Unit 2 Origin of Cinema
Unit 2 Origin of Cinema
Thematical points
I) The Film’s Distinctiveness as an Art Form: The Stage Actor and the Screen Actor
a) In the latter half of his essay, Benjamin narrows his focus on the film as the most representative
example of mechanically reproduced art in the contemporary era.
b) He goes on to raise some fundamental concerns about the ontological status of cinema as a new
art form that we touched upon in the introduction to this chapter. Benjamin begins by discarding
as fruitless the scholarly attempts to gauge whether cinema is an art. Instead, for him, the far more
critically interesting question that needs attention is the way cinema transforms “the entire nature
of art.” He compares the artistic performances of a stage actor and a screen actor to explore the
multiple ways cinema is distinctive from other pre-existing, more established art forms.
c) The most obvious point of divergence between the two modes of acting is that while we encounter
a flesh and blood actor on stage, a screen actor’s work is mediated by a camera: the latter does not
perform before a live audience. Consequently, the organic wholeness of the stage actor’s presence
is undercut by the technologically-inflected performance of the screen actor. The screen actor’s
“acting” is constituted of not only her/his individual efforts but also the varying effects of camera
angles, close-ups, lighting choices, editing patterns and so on. Just as mechanical reproduction
leads to the loss of the “aura” of the artwork, the film – as a form that is not only “subject to” but
also “founded in” technology – undermines the aura of the actor’s corporeal presence: “the aura
that envelops the actor vanishes, and with it the aura of the figure that he portrays.”
d) This is also so because the screen actor’s performance is discontinuous: it is “composed of many
separate performances,” such that a “jump from a window” and the “ensuing flight,” witnessed as
one uninterrupted sequence on screen, need not be shot in that manner. Shots are often taken in
different places and times and then inserted into the final product through post-production editing
procedures. Screen acting, to that extent, is thoroughly centred on artifice: it challenges
verisimilitude, or lifelikeness, one of the central artistic principles of realist-naturalist drama.
I) In place of lifelikeness, cinema gives us a technologically-generated effect of reality, “a
thoroughgoing permeation of reality with mechanical equipment.”
II) The Film and Psychoanalysis
a) In Section 13 of the essay, Benjamin furthers his arguments about the film by analysing how the
artform “enriches our field of perception” in terms of Freudian theory. Just as psychoanalysis – a
method for treating mental illnesses involving sustained, uninhibited conversations between a
patient and a trained practitioner pioneered by the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud – has
deepened our understanding of the mind, the film brings about a greater penetration of reality
from different points of view.
b) It is the technical prowess of the camera that makes this deep dive possible: close-ups, for
instance, expand our perception of space, just as the slow-motion extends time. “By close-ups
of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects [and] by exploring
common place milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera,” cinema reveals to us “an
immense and unexpected field of action.” It presents our everyday reality to us on screen in a new
light, defamiliarizing its contours such that we begin to acquire a fresh perspective into our
surroundings.
III) The Film and the Painting: The Subversive Power of Distractedness as a Mode of Perception
a) In Section 14, Benjamin returns to drawing comparisons between the film and other art forms,
painting in this case. While a painting, with its static depiction of life, usually invites
“contemplative immersion,” (when you look at a painting, you are compelled to think about it and
relate it to your life in some sense) cinema, with a rapid movement of shots, epitomises dynamic
change and fluidity.
b) The “shock effect” of the film – one that would have been felt much more keenly by cinema’s
first spectators than their contemporary counterparts who are much more habituated to cinematic
rhythm – engenders a distracted state of reception. This has long been seen as the basis for a
philosophical critique of cinema as an infantilising massspectacle that requires no intelligence,
discretion or concentration.
c) According to Georges Duhamel, whom Benjamin quotes and refutes in the essay, cinema is “a
pastime for helots, a diversion for the uneducated, wretched worn-out creatures . . . which kindles
no light in the heart and awakens no hope other than the ridiculous one of someday becoming a
‘star’ in Los Angeles.” This is an unabashedly elitist tirade against a democratic art form that
precisely owing to its roots in mechanical reproduction is accessible to a wider cross-section of
consumers as compared to literature or the “finer” arts.
d) Against the grain of such arguments, Benjamin considers the state of distraction that the
film generates as a strength. Echoing the Marxist German playwright Bertolt Brecht (1898-
1956) on the verfremdungseffekt (usually translated as “alienation effect”), Benjamin argues that
the experience of watching a film, interrupted as it is by a constant stream of moving images,
prevents the audiences from developing a stable sense of association or identification with the
cinematic spectacle. This then positions them as impersonal critics and judges of the film,
provoking them to thought and perhaps to action. “A man who concentrates,” Benjamin states,
“before a work of art is absorbed by it . . . In contrast, the distracted mass absorbs the work of
art.” Distractedness, hence, is a preferred mode over concentration when it comes to the
reception of the film: it transforms cinematic spectators from being naïve and passive recipients
of artistic illusion to active and judicious meaning-makers.
e) Further, since cinema as an art form is often collectively experienced by the masses in a public
theatre, it can be used as a tool for their shared political interests far more categorically in
comparison to a painting. Paintings are often unable to become “object[s] for simultaneous
collective experience” even when they are exhibited in galleries and salons because, despite the
changes wrought by mechanical reproduction of art, they continue to remain shrouded in an aura
of impenetrability.
f) The residual nostalgia for art’s “cult value,” its purported originality and authenticity, finds
expression in our relatively distanced and reverential attitude towards paintings. This is the basis
for Benjamin’s stringent faith in the politically revolutionary potential of the film: “the reactionary
attitude toward a Picasso painting changes into the progressive reaction toward a Chaplin movie.”
g) Articulating a rather valid concern that Benjamin’s essay sometimes runs the risk of romanticising
the emancipatory power of the film, Theodor Adorno’s (a critic) key point is that mass-reproduced
forms of art lend themselves just as readily to the counterrevolutionary trends they are meant to
subvert. To put it simply, no art form can be seen as essentially or intrinsically more progressive
than the other, even when one concedes the qualitative differences among them. Cinema can very
well serve the interests of modern capitalistic societies that thrive on the growing
commercialisation and commodification of art.
h) By turning people into complacent, resigned consumers of “entertainment” that is often based on
damaging stereotypes and bourgeois( middle class people) propaganda, cinematic representations
can effectively ratify rather than threaten the status quo.
IV) Conclusion: Cinema as a Counter to the Fascistic Aestheticization of Politics
a) As a German of Jewish ancestry, living in exile in Paris when he composed this essay, Benjamin
was acutely sensitive to the inexorable rise of fascism in his native country as well on the
continent. This ominous development required a concrete and powerful response: Benjamin
sought to emphasize the revolutionary promise of mass-reproduced forms of art by way of
countering the fascistic attempt to render all art reactionary, self-enclosed, and ultimately
“apolitical.”
b) In the epilogue of the essay, Benjamin connects his ideas to these larger socio-political
circumstances in mid-twentieth-century Europe. Fascism, in his view, seeks to channel the
potentially transformative energies of the proletarian masses under democratic systems in the
direction of racial pride, ethnonationalism and, eventually, war. To that extent, the very purpose of
waging war is to preserve the established property structure that the newly-empowered masses
strive to eliminate.
c) Fascism proceeds, then, by rendering politics “aesthetic” – glorifying and mythologising its
dangerous project in terms of self-serving narratives and symbols as well as turning war not only
inevitable but also, through a cruel and twisted logic, beautiful.
d) To counter such a cynical aestheticization of politics under fascism, “Communism responds by
politicizing art.” The implication here is that mechanical reproduction aids such politicisation of
art and hence the communist goal of a proletarian revolution by effecting a fundamental shift in
the very way we understand and experience art.
e) The film, in many ways still coming into its own when Benjamin first published the essay in 1936,
holds forth for him the promise of utopian change. With its unique embeddedness in technological
innovation, its widespread reach, and its capacity to inaugurate modes of perception that subvert
fascistic efforts to depoliticise art and culture, the film is emblematic of a paradigm shift that
portends a more egalitarian and emancipatory role for the arts in society than was heretofore
conceivable.