Amendments and Revision

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971

FACTS: A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions
and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The Convention approved Organic Resolution No.
1, amending section one of article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines to lower the voting age to 18. Said
resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification
for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution. The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws as far as they
are in contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed
amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the
other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.

ISSUE: WON the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional.

HELD: NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and
resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of
the respondent COMELEC complying therewith are null and void. The Court is of the opinion that in providing
for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it
has been called to formulate, the Convention’s Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the
Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one
“election” or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not
denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all
the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention. Prescinding already from the fact that under
Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to
what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations
which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in the
fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we
do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can
say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of
the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the
Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every
part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter
in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different
institutions, which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there
is improper submission.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. Comelec
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, DAVIDE, JR., J.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
FACTS: Jesus Delfin filed with a petition with Comelec to amend the Constitution so as to lift the term limits of
elective officials via People's Initiative. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and others opposed the petition on
the ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress and no such law has been passed. They also argued that RA No. 6735, which was relied upon by
Delfin, contained no provision regarding amendments to the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 6735 which intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is inadequate to cover that system.

RULING: Yes. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise
of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last
minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII. Moreover, RA No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action vs. Commission on Elections
GR NO 129745, Sep 23, 1997

On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in
compliance with R.A.6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among
others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general
and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and
submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would
be submitted to the people for ratification: Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the
President the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the VicePresident, so that both the highest
officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all
other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that
purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively? The
COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in
Santiago v. COMELEC.PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside
the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Courts decision on the
Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive
based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of
parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in
Santiago v. COMELEC. The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated
September 23, 1997. It explained: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June10, 1997.The Court next considered the question of
whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court
re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6)other members of the
Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there wasno need to
take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case at
bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno,
Francisco,Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re examinationx x x
x9In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA
petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

RAUL L. LAMBINO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, CARPIO, J.

Two essential elements must be present: the people must author and sign the entire proposal and it must be
embodied in a petition. These are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

FACTS: Lambino Group, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Sec 5(b) and (c) and Sec 7 of RA No. 6735. They alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
3% of its registered voters. COMELEC denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.

RULING: NO. The framers intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be
"ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal, before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them and that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare
that proposal and pass it around for signature."The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. Two essential
elements must be present: the people must author and sign the entire proposal andit must be embodied in a
petition. These are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who
express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state such fact. This is an assurance that
every one of the several millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible to prove. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present
petition, a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted a
copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government.
The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Indeed, it is
basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the
initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were
not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris
Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet. With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be
physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before
they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the
6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw
the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
 GONZALES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967

FACTS: The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments to the
Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be elected in the general elections. In addition, the third, proposing that the same
Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, became Republic Act
No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned resolutions be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the
said law contending that the Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and
call for the holding of a constitutional convention.

ISSUE(S): Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional? WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments
to the Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention?

HELD: YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is
different from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments. Indeed, the
power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly.
When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,
when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the
very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself. Since, when proposing, as a
constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are
within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary
to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution.
Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power
to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 104768, EN BANC, July 21, 2003, CARPIO, J.

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration of
Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not
exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus
valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
FACTS: Based on the mandate of President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government which was tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Marcos, the AFP Anti-Graft Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. The AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation
on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, finding ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of
₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379
against Ramas. The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine
Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas. It alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of
the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. It prayed for forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to
his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano. Admitting her
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed
ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the
Philippine Constabulary raiding team. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground
that there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed
for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are
ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.
Petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February
1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights
had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may
confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the
time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986, immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution
2. Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

RULING: We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained
in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law
higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill
of Rights during the interregnum. To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative
during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of
the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the takeover of private
property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and
seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as
violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as
contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution. If any doubt should still persist in the face of the
foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should
be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom"
Constitution recognizes the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." And as
also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the "authority
to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986." Even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same
rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as
the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to
which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration. The revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. The Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations
under international law. It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not
exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have
also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect
to the items specifically described in the warrant. However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not
included in the warrant. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The
seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not,
they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them, Dimaano.

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974

FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his
beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall
be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and
so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child. On the other
hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance
proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the
insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy.

HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then
the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the
minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The
application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of
the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA
G.R. NO. L-9959. DECEMBER 13, 1916

FACTS: About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the
inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake, which took place in the
Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief board was appointed to distribute the
moneys thus voluntarily contributed and allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution.
By order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names
of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila. These were later distributed up to the
sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365,403.85. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de
Piedad, the Philippine Government, by order, directed its treasurer to turn over to the former the sum of
$80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each and were received on the following dates: February
15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account
of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the abovementioned allotments were made,
the Philippine Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, “through the Attorney-General and in
representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands,” the $80.000, together with interest. After due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and made the following contentions:

1. that the $80,000, given to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a donation, and
that said donation had been cleared;
2. that the Government of the Philippine Islands has not subrogated the Spanish
3. Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money abovementioned;
4. that the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful,
are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, thus, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action;
5. that the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought
by the Insular Government against the defendant appellant.

ISSUES:
WON the $80,000 received by Monte de Piedad was in form of donation.
WON the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even
considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty.
WON the Government is a proper party to the case under the doctrine of parens patriae.
WON the Philippine Government is bound by the statute of limitations.

HELD:

1. No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the
Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that
out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, there be transferred to it the
sum of $80,000. The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved
by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be
given to it as a donation. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General,
understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum
as a loan interest.” Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31,
1902, that it received the $80,000 “as a returnable loan, and without interest.” Thus, there cannot be the
slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and
not as a donation.

2. No. Court ruled that if legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among “that great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights,” they continued in force and are still in force unless they have
been repealed by the present Government. From the nature and class of the subject matter, it is clear
that it falls within the latter class. They are laws, which are not political in any sense of the word. They
conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent
control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting “provident institutions,
savings banks, etc.,” all of which are in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such
institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the
Insular Treasurer.

3. Yes. The ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests on the fact that
the money, being given to a charity became a public property, only applicable to the specific purposes
to which it was intended to be devoted. It is but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and
became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine
Government. To deny the Government’s right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public
policy. The Supreme Court of the United States in Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital, ruled that:
―insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are
often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting
as parens patriae. They show that this beneficent functions has not ceased to exist under the change of
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready
to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly
capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever. Chancellor Kent says:
In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all
charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests,
where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)

4. No. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows: In the absence
of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against
the sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischief to
be remedied are of such a nature that the state must necessarily be included, where the state goes into
 business in concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private
rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and
prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust
developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. For the foregoing reasons the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

v. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et al.
G.R. NO. 173034, October 09, 2007, J. Austria-Martinez

The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the ambit of the term commercial
speech. The absolute ban on advertising is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed
governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young children. It ought to be self-evident, for
instance, that the advertisement of such products which are strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech.
The laudable concern of the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot
justify the absolute, overarching ban.

FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The DOH issued the assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006. Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes found
under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 2006-0012 (RIRR) should be struck down. (YES)

RULING: The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the ambit of the term
commercial speech-that is, speech that proposes an economic transaction. This is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed
forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. An American jurisprudence provided a four-part
analysis for evaluating the validity of regulations of commercial speech: (1) The commercial speech must
concern lawful acitivity and not be misleading; (2) The asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If
both of these requirements are met, it must next be determined whether the state regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest. Applying the test in the case at bar, first, it is not claimed that the advertisement at issue is an unlawful
activity or is inaccurate. In fact, both the International Code and the Milk Code recognize and concede that
there are instances when breastmilk substitutes may be necessary. Second, there is no doubt that the
government interest in providing safe and adequate nutrition to infants and young children is substantial. This
interest is expressed as a national policy in no less than the fundamental law of our land and is also embodied
in various international agreements where we are a party. Third, there is an undeniable causal relationship
between the interest of government and the advertising ban. Unquestionably, breastfeeding is the tested and
proven method of providing optimal nutrition to infants and young children. The rationale of the absolute ban is
to prevent mothers from succumbing to suggestive and misleading marketing and propaganda which may be
contained in advertisements of breastmilk substitutes.Fourth, prescinding from these predicates, the critical
inquiry is: whether the complete suppression of the advertisement and promotion of breastmilk substitutes is
no more than necessary to further the interest of the state in the protection and promotion of the right to health
of infants and young children. The absolute ban on advertising is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary
to further the avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young children. It ought to
be self-evident, for instance, that the advertisement of such products which are strictly informative cuts too
deep on free speech. The laudable concern of the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and
young children cannot justify the absolute, overarching ban.

OPOSA v. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation
and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they
have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations. Needless
to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
Social Justice

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.

FACTS: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated
rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles for a year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. Among others, the petitioner
Calalang, concerned citizen, aver that the rules and regulations complained of: infringe upon constitutional
precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people; and that
it constitutes unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

HELD: YES, it still promotes social justice. In enacting the said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through
a mistaken sympathy towards any given group (e.g. the poor - because social justice is bringing the greatest
good to the greatest number, not necessarily just the poor like the drivers of the animal-drawn vehicles).

Social Justice:
➔ "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated.
➔ the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated
to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex.
➔ must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number."

RATIO:
(1) Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
(2) The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness of all.

ERNESTO DEL ROSARIO vs. VICTORIANO DE LOS SANTOS, et. al.

G.R. Nos. L-20589-90. March 21, 1968

The police power is then sufficient to free the sad plight of Filipinotenants and agricultural workers.
FACTS: Two petitions were led by Victorino and Tomas de los Santos before the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR) regarding their desire, as tenants of Del Rosario, to use Sec. 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
adopt the leasehold system provided, which will then change their status astenants.Del Rosario, however, in
his answer, challenged the validity of the cited provision; hence, a decision was rendered by CAR, which
rejected Del Rosario’s argument and declaring the relationship between him and delos Santos to be one of
leasehold tenancy. Del Rosario, however, in his answer, challenged the validity of the cited provision; hence, a
decision was rendered by CAR, which rejected Del Rosario’s argument and declaring the relationship between
him and delos Santos to be one of leasehold tenancy

ISSUE: WON Sec. 14 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act is unconstitutional.

RULING: The framers of the Constitution, mindful of the then growing feeling of dissatisfaction with the ability
of the government to cope with the poverty and misery of the vast majority of our people inserted the protection
to labor and social justice.The legislation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act le no doubt about the validity of the
remedy Congress intended to minimize the oppressive condition associated with agricultural labor. As far as
the social justice principle is concerned, PresidentMagsaysay explained it as, “he who has less in life should
have more in law.”Therefore, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955 was passed, which vested in the tenants
“the right to change the tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to leasehold tenancy and vice versa and
from one-crop-sharing agreement to another of the share tenancy. This was ruled upon already as
constitutional in the case of De Ramas v CAR.The purpose of this act is, according to Sec. 2, “to establish
agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principle of social justice; toward
adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landlords, to insure an equitable division of the produce
and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient
agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation the development
of peaceful, vigorous, and democracy rural communities. The police power is then sufficient to free the sad
plight of Filipino tenants and agricultural workers.

RAFAEL GELOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA
G.R. No. 86186. May 8, 1992

FACTS: Ernesto Alzona owned a 25,000 sqm farmland in Cabuyao, Laguna. In 1970, he entered into a written
contract with Rafael Gelos employing the latter as a laborer of the land with a daily wage of P5.00. When
Ernesto inform Gelos of the termination of his services, the latter refused the returned the land and continue
working on the land. Ernesto filed a complaint for illegal detainer against Gelos before the MTC. The MTC
declared his complaint to be “not proper” because there exist an “Agricultural Tenancy” between him and
Gelos. Hence, Ernesto filed a complaint before the Court of Agrarian Relations against Gelos for a declaration
of non-tenancy. The trial Court dismissed his complaint after finding that there exist an agricultural tenancy
relationship between him and Gelos. On appeal to the CA, it held that Gelos was not a tenant of the land in
question and ordered him to vacate the said land.

ISSUES:

1. WON there exist an Agricultural Tenancy Relationship between Ernesto and Gelos
2. WON Gelos is an Agricultural Tenant

RULING:

1. NO. There is NO AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ERNESTO AND GELOS.

As closed look at the facts shows that the contract executed between the parties is not an agricultural
tenancy contract but rather it is a Contract of Employment wherein the agreement is a lease of services
and not of the land in dispute. It does not complied with the requisites of agricultural tenancy.
 2. NO. GELOS IS NOT AN AGRICULTURAL TENANT. An agricultural tenant is a person who himself and
with the help of his immediate household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with
the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landowner under the
share tenancy system, or under a leasehold tenancy system. It was shown that Ernesto paid Gelos
lump sums for specific kinds of work in the subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his
ages as laborer thereon.

Elements of State

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines

G. R. NO. 183591. October 14, 2008

The associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept of
association presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.

FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP)—represented by its Chairman Rodolfo C. Garcia—and the MILF23—represented by its
Chairman Mohagher Iqbal—were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (the MOA-AD) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The
MOA-AD has been initialed by the parties. The MOA-AD mentions, among others, the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of
the Bangsamoro. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not materialize, however,
because the SC, upon motion of petitioners, issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the MOA-AD.

ISSUE: Does the MOA-AD violate Philippine national territory and sovereignty?

HELD: Yes. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of
the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is
a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the
spirit animating it—which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association—runs counter to the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. MAXIMO DELA PEÑA, Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 219581. January 31, 2018

FACTS: Appellant was charged, with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 532
allegedly committed as follows that on or about the 24th day of September 2005, along the river bank of
Barangay San Roque, Province of Samar, the accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, feloniously take and carry away valuable items (13
sacks of dried coconuts valued at P7,537.00; 2 pieces automatic watch valued at P6,796.00; 1 piece ([S]audi
gold) valued at P4,731.00; 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at P3,615.00[;] 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16
horse power with propeller valued at P26,000.00[;] cash money worth [P]1,000.00, all amounting to P49,679.00
to the damage and prejudice of the said owner. Appellant interposed an alibi and claimed that the Information
did not state that the vessel in question was in Philippine waters.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of piracy.

RULING: Yes, the elements of piracy under PD 532 are all present. Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as
follows: Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including
a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters shall be considered as piracy.
Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is defined as follows: [A]ll bodies of water, .x x x and all other
waters belonging to the Philippines x x x and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction. It is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters. The Information also
clearly alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the passengers were taken by
the appellant and his armed companions. The appellant was able to seize these items when he, along with
armed companions, boarded the victims' pump boat and seized control of the same

National Territory

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA vs EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011, Carpio

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS
III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory.

FACTS: R.A. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines. After five decades, RA
9552 was passed, amending RA 3046 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). The new law shorterned one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group and
the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the new law on the ground that: it reduces the Philippine maritime
territory, in violation of Article 1 of the Constitution and it opens the country’s waters to maritime passage by all
vessels, thus undermining Philippine sovereignty. Respondents, on the other hand, defended the new law as
the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS. Respondents stressed that RA 9522 does not relinquish
the country’s claim over Sabah.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

RULING: NO. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from
the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination
of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States
in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority
over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines
laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international
law.
Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan
G.R. No. 170867. December 4, 2018

There is no debate that the natural resource in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belongs to the State, noting
that Palawan’s claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing scheme, under
Section 7, Article X of the 1986 Constitution and Section 290 of the LGC, that allows local government units
(LGUs) to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth provided they are found within their
respective areas. The Court, however, found that existing laws do not include the Camago-Malampaya
reservoir within the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. It stressed that “As defined in its
organic law, the province of Palawan comprises merely of islands. The continental shelf, where the
CamagoMalamapaya reservoir is loated, was clearly not included in its territory.

FACTS: On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic or National Government), through
the Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service Contract No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V.
and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated (collectively SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of
petroleum operations in the area known as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore northwest of Palawan.
Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometers
from the main island of Palawan and 30 kms from the platform. The Provincial Government of Palawan
asserted its claim over forty percent (40%) of the National Government's share in the proceeds of the project. It
argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under
Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National Government disputed the claim, arguing that since
the gas fields were approximately 80 kms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the province and is within the national territory of the Philippines. On May 7, 2003, the Provincial
Government of Palawan filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa
against DoE Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., DoF Secretary Jose Isidro N. Camacho and DBM Secretary
Emilia T. Boncodin (Department Secretaries), docketed as Civil Case No. 3779. It sought judicial determination
of its rights under A.O. No. 381 (1998), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7611 or the Strategic Environmental Plan
(SEP) for Palawan Act, Section 290 of R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (Local
Government Code), and Provincial Ordinance No. 474 (series of 2000). It asked the RTC to declare that the
Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir is part of the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan and
that the Provincial Government of Palawan was entitled to receive 40% of the National Government's share in
the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project. The RTC decided Civil Case No. 3779 in favor of
the Province of Palawan. The RTC held that it was "unthinkable" to limit Palawan's territorial jurisdiction to its
landmass and municipal waters considering that the Local Government Code empowered them to protect the
environment, and R.A. No. 7611 adopted a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of
Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the
province.

ISSUE: WON the national wealth, in this case the Camago-Malampaya reservoir, is within the Province of
Palawan's "area" for it to be entitled to 40% of the government's share under Service Contract No. 38.

RULING: NO. There is no debate that the natural resource in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belongs to the
State, noting that Palawan’s claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing
scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the 1986 Constitution and Section 290 of the LGC, that allows local
government units (LGUs) to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth provided they are found
within their respective areas. The Court, however, found that existing laws do not include the
Camago-Malampaya reservoir within the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. It stressed
that “As defined in its organic law, the province of Palawan comprises merely of islands. The continental shelf,
where the Camago Malamapaya reservoir is located, was clearly not included in its territory. The Court also
held that Presidential Decree No. 1596, which constituted Kalayaan as a separate municipality of the Province
of Palawan, cannot be the basis for holding that the Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of Palawan’s
territory. It declared that the delineation of territory in PD 1596 refers to Kalayaan alone and that the inclusion
of the seabed, subsoil, and continental margin in Kalayaan’s territory cannot by simple analogy be applied to
Palawan. Likewise, it held that the definition of “Palawan” under Republic Act No. 7611 should not be taken as
a statement of territorial limits for purposes of Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, but in the context of
RA 7611 which is aimed at environmental monitoring, research, and education. The Court also did not
subscribe to Palawan’s argument posited by the Province of Palawan that the national wealth, the proceeds
from which the State is mandated to share with the LGUs, shall be wherever the local government exercises
any degree of jurisdiction. “An LGU’s territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or
assertion of powers. To hold otherwise may result in condoning acts that are clearly ultra vires. It may lead to,
the words of the Republic, LGUs ‘rush(ing) to exercise its powers and functions in areas rich in natural
resources even if outside its boundaries) with the intention of seeking a share in the proceeds of its exploration’
– a situation that ‘would sow conflict not only among the local government units and the national government
but worse, between and among local government units.’ The Court further held that 1) estoppel does not lie
against the Republic as previous acknowledgments of Palawan’s share were based on the mistaken
assumption that it it is entitled to the said allocation, 2) Section1, Article X of the 1987 Constitution did not
apportion the entire Philippine territory among the LGUs such that at any one time, a body of water or a piece
of land should belong to some province or city, 3) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS) did not confer on LGUs their own continental shelf as this pertains to the coastal state.

Cruz v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000

FACTS: The case arose when petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a
suit for prohibition and mandamus questioning the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), or Republic Act No. 8371, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR). They argued that these provisions unlawfully deprived the State of its ownership over lands of the public
domain and the natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. They also contended that the law’s definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral
lands,” which could include private lands, violated the rights of private landowners. After the filing of the
petition, respondents required by the Supreme Court filed their respective comments. The National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) defended the constitutionality of the IPRA. The Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Secretary of Budget and Management,
through the Solicitor General, partially agreed with the petitioners regarding the unconstitutionality of the
provisions granting ownership of natural resources to indigenous peoples. Several groups of intervenors,
comprising indigenous peoples and their supporting organizations, along with the Commission on Human
Rights and other related entities, filed motions to intervene, supporting the constitutionality of the IPRA. The
Supreme Court deliberated on the case, and votes were equally divided; therefore, pursuant to Rule 56,
Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition was dismissed, upholding the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371.

ISSUES: The core legal issues revolved around:

1. Whether the provision of IPRA granting ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples is
unconstitutional for being contrary to the Regalian Doctrine.
 2. Whether the provisions related to the identification, delineation, and recognition of ancestral domains
infringe upon the due process clause of the Constitution.
3. Whether certain aspects of IPRA violate the rights of private landowners.
4. Whether the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President, as characterized in
the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, contradicts the President’s control over executive departments.

RULING: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, maintaining the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions. The Court explained that the IPRA did not violate the Regalian Doctrine, as it merely recognized
the indigenous peoples’ right to their ancestral domains and lands, a right considered never to have been part
of the public domain. Moreover, the IPRA provided safeguards to ensure that the delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains would not infringe upon private property rights. The Court also found no merit in the
argument regarding the NCIP’s administrative relationship with the Office of the President, stating that it did not
diminish the President’s control over the executive department.

DOCTRINE: The case reiterates the doctrine that the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains
are recognized and protected under the law. It emphasized that ancestral domains and lands, occupied,
possessed, and utilized by indigenous peoples and their ancestors since time immemorial, are presumed
never to have been public lands and are considered private.

Class Notes:
1. Regalian Doctrine (Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution) – All lands of the public domain and
natural resources belong to the State.
2. Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA, R.A. 8371) – Recognizes and promotes the rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and lands.
3. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands – Defined under IPRA as areas occupied and possessed
by Indigenous Peoples under claims of individual or collective ownership since time immemorial.
4. Native Title – Acknowledges the pre-conquest rights of indigenous peoples to lands and domains held
under claims of ownership since time immemorial.
5. The principle of due process and equal protection of the laws (Section 1, Article III, 1987
Constitution) – No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

State Immunity

Republic v. Villasor
G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973

FACTS: A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the Republic of the Philippines thereby
confirming the arbitration award of P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent corporation. After the decision
became final and executory, respondent judge issued an order directing the sheriff to execute the said
decision, and the corresponding alias writ of execution was thus issued. Hence the sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks especially the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover
the amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank received such notice. As certified by the
AFP Comptroller, these funds of the AFP with the said banks are public funds for the pensions, pay, and
allowances of its military and civilian personnel. The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings,
challenges the validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and executory and
subsequently issuing an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.

ISSUE: WON he writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against public funds.
RULING: NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by private parties, there is corollary that
public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued has been
previously granted and the state‘s liability has been adjudged. Thus in the case of Commission of Public
Highways vs. San Diego, such a well settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee. The
universal rule that where the state gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimant‘s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution
and that the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific object is
appropriated by law.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 104269. November 11, 1993

When the State waives its immunity, all it does is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that
the State has a liability.

FACTS: The petitioner DA and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant thereto, guards were deployed by SSA in the
various premises of the DA. For underpayment of wages, nonpayment of the 13th month pay etc., several
guards of the SSA filed a complaint against the DA and SSA. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
finding the DA jointly and severally liable with SSA for the payment of the money claims and a writ of execution
was accordingly issued. The DA prayed to quash the writ of execution with the NLRC which did not. The DA
asserts State immunity.

ISSUE: May the writ of execution be directed against the properties of the DA to satisfy a final and executory
judgment?

HELD: No. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. The Court reiterated Republic v. Villasor: “power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
correspondent appropriation as required by law.”

City of Bacolod v. Phuture Visions Co., Inc.,

G.R. No. 190289. January 17, 2018

A Case on Governmental Immunity and Business Permit Disputes

FACTS: Phuture Visions Co., Inc. filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages against the City of Bacolod and
specific officials due to the closure of its bingo outlet in SM City Bacolod, which commenced operations without
a mayor’s permit. The closure, implemented on March 3, 2007, followed the refusal of city officials to issue the
permit for bingo operations despite Phuture’s assertion that it had completed all requirements and was
previously issued a claim slip for the permit. The case escalated through the legal system as follows:
1. Phuture’s application for a permit in January 2007 was met with discrepancies noted by city officials,
leading to the refusal to issue the permit for bingo operations.
 2. Despite the absence of the permit, Phuture initiated bingo operations on March 2, 2007, which led to
the closure of its outlet the following day by city officials, citing violation of City Tax Ordinance No.
93-001.
3. Phuture challenged the closure through a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, which was dismissed
by the RTC of Bacolod City for lack of merit, prompting Phuture to appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).
4. The CA partially granted Phuture’s appeal by reinstating the damages suit but affirmed the denial of the
temporary mandatory order for the operation of the bingo outlet.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the City of Bacolod and its officials can be held liable for damages to Phuture Visions Co., Inc.
2. If the power to issue, refuse, or revoke business permits exercised by the Mayor and city officials falls
under governmental functions, providing them immunity from suit.
3. The validity of Phuture Visions Co., Inc.’s operation of a bingo outlet without a mayor’s permit.
4. The procedural rightness of the legal actions taken by both parties in relation to the bingo outlet’s
operation and subsequent closure.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the City of Bacolod and its officials, reinstating the RTC’s
dismissal of Phuture’s petition. The Court clarified that:
1. The issuance or refusal of business permits is a governmental function, not merchantile, granting the
city and its officials immunity from suit without their express consent.
2. No consent to be sued was secured by Phuture, invalidating their claim for damages.
3. Phuture did not have a clear legal right to operate bingo games at SM Bacolod without the required
mayor’s permit, hence their operation was rightfully closed down.
4. Damages could not be awarded as Phuture failed to establish a breach of duty by the city officials.

DOCTRINE: This case underscored the doctrine of state immunity from suit without explicit consent, especially
when governmental functions—such as the issuance, refusal, or revocation of business permits—are involved.
It reinforced the principle that engaging in business, particularly those requiring special permits like gambling
operations, does not confer an inherent right to operate without compliance with local regulations and obtaining
the necessary permits.

Class Notes:
➔ State Immunity from Suit - the State or its political subdivisions cannot be sued without its consent
(Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
➔ Governmental Functions - the issuance, refusal, or revocation of business permits by city officials is
considered a governmental activity protected by state immunity
➔ Business Permit Requirement - operating a business, especially one involving gambling, requires
obtaining a mayor’s permit in compliance with local ordinances
➔ Damnum Absque Injuria - damages caused without a legal wrong or breach of duty do not afford a
right to compensation