CIVIL PROCEDURE PROSEC.

SALAZAR

GENERAL PROVISIONS CHAPTER 1

Applicability - In general, the Rules of Court apply in all courts of the country. However, Section
2, Rule 1, thereof provides for exceptions to this applicability.
Where there are no existing rules which the Supreme Court has pronounced to be used in a
particular court, the provisions of the Rules of Court as herein discussed shall be applied.
On the other hand, it becomes in applicable to certain courts or other bodies exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial powers when its provisions forbid its application.

Cases Governed
As a whole, the entire Rules of Court applies to civil actions, criminal actions, and
special proceedings. However, the Rules of Civil Procedure refers only to civil actions. A civil
action may either be ordinary or special

In what cases are these Rules not Applicable ? (E – LR – Cad - Nat – Ins)
a. Election cases;
b. Land Registration Cases;
c. Cadastral cases;
d. Petitions for naturalization; and
e. Insolvency Proceedings

They are also not applicable to other cases which are not provided under the Rules except by
analogy or in suppletory character when the same is practicable and convenient.

A good example under this provision is the case of Ong Chia vs. Republic, wherein the Supreme
Court allowed the appreciation of evidence which were only submitted during the appeal
stage.

In the said cases the petitioner contended that the documents presented by the OSG for the
first time on appeal should not be considered since they were not presented and formally
offered in evidence before the trial court.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due
to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions
not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.

“As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in
this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No.270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor...This is a
mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward
and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.”

In ordinary actions governed by the Rules of Court by evidence which was not presented
during trial and was not offered in evidence cannot be appreciated by the court in rendering
judgement. This contention, however was not sustained by the Supreme Court on the basis of
the provisions of Section 4, Rule 1. (Sec.4 -In cases not applicable)

Hence, according to it, the rule on offer of evidence required under Section 34, Rule 132, is not
applicable since the case involves a petition for naturalization.

Civil Action- Civil action has been defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. As mentioned
earlier, it may either be ordinary or special.

Both ordinary and special civil actions are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions. This
is, however, subject to specific rules prescribed for special civil actions.

Hence, where there is a rule specifically prescribed to apply to a special civil action, such
specific rule shall be applied accordingly, In the event that it may seem in conflict with the rules
provided for ordinary civil actions, the prescribed rule for that special civil action shall prevail.

If no specific rule is provided to govern a special civil action, then the rules on ordinary action
shall be applied.

As distinguished from a special proceeding , a civil action is a formal demand of a right by

one against another.
- Purpose : It is instituted to enforce or protect the right of the litigant or to prevent or
redress a wrong which may have been caused.
Where a litigant seeks to recover property from another, his or her remedy is to file an
action.

A special proceeding, on the other hand, is but a petition for a declaration of a status or ,
right or fact.
- Purpose:
If that litigants purpose is to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact, his or her
remedy is to institute a special proceeding.

Civil actions and special proceedings are governed by different sets of rules. Hence, matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper special
proceeding.
It cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, and the trial court cannot make any
declaration of heirship therein as the same may only be made in a special proceeding.

Uniform Procedure:
The Procedure in the Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts.

The Municipal Trial Courts (MUTC), the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MuTCC), the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC), and the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MetC).

Exceptions to the Inform Procedure

An exception to this uniform procedure is where a particular provision expressly or

impliedly mandates its application to only one of these courts. In such case, that particular
provision shall only be applied to the particularly specified court and not to the other.

Among the exceptions are the application of the Rule on Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer provided for under Rule 70 and the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First level
Courts. This is because cases governed by these Rules fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. Hence, their provision are not made applicable to
actions cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

On one hand, probate proceedings, even if cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
cannot be governed by the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First level Courts by the
express provisions thereof.

Rules of Court as Law

The Rules of Court is considered as law. It has the force and effect of law. It is not,
however, considered as a substantive law, but merely a procedural law.

Substantive law vs. Procedural Law

Substantive law creates , defines, or regulated rights concerning life, liberty, or property
or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs. It
operates prospectively and cannot be construed retroactively without affecting previous or past
rights except when there is a contrary intent in its provisions.

On the other hand, procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure so that courts may be able to administer justice. It does not come within
the legal conception of a retroactive law ( means that its application cannot be restricted by
the general prohibition on non-retroactive application of laws) , or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes.
Can the Rules of Court be given retroactive application?

Yes. Rules of Procedure can be given retroactive application if there is no vested right to
be impaired therein and for some reason that is the nature of procedural law.

Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. However, they may be given
retroactive effect on actions pending and underdetermined at the time of their passage, and
this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he or she is adversely affected.

Insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. Hence, it can be given
retroactive application on actions which are pending and underdetermined at the time of its
passage.

The 2019 amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure were also given retroactive
application to those pending proceedings at the time of its effectivity on May 1, 2020, except to
the extent that in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would
work injustice. In which case, the procedure under which such actions were filed shall govern.

Is this rule on retroactive application absolute?

No. The principle on the retroactive application of the rules is not absolute.

Exceptions to retroactive Application

Rules of procedure cannot be given retroactive application where:

a) The statute itself expressly or by necessary implications provide that pending actions
are excepted from its operation; or
b) Its retroactive application to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.

By express Provision of the Rule

As an example, the Rules on expedited Procedures in the first Level Courts expressly
provide that it shall prospectively apply only to cases filed from its date of effectivity (April 11,
2022). As such, cases which are pending and undecided prior to such date shall be governed by the
older rules which are applicable at the time that they were filed.

Would impair vested right

 A good illustration of this is the case of Tan Jr. vs. CA which involves a decision rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in favor of the respondents. Under the old (1997) rules
which were in effect at that time, the petitioner has 120 days from the date of entry of the
judgement within which to redeem the property subject of the case.

During the pendency of the appeal taken from said decision, the Supreme Court issued
a circular giving effect to a new rule wherein a judgement is considered final if no appeal or no
motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time prescribed under the Rules.

Such date when the judgement attains finality shall be deemed as the date of its entry.
Eventually, the decision of the Regional Trial Court was sustained on appeal and attained
finality.

However, it was only after several months from such finality that the decision was entered in
the book of entries of Judgement.

The trial court allowed the petitioners to redeem the property since it was within the
120-day period which, according to it, should be reckoned from the entry of judgment in the
book of entries.

This was questioned by the respondents arguing that the new rule provides otherwise,
and, by reason of its effectivity, the period given to the petitioners to redeem that property has
long expired.

In sustaining the petitioners, the Supreme Court held that:

- remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
- It does not create a new or take away vested rights.

They are retroactive in the sense and to the extent that they are applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The reason for such retroactive
application is the general rule that no vested right may attach, nor arise, from procedural rules.

It explained that the retroactive application of the new rule made by the Court of
Appeals is an error as it would result in great injustice to the petitioners.

Undoubtedly, prior to the effectivity of the new rule, petitioner has already attained
vested right to redeem the subject lot within a specific period and this right is a substantive
right. Under that old rule, the 120-day period should be reckoned from the actual entry of the
decision in the book of entries.
By giving retroactivity to the new rule which shortened the redemption period would
prejudice the already vested right of the petitioners.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine that the
Rules cannot be given retroactive application when there is already a vested right that would
be impaired or prejudiced thereby.

When Not Feasible

As discussed earlier, the 2019 amendments to the Rules allow their retroactive
application to cases which are still pending at the time of its effectivity. An exception to this is
when their application would not be feasible or would work injustice. In which case, the
procedure under which such actions were filed shall govern.

Colmenar vs. Colmenar

A complaint was filed by the plaintiff. In its answer, defendant Pro-Friends included lack
of cause of action as an affirmative defense while defendants Philippine Estates Corp. (PEC) and
Crisanta Realty raised the defense that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. They also
invoked other common defenses.

- An "affirmative defense" is a legal strategy where a defendant admits to committing the

alleged act but introduces additional facts or circumstances that, if proven, would
negate their liability, essentially providing a legal justification for their actions, even if
they technically broke the law; it's invoked when a defendant wants to explain why their
actions, although seemingly wrong, should not result in legal consequences due to
mitigating factors like self-defense, necessity, or insanity.
- Key points about affirmative defenses:
 Admission of wrongdoing:
Unlike a typical defense, an affirmative defense requires the defendant to acknowledge
that they committed the act in question.
 Burden of proof:
The defendant usually bears the burden of proving the elements of their affirmative
defense.
 Examples:
Common examples of affirmative defenses include self-defense, insanity, duress,
necessity, entrapment, and statute of limitations.
When to invoke an affirmative defense:
 When there is a legal justification:
If the defendant can present credible evidence to support a legal reason for their
actions, even if they technically violated the law, an affirmative defense can be raised.
 To mitigate liability:
In civil cases, an affirmative defense can be used to reduce the defendant's liability or
responsibility.
 Thereafter, PEC and Crisanta Realty filed a motion to set the affirmative defenses for
hearing. The trial court initially granted the motion. And set the case for hearing on the
affirmative defenses. However, it eventually set aside and considered the same to be
submitted for resolution along with the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Apollo and
Amaia.

Eventually, the trial court denied both the motions to dismiss and the affirmative
defenses. The respective motions for reconsideration filed by the defendants were also
denined. Thus, Amaia filed its answer and raised anew the ground of failure to state the cause
of action as an affirmative defense.

Meantime, the 2019 amendments to the Rules of Court took effect. Following the new
provision therein which allows the court to motu proprio resolve the affirmative defense that
the complaint failed to state the cause of action within 30 calendar days from the filing of the
answer, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint against PEC, Crisanta Realty,
Amaia and ProFriends.

The Supreme Court held that the trial court gravely erred in applying the 2019
amendments in resolving the affirmative defenses. According to it, the records readily show
that when the trial court motu prorio resolved the affirmative defenses, the prescribed 30-day
period had long expired.

Thus, it should have desisted from applying the 2019 amendments to the case because
at the time, the same was no longer feasible. Worse, according to the Supreme Court, is that
the trial court ignored injustice caused by the application of the amendments to the case
because as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff lost his substantial right to be heard on the
common affirmative defense of PEC, Crisanta Realty and Amaia, and his right to seek a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, which were both granted to him by the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Construction and application of the rules

Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious administration of
justice. It is designed to provide for a practical system so that the parties in a litigation are
accorded full and fair opportunity to present their respective positions.

What is the general rule?

Generally, the Rules must be strictly construed and applied. Remember that the rules
were designed and laid down to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation and to protect the
substantive rights of all party litigants. Its basic purpose is to have an orderly presentation and
disposition of every action or proceeding. As an adjective law, it should both be treated merely
as remnant of the substantive law. Without such technical rules, there would be judicial
anarchy.
Sec. 6 Rule 1 (Liberal Construction as an exception to the General rule of Strict
Construction)

The provision on liberal construction as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 1, is more of an exception
rather than the general rule. Thus:

“These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”

A reading of this provision will readily show that the intention. To give the rules a liberal
construction is only if it will serve the inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. To
this, where its liberal construction will not serve such purpose, the Rules must be strictly
enforced.

As explained by the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Nachura, in Asia United
Bank vs. Goodland Co Inc.

“The emerging trend if jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible
application of the Rules of Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding the bench
and the bar that zealous compliance with the rules is still the general course of action. Rules of
Procedure are in place to ensure the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of cases; to this end,
inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or
the exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when
the purpose of justice requires it.”

“While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice. A liberal interpretation and application of the
rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.

From this, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the primordial policy is faithful
observance of the Rules of Court. The relaxation or suspension of its application should only be
allowed for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases in order to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his or her thoughtfulness in not complying with
the prescribed procedure.

There are, however, recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as:

(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; ( P & W reasons )

(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; ( Rel from Injustice )
(3) good-faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the
time of the default; ( GF )
(4) the existence of a special or compelling circumstances; ( S or C Circumstance )
(5) the merits of the case; ( Mer )
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; ( No-Att- F or N)
(7) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;(L-S – Rev–Friv
D)
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (Par – No -Unj Prej)
(9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant’s fault; (F-A-M-E )
(10) peculiar, legal, and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (Pec - Leg- Eq)
(11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (Subs J & F Play)
(12) importance of the issues involved; (Imp)
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances. ( S- D
of J )

In Sablas vs. Sablas, Short Facts: complaint for judicial partition, inventory, and
accounting was filed by respondents Esterlita S. Sablas and Rodulfo S. Sablas against petitioners
Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma S. Sablas in the Regional Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte. Petitioners
filed a late answer; Trial Court admitted it, no default motion filed. CA ruled default
mandatory; SC reversed, upheld trial court’s discretion, favoring merits over technicalities.

Doctrine: it was held that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit
the defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary
period for filing the answer expires.

The Rules of Court provides discretion on the part of the trial court:
- to extend the time for filing an answer; and also
- to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period

The defendant’s answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of

default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff.
Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period, but before the defendant
is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the
answer should be admitted.

Duty of the Party Invoking Liberality

Concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort

on the part of the party invoking liberality (1) to adequately explain his or her failure to abide
by the rules. Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of
proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. Thus,
there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, (2) to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his or her failure to comply with the rules.
 According to the Supreme Court the bare invocation of the “interest of substantial
justice” is not a magic word that will automatically compel it to suspend procedural rules.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights.

CHAPTER 2

Commencement of Civil Actions

A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court.

From this provision of the Rules, it is settled that an action is considered commenced at the
time the complaint is actually filed in court.
The (1) actual date appearing-on-stamped receipt placed by the on the pleading is the
date of its actual filing. Hence, it is not the date of the pleading nor the date of the same was
prepared that governs the commencement of the action.
When an action is filed through other modes, say by mail, the (2) date of mailing
thereof as appearing on the stamp mark placed by the postal service shall be deemed as the
date of its filing. This is, however, subject to the requisite payment of the docket fees which we
will be discussing.

As to Additional Defendants

S5 R1 [2nd sentence]
- If additional defendants are impleaded in the later pleading, the action is commenced
with regard to them on the date of the filing of such later pleading, irrespective of
whether the motion of its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.
- The commencement of the action as against those additional defendants is the date of
the actual filing of such amended complaint.

The determination of actual commencement of the action against these additional

defendants is (2) not affected by the subsequent ruling of the court granting or denying
admission of such pleading or amendment which seeks to implead them.

Explanation: when a new party, considered an "additional defendant," is brought into a lawsuit through
an amended pleading, the date the action is considered to have begun against them is fixed at the
moment the amended pleading is filed, regardless of whether the court later decides to allow or reject
that amendment; the court's decision on the amendment does not change the starting date (which is
amended pleading’s date) of the action against the additional defendant.

What is the importance of this provision? Sec. 5 Rule 1 [second sentence]

 It bears to stress that commencement of the action effectively interrupts the running of
prescriptive period for such case. Thus, with the express provision of the Rules as to when an
action is deemed commenced, it can readily be determined if the action has prescribed or not
prior to its filing in court as to the defendant or defendants named therein.

Likewise, when an action is eventually dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing, the
period which lapsed prior to the commencement of the action and the period which lapsed
during the intervening period prior to the re-filing may be determined with certainty. These
periods may be used as reference in determining whether or not the re-filing of such action is
already barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Basis of Ordinary Civil Actions

S1 R2
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. A civil action which is not
based on case of action is dismissible.

Cause of Action
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a part violates the right of another.
The elements of a cause of action are: ( R – O – A/O cons breach)

1. A right in favor of the plaintiff, by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of such right of the
plaintiff of constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the matter (plaintiff )may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

Here, there is basis for the institution of an ordinary civil action when a person, either
natural or juridical, believes that he or she has a right which was violated by another. Such
violation may be by act or by omission. The owner of such right may sue that other person,
either for the enforcement or the protection of that right which was violated, or for the
prevention or redress of a wrong caused thereby.

Absent such right or the violation of that right, a party cannot be said to have a cause of
action.

When the Plaintiff is Not the Real Party in Interest

 When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest S2 R3 [1stsentence], the action is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. This ruling was further expounded by
the Supreme Court –

Spouses Oco vs. Limbaring - by explaining that the 1st purpose is to prevent the
prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title , or interest in the case and 2nd to
require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action. 3rd to
avoid multiplicity of suits and 4th to discourage litigation and 5th keep it within certain bounds,
pursuant to public policy.

When Demand is Necessary

In a written contract, the cause of action does not accrue until the party under
obligation refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with his or her duty therein. Where
demand is necessary, the actual breach of the right under that contract accrues only if the
obligor refused to comply therewith despite such demand. It is only at such point in time
that the civil action may be instituted. This is because only at that point in time that the
obligee’s cause of action accrues.

Sufficiency of a Cause of Action

A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgement may be rendered thereon if the

alleged facts were admitted or proved. It bears to emphasize that where the defendant
raises the defense that plaintiff has no cause of action or that the plaintiff failed to state a cause
of action, it is tantamount to the hypothetical admission of the material facts alleged in the
complaint.

This hypothetical admission, however, admits of some exceptions (Falsi JD-LI-IE-Un). The
veracity of the allegations in the complaint cannot be said to have been hypothetically
admitted when the falsity thereof is 1stsubject to judicial notice. There is also no
hypothetical admission where the allegation is 2ndlegally impossible. This is also true when
the facts alleged is 3rd inadmissible in evidence or when the facts alleged appear to be
4thunfounded based on the record or document in included in the pleading.

Failure to State a Cause of Action

It is of utmost importance that the party instituting the action must state his or her
cause of action in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. Failing which, the same (1) can
be utilized as an affirmative defense which will be the topic of the later discussions.

In fact, after service of the answer, (2) leave of court may be refused by the Court to
amend a complaint which stated no cause of action from the beginning.

Failure to State a Cause of Action vs. Insufficiency of Cause of Action

 Although failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are both no longer
available as grounds in a motion to dismiss by reason of the recent amendments to the
rules, their difference is worth discussing so that the proper ground may be alleged in the
responsive pleading and avoid their being used interchangeably.

The Rules simply require that plaintiff alleges his or her cause of action in the complaint.
In determining whether or not the complaint states a cause of action the court is faced with
the issue on the sufficiency of the allegation in the pleading. If the court may validly grant
the relief prayed for when the truth of the allegation of facts in the complaint are proven
or hypothetically admitted, then the pleading sufficiently stated a cause of action.

In doing so, only the statements in the complaint may be considered by the court. The
Court cannot take cognizance of the external facts or even hold preliminary hearings to
determine the existence of these facts. It is also without regard to any defense that may be
assessed by the defendant. Only the allegations in the complaint may be considered and it
would be a procedural error on the part of the court to do otherwise. The court may not
even inquire into the truthfulness of these allegations.

On the other hand, lack or insufficiency of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the factual basis for the cause of action. This is determined after stipulations and
admissions are made or after the conduct of hearing on the merits of the case.

Splitting a Single Cause of Action [S4 R3]

A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. The institution
of more than one suit for a single cause of action amounts to splitting a single cause of
action, which makes the action dismissible.

Effect of Splitting a Single Cause of Action

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgement upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of
others. This leads to two possible results to wit:

a) The filing of the second and subsequent suits based on the same cause of action will
become an available ground for the dismissal of the other actions; or
b) When judgement on the merits is rendered on any of these actions instituted, such
judgement shall be a ground for the dismissal of all the other causes of action.

The First one speaks of litis pendentia or the pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause, while the second refers to res judicata or the bar of any prior
judgement.
Illustration
Sonia obtained a loan from Badong. As a security for the payment of that loan, Sonia
mortgaged her property to Badong wherein she executed a deed of mortgage in favor of the
latter.

When Sonia failed to pay the loan, Badong filed an action against her for the collection of
the amount due thereon. While the action is still pending, Badong also instituted an action
for the foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Sonia over her property.

From the given facts, it is obvious that there is only one cause of action available to
Badong, and that is Sonia’s failure to pay the loan. By instituting the action for the
collection of the amount due from the loan and another action to foreclose the mortgage
which guaranteed the payment of that loan, Badong ended up splitting a single cause of
action.

Upon the filing if the second action it becomes an available ground for the dismissal of any
of the two actions or if judgement on the merits is rendered on any of these actions, such
judgement may be used as ground for the dismissal of the remaining action.

As explained in Marilag vs. Martinez, in loan contracts secured by a real-estate-mortgage,

the rule is that the creditor- mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor-
mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt. Through the filing of a personal action for collection of
sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.

The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is
complete by itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate
mortgage, he or she waives the action for the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for
the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of the
debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged
properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgement shall only issue after it is established that
the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the
outstanding obligation.

In Rivera Golf Club, Inc. vs. CCA Holdings, B.V., Rivera Golf entered into a Management
Agreement with CCA Holdings for the management and operation of the club for the
monthly fee. The agreement was for a period of five years. They also entered into a co-
terminus Royalty Agreement wherein Riviera Golf would pay CCA Holdings royalty fees for
allowing it to use its name to market its club shares. However, due to financial crisis, Riviera
golf pre-terminated the agreements. To this, CCA Holdings demanded from it the
settlement of the unpaid monthly and royalty fees. Riviera Golf refused on the ground that
CCA Holdings violated the terms of the agreement.
 Hence, CCA Holdings filed an action against Riviera Golf for sum of money wherein the
parties eventually settled. The Court, thus, rendered a decision based on the compromise
agreement they executed.

Subsequently, CCA Holdings demanded from Riviera Golf the payment of the projected
income or expected business profits it was supposed to derive from the unexpired term of
the agreement. Unheeding the demand, CCA Holdings filed another complaint for sum of
money against the latter. Upon motion, the Trial court dismissed the second complaint
applying the rules on res judicata and splitting of cause of action which, however, was set
aside by the Court of Appeals.

Supreme Court sustained the RTC’s dismissal of the case saying that: “with respect to the
fourth element, a careful examination of the allegations in the two complaints shows that
the cases involve the same parties and the same subject matter. While the Civil Case no.
01-611 is for the collection of unpaid management and royalty fees, and Civil Cases No. 03-
399 on the other hand, is for recovery of damages for the premature termination of the
parties agreements, both cases were nevertheless filed on the basis of the same
Management and Royalty Agreements. This, we agree that these two cases refer to the
same subject matter”.

It explained that: “in both Civil Case No. 01-611 and Civil Case No. 03- 399 CCA Holdings
imputed the same wrongful act- the alleged violations of the terms and conditions of the
Management and Royalty Agreements. In Civil Case No. -01-611, CCA Holdings cause of
action rests on Rivera Golf’s Failure to pay the licensing fees, reimbursement claims, and
monthly management and incentive fees, reimbursement claims, and monthly
reimbursement and incentive fees.

In Civil Case No. 03-399 on the other hand, CCA Holdings’ cause of action hinges on the
damages it allegedly incurred as a result of Riviera Golf’s premature termination of the
Management and Royalty Agreements (i.e., expected business profits it was supposed to
derive for the unexpired two-year term of the Management Agreement). Although differing
in form, these two cases are ultimately anchored on Riviera golf’s breach of the
Management and Royalty Agreements. Thus, we conclude that they have identical causes of
action.

It is settled rule that the application of the doctrine of res judicata or identical causes of
action does not depend on the similarity or differences in the forms of the two actions.
A party cannot, by varying the form of the action or by adopting a different method of
presenting his case, escape the operation of the doctrine of res judicata.
The test of identity of causes of action rests on: whether the 1st same evidence would 2nd
support and establish the 3rd former and the present causes of action.

The pleadings and record of the present case show that there is a glaring similarity in
the documentary evidence submitted to prove the claims under two complaints. The pieces
of evidence both in the collection of unpaid management and royalty fees, and the recovery
of damages for the expected business profits aim at the establishing the breach of
Management and Royalty Agreements.

Based on the allegations in the two complaints, the facts that are necessary to support
the second complaint would have been sufficient to allow CCA Holdings of evidence in these
two cases therefore strongly suggest the identity of their causes of action.”

Joinder of Causes of Action [S5 R2]

A party, on the other hand, may assert as many causes of action which he or she may
have against another party. This refers to the joinder of causes of action.

The Supreme Court explained in Ada, et. Al. vs. Baylon, that by a joinder of actions, or
more properly, a joinder of causes of action mean uniting of two or more demands or
rights of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of
which could be made basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration, or
petition.

A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies, or
rights of action in one declaration.

MEMORIZE: Conditions in Joinder of Causes of Action: [Sec. 5 Rule 2]

A party may assert in one pleading as many causes of action as he or she may have
against an opposing party, provided that:

1) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules of joinder of parties;
2) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
3) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein;
and
4) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Note: If several causes of action are instituted in one pleading and such joinder of causes of
action does not conform with these conditions, it results in the misjoinder of causes of
actions. [Sec. 6 Rule 2]

In the case of Ada vs. Baylon, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for
partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for rescission of the said
donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. This is due to the fact that an action for partition is
a special civil action governed by special rules while an action for rescission is an ordinary
civil action governed by ordinary rules of civil procedure.
 The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and the ordinary civil
action of recission prevents them from joining in one complaint or to be tried in a single
proceeding.

However, the misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. It
may on motion of a party or initiative of the court be severed and proceeded with
separately.

MEMORIZE : Definition of Cause of Action: [Sec.2 Rule 2]

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

PART 3 Parties to Civil Action

Who are parties mentioned under the Rules of Court?

a) Natural person
b) Juridical person
c) Entity authorized by law

Correlating with the Art. 44 of the NCC, the following are juridical persons authorized by law to
be parties in a civil action:
1) The state and its political subdivisions
2) Other corporations, institutions, entities for public interest or purpose
3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which law
grants a juridical personality; separate and distinct from that of each shareholder.

CDCP vs. Cuenca (third-party complaint)

Short facts: UITC defaulted on a P600,000 surety bond; MICI paid Goodyear and sought
reimbursement. PNCC, UITC's majority stockholder, was absolved as the corporate veil
wasn't pierced, and it wasn't party to the indemnity agreement.
 To protect MICI's interests, UITC, Edilberto Cuenca (UITC President), and Rodolfo
Cuenca (UITC Board Member) executed an Indemnity Agreement in favor of MICI.
Edilberto signed in both his official and personal capacity, while Rodolfo signed only
in his personal capacity. They agreed to jointly and severally indemnify MICI for any
payments made under the surety bond.

 On February 18, 1983, Goodyear informed MICI of UITC's default and requested
payment of P600,000.00 under the surety bond. MICI sent demand letters to UITC,
Edilberto, and Rodolfo, but they failed to settle the obligation. MICI paid Goodyear
P600,000.00 on April 25, 1983.
  On May 3, 1983, MICI demanded reimbursement from UITC, Edilberto, and
Rodolfo, including legal interest. UITC responded that Construction & Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), now Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), was reviewing UITC's financial plans to pay creditors. UITC
requested MICI to delay legal action, which MICI agreed to, but no payment was
made.

 On July 1, 1983, MICI filed a complaint for sum of money against UITC, Edilberto,
and Rodolfo, seeking indemnity for the P600,000.00 paid to Goodyear, plus interest
and attorney's fees.

Third-Party Complaint
Rodolfo filed a third-party complaint against CDCP (now PNCC), alleging that CDCP had
assumed his liability under the indemnity agreement based on a board resolution. UITC
also proposed a payment plan to MICI, but no settlement was reached.
Trial Court Decision
On January 6, 1994, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) held UITC and PNCC (CDCP) jointly
and solidarily liable to MICI under the indemnity agreement. The court dismissed the
complaint against the Cuencas (Rodolfo). UITC and PNCC appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC decision on October 28, 2003.
Appeal to the Supreme Court
PNCC(CDCP) filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court, arguing that it should
not be held liable under the indemnity agreement as it was not a party to it and that
the corporate veil should not be pierced.

Ratio:
Third-Party Liability: A third-party defendant (PNCC) cannot be held liable to the
plaintiff (MICI) unless directly impleaded by the plaintiff.
PNCC was brought into the case by Rodolfo Cuenca for a "remedy over," not as
a direct defendant.
Supreme Court absolved PNCC from liability under the indemnity agreement and
dismissed the third-party complaint against it. Since PNCC's liability was based
on Rodolfo's liability, PNCC cannot be held liable once Rodolfo was
absolved.

Dr. Treyes vs. Larlar (Heir as a plaintiff)

Short Facts: Widower executed affidavits claiming sole heirship over deceased wife's
estate; siblings contested, seeking annulment, reconveyance, and partition. SC upheld
jurisdiction, no prior heirship declaration required.

- Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner Dr. Nixon L. Treyes, passed away on
May 1, 2008, without a will and without bearing any children. She left behind seven
siblings (private respondents) and 14 real estate properties, which were conjugal
 properties owned jointly with petitioner Treyes. Respondents (Rosie's siblings) sent
letters to petitioner Treyes in 2012 requesting a conference to settle Rosie's estate but
received no response. They later discovered that the titles to the properties had been
canceled and reissued in petitioner Treyes' name.
- Respondents Larlar filed a Complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, seeking:
o Annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication.
o Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
o Reconveyance of ownership and possession.
o Partition of the estate.
- Treyes filed two Motions to Dismiss, arguing:
 Lack of jurisdiction over his person.
 Improper venue.
 Prescription of the action.

RTC denied the Motions to Dismiss, holding that it had jurisdiction over the annulment,
reconveyance, and damages claims but not over the partition claim. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, ruling that the case was an ordinary civil
action, not a special proceeding, and that the action was not barred by prescription.

Doctrine / Ruling:

1. Heirship Determination:
o A prior judicial declaration of heirship in a special proceeding is not required
before filing an ordinary civil action to enforce successional rights. The private
respondents, as siblings of the deceased, had legal standing to assert their rights
as heirs under the Civil Code.
2. Exceptions to the Rule:
o The Court recognized exceptions where a regular court may determine heirship
in an ordinary civil action, such as when the parties voluntarily submit the issue,
or when a special proceeding is impractical or unnecessary. However, such
determinations are binding only on the parties involved and do not preclude a
subsequent special proceeding.

Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary Reyes