency does not negate the fact of residence if such fact is
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of
paper. It is settled that when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in
election law, it actually means only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban,
Leyte was in fact the domicile of origin of Imelda by operation of law for a
minor follows the domicile of her parents (which was the same). In its
Resolution, COMELEC was obviously referring to Imelda’s various places of
actual residence, not her domicile (legal residence). An individual does not
lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment,
80 and Imelda has clearly always chosen to return
to her domicile of origin. Even at the height of the Marcos Regime’s
powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating important personal milestones there,
instituting well-publicized projects for its benefit and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power always with either her influence or consent.

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
AC No. 7399 [Aug 25, 2009]

Facts. In a speech delivered on the Senate floor, respondent Sen. Miriam

Defensor-Santiago, a member of the IBP, uttered the following: “x x x I am
not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of [C.J.] Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the [SC], I am no longer interested in the position [of C.J.] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment
but not in the SC of idiots x x x”. Complainant Pobre asks that disciplinary
action be taken against the Senator for her total disrespect towards then
C.J. Panganiban and other members of the SC which Pobre believes
constituted direct contempt of court. The Senator invokes parliamentary
immunity under Sec 11, Art VI of the Constitution.

Issue. May disciplinary action be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago?

Held. No. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy
the privilege [of parliamentary immunity]. The disciplinary authority of the
assembly, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary
sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have
constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter
the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition
Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr.
No. L-51122, 113 SCRA 31 [Mar 25, 1982]

Facts. Assemblyman Fernandez moved to intervene for Acero et al. in a case

before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, an administrative
body) involving an intra-corporate dispute with Puyat et al. regarding the
election of the directors of International Pipe Industries (IPI, a private
corporation). Puyat et al. objected, averring it is in violation of Art VIII, Sec
11 (now art VI, sec 14) of the Constitution which bars assemblymen from
appearing as counsel before any administrative body. On the basis of
ownership of 10 shares of stock of IPI, Fernandez alleged legal interest in
the matter in litigation. In view thereof, SEC granted Fernandez the
motion. Hence this petition. Reviewing the circumstances surrounding his
purchase of the shares, it was noted that he had acquired the mere 10
shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares on May 30, 1979—after he has
signified his intention to appear as counsel for Acero but was denied on
constitutional ground, after the quo warranto suit had been filed by Acero
et al. on May 25, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC on May 31.

Issue. Is Fernandez’s intervention valid?

Held. No. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Fernandez

cannot be said to be appearing as counsel but theoretically appearing for
the protection of his ownership of shares in respect of the matter in litigation.
However, under the facts and circumstances immediately preceding and following
his purchase of the shares, We are constrained to find that there has been an
indirect “appearance as counsel before xxx an administrative body.” That is
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.

Avelino v. Cuenco
No. L-2821, 83 Phil 17 [Mar 4, 1949]

Facts. Senators Tañada and Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges

against the petitioner Senate President Avelino and ordering an
investigation thereof. During the session day when Sen. Tañada was
supposed to have his privilege speech, all members of the Senate were
present except two Senators (so that there were 22 in attendance out of
the 24 members of the Senate).84 When the session was called to order,
Sen. Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour
speech but Sen. Pres. Avelino kept on ignoring him, and announced that he
would order the arrest of anyone who would speak without being
previously recognized. A commotion broke out. A move for adjournment
was opposed. Suddenly, Sen. Pres. Avelino banged his gavel and walked
out of the session hall followed by his followers (leaving only 12 senators in
the hall). Thereafter, senators who remained went on with the session (socalled
“rump session”), and voted to declare vacant the position of the
Senate President and designated respondent Sen. Cuenco as the Acting
Senate President. In this petition, Sen. Avelino prays for the Court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and to oust respondent Sen.
Cuenco.

Issues.
(1) Is the rump session a continuation of the morning session?
(2) Supposing the rump session was not a continuation of the morning
session, was there a quorum when Sen. Avelino was ousted and Sen.
Cuenca was elected as the Senate President?

Held.

(1) Yes. A minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent
the other 12 senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement.

(2) Yes. In view of Sen. Confesor’s absence from the country, for all
practical considerations, he may not participate in the Senate
deliberations. Therefore, an absolute majority of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of a quorum; that is, 12 senators in this case
constitute a quorum.85 Even if the 12 did not constitute a quorum,
they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members. If one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt [that
there is a quorum] then, and Sen. Cuenco would have been elected
just the same inasmuch as, at most, only 11 will side with Sen. Avelino.
It would be most injudicious [then] to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate.

Senate v. Ermita
GR 169777 [Apr 20, 2006]

Facts:
The case Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita involves petitioners like the
Senate, represented by Senate President Franklin Drilon, Bayan Muna,
Francisco I. Chavez, and others, against respondents led by Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita. The case arose from President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464), which required
senior executive officials to get the President’s consent before appearing
before Congress. The petitioners argued that this violated the separation of
powers and the right to information. The Supreme Court invalidated certain
parts of E.O. 464 on April 20, 2006. Motions for reconsideration were filed by
both sides, but the Court denied these on July 14, 2006.

Issues:

1. Whether Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are constitutional.

2. Whether the President can prohibit executive officials from appearing
before Congress without specific grounds for executive privilege.
 3. Whether PDP-Laban had standing to file the petition.

1. **Issue:** Are Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 constitutional?
**Ruling:** No, Sections 2(b) and 3 are unconstitutional. The Court invalidated
them because they lacked specificity in claiming executive privilege and allowed
officials to avoid congressional appearances without valid grounds.

2. **Issue:** Can the President prohibit executive officials from appearing before
Congress without specific grounds for executive privilege?
**Ruling:** No, the President cannot prohibit executive officials from appearing
before Congress without specifying valid grounds for executive privilege. The Court
emphasized that executive privilege must be invoked with particularity, ensuring
accountability and transparency.

3. **Issue:** Does PDP-Laban have the standing to file the petition?

**Ruling:** No, PDP-Laban does not have the requisite standing. The Court ruled
that its members represent their constituents, not the party itself, unlike Bayan
Muna, which represents its party. Thus, PDP-Laban could not file the petition.