North Korean nuclear

fuel rods, Yongbyon.

A Quiet Revolution
Nuclear Strategy
for the 21st Century
By J A M E S J. W I R T Z and J A M E S A. R U S S E L L

AP/ Wide World Photo

T
here is a quiet revolution underway in assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, defense, and
U.S. nuclear strategy. It is overshad- denial articulated in the Quadrennial Defense
owed by the global war on terrorism, Review in 2001. Both reviews set priorities for
questions over homeland security, and formulating defense and foreign policy, develop-
chaos in the international order. It is revolution- ing a strategic relationship with Russia, and
ary because it reflects many changes in threats, countering proliferation of nuclear, biological,
capabilities, and doctrine that have preoccupied and chemical (NBC) weapons and long-range
nuclear planners since the 1950s. It also high- ballistic missiles.
lights the way the Armed Forces prepare for fu-
ture conflicts. New Threats, New Opportunities
The vision found in the Nuclear Posture Re- Nuclear policy reflects strategic, political,
view (NPR) is part of a wider endeavor to de- and technological trends that emerged over the
velop new policies.1 It embraces the concepts of last decade. The collapse of the Soviet Union pre-
sented an opportunity to foster a new strategic re-
lationship. The United States concluded that mas-
James J. Wirtz is the chairman and James A. Russell is Office of the sive nuclear arsenals, which had produced the
Secretary of Defense fellow in the National Security Affairs Department concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD),
at the Naval Postgraduate School. arms control agreements, and many views of the

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 9

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■ NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Dismantling Tu-160
in Ukraine.

AP/ Wide World Photo (Efrem Lukatsky)

Cold War, were no longer relevant. Moreover, missiles and hinted at this new threat. A na-
both countries would benefit by reducing defense tional intelligence estimate issued in 1995,
budgets. During the 2000 Presidential campaign, Emerging Missile Threats to North America during
supporters of George Bush noted that the arms the Next Fifteen Years, posed relatively benign
control regime prevented adjustments to meet fis- threats. It was discredited by the Rumsfeld Com-
cal realities and new threats. Arms control was mission Report and the North Korean test of the
the source of acrimony; the time had come to Taepo-Dong missile in 1998. The sarin attack in
stop regarding Russia as an enemy and to develop the Tokyo subway in 1995, Indian and Pakistani
a more cooperative approach to managing strate- tests of nuclear weapons in 1998, the end of
gic relations. U.N. inspections in Iraq, and the terrorist attacks
Though many observers marveled at the ef- on 9/11 have turned weapons of mass destruc-
fectiveness of precision-guided air strikes in the tion (WMD) into a salient danger. In a report to
Persian Gulf War, advances in technology did not Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency iden-
stop. The information revolution of the 1990s tified nine states that were developing or seek-
continued to transform military capabilities. ing to acquire such weapons. According to the
Sometimes called the revolution in military af- Nuclear Policy Review, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North
fairs, it involved integrating sur- Korea, and Syria could be involved in a nuclear
commanders can use data veillance and reconnaissance contingency. Various nonstate actors and terror-
sensors, information processing, ist groups such as al Qaeda, which are reportedly
from myriad sensors tactical and operational commu- seeking NBC and radiological weapons, also are
to acquire a picture of the nications, and precision-guided depicted as posing a serious threat to the United
munitions. Today, commanders States. By contrast, the review does not charac-
battlespace in real time can use data from myriad sen- terize Russia as an immediate or potential con-
sors—generically known as the cern to national security.
global command and control system—to acquire Recent trends present a challenge. On one
a picture of the battlespace in real time, a capabil- hand, there is a strategic capability optimized for
ity that did not exist ten years ago. The Pentagon a danger that no longer exists and is considered
wants to use advances in command, control, the stumbling block in Russian-American rela-
communications, computers, and intelligence tions. On the other, failures in nonproliferation
(C4I) to integrate nuclear and conventional forces confront planners with relatively small-scale
so they can be responsive on short notice. threats that could become serious problems with
Concern has grown over the proliferation little warning. Although the Armed Forces may
of NBC weapons and related delivery systems. confront an enemy willing to use NBC weapons,
The conflict between Iran and Iraq and the Gulf
War highlighted the danger posed by long-range

10 JFQ / Winter 2002–03

 Wirtz and Russell

Destroying Pershing II
missiles in 1989.

DOD (Jose Lopez, Jr.)

the revolution in military affairs provides ways of framework. As the United States has repeatedly
employing conventional weapons for missions noted, the treaty stood in the way of missile de-
once reserved for nuclear forces. fense as well as more cooperative relations with
Moscow. The agreement signed by Presidents
The End of MAD George Bush and Vladimir Putin in May 2002 is
The Nuclear Posture Review and the Qua- part of this new framework. Though the treaty
drennial Defense Review indicate that mutual as- limits deployed nuclear warheads to a maximum
sured destruction is not an acceptable basis for a of 2,200 by 2012, it is more of a political docu-
strategic relationship. According to the former re- ment than a vehicle for arms control and strate-
view, the United States “will no longer plan, size, gic stability. The treaty reflects changes in force
or sustain its forces as though Russia presented structure discussed in the Nuclear Policy Review
merely a smaller version of the threat posed by and fulfilled Russian requirements for concrete
the Soviet Union.” In other words, because Russ- evidence of this new partnership.
ian nuclear arms are seen as a waning threat, de- In fact, bilateralism was helped by pragma-
terrence will no longer dominate nuclear doctrine tism. By declaring peace, Bush and Putin have un-
and targeting. dermined the strategic rationale for sustaining the
Although the current administration has not military, institutional, and diplomatic status quo.
articulated a clear plan to transform strategic rela- The United States made it difficult for Russia to as-
tions, policy changes are creating a new bilateral sume a Cold War approach because it is willing to
framework. Washington took the initiative by an- reciprocate. Putin found it possible to live with a
nouncing a shift in nuclear doctrine, negotiating limited ABM system in return for a U.S. nuclear ar-
strategic force reductions, and introducing confi- senal reduced to Russian levels, which are based
dence-building measures that were intended to not on doctrine but on a weak economy. The
reduce tension and foster relations. Viewed in American approach challenges traditional arms
this light, withdrawing from the Antiballistic Mis- control and disarmament policies. Many treaties
sile Treaty becomes a positive step because it de- may become obsolete as bilateral relations im-
livered a lethal shock to an outdated strategic prove. Cooperative efforts to foster peace, reduce
forces, and safeguard materials do not pose a dan-
ger to other nations and need not be codified by
treaties to ensure a stable world order.

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 11

■ NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The New Triad employed against targets able to withstand non-

The Nuclear Posture Review offers a pathway nuclear attack (for example, deep underground
toward a new strategic triad that is aided by en- bunkers or bio-weapons facilities).
hanced command and control and intelligence Advanced command, control, and intelli-
systems with offensive strike systems (nuclear and gence will integrate the triad, facilitating flexible
nonnuclear), defenses (active and passive), and a operations. The new strategic triad will rely on
revitalized infrastructure. It assumed that nuclear adaptive planning to meet emerging threats and
weapons are only one of contingencies. Emphasis on adaptive planning
advanced command, control, the capabilities that can differs from the traditional way of developing the
address threats from prolif- nuclear war plan—the single integrated opera-
and intelligence will integrate eration of NBC weapons tions plan—which was a deliberate process that
the triad, facilitating flexible and ballistic missiles. This often took months or even years to generate a fi-
triad represents a departure nite number of options for consideration by the
operations in strategic doctrine, with President as Commander in Chief.
deterrence, defense, and Administration officials suggest that the new
counterforce acknowledged as components. It can triad would allow reductions in operational nu-
be best supported by a new force structure, al- clear forces from current START I levels of approxi-
though the concepts and planning for this ad- mately 6,000 warheads for each country. The
vance remain undefined. Treaty of Moscow in May 2002 made a reality of
The new triad is intended to integrate capa- these levels when the signatories agreed to reduce
bilities (like missile defense), nuclear weapons, strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by
and nonnuclear strike forces into a seamless web 2012. Reductions in the U.S. arsenal will result
from retiring MX Peacekeeper ICBMs (which
began in 2002), removing four Trident submarines
from strategic duty, and eliminating the require-
ment that B–1 bombers have nuclear capabilities.
The administration will maintain a response force
(sometimes known as a reserve force) of warheads
that could be brought back into service. Planners
probably have not finalized the size of this force,
but in all likelihood it will number in the thou-
sands. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations
have maintained that it makes sense to count
only warheads that either are deployed or can be
available for use in days. By contrast, the response
force would become available only after an ex-
DOD (Helene C. Stikkel)

tended regeneration and redeployment, which

could take months or years.
The reduction in warheads will be accompa-
nied by the development of new capabilities. The
centerpiece will be missile defense, a multi-
Briefing Nuclear layered protection against accidental launches or
Posture Review. to assure allies and friends, dissuade potential en- relatively limited strikes. No longer constrained by
emies from mounting military challenges against treaty, the United States is building on work initi-
the United States, deter enemies, and fight and ated more than a decade ago. The current pro-
win wars when deterrence fails. The Nuclear gram includes boost-phase interceptors that attack
Posture Review notes that strike elements: ballistic missiles over enemy territory. There is
can provide greater flexibility in the design and con- special interest in the airborne laser, a speed-of-
duct of military campaigns to defeat opponents deci- light directed energy weapon, and research on sea,
sively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particu- air, and space-based boost phase systems to defeat
larly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict missiles in the highly visible and vulnerable initial
escalation. NPR emphasizes technology as a substi- stage of flight. The plan enhances the mid-course,
tute for nuclear forces that are withdrawn from serv- ground-based interceptor program with an ex-
ice. Global real-time command and control and recon- panded testbed. Additional support for the ad-
naissance capabilities will take on greater importance vanced Patriot missile will bolster terminal and
in the new strategic triad. Nuclear weapons could be point defense. This system is intended to protect
land forces against cruise and tactical ballistic mis-
sile attack. The Pentagon also appears interested
in a mobile tactical high-energy laser, which will

12 JFQ / Winter 2002–03

 Wirtz and Russell

305th Communication Squadron (Scott H. Spitzer)

Unloading weapon
from C–141.
provide ground forces with a directed energy warheads, deploying missile defenses, shifting to
weapon to counter rockets, cruise missiles, and ar- adaptive nuclear planning, and developing con-
tillery and mortar munitions. ventional precision-strike capabilities suggest a
The new triad highlights profound changes new era in strategic thinking and the relationship
in strategic doctrine. First, it makes clear that de- among nuclear weapons, deterrence, and war. The
terring an all-out nuclear war with Russia is no review identifies new targeting priorities for nu-
longer a feature of war plans. Policymakers be- clear weapons: hardened facilities for command
lieve that to be an extremely remote possibility. centers, underground facilities associated with
Second, the triad embodies an effort to increase NBC weapons, and mobile targets, such as NBC-
the credibility of strategic deterrent threats by in- armed missiles. It cites some 1,400 underground
creasing available options. The old triad was sites around the world that require targeting be-
intended to pose a massive response to nuclear cause conventional weapons cannot destroy them.
attack, while the reconfigured triad guarantees an Thus there is a need to develop an earth-penetrat-
appropriate way to respond to other forms of ag- ing capability to place these targets at risk.
gression, thereby bolstering deterrence. Third, the The review calls for greater yield flexibility
new concept sidesteps bureaucratic resistance to for both stockpiled weapons and warheads that
reconfiguring longstanding doctrine—the sanc- reduce collateral damage. By identifying new tar-
tity of the old triad and focus on assuring a mas- gets and missions for nuclear weapons, it would
sive response under any circumstances. This ap- appear that the United States must design and
proach paves the way for further reductions in build arms—a process that was made difficult by
U.S. strategic nuclear forces. the moratorium on testing. Given the unlikeli-
hood that the moratorium would be abandoned
Proliferation, Counterforce, and War under present circumstances, the way to over-
Although there is little doubt that the United come this basic inconsistency in the policies and
States wants to eliminate nuclear deterrence as the capabilities advocated by the review is unclear.
basis for a strategic relationship with Russia, it is
clear that the Nuclear Posture Review is not a blue-
print for disarmament. But reducing operational

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 13

■ NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Precision-guided weapons are clearly the pre-

Launching ICBM from
ferred option for preemptive attacks against Vandenberg Air Force
WMD infrastructure and delivery systems. Al- Base.
though it is difficult to justify employing nuclear
weapons in order to prevent their use by an
enemy, the arsenal provides escalation domi-
nance. U.S. nuclear superiority makes doing
nothing and being disarmed by a conventional
counterforce attack the only rational response
available to an enemy.
A range of nuclear options makes it more
likely that an enemy with a small WMD arsenal
will lose rather than employ NBC capabilities.
And using such weapons might generate a nu-
clear response by the United States, a perception
that reduces incentives for initial escalation. The-
ater and national missile de-
missile defenses backstop fenses backstop conventional
counterforce attacks by destroy-
conventional counterforce ing incoming warheads. This is

U.S. Air Force (Amanda M. Edwards)

attacks by destroying a form of nuclear warfighting
and troublingly is not merely
incoming warheads hypothetical. It has played out
repeatedly in the case of Iraq,
though many observers fail to pay attention to
preventive war in counterproliferation strategy.
The message for both state and nonstate ac-
tors seeking WMD is unambiguous—America ac-
cepts that it cannot prevent proliferation. In-
stead, it is preparing to target nuclear, biological, be overhauled to meet new targeting needs. This
and chemical arsenals with conventional and, if change will require reviewing nuclear programs,
necessary, nuclear forces. Preemptive attack has retiring old systems, and fielding new weapons.
not been ruled out. The President announced at Conversely, while the Nuclear Posture Review
West Point in June 2002 that U.S. security “will proposed greater reliance on conventional
require all Americans to be forward-looking and weapons to perform strategic missions, the process
resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when of operationalizing this concept is ill defined. In-
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend creased reliance on conventional munitions as a
our lives.” 2 substitute for nuclear weapons calls for a new tar-
geting methodology, which will require criteria for
Warfighting Issues targeting. Doctrine must be developed for substi-
While the Nuclear Posture Review makes in- tuting conventional weapons to strike targets once
teresting reading, its implementation falls on the covered by nuclear weapons. Moreover, varied
warfighter. Because of internal inconsistencies, conventional munitions must be designed, built,
some challenges may take years to resolve. For ex- and integrated into the force structure.
ample, there is a mismatch between force struc- Another targeting issue flows from the re-
ture and the new missions given to nuclear duction in nuclear force levels. Fewer warheads
weapons. The review proposes that the weapons translate into a reduced number of targets that
be used to hold at risk hardened underground can be struck by nuclear weapons. Redundancy in
bunkers containing WMD or command and con- coverage has played an important role in counter-
trol facilities. Yet there are no nuclear weapons in force strategy. But making serious reductions in
the arsenal that are optimized to meet this re- arsenals could force the United States to confront
quirement, although there are plans to modify nuclear scarcity: by definition counterforce could
the B–61 gravity bomb for earth penetration. And become primarily a mission for conventional
if enemies simply decide to dig deeper, the length weapons, while nuclear weapons are held in re-
of time that modified B–61s can hold this target serve for countervalue missions. The new threat
set at risk is uncertain. The force structure must environment, however, suggests that nuclear
weapons might be more in demand, not less—to
hold hardened underground facilities at risk.

14 JFQ / Winter 2002–03

 Wirtz and Russell

have to establish a command and control infra-

structure for the components of the new triad
and determine mechanisms for these command
relationships.

The Nuclear Posture Review represents a de-

parture in thinking about deterrence. First, it
abandons mutual assured destruction as the basis
of the Russian-American strategic relationship
and eliminates Russia as the benchmark for sizing
nuclear forces. Second, it seeks to substitute con-
ventional for nuclear capabilities as a strategic de-
terrent; the objective in the past was finding ways
to combine conventional and nuclear force struc-
tures to function in a mutually supportive way to
bolster conventional and nuclear deterrence.

U.S. Marine Corps (I.M. Gilbert)

Third, the integration of offense and defense to
bolster deterrence by denial is a departure, even if
mechanisms and organizations to integrate these
forces are still on the drawing board.
Despite the critics, the paradox of the review
is that while it appears to make nuclear use more
M93A1 NBC reconnais- likely, it reflects the practice of nonuse that
sance system. emerged after World War II. Factors other than ef-
Conventional counterforce, under such circum- ficiency or military utility shape policy on weak
stances, could be extremely demanding in terms states with NBC weapons. The United States
of force structure, doctrine, and operations. could have addressed proliferation and long-
Although assigning forces to particular tar- range delivery systems as a simple threat. It could
gets is challenging, there is a broader mismatch have stated that any use of WMD, conventional
between the nuclear force structure and the inter- strike, or unconventional attack would be met by
national environment. What are the benefits of a massive use of nuclear weapons. Instead, plan-
the D–5 SLBM or Minuteman III against al Qaeda ners are searching for options to deter and defeat
or other transnational/terrorist threats? Would WMD-armed enemies with far less force than an
the United States contemplate using the Minute- all-out nuclear attack.
man III against WMD sites? This imbalance in ex- The problems of implementing the Nuclear
plosive yield and targets to hold at risk is a major Posture Review and operationalizing concepts in
challenge that takes on greater urgency given that document will eventually reach warfighters.
emerging doctrine, which emphasizes either pre- This is a sobering challenge that will require
emptive strikes or war to check such threats. But decades to meet. But by destroying the paradigm
developing a new generation of nuclear weapons that informed nuclear strategy in the Cold War,
to match this threat will be difficult as long as the the review provides an opportunity to develop
United States honors a moratorium on testing. nuclear strategy for the 21st century. JFQ
There is also a mismatch between calls for a
new generation of nuclear weapons and the abil- NOTES
ity of the nuclear infrastructure to meet that re- 1 Excerpts from the classified version of the report
quirement. While the Nuclear Posture Review were published in The New York Times and Los Angeles
draws attention to the deterioration of the infra- Times. Most of the text is posted at http://globalsecurity.
structure, scientists who designed the weapons org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm. This cite is taken
are leaving the scene. The source of a new gener- from the executive summary released by the Depart-
ation of scientists to design weapons to respond ment of Defense. Other quotes come from the global se-
to future threats is unclear. And even if scientists curity Web site, although the authors have no way of
are found, it is uncertain how they will design, confirming their authenticity.
2 Remarks by the President at the U.S. Military Acad-
construct, and certify weapons, particularly low-
emy on June 1, 2002 (Washington: The White House,
yield and earth penetrating systems, without re-
June 1, 2002).
suming nuclear tests.
Another major issue facing nuclear planners
is the integration of offensive and defensive com-
ponents of the strategic deterrent. The Pentagon
is entering uncharted waters, and planners will

Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 15